Francisco vs.

House of Representatives,
G.R. No 160261, November 10, 2003
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded impeachment Rules of the
11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if
the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by
one-thirds of the members of the House.

A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief
Justice Davide of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first impeachment complaint
“sufficient in form.” However, it also voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a
second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide, founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry on the JDF. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the House of
Representatives, as well as private individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as
taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution
bars the filing of the second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states that
“(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.”
Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the High Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-
equal branch of government.

ISSUES/HELD:

1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the
Constitution—YES

2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

approved by the HoR are unconstitutional – YES

3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked – YES

RATIO:

1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the Constitution.

2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:

1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
(verbal egis);

2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the
framers; and

3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin. The
records of the debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and
Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House
itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the
complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of
the members of the House.
In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are
unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the
term “initiate” a different meaning from filing and referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the
constitutional one-year ban.

3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.

The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only carried out its duty
as stated in Section 1, Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to look into cases
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the different branches of
government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of the Rules of Impeachment against the
one-year ban explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that judicial
review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.

The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter, effectively checks on the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law. It must declare executive and
legislative acts void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to decide.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No.

122156 | February 3, 1997
SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

Facts:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner,” is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding, only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner wrote to respondent GSIS offering to match the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad. It even subsequently tendered a manager’s check to pay for the shares, which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
Petitioner filed a case before the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes par., Art. XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of
an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence
and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.

Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing
laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done.”

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and
the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the
hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony

Held:

1. Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional

mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right.

2. Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and
Memory of a City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture
Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro
their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino
talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.

Other matters discussed: Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to
give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a case for
reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The
COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted
that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to
opportunities for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the
Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the
Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most
qualified among all the presidential candidates” and supported the
statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national
and international campaigns, and his government platform.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request
for presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal,
violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.
HELD
1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for
presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal,
violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.
– NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally
considered not-self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along
with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially
enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the policies
presented.
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one
that is subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are
enforced without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated.
The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral
candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly
elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a
“mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a
government position, is allowed to run.
Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible
for candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their power to
make such assessments.

CASE DIGEST: MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. COMMITTEE ON

JUSTICE, et al.

Here's a more detailed case digest for G.R. No. 193459:

http://lawphils.blogspot.com/2017/05/gutierrez-v-committee-on-justice-gr-
no.html.

FACTS: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as
the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment
complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List
Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.

The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte
who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which both
allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient
in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order
and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They
argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a
political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin
to a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.

ISSUES: [1] Is petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? [2] Do the
simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule?

HELD: The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two

impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner
cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” However, the term
“initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of
the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. DISMISSED.

SANTIAGO v COMELEC G.R. No. 127325

Summarized by Catherine Pedrosa, Sophia Sy, Albert Amparo
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits on Elective Officials, by People’s
initiative”, granted under Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
COMELEC issued an Order directing Delfin to publish the petition, and
notice of hearing and, setting the case for hearing. Petitioners herein
thus filed a petition for prohibition against respondent, arguing that
the said Constitutional provision can only be implemented by a law to
be passed by Congress, and such implementing provisions cannot be
found in RA 6735.
Important People: Petitioners: Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, Maria Isabel Ongpin; Respondents: Comelec, Atty. Jesus
Delfin; Petitioner-Intervenor: Raul S. Roco
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
1. Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative.” (A.K.A. Delfin Petition)
It proposed to amend Sec. 4 and 7 of Art. VI, Sec. 4 of VII, and
Sec. 8 of Art. X of the Constitution and REMOVE the term limit of 6
years for Senators, 2 years for the House of Representatives and 6
years for the President.
2. In the Delfin Petition they asked COMELEC for an order to:
a. Fix time and date of signature gathering
b. Cause the publication of said order and attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
c. Instruct Municipal Election Registrars to assist Delfin and his
volunteers, in establishing signing stations.
3. COMELEC issued the order to:
a. Cause, at the expense of Delfin, the publication of petition and
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution and
Notice of Hearing in 3 daily newspapers of general circulation.
b. Set the case for hearing on December 12, 1996.
4. At the hearing: Atty. Delfin and Atty. Quadra represented PIRMA
against the intervenors Senator Roco and others representing IBP,
DIK, LABAN
5. After hearing the arguments of each party, COMELEC directed Delfin
and oppositors to file their memoranda within 5 days.
6. On December 18, 1996, Santiago and other petitioners filed a
special civil action for prohibition to the Supreme Court.
7. Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the COMELEC and Delfin from
proceeding any further.
ISSUE(s):
1. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
2. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
3. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter
alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
HOLDING:
1. YES PETITION IS GRANTED.
COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss or
failure to act on Roco’s motion to dismiss, rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition (for prohibition) under Section 2 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
2. R.A. No. 6735 DECLARED INADEQUATE TO COVER THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDEMENTS TO CONSTITUTION due to the
following reasons:
a. Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded
the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of
initiative as they can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”
b. While the Act provides for subtitles for National Initiative &
Referendum (Subtitle II) and Local Initiative & Referendum
(Subtitle III), it could have provided for a subtitle for Initiative
on the Constitution as the right of people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
c. Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b)
defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides
for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant
lip service.
3. THOSE PARTS OF COMELEC Resolutions No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution DECLARED
VOID.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid. It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
4. COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to
file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources.
VERDICT: Petition granted. RA 6735 declared inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Parts of
Comelec Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution declared void. Comelec
ordered to dismiss the Delfin Petition.
DISSENT: (Puno)
RA 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution through initiative. The law must be
interpreted as it was intended, and it is clear that the intent of RA
6735 is to implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
Once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law. Accordingly, Comelec
Resolution No. 2300 cannot be assailed as infirmed as RA 6735
expressly delegates the commission the power to promulgate rules
necessary to carry out the said act.

G.R. No. L-27833 Gonzales v. Commission on Elections April 18, 1969

Fernando, J .
FACTS:
Two new sections were included in the Revised Election Code, under
Republic Act 4880, which was approved
and took effect on 17 June 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of
election campaign or partisan political activity. On 22 July 1967,
Arsenio Gonzales and Felicisimo R. Cabigao
filed an action entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Injunction," a proceeding that should have been
started in the Court of First Instance, but treated by the Supreme Court
as one of prohibition in view of the
seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Gonzales
and Cabigao alleged that the
enforcement of said RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights, such as
their freedom of speech, their freedom
of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under
the Philippine Constitution," and that therefore said act is
unconstitutional. Cabigao was, at the time of the
filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected
on 11 November 1967; while
Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of
Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner.
ISSUE(s):
Whether or not the freedom of expression may be limited. YES
HELD:
The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of
course a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system. No law shall he passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. It embraces,
at the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether
in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a
clear and present danger of substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent .
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression
is undeniable whether as a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of
securing participation by the people in social
including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance
between stability and change. The trend
as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the
broadest scope and assure the widest
latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate
of public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
It is not going too far to view the function of free speech as
inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its
“

high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates

dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Freedom of speech and of the press thus
”

means something more than the right

to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
support to official measures, to take
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right
becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well, if not more, for those
who question, who do not conform,
who differ. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought
that we hate, no less than for the
thought that agrees with us.
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible
of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech
and of the press. The realities of
life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
G.R. No. L-27833 Gonzales v. Commission on Elections April 18, 1969
It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for r
ecognition.
 Two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The test, the
"clear and present danger" rule, as a
limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil
of a substantive character that the
state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine,
the danger must not only be clear but
also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with
the danger of the substantive evil
arising from the utterance question. Present refers to the time element.
It used to be identified with
imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but
very likely inevitable.
The Court is of the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists
insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party is restricted
and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving
contribution for election purposes, either
directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity.
The restriction on freedom of assembly
as confined to holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades or other
similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda or both
for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other
legitimate exercise of such poses a more
difficult question. Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, it
should not be annulled. The other acts,
likewise deemed included in "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity" tax to the utmost the judicial
predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate
election practices deemed inimical,
because of their collision with the preferred right of freedom of
expression. The scope of the curtailment
to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
r ecognition of the existence of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the
electoral process.
The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the
solicitation or undertaking of any campaign
or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the
making of speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any
party or candidate for public office,
or the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials,
suffers from the corrosion of
invalidity. It lacks however one more affirmative vote to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality. The
necessary 2/3 vote, however, not being obtained, there is no occasion
for the power to annul statutes to
come into play. Such being the case, it is the judgment of the Court
that RA 4880 cannot be declared
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE(s)/KEY POINT(s):
- At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous
restrain on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether
in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be
a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
- This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez, of two tests that may
supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction. These are the "clear and present danger" rule
and the "dangerous tendency" rule.
The test, the "clear and present danger" rule, as a limitation on
freedom of expression is justified by the
danger or evil of a substantive character that the state has a right to
prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency
doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term
clear seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the
utterance question. Present refers to
G.R. No. L-27833 Gonzales v. Commission on Elections April 18, 1969
the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate
danger. The danger must not only
be probable but very likely inevitable.

Javellana vs Executive Secretary (1973)

Summary Cases:
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
Subjects:
Ratification of Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
Facts:
Previously, Congress passed a resolution calling a convention to propose
amendments to the
Constitution. The 1971 Constitutional Convention came up with a Proposed
Constitution, which by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 73, was submitted to the Filipino people for ratification
or rejection. This
spawned a a sequel of cases (hereafter “Plebiscite cases”) questioning the validity
of PD 73 and the
antecedent acts.
However, pending the hearing of the Plebiscite Cases, the President signed
Proclamation No. 1102
which proclaimed that “the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all
the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into
effect .”
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing the Proposed
Constitution. Javellana filed the petition as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and
registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Petitioners prayed for the
nullification of Proclamation No. 1102.
After deliberating on the cases, the members of the Court agreed that each
would write his own opinion
and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the
Court discussed said
opinions and votes were cast thereon.
Held:
Required Vote to Nullify Executive Proclamation
One of the petitions theorized that the case was an academic futility since it was
improbable that the
necessary 8 votes under the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten 10 votes
required by the 1973
Constitution, can be obtained to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No.
1102.
Section 10 of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, the concurrence of two thirds
of all the Members of the
Supreme Court is required only to declare a "treaty or law" unconstitutional, but
not to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President.
The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (8
votes) requirement was made
to apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the participation of the
two other departments of
the government - the Executive and the Legislative - is present, which
circumstance is absent in the case
of rules, regulations and executive orders. Indeed, a law(statute) passed by
Congress is subject to the
approval or veto of the President, whose disapproval cannot be overridden
except by the vote of
two-thirds of all members of each House of Congress. A treaty is entered into by
the President with the
concurrence of the Senate, which is not required in the case of rules, regulations
or executive orders
which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to nullify the same, a lesser
number of votes is
necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to invalidate a law or treaty.
| Page 2 of 4
Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by
the President, the
dictum applies with equal force to executive proclamations, like said
Proclamation No. 1102.
In fact, while executive order s embody administrative acts or commands of the
President, executive
proclamations are mainly informative and declaratory in character. As
consequence, an executive
proclamation has no more than "the force of an executive order," so that, for the
Supreme Court to
declare such proclamation unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the
same number of votes
needed to invalidate an executive order, rule of regulation namely, six votes
would suffice.
Political Question
Political questions refer to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Accor dingly, when the grant of power is qualified, condi tional or subject to limit
ations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, it
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or
validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom
Considering that Art. XV of the1935 Constitution prescribes the method or
procedure for its amendment,
the question of whether or not the Proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention
has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable and not a
political question.
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution should be settled by
applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification, or the old
Constitution. Hence, The determination of whether or not the new constitution is
now in force depends
upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance
with the requirements of
the 1935 Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional
Convention was called and
approved the proposed Constitution.
The plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies , claimed to have ratified the revised
Constitution, is null and
void based on the following reasons:
(a) Unqualified voters allowed to vote
Under the 1935 Constitution, persons below 21 years of age could not exercise
the right of suffrage.
Hence, when persons above 15 years but less than 21 years of age were allowed
to vote in the
plebiscite, it rendered the proceedings void. And, since there is no means by
which the invalid votes of
those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the
proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
(b) Casting of votes not done by ballot
The 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed
amendment to be valid.
The term "votes cast" has been held to mean “ballots cast” , and the word “cast”
means to deposit (the
ballot) formally or officially. In short, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution intended
the term "votes cast" to
| Page 3 of 4
mean “votes made in writing” or choices made on ballots – not orally or by
raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites.
Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies is null and void ab initio
(c) Conducted without Comelec supervision
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void.
The Barrio Assemblies took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with
the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or of PD 73. The procedure followed
is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers
who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of the fundamental scheme set forth
in the 1935 Constitution
to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will.
Evidence of Ratification
Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence, prima facie or otherwise, of the alleged
ratification of the
proposed Constitution. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC as the
"exclusive" charge to
the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections" independently of
the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of
the alleged results of
the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, the respective
local governments
had not certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all
over the Philippines. In
effect, the citizen’s assemblies did not adopt t he proposed constitution.
Acquiescence of the People to the Proposed Amendments
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition
by members of
Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have
performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law
and of the Law of
Public Officers.
Taking into consideration Proclamation No. 1081 which placed the entire
Philippines under Martial Law,
the compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does
not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither is the Court prepared to
declare that the people's
inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number
of Presidential orders,
decrees and/or instructions amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of
said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not
necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
Enrolled Bill
It is claimed that Proclamation No. 1102 is "conclusive" upon the Court, or is, at
least, entitled to full faith
and credence, as an enrolled bill.
The "enrolled bill" refers to a document certified to the President or his action
under the Constitution by
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
attested to by the
respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved
by said Houses. I
The conclusiveness bestowed to an enrolled bill cannot be applied to
Proclamation No. 1102. A
certification issued by an officer without legal authority is as good as non-
existent. The act of the
| Page 4 of 4
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution was
made without authority.
1973 Constitution is in Force
Four members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; Four
members cast no vote thereon on the premise that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the
people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two members of the
Court voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with
the result, there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962
October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP
Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of
the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to
which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the
Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao
del Norte
which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to
build,
develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and
the BJE
as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its
provisions
requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a
Comprehensive
Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to
disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public
consultation
thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to
have the
City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on 4
August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing
the
MOA-AD.
Overview of the MOA-AD:
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives
or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time
of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. 30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros"
as traditionally
understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD proceeds to
refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro
people by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of
the public domain.33
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants
the authority
and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus
constituting the
following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Outside of this
core, the BJE is
to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories,
Category A and
Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years
apart from each
other.
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within
its
" interna lwaters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that
the BJE shall also
have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territoria l
waters, the BJE and the
"Central Government" shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural
resources.Notably, the
jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."There is no similar provision on the
sharing of
minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries
and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and
understandings, however,
are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation
agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The
sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor
of the BJE.49
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, etc. granted by the Philippine
Government,
including those issued by the present ARMM.
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the
implementation of the
Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the
BJE as
"associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of
governance is to be
based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions
in the
Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall
take effect upon
signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to
the nonderogation
of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.
ISSUE:
Main Issue: WON the MOA-AD is constitutional?
RULING:
The MOA-AD is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the powers granted to the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE)
exceeds those granted to local governments and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. It
cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and existing laws.
Sub-issues:
Is the “associative” relationship envisioned between the GRP and BJE unconstitutional?
YES, the “associative” relationship between the GRP and the BJE is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since
the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that same is on its way to
independence
and the concept of “association” is NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
An ASSOCIATION is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In
the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between
integration and independence.
In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal
concept of association:
BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our
laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
Can the BJE be considered a state under international law?
YES, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo
Convention: permanent population, defined territory, government & capacity to enter into
relations with other
state.
The BJE is a far MORE POWERFUL ENTITY than the ARMM recognized under the Constitution.
The spirit
animating it RUNS COUNTER to national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
Does the MOA-AD violate Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation of
Autonomous
Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD violated Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation of
autonomous
regions since the BJE is MORE OF A STATE than an autonomous region.
Even assuming that it can be covered by the term “autonomous region”, it would still be contrary
to the
Constitution.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE
without need of
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the
present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for
inclusion
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary
under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was
their inclusion
in the ARMM , not the BJE.
Does the MOA-AD violate Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution on the Powers of
Autonomous
Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD does not comply with Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The MOA-
AD would
require an AMENDMENT that would EXPAND the powers granted to autonomous regions under
the
Constitution.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.
The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of
said
constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest
in the BJE
the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions
of the
Constitution . It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE
with treatymaking
power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states:
The BJE
is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
however, that such
relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines
since only the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the
MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: The State recognizes and promotes
the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
(Underscoring
supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a
semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion
of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence , is
certainly not
conducive to national unity.
Is the MOA-AD consistent with statutory law (RA 9054 – Organic Act of ARMM and the Indigenous
Peoples’
Rights Act)?
NO, besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also INCONSISTENT with
prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of ARMM and the IPRA.
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X,
Section 3 of the
Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and
other
indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro
people and
Tribal peoples, as follows:
As used in this Organic Act, the phrase indigenous cultural community refers to Filipino citizens
residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some
or
all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.
Respecting the IPRA , it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of
ancestral domains . The MOA-ADs manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro
people is a clear departure from that procedure.
By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed
Schedules, [t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the
following provisions
thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done
in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP
with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a
majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon
filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the
community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the
members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community
under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the
area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the
following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred
places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the
ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges,
hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report
of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of
the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other
claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That
in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute:
Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are
not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim
that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral
Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the
applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be
appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among
ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict,
without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below

.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.

EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation
were no de facto government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
 are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts
and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of
the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . .
He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but
this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become
re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
Rulings:

The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being
de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice
of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only
judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive
Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws)
are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a
theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-
point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.”
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and
the government established by the occupant of transient character.

Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy

Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Facts:

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a

department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center,
organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a
Research Associate. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to
private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the
department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay
forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed
that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case? NO

Held: Petition Granted

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an

international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental
organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom
from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice
of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by
virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and
privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch
as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed
employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is
the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver
is discretionary on its part.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomaticclearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters
of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right”
of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.”
We declaredthat the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.
Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers

of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they

continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of

the coastalState

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastalState resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and

31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized
entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the
US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing
out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as
a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation
to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international
affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is

beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application

of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

PNB vs CIR
the test of suability is found in its charter

PNB VS CIR
G.R. No. L-32667 81 SCRA 214 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his
official capacity as authorized Deputy sheriff, respondents.

Facts:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He
was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The
validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds:

That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law and

That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to
quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by
authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the lack of
merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of Garnishment’
dated May 6, 1970.”

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion.

Discussions:

According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:

“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial personality. If
the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we
think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its
associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.

Rulings:

No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that the
funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were
exempt from garnishment.

As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government
owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation.
Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a
particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.

San Fernando v. Firme

G.R. N. L-579 [April 8, 1991]

FACTS:

On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by

Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by
Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries
they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The heirs of Baniña Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras
and Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against
the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case was transferred to
branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Baniña Sr. amended the complaint
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants.
Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly
and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was liable.

RULING:

The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.

The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be
sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a
general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of
money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts and also when
the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However,
the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable.”
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck
of the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

CASE DIGEST: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF

HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON, Petitioners, v .PHIL
PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 182358; February 20,
2013).

FACTS: On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which
provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings
regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations
committed by them during their accreditation.

In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary
Ma. Margarita M. Galon(Galon), issued Memorandum No. 209 series of
2000,inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein
respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document
entitled "Report on Violative Products"issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited
drug companies products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI products which
were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption.

During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to
submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective explanations
on the adverse findings covering their respective products contained in the
Report on Violative Products.

Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as

required, PPI belatedly sent a letter dated November 13, 2000 addressed to
Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on
Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding
reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did
it seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on
November 6, 2000, much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely
submit its reply.

In a letter-reply dated November 23, 2000 Undersecretary Galon found

"untenable" PPI November 13, 2000 letter and therein informed PPI that,
effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years
pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C.

In another December 14, 2000 letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, PPI

through counsel questioned the suspension of its accreditation, saying that the
same was made pursuant to Section VII of AO 10 which it claimed was patently
illegal and null and void because it arrogated unto the DOH Accreditation
Committee powers and functions which were granted to the BFAD under
Republic Act (RA) No. 3720 and Executive Order (EO) No. 175. PPI added that its
accreditation was suspended without the benefit of notice and hearing, in
violation of its right to substantive and administrative due process. It thus
demanded that the DOH desist from implementing the suspension of its
accreditation, under pain of legal redress.

On December 28, 2000, PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative
issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former
Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon.

In their Amended Answer,the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then Secretary

Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon sought the dismissal of the Complaint,
stressing that PPI accreditation was suspended because most of the drugs it was
importing and distributing/selling to the public were found by the BFAD to be
substandard for human consumption. They added that the DOH is primarily
responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of
policies and programs in the field of health; it is vested with the comprehensive
power to make essential health services and goods available to the people,
including accreditation of drug suppliers and regulation of importation and
distribution of basic medicines for the public.
In a January 8, 2001 Order, the trial court partially granted PPI prayer for a
temporary restraining order, but only covering PPI products which were not
included in the list of violative products or drugs as found by the BFAD.

In a Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 68200, claiming that the case was one against the
State; that the Complaint was improperly verified; and lack of authority of the
corporate officer to commence the suit, as the requisite resolution of PPI board of
directors granting to the commencing officer PPI Vice President for Legal and
Administrative Affairs, Alan Alambra, the authority to file Civil Case No. 68200
was lacking. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to
be one instituted against the State, in which case the principle of state immunity
from suit is applicable.

On appeal, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision, reversed the trial court ruling
and ordered the remand of the case for the conduct of further proceedings. The
CA concluded that it was premature for the trial court to have dismissed the
Complaint. The CA further held that instead of dismissing the case, the trial court
should have deferred the hearing and resolution of the motion to dismiss and
proceeded to trial. It added that it was apparent from the Complaint that
petitioners were being sued in their private and personal capacities for acts done
beyond the scope of their official functions. Thus, the issue of whether the suit is
against the State could best be threshed out during trial on the merits, rather
than in proceedings covering a motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Should Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit
against the State?

HELD: The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that t)he State may not
be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very
essence of sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the state the
prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
nonsuability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience
that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly
restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; it's clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The State consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. x xx Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim
or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either

expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express
consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand,
there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into
a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability.
The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it
has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such
waiver may be implied.""Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are
construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of
sovereignty."

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH is an

unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental
functions because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly,
to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs functions of governmental character.

As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and
Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity
extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for
acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. "The suability of a
government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within
his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the
performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability
against the government." Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is showing of bad faith."

It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit, as well as Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and
discharge of their official functions or in their official capacities, and not in
their personal or individual capacities. Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit
were being charged with the issuance of the assailed orders. On the other hand,
Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the assailed
issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same be categorized as ultra
vires simply because the said acts are well within the scope of their authority.
Section 4 of RA 3720 specifically provides that the BFAD is an office under the
Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the Health Secretary is authorized to issue
rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively enforce the provisions of
RA 3720. As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to supervise
the offices under the DOH authority, such as the BFAD. Moreover, there was also
no showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed issuances were not directed
only against PPI. The suspension of PPI accreditation only came about after it
failed to submit its comment as directed by Undersecretary Galon. It is also
beyond dispute that if found wanting, a financial charge will be imposed upon
them which will require an appropriation from the state of the needed amount.
Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against them should
likewise be dismissed for being a suit against the state which absolutely did not
give its consent to be sued. Based on the foregoing considerations, and regardless
of the merits of PPI case, this case deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very
foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has crumbled at this initial juncture.
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