VOL.

253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 483

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and

SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeals; An appellee in a civil case, who has

not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of
the lower court.—For failure to appeal the decision of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed,
by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an
appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower
court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may
deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the
decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the
court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by
the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on
other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying
the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other
affirmative reliefs.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Law; Action; Damages; To warrant the recovery of

damages, there must be a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff.—
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not
give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely
part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong.
Same; Same; Same; Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right, damage is the harm which results from the injury and
damages are the compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
—There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
Same; Same; Same; To maintain an action for injuries,
plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach
of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.—In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be
tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.
Same; Same; Same; The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong.—Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by
acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but
which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases,
the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The
law affords no remedy for
 485

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 485

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal

injury or wrong.
Same; Same; Same; In order that the law will give redress for
an act causing damage, that act must not only be hurtful, but also
wrongful.—In other words, in order that the law will give redress
for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in
many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or
loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury,
that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury,
the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
Civil Law; Article 21, Civil Code; Principle of Abuse of Right;
Requisites.—In the case at bar, although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right
provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; There is no cause of action for lawful acts
done by one person on his property although such acts incidentally
caused damage or loss to another.—A person has a right to the
natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually
applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action
for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or
an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is
damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property
is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case,
nobody can complain of having been injured, because the
inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere
consequence of community life.
Same; Same; Same; One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s
favor.—The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a
legal wrong

486

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

for which an action will lie, although the act may result in
damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though
the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action
reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Maria T.M. Leviste for petitioners.
     Roberto B. Arca for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of

respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115,
promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its
resolution dated July
1
8, 1994 denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant
of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa
against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before
the Regional
2
Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch
22 thereof.
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the
trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

_______________

1 Penned by Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, with Justices Vicente V.

Mendoza and Jesus M. Elbinias, concurring.
 2 Original Record, 1.

487

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 487

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff
Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was
substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment
erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon,
Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said
property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos
and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said
property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the
point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff’s property, the
row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and
Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and
then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of
defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit “D”).
As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff’s property, there
are two possible passageways. The first passageway is
approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t)
from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing
in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff
Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In
passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be
traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were
tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by
plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February,
1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when
plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had
been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the
first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence
and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed (Exhibit “1-Santoses and Custodios,
Exh. “D” for plaintiff, Exhs. “1-C,” “1-D” and “1-E”) And it was
then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the
area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she
constructed said fence because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the
tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also
mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of
her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were
drunk and would bang their doors

488

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
3
and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x. (Italics
in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)

On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial

court, with this dispositive part:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give

plaintiff permanent access—ingress and egress, to the
public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and
Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
4
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his

heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of
Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower
court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On
November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court with modification, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby

AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein
grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby
orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum
of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages,
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten
Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages.5
The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.

On July 8, 1994, the Court 6of Appeals denied petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then took the
present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether
or not the
_______________

3 Rollo, 28-29.
4 Ibid., 38.
5 Ibid., 31.
6 Ibid., 34.

489

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 489

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

grant of right of way to herein private respondents is

proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in
order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are
already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to
be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality
of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less
reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee
who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can
only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that
is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if
such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the
court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the
appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose
of reversing or modifying the judgment in the 7
appellee’s
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with
petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
dam-

_______________
 7 See Lumibao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64677,
September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 469; SMI Fish Industries, Inc., et al. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 96952-56,
September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 444; Heirs of Juan Oclarit, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96644, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 239.

490

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

ages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages

has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of
the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized
rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by
reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses
does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the8
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty.
9
These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the 10
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort

_______________
 8 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Sec. 4, 35-36.
9 Ibid., 13.
10 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 65, 595; see The Board of Liquidators vs.
Kalaw, et al., L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987.

491

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 491

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

liability merely
11
because the plaintiff suffered some pain
and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by
acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another
but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an 12
act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for
an act causing damage, that act must be not only 13 hurtful,
but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as
may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an 14injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated
the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can
be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
The acts should be willful;
15
and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence
not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The
law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing,

_______________

11 Plummer vs. Abbott Laboratories (DC RI), 568, F Supp. 920, CCH
Prod Liab Rep 9878.
 12 Ibid., 598.
13 Comstock vs. Wilson, 257 NY 231, 177 NE 421, 76 ALR 676;
Haldeman vs. Bruckhart, 45, 45 Pa 514.
14 U.S.-Premier Malt Roducts Co. vs. Kasser, 23 F. (2d) 98.
15 Jurado, D.P., Personal and Family Law, 1984 ed., 41.

492

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

16
without other limitations than those established by law. It
is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.”
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was
not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law
or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the
very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It
was only that decision which gave private respondents the
right to use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on
petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute
right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully
perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful
use of 17the said land by petitioners is damnum absque
injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a
general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts
done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoid-

_______________
 16 Jovellanos, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100728, June
18, 1992, 210 SCRA 126.
17 See Escano, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-47207, September 25,
1980, 100 SCRA 197; Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 5; Albenson Enterprises
Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 88694, January 11,
1993, 217 SCRA 16.

493

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 493

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

able loss to another,

18
as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as
in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured,
because the inconvenience arising from said use 19can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot
20
constitute a
legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act
may result in 21damage to another, for no legal right has
been invaded. One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means
adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts
can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting
from action reasonably
22
calculated to achieve a lawful end
by lawful means.
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing
premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

     Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the court a quo

reinstated.

Notes.—There is no hard and fast rule which can be

applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse
of

_______________
 18 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 15, 1007-1008.
19 Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. II (1987), 59, citing 8 Salvat 614.
20 Coyne vs. Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co., 72 533, 75 NW 748.
21 White vs. Kincaid, 149 NC 415, 63 SE 109; Fahn vs. Reichart, 8 Wis
255.
22 O’Keefee vs. Local 463, United Asso. P. & G. 277 NY 300, 14 NE 2d
77, 117 ALR 817.

494

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Flores vs. National Labor Relations Commission

rights may be invoked. (Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs.

Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16 [1993])
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud
or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. (Ibid.)

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