THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240053. October 9, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. MARIA CRISTINA P.

SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO , respondents.

DECISION

HERNANDO , J : p

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a
novel question of law. May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane),
who was convicted of drug tra cking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Government and who is presently con ned in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by
way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness by the accused? HTcADC

This petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the December 13, 2017 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002
which granted respondent's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and reversed the
August 16, 2016 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 88, of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the prosecution to take the deposition by
written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.

The Factual Antecedents

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius)
were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire
situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic
helper in Malaysia. Believing that the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped
whatever meager money she had and when the amount was not even enough to pay
Cristina and Julius as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from relatives. Still, the
amount gathered was insu cient prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even their
precious motorcycle. On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually
left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by
Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was no longer
available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia
for a seven-day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in
Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her
trip.
Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police o cers for allegedly carrying 2.6
kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged with drug
trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed them
that she was currently detained in Indonesia. Mary Jane's family immediately
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 confronted Cristina who instead of helping them even threatened them to keep the
matter to themselves and not to divulge the same especially to the media. She even
told Mary Jane's family that she is part of an international drug syndicate who would
spend millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.
However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
convicted Mary Jane of drug tra cking and sentenced her to death by ring squad.
After the a rmance of her conviction by the High Court and the Supreme Court of
Indonesia, Mary Jane and eight other felons who were similarly convicted of drug-
related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of Nusakambangan, off
Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by ring squad, which was originally
scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Eventually, the eight
companions of Mary Jane were executed by ring squad. Presently, Mary Jane is
detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives
of the Anti-Human Tra cking Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Thereafter, they were charged with quali ed tra cking in person in violation of Section
4 (a) in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise
known as "Anti-Tra cking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as Criminal Case No. SD
(15)-3723. 4 Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two separate Informations
with the crime of illegal recruitment as penalized under Section 6, par. (k) and (l) of R.A.
No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of
1995," and estafa in violation of Section 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SD (15)-3724, 5 and SD (15)-3753, 6 respectively, led
before the trial court. Upon arraignment, Cristina and Julius entered a plea of "not guilty"
on all charges.
On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane.
She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso."
aScITE

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated
how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in Malaysia, she and
Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia.
Cristina has a boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a
brother named "Ike." On April 24, 2010, Mary Jane and Cristina went to the hotel parking
lot and met with "Ike" who was on board a white car. They then went inside the car
wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned to the hotel room,
Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was unusually heavy but,
upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was
heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same
bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the
airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.
On the basis of her a davit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the
Indonesian Government that the recruiters and tra ckers of Mary Jane were already in
police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary
Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an inde nite
reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary of the Indonesian Government informed the public that
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 President Widodo received reports about the on-going legal proceedings in the
Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her recruiters were already
in police custody.
Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred inde nitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and
"Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her to engage in drug
trafficking.
The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to
the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia ;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in
writing .
Thereafter, the State led a " Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. " 7 It
averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because
she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due
to her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon
written interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules of
Court. Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of direct
testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental Cases and the Judicial
A davit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius will still have an
opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written
interrogatories through the designated consular o cer who will be taking the
deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and
answers. HEITAD

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should
be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open
court and the use thereof is con ned only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such
method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or
to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial A davit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the prosecution's
motion subject to the following conditions:
1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed
questions in the written interrogatories, the accused, through counsel, is given a
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit their comment
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 to the proposed questions on the deposition upon written interrogatories for the
witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the Comment, the Court shall
promptly rule on the objections;
2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The nal
questions for the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections), shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his
designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the O ce of the
Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished
the accused, through counsel, who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;
4. The Prosecution is given the same period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the proposed cross interrogatory questions of the Defense stating the ground
for the objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule on
the objections;
5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions
for the deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be
presided by the undersigned trial judge. The nal questions for the written cross
interrogatories (after ruling on the Prosecution's objections) shall be
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his
designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written cross
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the O ce of the
Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;
6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories,
the testimony of Mary Jane Veloso by way of deposition upon written
interrogatories shall be deemed terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds
re-direct written interrogatories on the deponent, the above-mentioned procedure
for the conduct of direct and cross interrogatories shall be observed. 8
Cristina and Julius immediately led their " Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed Questions for
Deposition of Mary Jane Veloso. " 9 However, the trial court denied their Omnibus
Motion in its November 3, 2016 Resolution. 1 0
Undeterred, Cristina and Julius led a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction 1 1 before
the Court of Appeals averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her discretion in
the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. ATICcS

Ruling of the Court of Appeals :

Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate
court, in its assailed December 13, 2017 Decision, granted the Petition for Certiorari
and reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to
the RTC's findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to the
appellate court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart from such rule
and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies in civil
cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her
conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the
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 case is pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88,
and that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings, should be
notified thereof so they can attend the examination.
The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the
deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories will violate the right of Cristina
and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the witness face to face.
The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration 1 2 but it
was denied by the appellate court in its June 5, 2018 Resolution. 1 3
Aggrieved, the OSG led the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court before this Court alleging mainly that: (a) the Court of Appeals
erred in giving due course to Cristina and Julius's petition for certiorari because there
was another plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law;
in addition, the OSG contended that the Petition for Certiorari should not have been
given due course considering the lack of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court; and; (b) Rule 23 of the Rules of Court with
respect to deposition under written interrogatories can be applied suppletorily in the
taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her extraordinary circumstances.
Meantime, spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, led a "Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention." 1 4 They prayed
to be allowed to intervene, on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant proceeding for the
purpose of protecting and preserving their daughter's substantial and immediate
interest. Attached to their motion was their Petition-In-Intervention. 1 5
The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion. 1 6 It
informed the Court that the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the criminal cases
in accordance with A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial
of Criminal Cases. The prosecution has only Mary Jane to present as a witness. Hence,
the OSG prays that the Court immediately resolve the instant Petition for Review and to
suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal proceedings before the
trial court.
In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution, 1 7 it denied the motion for intervention
of Mary Jane's parents for failure to establish legal interest in the instant case that is
actual and material as well as direct and immediate. The Court likewise denied the
OSG's prayer to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal
proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.

Issues

(a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;
(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through
deposition by written interrogatories. TIADCc

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

On Procedural Matters
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 The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting
the respondents' Petition for Certiorari there being other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. It further argues that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the State's motion to allow the
taking of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written interrogatories.
The Court agrees.
Impropriety of the writ of certiorari
before the Court of Appeals

A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available only

to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. In other words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction,
and not errors of procedure or mistakes in the ndings or conclusions of the
lower court . Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and
not by a petition for certiorari. 1 8
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cruz v. People , 1 9 citing Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 2 0 is instructive on the scope of certiorari:
We remind that the writ of certiorari — being a remedy narrow in scope
and in exible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or
authority in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop,
and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ
o f certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding
agents or o cers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ
would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors
were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial
injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior
court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according
to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-
judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains
much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however,
the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by
laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior
court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or o cer. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that
purpose[.] AIDSTE

xxx xxx xxx

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the
tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
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 without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
of amending or nullifying the proceeding. (Citations omitted)
It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina
and Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the
factual milieu, and the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for
Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that can support a nding of grave abuse
of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to erroneous exercise of the
lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, which does
not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a certiorari proceeding.
Grave abuse of discretion is de ned as "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 2 1 It arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 2 2
The Supreme Court explained in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 2 3 viz.:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a speci c meaning. An act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is
restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing de nition, it is clear that
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for
having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could
manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x.
In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial
court abused its discretion, much less that the exercise thereof was so patent and
gross and to amount to lack of jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply
stated in its assailed Decision that the trial court merely erred, and not abuse its
discretion, much more grave , in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
instead of Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in criminal
cases. Notably, the appellate court did not specify the circumstances in support of its
conclusion that the trial court arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary and despotic
manner. On the contrary, a close examination of the trial court's judgment shows that it
was anchored on the peculiar incidents surrounding the case, and applied jurisprudence
and rules which it believed were pertinent. It has in fact judiciously discussed the
rationale for its decision to allow the taking of Mary Jane's deposition through written
interrogatories in this wise: AaCTcI

First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requiring prosecution witnesses who are either sick or in rm or has left the
Philippines without any date of return, to deliver their testimony in open court
cannot be applied to the private complainant, because her situation as a death
row convict in a foreign country incapacitates her from making decisions, on her
own, to take the witness stand. Such decision to testify and the manner by
which her testimony is to be given depends on the Indonesian authorities before
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 whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death;
Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court found it appropriate to apply in a
suppletory manner, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Court for the taking of the
private complainant's deposition upon written interrogatories. Sec. 1, Rule 23 of
the Revised Rules of Court speci cally provides that the deposition of a person
con ned in prison may be taken only by leave of court upon such terms as the
court prescribes;
Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb x x
x, the Supreme Court categorically declared that "due process is not a monopoly
of the defense. The State is entitled to due process as much as the accused." To
deny the motion of the Prosecution would result in a highly inequitable situation
where the sole witness relied upon by the Prosecution to establish their case
would be denied the opportunity to present her case due to procedural
technicalities which are beyond her control;
Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is speci cally aimed at
perpetuating the testimony of the private complainant, thus said deposition may
be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal pursuant to Rule
24 of the Revised Rules of Court in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide in the previously cited case of People vs. Webb, be a rmed that
depositions may be allowed in criminal cases and may be taken at any time
after the commencement of the action whenever necessary or convenient, x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e., quali ed human tra cking, is
a major transnational crime committed across continents. Unlike the previously
cited cases of Cuenco and Go where the offenses involved are non-index crimes
(i.e., estafa and other deceits), the subject suit involves a major transnational
crime that cuts across borders and is a principal policy concern among nations.
Thus, the Court believes that the Prosecution should not be denied the
opportunity to prove its case, thus assuring the global community that the
Philippines is committed to fight such modern day menace[.] 2 4
Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of
deposition through written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary,
whimsical, and capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was
so gross in nature thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. 2 5
What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly considered
the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Su ce it to state that the Decision of the trial court
was not without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the
trial court to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law. EcTCAD

As already adverted, the case at hand is unprecedented. It involves novel issues

and poses di cult questions of law. It is settled jurisprudence that "[a] doubtful or
di cult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law
always accords to public o cials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of o cial duties. x x x Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has
the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive." 2 6 As such, no abuse of discretion, much
more grave abuse of discretion, may be successfully imputed against the trial court.
In ne, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in nding grave abuse of
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 discretion on the part of the trial court and in holding that respondents' resort to a
Petition for Certiorari was proper.
This now brings our discussion to the substantive issues.
On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary
Jane's conviction by nal judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, while awaiting execution by ring squad; the grant by the Indonesian
President of an inde nite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against
Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve
particularly that Mary Jane should remain in con nement in Indonesia, and any question
propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have
allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG's contentions are meritorious.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the
State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the
suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that
the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated
since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect and preserve
their rights.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
is inapplicable in the instant case

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary
Jane's testimony through written interrogatories in Indonesia is not sanctioned by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the
pronouncements of the Court in Go v. People 2 7 and Cuenco vda. De Manguerra v. Risos
2 8 that Section 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be given any suppletory
application. It held that "just like a witness who is sick or in rm, Mary Jane's
imprisonment in Indonesia presents a limitation on her mobility." 2 9 According to the
Court of Appeals, Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must be taken before
the court where the case is pending. In other words, the appellate court opines that
Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the cases of
respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.
The Court begs to differ. HSAcaE

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
in rm to appear at the trial as directed by the court , or has to leave the
Philippines with no de nite date of returning , he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in
the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
(Emphasis Ours.)
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 Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution
witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that
the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or in rm to appear at the trial as
directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no de nite
date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither
too sick nor in rm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines inde nitely. To
recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted by nal
judgment of the crime of drug tra cking, a grave offense in the said state. In fact, she
was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her execution by ring squad. Her
situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by reason of ill-health or
feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary Jane's
predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one place to
another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with little or no
hope of being saved from the extreme penalty of death by firing squad.
It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De
Manguera v. Risos are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the
prosecution witnesses in the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justi ed the strict
adherence to Rule 119. The witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify
by way of deposition on their claims that they were too sick or in rm to testify before
the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to Cambodia claimed that he was
undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel back to the Philippines due
to his illness.
Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra averred
that she would not be able to testify before the trial court due to weak physical
condition and age. Note, however, that despite the limitation in the mobility of Li Luen
Pen and Concepcion, they can still undoubted voluntarily take the witness stand and
testify before the trial court should they get better or so decide.
This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single step
out of the prison facility of her own volition without facing severe consequences. Her
imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of
any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial
court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending.
Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written
interrogatories and effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly
applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the
concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the prejudice
that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering the
circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to
happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was akin
to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish
its case against the respondents. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present
case made it impossible for Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by the respondents and taken
advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being repeated
because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire
circumstances which they themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to
speak and obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into account the
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 fact that the case of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected
through the testimony of Mary Jane herself.
Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written
interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the
People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.
By its belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in
effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary
Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the
opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of
reprieve to Mary Jane. HESIcT

It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion , 3 0 "[t]he due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but
more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an unde ned and expanding
future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and
the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and
improvement . Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket , the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause
'gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decisions of cases as they arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it
refers to 'the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila , 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366)." Thus, it behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have
provided some leeway in its interpretation of the subject provision.
At this juncture, we nd the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado instructive and relevant, viz.: 3 1
1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action, viz.:
a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23) ;
b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24) ;
c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25) ;
d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26) ;
e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27) ; and
f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28) ;
Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party to
comply with such modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by the adverse party.
2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the
prosecution was formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the purpose of
perpetuating the evidence to be presented at the trial, without a similar provision
for defense witnesses. However, in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, only
the conditional examination, and not a deposition, of prosecution witnesses
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 was permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed in the latest revision
(Sec. 15, Rule 119).
3. Depositions are classified into:
a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written
interrogatories; or
b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam.
Depositions de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending
action and are regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam are those taken to perpetuate evidence for purposes of an
anticipated action or further proceedings in a case on appeal and are now
regulated by Rule 24.
4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken
upon oral examination or written interrogatories to prevent abuse or harassment
(De los Reyes vs. CA, et al., L-27263, Mar. 17, 1975).
The extraordinary factual circumstances
surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's
testimony as a prosecution witness proper?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 3 2 Simply put, rules of
procedure should facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They should not be
strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. This precept has
been elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 3 3 to wit:
[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to
suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so
as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be nal, as
we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional
basis. x x x ICHDca

There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to
serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c)
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) n the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. 3 4
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige the
Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress, "[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's
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 substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed." 3 5
The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known as
the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, was entered into by the Southeast Asian
countries namely: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia,
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, Republic of the
Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement
authorities of the state parties in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of
offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
Article 1, paragraph 2 (a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can be
rendered by the state parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary
statements from persons , among others. The legal assistance sought by the
Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not without limitations. In fact, Article 3
of the ASEAN MLAT has laid down guidelines on limitations on assistance. In particular,
paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render legal
assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party must observe.
To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in taking
the testimony of Mary Jane:
a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia ;
b) No cameras shall be allowed;
c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;
d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing .
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state
how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a
grave offense by nal judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken
to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he
is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under
the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings
so long as there is compelling reason.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by
applying suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal
proceedings. TCAScE

For one, in Canos v. Peralta , 3 6 the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge
did not abuse his discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of the
criminal cases that were led against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned, among
others, that consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure.
The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court 3 7 and
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 3 8 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the
consolidation of the criminal case and civil case that were respectively led against the
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 petitioners therein.
On that score, the Court nds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally
construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.
The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that
were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written
interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which
read:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination
or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in
foreign countries. — In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a)
on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such
person or o cer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory;
or (c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice
and of interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a
notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and
the name or descriptive title and address of the o cer before whom the
deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may
serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
Within ve (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon
a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being
served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories
upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the
grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony,
being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were led
against Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the Indonesian
President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to afford
Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the
Philippines. cTDaEH

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with

the aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters
among signatory states including the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is enforced
precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the
signi cance of cooperation and coordination among the states to prevent, investigate
and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just
like in the case of drug and human tra cking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges
that were filed against respondents.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the
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 Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
The deposition by written interrogatories
is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right
to due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all
the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to
follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty.
But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State
entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal
chance to present its evidence in support of a charge. 3 9
Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of
Mary Jane's deposition by written interrogatories. The grant of the written
interrogatories by the Indonesian Government perceives the State's opportunity to
present all its desired witnesses in the prosecution of its cases against Cristina and
Julius. It is afforded fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence it deem vital to
ensure that the injury sustained by the People in the commission of the criminal acts
will be well compensated and, most of all, that justice be achieved. Hence, the right of
the State to prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld and protected.
Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and Julius
should not be derailed and prevented by the stringent application of the procedural
rules. Otherwise, it will constitute a violation of the basic constitutional rights of the
State and of Mary Jane to due process which this Court cannot disregard. cSaATC

The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally upheld
and protected so that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the word. To do justice
to accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be dispensed to
all the parties alike. 4 0 As aptly held in Dimatulac v. Villon: 4 1
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same
devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate
with the public trust and con dence reposed in him. Although the determination
of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
reasonable con nes. The judge's action must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to
due process of law .
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is
not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society
and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered . Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice,
and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society
offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must
be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
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 offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)

No violation of the constitutional right

to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the

constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of
an accused. It is ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the
1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14 (2), to wit:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face , and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly noti ed and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings
but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers. 4 2 It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused
an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2)
secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness. 4 3
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face
in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by
the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane
by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the rst purpose of their
constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their
counsel, to le their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in
the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall
promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the nal questions would be asked by
the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The
answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a
transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would,
in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should
the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on
the same, and the nal cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane
will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be
taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution. cHDAIS

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise

been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition,
the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on
Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the
demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court
judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she
answers each question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally
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 safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are su cient in detail
ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of
perjury charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the
presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court
judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized
exceptions to the right to confrontation. 4 4 In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to
state that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying
declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written
interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death — or execution by a
ring squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by nal judgment and
sentenced to death by ring squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all available legal
remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the
Indonesian authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane
to assist the prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and tra ckers.
There was nary any mention that the outcome of the legal proceedings here in the
Philippines will have a concomitant effect in Mary Jane's conviction by the Indonesian
authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is undisputed considering the
nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore not a stretch of
imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in her deposition "are made in
extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone;
when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth," 4 5 to vindicate oneself, and to secure
justice to her detractors.
All told, the Court nds reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals. It erred when it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of Cristina and
Julius considering that the errors ascribed therein were mere errors of judgment which
do not lie in a certiorari proceeding. More importantly, the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the
taking of testimony of Mary Jane by way of deposition through written interrogatories
in light of the conditions of Mary Jane's reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia.
These are compelling reasons to liberally construe the procedural rules and apply
suppletorily the Rules on Civil Procedure. Yet still, the fundamental rights, not only of the
State, but also of the accused Cristina and Julius have been fully and equally protected
and preserved in the pursuit of justice.
WHEREFORE , the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13, 2017
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE . The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the deposition will be taken before our Consular O ce and o cials in Indonesia
pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.
The recommendation by the O ce of the Solicitor General for this Court to
promulgate a set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in transnational
cases that may arise in the future, where a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal
proceeding is unavailable for reasons other than those listed in Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the enforcement of the accused's
constitutional right to confront witnesses face-to-face is NOTED and REFERRED to
this Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules for its appropriate action. ISHCcT

SO ORDERED .
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 Peralta, Leonen and A.B. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Inting, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 11-81.

2. Id. at 90-107; penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Renato C. Francisco.
3. Id. at 117-129.

4. Id. at 214-216.
5. Id. at 217-219.

6. Id. at 220-222.

7. Id. at 223-233.
8. Id. at 128-129.

9. Id. at 274-297.

10. Id. at 130-146.

11. Id. at 387-414.

12. Id. at 147-191.

13. Id. at 109-116.

14. Id. at 613-618.

15. Id. at 619-655.

16. Id. at 751-757.

17. Id. at 765-770.

18. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 702 Phil. 263, 279 (2013).

19. 812 Phil. 166, 172 (2017).

20. 698 Phil. 1, 14-16 (2012).

21. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17, 518 Phil.
455, 462 (2006), citing Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., 498 Phil. 825 (2005).

22. Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 183, 197 (2008).

23. 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011).

24. Rollo, pp. 125-127.

25. First Women's Credit Corp. v. Perez, 524 Phil. 305, 309 (2006).

26. Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 14, 32 (2001).

27. 691 Phil. 440 (2012).

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 28. 585 Phil. 490 (2008).

29. Rollo, p. 102.

30. 379 Phil. 165 (2000).

31. Regalado, Florenz D., REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOLUME I, 9th Edition, 2004, at 334-
335.
32. Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 6.

33. 326 Phil. 182, 190 (1996).

34. Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 244, 272, citing Barnes v.
Hon. Quijano Padilla, 500 Phil. 303, 311 (2005); Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil.
665, 674 (2003).

35. Philippine Savings Bank v. Papa, G.R. No. 200469, January 15, 2018, citing Lazaro v. Court
of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).
36. 201 Phil. 422, 426-427 (1982).

37. 247 Phil. 468 (1988).

38. 280 Phil. 678 (1991).

39. People v. Verra, 432 Phil. 279, 282-283 (2002), citing 16B Am. Jur. 2d. § 946.

40. People v. Tac-an, 446 Phil. 496, 505-506 (2003).

41. 358 Phil. 328, 365 (1998).

42. Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas Manggagawang Pilipino, 159 Phil. 310, 315 (1975).

43. People v. Nicolas, 436 Phil. 462, 476-477 (2002).

44. Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary ,
Volume 1, 1987 Edition, p. 393.

45. Id.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "t" in the original document.

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