• The Holy See v Rosario, (December 17, 1994)

Badge: Lateral Treaty, Nonsuability of foreign State

Caption: THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U.ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.G.R. No. 101949. December 1, 1994.

Syllabus:
Public International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; Nonsuability; Courts and Practices; A state
or international agency requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that it is entitled to immunity.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the government sovereign or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity
Statehood; In 1929, through the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized the exclusive dominion
and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See.

Facts:
The Holy see acquired Lot 5-A as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for the use
of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.The squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.
The Holy see initially sold the land to Licup who gave an earnest money amounting to
100,000. Licup assigned his rights to the sale to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a
dispute arose as who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana) without giving prior notice to the
previous buyer.
On January 23, 1990, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land,
and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and
three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case
No. 90-183).
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint
— petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for
being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. On June
20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss
after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract
in question"

Issue:
WON THE HOLY SEE MAY INVOKE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS A BASIS
IN DISMISSING THE CASE FILED AGAINST THEM.

Ruling:
 YES, THE HOLY SEE MAY INVOKE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS A BASIS
IN DISMISSING THE CASE FILED AGAINST THEM.

• USA v Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)

Facts
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams
requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company complied with the requests.
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I.
Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest
Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein.
The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea
wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said
that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the
U.S. Navy. The company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because
"A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' . The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff
to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no
longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on bidding practices.

ISSUE:
WON THE USA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ENGINEERING COMMAND OF
THE US NAVY MAY INVOKE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS A BASIS IN
DISMISSING THE CASE FILED AGAINST THEM.

RULING :
 YES, THE USA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ENGINEERING COMMAND OF THE US
NAVY MAY INVOKE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AS A BASIS IN DISMISSING THE
CASE FILED AGAINST THEM.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them—between sovereign andgovernmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
states in western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts,
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

• Minucher v CA, GR No. 76609 (1990)

Badge: Diplomatic Note, Diplomatic Immunity, Torts
Caption: KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTHUR W. SCALZO, JR., respondents.G.R. No. 97765. September 24, 1992.*
Syllabus:

Diplomatic immunity from suit; Private respondent may be held liable for acts committed
beyond his official duties.

Facts:
On 3 August 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a
complaint for damages against private respondent Arthur Scalzo, Jr., an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice, of the United States of
America assigned to the American Embassy in Manila.
In the evening of 26 May 1986, private respondent came to petitioner's residence
and asked to be entrusted with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a floor price of
$24,000.00 each, for which he had a buyer.
The following day, private respondent returned to petitioner's residence, took the
carpets and gave the latter $24,000.00;after about an hour, private respondent returned,
claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts at the American
Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.00. He was given this amount.
It turned out, however, that private respondent had prepared an elaborate plan to
frame-up the petitioner and Abbas Torabian for alleged heroin trafficking; both were
falsely arrested by private respondent and some American and Filipino police officers,
and were taken to Camp Crame in their underwear.
Private respondent and his companions took petitioner's three (3) suitcases
containing various documents, his wallet containing money and the keys to his house and
car, as well as the $24,000.00 which private respondent had earlier delivered to him.
Petitioner and Torabian were handcuffed together for three (3) days and were not
given food and water; they were asked to confess to the possession of heroin or else they
would be jailed or even executed by Iranian terrorists.
Consequently, the two were charged for the violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They were,
however, acquitted by the said court on 8 January 1988. Private respondent testified for
the prosecution in the said case.
On 14 June 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the
ground that as per the copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the Embassy of the
United States of America, 13 dated 29 May 1990 and certified to be a true and faithful
copy of the original by one Donald K. Woodward, Vice-Consul of the United States of
America on 11 June 1990, 14 the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of the Philippines that:
". . . Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on October 14, 1985 until
his departure on August 10, 1988. . . .
. . . in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement officials and in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Mr. Scalzo investigated Mr.
Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a
prohibited drug. It is this investigation which has given rise to the plaintiff's complaint. The
Embassy takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from civil suit for
acts performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the case here, even though he has
departed the country."

Issue: WON THE CASE AGAINST SCALZO SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
HIS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Ruling:
NO THE CASE AGAINST SCALZO SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND
OF HIS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY.
The complaint for damages filed by the petitioner still cannot be
peremptorily dismissed.
Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the
private respondent committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and
outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described in the
complaint, he committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the
Special
Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded to, on the other hand,
private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose "from an alleged
tort." Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no
question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts
committed outside his official functions and duties.
In the decision acquitting the petitioner in the criminal case involving the
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint
for damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial
court gave full credit to petitioner's theory that he was a victim of a frame-up
instigated by the private respondent.
Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the complaint that indeed private
respondent could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his
official functions or duties.

• Rep. of Indonesia v Vinzon, GR 154705 (2003)

Badge:

Caption:
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN,
and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing
business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent.

Syllabus:

Immunity from Suit; Consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of

independence and equality of States; All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another

The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis.

The State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.

Facts:
In August 1995, petitioner Republic of Indonesia entered into a
Maintenance Agreement for its specified buildings in the embassy with
respondent James Vinzon as sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services.
The said Agreement was effective for four years and will renew itself
automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written
notice from the date of expiry. Before August 1999, respondent was informed
that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief
of Administration, petitioner Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim.
On August 31, 2000, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the said
agreement. Respondent claimed that the said termination was arbitrary and
unlawful. Thus, he filed a complaint against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 145.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss by alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia has sovereign immunity from suit and that Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim enjoy diplomatic immunity as defined
under Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Vinzon filed an opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon
the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement:

"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be

settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati
City, Philippines."

Vinzon likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister

Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for
tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.

The trial court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
likewise denied petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition in relation
thereto.
Issue:
WON THE contract FOR the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the
Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador
constitute Jure Imperii.
WON THE provision on the contract stating that any legal action arising out of the
agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a
specified court of the Philippines constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit

Ruling:
Yes, contract FOR the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the
Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador
constitute Jure Imperii.
The Court held that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis. In this case, there is no dispute that the establishment of a
diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.
 A sovereign state does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and
leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its
maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and
the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner
Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered
into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water
motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the
Indonesian ambassador.

No. THE provision on the contract stating that any legal action arising out of
the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a
specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign
immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily
inconsistent with sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the
sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity
by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to
include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign
immunity.
Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the
case, except to dismiss it.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and
unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no
such waiver in this case.

Badge: Rule of Law

Caption: [No. 14639. March 25, 1919.] ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO ET

AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN ET AL., respondents.

Syllabus:

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF

LAWS.—The Government of the Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The
court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not of men.
No official, however high, is above the law.
The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty
and to punish official transgressors.