Dreamland Hotel Resort vs. Johnson
Dreamland Hotel Resort vs. Johnson
Dreamland Hotel Resort vs. Johnson
*
DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT and WESTLEY J.
PRENTICE, President, petitioners, vs. STEPHEN B.
JOHNSON, respondent.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be
awarded as an alternative.·The above preceding statement only
goes to show that while it was Johnson who tendered his
resignation, it was due to the petitionersÊ acts that he was
constrained to resign. The petitioners cannot expect Johnson to
tolerate working for them without any compensation. Since Johnson
was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. As to the
reliefs granted to an employee who is illegally dismissed, Golden
Ace Builders v. Talde, 620 SCRA 283 (2010), referring to Macasero
v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, 577 SCRA 500 (2009), is
instructive: Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations
between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted.
In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no
longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences of
respondentsÊ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages
computed from the time compensation was withheld up to
the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no
longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded
as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in
addition to payment of backwages.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; Under the doctrine
of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no
longer desirable or viable.·The case of Golden Ace further provides:
„The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in
lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical
or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not
to be reinstated.‰ x x x Under the doctrine of strained relations, the
payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative
to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from
what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other
hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no
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longer trust. In the present case, the NLRC found that due to the
strained relations between the parties, separation pay is to be
awarded to Johnson in lieu of his reinstatement.
Same; Same; Separation Pay; Separation pay is computed from
the commencement of employment up to the time of termination,
including the imputed service for which the employee is entitled to
backwages.·Accordingly, the award of backwages should be
computed from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 · which is
three years from August 1, 2007. Furthermore, separation pay is
computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of
termination, including the imputed service for which the employee
is entitled to backwages. As one-month salary is awarded as
separation pay for every year of service, including imputed service,
Johnson should be paid separation pay equivalent to his three-
month salary for the three-year contract.
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
assailing the December 14, 2009[2] and February 11,
2010[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 111693 which dismissed outright the petition
for certiorari on technical grounds.
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[1] Rollo, pp. 3-25.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with
Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now CA Presiding Justice) and
Vicente S. E. Veloso, concurring; id., at pp. 28-29.
[3] Id., at pp. 31-32.
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contract because the application for the TIN and AEP were still
under process. Thus[,] it was agreed that the efficacy of the said
agreement shall begin after one (1) month or on August 1, 2007.
x x x.
14. On or about October 8, 2007, Prentice asked on several
occasions the production of the AEP and TIN from Johnson.
Johnson gave excuses and promised that he is already in possession
of the requirements. Believing the word of Johnson, Dreamland
commenced a dry run of its operations.
15. Johnson worked as a hotel and resort Operations Manager
only at that time. He worked for only about three (3) weeks until he
suddenly abandoned his work and subsequently resigned as
Operations Manager starting November 3, 2007. He never reported
back to work despite several attempts of Prentice to clarify his
issues. x x x.[4]
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[4] Id., at pp. 5-6.
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of the staff, which highlighted his lack of real authority in the hotel
and the disdain for him by petitioners, respondent Johnson was
forced to submit his resignation, x x x. In deference to the
Employment Agreement signed, [Johnson] stated that he was
willing to continue work for the three month period stipulated
therein.
11. However, in an SMS or text message sent by Prentice to
[Johnson] on the same day at around 8:20 pm, he was informed that
„⁄ I consider [yo]ur resignation as immediate.‰ Despite demand,
petitioners refused to pay [Johnson] the salaries and benefits due
him.[5]
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[5] Id., at pp. 210-212.
[6] Id., at pp. 98-106.
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[7] Id., at pp. 104-106.
[8] Id., at pp. 144-154.
[9] Id., at p. 153.
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[10] Id., at pp. 151-152.
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A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN PROMULGATING ITS FIRST RESOLUTION (DECEMBER 14,
2009) WHICH OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED PETITIONERSÊ
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN PROMULGATING ITS SECOND RESOLUTION (FEBRUARY
11, 2010) WHICH DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT PETITIONERSÊ
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
C.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE MERITS OF
THE PETITIONERSÊ PETITION AND IN NOT GRANTING THEIR
PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER[.][13]
The petition is partially granted.
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[11] Id., at pp. 28-29.
[12] Id., at pp. 31-32.
[13] Id., at p. 10.
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[14] Id., at p. 28.
[15] Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla, 500 Phil. 303; 461 SCRA 533
(2005); R.P. Dinglasan Construction, Inc. v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156104,
June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 263; Vda. de Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 345
Phil. 678; 280 SCRA 444 (1997); A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
188 Phil. 577; 100 SCRA 590 (1980); Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 164
Phil. 129; 73 SCRA 608 (1976).
[16] Lapid v. Judge Laurea, 439 Phil. 887, 897; 391 SCRA 277, 286
(2002).
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tive they seek which are the attainment of justice and the
protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the
relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case
from the operation of technicalities when substantial
justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer
be subject to cavil.‰[17]
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that
procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. „From time to time, however, we
have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the
most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the
Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of
justice.‰[18] „It is true that procedural rules may be waived
or dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice.‰[19]
Brushing aside technicalities, in the utmost interest of
substantial justice and taking into consideration the
varying and conflicting factual deliberations by the LA and
the NLRC, the Court shall now delve into the merits of the
case.
The petitioners contend that the employment of Johnson
as operations manager commenced only on October 8, 2007
and not on August 1, 2007. However, the employment
contract
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[17] Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, 539 Phil. 37, 48; 509
SCRA 532, 543 (2006); Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 32, 42-43;
378 SCRA 28, 36-37 (2002).
[18] Osmeña v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818, May 31, 2011,
649 SCRA 654, 660.
[19] Calipay v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
166411, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 409, 417, citing Tiger Construction
and Development Corporation v. Abay, G.R. No. 164141, February 26,
2010, 613 SCRA 721, 731 and Iligan Cement Corporation v. ILIASCOR
Employees and Workers Union-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor
(IEWU-SPFL), G.R. No. 158956, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 449, 461.
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Although the resort did not open until approximately 8th October
2007, [JohnsonÊs] employment began, as per Employment
Agreement, on 1st August 2007. During the interim period[,
Johnson] was frequently instructed by [Prentice] to supervise the
construction staff and speak with potential future guests who
visited the site out of curiosity. Other duties carried out by
[Johnson] prior to [the] opening included the overall preparation of
the guest rooms for eventual occupation ensuring cracked tiles were
replaced, ensuring grout was properly installed between tiles,
ensuring all lighting and air conditioning [were] functioning,
measuring windows for curtain width, measuring showers for
shower curtain rods and installing shower curtains. Other duties
included the unloading, carrying and installation of mattresses,
bedding[s], TVÊs, refrigerators and other furnishings and ironing
curtains x x x.[20]
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[20] Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[21] Id., at pp. 156-165.
[22] Id., at p. 160.
[23] Id., at pp. 137-143.
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[24] SHS Perforated Materials, Inc. v. Diaz, G.R. No. 185814, October
13, 2010, 633 SCRA 258, 275.
[25] Rollo, p. 21.
[26] Id., at p. 36.
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[27] Issued by Regional Director Nathaniel V. Lacambra, dated March
31, 2008, id., at p. 76.
[28] Id., at p. 83.
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Even the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job
after working for three months and receiving only an insignificant
fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not an abandonment
of employment nor a resignation in the real sense, but a
constructive dismissal, which is defined as an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely x x x.[31]
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[29] 334 Phil. 514; 266 SCRA 561 (1997).
[30] Id., at p. 518; p. 565.
[31] Rollo, p. 152.
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[36] Rollo, p. 39.
[37] G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283.
[38] G.R. No. 178524, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 500.
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[39] Supra note 37, citing Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases
Philippines, id., at p. 507.
[40] Id., at pp. 289-290, citing Velasco v. NLRC, 525 Phil. 749, 761; 492
SCRA 686, 698 (2006) and Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Daniel, 499
Phil. 491, 511; 460 SCRA 494, 512 (2005).
[41] Rollo, p. 153.
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While the Court agrees with the NLRC that the award
of separation pay and unpaid salaries is warranted, the
Court does not lose sight of the fact that the employment
contract states that JohnsonÊs employment is for a term of
three years.
Accordingly, the award of backwages should be computed
from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 · which is three
years from August 1, 2007. Furthermore, separation pay is
computed from the commencement of employment up to
the time of termination, including the imputed service for
which the employee is entitled to backwages.[42] As one-
month salary is awarded as separation pay for every year
of service, including imputed service, Johnson should be
paid separation pay equivalent to his three-month salary
for the three-year contract.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated December 14,
2009 and February 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 111693 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the NLRC dated April 30, 2009 in NLRC LAC
No. 07-002711-08 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in the computation of backwages and
separation pay. Dreamland Hotel Resort and Westley
Prentice are ORDERED to PAY Stephen Johnson
backwages of P60,000.00 per month which should be
computed from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 less
the P7,200.00 already paid to him. Likewise, separation
pay of P180,000.00, representing Stephen JohnsonÊs three-
year contract should be awarded.
SO ORDERED.
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[42] Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA
186, 215; Sarona v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
185280, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 394, 421.
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