Case No.

2
RP V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 7/21/2003

EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
CARPIO, J.:

TOPIC: Concept and Origin of the Bill of Rights, and the classification of rights in
general: Civil, Political, Social and Economic Rights

It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

FACTS:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. Investigations include the alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. Evidences showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot in
Quezon City as well in Cebu City. Moreover, equipment and communication facilities
were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military
equipment, the raiding team also confiscated P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in
the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by
respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. With these, a prima facie case exists against
respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.

The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, known as The
Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and
impleaded Dimaano asco-defendant, in favor of the State. However, the Sandiganbayan
subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search and seizure of the
items confiscated.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of
the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name
and by the will of the Filipino people." Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUE: (Third Issue in the case: Legality of the Search and Seizure)

(1) Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist
forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); and

(2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

HELD: (Petitioner is partly right in its arguments)

1. NO. It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives
and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
 right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.

HOWEVER,

2. YES. The protection accorded to individuals in International Covenant on Civil and

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to
the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration,
the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

HENCE,

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding
team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize
these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search
and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items,
merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be
returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of