Investment Wisdom From The Super Analysts
Investment Wisdom From The Super Analysts
Investment Wisdom From The Super Analysts
While travelling overseas I have read the book The Super Analysts by Andrew Leeming. It is a series
of interviews with some of highly rated sell side and buy side analysts around the world at the time
(2000). While much of the content of the interviews concerned their specific jobs, Leeming also
asked the analysts for their thoughts on investing in general and some of his questions elicited
advice for private investors and what they do compared to professional investors. On the way
through the book, I flagged some of these thoughts and have discussed them below.
Be a sceptic
This advice came from several analysts. Stuart Baker (Australian oil analyst) advised to “treat them
all as liars and crooks until proven otherwise”. In the context of a sell side analyst, this is sage advice,
even if it is expressed in rather strong terms. However, my experience is that many private investors
have a strong tendency to believe that everything the management of a company says is the whole
truth of a situation, when that is unlikely to be the case.
The longer I spend in the markets, the more sceptical I have become about company
announcements, especially of the negative variety. In particular, I have learned that the first advice
of bad news is rarely the last. This may not be outright dishonesty as Baker suggests in the
quotation. However, companies have a strong tendency to only disclose the minimum of bad news
and to try to throw the best light on it that they can. They also tend to give the impression and
perhaps believe that they have more control over a situation that they actually have. My natural
reaction now is that more bad news is likely to follow rather than that all of the bad news has been
announced initially.
This is where being a technical analyst is very useful. If there is more bad news coming, its shadow
will tend to be cast on the share price. So, if the company says that there has been a problem, but
that it is now all behind it, look at the direction in which the share price is moving. If the price is still
falling, it is safe to assume there are more confessions to be made.
Mistakes
Many of the analysts talked about mistakes. Universally, they stressed that there was nothing wrong
with making mistakes. Everyone makes mistakes. What they stressed was wrong about mistakes was
not learning from them. In fact many of the analysts made the same point: that we tend to learn
more from our mistakes than from our successes. Indeed, many pointed out that investors can
frequently be wrong for the right reasons, if that makes sense. I think what they are saying is that it
is very difficult to predict what will happen. Our analysis of the known information can be very good,
yet what we expect does not come to pass, perhaps because the situation changes from that which
prevailed when we made our analysis.
What also comes out of this is that it is the way we manage our mistakes that is important. We
should expect that, at best, only about half of our investments will be successful and the key is not
to lose too much by taking firm and early action when what we expect does not come to pass on an
investment.
That said, a view expressed by some analysts was that the great investors do tend to have a rare
talent or at least a rare mindset that makes them great. However, this is a view about the great
investors; the very few in any field that tend to have something special. One analyst said they were
“hardwired” to be great investors.
Nevertheless, putting the greats aside, there are a large number of good investors who succeed
because they work very hard at honing their skills and putting in prodigious hours over a long period
to achieve their results. I guess the main point is that consistent investing success is not luck. Luck
might give a scattering of big wins, but without consistent hard work, the losses will far outweigh the
few lucky winners.
Management
One of the constants in the comments by analysts was the overriding importance of the quality of
the management of the companies in which we invest. Most of the analysts put a very high priority
on getting to know management and understanding their strengths and weaknesses. This is difficult
for private investors, who do not have the same access to managements that is available to the best
analysts.
However, the one important clue to the quality of management for private investors is their track
record. Have they managed the business well over a long period? Critically, how well have they
managed change in their industry and markets? Look beyond the leader to the strength and depth of
their management team and the culture of the firm.
Of great importance is to look at the discipline of management in expanding the business by the
acquisition of competitors. Are they building an empire at the expense of the return to investors?
A particular danger is ill-advised expansion into new activities that destroy shareholder wealth.
Watch out also for over-reach into new markets dominated by entrenched competition.
Some key ideas are to invest in companies that are in businesses where the people can make a
difference in terms of results and where the culture is conducive to the necessary teamwork. Above
all, avoid companies and managements that have a reputation for arrogance because sooner or later
they will blunder and not have the personality traits that can recognise the danger and take
corrective action. Pride usually precedes a fall from grace in management.
Lise Buyer (US internet analyst) asks the four key questions in assessing a company:
In this respect, sell side analysts were more at fault than buy side analysts who tended to give
managements time to allow their strategy to pay off. This may be in part because of the pressure to
come up with deal-flow, which is where the money is for sell side analysts’ firms.
The key that was emphasised repeatedly was to buy good companies with good managements in
healthy industries when they were cheap and then hold with enough patience to allow their strategy
to work or for the cycle to turn in their favour.
A key question is whether, if you had unlimited resources, would you be happy to buy the whole
company? If not, why would you buy a part of it? In particular, ask whether the business is attractive
in an absolute sense, rather than just being the best of a poor lot. There are many industries that we
do not have to own a part.
In this regard, some of the buy side analysts stressed the importance of the size of the exposure to
each investment being even more important than which investments they were. The two great sins
were to have too large an exposure to a business that failed to perform and too small an exposure to
a business that does really well. In other words, it is not so much which companies we buy, but
whether the size of our exposure to them is well balanced.
Change
Change is both a challenge and an opportunity. Companies that fail to meet a challenge are to be
avoided. However, when a company can manage change well, the opportunities for investment
returns are very great. In this respect, Tim Jensen (US portfolio manager) highlighted that the
perception of a company can change over time, often when new management is brought in or an
existing management identifies change and takes great advantage of it.
Tim Jensen, who had a focus on change situations, was often looking at out-of-favour stocks, seeking
the big turnaround story. However, this is high risk. The way he manages this is to look to be able to
identify three or four different potential factors in play that could work in the favour of the company
concerned. He described these as catalysts that could move the share price in the favour of the
investor. They may be internal to the business or external to it in the market or the economy.
Above all, when hunting for change situations, be flexible and keep an open mind. If the facts
change, be prepared to reconsider the whole situation. Again, recognise that stock prices are driven
by perceptions as much as by facts. If perceptions change and prices fall, facts may not save you and
may in fact turn out not to be as solid as you thought. Against that, if perceptions become
unrealistically negative, look for great opportunities if and when perceptions reverse from very
strongly negative to strongly positive.
The analysts in the book made great stress that they never have complete information. Nor does the
market ever have complete or perfect information. This suggests that they are sceptical about the
efficient market hypothesis, at least to extent that they can add value to the investing process by
research and their insights.
This leads to their warning to be wary of brokers or advisers who are absolutely certain about the
prospects of a company and who do not entertain alternative scenarios. The test suggested by one
analyst in this situation was to ask such a broker or adviser if they can identify three key issues or
events that could change or alter their judgement.
In particular, Murdoch Murchison (US global mining analyst) stressed the point that indices contain
many companies that you would not want to own, so index investing was not the way to beat the
market. In particular, he pointed out that many of the biggest stocks of today that dominate the
index are likely to be the dinosaurs of tomorrow in investing terms.
Behavioural finance
I found the interview with Michael Mouboussin (US investment strategist) the most difficult to
understand. Perhaps it is me that is way below the plane on which he thinks, but every other analyst
1. Don’t irrationally escalate commitment to an initial course of action: As sunk costs are
irrelevant, your reference point should be the present. Consider only future costs and benefits.
2. Don’t anchor judgements on irrelevant information, including historical prices or multiples: The
past is only a guide; change on the margin is critical.
3. Don’t be overconfident: Try not to overestimate your abilities. Weigh all potential outcomes
with probabilities. Carefully consider both sides of any investment case.
4. Don’t be overly influenced by how information is presented: How a situation is framed can alter
the choice. Be objective in weighing risk and reward.
5. Don’t fall into the confirmation trap: Try not to seek confirming information at the expense of
non-confirming evidence. Be honest and objective.
Trends
Understand that there are trends (bull and bear markets) in markets and the fortunes of companies.
When investing in cyclical stocks timing is most important. Do not be afraid to buy when pessimism
is at its worst or to sell when optimism is rampant.
This is something that I have explicitly incorporated into my investment plan for value model stocks.
I do not plan to ever buy at the bottom or sell at the top. Instead, my aim is to take a large chunk out
of the uptrend – hopefully 70 – 80%. The two hardest things I notice for most beginners to manage
are:
1. Buying into a rising trend. They tend to think they are too late and fear buying at the top.
Instead they buy the laggards and allow the strong stocks to soar upward without them.
2. Giving back significant paper gains after the top has been made. They typically wait for a
retest of the top which never happens and they end up riding it down and down and down.
This is just the list of his rules. The real value is in his explanations. His paper is available on the
internet at https://www.franklintempleton.com/retail/pdf/home/splash_PUB/TL_R16_1207.pdf
I have downloaded the paper and made a recurring entry in my diary to read it again every month
until I know it backwards. I suggest that readers do the same.
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