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21
RESOLUTION NO. , Series of 2014

A RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE GRID MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
INTERPRETATION, IMPOSITION, AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE OUTAGE
CONTINGENCY (N-1) OPERATIONAL CRITERION
IN THE PHILIPPINE GRID CODE

WHEREAS, it is a declared policy of the state to ensure the

quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power in the country and promote transparency in a regime of free
and fair competition, with full public accountability to achieve greater
operational and economic efficiency, in order to protect the public
interests as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities
1
and other providers of electric power ;

WHEREAS, in furtherance of the afore-cited state declared

policies, the EPIRA, empowers the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) to promulgate and enforce a National Grid Code2, now, the
Philippine Grid Code (PGC), which establishes the set of rules,
requirements, procedures, and standards to ensure the safe, reliable,
secured and efficient operation, maintenance and development of the
high voltage backbone transmission system and its related facilities;

WHEREAS, in order to attain the grid reliability and security

objectives of the EPIRA, the Philippine power system must be
designed, planned, and upgraded so as to withstand a disturbance at
any given time, due to unexpected loss or failure of one component
or a single element thereof;

WHEREAS, for the Philippine grid to be reliable, secure, and

stable, it is incumbent upon the Transmission System Provider and
the System Operator to upgrade the system in such a way that it
meets and satisfies the (N-1) contingency criterion under the PGC.
The compliance of the SO with the (N-1) requirements should not
result to any disruption of power supply in the system;

1 Ct. Section 2 (b), (c), and (I) of Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or
EPIRA' ,
2 Id., Se~. 43 (b) thereof; ,I
ERC Resolution No. 21 Series of 2014
A Resolution Adopting the Grid Management Committee's Recommendations on the Interpretation, Imposition, and
Implementation of the Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Operational Criterion Provision in the Philippine Grid Code
Page 2 of 3

WHEREAS, the recent occurrences of generation redispatch

and/or curtailment coupled with line restrictions being implemented by
the System Operator as an application of its interpretation of the (N-1)
provision and the actions it (SO) undertakes during a single
contingency event and immediately thereafter, in anticipation of a
secondary contingency, have triggered and caused line congestions
resulting in higher generation rates, thus taking their toll on the
consumers in the form of higher electricity rates;

WHEREAS, the current PGC provisions on N-1 is open to

different interpretation on certain aspects such as the stipulations of a
Normal State and N-1 state, the predetermined credible N-1
contingencies to be considered, the minimum performance of the grid
during an N-1 contingency, and the specific adjustment tools and I or
corrective interventions that the SO could use, where appropriate, to
drive the system back to stability following a disturbance;

WHEREAS, the circumstances mentioned in the foregoing

paragraphs prompted the ERC to direct the GMC to issue a
recommendation as regards the proper interpretation and
implementation of the single outage contingency (N-1) criterion as
defined in the PGC;

WHEREAS, the GMC conducted series of meetings with the

System Operator to clarify the proper interpretation and
implementation of the (N-1) provision in the PGC in the context of
both planning and operational aspects and laid down the technical
criteria and parameters therefor for compliance in order to achieve
grid reliability and security;

WHEREAS, the GMC considered the inputs and comments

from the System Operator and other power industry stakeholders
affected by recent incidences of line congestions in the finalization of
its recommendations in the proper implementation of the single
outage contingency (N-1) criterion;

NOW THEREFORE, the ERC hereby RESOLVES to ADOPT

the Grid Management Committee's recommendations on the
interpretation, imposition, and implementation of the single outage
contingency (N-1) operational criterion provision in the PGC, hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the University of

the Philippines Law Center - Office of the National Administrative
Register (UPLC-ONAR), the Department of Energy (DOE), the
• I, •.•

ERC Resolution No. 21Series of 2014

A Resolution Adopting the Grid Management Committee's Recommendations on the Interpretation, Imposition, and
Implementation of the Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Operational Criterion Provision in the Philippine Grid Code
Page 3 of 3

Nati'onal Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), the National Grid

Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), the Philippine Electricity
Market Corporation (PEMC), and all the other parties concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Pasig City, November 24, 2014.

f) ILl ( ~
NAIDA <S .. CRUZ-DUCUT
Chairperson

G. /(/.:;L,.w ~f
G~c5RiA
A.

VICTO~I
.
C. YAP TARUC
Commls oner

(on leave)
JOSEFINA PATRICIA A. MAGPALE - ASIRIT
Commissioner

MPF/GMC2014-11-06ERCResoN-l
 ANNEX "A"

GMC'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION,

IMPOSITION, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE
OUTAGE CONTINGENCY (N-1) OPERATIONAL
CRITERION IN THE PHILIPPINE GRID CODE

I. Technical Criteria for the Transmission Network

The technical criteria for the transmission system planning are used
for the technical evaluation of the candidate projects for transmission
network reinforcements.

Technical criteria includes:

A) The 'N-1' criterion;

B) Voltage and Reactive Power criterion;
C) Short-circuit criterion; and
D) Stability criterion.

In system operations, the N-1 criterion is deterministic and it requires

that the system be able to tolerate the outage of anyone Component
without disruption and does not concern itself with the probability of
an outage. Even if an outage is highly unlikely, the criterion is still
generally applied because system failure due to a lost Component is
unacceptable. i

The cost of meeting this criterion is not questioned; the criterion is

generally considered fundamental as the need to balance generation
and load.ii

II. The Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Criterion Definition

The N-1 Criterion is a system security criterion where the Grid,

following a Credible N-1 Contingency (specified in II-A), is required
to be capable to operate within certain minimum performance
(specified in II-B) and tolerate the outage. The common
nomenclature widely used can be expressed as follows:

Page 1 of 5
 Depicts a system in base case or in its normal
steady-state operation, with all Components that
N-O
are expected to be in service are in fact in
service.
Depicts a Contingency where one Component of
N-1
the system is on outage.
Depicts a Contingency where a sequence of
N-1-1 events consisting of an initial outage of a
Component followed by a secondary loss.
Depicts a Contingency of multiple outages
N-2/N-k
happening at the same time.
Defined as the trip of an element that cannot be
1 predicted in advance. A scheduled outage is not
Contingency
at all a contingency. An "old" lasting contingency
is considered as a scheduled outage.

A. Credible N-1 Contingenciesiii

The N-1 Criterion is related to one of the following contingencies:

(A.1) Loss of a single-circuit transmission line, except those

radial circuits2 which connect loads using a single line or
cable;
(A.2) Loss of one circuit of a double-circuit transmission line;
(A.3) Loss of submarine cable;
(A.4) Loss of a single transformer, except those which connect
loads using a single radial transformer;
(A.5) Loss of a Generating Unit, whether grid-connected or
embedded; and
(A.6) Loss of compensating devices, Le.,
Capacitor/ReactorlSVC.

B. Rules for a Minimum Grid Performance Following a

Credible N-1 Contingency

The N-1 security criterion is satisfied if, after a single system

Component has failed under the circumstances specified in
Section II-A, the following Rules are observediv:

(B.1) No breach of the limiting values for network operation

variables (Le. operation voltage, frequency) that may

1 Union/or the Co-ordination o/Transmission 0/ Electricity (UCTE)Appendix 3 (2009), https:jjwww.entsoe.eujpublications

2 Transmission System Operation and Interconnection, Alvarado and Oren: For radial connections, the N-! criterion may be
impossible to satisfy; there is no way to prevent at least some load outage if the link fails. The only way to avoid an outage would be
to have instantly available local generation or not to connect loads radially.

Page 2 of 5
 endanger the security of the power system or lead to an
unacceptable strain on equipment, damage, destruction
or an inadmissible reduction in the life of equipment.

These variables should be satisfactory for consumers and

Generating Units;

Table 1: Volta e Scalev

Voltage N-O Condition N-1 Condition3

Level
Vmin L! Vmin
69 kV 0.95 0.9
138 kV 0.95 0.9
230 kV 0.95 0.9
500 kV 0.95 1.05 0.9 1.1
(Voltages are relative to the Nominal Voltage
of the system considered)

Table 2: Fre

N-O Condition N-1 Condition

Low Hi h Low Hi h
59.7 Hz 60.3 Hz 59.4 Hz 60.6 Hz

(8.2) No equipment/transmission line loading has exceeded

100 of its operational thermal limit capacity;
%

(8.3) Interruptions of electric power supply to End-Users are

avoided;
(8.4) Cascaded Tripping is avoided;
(8.5) There is no need to change or interrupt power transfers
and generation dispatch; and
(8.6) The loss of Generating Unit stability is avoided.

III. Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Criterion Applicability under

System Operations

The N-1 criterion is a minimum system security measure that the

System Operator should model the transmission network to
address redundancy avoiding potential power interruptions and/or
system failure.

3ESBNational Grid Transmission Planning Criteria, page 6: It is acceptable for the voltage to fall within the post contingency (N-l
condition) limits for the duration of an outage.

Page 3 of 5
In case an elementls of the existing network lacks N-1 security, a
temporary stopgap measure such as the System Integrity
Protection Scheme (SIPS) should be made available for the time
being that a permanent network improvement is pending.

A. System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) for System

Stopgap Security

Following a Credible N-1 Contingency where the Rules

specified under 11-(8.1-8.6) are compromised, a temporary
security measure such as the SIPS should be employed to
avoid subsistence and spreading of the disturbance.

The temporary employment of SIPS shall be coordinated with

the concerned Users and shall only be specific to parts of the
system determined to be exposed to a high degree of likelihood
for a secondary contingency (N-1-1) or a subsequent multiple
contingency (N-x) such that the risk of cascaded blackout is
avoided.

Information on all available SIPS shall be provided to the Grid

Management Committee at the same time it is coordinated with
the concerned Users.

B. System Operations Corrective Intervention Following a

Credible N-1 Contingency

If the SIPS cannot be otherwise employed, the System

Operator shall initiate below corrective interventions, where
appropriate, within 30 minutes from the inception of the event,
in order to stabilize the system:

(B.1) Generating Unit re-dispatching;

(B.2) Usage of voltage and/or power flow control on regulation
transformers;
(B.3) Network re-configuration; or
(B.4) Manual Load Dropping (MLD).

In the event of a Credible N-1 Contingency, the system or any

part thereof shall be operated up to its operational thermal limit
capacity, beyond which the System Operator shall intercept to
restore system stability. For the avoidance of doubt, manual
corrective interventions shall not be imposed to delimit the

Page 4 ofS
 power transfer capabilities of equipment/transmission lines in
anticipation of a secondary outage (N-1-1).

IV. Transmission Facilities Non-Compliant to Single Outage (N-1)

Criterion

As a general principle, for a transmission facility that is not

compliant with the 'N-1' criterion, a System Integrity Protection
Scheme (SIPS) should be employed only as a stopgap measure
and should not be preferred over an improved reinforcement of the
system.

END NOTES

I Transmission System Operation and Interconnection, Alvarado and Oren.

Ii -do-
Iii EIHP:Transmission Network Investment Criteria, Final Report, March 2007, Page 63.

Iv -do-
v California ISO Planning Standards, June 23, 2011, Page4.

GAOG/G MCAnnextoERCResoN-l

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