Countersea Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.4 15 September 2005
Countersea Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.4 15 September 2005
Countersea Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.4 15 September 2005
OPERATIONS
SUMMARY OF REVISIONS
This document is substantially revised. This revision’s overarching changes are
new chapter headings and sections, terminology progression to “air and space” from
“aerospace,” expanded discussion on planning and employment factors, operational
considerations when conducting countersea operations, and effects-based methodology
and the emphasis on operations vice capabilities or platforms.
Specific changes with this revision are the additions of the naval warfighter’s
perspective to enhance understanding the environment, doctrine, and operations of the
maritime forces on page 3; comparison between Air Force and Navy/Marine Corp
terminology, on page 7, included to ensure Air Force forces are aware of the difference
in terms or semantics; a terminology matrix added to simplify that awareness on page 9;
amphibious operations organization, command and control, and planning are also
included throughout the document.
BENTLEY B. RAYBURN
Major General, USAF
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii
CHAPTER ONE—Fundamentals Of Countersea Operations............................................... 1
General ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Definition of Countersea...................................................................................................... 1
The Maritime Environment...................................................................................................... 2
Air Force Service Functions and Responsibilities............................................................... 2
Countersea Operations ........................................................................................................... 3
Naval Warfighter Perspective................................................................................................. 3
Sea Control ........................................................................................................................... 4
Power Projection .................................................................................................................. 4
Naval Warfare Areas ........................................................................................................... 5
Air Force Countersea Operations.......................................................................................... 7
Terminology .............................................................................................................................. 7
CHAPTER TWO—Organization, Command, And Control (C2) ......................................... 12
General .................................................................................................................................... 12
Supporting Versus Supported Relationships ..................................................................... 12
Commander of Air Force Forces ......................................................................................... 13
The Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander................................................ 13
Sea-based JFACC ............................................................................................................. 14
General Considerations for Command and Control of Joint Air Operations............. 15
Maritime Command and Control.......................................................................................... 16
Maritime Airspace Sector Commander Coordination Responsibilities ...................... 17
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander ................................................................. 17
Navy Composite Warfare Commander............................................................................... 18
Amphibious Operations......................................................................................................... 19
Airspace Control During Amphibious Operations ......................................................... 19
C2 of Amphibious Operations .......................................................................................... 22
Afloat C2 .............................................................................................................................. 22
Ashore C2............................................................................................................................ 22
Close Air Support C2 During Amphibious Operations ................................................. 22
Close Air Support Agencies.............................................................................................. 23
Multinational Maritime Organization.................................................................................... 27
Coalition Command Structures ........................................................................................ 27
CHAPTER THREE—Countersea Planning And Employment ............................................ 28
General .................................................................................................................................... 28
Supported Commander Responsibilities for Planning...................................................... 28
Supporting Commander Responsibilities for Planning..................................................... 28
Apportionment and Allocation .............................................................................................. 29
Liaison Officers in the Joint Air and Space Operations Center ...................................... 29
iii
Planning Considerations ....................................................................................................... 30
Air Force Operations.............................................................................................................. 33
Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissannce................................................................ 33
Antisurface Ship Warfare (Surface Warfare) ................................................................. 34
Antisubmarine Warfare...................................................................................................... 36
Aerial Minelaying Operations ........................................................................................... 37
Counterair Operations ....................................................................................................... 38
Air-to-Air Refueling............................................................................................................. 39
Amphibious Operations ..................................................................................................... 39
Close Air Support ........................................................................................................... 42
Maritime Air Support ...................................................................................................... 42
Space Capability................................................................................................................. 43
Stability Operations............................................................................................................ 43
Homeland Security Operations ........................................................................................ 43
Other Air Force Countersea Operations......................................................................... 44
International Law .................................................................................................................... 44
CHAPTER FOUR—Countersea Training............................................................................... 46
General .................................................................................................................................... 46
Training Forces....................................................................................................................... 46
Summary ................................................................................................................................. 47
Suggested Readings ................................................................................................................. 48
Glossary....................................................................................................................................... 50
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
This document establishes doctrine guiding the employment of Air Force forces
in countersea operations. It describes the critical role Air Force functions such as
counterair and interdiction perform in the maritime environment. Additionally, it
articulates the conventional wisdom of Airmen and provides guidance for conducting
independent, joint, and multinational Air Force operations.
APPLICATION
This Air Force Doctrine Document applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve,
Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. The doctrine in this document is
authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents
of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen
should read it, discuss it, and practice it.
SCOPE
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COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC
A note on terminology
One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force
prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air
Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and
space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1)
While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will
normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are
different, and should be executed through different staffs.
vi
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS
Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which
Air Force doctrine documents (AFDDs) are built. Other information in the AFDDs
expands on or supports these statements.
Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime environment through the integrated
employment of air and space operations. (Page 1)
Countersea operations are equally relevant to shallow littoral “brown” water as well
as the deep “blue” water environment. (Page 2)
Air Force capabilities can extend the reach and increase the flexibility of naval
surface, subsurface, and aviation assets, playing a key role in controlling the
maritime environment. Air Force and Navy capabilities synergistically employed
enable the joint force to control the maritime environment. (Page 2)
Air Force forces can provide rapid and large area coverage and often engage the
adversary long before other forces arrive, transitioning swiftly from defensive to
offensive roles to dominate the maritime environment. (Page 7)
Regardless of the support relationship, Air Force forces are best utilized when
employed by a single air component commander exercising centralized control and
decentralized execution of joint air operations. (Page 12)
Until the requisite combat power exists ashore, the amphibious operation is quite
vulnerable. It is during this transition from afloat to ashore that Air Force forces can
vii
create needed effects and play a pivotal role in the success of the amphibious
operation. (Page 22)
Due to the inherently joint nature of most countersea operations, liaisons serve a
vital and active role in coordinating and planning effects in the maritime environment.
(Page 29)
Air Force members can be expected to be liaisons to the joint force maritime
component commander and/or the commander, Naval forces, during joint maritime
operations. These Air Force liaisons within the staff(s) of the respective maritime
commander offer tactical expertise, operational guidance, proper doctrinal
implementation and real-time coordination of operations with Air Force forces.
(Page 30)
Air Force forces provide rapid and large area surveillance and reconnaissance
coverage, often arriving on station prior to other forces. This coverage can be used
to observe the maritime environment in a homeland security role or overseas. (Page
33)
viii
CHAPTER ONE
—Transforming Defense:
National Security in the 21st Century
GENERAL
Our nation depends on assured access to the world's waterways and coastal
regions for global economic trade, as well as providing a stabilizing military presence
abroad. These waterways, along with our maritime fleet, provide the means for
projecting the bulk of our heavy forces forward, sustaining them over the long term, and
projecting force ashore from the seas. Where air and space power is the key to rapid
forward presence and striking power over long distances, sea power is key to extended
forward presence, power projection, mass force deployment, and sustainment through
sealift. Protecting sea lanes, littorals, and our maritime assets operating within them are
vital to US defense posture, economic prosperity, and national security.
Definition of Countersea
Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and
maintain a desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption,
delay, diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime environment.
The main objective of countersea operations is to secure and dominate the maritime
environment and prevent opponents from doing the same.
The countersea function entails Air Force operations in the maritime environment
to achieve, or aid in the achievement of, superiority in that medium. This function fulfills
Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for the use of Air Force forces to counter
adversary air, surface, and subsurface threats, ensuring the security of vital sea and
coastal areas, and enhancing the maritime scheme of maneuver. More importantly, it
demonstrates the teamwork required of Service forces working together in a joint
environment. Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime environment
through the integrated employment of air and space operations. The overarching
effect of countersea operations is maritime superiority—denial of this medium to the
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adversary while assuring access and freedom of maneuver for US and allied maritime
forces. To this end, Air Force operations can make significant contributions to maritime
components in support of joint force objectives.
From a military perspective, the maritime environment is not limited to the open
seas. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication [JP] 1-
02) defines the maritime environment as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands,
coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals.” “Littoral” refers to
the world’s coastal regions. Countersea operations are equally relevant to shallow
littoral “brown” water as well as the deep “blue” or open water environment.
DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major
Components, directs the Air Force to carry out certain functions for protecting and
enhancing maritime freedom of operations. The Air Force performs the following DOD
maritime functions through assigned missions designed to achieve effects for the JFC:
2
Primary function:
The Air Force is required to organize, train, equip, and provide forces and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) for joint amphibious, space, and airborne
operations.
Collateral functions:
Surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air and space
operations.
COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS
Countersea operations can be used in various ways to support the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) campaign. Conducted independently, or in conjunction with other
military operations, countersea operations may be used for the following purposes:
Support stability operations in order to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace
and stability, or support civil authorities in response to crises that require
controlling the surrounding maritime environment.
3
during crisis response as well as during a campaign. In peacetime, the carrier strike
group (CSG), expeditionary strike group (ESG), and surface action group (SAG)
possess the credible military might to project power reinforcing our nation’s ability to
influence events, deter potential aggressors, promote regional stability and provide the
requisite force to influence multinational collective security.
The ability to take the fight to the enemy at a time and place of our choosing is a
forte enjoyed by naval forces, and has always been one of our nation’s primary
objectives in war. Sea control and power projection in naval warfare are critical to
securing the maritime environment and delivering effects against the enemy. Airmen
can view sea control as a similar concept to air superiority. Additionally, the concept of
maritime power projection can be viewed in parallel with the Air Force’s functions of
counterland and strategic attack. Historically, maritime power projection focused on
creating effects in the maritime environment while Air Force counterland and strategic
attack operations typically were directed theater-wide. The maritime forces are now
creating effects throughout the joint operations area (JOA).
Sea Control
Sea control entails control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace affecting
naval operations in any littoral or open ocean. Naval forces achieve control of the sea
by destroying enemy forces, deterring enemy actions, disabling or disrupting enemy
command and control, or seizing critical littoral areas and/or chokepoints. Control of the
sea ensures operating areas and SLOCs remain open and protected, but it does not
imply absolute control over all the seas at all times. Rather, control of the sea is
required in specific regions for particular periods of time, to allow unencumbered
maritime operations (Naval Doctrine Publication [NDP] 1, Naval Warfare).
Power Projection
Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. It means applying high-intensity,
precise, offensive power at a chosen time and place to create the desired effects and
achieve JFC objectives. Naval commanders are provided with a full range of power
projection options that include employment of long range cruise missiles, Marines
conducting high-speed maneuvers across the shore (and inland) aided by naval surface
fire support, and a great variety of weapons released from naval strike aircraft (NDP-1,
Naval Warfare).
At the end of the Cold War, the emphasis of maritime warfare changed from
"blue water" operations against enemy navies to "brown water" force projection ashore.
The naval perspective similarly changed. To this end, Navy and Marine Corps
capabilities and operations are currently used increasingly in combination with
Air Force capabilities and operations to create effects inland.
In contrast, the growing naval threats in the 21st century, and the possibility of
entering into combat with a near-peer adversary, have forced the Navy to readdress its
4
capabilities in the blue water environment. In order to employ in this fashion, Air Force
forces should be familiar with and understand the maritime warfare areas and three-
dimensional battlespace from which maritime forces develop their operations.
Strike Warfare (STW). STW consists of carrier-based strike aircraft, the use of
missiles such as the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), and naval surface
artillery to create effects ashore. STW can produce strategic, operational, and
tactical effects. Integration of TLAM with strike aircraft in the same attack
requires close coordination between the joint force air and space component
commander (JFACC) and the joint force maritime component commander
(JFMCC) (specifically through the air and space operations center [AOC]
Tomahawk strike coordinator) and possibly the joint force land component
commander (JFLCC) as well to ensure target and airspace deconfliction. The
Air Force refers to these operations as “counterland,” “counterair,” or “strategic
attack” depending on intended effects. Close air support (CAS) is part of STW.
Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W achieves effects in the realm of
command and control. It integrates operations security, military deception,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction and is
driven by intelligence. Its purpose is to deny or influence information used for
5
C2. This area also includes protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such
actions. C2W is the offensive and defensive application of information
operations. Naval C2W involves the direction and control of aircraft, TLAM,
naval surface fire support (NSFS), and special operations forces (SOF) targeting
(directing units and localization), counter-targeting, reconnaissance,
surveillance, counter-surveillance, C2 attack, and C2 protection. The Air Force
conducts similar “C2W type” operations, depending on the desired level of
effects and objectives through functions such as strategic attack; counterland,
counterair, countersea, counterspace operations; information operations; and
command and control operations.
Air Defense (AD). AD is the protection of all friendly forces in the assigned area
of operations (AO) against hostile air platforms and weapons, i.e., theater
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft both manned and unmanned.
6
AIR FORCE COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS
US military airpower is particularly suited to dominating the maritime
environment by virtue of its inherent offensive character, precision, speed, range,
and flexibility. Long ago, maritime forces realized the power and flexibility of aircraft
carrier operations over battleship operations and the distinctive advantage of using
airpower to dominate the maritime environment. Subsequently, Navy and Marine
aviation further developed by fielding a formidable array of carrier-based air capability
enabling the maritime forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical effects
through airpower. Today, Air Force capabilities protect and complement maritime
operations. Air Force forces, by design, can augment naval forces by providing
additional protection; extended reach; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR); and strike capability with air, both manned and unmanned, and space platforms.
Due to their inherent flexibility and versatility, Air Force forces can provide
rapid and large area coverage and often engage the adversary long before other
forces arrive, transitioning swiftly from defensive to offensive roles to dominate
the maritime environment. In certain situations Navy and Marine airpower alone is
insufficient, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are well suited to provide large littoral or
open ocean area surveillance and reconnaissance over long time periods that would
normally require several aircraft and air-refueling resources to accomplish. .Air Force
forces will likely be called upon to counter adversary maritime threats whether those
threats originate from land, the sea, or from the air. Air Force forces should be
prepared to conduct warfare in the maritime environment independently or together with
Navy and Marine aviation.
Air Force countersea operations use Air Force strengths in traditional air
interdiction, close air support, and counterair missions to accomplish effects in the
maritime environment. From a tactical perspective, these traditional missions can be
quite different in the maritime environment than missions conducted over land.
Countersea operations require familiarity with naval air warfare, terminology, and
command and control. This familiarity will be key in successful countersea operations in
the maritime environment, and is one reason why joint training is vital.
TERMINOLOGY
Air Force personnel operating in the maritime environment will likely do so in
conjunction with maritime forces. Understanding Navy and Marine Corps terminology
will contribute greatly to clear communication while minimizing confusion during
operations. The following discusses Navy/Marine Corps terms used for comparable Air
Force functions, missions, or capabilities. For more information regarding Naval or
Marine Doctrine, see, Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-03.4 (Rev
A), Naval Strike and Air Warfare and Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0,
Marine Corps Operations.
7
Air Warfare vs. Counterair
Air warfare is a term used by Navy forces to indicate the action required to
destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. The Marine
Corps term, anti-air warfare, uses same definition (see below). It includes use of
fighters, bombers, ship antiaircraft guns, ship surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles,
cruise missiles launched from ships or submarines, as well as electronic attack to
destroy, disrupt, delay, or deceive the air or missile threat before or after it is launched.
It also includes measures taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action using cover,
concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility.
Naval and Marine aviators label and define operations such as offensive
counterair (OCA), defensive counterair (DCA), and suppression of enemy air defenses
(SEAD) in line with Air Force and joint terminology. What is different is the Navy and
Marine Corps, outside of the aviation community, identify all or partial employment in
this operational function as either “air defense” or “anti-air warfare.” Thus, doctrinally
the terms “air defense/anti-air warfare” and elements of “counterair” are similar. Air
Force doctrine and joint doctrine identify this function solely as counterair.
Further confusion for Air Force forces could come from the Marine Corps
definition of anti-air warfare (AAW) used to indicate that action required to destroy or
reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. This definition is more
in line with Air Force operational function of counterair (and the Navy operational
function of air warfare). The Marine Corps breaks down AAW to offensive AAW
(OAAW) and air defense (AD), which parallels the OCA and DCA elements of counterair
respectively.
8
Maritime Air Support (MAS) and Dynamic Targeting
Maritime air support or MAS is a concept that adapts the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) of CAS against a dynamic target in the littoral or open ocean
environment not in close proximity to friendly forces. The Navy and Marine Corps don’t
think of MAS as a tactic, but more of a standardized method of providing targeting
information through a maritime air controller (MAC). MAS is defined as those
operations conducted against enemy forces and their equipment to directly assist in the
attainment of the surface force objectives by the destruction of enemy resources or the
isolation of his military force.
Any available and suitably loaded aircraft may conduct MAS in order to provide a
rapid response. A MAC is responsible for the coordination, tactical employment, and
safety of on-scene action platforms. MAC duties are similar to those of a forward air
controller (FAC) in CAS. The MAC simply adapts CAS procedures to control aircraft or
ship-coordinated fires to achieve mission objectives against a dynamic target. As MAS
is not conducted with friendly forces in close proximity, there is no requirement for
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces.
Detailed integration is simply used as needed to enhance mission success.
Battlespace dominance can be easily mistaken with the Air Force term of
battlespace control which has a somewhat different meaning. Battlespace control
means exercising the degree of control necessary in all domains (land, sea, air, and
space in their physical and informational domains) to employ, maneuver, and engage
forces while denying the same capability to the adversary. Battlespace control includes
a number of active measures such as ensuring air, space, and maritime superiority.
Furthermore, information superiority and control of the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum also play a critical role in battlespace control.
9
Figure 1.1 is a terminology matrix to help Air Force forces understand
terminology of functions, operations, or missions, and how they relate to their maritime
force counterparts. These terms are NOT synonymous, but are similar and aid in
discussion, planning, and execution of countersea operations.
TERMINOLOGY
Air Force Navy/USMC Joint DOD 5100.1
Counterair Air Warfare/Anti-Air Counterair Anti-Air Warfare
Warfare
10
BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA (14 MARCH 1943)
11
CHAPTER TWO
GENERAL
An example would be the JFACC providing air and space support to the JFMCC
in the planning and execution of an amphibious operation. Supporting the landing force
12
can range from aircraft conducting CAS to an increase in communication satellite
priority and utilization. The JFMCC would generally provide requirements in terms of
the effects desired to meet his objectives, and possibly the specific maritime targets or
target sets. The JFACC should determine how best to achieve those effects to meet
JFMCC objectives and recommend the necessary apportionment of forces to the JFC.
Employing those apportioned forces, the JFACC can provide the optimum support to
JFMCC objectives.
13
A single air commander should command and control all joint air assets. The JFC
normally designates a JFACC and apportions joint air assets for the JFACC to control.
The component commander with the preponderance of air forces and the capability to
control and direct joint air and space operations should be designated the JFACC.
Centralized control and decentralized execution serve to focus forces on theater
objectives and provide commanders flexibility for employment. The JFACC will make
apportionment recommendations to the JFC. Apportionment can change as the
campaign progresses and/or as the operational situation changes. The JFACC will
allocate the JFC’s apportioned air power to best affect the JFC’s intent and priorities.
Even though the JFACC and COMAFFOR will normally be the same individual,
the staffs are separate and have different functions. Furthermore, JFACC staffing
requires augmentation within the AOC from relevant Service components and coalition
partners to ensure adequate joint and multinational representation. It is important
during countersea operations that the naval liaison officer (NALO) and/or Marine liaison
officer (MARLO) assist the JFACC in having a clear understanding of the JFMCC or
commander, Naval forces (COMNAVFOR), desired and prioritized effects.
The other Services have developed their air arms with different doctrinal and
operating constructs in mind. Maritime forces have allowed for organic asset
scheduling, command, and control utilizing their own assets for missions separate from
the JFACC’s control. For example, the Marine Corps expects that Marine aviation
assets will be used organically within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), during
both amphibious operations and subsequent land operations. COMNAVFOR may have
other mission priorities, such as USW or AW, constraining asset availability to the
JFACC. Similar concerns also apply to the aviation arms of our allies. These limitations
of air assets by their respective entities will normally be limited in time and scope to
specific missions during certain phases of operations. The JFACC must account for
these dynamics when developing the joint air operations plan and realize that all aircraft
flying within the AOR may not be available for tasking.
Sea-based JFACC
In operations where no shore-based AOC facility can initially be accommodated,
the preponderance of air capability coordination may be located afloat on a US Navy
command and control ship. This scenario is most likely during the initial stages of a
campaign, in maritime forced entry operations or prior to shore-based AOC
arrival/completion.
The sea-based JFACC positions are jointly manned by officers and enlisted
personnel from the other Services who may fill key JFACC staff positions while aboard
the command ship. These ships have the ability to host several hundred augmentees
and have sufficient connectivity to meet requisite command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I) requirements for initial operations until the JFACC is
transitioned ashore.
14
In this arrangement, Air Force component and joint air component functions and
responsibilities remain distinct; both are essential to successful joint air operations. The
COMAFFOR will maintain OPCON of Air Force forces executed through an A–staff.
With another Service designated as JFACC, the COMAFFOR will provide Air Force
forces TACON to the JFACC as directed by the JFC. In addition, the COMAFFOR will
coordinate with the JFACC through a liaison officer (LNO) teams and fill designated
billets within the JFACC staff and joint AOC (JAOC).
Planned Transition. The JFACC should develop a plan for transition of JFACC
duties to another component or location. Planned JFACC transitions are possible
as a function of buildup or scale down of joint force operations. During transition
of JFACC responsibilities, the component passing responsibilities should
continue monitoring joint air planning, tasking, and control circuits, and remain
ready to reassume JFACC responsibilities until the gaining component has
achieved full operational capability.
Transition Events. The following events may cause the JFACC responsibilities
to shift:
15
(a) Coordination requirements related to ATO planning and execution exceeds
the component capability.
(a) Continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction for joint
air operations must be the primary objective of any JFACC transition.
(c) Specific procedures for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned
shifts of JFACC should be published in the joint air operations plan (JAOP).
16
integration, unity of effort and minimal interference along adjacent boundaries, the
commander responsible for the maritime airspace sector should coordinate with the
ACA on the items from JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.
Procedures for assisting and coordinating with airspace control elements that
respond to adjacent or supporting component commander.
Where no sector control authority is designated by the ACA and where joint
operations composed of adjacent maritime and land environments exist, specific control
and defensive measures may be a composite of those measures normally employed in
each environment. The JFC for such operations needs to ensure detailed coordination
of control and defensive measures with the affected air, land, and maritime
commanders. The exchange of liaison personnel at the joint force level will facilitate
coordination to ensure:
These coordination items should be clearly stated in the airspace control plan
(ACP) and daily special instructions (SPINS) as required.
17
The JFMCC is also responsible for advising the JFC on the proper employment
of maritime forces, and in some situations, may plan and direct limited Air Force support
operations in coordination with the COMAFFOR. For instance, a communications
support unit operating in the maritime environment may fall under the guidance of the
JFMCC.
Naval units are deployed in task group organizations that can be tailored to the
intended employment of the force. The commander of each task group is responsible
for all aspects of operations and for carrying out the missions assigned by the JFC.
(The force is organized according to the composite warfare commander [CWC]
doctrine). CWC doctrine represents the Navy’s implementation of centralized control
and decentralized execution. This type of planning, control, and execution allows
subordinates flexibility and initiative in executing the commander’s intent by telling them
how their respective warfare areas contribute to overall mission success without
specifically telling them how their tasks are to be accomplished. Naval doctrine makes
decentralized execution of battlespace dominance and power projection tasks possible
through subordinate warfare commanders who are focused on air (air defense
commander or ADC), strike (strike warfare commander or STWC), sea (sea combat
commander or SCC), surface information (information warfare commander or IWC)
environments. Standard procedures for the CWC concept are contained in NWP 3–
56.1, JFACC Organization And Processes. Air Force forces should view this
organizational construct as similar to how the Air Force organizes an AETF.
18
Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating land-based air operations with
maritime air and sea operations are challenging, but necessary. In a joint context,
maritime operations are distributed operations that stress communications capabilities.
The JFACC staff, as well as land-based air units, should establish communication
channels and points of contact well in advance of integrated joint air operations. For
example, normal Air Force mission planning timelines may not be adequate for
operations with strike warfare crew mission planning on an aircraft carrier.
The criteria for either joint force or Service component application are determined
by the overall effectiveness and availability of appropriate forces for the task at hand. In
most instances joint operations will dominate a campaign; however, in selected
instances, this should not preclude the effectiveness, C2, and economy of force
considerations of single Service operations.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
With increased maritime operations in the vicinity of the shoreline (the littoral), Air
Force forces conducting countersea operations should be prepared to be part of
amphibious operations. Airmen need to understand that amphibious operations are
very intensive and complex in planning, C2, and execution. Operations in the
amphibious objective area (AOA) are particularly risky due to the high density and close
proximity of friendly forces attempting to achieve initial lodgment, with their variety of
supporting fires. Landing forces will generally be supported by ship artillery, land-based
artillery, organic Navy and Marine airpower, and Air Force airpower, all using the same
airspace. The risk of fratricide is high in this environment.
19
Minimum risk routes into and out of the HIDACZ (and to the target area.).
Procedures that offer expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the
HIDACZ while providing aircraft deconfliction as well as awareness to surface
units.
At a minimum, the HIDACZ should cover the amphibious task force sea echelon
areas and extend inland to the landing force’s (LF’s) fire support coordination
line. Additionally, the HIDACZ should be large enough to accommodate the flow
of fixed-wing aircraft into and out of the amphibious airspace.
20
Figure 2.1. Airspace Control in Amphibious Operations (from JP 3-52
Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone)
When an amphibious objective area (AOA) is established, the items in Figure 2.1
(see JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations) need to be considered and
implemented.
21
C2 OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
Afloat C2
While the preponderance of forces are sea-based, airspace control in the AOA
will be performed by the Navy tactical air control center (TACC). The TACC role is to
provide air planning, direction, and control over all air efforts within the airspace sector
until such time as a land-based control center is established. Within the TACC, the
Navy will produce airspace control measures for incorporation into the airspace control
plan (ACP) and ATO special instructions (ATO SPINS). The TACC is usually collocated
with the supporting arms coordination center (SACC). The SACC works closely with the
Navy TACC to integrate both helicopter and fixed wing air operations with naval surface
fire support (NSFS), land based artillery, and any other supporting arms. The SACC is
the naval equivalent of the Marine Corps fire support coordination center (FSCC). The
Marine Corps establishes a tactical air direction center (TADC) on initial build-up ashore
to effect air operations through the Navy TACC.
Ashore C2
Once sufficient combat power is massed ashore, C2 of the AOA is passed to
CLF. This transition requires extensive planning and coordination in execution. When
established ashore, the Marine Corps’s TADC becomes the tactical air command center
(TACC) and the afloat Navy TACC becomes a TADC supporting the Marine Corps
TACC. Also, the Marine Corps TACC works in conjunction with the Marine Corps FSCC
to integrate the different arms (as the SACC performed afloat).
22
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps air control systems are capable of
independent operations. However, in the conduct of an amphibious operation, elements
of both systems are used to different degrees from the beginning of the operation until
the C2 of aircraft and missiles are phased ashore.
Under the CATF, the Navy TACC, typically onboard the amphibious flagship will
normally be established as the agency responsible for controlling all air operations
within the allocated airspace regardless of mission or origin, to include supporting arms.
As the amphibious operation proceeds, C2 of aviation operations is phased ashore as
Marine air command and control systems (MACCS) agencies are established on the
ground. Air C2 functions are traditionally sequenced ashore in five phases:
(1) Phase one is characterized by the arrival of various “supporting arms controllers”
ashore; namely the tactical air control party (TACP), forward observers, air support
liaison teams, and naval surface fire spot teams.
(2) In phase two, the Marine direct air support center (DASC) is normally the first
principal air control agency ashore during amphibious operations. When control is
afloat, the Navy TACC supervises DASC operations.
(3) The movement of the Marine TADC ashore, although not directly related to CAS,
is the principal event in phase three.
(4) In phase four, the senior organization of the Marine air control group (MACG) is
established ashore and functions as the Marine TADC under control of the Navy TACC.
23
Figure 2.2. Component Air Command and Control Agencies for Close Air Support
(from JP 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support)
24
Figure 2.3. Army/Air Force Close Air Support Connectivity (from JP 3-09.3 Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support)
25
Figure 2.4. Navy/Marine Corps Close Air Support Connectivity (from JP 3-09.3
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support)
26
MULTINATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
Coalition Command Structures
Coalition command structures are usually regulated by agreements and reflect
the composition of the participating nations. The selection of the overall commander
may be based on the preponderance of a nation’s forces, a rotational basis, expertise,
or other considerations. There are three basic coalition command structures—parallel,
lead nation, or a combination of the two.
Within a parallel command, each nation retains control of its forces. Though Air
Force forces will be operating under standardized joint guidance, they will probably be
participating in maritime operations with other nations using different operating
procedures. Careful coordination of multinational maritime operations is necessary to
preclude conflicting operations.
Under a lead nation command structure, the nation that supplies the
preponderance of forces generally provides the overall commander of forces. In a
combination structure, parallel and lead nation arrangements coexist. Regardless of the
structure, it is imperative that US personnel understand the procedures of other nations
conducting operations in the maritime environment.
27
CHAPTER THREE
GENERAL
Countersea planning and employment of Air Force forces with maritime forces
will require close coordination between maritime component planners and AOC and unit
planners. Ironing out the differences in expectations through liaison officers (LNOs) will
reduce confusion and distraction while providing synergy, unity of effort, and effective
air-sea integration. Employment in the maritime environment is enhanced greatly
through integrated service collaboration, collective planning effort, and synchronized
coordination in execution.
28
APPORTIONMENT AND ALLOCATION
JFC priorities and objectives will determine the operational effects and weight of
effort required. The JFACC, as the senior Airman, should determine the utilization of air
assets to ensure proper balance, economy of force, and priority. This is particularly
important to countersea operations where maritime and Air Force airpower need to be
combined efficiently.
Allocation: The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers
of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task.
Naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Marine liaison officer (MARLO)
and special operations liaison element (SOLE) provide the necessary face-to-face
contact between Navy, Marine, and Special Operations planners and the JFACC or
COMAFFOR and the respective planning staff. Direct communication between these
individuals will help ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort, reducing friction
between Services. The Navy, Marine, and special operations liaison officers
participating in the AOC planning process represent their respective component
commanders, and are not assigned or attached to the COMAFFOR or JFACC staff.
The NALE, MARLO, and SOLE provide the JFACC or COMAFFOR with timely
information on non-familiar forces, assets, and planning opportunities to further the
collective coordination and integration between components/Services. Due to the
inherently joint nature of most countersea operations, liaisons serve a vital and
active role in coordinating and planning effects in the maritime environment.
One liaison element offers coordination between the JFACC and other
component or Service commanders. The air component coordination element (ACCE)
29
director is the JFACC's primary operational-level conduit to the supported/supporting
component. The mission of the ACCE is to enable the director to personally and
effectively represent the JFACC to his counterpart component commander. The ACCE
works to ensure the director has all requisite knowledge, understanding, and
background information to facilitate this mission. The ACCE also can provide
component-to-command level presence in the forward headquarters. It provides
operational level assessment and coordination of JFACC planning and execution to
ensure integration with the operations plan and operational intent to meet JFC
guidance.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Planning for operations in the maritime environment presents many challenges.
The following characteristics, conditions, and challenges found in the maritime
environment should be considered in the planning process:
The JFACC, land or sea-based, is normally both the AADC, ACA, and
space coordinating authority (SCA) responsible for overall defense of the
joint operations area (JOA) and integrating all component requirements for
space support.
30
The JFACC is normally tasked to achieve functional, not regional,
objectives. Whereas land and naval commanders are normally given
areas of operations (AO), the JFC normally tasks the JFACC with theater-
wide responsibilities such as interdiction or strategic attack. Per joint
doctrine, areas of operation do not apply to the joint air component.
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and air refueling are typically
operations with the greatest demand. Consider all LIMFACs when
conducting strike planning.
Air Refueling Operations. Air Force assets operating near or in the vicinity of
an aircraft carrier require familiarity with flight deck operations to facilitate
effective air refueling operations with Navy air assets. Air refueling coordination
and integration requires constant management by planners, and details need to
be stated in ATO SPINS.
Organic maritime aircraft operating at lower altitudes (below 10,000 ft) can
be a risk factor in the maritime operating environment
31
Desired effects. Once desired effects are defined, the concept of operations
(CONOPS) and master air attack plan (MAAP) optimize assets and munitions
based on the maneuverability, size, shape, and dimensions of surface, undersea,
and other potential maritime targets.
Integration with maritime forces. Many variables not encountered in typical Air
Force training environments are essential to the success of planning integrated
operations with maritime forces. Integration during the planning process should
consider and determine issues such as:
Joint packaging.
Areas of responsibility.
Dynamic targeting.
Surface attacks.
EW support.
32
sufficient air power assets to offset the loss of capability and desired effects due
to environmental factors.
In the maritime environment, control must be achieved in the air, on the surface,
and under the surface as part of battlespace dominance. Air Force forces help enable
control of air and surface maritime areas through surveillance and reconnaissance
coverage and their significant abilities to collect data. Air Force forces provide rapid
and large area surveillance and reconnaissance coverage, often arriving on
station prior to other forces. This coverage can be used to observe the maritime
environment in a homeland security role or overseas.
Planning and employing this capacity could occur as a single Service or jointly.
Operations may involve interfacing with multinational forces, Navy forces, the Coast
Guard, or other agencies responsible for homeland security. Preparation and execution
of ISR should include coordination through LNOs working in the AOC or with other
agencies.
Some of the attributes Air Force air and space assets may offer in surveillance
and reconnaissance of the maritime environment are:
33
Ability to loiter with or without air refueling depending on platform.
Planning for ISR operations should address the objectives of area and directed
surveillance/reconnaissance, classification of contacts, prioritization of contacts, and
rules of engagement relating to contact location, type, and overflight. LNOs may be a
valuable source of information regarding surveillance/reconnaissance operations and
associated supported commander’s intent. Awareness of international laws regarding
vessel type and location, as well as threat capabilities, help avoid unnecessary
escalation of a surveillance/reconnaissance situation.
34
Air Interdiction Demonstration In The Maritime Environment
1921 2004
US Army Air Service MB-2 bombing of US Air Force B-52 using AMSTE JDAM
German capital ship Ostfriesland creating effects on ex-USS Schenectady
Analogous of the transformation from black and white to color photos, air
interdiction in the maritime environment has progressed since 1921 when the first
employment (83 years ago) of an aircraft against a ship proved to be, yet another
effective use of air power. In November of 2004 the Air Force conducted Resultant
Fury, a two-phased demonstration featuring B-52 bombers and F-15E fighters
meeting, engaging, and sinking multiple moving maritime targets. This is the first time
Air Force aircraft have used the [joint direct attack munition] JDAM to sink a moving
vessel. “The ability for airpower to rapidly respond and sink naval vessels is crucial in
our theater,” said Maj. Gen. David Deptula, Director of [Pacific Air Forces] PACAF air
and space operations. “We can successfully engage and destroy multiple ships in all
weather, day or night.”
Though maritime interdiction itself is not new, the Air Force has not practiced it a
lot since before Desert Storm. However, the level of command and control and the
ability to use the technology in the Global War on Terrorism is new. “We can use this
technology to sink ships used by enemy combatants, terrorists, or those used for
piracy,” said Maj. Mike Eliason, Resultant Fury demonstration director and Chief of
PACAF weapons and tactics.
Through real-time, all-weather technology, information was fed from intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to the Pacific air and space operations
center, enabling command and control elements near real-time ability to track multiple
moving sea targets and feed that information to airborne bomber pilots, allowing them
to quickly engage and destroy the vessels.
–PACAF Public Affairs
NOTE: While Resultant Fury was designed strictly as a demonstration, and as such
does not reflect current operational capabilities, it, like Brigadier General “Billy"
Mitchell’s demonstration in 1921, dramatically highlighted the potential effectiveness
of airpower in the maritime environment.
35
ATTACK ON THE HMS SHEFFIELD
Antisubmarine Warfare
Air Force forces successfully performed ASW during WW II. Currently, Air Force
assets could perform ASW in an ISR and interdiction role by monitoring and, if needed,
attacking enemy submarines under way or in port, as well as the port itself, or locations
used for refueling or supply. Additionally, currently fielded Air Force assets have
sensors and weapons required to detect and engage diesel submarines, in support of
the JFMCC’s undersea warfare efforts. However, extensive planning and training would
be required for Air Force forces to effectively attack deployed, submerged submarines.
36
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
37
EFFECTS OF MINES
Counterair Operations
Air Force doctrine and joint doctrine identify the term counterair as the action
required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat.
“Counterair” and the US Navy/US Marine Corps term, “air warfare” (AW), are virtually
synonymous. The Navy employs an air defense commander (ADC) as part of its
composite warfare commander (CWC) structure to enable air and ship platforms to
engage the enemy in much the same way Air Force assets perform counterair.
Air Force forces may perform DCA to thwart enemy air and missile attacks
against maritime forces. Maritime aviation protects the carrier/expeditionary strike group
through the action of AW. Surface combatants and aircraft within the strike group to
protect them from any air threat much the same as DCA is employed. This function is
controlled by the air warfare commander (AWC). The airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) and Air Force fighter aircraft are the primary assets to perform DCA
and augment the AW mission.
38
Planners, with LNO coordination, should flesh out airspace deconfliction,
identification procedures and responsibilities, entry and exit procedures, and minimum
risk routing (MRR) within the strike group AO. More importantly, the defining of fighter
engagement zones (FEZ), joint engagement zones (JEZ), surface combatant missile
engagement zones (MEZ), and/or self-defense zones is necessary to preclude
fratricide.
Air-to-Air Refueling
Planning air–to–air refueling in
support of maritime operations should
ensure refueling compatibility between
tankers and aircraft receiving fuel.
Because maritime support aircraft
missions generally begin from locations
outside the AO, determination of air
refueling tracks and offload
requirements should account for
operating radius of aircraft, distance to
and from the AOR, and threat reaction
requirements. To the maximum extent
possible, joint air units ordered to
receive a scheduled ATO offload (e.g.,
KC-10 refueling F-18 with F-14 in formation
specified air refueling control time)
should take the fully planned onload.
This helps ensure timely and efficient execution of joint air operations and prevents
unintentional consequences in the joint air environment. Air Force air mobility planners
need to recognize the Navy/Marine practice of “opportunity tanking” and accommodate
it where practicable, without sacrificing planned offloads. Flight operations aboard an
aircraft carrier are very dynamic and time sensitive requiring carrier-based crews to plan
their missions with flexibility with regard to fuel and timing. There are instances where
extra fuel can give these aircraft, or the aircraft carrier, the needed time and flexibility to
conduct their operations safely and efficiently without having to divert aircraft to land-
based facilities.
Amphibious Operations
39
Amphibious operations may require Air Force forces to perform functions such as
counterair to provide air superiority, counterland for interdiction and/or joint close air
support, airlift for air assault or resupply, and ISR from air and space assets. The
COMAFFOR or JFACC should plan with the JFMCC, CATF, and CLF to ensure
functional integration and to accomplish the following in preparation for amphibious
operations:
Air superiority must be gained and maintained to protect the amphibious forces
at sea during transition to land and until amphibious assault is complete.
Through air interdiction, enemy forces in the littoral environment will need to be
reduced or suppressed to an acceptable level prior to an amphibious assault.
ISR assets are required to support friendly forces and to monitor enemy forces
throughout the amphibious operation.
High-density airspace control may require the JFACC to designate, along with
the CATF, a subordinate ADC and ACA within the AOA or HIDACZ depending
on the area established.
40
FAR EAST AIR FORCES (FEAF) AND
INCHON (AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 1950)
As an entity, the amphibious operations generally follow following five distinct phases,
though the sequence may vary:
Embarkation: The period during which the forces, with their equipment and
supplies, are embarked (on board) in the assigned shipping.
Rehearsal: The period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for
the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations,
and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons
are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. Rehearsal may consist
of an actual landing or may be conducted as a command post exercise.
41
Movement: The period during which various components of the amphibious task
force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed position to
the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous
areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the
amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area.
Assault: The period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the
amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the
amphibious task force mission.
When amphibious forces are forward deployed, or when subsequent tasks are
assigned, the sequence of phases may differ. Generally, forward-deployed amphibious
forces use the sequence “embarkation,” “planning,” “rehearsal” (to include potential
reconfiguration of embarked forces), “movement to the operational area,” and “action.”
However, significant planning is conducted prior to embarkation to anticipate the most
likely missions and to load assigned shipping accordingly. The same sequence is useful
for subsequent tasks or follow-on amphibious missions.
In short, the five phases of an amphibious operation are always required, but the
sequence in which they occur may be changed as circumstances dictate.
Air Force forces may be called upon to prosecute maritime surface targets in a
time urgent manner. This is a Navy/Marine Corps mission called maritime air support
(MAS) that is similar to Air Force dynamic targeting. This mission also parallels the
42
methodology of CAS with detailed integration and terminal control, but not in close
proximity to friendly forces. Planner and operator coordination with LNOs is critical in
conducting successful MAS. For more information and MAS procedures, refer to NTTP
3-03.4 (Rev A), Naval Strike and Air Warfare.
Space Capability
The JFACC, as the SCA, will coordinate space operations, integrate space
capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in-theater joint space operations
planning. Planning and coordinating as early as possible to utilize joint space
capabilities greatly enhance maritime operations. Space-based assets may provide a
significant capability to characterize threats and identify adversary strengths,
weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Joint space assets provide global communication,
bandwidth, space-based ISR, environmental monitoring, missile warning, positioning,
navigation, and timing, which enhance air and maritime maneuver as well as joint fires
in countersea operations. Also, counterspace operations are conducted to ensure
friendly forces the ability to exploit space capabilities while negating the adversary’s
ability to do the same. Defensive counterspace operations are important since space
capabilities enable distributed operations in the maritime environment.
Stability Operations
The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support
national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. The various discrete
military tasks associated with small-scale and security operations are not mutually
exclusive; depending on the scenario, there may be some overlap among the tasks.
They may also occur within the context of a larger major operation. Air Force stability
operations in the maritime environment include:
Counterdrug enforcement.
Recovery operations.
43
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works with DOD to
ensure the sovereignty and security of our nation. DHS provides a comprehensive
framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations
whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. Air Force forces can
be employed in the role of preserving the security of our homeland by performing
operations that are conducted to protect our coastal areas from various threats. Air
Force homeland security operations in the maritime environment include:
Counterair.
There are differences in terminology and definitions between the DHS and the
DOD. The Air Force construct for homeland security operations attempts to bridge the
differences. See AFDD 2-10, Homeland Security Operations, for more detailed
information regarding this matter.
Other Air Force operations such as airlift, IO, special operations, C2, personnel
recovery operations, and weather services may also provide support to countersea
operations.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
To effectively conduct countersea operations, commanders, planners, and
aircrews must be aware of the legal issues that can impact such operations. National
policy and legal requirements dictate that countersea operations be conducted in
compliance with international law. The law relating to countersea operations is
particularly complex in that much of the law is customary international law developed
throughout naval history. In addition, commanders, planners, and aircrews must have
knowledge of the air navigation regimes that dictate where aircraft can lawfully fly. Part
of the preparation for countersea operations must be a review of the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) and law of the sea requirements, which affect these operations.
The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 has codified customary
international law on maritime navigation and overflight rights. Air Force members
involved in countersea operations must be aware of the rights of aircraft over the
various maritime zones. These zones include the high seas, exclusive economic zones,
contiguous zones, territorial seas, internal waters, archipelagic waters, international
straits, and archipelagic sea lanes. These zones are important because they determine
the amount of control that a coastal state may exercise over foreign aircraft and ships.
44
All of these zones are measured from national baselines, hence knowledge of where
these baselines are located is essential if aircraft are to be able to assert and exercise
their lawful rights in conducting countersea operations.
Some nations assert security zones beyond the limits of their territorial sea but
international law does not recognize any such zone. Military aircraft generally have
freedom of navigation rights outside of territorial seas. Any nation may declare a
temporary warning zone including over areas of the high seas. These zones do not
restrict the right of navigation but advise ships and aircraft of hazardous (but lawful)
activities. These may include missile testing, gunnery practice, and space vehicle
recovery operations. In the exercise of their inherent right of self-defense under the
United Nations Charter, nations may declare various forms of maritime control areas.
These may include air or maritime exclusion zones, or other types of defensive sea
areas in which a measure of control is exercised over foreign ships and aircraft. During
times of conflict, Air Force units must be particularly aware of the rights of neutral
nations. These rights protect a neutral’s sovereignty, which includes national ships and
aircraft.
The upper limits of airspace have not been authoritatively defined by international
law. There is a different legal regime that governs outer space, which begins at an
unidentified point at which artificial satellites can be placed in orbit without freefalling to
earth.
45
CHAPTER FOUR
COUNTERSEA TRAINING
GENERAL
Not since the demise of the Soviet Union has the United States faced a
formidable adversary on the seas or other maritime environment. Today, a near-peer
threat to our maritime forces is emerging and will require countering through the use of
organic maritime forces and Air Force forces. In short, Air Force countersea operations
can be expected to take place against an enemy’s maritime force, and to project power
along with the Navy and Marine Corps and protect our domestic shores from would-be
unconventional attacks.
To meet the challenges of the maritime environment, the Air Force should be
prepared to conduct its assigned functions independently, as part of a joint force or as
part of a coalition. Countersea functions assigned to the Air Force, based on its air,
space, and information operations capabilities, will be performed most effectively with
thorough and frequent training in the joint environment.
TRAINING FORCES
46
Simulation and wargaming, although not a substitute for hands-on training,
should be utilized when unable to conduct live exercises. Simulations can be made
more realistic by incorporating stress factors and varied scenarios. Simulation and
wargaming may best be utilized to work through challenging aspects of an operation,
such as integration or C2 issues, so as to identify “best practices” and optimize training
in live exercises.
Examples of current training include B-52 and E-2 Hawkeye crews routinely
performing maritime patrol missions, ISR, and aerial minelaying. The USAF Weapons
School (USAFWS) provides elements of countersea training and academics to some
weapon school students. For instance, the 340th Weapons Squadron provides training
to all B-52 weapons officers in aerial minelaying and jointly coordinates with US Navy
crews. Other squadrons at the Weapons School, such as the16th Weapons Squadron
(F-16) are taught maritime operations academics with cross-talk between USAFWS
instructors and Navy “Top Gun” instructors.
SUMMARY
The future success of Air Force maritime operations is based on efforts taken
now to effectively organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for these operations.
Through proper preparation and foresight, Air Force forces will be capable of conducting
countersea to achieve commanders’ objectives in support of national policy for the
maritime environment.
47
SUGGESTED READINGS
Joint Publications
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support
JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
Other Publications
Naval Warfare Publication 3–56, Composite Warfare Commander Manual. Naval
Doctrine Command.
Naval Doctrine Publication 1–14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations. Naval Doctrine Command.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Maxwell AFB, AL, reprinted by Air
University Press, 1987.
Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral. Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979.
Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An
Illustrated Account. Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1984.
Blair, Clay. Hitler’s U–Boat War. New York: Random House, 1996.
Doenitz , Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. New York: World Publishing
Company, 1958.
Ethell, Jeffrey and Price, Alfred. Air War: South Atlantic. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1983.
Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. Air Force History and Museums Program,
1997.
McAulay, Lex. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
48
Mason, R. A. Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. London: Brassey’s Publishers, 1994.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two–Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy
in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.
Perry, Charles M., Pfaltzgraff Robert L., Conway Joseph C. Long–Range Bombers and
the Role of Airpower in the New Century. Cambridge, MA, Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1995.
Perry, Charles M., Rothenberg Laurence E., Davis Jacquelyn K. Airpower Synergies in
the New Strategic Era: The Complementary Roles of Long–Range Bombers and
Carrier–Based Aircraft. McLean, VA, Brassey’s, Inc., 1997.
Potter, E. B. and Nimitz, Chester W., eds. Sea Power: A Naval History. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice–Hall, 1960.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York:
Free Press, 1984.
Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U–Boats. Columbia, S.C.: University of South
Carolina Press, 1994.
Van der Vat, Dan. The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle. New York:
Harper & Row Publisher. 1988.
49
GLOSSARY
Abbreviations and Acronyms
IO information operations
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JA judge advocate
JAOC joint air operations center
JDAM joint direct attack munition
JFACC joint force air and space component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JP joint publication
JTF joint task force
50
MCM mine countermeasures
MIW mine warfare
Definitions
airlift. Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the air in support
of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1)
air refueling. The capability to refuel aircraft in flight, which extends presence,
increases range, and serves as a force multiplier. (JP 1-02)
air warfare. A US Navy/US Marine Corps term used to indicate that action required to
destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includes
such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface–to–air
and air–to–air missiles, electronic attack, and destruction of the air or missile threat both
before and after it is launched. Other measures which are taken to minimize the effects
of hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic),
and mobility. Also called AW. (NDC)
amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces,
embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
As an entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases: a. planning—The
period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. b.
embarkation—The period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies,
are embarked in the assigned shipping. c. rehearsal—The period during which the
51
prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing adequacy of plans, the
timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2)
ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing communications. d.
movement—The period during which various components of the amphibious task force
move from points of embarkation to the objective area. e. assault—The period between
the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area
and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (JP 1–02)
close air support. Air action by fixed– and rotary–wing aircraft against hostile targets
which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1–
02)
close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which
are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or
coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the
supported force. (JP 1–02)
coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
(JP 1–02)
52
(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and the Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant
command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ
commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to
accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command
(command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1–02)
counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and
maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to
destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1–02)
direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1–02)
general support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not
to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1–02)
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interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JP 1–02)
joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air
operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint
force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See
also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) [The joint air and space component commander
(JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command and control the
integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title
emphasizes the Air Force position that air power and space power together create
effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] (AFDD 2) {Italicized
words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
littoral. A coastal region (Webster, 10th ed). The term littoral, as it applies to naval
operations, is not restricted to the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the
world’s coastal regions. Rather, it includes that portion of the world’s land masses
adjacent to the oceans within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of
sea-based forces. (NPD-1)
maritime environment. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and
the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 1–02)
maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment,
including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or
logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’
range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by
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amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control
operations. (JP 1–02)
mine warfare. The strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and mine
countermeasures. Mine warfare is divided into two basic subdivisions: the laying of
mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime warfare; and
the countering of enemy–laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land
or sea areas. Also called MIW. (JP 1–02)
mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy,
because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy,
and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1–02)
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and
electronic-warfare systems in support of a unit or units on land. (NDP-1)
sea control operations. The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air
forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations
include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce,
protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of
naval operations. (JP 1–02)
sea surveillance. The systematic observation of surface and subsurface sea areas by
all available and practicable means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and
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determining the movements of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and
enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans. (JP 1–02)
strategic attack. Military action carried out against an enemy’s center(s) of gravity or
other vital target sets including command elements, war production assets, and key
supporting infrastructure in order to effect a level of destruction and disintegration of the
enemy’s military capacity to the point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or
will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity. (AFDD 1)
supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects
of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation
planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the
commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to
requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1–02)
surface warfare. That portion of maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to
destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. Also called
SUW. (NDC)
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control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the
level of combatant command. Also called TACON. See also combatant command;
combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1-02)
undersea warfare. Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the
effective use of submarines. Also called USW. (NDC) [This term was formerly known as
antisubmarine warfare.]
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