CASE 1

ARUELO V. CA

FACTS:

(1) Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the
Vice- Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a
margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him
as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan.
(2) On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of
"fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by declaring that Gatchalian’s answer
with counter- protest and counterclaim was timely filed

RULING:

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DISMISSED.

An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office.
Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true
choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election
protests must be

liberally construed to the end that the popular will, ex pressed in the election of public officers, will
not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated (Unda v. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA
827[1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz , J r., 104 SCRA591 [1981]; Macasundig v. Macalangan, 13 SCRA
577[1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara,9 SCRA 519 [1963]).
CASE 2
SEVILLA V COMELEC
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa
City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26,
2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a
winning margin of 628 votes over So's 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election
protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of
the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.[4]

Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated
May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration
from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.[5]

In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the
rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific
details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by
one or two persons.[6]

The Comelec 2nd division and En Banc Ruled ( 3-3 votes) that the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Respondent judge is directed to conduct another revision of the
contested ballots in Election Protest Case No. SP-6719 with dispatch.[9]

Issue: WON The Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the
petition for certiorari

RULING:

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "[e]ach Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution."[17] Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the
Comelec provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for
the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members
of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting
business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution,
order or ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and REMAND SPR (BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011 to
the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required rehearing under the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. The Comelec en banc is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the rehearing with utmost
dispatch.

CASE 3
Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582

FACTS: The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the petitioner but
nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino
due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No.
1669.

Section 5 of the said resolution states that, “A case being heard by it shall be decided with the
unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision
of the Commission. If this required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion,
the case may be appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority
thereof shall be the decision of the Commission.”

Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the
resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. He argues that this
applies to the voting of the Comelec both in division and En Banc.

Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by the first division because
the required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was
reached by the Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and
these did not constitute the majority of the body.

ISSUE: Whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first Division was a valid
decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who
voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and
voted thereon En Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision.
Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that
entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of Representatitves.

CASE 4
Acena v Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 (1991)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which
set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as
the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned
as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently
promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a
Master’s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The
Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the
same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as
acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his
appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s appointment
was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing
the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another
complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment
as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the
President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the
dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside
the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a
petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue.

ISSUE: WON the CSC acted in grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas filed a petition for review beyond the
prescriptive period of 15 days where the decision of the MSPB can be made appealable with
the CSC. Beyond this reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB renders to be final and
executory. The petition was also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the Pres.) The court
finds the CSC to have an excess of jurisdiction of entertaining the petition and made a
reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order which has long become final and executory.
The court granted the petition of the petitioner while setting aside the decision of the CSC.

CASE 5
VITAL-GOZON V CA
Facts:
In 1987, by virtue of E.O. 119 issued by then Pres. Cory Aquino, a reorganization of the Ministry of
Health was effected. At the time of such reorganization, Dr. Alejandro Dela Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of
the National Children’s Hospital. In February 1988, Dr. Dela Fuente received a notice from the Deparment of
Health that he would be re-appointed as Medical Specialist II. Such a position was considered as two ranks
lower than his previous position of Chief of Clinics. This prompted Dr. Dela Fuente to file a protest with the
DOH Reorganization Board. The protest was ignored. Dela Fuente then filed a case before the CSC. In the
meantime, the position of Chief of Clinics (then changed to Chief of Medical Professional Staff) were turned
over and thereafter exercised by a Dr. Merencilla. CSC ruled in favor of Dr. Dela Fuente. It ruled that Dr. Dela
Fuente is deemed having retained his previous position. Neither an MR nor an appeal was filed assailing such
a decision thereby rendering the decision as final and executory. Months have elapsed but still there was no
action on the part of Vital-Gozon et. al. to execute the decision of the CSC. CSC also told him that they
believed they have no coercive powers to enforce their own decision. This prompted Dela Fuente to file a
petition before the CA to compel Vital-Gozon et. al. to restore him to the position of Chief of Clinics and pay
him his backwages plus damages for Vital-Gozon’s refusal to comply with the CSC resolution. CA granted the
decision insofar as his restoration to his former position but denied insofar as the grant of damages ruling that
the petition is not the correct vehicle to claim such damages not the CA is the correct forum for such relief. CA
also took note to representation by the SolGen of Dr. Vital-Gozon saying that pursuant to the ruling in Urbano
and Co cases, the SolGen is not authorized to represent her. MR was filed by Dela Fuente arguing that CA
has the power to grant damages in a mandamus action by virtue of BP 129 which gave the SC, CA and RTCs
concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions and that CA was given the power to conduct hearings and receive
evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued,
would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law. CA eventually granted the MR and ordered
setting a date for reception of evidence on the la Fuente's claim for damages. It based its judgment on the last
phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which expressly allows the award of damages in a mandamus petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a
special civil action of mandamus.

Held:
Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant." The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's
wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940
had an identical counterpart provision. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere
procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it
implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit
may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of
action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

Issue:
WON the SolGen is authorized to represent Vital-Gozon in this case

Held:

Yes. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, 45 is quite clear to the
effect that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a
criminal case. This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary
liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not
liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in
such a civil suit for damages. Here, Dr. Vital-Gozon is not charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for
damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

CASE 6
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP V FERRER 135 SCRA 25
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths.
However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction
suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of
the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the
COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.
RULING:

It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections
and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may
be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

CASE 7
MATEO V CA
 Mateo v. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
Puno, J.

Issue:

whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving
dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation

Held:

No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree

(P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled

corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial
remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving
termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private
respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he
still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995

(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.

1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of
the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in
seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on
the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended
for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If
the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful
fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.

6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of
the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and
other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the

petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the
dismissal thereof.

8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice
in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It
shall point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and
state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be
served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents
as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the
filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima
facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would
warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The
findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence,
shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.

11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has
been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to
transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under
review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition
to the record.

12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such
terms as it may deem just.

13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period
of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.

14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service
Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme
Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions
for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the
effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review
and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.

In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the
date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be
considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals
may require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such
further documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the
change in the mode of appellate review.

15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and
superseded by this Circular.

16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.

May 16, 1995.

CASE 9
TUPAS v. NHA

Facts:
 Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is
a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise
known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its
shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the
Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The
government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance
System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the
National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation. Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election
with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members
comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed
by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that
NHC “being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers
are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.”

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations
where Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding
of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio
S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of
respondent NHC.
Issue:

whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and have therefore the right to unionize
Held:

Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled
corporations with original or legislative charters, that is, those created by an act of
Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general
legislation. The Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled
corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among

the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being
a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory
implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:

... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the

government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall
have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective
employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to
form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

CASE 10
Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976
The Civil Service Commission: Appointments

Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
“confidential agent” in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her
appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965
she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as “confidential agent” in the same office.

On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as “confidential
agent” have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the
Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an
appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil
Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.

On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated
to her former position as “confidential agent”. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a
petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former
position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the
Court of First Instance.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as “confidential agent” was validly terminated on the
alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said
position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:
The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the
absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment
or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.” In the case before
us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring “...confidential agents in the several department and
offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential” brings
within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.
Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services
as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from
the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds
office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure
turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office — his term merely “expires,”
in much the the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he
had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed “removed” or “dismissed” therefrom, upon the
expiration of said term. The main difference between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and the
latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the
time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses
its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from office — his term has merely “expired.”
But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that
therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a
civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of “confidential agent” in the
same office.

CASE 11
CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65)

Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export
Department" of the Central Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly
technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the export department
with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. The
Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created a three-man investigating
committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to recommend disciplinary
action and recommended the immediate reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board
issued a resolution considering the respondents resignation as of the day he was suspended due
to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss confidence of the respondent.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it,
after which he filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with
preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal
of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding
highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing
power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

Issue:
W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and
legitimate cause of removal

Rulings:

The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear
and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not
proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record which the
committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to
any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence
made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that the alleged loss of
confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated,
that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that: “No public officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.”

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in
positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly technical," the
Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at
least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended
with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials
holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those
holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly
distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of
confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made
by our fundamental charte

CASE 12

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,”
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of
the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the
position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of
the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the
power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was
better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

CASE 13
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza
G.R. No. 141141 | June 25, 2001

FACTS:
On November 5, 1997, administrative charges were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza,
a casino operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR) for failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and
regulations committed by co-officers during his. PAGCOR Board issued a Resolution dismissing
respondent on the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and loss of confidence. Thus, respondent appealed to the Civil Service
Commission which modified the said resolution finding respondent guilty only of Simple Neglect of
Duty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the CSC and ordered reinstatement
of respondent with payment of full backwages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is a confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by
reason of loss of confidence.

RULING:
No. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
1869 expressly provides that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as
“Confidential” appointee are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of
Directors. The submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential appointees
must be rejected. Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as
primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts, the true test being the nature of the
position.

Although respondent’s position handles confidential matters such fact does not warrant the
conclusion that his position is primarily confidential in character. Every appointment implies
confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is
primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state.

CASE 14
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,
RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO,
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June
9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances
to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the
strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential
pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or
more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations
only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the
SSS was illegal.

CASE 15
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission 194 SCRA 269

FACTS:
The Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon. Danilo R.Lacuna, submitted to
the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the NationalCapital Region, the appointments of
nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of theOffice of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 15, ofsaid Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which reads:Sec. 15. The Board
shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the otheremployees of the Board.The Personnel
Bureau then forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer who, in a 3rdendorsement dated September 19,
1988,rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer isthe City Mayor and not the City Council. This opinion was
transmitted by the Secretary to the CityMayor to the Commission.The Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules
that the proper appointing authority of theofficers and employees of the City Council of Manila is the City Council and
the signatory ofindividual appointments thus issued is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employeesunder Republic Act No.
409, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether thepower is now vested with the City Mayor
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the DecentralizationLaw, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code.

RULING:

There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization ofthe Government of the
City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 andBatas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal
governments in general, are general laws. As theSolicitor General points out, it is a canon of statutory construction that
a special law prevails overa general law , regardless of their dates of passage and the special is to be considered
asremaining an exception to the general

CASE 16 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without
pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government
official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific
(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within
30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work.
After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was
reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for
leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De
Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier
stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from
the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the
Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres.
The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL
beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De
Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to
him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure
to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service.
ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the CSC due to AWOL is valid
HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was
in effect at the time. The provision states:
"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on
leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of
such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a
reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the
expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the
service."
UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to
return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is
whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the case at bar, however,
Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of
academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he
failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de
Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private
petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover,
he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP.
All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative
of dismissing petitioner from its employ.
Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without
leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may
continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the
Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could
not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover,
in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate
administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or
reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In
short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the
rolls.
Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in
UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.

CASE 17

Navarro v. Civil Service Commission

226 SCRA 522 G.R. Nos. 107370-71 September 16, 1993

Facts:
Cable drums were stolen from Ford Stockyard in Mariveles Bataan on June 21, 1989 who were
owned by Takaoka Engineering Construction Co. Ltd worth P21,250.00. The suspect for the stolen
cable drums is the Petitioner Mario Navarro .The Senior Deputy Administrator of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) approved an Order terminating the services of Navarro and
finding him guilty as charged.
Navarro appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB rendered its
decision setting aside the Order issued by the Senior Deputy Administrator of EPZA. The decision
of the MSPB also reinstated Navarro with payment and back wages and other benefits due him
from the time of his dismissal. The MSPB denied the motion for reconsideration of the EPZA. The
Regional Trial Court of Bataan dismisses the criminal case filed against Navarro and his
co-accused for qualified theft. EPZA sought to reverse the decision of the MSPB before the CSC
and on July 16, 1992, the CSC rendered its decision setting aside the MSPB’s decision dated
December 11, 1991 and the CSC found Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and reimposed the
penalty of dismissal. The CSC also denied in its Resolution dated September 11, 1992 the motion
for reconsideration of Navarro.
In the recourse, Navarro claims that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess jurisdiction in deciding the case without considering other pertinent evidence but the
EPZA filed for the dismissal of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
manifestation to support the plea of the Petitioner in the argument that there can be no appeal in
the MSPB’s decision exonerating Navarro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission and the Export Processing Zone Authority acted
without jurisdiction.
HELD:
The MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro and this fact alone should have prevented
EPZA from appealing to the Commission on the bases of prevailing jurisprudence. Under P.D. 807
or The Philippine Civil Service Law, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPB’s decisions
exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges and P.D. 807 does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees.
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving suspension for more
than thirty days or removal or dismissal from office. P.D. 807 provides that appeals shall be made
by the party adversely affected by the decision. The party adversely affected by the decision refers
to the government employee whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action. EPZA, for appealing MSPB’s decision and exonerating Navarro from administrative charge
and CSC, for taking recognizance of, and deciding the appeal shows that both EPZA and CSC
acted without jurisdiction.

Case 18
CSC v DACOYCOY
Posted by kaye lee on 11:37 AM
GR NO. 135805, dated 29-Apr-1999

FACTS:
Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades in Northern Samar. After formal investigation by the CSC, he was found guilty of
nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the the argument that he was not the
appointing or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution ruling that the respondent
did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism.

DECISION:
Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as all appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
1. appointing or
2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.
The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity.

CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver
and Ped, a utility worker, as their are under his immediate supervision and control as the school
administrator

CASE 19
Santos v. Yatco
L-16133 | November 6, 1959
FACTS:
Judge Yatco issued an order disallowing the Secretary of National Defense from conducting a
house-to-house campaign on behalf of Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan. Thus,
the Secretary-petitioner filed a complaint for prohibition of the order, enjoining the enforcement
thereof, claiming that he is not covered by the 1935 constitutional prohibition stating that, “No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.

ISSUE:
Is Santos, as Secretary of National Defense, covered by the 1935 Constitutional prohibition?

HELD:
No.The Court held that Santos is not covered by the constitutional prohibition. The Court cited the
records and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, wherein a delegate moved for the
formal inclusion of Cabinet members but such motion was dismissed – hence, by reason of
inferring that the Constitutional Commission had reasonably intended that Cabinet members are
not included in the prohibition. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Cabinet Members, being alter
egos of the President, were in fact chosen principally for their political influences. Thus, they were
expected to exert for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.

CASE 20
Civil Service Commission vs. Larry Alfonso
Doctrine: When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decidecases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusiveunless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
whichcase, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Facts:This is petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA).Dr. Zenaida
Pia, a professor, and Dindo Bautista, president of Unyon ng mga Kawanisa PUP (Polytechnic
University of the Philippines), filed a complaint before the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
against the respondent Larry Alfonso. They alleged that Alfonso violatedthe Republic Act (RA)
6713, that he acted in grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interestof the service, and violated
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Private petitionersalleged that respondent
repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUP’s personnel department for when the
latter prepared and included his name in certain Special Orders forovernight services, authorizing
him to work for 24 hours.On his counter-affidavit, respondent averred that he only rendered
overnight work onMay 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006.CSC found his explanation lacking,
hence, he was charged of grave misconduct andconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
Service. CSC imposed a 90 days preventivesuspension against the respondent.The
respondent filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the preventive suspension
order and requested a change of venue from CSC-Central Office to CSC-NCR. Themotion was
denied. Respondent then filed another motion for reconsideration, thi s timealleging the
grounds that under RA 8292 in relation to 4670, on the Board of Regents (BOR)has the exclusive
authority to appoint and remove PUP employees. The alleged that CSC hasno jurisdiction to hear
and decide the administrative case filed against him.CSC-NCR issued an order directing the
Office of the President of PUP to implementthe preventive suspension order against
respondent. CSC has not rendered a ruling for themotion for reconsideration. Respondent
then sought relief before the CA for petition forcertiorari and prohibition. However, CA affirmed
the decision of the CSC. Hence, this issue.

Issue:Whether or not CSC has the jurisdiction over government officials or employees.

Ruling:Yes, CSC has jurisdiction over government officials and employees as vested by
theConstitution.Ratio Decidendi:

COMELEC

CASE 1

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or
out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as
a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition
is DISMISSED.

CASE 2

Brillantes vs. Yorac

G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990

FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding
commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then
questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall any
member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:.
Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The
designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the
quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yorac’s designation is null and
unconstitutional.

CASE 3 Lindo v. COMELEC

Facts:
In the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner CONRADO LINDO and private respondent
ROSARIO VELASCO (incumbent mayor of Ternate, Cavite) were the main rivals for the
position of Ternate mayor. On May 9, 1995, petitioner was declared by the board of
canvassers as the duly elected mayor, garnering the highest number of votes at 2,711.
Private respondent was second with 2,195 votes.
On May 19, 1996, private respondent, while still discharging her functions as
Ternate mayor, filed an election protest contesting the results of the election in all the 19
precincts.
In June, 1995, prior to petitioner’s assumption of the office of Ternate mayor, the
ballot boxes of all the protested precincts were transferred from the office of the municipal
treasurer to the office of the clerk of court, RTC Naic, for revision of the ballots. Only the
ballots from 24 precincts were revised because private respondent abandoned her protest
with respect to the other 15 precincts.
The revision showed a substantial variance between the number of votes as stated in
the election returns and the number of votes as per physical count of the ballots in five (5)
precincts. In view of the above findings, Assisting Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili declared private
respondent as the duly elected mayor of Ternate, Cavite. Petitioner was ordered to vacate
the office of the Ternate mayor and turn it over to private respondent.
At the hearing on the motion for execution, petitioner claimed that Judge Agcaoili only
examined the photocopies of the ballots in deciding the case. Thereafter, respondent Judge
Napoleon Dilag took over the protest case and issued an Order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal upon private respondent’s filing of a P100,000.00 cash bond. On
the same date, Judge Dilag issued the writ of execution directing the PNP Director of Cavite
to implement the writ and install private respondent as mayor of Ternate, Cavite.
Petitioner claims that the COMELEC issued the preliminary injunction after finding
that the trial court did not examine the original ballots, but relied only on the xerox copies in
deciding the protest. Although subsequently COMELEC lifted the injunction, it still made a
finding that fake and spurious ballots may have been introduced in the ballot boxes to
increase the votes of private respondent. Thus, petitioner contends that the COMELEC
should not have allowed the execution of the decision pending appeal and should have
opened the ballots boxes to determine the authenticity of the ballots therein.
Issue: whether or not COMELEC erred in allowing the implementation of the writ of
execution of the decision pending appeal
Held: Rule 143 of the Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal in election
cases upon good reasons stated in the special order. In its Order of execution, respondent
RTC Judge Dilag cited two reasons to justify execution of his decision pending appeal, viz: (1)
the grant of execution would give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate,
especially since the RTC has established private respondent’s right to office, and; (2) barely
18 months is left on the tenure of the Ternate mayor and the people have the right to be
governed by their chosen official. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the same
grounds for execution pending appeal of the decision in the protest case were relied upon by
the trial court and we found them to be valid reasons for execution.

COMELEC did not err in applying Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with

notice to the adverse party, the court may, in its discretion, order execution to
issue before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion
and special order shall be included therein.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to election cases. As

long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed before the perfection of appeal, the
writ of execution may issue after the period of appeal.

CASE 4

Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253
ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO
SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYAN, PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners, vs. HON. SINFOROSO
V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents.
At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the
incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections. Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial
auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial budget officer of Camiguin. Their co-petitioners Rambuyon, Primo
and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private respondent was the
incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the
said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in
Region X.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo
against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as
it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they
were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions
for the commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2)
categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or
concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol
Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the
construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks
systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory
equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners
to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465.
RULING:

The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal
grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee
including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases,
disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxx xxx xxx

 (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works
and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. — During the period of forty-five
days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who
(a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted
in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against
public funds.

The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and
regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the
Comission with the power to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the
election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself
grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the
Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the
prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged
election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses
which, by their alleged nature, are continuing.

There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate
the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent
any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection
therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election
offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen,
candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited
citizens arms of the Commission. However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law
Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors
or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated,
the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his
candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he
committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the principal
issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465

CASE 5

RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA

243 SCRA 502

Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba
were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat,
the petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a
margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on
12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial court
granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of execution which was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul
the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ
of execution. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor, pending
resolution of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed
this special civil action.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction?

Held: The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not
been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held that the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion
for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Since
the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of
the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon.

COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

CASE 6

NORBI H. EDDING VS.

 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND PABLO BERNARDO
G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the
office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga Del Norte during the May 1992 elections.
After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212
votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June
9, 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte docketed as Election
Case No. SE-10. Upon termination of the protest proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the
RTC rendered judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election for the
mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring as null and void the election of
respondent Bernardo so that on July 15, 1993, Edding assumed office and replaced Bernardo.

On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as SPR No.
5-93 seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC
gave due course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari
against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.

RULING:
This court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus over election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as follows: "SEC. 50. Definition. - x x x The commission is
hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases."

COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking Sections
2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part: "Sec. 2. The commission
on elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: x x x (2) xxx appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. xxx Sec. 3. The
commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election case, including pre-proclamation
controversies. x x x"

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

CASE 7
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Facts:

The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque.

On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the
ground that it contained material representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013,
COMELEC en banc denied her MR.

However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5,
2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day,
petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of
Marinduque.

Held:

Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office
yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.

Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse
of discretion exists.

CASE 8
 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No.
199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our
September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents
Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and
DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the
creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007
National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary
investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but
not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the
assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election
offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With
more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an
abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by
the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation
which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the
cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance
of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
FALLO: petition is denied

CASE 9
 Salic Dumarpa vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 192249, April 02, 2013

Facts:
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10 May
2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7) municipalities,
including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in the
1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur.
The conduct of special elections in the seven municipalities was originally scheduled for 29
May 2010 but was reset to 3 June 2010 because: aside from the 7 municipalities, there are precincts
in 8 other municipalities where there were failure of elections; the results of elections in the said
municipalities will affect the elections not only in the provincial but also in the municipal level; there
are missing ballots in some precincts; some of the BEIs are not willing to serve or are disqualified
due to relationship; the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) assigned in the said municipalities
were already pulled out by Smartmatic; there is a need for the newly constituted BEIs to undergo
training and certification as required under R.A. 9369 and last, there is a need to review the manning
of Comelec personnel in the municipal level and assess their capabilities to discharge their duties
and functions not only as an Election Officer but also as Chairman of the Board of Canvassers.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it
may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on Dumarpa’s
motion. A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant
petition alleging that “both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of
SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4).
Issues:
1. Whether or not section 12 of COMELEC resolution no. 8965 is illegal or void?
2. Whether or not section 4 of COMELEC resolution no. 8965 is illegal or void?
3. Whether or not the commission on elections, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in incorporating, providing, or issuing section 12
and section 4 in said resolution no. 8965
Ruling:
Petition Denied. The special elections held on 3 June 2010 mooted the issues posed by
Dumarpa. The opponent of Dumarpa was proclaimed winner in the 1st Congressional District of
Lanao del Sur. The event mooted the present petition as the issues raised herein are resolvable in
the election protest.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965, in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct
of elections enshrined in the Constitution. COMELEC’s broad power to “enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall,” carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure
a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the
Commission must be given considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest
elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal
or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be inferred with.

CASE 10 MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMELEC (October 25, 2013).

FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon.
Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill No.
4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law
as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter,
upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be
conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the
date of the effectivity of this Charter.

As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the
conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National
and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite
for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save
on expenses.

Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify
section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's
act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?

HELD: The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and intent of
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."

The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or
plebiscites.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February
2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as
mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take
judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the
Party-List Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National
and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative
mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse
of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental
to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.

To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would have the
COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC abandoned any of its
tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in
serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus
all its attention and concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013
National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all
plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360. DENIED.

CASE 11
Petitioners: Commission on Election
Respondents: HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branches 2 and 3,
Balanga, Bataan, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge, Branch 1, of the same
Court, ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO
G.R. No: 129417
Facts:

The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some certificates ofcanvass,
moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against them. The Chief State Prosecutor,who had
been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed acomment joining
in private respondents' request. Eventually, the cases were dismissed.
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals. Whenthe
Chief State Prosecutor was required to comment, he stated that he cannot give hisconformity to
the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it would not be consistent with hisposition that he
would abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existenceof probable cause as
against the Private Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course tothe appeal. The sole
basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEChad deputized to
prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
Issue:
Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal the
COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
Ruling:
Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to decide, not for Chief
State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to represent in it court.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive
their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief
State Prosecutor to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his
power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of
whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the
cases should be dismissed.

CASE 12
 Atty. Rosauro I. Torres vs. Commission on Elections and Vicente Rafael A. De Peralta
270 SCRA 583, G.R. No. 121031, March 26, 1997
Facts:
This case involves the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to annul the
proclamation of a winning candidate for Municipal Councilor in view of an error in the computation
of totals in the Statement of Votes which was made the basis of the proclamation, and to direct the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the rightful winner.
On May 9, 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite issued a Certificated
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates of the Municipal Offices
(Councilors) where petitioner Rosauro Torres was proclaimed as fifth winning candidate for
councilor. Two days after, the same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for
correction of the number of votes garnered by the petitioner. The votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in
the subtotal was erroneously added to Mr. Torres. Mr. Torres should have been number ten (10) in
the winning column and that Mr. Peralta should have landed in the 7th position. Petitioner filed his
answer alleging that the subject matter of the letter-petition, which was the correction of votes
garnered by him, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec. 251of the
Omnibus Election Code. After due course, respondent COMELEC issued the assailed en banc
resolution granting the letter-request for the correction of the number of votes garnered by
petitioner
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the
request of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to correct the votes garnered by petitioner and in
ordering the proclamation of private respondent?
Ruling:
No. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides the Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of
Canvassers. (a) where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed
in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of
canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of
canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures
into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election
returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may motu proprio or
upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties,
after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the
candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is involved in the instant case is simple
arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation the Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in
an administrative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to its
constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections, the COMELEC En Banc has
authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.

CASE 13
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC
212 SCRA 307

Facts:
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087
Issue:
Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals
without first referring them to any of it Divisions.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the
appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its
Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are
deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No.
7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject
of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and
such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.

Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular
elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these
petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed
suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Notes:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac,
Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the
exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in
the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the
returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur
which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which
rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi
Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended
petition.

CASE 14
AQUILES U. REYES, petitioner, vs. RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH XXXIX,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ADOLFO G. COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995
FACTS:
Reyes and Comia were candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Municipal BOC
proclaimed Reyes as the 8th winning candidate. Comia then filed an election protest before the
trial court alleging that a vital mistake was committed by the BOC in the computation of the total
votes he garnered. Municipal BOC admitted in its answer that it had made a mistake in the
counting of votes of Comia. Thus, the trial court rendered its decision annuling the proclamation of
Reyes and declared Comia as the 8th winning candidate. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the
COMELEC but COMELEC's First Division dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

ISSUE:
WON filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be dispensed of
by the petitioner.

RULING:
No. A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s argument that this may be dispensed with because the only
question raised in his petition is a question of law is not correct. Questions raised by petitioner
involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case.
The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law.
Art. IX, C, §3 provides that COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with
the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is,
therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX,
A, §7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari."

CASE 15
National Press Club vs Comelec

G.R. No. 102653, March 05, 1992

Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates
the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition
imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of
media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant
to election issues.

Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space
of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic
Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:

b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making
use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public
office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”

Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional

Held: Yes.

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction
with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period —
i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity
and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have
governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our
constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality
of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may
have at one’s disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank
by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that “the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited
purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings
into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time
and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz)

But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of
ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the
citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say
on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed
Printing,” Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at
the same time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today,
smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.

One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is screened
during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified matters that might
prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person is prohibited from shouting
“Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no
prior restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies
whether the censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle
forms like the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of copies per
issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading
tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.

I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.” That presumption has not
been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be
invalid on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name
of social justice and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an
illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient
instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve
financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the
Constitution.

CASE 16
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons,
it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing
to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time
to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio
and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide
radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92
singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992
it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies
to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast
stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation
of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

CASE 17
ADIONG V COMELEC

Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following
are lawful election propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or
printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches
in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party,
organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential
houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not
exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places
like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner
believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a
neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to
inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the
petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any
notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed
"Comelec Poster Areas."

Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
Held: -The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Held: The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or
poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as
important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free
speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal
property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

CASE 18
SANIDAD v COMELEC

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad,
who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19.
Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period,
on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because
it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in
the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While
the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on
his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent
to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently
make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to
either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

CASE 19
CASE DIGEST : SWS vs Comelec

Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting
the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of
information including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey
as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May
14,2001

Issue : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4? The
United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A]
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become
canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this
Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not
related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey
results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election,
§5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators,
armchair theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the governmental interest sought to be
promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression
is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the
restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
§5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
"junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
"dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly
pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech
creates the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.

CASE 20
MOHAMAD CAMPING MITMUG vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (DIVISION I)

FACTS

On May 9, 1980, Comelec made a resolution which read as follows: "it appearing that the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur has canvassed the election returns and tabulated the votes
obtained by the candidates, except election returns which has been excluded, and in order not to deprive the
Municipality of The services of its elective municipal officials, the Commission [resolved,] as it hereby
resolves, to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers to immediately convene and temporarily proclaim, after
due notice, the winning mayoralty candidate of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, pursuant to Resolution No.
9434, as amended by Resolution No. 9440, of this Commission, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
said cases. 1

Mitmug must have had the impression that if such resolution be implemented his opponent, respondent
Mangayao Dagalangit would be proclaimed, thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Comelec. The issue raised, therefore, is the validity of allowing a temporary proclamation, prior to the
canvassing being completed. Mitmug filed a restraining order issued on June 26, 1980, against respondent
Mangayao Dagalangit to "DESIST from assuming, discharging or performing the functions or duties of
Municipal Mayor and to further claim and receive salaries therefor.”

Subsequently on January 13, 1981 there was a manifestation filed by respondent Commission on Elections to
the effect that: "Inasmuch as the Court's restraining Order of June 26, 1980 did not restrain the enforcement
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9759 dated May 7, 1980, the fingerprint division of COMELEC proceeded with
the examination and analysis of fingerprints and signatures on the records of voting and the books of voters
specified in the said COMELEC Resolution of May 7, 1981, and has now submitted its report on the matter.
Accordingly, COMELEC issued an order dated January 8, 1981 setting the pre-proclamation cases for
hearing on January 19, 1981 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning,

The latest pleading, received on March 19, 1981, is a manifestation submitted directly to the Supreme Court
by respondent Commission: " 1. That the new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del
Sur, xxx convened and canvassed the votes of candidates for Mayor of said municipality, on March 14, 1981,
at, 10:00 o'clock in the morning, xxx ; and 2. That after the aforesaid canvass, the results showed that the
votes obtained by the three (3) candidates for Mayor are as follows: (1) Mangayao Dagalangit — 2,376 votes
(2) Mohamad Lamping Mitmug — 1,432 votes (3) Bambai Dagalangit — 54 votes and, thereafter, the same
board of canvassers proclaimed Mangayao N. Dagalangit, one of the respondents in this case, as the duly
elected Mayor of Lumba Bayabao, Lanao del Sur."

ISSUE: WON TRO is valid

RULING: It is thus clear that the objective of the petitioner is to prevent a temporary proclamation. With the
canvassing completed and the proclamation made, private respondent emerging as the victor with the right
reserved to petitioner to file his corresponding election protest, this case has become moot and academic.

Moreover, this mode of disposing the case is in accordance with the invariable principle followed by this Court
given its formulation as to disqualification controversies in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections. 6 It is
equally applicable to petitions raising questions more appropriately decided in an election protest. By virtue
thereof, proceedings filed with us after January 30, 1980 are dismissed, without prejudice to having the issues
passed upon in the appropriate contests before the proper agency. The time that had elapsed since the 1980
election emphasizes the validity and wisdom of such an approach. It is even more appropriate here. An
election protest should settle the matter conclusively once and for all, instead of the parties being caught in
the procedural meshes of a pre proclamation controversy.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. This decision is immediately executory. The temporary restraining
order issued on June 26, 1980 is lifted. No costs.