M
M
DECISION
JARDELEZA , J : p
These are consolidated petitions 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA)
July 19, 2010 Decision 2 and May 2, 2011 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90031. The CA
modi ed the February 26, 2007 Decision, 4 as amended by the June 19, 2007
Amendatory Order 5 (Amended Decision), of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Batangas City in the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 5808 and LRC Case No. N-
1685. The RTC nulli ed the extrajudicial foreclosure sales over petitioners-spouses
Rodrigo and Erlinda Mercado's (spouses Mercado) properties, and the interest rates
imposed by petitioner Security Bank Corporation (Security Bank). HEITAD
On October 19, 1999, the foreclosure sale of the parcel of land in Lipa City,
Batangas was held wherein Security Bank was adjudged as the winning bidder. The
Certi cate of Sale 1 6 over it was issued on November 3, 1999. A similar foreclosure
sale was conducted over the parcels of land in Batangas City and San Jose, Batangas
where Security Bank was likewise adjudged as the winning bidder. The Certi cate of
Sale 1 7 over these properties was issued on October 29, 1999. Both Certi cates of Sale
were registered, respectively, with the Registry of Deeds of Lipa City on November 11,
1999 and the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City on November 17, 1999. 1 8
On September 18, 2000, the spouses Mercado offered to redeem the foreclosed
properties for P10,000,000.00. However, Security Bank allegedly refused the offer and
made a counter-offer in the amount of P15,000,000.00. 1 9 ATICcS
The foreclosure sales of the properties in Batangas City and San Jose,
Batangas are void for non-compliance with the publication requirement of the
notice of sale.
Act No. 3135, as amended, provides for the statutory requirements for a valid
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Among the requisites is a valid notice of sale. Section 3,
as amended, requires that when the value of the property reaches a threshold, the
notice of sale must be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation:
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not
less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city . (Emphasis supplied.) AIDSTE
We have time and again underscored the importance of the notice of sale and its
publication. Publication of the notice is required "to give the x x x foreclosure sale a
reasonably wide publicity such that those interested might attend the public sale." 5 3 It
gives as much advertising to the sale as possible in order to secure bidders and
prevent a sacri ce of the property. We reiterated this in Caubang v. Crisologo 5 4 where
we said:
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is
not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms
of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacri ce of the
property. Therefore, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale, at the very least,
voidable. Certainly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are
mandated and imbued with public policy considerations. Failure to advertise a
mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with the statutory requirements
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constitutes a jurisdictional defect, and any substantial error in a notice of sale
will render the notice insu cient and will consequently vitiate the sale. 5 5
(Citation omitted.)
Failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory
requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. 5 6 This
jurisdictional requirement may not be waived by the parties; to allow them to do so
would convert the required public sale into a private sale. 5 7 Thus, the statutory
provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the
notice and render the sale at least voidable. 5 8
To demonstrate the strictness of the rule, we have invalidated foreclosure sales
for lighter reasons. In one case, 5 9 we declared a foreclosure sale void for failing to
comply with the requirement that the notice shall be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks. There, although the notice was published three times, the
second publication of the notice was done on the rst day of the third week, and not
within the period for the second week. 6 0
Nevertheless, the validity of a notice of sale is not affected by immaterial errors.
6 1 Only a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insu cient and vitiate the sale. 6 2 An error is substantial if it will deter or mislead
bidders, depreciate the value of the property or prevent it from bringing a fair price. 6 3
In this case, the errors in the notice consist of: (1) TCT No. T-33150 — "Lot 952-
C-1" which should be "Lot 952-C-1-B ;'' (2) TCT No. T-89822 — "Lot 1931, Cadm-164-D"
which should be "Lot 1931 Cadm 4 64-D;" 6 4 and (3) the omission of the location. 6 5
While the errors seem inconsequential, they in fact constitute data important to
prospective bidders when they decide whether to acquire any of the lots announced to
be auctioned. First, the published notice misidenti ed the identity of the properties.
Since the lot numbers are misstated, the notice effectively identi ed lots other than the
ones sought to be sold. Second, the published notice omitted the exact locations of the
properties. As a result, prospective buyers are left completely unaware of the type of
neighborhood and conforming areas they may consider buying into. With the properties
misidenti ed and their locations omitted, the properties' sizes and ultimately, the
determination of their probable market prices, are consequently compromised. The
errors are of such nature that they will signi cantly affect the public's decision on
whether to participate in the public auction. We nd that the errors can deter or mislead
bidders, depreciate the value of the properties or prevent the process from fetching a
fair price.
Our ruling nds support in San Jose v. Court of Appeals 6 6 where we nulli ed a
foreclosure sale on the ground that the notice did not contain the correct number of the
TCT of the property to be sold. We rejected the contention of the mortgagee-creditor
that prospective bidders may still rely on the technical description because it was
accurate. We held that the notice must contain the correct title number and technical
description of the property to be sold:
The Notice of Sheriff[']s Sale, in this case, did not state the correct
number of the transfer certi cate of title of the property to be sold. This is a
substantial and fatal error which resulted in invalidating the entire Notice. That
the correct technical description appeared on the Notice does not constitute
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The purpose of the
publication of the Notice of Sheriff[']s Sale is to inform all interested parties of
the date, time and place of the foreclosure sale of the real property subject
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thereof. Logically, this not only requires that the correct date, time and place of
the foreclosure sale appear in the notice but also that any and all interested
parties be able to determine that what is about to be sold at the foreclosure sale
is the real property in which they have an interest.AaCTcI
The Court is not unaware of the fact that the majority of the population
do not have the necessary knowledge to be able to understand the technical
descriptions in certi cates of title. It is to be noted and stressed that the Notice
is not meant only for individuals with the training to understand technical
descriptions of property but also for the layman with an interest in the property
to be sold, who normally relies on the number of the certi cate of title. To hold
that the publication of the correct technical description, with an incorrect title
number, of the property to be sold constitutes substantial compliance would
certainly defeat the purpose of the Notice. This is not to say that a correct
statement of the title number but with an incorrect technical description in the
notice of sale constitutes a valid notice of sale. The Notice of Sheriff[']s
Sale, to be valid, must contain the correct title number and the correct
technical description of the property to be sold . 6 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
We do not agree with Security Bank's reliance on OCA Circular No. 14 (s. 1984).
While it is true that the circular does not require the full technical description of the
properties, it still requires the inclusion of the salient portions such as the lot number of
the property and its boundaries. 6 8 In any case, what is apparent is that Security Bank
published incorrect data in the notice that could bring about confusion to prospective
bidders. In fact, their subsequent publication of an erratum is recognition that the error
is signi cant enough to bring about confusion as to the identity, location, and size of
the properties.
The publication of a single erratum, however, does not cure the defect. As
correctly pointed out by the RTC, "[t]he act of making only one corrective publication in
the publication requirement, instead of three (3) corrections is a fatal omission
committed by the mortgagee bank." 6 9 To reiterate, the published notices that contain
fatal errors are nullities. Thus, the erratum is considered as a new notice that is subject
to the publication requirement for once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city where the property is
located. Here, however, it was published only once.
While there are cases where we upheld foreclosure sales on the ground that the
mortgagor-debtor's act of redeeming the property amounts to estoppel, we cannot
apply this equitable principle here. For one, Security Bank never raised the issue in its
pleadings. Defenses and objections that are not pleaded in the answer or motion to
dismiss are deemed waived. 7 0 Second, estoppel is a mere principle in equity. We
cannot grant estoppel for the reason that Security Bank itself denies that the spouses
Mercado offered to redeem the Batangas properties. 7 1 Thus, the element of reliance is
absent.
II
The interest rate provisions in the parties' agreement violate the principle
of mutuality of contracts.
a.
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The principle of mutuality of contracts is found in Article 1308 of the New Civil
Code, which states that contracts must bind both contracting parties, and its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. The binding effect of any
agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled principles: (1) that
any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and (2)
that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality. 7 2
As such, any contract which appears to be heavily weighted in favor of one of the
parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. Likewise, any stipulation
regarding the validity or compliance of the contract that is potestative or is left solely
to the will of one of the parties is invalid. 7 3 This holds true not only as to the original
terms of the contract but also to its modi cations. Consequently, any change in a
contract must be made with the consent of the contracting parties, and must be
mutually agreed upon. Otherwise, it has no binding effect. 7 4
Stipulations as to the payment of interest are subject to the principle of mutuality
of contracts. As a principal condition and an important component in contracts of loan,
7 5 interest rates are only allowed if agreed upon by express stipulation of the parties,
and only when reduced into writing. 7 6 Any change to it must be mutually agreed upon,
or it produces no binding effect:
Basic is the rule that there can be no contract in its true sense without the
mutual assent of the parties. If this consent is absent on the part of one who
contracts, the act has no more e cacy than if it had been done under duress or
by a person of unsound mind. Similarly, contract changes must be made with
the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as
to the proposed modi cation, especially when it affects an important aspect of
the agreement. In the case of loan contracts, the interest rate is undeniably
always a vital component, for it can make or break a capital venture. Thus, any
change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it produces no binding effect.
7 7 (Citation omitted.) EcTCAD
Thus, in several cases, we declared void stipulations that allowed for the
unilateral modi cation of interest rates. In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals ,
7 8 we disallowed the creditor-bank from increasing the stipulated interest rate at will
for being violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts. We said:
Besides violating P.D. 116, the unilateral action of the PNB in increasing
the interest rate on the private respondent's loan, violated the mutuality of
contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code:
"ART. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties;
its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their
essential equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its ful llment
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting
parties, is void (Garcia vs. Rita Legarda, Inc., 21 SCRA 555). Hence, even
assuming that the P1.8 million loan agreement between the PNB and the private
respondent gave the PNB a license (although in fact there was none) to increase
the interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that license would have been
null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality essential in
contracts. It would have invested the loan agreement with the character of a
contract of adhesion, where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the
weaker party's (the debtor) participation being reduced to the alternative "to take
it or leave it" (Qua vs. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., 95 Phil. 85). Such a
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contract is a veritable trap for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must
protect against abuse and imposition. 7 9 (Italics in the original.)
The same treatment is given to stipulations that give one party the unbridled
discretion, without the conformity of the other, to increase the rate of interest
notwithstanding the inclusion of a similar discretion to decrease it. In Philippine
Savings Bank v. Castillo 8 0 we declared void a stipulation 8 1 that allows for both an
increase or decrease of the interest rate, without subjecting the modi cation to the
mutual agreement of the parties:
Escalation clauses are generally valid and do not contravene public
policy. They are common in credit agreements as means of maintaining scal
stability and retaining the value of money on long-term contracts. To prevent
any one-sidedness that these clauses may cause, we have held in Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Judge Navarro that there should be a
corresponding de-escalation clause that would authorize a reduction in the
interest rates corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the
Monetary Board. As can be gleaned from the parties' loan agreement, a de-
escalation clause is provided, by virtue of which, petitioner had lowered its
interest rates.
Nevertheless, the validity of the escalation clause did not give petitioner
the unbridled right to unilaterally adjust interest rates. The adjustment should
have still been subjected to the mutual agreement of the contracting parties. In
light of the absence of consent on the part of respondents to the modi cations
in the interest rates, the adjusted rates cannot bind them notwithstanding the
inclusion of a de-escalation clause in the loan agreement. 8 2 (Underscoring
supplied; citation omitted.)
We reiterated this in Juico v. China Banking Corporation , 8 3 where we held that
the lack of written notice and written consent of the borrowers made the interest
proviso a one-sided imposition that does not have the force of law between the parties:
This notwithstanding, we hold that the escalation clause is still void
because it grants respondent the power to impose an increased rate of interest
without a written notice to petitioners and their written consent. Respondent's
monthly telephone calls to petitioners advising them of the prevailing interest
rates would not su ce. A detailed billing statement based on the new imposed
interest with corresponding computation of the total debt should have been
provided by the respondent to enable petitioners to make an informed decision.
An appropriate form must also be signed by the petitioners to indicate their
conformity to the new rates. Compliance with these requisites is essential to
preserve the mutuality of contracts. For indeed, one-sided impositions do not
have the force of law between the parties, because such impositions are not
based on the parties' essential equality. 8 4 (Citation omitted.)
In the case of Silos v. Philippine National Bank , 85 we invalidated the following
provisions:
1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of
19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred
twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in
the Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future,
including without limitation, the shifting from the oating interest rate system to
the xed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the
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Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the Bank's spread over the
current oating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees that the Bank may,
without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread over the
oating interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in
the future. 8 6 (Emphasis and citation omitted, italics supplied.)
HSAcaE
b.
Security Bank argues that the subject provisions on the interest rate observed
the principle of mutuality of contracts. It claims that there is a ceiling on the maximum
applicable rate, and it is the market forces that dictate and establish the rate of
interest.
We disagree.
The RTC and CA were correct in holding that the interest provisions in the
revolving credit line agreement and its addendum violate the principle of mutuality of
contracts.
First, the authority to change the interest rate was given to Security Bank alone as
the lender, without need of the written assent of the spouses Mercado. This unbridled
discretion given to Security Bank is evidenced by the clause "I hereby give my
continuing consent without need of additional con rmation to the interests stipulated
as computed by [Security Bank]." 9 3 The lopsidedness of the imposition of interest
rates is further highlighted by the lack of a breakdown of the interest rates imposed by
Security Bark in its statement of account 9 4 accompanying its demand letter.
Second, the interest rate to be imposed is determined solely by Security Bank for
lack of a stated, valid reference rate. The reference rate of "Security Bank's prevailing
lending rate" is not pegged on a market-based reference rate as required by the BSP. In
this regard, we do not agree with the CA that this case is similar with Polotan, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals (Eleventh Division). 9 5 There, we declared that escalation clauses are
not basically wrong or legally objectionable as long as they are not solely potestative
but based on reasonable and valid grounds. We held that the interest rate based on the
"prevailing market rate" is valid because it cannot be said to be dependent solely on the
will of the bank as it is also dependent on the prevailing market rates. The uctuation in
the market rates is beyond the control of the bank. 9 6 Here, however, the stipulated
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interest rate based on "Security Bank's prevailing lending rate" is not synonymous with
"prevailing market rate." For one, Security Bank is still the one who determines its own
prevailing lending rate. More, the argument that Security Bank is guided by other facts
(or external factors such as Singapore Rate, London Rate, Inter-Bank Rate) in
determining its prevailing monthly rate fails because these reference rates are not
contained in writing as required by law and the BSP. Thus, we nd that the interest
stipulations here are akin to the ones invalidated in Silos and in Philippine Savings Bank
for being potestative.
In striking out these provisions, both in the original and the addendum, we note
that there are no other stipulations in writing from which we can base an imposition of
interest. Unlike in cases involving escalation clauses that allowed us to impose the
original rate of interest, we cannot do the same here as there is none. Nevertheless,
while we nd that no stipulated interest rate may be imposed on the obligation, legal
interest may still be imposed on the outstanding loan. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals 9 7 and Nacar v. Gallery Frames 9 8 provide that in the absence of a
stipulated interest, a loan obligation shall earn legal interest from the time of default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand. 9 9
III
In Andal v. Philippine National Bank , 1 0 0 the case cited by the spouses Mercado,
we declared the mortgagor-debtors therein liable to pay interest at the rate equal to the
legal interest rate from the time they defaulted in payment until their loan is fully paid.
We also said that default, for purposes of determining when interest shall run, is to be
counted from the time of the nality of decision determining the rate of interest.
Spouses Mercado claim that following Andal, they, too, could not be deemed to have
been in default from the time of the extrajudicial demand on March 31, 1991. They
claim anew that since the validity of the interest rates is still being determined in this
petition, interest should be imposed only after finality of this Decision.
They err. Andal is not squarely applicable to this case. In that case, there was a
nding by both the trial court and the CA that no default can be declared because of the
arbitrary, illegal, and unconscionable interest rates and penalty charges unilaterally
imposed by the bank. There, the debtors questioned the period of default in relation to
the interest imposed as it was an issue necessary for the determination of the validity
of the foreclosure sales therein. In contrast, here, the spouses Mercado never denied
that they defaulted in the payment of the principal obligation. They did not assert, from
their complaint or up to their petition before this Court, that they would not have been in
default were it not for the bank's imposition of the interest rates. Theories raised for
the first time cannot be entertained in appeal.
Moreover, for purposes of computing when legal interest shall run, it is enough
that the debtor be in default on the principal obligation. To be considered in default
under the revolving credit line agreement, the borrower need not be in default for the
whole amount, but for any amount due. 1 0 1 The spouses Mercado never challenged
Security Bank's claim that they defaulted as to the payment of the principal obligation
of P8,000,000.00. Thus, we nd they have defaulted to this amount at the time Security
Bank made an extrajudicial demand on March 31, 1999. caITAC
Principal P8,000,000.00
P8,800,876.71
––––––––––––
* On official leave.
** Designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2562 dated
June 20, 2018.
*** Designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May
11, 2018.
1. Petition for review on certiorari filed by Security Bank Corporation (formerly known as
Security Bank and Trust Company, rollo (G.R. No. 192934), pp. 24-46; and petition for
review on certiorari filed by the spouses Rodrigo and Erlinda Mercado, rollo (G.R. No.
197010), pp. 9-22. We resolved to consolidate these petitions in our Resolution dated
January 18, 2012, see rollo (G.R. No. 192934), p. 183.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 192934), pp. 9-22; penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with
Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
5. Id. at 79-82.
6. Id. at 51, 94.
7. Id. at 94.
13. An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real-
Estate Mortgages (1924).
14. Rollo (G.R. No. 192934), p. 52.
Such consignation with prior and subsequent notice to the Bank shall automatically
extinguish the P8,000,000.00 loan if seasonably made.
3. [O]rdering the payment of attorney's fees of P50,000.00.
32. Records (Civil Case No. 5808), Vol. II, pp. 83-101.
53. Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr., G.R. No. 164104, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA
394, 400.
54. G.R. No. 174581, February 4, 2015, 749 SCRA 563.
59. Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 134.
64. See TCT No. T-33150, rollo (G.R. No. 192934), p. 106; see also TCT No. T-89822, id. at 100.
72. Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113412, April 17, 1996, 256 SCRA 292, 299-300.
73. Id.
74. Silos v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181045, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 617, 646.
75. Id. at 660.
76. Article 1956 of the New Civil Code provides that: "[n]o interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing."
See also Prisma Construction & Development Corporation v. Menchavez, G.R. No.
160545, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 590, 598.
77. Philippine Savings Bank v. Castillo, G.R. No. 193178, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 527, 537.
78. G.R. No. 88880, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 536.
79. Id. at 544-545.
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80. Supra.
81. Id. at 529. The clause therein provided:
The rate ofinterest and/or bank charges herein stipulated, during the terms of this
promissory note, its extensions, renewals or other modifications, may be increased,
decreased or otherwise changed from time to time within the rate of interest and charges
allowed under present or future law(s) and/or government regulation(s) as the
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK may prescribe for its debtors.
89. Id.
92. Manual of Regulations for Banks, Vol. 1, § X305.3; See also BSP Circular No. 99, December
23, 1995.
93. Records (Civil Case No. 5808), Vol. I, p. 26.
97. G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
98. G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
f) Any creditor tries by legal process to attach or levy on my money or any property with
Security Bank,
g) I apply for voluntary or involuntary relief under the bankruptcy or insolvency laws,
107. This is the computed number of days from March 31, 1999, the date of extrajudicial
demand, until October 19, 1999, the date of the foreclosure sale.