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1981

Estrangement: Marx's conception of human nature

and the division of labor
Isidor Wallimann
Syracuse University, [email protected]

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ESTRANGEMENT

Marx's Conception of Human

Nature and the Division of Labor

ISIDOR WALLIMANN
Foreword by Gunter W. Remmling

C ON TR IBU T I ONS IN P H ILOSOPHY, NUMBER 1 6

Greenwood Press
Westport, Connecticut• London, England
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Wallimann, Isidor, 1 944-
Estrangement: Marx's conception of human nature
and the division of labor.
(Contributions in philosophy; no. 1 6 ISSN 0084-926X)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
l. Marx, Karl, 1 8 1 8- 1 883. 2. Man. 3. Division
of labor. 4. Alienation (Philosophy) I. Title.
B3305.M74W34 335.4' 1 2 80-929
ISBN 0-3 13-22096-4 (lib. bdg.)
Copyright © 1 98 1 by Isidor Wallimann

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be

reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 80-929
ISBN: 0-3 13-22096-4
ISSN: 0084-926X
First published in 198 1
Greenwood Press
A division of Congressional Information Service, Inc.
88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881
Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Copyright Acknowledgments
The publishers listed below kindly gave me permission to reprint from the following
sources:
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, by Karl Marx,
translated by Martin Nicolaus. New York: Random House, Inc., 1973. Translation
and Foreword Copyright © 1 973 by Martin Nicolaus. Notes Copyright © 1973 by
Ben Fowkes.
The Ethnological Notebooks, by Karl Marx, transcribed and edited with an in­
troduction by Lawrence Krader. Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1 974, © 1 9 74 by
Lawrence Krader.
Collected Works, Vols. 3, 4, 5, 6, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. New York:
International Publishers Co., Inc., 1 975- 1 976. Reprinted by permission of Interna­
tional Publishers Co., Inc., Copyright © 1 97 6.
Critique of the Gotha Programme, by Karl Marx. New York: International
Publishers Co., Inc., 1 93 8. Copyright 1 93 8 by International Publishers Co., Inc.
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: In the Light of the
Researches of Lewis H. Morgan, by Frederick Engels. New York: International
Publishers Co., Inc., 1 942. Copyright 1942 by International Publishers Co., Inc.
Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology, by Joachim Israel. Copyright ©
1 97 1 by Allyn and Bacon, Inc., Boston. Reprinted with permission.
To my mother and
in memory of my father
CONTENTS

Foreword by Gunter W. Remmling xi

Preface xv
Introduction xvii
Abbreviations xxiii

1. ISSUES AND PROCEDURES 3

2. MARX'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 11

MAN VERSUS ANIMAL: THE BIOLOGICAL MODEL 11
THE BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUALS CHANGES: THE
HISTORICAL MODEL 14
HUMAN NATURE AND MARX'S DEFINITION OF MAN
AS SPECIES-BEING 16
DISCUSSION 17

3. ESTRANGEMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING

COERCED INTO SELLING ONE'S LABOR POWER 25
WAGE LABOR: THE COERCION TO GIVE UP ONE'S
WILL AND CONTROL OVER ONE'S BODY 27
THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING COERCED INTO
SELLING ONE'S LABOR POWER 30
viii CONTENTS

ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE PRODUCT OF ONE'S LABOR 31

THE WORKER'S ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE ACT OF
PRODUCTION AND FROM HIMSELF 32
ESTRANGEMENT FROM NATURE 34
ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE SPECIES AND FROM MAN 35
ESTRANGEMENT OF THE CAPITALIST 37
THE CAPITALIST'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORKER 38
A COMMENT ON MARX'S TERMINOLOGY: ENTAUSSERUNG,
ENTFREMDUNG, ALIENATION 40

4. THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY

AND ECONOMY 47
LABOR THEORY OF VALUE, SURPLUS VALUE 47
SURPLUS VALUE AND EXPLOITATION 57
DISCUSSION 60
THE INABILITY TO APPROPRIATE ONE'S PRODUCT
OF LABOR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 62

S. MARX'S EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION

OF MAN IN PRECAPITALIST SOCIETIES 71
THE DELINEATION OF THE CAPITALIST MODE OF
PRODUCTION 71
COMMUNITIES IN WHICH PROPERTY WAS HELD IN
COMMON 73
COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES BASED ON THE GENTILE
ORGANIZATION 76
MARX'S USE OF THE TERM "PRIVATE PROPERTY" 81

6. THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND ITS

CENTRALITY FOR MARX'S THEORY OF
ESTRANGEMENT 89
INVOLUNTARY DIVISION OF LABOR 94
INVOLUNTARY DIVISION OF LABOR AND ITS CENTRALITY
TO THE THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT %

7. TRUE COMMUNISM AND ITS BASIS ON A

VOLUNTARY DIVISION OF LABOR 99
TRUE COMMUNISM 100
COMMUNISM AS THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP 106
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL 109
DISCUSSION 115
MARX'S DEFINITION OF HUMAN NATURE RECONSIDERED 122
 CONTENTS ix

8. IS ESTRANGEMENT LIMITED TO CAPITALIST

SOCIETIES? 129
ESTRANGEMENT AND PRECAPITALISTIC, NON-
PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES I29
DISCUSSION 136
IS MARX AN ANTI-INDUSTRIALIST ROMANTICIST? 137

9. THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S

THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 147
THE QUESTION OF BEING MORE OR LESS ESTRANGED 150
WHAT MARX CALLS ESTRANGEMENT: A CAUSE OF CERTAIN
IDENTIFIABLE BEHAVIOR OR ATTITUDES? 155
ESTRANGEMENT AS AN OBJECTIVELY DEFINED CONCEPT 160

10. CONCLUSIONS 165

ESTRANGEMENT AND THE ABOLITION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY 169
A NOTE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF
ESTRANGEMENT 171

Selected Bibliography 177

Index 191
FOREWORD BY G U N T ER w. REMMLING

When Marx informed his collaborator Arnold Ruge that he had decided
to " make man into man , " he rejected the notion of a human being as
no more than an estranged producer of commodities belonging to some­
one else. More importantly , Marx had communicated to Ruge the central
idea that was to give purpose to his entire life 's work : the realization of
the true character of men and women. Marx crystallized this idea in the
intellectual fires that produce d his differentiation from Hegel and Feuer­
bach. The i dea persuaded him to concentrate all his remarkable energies
on identifying t he forces that could dissolve the contradiction between
idea and reality. Therefore , Marx set out to discover those elements in
social action that had the power to break down the exist ing socioeconomic
rel ations-elements that, be cause of t heir own inner contrad iction , woul d
negate t h e general estrangement in social life .
Marx understoo d that these elements had to be found in the relations
of active life . He realized that they were present in the relations that domi­
nate as a nameless force the relations between persons-that is, in the eco­
no mic relations wherein all estrangement originates. While commodities
relinquish their ultimate qualities in money , men and wo men relinqu ish
xii FOREWORD

theirs in becoming commodities; they become commodities as soon as

their labor power becomes useless, unless it is sold. In society , the worker
is not a human being but merely the exponent of an abstract commodity :
labor power. In selling this commodity , the worker sells himself or her­
self, and thus the estrange ment of men and women reaches its ultimate
form. The economic theorists of capitalism therefore regard proletarians­
the men and women who , without capital or ground rent , live entirely by
their labor-as mere workers but not as human beings .
Unlike bourgeois econo mists and sociologists , Marx viewed the division
of labor as problematic. He maintained that the division of labor estab­
lished the mutual dependence of individuals and introdu ced the contra­
diction between the interests of the individual and the common interest
of all indivi duals. In its complete form , the division of labor creates a situa­
tion whereby no one any longer disposes over the means of h is subsistence.
Now the relations of production and trade completely re place human rela­
tions, an d men an d women no longer face each other as men and women
but as mere exponents o f the anonymous· and all-powerful relations of
pro duction that separate and estrange o ne human being from the other.
Hence , the discovery of the laws of political economy was at the same
time the discovery of the conditions that h ad to be met in o rder to achieve
the self-realization of the human being. This is the reason for Marx 's
tireless analysis of e conomic laws and their development as reflected in
his Kapital and kindred writings .
I sidor Wallimann's study of Marx's theory of estrangement introduces
the long-nee ded proof that the concept of estrangement remained funda­
mental to Marx's thought throughout his life's work . Equally important is
the author's interpretation of the involuntary nature of the division of
labor as the fundamental cause of estrange ment . Most importantly , Walli­
mann's work shows in detail that Marx employs two different concep­
tions of human nature, and it explains how the relative ( historical) and
nonrelative ( biological) conceptions of human nature bear u pon Marx's
theory of estrangement. For the first time , Wallimann shows that Marx
speaks of estrange ment only in those instances wherein individuals are
prevented fro m living according to their human nature (biologically con­
ceived). The structure of society prevents individuals fro m fully exercising
the faculties nature has given them: they are estranged. For i nstance,
 FOREWORD xiii

they are prevented fro m subj ecting their labor power and the product of
their l abor to their own will, although by nature they are capable of doing
so.
Wallimann's interpretation is methodical, rigorous, impeccably judicious,
and based on an impressive mastery of the primary and secondary sources.
As such, it has raised the standards for academic Marxist scholarship .
Malaga, S pain
November 1 97 9 GUNTER W. REMMLING
PREFACE

While this study owes much to many people in one way or another, here
it is possible to express my appreciation only to those who we re most
directly involved.
Gunter Re mmling gave generously o f his time and valuable advice . I
gained immeasurably from the breadth of his knowledge relating to the
work of Karl Marx an d other subjects, as well as from the m any h ours
spent in pleasant conversation an d friendship . I am also very appreciative
of David Edelstein, both for his intere st in me and my work , and for his
personal encouragement. I am particularly grateful for the many mean­
ingful questions h e raise d in connection with this stu dy. I would also
like to thank him, as well as Ephraim H. Mizruchi and Willie Lamouse­
Smith, for their pertinent suggestions. In addition, I am than kful for the
academic support and friendship I received from J erry J acobs, Harold
Orbach , George Zito, Nicholas Tatsis, Barry Glassner, Allen Large, and
Dorothy Zito.
This stu dy also owes much to Linda Brasington who devoted much ef­
fort and patience to t he typing of a manuscript intersperse d with so many
awkward foreign and E nglish words ; and to my friend, Carol Leonard ,
xvi P REFACE

without whose e motional support an d direct involvement in the editions

of the material, this study would not have been possible . A research grant
fro m Syracuse University and support from Hobart and William S mith
Colleges facilitated this study considerably .
Finally , I would like to extend my gratitude to the staff of Greenwood
Press for devoting many h ours of careful work to this manuscript and giv­
ing useful advice on numerous occasions. I would especially like to thank
J ames Sabin , Margaret Brezicki, Kathie Stone, and Anne Kugielsky.
INTRODUCTION

Although the term "alienatio n " is u sed frequently in popular and scientific
circles , its precise meaning remains so unclear that many have questioned
its value. Because the term has been imprecisely used and because present­
day usage seems equally imprecise, it has also been recommended that
the term "alienation" be either abandoned or conceptually clarified and
more rigorously defined.
This study attempts to show that Marx u sed the terms "alienation " and
"estrangement" both precisely and systematically , and that c alls for the
abandonment or clarification of the terms are unjustified with regard to
the works of Marx. We are not convin ce d , however, that the lack of pre­
cision inherent in today ' s use of the term "alienation " is reversible and
that the term is at all useful as it has been e mployed in modern studies .
It is therefore i m po rtant to distinguish strictly between Marx 's pre cision
and today 's ambiguity and thus to abandon the widely held notion that
many modern studies involving the term are somehow relate d to the Marx­
ian tradition , when in fact they are not .
There are several reasons for today 's lack of consensus and systematic
use of the term "alienation . " In this short space , we can only briefly
xviii INTRODUCTION

touch u pon some of them. As used in popular l anguage today , the term
designates individual or group remoteness from and/or disaffe ctio n with
something or someone. It may therefore be said that "alienation " stands
for a discre pancy of so me sort. Conte mporary social scientists-not im­
mune fro m the influence of popular l angu age-design studies intending
to locate and measure the individual 's "alienation. " Thus, fo r example,
the individual's alienation (that is, remoteness or disaffectio n) from gov­
ernment or t he political process is studie d , and phrases su ch as "urban
alienations" ( Fischer, 1 97 3 ) are coined .
In view of the multitude of cases in which it is possible t o speak of
re moteness or disaffe ction , "alienation " loses all specificity . It is at best
a sophisticated term denoting a variety of conditions that coul d , without
loss of clarity , be just as well apprehended with numerous other words .
In fact, the use of vocabulary other than "alienation " to describe situa­
tions in which in dividuals or groups are remote from someone or some­
thing an d/or are disaffected about something would most l ikely lead to
increase d specificity in t he way language is u se d to describe social phe­
nomena , by both laymen an d social scientists. Instead of an all-encompass­
ing term such as " alienation , " terms more descriptive of various types
of remoteness and disaffection could be e mployed. Certainly , this would
not be a violation of the spirit of the "social scien ce enterprise . " On the
contrary , social science as well as philosophy depends on a disciplined
use of vocabulary in its attempt to apprehend reality .
Given the all-enco mpassing way in which "alienation " is often use d ,
it is indee d understandable why some advocate dropping t h e term al­
together from the social science vo cabulary . Indee d , it does n ot seem to
be necessary for a clear understanding of the various types of remote-
ness or disaffection . In actuality , the particularity of these various types,
which are of special interest to social scientists because of their particular­
ity, tends to be glosse d over when "alienation " is use d .
O f course , "alienation " is not always employed in a n all-en compassing
and indiscriminate way . Thus, attempts have been made to arrive at p ar­
ticular di mensions that could be subsumed under the term-that is , to ap­
prehend particular situations of individuals' remoteness or disaffection .
Seeman's six varieties of alienatio n ( 1 97 6 : 2 6 8 ) serve a s an example . These
varieties ( po werlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, cultural estrange­
ment, self-estrangement, an d social isolation) represent an effort to avoid
 INTRODUCTION xix

using a term that is too all-encompassing. It remains unclear, however,

why the term "alienation , " when used in this way , should be retained at
all . There is no apparent advantage , for example , in callin g " so cial isola­
tion " a variety of alienation. "Social isol ation , " however defined , re­
mains social isolation .
It also re mains unclear why only some situations and not others are
categorize d as "varieties of alienation . " The criteria for categorization
have been quite arbitrary ones and are likely to remain so . For example ,
Seeman 's "varieties of alienatio n " only reflect one perso n ' s j u dgment
and atte mpt to abstract fro m the numerous ways in which the term
" alienatio n " is used. It represents an attempt to create a con sensus con­
cerning the use of the term where there is no consensus. The basis on
which this consensus could rest is in itself relative , making it both un­
likely that a discipline-wide consensus could be sustained an d that
"alienatio n " as a term would be given a clearly defined meaning in the
social science community.
Seeman 's endeavor, then , does represent an attempt to clearly define
and consistently apply the term "alienation . " But the attempt has not
been successful an d the a mbiguity often associated with today 's u se of
the term has hardly been overcome . Recent social analysis h as often
linked the use of the term to Marx and has justified it on the basis of
his writings. I n many cases, however, this linking has expli citly or implicitly
distorted Marx's thought and the way he use d the terms "alienation"
and "estrange ment. "
The present study addresses the main distortions that have arisen
fro m linking Marx to modern research and commentary on " alienation . "
I t also attempts t o break some n e w ground in interpreting M arx and
points out the i mplications for scholars who wish to utilize Marx's con­
cepts o f estrangement and alienation 1 in their own work . The aim here
is both to contribute to the understanding of Marx 's work and to pro­
mote greater clarity and rigor in the way certain concepts, especially
"estran ge ment" and "alienation , " are used in the so cial scie n ces.
In addition to making certain that the correct vocabulary and trans­
lations are used when discussing Marx's theory of estrangement, it is
e qually i mportant t hat Marx 's analytic framework as a whole be under­
stood correctly . Only then is it possible to apprehend the fu nction and
value of his theory of estrangement for today 's social science s . Marx
xx INTRODUCTION

based his theory of estrangement on an "inventory " of each human being's

capabilities. I n his investigation of the n ature of social organization , he
found that t hroughout most of history individuals have not been able to
live according to their capabilities. For example , by nature human beings
are capable of subjecting production and t he product of their labor to
their conscious control. Yet , in actual life they are prevented from do ing
so . In other words, a discrepancy was found to exist between individuals'
capabilities and how, in fact, they must live . I ndividuals were seen to be
estrange d in the broadest sense of the word. More concretely , taking
capitalism as an example , Marx showed w hy a discrepancy existed between
individuals' capabilities and how in fact they must live . He specified pre­
cisely the social processes that force individuals into such a discrepancy .
He also specifie d the basis upon which it can be said that individuals are
estranged an d fro m what they are e strange d .
F o r Marx , t h e desire d form of social organization was communism ,
which, contrary to capitalism, would a ssure that individuals would be able
to live according to their capabilities. Thus, the need for a communist
society as perceived by Marx was based on the value judgment that in­
dividuals should be able to live according to their capabilities. Marx 's
cal1 for a co mmunist society did not , of course , only express the wish_
that individuals be able to l ive according to their capabilities . Marx main­
taine d that once human beings h ave the opportunity to live according to
their abilities, many o ther conditions would change for the better. There­
fore , man would no longer be dominated by the product of his own labor,
and his physical existence would no l onger be subject to arbitrary ex­
change relations. Hence , the call for a society without estrangement is
not base d only on the abstract postulate that man ought to be able to
live according to his capabilities. Marx also realized that if estrangement -
were not eliminate d , the undesirable conditions of l ife brought about
by capitalist social organization could not be abolished .
According to Marx , a form o f social organi zation such a s that which is
prevalent under capitalism develops its own forces which in various ways
will set the stage for the successful constru ction of a communist society .
Marx did not advocate a society without estrangement only because of an
abstract notion that it is desirable that individuals be able to live accord­
ing to their n ature . Rather, he asserted that if and only if individuals are
able to live according to their abilitie s , which they possess by nature , will
 INTRODUCTION xxi

it be possible to free humanity of the numerous burdens brought about

by a form of social o rganization (for example , capitalism) which does
not all o w man to live according to his nature . For Marx , the ability to
live according to one's abilities was not completely subject to the will of
individuals. Sufficient historical development was seen as a ne cessary
prerequisite to the successful formation of a society in whi ch individuals
would be able to l ive according to their nature .
This stu dy s ho ws that Marx considers estrangement to be a dichotomous
pheno menon. If, as is the case under capitalism , individuals are p revented
fro m living according to th eir capabilities, they are estranged . Evidence i s
presented here showing that individuals cannot b e said to b e more or less
estranged 2 if Marx is not to be misinterpreted. For Marx individuals are
either estrange d or not estrange d .
Marx's theory of estrangement becomes a t o o l for t h e critical analysis of
the capitalist as well as socialist societies known to us today . It is a tool for
the critical analysis of all forms of social o rganization in which individuals
are prevente d from l iving according to their abilities.

NOTES

1. As the title of this study indi cates, I do not speak of Marx 's theory of aliena­
tion but of his theory of estrangement. Marx made a clear distinction between the
terms "estrangement" (Entfremdung) and "alienation" (Entausserung), and the two
terms should n o t both be translated as "alienation , " as customarily has been the case.
Based on inade quate transl ations, so cial scientists in the English-spe aking world have
seldom made this distinction, whi ch is so cru cial to an un derstan ding of Marx.
2. In t his context, it will also become apparent that many studies involving
Marx 's theory of estrange ment have overlooked this important fact.
ABBREVIATIONS

German So urces 1 English So urces2 Title

Volu me No . Volume No .
M EW, E B, 1 .T. cw, 3 Econo mic and Philo-
sophic Manuscripts of
1844
MEW, 2 CW, 4 The Holy Family
MEW, 3 cw, 5 Theses on Feuerbach
MEW, 3 cw, 5 The German Ideology
MEW, 4 CW, 6 The Poverty of Philos-
ophy
MEW, 4 CW, 6 Manifesto of the Co m-
munist Party
MEW, G G Grundrisse
MEW, 1 3 CP E A Con tribution to the
Critique of Political
Eco n o my
MEW, 1 6 WPP Wages, Price and Profit
MEW, 1 9 CGP Critique of the Got ha
Programme

1 . Marx/Engels: Werke ( MEW).

2 . Marx/Engels: Collected Work s (CW) .
xxiv ..\BBREVIA TIONS

MEW, 2 0 AD Herr Eugen Duhring 's

Revolution in Science
(Anti-Duhring)
M EW, 2 1 OF The Origin of the
Family, Private Property,
and the State
MEW, 2 3 Cl Capital Vol. I
MEW, 24 C2 Capital Vol . I I
MEW, 2 5 C3 Capital Vol . III
MEW, 26. 1 TSl Theories of Surplus­
Value I
MEW, 26.2 TS 2 Theories of Surplus­
Value I I
MEW, 26. 3 TS 3 Theories of Surplus­
Value I I I
EN The Ethnological Note­
books of Karl Marx
ESTRANGEMENT
1
ISSUES AND PROCEDURES

In the 1 9 20s, along with the ascent of the Frankfurt School, Marxian
thought experienced a revival that had far-reaching effects. The revival
occurre d in a political atmosphere that , to say the least, was quite plural­
istic. The Wei mar Republic, despite its short life-span ( 1 9 1 9- 1 9 3 3 ) , pre­
sented a stage on which, as Remmling ( 1 9 7 3 : 3-4 3 ) has pointed out, margin­
al characters in the society could su ddenly become socially accepted major
characters (see also Mej a , 1 97 5 ) . Thus, very unlike the situation during
Weber's imperial Germany, Marxists were suddenly found at the university .
This increasingly "tolerant" environment also provided fertile ground for
thinkers like Mannheim who drew heavily fro m Marx and whose i ntellectual
questio n s pertaining to the sociology of knowledge might easily be viewed
as socially threatening ( Remmling, 1 97 5 ) .
Given the revival of Marxism and the interest i n the sociology o f knowledge
in Weimar Germany , it is therefore not surprising that renewed attention was
also paid to Marx's theory of estrangement . In fact, this theory must be con ­
sidere d a central element in t h e evaluation of h i s contribution to t h e sociology
of knowle dge ( Remmling, 1 96 7 ) . Outside the particular sphere of the sociol­
ogy of knowledge , Marcuse ( 1 964, 1 97 0 , 1 9 7 2) and Fro m m ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 96 8)-
4 ESTRANG EMENT

both members of the Frankfurt School-made extensive use of Marx' s con­

cept of estrange ment in their writings.
Given this initial mo mentum , many social scientists became interested in
further e mploying Marx's theory of estrangement in their so cial analyses .
I n retrospect, it has become apparent that many questions concerning the
applicability an d interpretation of Marx 's theory have not been resolved. If
there is to be a common discourse , and if Marx 's theory of estrangement is
to be e mploye d fruitfully , it is essential that sociologists share a common
understanding of the nature of this theory . This study addresses itself to
some of these still unresolved questions and repre sents an attempt both to
give a logically consistent interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement
an d to point out the scope of its applicability . In short , the questions ad­
dressed here can be stated in the following way .

-What is Marx's concept of human n ature ?

-Is there only one theory of estrange ment in Marx?
-Is estrange ment measurable : Does what Marx calls estrangement
cause certain behavior, feelings , or attitudes ?
-Is Marx's theory of e stran gement also applicable to non capitalist
societies?
-Is estrange ment as Marx views it a historically specific phenomenon , or
is it an existential predicament?
-What role does the division of labor play in Marx's theory of estrange­
ment?

Unfortunately , students of Marx writing in the English language ( and

many i n French) have generally not made a distinction between "estrange­
ment" an d "alienation . " One of the latest examples of this tendency can
be found in Oilman ( 1 97 6 : 47 , 1 3 2 ) , in which "estrangemen t " and " aliena­
tion" are synonyms. Unlike the work done by the I talian scholars ( see
Bedeschi, 1 968, and Chiodi, 1 97 6) who are more precise , both the trans­
lations an d the use of Entfremdung and Entausserung in the E nglish-speakin1
world are inexact. As one translator points out :

There can hardly be said to be any very common practice among English
translators. Thus , M. Milligan (flconomi c and P hi losophi cal MSS of 1844;
cit.) translates Entfremd ung as "estrangement " and Entausserung as
 ISSUES AND PROCEDURES 5

"alienation " (or "externalisation " ) ; T. Bo tto more (Karl Marx: Early Writ­
ings) claims that Marx does not distinguish between the two terms and
translates both as "alienation " (or "estrangement" ) . D. Mc Lellan (Karl
Marx: Early Texts ) and L. D. Easton and K. H. Gu ddat ( Writings of the
Yo ung Marx ) translate Entfre md ung as "alienation " and Enta usserung
as "externalisation " ( Chiodi , 1 9 7 6 : 1 24) .

As will beco me clear in the co urse of this study , Marx does m ake a distinc­
tion between Entfremd ung and Entii usserung. This distinction, though fine ,
i s a n important o n e an d will b e discussed later in this work . O n e qualifica­
tion is necessary here . The distinction is not, of course, injected into those
primary and secondary sources quoted which lack such a distinction , in
order to preserve the authenticity of the sources. Hence, in all quotes ,
except those fro m the Collected Work s , the reader should know that when­
ever the word "alienation " appears , it may actually mean "estrangement . "
Social scientists and philosophers generally agree that if someone is said
to be estranged, he/she must be estranged fro m something or somebody . What
is less often understood is the basis upon which Marx can say that someone
is estranged, that is, the element distinguishing Marx's theo ry of estrange­
ment from , say , a purely no minalist use of the concept of estrangemen t ,
according to which individuals are arbitrarily said t o be estranged fro m all
sorts of things. On the basis of his concept of human nature , Marx can say
that individuals are estranged. Because Marx uses his concept of human na­
ture as a basis for determining why man is estrange d , he avoids m aking
only tautological statements1 and having to give reasons of only a relativ-
istic nature . Thus , Marx's theory of estrangement rests on a concept of
human nature that allows for statements about man 's estrangement , state­
ments that are neither tautological nor relativistic. 2 This concept can be
termed "hu man n ature in general . " Generally , the literature dealing with
Marx 's theory of e strange ment (or with his concept of human nature)
either fails to make this crucial distinction or fails to make it clearly (for
example, Markovic, 1 97 4 : 2 1 7 -2 1 8 ) . The present study shows that such a
distinction can be made , and even must be made , if Marx 's theory of
estrange ment is to be pro perly understood and interprete d .
Marx's theory o f estrangement cannot b e understood without a n under­
standing of why man is estranged. When discussing this theory , students
of Marx usually focus on wage labor and the accompanying p rodu ction of
6 ESTRANGEMENT

commo dities. Estrangement is usually , and correctly , said to result from

the fact that man must sell his labor power and that he controls neither
the product of his labor nor the act of production . However, Marx also
speaks of the pro pertied class as being estranged , even though this class
need not sell its labor power. The selling of one's labor power is therefore
not the sole explanation for man 's estrangement. As this stu dy demon­
strates , for Marx the existence of an involuntary division of labor ultimately
determines why man is estranged . Conversel y , the voluntary divisio n of
labor under communism creates a condition of nonestrangement . Thus far,
scholars have pointed out only that there is a connection between Marx ' s
theory of estrangement a n d what he considered to be a n involuntary divi­
sion of labor (Remmling, 1 96 7 : 1 5 2 ; Meszaros , 1 9 7 2 : 140- 14 3 ) . This
present investigation , however, shows in more detail not only that the
" division of labor" is of central importance in Marx 's theory of estrange­
ment, but also how it must be un derstoo d . In the process, it will become
obvious that for Marx " division of labor" has a much broader meaning
than most writers on estrangement have assigned to it. In Marx , division of
labor is not exclusively i dentified with the tendency to divide work into
more and more minute tasks. Neither can it be identified only with what
so me might call the "man as cog in a wheel phenomenon ." The discussion
in this work of the i mportance the division of labor plays in Marx 's theory
of estrangement will also enable the reader to systematically deal with the
question as to whether or not , according to Marx, one can speak of estrange­
ment under feu dalism 3 and present-day socialism, a topic also addressed
by Ota Sik ( 1 9 7 2 ) an d S chwarz ( 1 9 6 7 : 82) . S chwarz maintains that once
the private o wnership in the means of pro duction is abolished, it is no
longer possible to speak of estrangement, while Sik tends to take the op­
posite point of view.
This analysis will also show that Marx does not require the abolition
of all division of labor if man is to live free fro m estrangement. Marx 's
aim is not so much to do away with all division of labor as to create a
society that allows individuals to engage in a division of labor voluntarily.
This is not to say that a voluntary division of labor would not be different
along various dimensions fro m an involuntary one. Rather, individuals are
not estranged, even if they should engage in a certain division of labor , as
long as they can do so voluntarily.
Any study dealing with the interpretation and application of Marx 's
theory of estrangement must address the question as to whether it is
 ISSUES AND PROCEDURES 7

legitimate to speak of only one theory of estrangement. This topic h as

been u n der discussion for a considerable length of time , whereby some
(such as Meszaros , 1 9 7 2 ; Petrovic, 1 96 7 ; E. Fischer , 1 970) represent the
point of view that there is no difference between Marx 's early and later
writings . Others maintain that Marx aban doned his theory of estrangement
in favor of a t heory of reification in his later writings (Israe l , 1 97 1 ) . (For a
similar argument, see also S wingewo o d , 1 9 7 5 : 9 5 -9 7 . ) Bell ( 1 96 7 : 3 6 5 )
states that "the historical Marx had , i n effect, re pudiated the idea o f aliena­
tion , " a proposition that Meszaros ( 1 9 7 2 ) vigorously counters. Based on
the view t hat the division o f labor play s a central role in Marx 's theory of
estrange ment , it will be shown how the issues raised by this rather fruit­
less debate can be "resolve d" and in what sense it is possible to speak of
only one theory of e strange ment in Marx .
In his excellent review essay on estrangemen t , Lu dz ( 1 97 3 : 2 7 ) mentions
that, in the conte mporary use of Marx 's theory of estrangement , different
"ideologi cal realms as well as divergent methodologies confront one another."
Lu dz correctly states that so me authors believe that "[f] ro m Marxist and neo­
Marxist points of view, alienation in the hands of empirical-analytical re­
searchers has become merely 'a concept of accommodation' rather than a
means of cultural criticism." It is legitimate to ask for the basis of this be-
lief. One source of contention lies in the fact that in contemporary u sage of
Marx's theory of estrange ment , the attempt is made to o perationalize "es­
tran ge me nt" in order to make it "accessible" to measurement. The operation­
alization has fre quently been based on social-psychological c on cepts, imply­
ing that if individuals did not perceive their existence and social environ-
ment in certain ways , they would not be estrange d . Estrange ment thus came
to be viewed as a function of the individual 's state of min d . O thers con ­
tended that for Marx estrange ment was a t least i n part , i f not totally , also
a function of certain social-structural conditions (see Schach t , 1 9 7 1 : 1 7 2 ;
and Israel, 1 97 1 ) . According t o this latter view, i t follows that i f estrange­
ment is to be abolishe d, basic social-stru ctural changes must o ccur . This
demand for social change is not necessarily implied in the position which
holds that estrange ment is only a function of whether individuals perceive
their social environment in a particular way . In view of this debate , this
study investigates whether , according to Marx , estrangement must be viewed
as a function of social structure or as one of the individual 's states of mind .
Conte mporary application of Marx's theory of estrangement raises other
crucial issues. Thus, many students of Marx who interpret and apply his
8 ESTRANGEMENT

theory of estrange me nt view estrangement as occurring to a greater or lesser

extent. 4 It is also very common to view estrangement as a cause for certain
behavior, feelings , or attitudes. Both of these views are discussed in detail,
and it will become apparent how the application of Marx 's t heory of es­
trangement is intricately linked with its interpretation . I t will also become
apparent that a'l;'ly attempt to measure estrange ment , that is , to view it in
quantitative terms , is problematic . The problem with measu rement, as
will be shown , does not lie with the multidimensionality of estrangement
as Feuer ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 3 9- 1 40) seems to thin k , 5 but with the implicit danger
of misinterpreting Marx once estrangement is perceived to be a qu antita­
tive phenomenon .
The early postwar perio d witnessed an u psurge and po pularization of
existentialist thinking which did not leave the debate on estrangement un­
affecte d . The y ears in which existentialism experienced its growth were
also characterized by an increased interest in Marx 's early writings, par­
ticularly the Manuscripts. For many , the Manuscripts were symbolic of
the "revitalization" of Marxism and a "novel " source for an attempt to
provide new interpretations of and insights into Marx in view of the Stalin­
ist experience. Marxist scholarshi p had become a "weapon" that could be
directed against both capitalism and " Russian socialism . " Thus , it is not
surprising that philosophers fro m socialist countries were put on alert .
What pro duced a virtual counteroffe nsive , however , was the fact that exis­
tentialists like Sartre made heavy use of the concept of estrangement in
their writings. Scholars like Schaff ( 1 9 64) , Oiserman ( 1 96 5 ) , and Schwarz
( 1 967) subse quently accused Sartre and others of misinterpreting Marx.
They claimed that the existentialists treated estrangement as if it were a
phenomenon of all social life at all times, an d they maintain ed that Marx
thought estrange ment should be associated with only a certain historical
phase . 6 As a result of the investigation in this volume (including the topics
of scarcity and estrange ment in present-day socialism) , it will become clear
how the issues raise d above must be resolve d . I do not endorse J ordan 's
( 1 97 1 : 1 9 ) view that "Marx came to believe that estrangement (self-aliena­
tion) is an unavoidable conse quence of the necessity to work . "
Focusing o n the issues outlined above may give u s the key t o a novel
interpretation of Marx's theory o f e strangement . The contribution this
stu dy makes with respect to the interpretation of Marx's writings will
be of immediate relevance to the social sciences which have tradition ally
 ISSUES AND PROCEDURES 9

sought to employ his theory for further social analysis. It will be of im­
mediate relevance to social science in the same way that the social scientists'
application of the theory has affected its interpretation.

This inquiry seeks to give an accurate and well-documented interpreta­

tion of Marx's theory of estrangement. Hence, I rely on the Marx/Engels
Werke as the source of Marx's original writings.7 The translations of the
relevant passages are taken from the sources indicated in the list of
abbreviations. As a rule, all the translations provided here have been ex­
amined for their accuracy.8 Whenever the translation does not accurately
convey the meaning of the original, it is amended. Any such alteration is
indicated, and usually the justification for making a specific change is
presented.
This text deliberately excludes controversies concerning interpretations
of what Marx says on certain topics in order to avoid confusion and over­
loading the text with too many details. In the process, it is hoped that the
main theses of this book will also appear with greater clarity. This does
not mean that points of controversy are not discussed. They are indeed
addressed, but only in footnotes and in sections separately set aside for
this purpose. The various interpretations of Marx are for the most part
in those sections labeled "Introduction," "Discussion," "Comment," and
the whole of Chapters 1 , 9, and 1 0 .
This work differs from similar studies in its conscious attempt t o separate
the account of Marx's thought from points of debate and in its use of com­
plete quotes. In general, I refrain from quoting "phrases," and use full
quotes for purposes of documentation. Seldom is there paraphrasing with­
out subsequent documentation by quotes. There are several reasons why
this procedure is followed. First, any interpretative study depends for its
"data" on the texts that are being interpreted. It is therefore very important
that these data be presented in an unabridged form. An interpretation
documented by complete quotes presents less risk of distorting the mean­
ing than does an interpretation based on paraphrase or quotation of phrases.
Second, the reader will be directly involved in the ways Marx expresses him­
self, an emotional component that should not be separated from an attempt
to understand Marx. Third, the reader's direct confrontation with Marx's
text (as well as the reader's development of a feeling for it) facilitates a
critical appraisal of the interpretation in this book, and allows a more ob-
10 ESTRANGEMENT

jective debate. While this approach does not guarantee a solution to all
the questions of interpretation, it is at least a step in the right direction.
In order to improve the readability of the "main text," quotes that provide
additional evidence for a certain argument are presented in the appropriate
notes.

NOTES

1. For exampl e , "man is estrange d because he is distant from, or does not control
such and such."
2 . It also allo ws for statements that are empirically founded. Man del ( 1 97 1 : 1 6 1 )
i s in correct when h e says that early writings lack "emp irical fou n datio ns" a n d are
"l argely p hilosophical and speculative ." Man del's misu n derstanding comes from the
fact that he does not fully appreciate the role Marx 's concept of human natu re plays
with respect to his theory of estrange ment.
3 . Feudalism is characterized by the almost total absence of a market in labor
power. Oilman ( 1 97 6 : 1 8 1 , 2 5 2) p oints out that Marx speaks of estrangement u n der
feu dalism, but he does not elaborate on the subject.
4. See, for example , S wingewood ( 1 97 5 : 92 ) an d Krader ( 1 9 7 5 a : 269; 1 97 5b : 4 3 7 ) .
5. The problem, the n , i s n o t h o w to measure a p henomenon which some (Neal
and Rettig, 1967; Tatsis a n d Zito , 1975) cla i m is mul t i d i mensional. Rather, the p roble1
is whether what Marx calle d estran gemen t is at all accessible to measureme nt, if Marx
is not to be misinterpreted.
6 . Similarly, others can be criticize d : "The glaring survival of p h en omena of alien a
t i o n in Soviet society serves a s a b asis fo r bourgeo is i deol ogists to demo nstrate triumph
ly the absolute inevitability of alienation 'in indu strial so ciety ' " (Mandel , 1 97 1 : 1 8 7) .
7. An exception is The Poverty of Philosophy which was transl ate d into German
under Engels' supervision (see MEW, 4, p p . 5 5 8- 5 69, 6 2 1 ) .
8 . This does not i mply that t h e translations are o ptimal with respect to clarity
an d style. To provi de optimal translations was beyon d the p rovince of this work.
2
MARX'S CONCEPTION
OF HUMAN NATURE

Marx's theory of estrangement is roote d directly in his theory of human

nature . Before addressing the issue of what leads to estrangement , I will
therefore examine the ways in which Marx's theory depends o n his defi­
nition of human nature .
When defining the characteristics that make man specifically human ,
Marx makes use of two different starting points which yield quite dif­
ferent definitions of hu man nature . First , he defines human n ature using
a biological mo del , and then an historical model. In the course of the dis­
cussion here , it will become evident that Marx 's theory of estrangement
is base d pri marily on the biological mo del. This is not to say that Marx
was not intereste d in the historical , for he used the historical model to
counter the views of some of his most ardent intellectual competitors ,
as is evident when one reads, for example , The German Ideology.

MAN V E R S U S ANIM A L : T H E BIOLOGICAL M O D E L

The biological mo del of human n ature is a continuous theme in Marx,

appearing in both his early and later works. The same is true with regard
to Marx 's historical model. He states that what is unique to the human
species from a biological point of view are the very general ways in which
12 ESTRANGEMENT

human beings differ from animals. As is indicated by the currently used

definition ho mo sapi ens (a term Marx does not tend to use but to which
he would probably have no objections), human beings are knowing beings
with a consciousness and the ability to reflect upon themselves and their
human and natural environment. As a result, unlike the animals, human
beings have a sense of history and can anticipate the future. They can con­
sciously and willfully create and produce for a manifold of purposes, as
individuals and as a collective.Marx does not claim that his method (that
is, isolating what is specifically human by contrasting human beings with
animals) is new. On the contrary, he maintains that, since Aristotle and
the Stoics, it has been common knowledge that human beings have "in­
tellect, emotion and will" (CW, 5 , p. 5 1 1 ; MEW, 3, p. 500) . Marx believes
that his premises with regard to the differences between human beings
and animals are not arbitrary, but rather are empirically verifiable: "The
premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but
real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination
. ...These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way"
(CW, 5 , p. 31; MEW, 3, p. 20) . With respect to the differences between
man and the animals he states:

The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not dis­
tinguish itself from it. It is i ts life activi ty. Man makes his life activity
itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.He has conscious
life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges.
Conscious life-activity distinguishes man immediately from animal
life (CW, 3, p. 2 7 6) ; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 5 1 6) .

Admittedly animals also produce. . . . But an animal only produces what

it immediately needs for itself or its young.It produces one-sidedly,
whilst man produces universally.It produces only under the dominion
of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is
free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.
An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of
nature. An animal's product belongs immediately to its physical body,
whilst man freely confronts his product.An animal forms objects only
in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which
it belongs, whilst man knows how to apply everywhere the inherent
standard to the object.Man therefore also forms objects in accordance
with the laws of beauty (CW, 3, pp. 2 7 6-2 7 7 ; MEW, EB, l. T., p. 5 1 7).
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 13

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion

or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish them­
selves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation.
By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing
their material life (CW, 5, p. 31; MEW, 3, p. 21).
Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity,
of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it
exists for me: the animal does not "relate" itself to anything, it does
not "relate" itself at all. For the animal its relation to others does not
exist as a relation (CW, 5, p. 44; MEW, 3, p. 30).
At this point [i.e., at the beginning of conscious social life] man is dis­
tinguished from sheep only by the fact that with him consciousness
takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one (CW,
5, p. 44; MEW, 3, p. 31).
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this,
that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in
reality.At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already
existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He
not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works,
but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus
operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordina­
tion is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs,
the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's
will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close atten­
tion. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in
which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something
which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his
attention is forced to be (Cl, p. 174; MEW, 2 3, p. 19 3) .

In postulating that, contrary to animals, human beings produce independent­

ly of need, Marx disagrees with Adam Smith. Adam Smith assumes that
human beings by nature, prefer rest (Rube) to work, while Marx postulates
that the individual, by nature, tends also to engage in work.
Nonetheless, Marx would probably agree with the suggestion that under
certain historical circumstances, individuals prefer rest to work. In a society
in which work is not imposed on individuals (a subject discussed), how­
ever, Marx would maintain that this is not the case (MEW, G , pp. 505, 507):
14 ESTRANGEMENT

"it see ms quite far from Smith's mind that the individual , ' in his normal
state of health, strengt h , activity , skill , facility , ' also needs a normal por­
tion of work , and of the suspension of tranquillity" (G, p . 6 1 1 ) ; MEW,
G, p. 505).
If Marx i s willing to a dmit t hat under given circumstances human beings
might prefer rest (Rube) to work , in order to be consistent, he must also
admit that in dividuals may not behave or be able to behave in a way th at
corresponds to their "natural conditio n . " This "natural conditio n " is a non­
variable ( disregarding hu man evolution) conditio n , since , acco rding to Marx
himself, it is base d not o n dogma but on o bservable , empirical reality , a col­
lection of facts derive d from a comparison of the human being with animals.
As a resu lt , one can speak of human nature in general-human nature, a
"natural conditio n , " which exists uninfluenced by the course of history .
Against J eremy Bentham, Marx argues therefore that general human nature
cannot be defined from the utility theory , since what is useful is histori cally
relative and general hu man nature is in no way relative :

To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature . This nature
itself is not to be deduce d from the principle of utility. Applying this to
man , he that would criti cise all human acts, movements, relations, etc . ,
b y the principle of utility , must first deal with human nature as modified
in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it . With the
driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the E nglish shop
keeper, as the normal man . Whatever is useful to this queer normal man,
and to his world , is absolutely useful (Cl, p. 5 7 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 6 3 7) .

As this quotation in dicates, Marx also makes use of an historical model of

human nature .

T H E B E HAVIO R OF I ND I VIDUALS C H AN GE S :
T H E HI STORICAL M O D E L

Bentham, using the principle of utility , arrived at a definition of human

nature or "normal man " ( Norma/ mensch) . Marx objects to this definition ,
arguing that Bentham's "normal man " i s a mere historical phenomenon .
Therefore , in addition to his theory of general human nature , Marx intro­
duces a theory of specific human nature . Human nature as it is understood ,
in addition to the criteria that distinguish human beings fro m animals, is
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 15

accordingly seen t o be a function o f history . Thus, what for Bentham is

"normal man , " that is, human nature as such , is for Marx merely human
nature as manifested in Bentham's historical period . With Bentham, as
with many other philosophers, especially the German idealists, Marx is
quick to point out that what is often seen to constitute immutable
human nature is not immutable , but represents hu man traits under certain
historical circumstances only . While Marx's biological model emphasizes
the properties of human nature that are immutable (such as intelle ct , con­
sciousness, will , an d e motion) , his historical model points to the properties
of human n ature that are subject to change . Marx illustrate s this important
,
distinction as follows:

But in any case , why should the Germans brag so loudly of their knowl­
e dge of human essence, since their knowledge does not go beyond the
three general attributes , intellect , emotion and will , which h ave been
fairly universally recognise d since the days of Aristotle and the Stoics
( CW, 5, pp. 5 1 1 -5 1 2 ; MEW, 3, p . 5 00) .

He also criticizes Herr Karl Griin for his conception of human nature .

I t is o bvious too that this "whole man , " " contained" in a single at­
tribute of a real in dividual and interprete d by the philosopher in terms
of that attribute, is a comp lete chimera. Anyway , what sort of man is
this " man " who is not seen in his real historical activity and existence ,
but can be dedu ced fro m the lobe of his own ear, or from some other
feature which distingu ishes him fro m the animals?

Similarly , Marx criticizes Feuerbach :

Feuerbach resolves the e ssence of religion into the essence of man . But
the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual .
I n its reality it is the ensemble of t h e social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is
hence o blige d :
1 ) T o abstract from the historical process and t o define the religious
sentiment ( Gemiit) by itself, and to presuppose an abstract-iso /ated­
hu man individual (CW, 5 , pp. 7-8 ; MEW, 3 , p. 6) .
16 ESTRANGEMENT

We can see t hat Marx accepts a biological definition of human n ature, but, as
is clear fro m his comment on Herr Grlin , this definition is n o t sufficient to
understand other aspects of hu man nature . Thus, he introdu ces the notion
that all the aspects o f human nature that cannot be derived from a compariso1
of human beings with animals can be understood by seeing them in an his­
tori cal perspe ctive . In the same vein , he criticizes those (Grli n , Feuerbach,
an d others) who attempt to understan d the nonbiologically based aspe cts
of human nature in ways other than through historical spectacles. He ac­
cuses them of "abstracting" and creating "phantasies" about human nature,
of falling into t he trap of seeing nonbiologically based aspects as absolute
instead of mutable and relative .

HUMAN NATURE AND MARX'S D E FINITION

O F MAN AS SPECI ES-B EING

If a significant p ortio n of Marx 's definition of human nature rests on

the co mparison of man with animals, so does his concept of species . "Yet
productive life is the life of the species" (CW, 3 , p . 2 7 6 ) . When specifying
the type of pro ductive life which defines the species, Marx say s :

It is life-engendering life . T h e whole character of a species-its spe cie s ­

character-is contained in t h e character of i t s life activity ; and free ,
conscious activity is man 's species-character . . . . Conscious life
activity distinguishes man i mmediately fro m animal life activity . I t is
just because of this that he is a species-being. Or it is only because he
is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i .e . , that his own life is
an o bject for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity "
(CW, 3 , p. 2 7 6 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p. 5 1 6).

It can readily be seen that, for Marx , the concept of species h as a biological
base . It is also clear that , on the basis of consciousness, unlike the animals,
man is able to reflect upon himself an d recognize what makes him a unique ,
that is, a species-being, when compare d to the rest of his nonhuman environ­
ment.

Man is a species-being, not only because in pra ctice and in theory he

ado pts the species ( his own as well as those of other things) as his
o bject, but-and this is only ano ther way of expressing it-also because
he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being (CW, 3 , p . 2 7 5 ;
MEW, E B 1 . T. , p. 5 1 5 ) .
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 17

Since these characteristics, i f based o n the comparison o f man with

animals, are an integral part of all human beings , it has been possible to see
them also as the characterizing elements of the human species . Thus,
"species" is defined by the sum of the parts (that is, individuals) possess­
ing the set of characteristics outlined above . However, this gives an atomis­
tic view of what the human species is and does not show that the p arts
within this spe cies interact with each other. In the Manuscripts, Marx
postulates that individuals stand in interaction with each other. It is in
the Grun drisse, however, that he postulates that human interaction is
qualitatively very different from that of animals. He adds that precisely
this qualitative difference further characterizes the human species:

The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the prod­
uct of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of pro­
ducing the o bj ect of the other's need , this proves that each of them
reaches beyo n d his own particular need etc., as a human being, and
that they relate to one another as human beings ; that all know their
species nature ( Gattungswesen) to be socil!l (gemei nschaftlich ) . It
does not happen elsewhere-that elephants produce for tigers, or
animals for other animals. For example . A hive of bees comprises
at bottom (au fon d) only one bee , and they all produce the same
thing (M EW, G, pp. 154-155; translation mine) . 1

Marx further illustrates the social nature of man , as follows : " I f man
is confronted by himself, he is confronte d by the other man . . . in fact,
every relationship in which man [ stands) to himself, is realised and ex­
pressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men "
(MEW, EB l .T. , p . 5 1 8 ; translation mine). 2 The above passages show th at
man is by nature a social being an d that this aspect also characterizes
the human species as a species. It also is species-nature . Before leaving
this discussion, a few comments o n Marx 's terminology (such as species
and species-being) and on interpretations of Marx are in order.

DISCUSSION

Marx's vocabulary has caused some discomfort among scholars, partially

becau se when translated into English , h is terminology is often difficult
and his word-co mbinations awkward. Even in German , Marx 's terminology
concerning the subject of species is not always completely clear , an d close
18 ESTRANGEMENT

attention must be paid to t he various twists associated with a p articular

usage of words. Hence , a short digression on his use of the term species
in its various co mbinations may be useful.
"Species" is a translation of Gattung, a word that has the following
synonyms in German ( Klappenbach and S teinit z , 1 9 7 1 ) : A rt ( translated
by Cassell as kin d, species, variety, type , sort; race , class, sto ck , bree d ;
nature) an d Sorte (translated b y Cassell a s kin d , sort, ty p e , species, qual ity ,
grade , variety , bran d) . Gattung itself i s tran slated b y Cassell a s kind, class,
type, sort ; specie s ; genus, race , bree d , family (of plants) ( Betteridge , 1 9 7 5 ) .
A dictionary u se d in Marx's time translates Gattung a s k in d , sort, species,
race (Adler , 1 8 64) . Thus, the term Gattung can take on various meanings
and can be u se d an d translated very flexibly .
T h e above cited Worterbuch der deutschen Gegenwartssprache ( Klappen­
bach an d Steinitz) gives the following description of Gattung : general con­
cept which summarizes in dividual things or beings that have common es­
sential properties" (translation mine). This is how Marx defined what is
human nature and species-nature , namely , by singling out those aspects of
man that are not subject to historical change , yet distinguish him from the
ani mals. On the basis of these aspects he called man a Gattung.
Gattung is usually translated as "species, " a word that is generally used
in biology for t hose types of animals that can reproduce themselves. When
Marx speaks of Gattung, however, he does not have this meaning in mind.
For him, man belongs to a species because of the aspects that separate him
fro m the animals and that he has in common with other human beings , in­
clu ding t he fact that man is so cial. " S pecies-being" therefore means "inter­
active-being," in a ddition to a being that has intellect , will , and emotion .
Whenever Marx uses the word " spe cie s , " he may or may n ot imply all
the characteristics that define the "species. " For example , when he says,
"Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he
ado pts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his obj e ct"
(CW, 3 , p . 2 7 5 ) , "spe cies " refers to the interactive nature of the members
of the species, since without interaction , it would be impossible to adopt
one's o wn species as an obj ect. On the other hand, when Marx says, " It is
just in his work u pon the objective world, therefore , that man really proves
himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life "
(CW, 3 , p . 2 7 7 ), "species" refers to man's ability to act upon n ature con ­
sciously . Nothing is implied about any so cial processes through which this
might occur.
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF H UMAN NATURE 19

This example shows that , i n reading Marx's early work , cl ose attention
must be paid to his precise meaning when he uses "species " ( Gattung) .
This is also the case in another respect. As mentioned earlier, the term
Gattung has synonyms; these synonyms are not considere d when Gattung
is routinely translated as "species. " Consider the quote given above . Marx
writes that " Man is a species-being, not only because . . . he adopts the
species ( his o wn as well as those of other things) as his obj e c t . " However ,
"species" when referring to "other things" coul d better be rendered by
"nature of other things."" In German , no word distinction m ust be made
since the word Gattung (spe cies) can substitute for its synonym Art
(nature). Thus, if Gattung is translated by "spec ies" (as is u sually the
case) , the German synonyms for which "species" could stan d must be
kept in min d.
Another potential source of confusion is Gattungswesen , a word fre­
quently used in Marx 's early writings. It is sometimes overlooked in trans­
lations that Wesen has different meanings in German . For example , Wesen
can stan d for Sein (translated by Cassell as being, existen ce ; essence , true
nature ) , "Dasein " (translated by Cassell as presen ce ; existence, life ) , or
Natur (in the sense of "nature of someth ing") (Paul, 1 9 66) . Wesen itself
is translate d by Cassell as reality , substance , essence ; being, creature , living
thing, organis m ; state , con dition ; nature , character, p roperty , intrinsic
virtue , and so forth) . Thus, when Marx says that man is a spe cies-being
(Gattungswesen) , he refers to the fact that man , in his existence (Sein ,
Dasein ) , is a member of a species. When he says that man is "estranged
fro m his ( Gattungswesen ) " (CW , 3 , p. 2 7 7 ; MEW , EB l .T . , p . 5 1 7 ) , he
means that man is estranged fro m the nature of his species . The se cond
meaning is marke dly different from the first one ; yet , the same word
( " Wesen ") can be used in German to render both meanings . The second
meaning, however, is sometimes rendered in English in the same way as
the first , usually with "species-being. " This is inadequate since, according
to Cassell , " being" does not translate into the German Natur , but only
into Sein an d Dasein.
Not only is the inade quacy of a technical nature , but it also has im­
portant conse quen ces in interpreting Marx . We have seen that, for Marx ,
man is a spe cies-being because of the characteristics by which man differs
from the animals and by which human society differs fro m animal colonies.
Base d on these characteristics, each human individual is a member of a
group of other individuals sharing the same characteristics. The individual
20 ESTRANGEMENT

exists as a member of a species, and he is a species-being. According to

Marx's definition, man is and remains a species-being as long as the defin­
ing characteristics remain the same . As long as man , contrary to animals ,
remains a being endowe d with certain faculties, he will remain a species­
being. It t herefore is misleading to say that man is estrange d from his
species-being, since , although estrange d , he remains man . I t is more mean­
ingful to say that man is estranged from his spe cies-nature ; that is, he is
prevented fro m using the faculties that are given to him by n ature and
that define him as a spe cies according to his will . Although a member of
a species (a species-being) , he cannot produce as he wants , an d he cannot
interact as would be the case if he could produce as he wants. I n othe r
words, he is estrange d from his species-nature . I t would h ave been more
beneficial to translate "estranged from his species-nature " instead of
"estranged fro m his species-being" (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 7 ) . 3
Although the vocabulary of the young Marx is often difficult to decipher,
it has been possible to show a very strong consistency in his use of terms.
Conse quently , I cannot endorse Adam Schaff's statement that Marx's
early vocabulary " was neither consistent nor precise " (S chaff, 1 9 70a: 84) .
There is yet another point of disagreement with Sch aff and Fromm .
It has been shown that Marx's theory of human nature consi sts of two
clearly delineated components, one of which is based on Marx 's biological
mo del and the other on his historical model of human nature . Quoting
Fro mm, Schaff writes :

Marx was opposed to two positions : t h e unhistorical o n e that the

nature of man is a substan ce present from the very beginning of
history , and the relativistic position that man 's nature has no in-
herent quality whatsoever and is nothing but the reflex of social
conditions. But he never arrived at the full development of his own
theory concerning the nature of man , transcending both the unhistorical
and the relativistic positions ; hence he left h imself open to various and
contradictory interpretations" (Schaff, 1 9 70a: 8 8 ) .

Schaff's position is unjustified because , a s Marx himself showe d , t h e u n ­

histori cal position is based on criteria that distinguish man fro m animal .
These criteria are not subject to historical change unless, of course , one
assu mes that man , at the beginning of his evolution , did not possess the
characteristics that distinguish him today from animals. When defining
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 21

human n ature , however, Marx does n o t seem t o have been co ncerned with
such matters. Instead, he based his theory on the "human animal " as it
is known to us today , assuming that , as far as the history of man is known
to us, the defining characteristics have remained unchanged .
Fro m another angle , Israel makes a similar charge against Marx's theory
of hu man nature. He claims that Marx 's concept of man "contains meta­
physical notions concerning the characteristics which comprise man 's
essence" (that is, man 's nature) and that it is not empirically testable
(Israel , 1 97 1 : 8-9 , 7 5 , 7 6 ) . According to the presentation of Marx 's
theory of hu man nature here , however, one would have to conclude
that the characteristics which he specified as distinguishing man from the
animals are empirically verifiable and therefore far from metaphysical.
Israel's presentation of Marx's theory of human nature is unclear in
another respect . He writes that Marx adopted Schiller 's view "that human
nature could reach perfe ction " (Israel, 1 9 7 1 : 24) and that "human n ature
can be con ceived of, on the one han d , as the p o tentiali ties w hich mankind
has an d , on the other h an d , as the existi ng human being seen as a con­
se quence of a certain social structure " (I srae l , 1 9 7 1 : 5 7 ) . H ere , Israel
fails to distinguish between the two components of Marx 's theory of hu­
man nature . He is likely referring to that part of Marx's theory of human
nature that is labeled here as the historical model of human n ature . He
does not specify , however. It woul d not be possible to speak of human
nature reaching perfection in any other way since it is perfect in its own
right, as is shown in the comparison of man with animals. Israel believes
that the

young Marx's theory concerning man 's n ature contained value premises
which were anchored in a specific historical period characterized by
specifi c con ditions: it was a situation marked by the transition from
the artisan to the in dustrial level of production . . . . Marx 's theory of
man as developed in the Manuscripts was characterized by romantic
i deas and notions concerning the n ature of work , which , in my opinion ,
were influenced by the historical situation preceding the p rocess of
industrialization (Israel, 1 97 1 : 2 6 2 ) .

If m y delineation of Marx's theory of human nature is corre ct , no such

conclusion can be drawn , regardless of what model (historical or u nhis­
torical) is consi dered. First , a comparison of man with the animals does
22 ESTRANGEMENT

not contain "value premises which were anchored in a specific historical

period . " Secon d, any determination of the characteristics of human
nature which are historically determined does not depend on p articular
values , since it is merely based on a comparison of human behavior under
various historical conditions. Therefore, if anything depends on value , it
is not Marx 's theory of human nature but his assu mption that man ough t
to be able to live according to wh at he thinks is man's nature. Third, as
our analysis of Marx 's theory of human natu re has shown , there is no
evidence, contrary to Israel 's implied view, that this theory ch anged
as Marx wrote his later works. By selecting p assages from Marx's early
and later works , it could be shown that his theory of human nature did
not change.
In a recent essay , Daniel Bell suggests that Marx was seeking to resolve
"a nu mber of inherently irrecon cilable dilemmas in the epistemology an d
sociology of the so cial sciences" ( Bell, 1 9 7 7 : 1 89 ) . Bell further asserts
that one such dile mma is "human nature seen as an essence ( Wesen ) versus
hu man nature seen as recreated by history . " Bell is correct in recognizing
that Marx's theory of hu man n ature consists of two parts. My analysis
above , ho wever, suggests no reason why these two parts should be th ought
of as irreconcilable o p posites; on the contrary , they complement each
other. Marx's biological model can determine only those characteristics
that distinguish man from animals and that thus define human nature . I t
cannot, and does not claim to , explain the differences i n human behavior
(that is, hu man nature ) over time . For this, Marx makes use of an historical
mo del . This an d the biologi cal model are mutually exclusive , however, and
are not irreconcilable but com plementary .

NOTES

1. My transl a t i o n di ffers from Martin Nicolaus' translation o f the Grundrisse

insofar as it replaces "that their common species-being (Gattungswesen ) is acknowl­
e dge d by all " with "that all know their species-nature (Gattungswesen ) to be social
(gemeinscbaftlicb)"; an d "at bottom" with "at bottom (au fon d ) " (see G, p . 243 ) .
2 . For additional illu stration, consider the following quotes:

But also when I am active scientifically , etc.-an activity which I c an sel dom
perform in direct community with others-then my activity is social, becau se I
perform it as a man . Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a
social product (as is even the langu age in which the thinker is active) : my
o wn existence is social activity , an d therefore that which I make of myself,
 MARX ' S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE 23

I make of myself for society and with the con sciousness of myself as a social
being.
My general consciousness is only the theo retical shap e of that of which the
living shape is the real community, the social fabri c , although at the present
day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts
it with hostility . The activity of my general consciousness, as an activity , is
therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being.
Above all we must avoi d postulating "society " again as an abstraction
vis-a-vis the in dividual . The individual is the social being . . . man 's in dividu al
and species-life are not different. (CW, 3, p . 2 9 8-29 9 ; MEW, EB 1 .T., p . 5 3 8 ) .

Lan guage, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, o f inter­
course wit h other men. Where there exists a relationsh i p , it exists for me.
(CW, 5, p . 44; MEW, 3 , p . 3 0) .

I n a sort of way, it is with man a s with commodities. Since h e comes into the
worl d neither with a looking glass in his han d , nor as a Fichtian p h il osopher,
to whom "I am I" is sufficient, man first see s and re cogn i s es himself in other
men. Peter only e stablishes his own identity as a man by first comp aring him­
self with Pau l as being o f l i ke kind. And thereby Pau l , just as he stands in his
Pauline personality, be co mes to Peter the type of the genus homo (C l , p. 5 9 ;
MEW, 2 3 , p. 6 7 ) .

3 . Marx himself ( C W , 3 , p . 2 7 7 ; M E W , E B , 1 .T., p . 5 1 7) explains that estrange­

ment from Gattungswesen means estrangement from "species-nature ." I n the
Collected Works (Vol. 3, p. 2 7 7 ) , the translation is not consistent.
Marx makes another u se of Gattungswesen or Gattungssein : " the divine
power of money lie s in its character as men 's estrange d, alienating and self-disposing
species-nature " (Gattungswesen) (CW, 3, p. 3 2 5 ; M EW, E B 1 .T., p. 5 6 5 ) . Here
Gattungswesen refers not to the species' principal nature, but to its n ature as it
applies to a certain historical situation. The word Gattungswesen is used in con­
junction with Marx 's historical model of human nature rather than the biol ogical
on e .
3
ESTRANGEMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF BEING COERCED INTO SELLING
ONE'S LABOR POWER

Before it can be shown how Marx's theory of estrangement derives

directly fro m his concept of human n ature , we must first examine how
Marx perceived some other aspects of social life . This examin ation will
then be helpful in u n derstanding Marx's theory of estrangement.
Throughout his work , Marx emphasized that , although some individuals
may have so me choice as to the persons or institutions to which they sell
their labor power, under a system of wage labor it is capital that commands
labor. The observation that capital has more power than labor is manifest
by the fact that the cap italist as the agent of cap ital has more alternatives
than the worker.

Wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capital­

ist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist. The capitalist
can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the
capitalist (CW, 3, p. 2 3 5 ) ; MEW, EB l .T . , p. 47 1 ) .
. . . it is just the capacity of the capitalist to dire ct his capital into
another channel which either renders the worker, who is restricted to
some particular branch of labour, destitute, or forces him to submit
to every demand of this capitalist ( CW, 3 , p. 2 3 6 ; MEW, EB 1 . T . , p. 472 ).
26 ESTRANGEMENT

Marx was even more distressed by capital 's apparent power to seriously
threaten even the worker's physical survival:

[ T]he worker has the misfortune to be a living cap ital, and therefore an
indigent capital, one which loses its interest , and hence its l ivelihood,
every moment it is not working . . . . As soon , therefore , as it occurs to
capital ( whether fro m necessity or caprice) no longer to be for the
worker, he himself is no longer for himself: he has no work , hence
no wages, and since he has no existence as a human being but only
as a wo rker, he can go and bury himself, starve to death, etc (CW, 3 ,
p . 2 8 3 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 2 3 ) .

[ I ] n those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the worker
suffers in his very existence , the capitalist in the profit on his dead
mammon (CW, 3 , p. 2 3 7 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 47 3 ) .

I n view o f such a n account of the power o f capital, w e shoul d n o t be

surprise d by Marx's categoric statement t hat " Capital is thus the governing
po wer over labour" (CW, 3 , p. 2 4 7 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 484) . However , the
agents of capital-the capitalists-do not p ossess this governing power on
the basis of personal or human qualities, but merely because they own
capital with its inherent power to purchase anything and everything. The
capitalist 's power "is the purchasing power of his capital , wh ich nothing
can withstan d" (CW , 3 , p. 247 ) . Thus, whereas in earlier societies people
were herde d together to engage in forced labor , capital manages to ac­
complish the same coordination of labor power through the exchange of
free labor (MEW, G , p . 4 2 7 ) .
Capital re presents

a coercive relation , which compels the working class to do more work

t han the narrow round of its own life-wants prescribes. As a producer
of the activity of others, as a pumper-out of surplus-labour and ex­
ploiter of labour-power, it surpasses in energy , disregard of bounds,
recklessness and efficiency , all earlier systems of production based on
directly co mpulsory labour (C l , p . 2 9 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 2 8 ) .

Capital not only governs labor in so ciety a s a whole , but also has command
over labor during the act of production. "Personified capital , the capitalist
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING O N E ' S LABOR POWER 27

takes care that the labourer does his work satisfactorily (ordentlich) and with
the proper degree of intensity " (Cl, p. 2 9 3 ; MEW , 2 3 , p. 3 2 8 ; translation
mine) .
At first, it may ap pear that the worker is a free agent and that cap ital
is not coercive . Indeed, the worker himself sells his labor power to the
capitalist and engages in a contractual relationship with him. After the
deal is made , however, it is discovered that the worker

Was no "free agent , " that the time for which he is free to sell his
labour-power is the time for which he is force d to sell it, that in fact
the vampire will not lose its hold on him "so long as there is a muscle,
a nerve , a drop of blood to be exploited" (Cl, p. 2 8 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 1 9 ) . 1

In fact , the worker was in the bondage of capital even before he appeared
as a "free agent" of his labor power. As part of an unending cy cle , all he
can do is sell his labor power over and over again . I t is the capitalist process
of production itself which, based on the fact that the worker does not own
his product of labor, "incessantly hurls back the labourer on to the market
as a vendor of his labour-po wer, and that incessantly converts his o wn p rod­
uct into a means by which another man can purch ase him " (Cl, pp. 5 4 1 -
542 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 6 0 3 ) . The capitalist process o f production in cessantly
forces the worker "to sell his labour-power in order to live , and en ables
the capitalist to purchase labour-power in order that he may enrich him­
self" (Cl, p. 5 4 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 603 ) . This process keeps the worker in con­
stant bon dage , an d in the case of child labor, even the formality of a volun­
tary sale disappears (MEW, 2 3 , p . 6 0 3 ) .

WAGE LAB O R : T H E C O E R C I O N TO G I V E U P
ONE'S WI L L AND C O N T R O L OVER O N E ' S B O DY

In return for his continued physical existence , the worker is compelled

to repeate dly sell his labor power as one would sell any other commodity .
But since labor po wer cannot in reality be separated fro m the lo cus of this
po wer-a human being with distinct qualities and needs-the individual as
the locus of labo r po wer is also treated as any other co mmo dity. Not only
does capital coerce the individual to become a commo dity in that he or she is
forced to sell his labor power, but also once the labor is sol d , the individual
worker possessing this power loses control over it. Once sold , labor power
28 ESTRANGEMENT

is the property of capital , property for which the locus of this power (the
worker) receives a sum of money in return . However , l abor power cannot
become the property of capital without the locus of this power, for the
time contracted, also becoming the property of capital. As is the case with
any other commodity , the capitalist owner of l abor power h as the right to
subject this power to his will. Having this right, however, implies that the
indivi dual , who is the source of labor power, no longer is allowed to exert
his/her will over their o wn power, since the individual cannot be separated
from t he labor power he/she puts out. If l abor power becomes a commodity
so must the in dividual putting out this labor power.
The worker is thus forced ( 1 ) to sell his labor power and ( 2 ) to give
up his command over it once it is sold. Even if the terms of e mployment
are attractive , this principal condition does not change . Thus, Marx writes:
"The raising of wages excites in the worker the capitalists' mania to get
rich, which he , however, can only satisfy by the sacrifice of his mind and
body " (CW, 3, p. 2 3 8 ; MEW, EB l .T . , p. 474) . And sin ce the worker is
forced to become a commodity by being coerced into selling his labor
power as if it were any other commodity and giving up his co ntrol over it
once it has been sol d , the stage is set for him to be tre ated as a thing , as
a machine with the capacity to perform certain tasks and also subject to
the owner's will. " Since the worker has sunk to the level of a machin e , he
can be confronted by the machine as a competitor" (CW , 3 , p . 2 3 8) .
The worker therefore serves a will that i s not his own . Furthermore , he
is treated as a commodity and , like a machine , acts in behalf of a will out­
side himself. This is not the case if the worker is not coerced into selling
his labor power. "So far as the labour-process is purely individual , " writes
Marx,

one an d the same labourer writes in himself all the fun ctio ns, that later
on become separated . When an in dividual appropriates natural obj ects
for his livelihood, no one controls him but himself. Afterwards he is
controlled by others . A single man cannot operate nature without call­
ing his o wn muscles into play under the control of his own brai n . As in
the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the l abour­
process unites the labour of the hand with that of the hea d . Later on
they part co mpany and even become deadly foes" (C l , p. 4 7 6 ; MEW,
2 3 , p. 5 3 1 ) .
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 29

An d in the Grun drisse, Marx says that

in the pro du ctio n process of capital labour is a totality -a combination

of labours-whose individual component parts are alien to one another,
so that the overall process as a totality is not the work of the individual
worker, and is furthermore the work of the different workers together
only to the extent that they are (forcibly) combined, and do not (volun­
tarily) enter into combination with one another . The combination of
this labour appears j ust as subservient to and led by an alien will and an
alien intelligence-leaving its ani mati ng uni ty elsewhere . . . " ( G , p. 4 7 0 ;
M E W , G , pp. 3 7 4- 3 7 5 ) .

In summary , i t may b e note d that under capital , unlike sl avery , "the

worker is not a condition of production , only work is " ( G , p. 498 ) . That
is, only the cost of labor power is considered in the decision-making pro­
cesses of the agents of capital . The fact that the individual , as the locus
of this power, also has needs remains ignore d . In addition , capital coerces
the worker by appropriating his will: "The presupposition of the master­
servant relation is the appropriation of an alien wi ll . . , " an d this relation
.

is "repro duced-in mediate d form-in capital " (G, pp. 5 00- 5 0 1 ; MEW, G,
p . 400).
In order to elaborate on the fact that coercion alone makes wage labor
possible , it will be fruitful to examine the p arallels Marx sees between wage
labor and ·other forms of coerced labor resulting in slavery , serfdom , and
the like.
I nsofar as wage labor is subject to an alien will it resembles slavery : "A
man is continually compelled to sell his labour-power , i .e . , himself to another
man . . . " ( C 2 , p . 444 ; MEW, 24, p . 4 3 8) . Marx 's analogies to slavery further
illustrate this point :

The Ro man slave was held by fetters: The wage labourer is bound to his
o wner by invisible threads (C l , p. 5 3 8 ; MEW , 2 3 , p . 5 99) .

The essential difference between the various economic forms of society ,

between , for instance , a society based on slave labour, and one based on
wage labour, lies only in the mode in which this surplus-labour is in each
case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer ( C l , p. 209 ; MEW ,
2 3 , p. 2 3 1 ; see also MEW, 24, p . 3 8 5 ) .
30 ESTRANGEMENT

The more they [the workers] wish to earn , the more must they sacrifice
their time and carry out slave-labour, co mpletely losing all their freedom ,
i n the service of greed ( CW, 3 , p . 2 3 7 ; M EW, EB l . T. , p. 4 7 3 ) . 2

The analogy between wage labor and slavery is an apt one . Engels
concisely summe d up some of the parallels between wage labor and slavery ,
sho wing that the slave can have a better existence than the worker, since
the slave 's biological existence is guaranteed , while the worker's is not . A
slave is the pro perty of his master, who has an interest in keeping his slave
pro ducing; the worker is fo rced to sell h is labor power on a daily and hour­
ly basis. However, the worker's labor power is purchased only when it is
nee de d ; conse quently , the worker's existence is threatened. Capitalism
secures only the existence of the proletariat as a class , an d not the existence
of the individual worker ( Engels, MEW, 4, p . 3 6 6 ).
Man under capital is force d to sell his labor power and is force d to sub­
ordinate his will to an alien will ; as Marx 's analogies with sl avery point out,
this con dition is tantamount to slavery . The difference is th at under capital
slavery is a mediate d form of slavery while , earlier , slavery was based on
direct do mination. Armed with this knowledge as well as knowledge of
Marx 's theory of human nature , it is now possible to address the question
of estrangement. As will be apparent, Marx 's theory of estrangement rests
dire ctly on t he postulates outlined so far.

T H E C O N S E QU E NC E S O F B E I N G C O E RC E D
I NTO S E L LI NG ONE'S LABOR POWE R

Un der capital , the worker is forced to sell his labor power in return
for a wage , which then allows him to purchase commodities necessary for
his sustenance. The worker then does not pro duce his su stenance directly.
Nor does he own the means to do so. He is thus forced to sell h is only
asset-his labor power. According to Marx , this process implies that the
ori ginal connection of the means of pro duction with the individual exert­
ing labor power has been dissolved. As a result, "the mass of the people ,
the labourers, have , as non-owners, come face to face with the non-labourers
as the o wners of these means of production " (C2 , p. 3 1 ; MEW, 24, p. 3 8 ). 3
The workers not only lack the means to transform an d manipulate nature
in the process of pro duction, but they also have no claim to the product
of their labor. They produce the product for and in behalf of an alien will.
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING O N E ' S LABOR POWER 31

For the labo r power expended, they are compensated not with the product
of their labor but with a su m of money , a wage . Marx therefore concludes
that the worker is estrange d in two pri ncipal ways. He who i s coerced into
selling his labor power , and labor under the domination of an alien will is
estrange d from ( 1 ) the pro duct of his l abor, and (2) the act of productio n .

ESTRANGEMENT F ROM T H E P RODUCT O F ONE 'S LABOR

As sho wn earlier, man differs from the animals in being a conscious

being, an d on the basis of such criteria Marx determines what human nature
is. The criteria themselves, if they are to determine in an ahistorical way
what human nature is, are derived from a comparison of man with animals.
Thus, unlike animals , man by nature is able to confront his p ro du ct of labor
freely , while the ani mal's product belongs imme diately to its physical body
( CW, 3 , pp. 2 7 6-2 7 7 ) . The nature of man is thus to confront his product
of labor freely . Man not only has the natural faculty to make his "life
activity itself the o bject of his will and of his consciousness " (CW , 3 ,
p. 2 7 6) , but he is also by nature able to confront the pro duct of his labor
both consciously and freely . This product, of course, is again an integral
part of his environment and, thus, again an object of man 's will and consciou�
life activity . For Marx , then, man has the faculty, given to h im by nature,
to act consciously upon nature as such as well as upon the p roducts of
his labor.
Under capital , man is not allowed to live according to his n ature . Since
he must sell his labo r, his o wn product of labor ceases to be an object of
his will and consciousness. Rather, under capital the product of a worker's
labor becomes the object of a will that is alien to him/her. For Marx , this
con dition is unnatural , for by nature the human produ cer has the faculty
to freely and consciously confront the product of his labor an d subj e ct i t
to h i s will. T h e capitalist mode of production prevents t h e producer from
subjecting his product of labor to his will as he has by nature the faculty
to do . In this context , Marx speaks of the estrangement of m an fro m the
pro duct of his labo r (CW, 3, p. 274) . Referring to the worker , he speaks
of "the estrange ment , the loss of the object , of his product" ( CW , 3 ,
p . 2 7 3 ) , "the estrange ment of the object o f labour" (CW , 3 , p . 2 7 4 ) , and
so forth .
T h e producer's inalienable ability to subject the product of his labor t o
h i s o wn will is denie d , a n d instead, t h e workers' products are subject t o a
32 ESTRANGEMENT

will alien to the producers, the will of the capitalists who ap propriate the
pro duct of labor. Hence , the worker cannot dispose o f his product. And
since it is subject to an alien will, his own pro duct confronts him as "some­
thing alie n , as a power independent o f the producer" (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 2 ) . This ,
Marx says, is a fact of political e conomy (CW, 3 , p . 2 7 1 ) . While "the pro ­
duct of labour i s labour which has been embodied in a n o bject, which has
become material , " an d while "labour's realisation is its o bjectifi cation , "
under "these econ o mic con ditions this realisation of labour appears a s a
loss of realisation for the workers ; o bj e ctification as loss of the object
and b o ndage to it; appropriation as estrange ment, as alienatio n " ( CW,
3, p . 2 7 2 ; MEW, E B 1 .T. , pp. 5 1 1-5 1 2 ). To this Marx adds : " S o much
does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that the
more o bj ects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more
he falls under the sway of his product, capital" ( CW, 3, p. 2 72 ; M EW,
E B 1 .T. , p. 5 1 2 ) .
T h e greater t h e worker's product " t h e less is he himself" ( C W , 3 , p . 2 7 2 ) .

The alienatio n of the worker i n his produ ct means n o t only that his
labour beco mes an obj e c t , an external e xistence , but that it exists
o utside him, inde pendently , as something alien to him, an d that it
beco mes a power on its o wn confronting him. I t means that the life
which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something
hostile and alien (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 2 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 5 1 2) .

The relationship o f the worker t o the product o f his own labor i s there­
fore one in which the worker is do minate d by his very own p roduct. This
con dition goes against the indivi dual 's nature , since human beings have
the capability to appropriate their o wn product as well as subject it to
their will. The political economy under capitalism forcibly prevents the
worker frn m doing this. Such a political economy is based o n p ro cesses,
although manmade , 4 that result in man not living according to his human
nature.

T H E W O R KER'S ESTRANGEMENT FROM T H E

ACT O F PRODUCTI ON AND F ROM HIM S E L F

Marx asks the following question : "How could the worker come to
face the pro duct o f his activity as a stranger, were it no t that in the very
act of pro du ction he was estranging himself from himself? " (CW, 3 , p . 2 7 4 ;
 B E I NG COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 33

MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 5 1 4) . He postulates that "in the estrangement of the

o bj ect of labour is merely summarized the estrange ment, the alienation ,
in t he activity of labour itself" (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 4 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 14 ) .
W e have seen that t h e worker is coerced into selling h i s labor power
and that , once his labor power is sol d , he himself becomes subject to an
alien will. He is forced to do so because he does not have any other means
by which he could produce his livelihood ; he does not o wn any other
means but his labor power-that is, he does not own the means of pro duc­
tion . I n Capital, Marx emphasizes that, historically speaking, in dividuals
"became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all
their own means of production " ( C l , p. 66 9 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 7 4 3 ) . The lack
of o wnership of the means of production is therefore directly related to
wage labor and is the reason why , under capital, the worker is coerced into
subordinating himself to an alien will. This same lack is directly related to
and expressive of the fact that the worker is prevented from appropriating
the product of his own labor, since the means of production are in themselves
nothing but the product of labor. Although the worker is the capitalist ' s " per­
sonal source of wealth , " he is "devoid of all means of making that wealth his
own " ( C l , p. 5 3 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 96). The capitalist's personal source of wealth
of course, also includes the means of production he owns (see C l , p. 5 3 5
and MEW, 2 3 , p . 5 9 5 ). I n addition , it is particularly the product of man 's
labor as re prese nte d in the means of production which , subj e ct to an
alien will, is turning into an alien po wer. Capital , constant an d variable ,
confronts the worker "as the totality of the o bjective co n ditions o f labour , "
"as alien pro perty ," an d a s time proceeds the " conditions of labour con­
front the individual worker in an ever more gigantic form " (TS 3, pp. 3 5 2-
3 5 3 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p p . 344- 3 4 5 ) . 5 In this context , it is therefore p ossible
to s peak of the "alienation of the conditions of production " (TS 3 , p. 5 3 0 ;
MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p . 5 1 9) .
Marx contends, then , that "estrange ment from t h e pro du ct o f one 's
labour" is directly connected with man 's "estrangement from the act of
pro ductio n . " As we have just see n , under "the act of production" one
shoul d also understand the "totality of the objective conditions of labour,"
namely , capital in its constant an d variable form. Both forms of estrange­
ment always exist simultaneously . 6 Common to both is their source . A
will alien to the worker controls the product of labor, and hence the totality
of the con ditions of production as well, that is, capital in its co nstant and
variable form.
34 ESTRANGEMENT

According to Marx's theory of human nature , man by nature h as the

ability to make "his life activity itself the object of his will an d of his
consciousness" (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 6 ) . Man 's species-character is his free and
conscious activity (CW, 3, p . 2 7 6 ) . Under capitalism , howeve r, the con­
ditions of labor are subject to a will alien to the worker, thus p reventing
the worker fro m making work a free an d conscious activity . Marx p o ints
out that "labour i s therefore not voluntary , but coerce d ; it is forced
la bour " (CW, 3 , p. 274). The act of production is one of coercio n , out­
side of the in dividual worker's control. Thus, the worker is p revented
fro m pro ducing freely an d under the guidance o f bis will and conscious­
ness, and is coerce d into producing according to a will alien to him . The
worker is estrange d from the act of production , which is also saying that
he is estrange d from himself: " [ T] he external c h aracter of labour for the
worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's,
that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs , not to himself, but
to another" (CW, 3, p. 2 7 4 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 5 1 4). Man is estranged
from himself because his own active fun ctions, his life activity , are not
his but someone else's ( CW , 3, p. 2 7 6 ). Self-estrangement co nsists in the
fact that the worker's "personal life -for what is life but a c ti v ity ? -is
an activity which is turned against him, independent of him an d not
belonging to him" (CW, 3, p . 2 7 5 ; MEW, E B 1 .T. , p. 5 1 5 ) . S ince man 's
activity is not his own but someone else 's, it becomes a mere m eans. As
we have seen , since man is forced to sell his l abor power , it becomes a
means to " maintain physical existence " (CW, 3 , p p . 2 74-27 7 ; MEW,
EB 1 .T., pp. 5 1 4-5 1 7 ) .

ESTRANGEMENT FROM NATURE

Like the animals , man depends on nature for his livelihood . However ,
men begin to distinguish themselves fro m animals as soon as they begin
to pro duce their means of subsistence , a step which is con ditioned by
their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men
are in directly producing their material life " (CW, 5 , p . 3 1 ; MEW, 3 , p . 2 1 ) .
Man manipulates nature ; he does not merely live off it. H e also manipulates
nature consciously . Hence, the best of bees differ from the worst architect
by the fact that

the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in

reality. At the end of every labour-process , we get a result that already
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 35

existed in t h e imagination o f t h e labourer a t i t s commencement . He

not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works ,
but he also realises a purpose of his own . ( C l , p . 1 7 4 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 1 9 3 ) .

Consciousness also allows man t o produce "free fro m need , " "in accordance
with the laws of beauty , " (CW, 3 , pp. 2 7 6-2 7 7 ) , an d so o n .
The l i n k to nature is c u t i f workers , against their natural ability , are pre­
vente d fro m manipulating nature according to their will and consciousness ,
an d if in the act of production man is forced to manipulate nature according
to an alien will , a will independent of the producer. This point is illustrated
in t he Grun drisse :

[ T ) he relatio n of labour to capital, or to the obj ective conditions of

labour as capital, presupposes a process of history which dissolves the
various forms in which the worker is a proprietor, or in wh ich the pro ­
prietor works. Thus above a l l ( 1 ) Disso lutio n of t h e relation to t h e earth ­
lan d an d soil-as natural condition of production-to which he relates
as his o wn inorganic being; the workshop of his forces, an d the domain
of his will (translation mine ) . 7

When the link to nature is not broke n , nature is man 's inorganic body . Under
conditions in which man is not forced to produce under an alien will , " man 's
physical an d spiritual life is linked to nature " (CW , 3 , p. 2 7 6 ) . But under
capitalism this is not the case . Marx speaks of man 's estrange ment from
nature (CW, 3 , pp. 2 7 6-2 7 7 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p p . 5 1 6-5 1 7 ) , which means
that man 's "inorganic body , nature , is taken away fro m him " (CW , 3 , p. 27 7 ) .
As a result , man is also prevented from seeing , through the act o f produc­
tion , nature "as his work and his reality " (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 7 ) . M arx goes so far
as to say that even man 's advantage over animals is transformed insofar as
"his inorganic body , nature , is taken away from him" (CW, 3 , p . 2 7 7 ) .

ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE SPEC I E S AND F ROM MAN

In the earlier discussion of Marx 's concept of spe cies, it is concluded

that the same characteristics differentiating each individual from animals
also designate t he nature of the species. In this sense , the hu man species
consists of in dividuals sharing the same biological characteristics, those
characteristics that also define human nature . Beyond that , h o wever, it is
sho wn that the way in which human in dividuals interact also defines the
36 ESTRANGEMENT

species. Hence , human interaction is by nature very different from animal

interaction , particularly when it comes to production . For instan ce , the
"need on t he part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other. . . ,
and . . . the one is capable of producing the obj e ct of the need of the other "
(G, p . 24 3 ; MEW, G , p. 1 5 4). According to Marx , this capability is qualita­
tively very different from that of animals. The species-nature is defined
by t he biological nature of human individuals comprising it , as well as by
the quality of interaction among these individuals.
When Marx says that "estranged labour estranges the species from
man " (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 6) , he does not mean that man ceases to be a member
of t he species. Rather, man re mains a member of his species by definition.
Un der capital , however, the species as a whole is prevented from living
according to its natural capability . The individual is therefore prevented
from being a member of a "group " (species) which is allowe d to pursue
life according to its natural capability .
Marx maintains that "productive life is the life of the species" an d that
"free , conscious activity is man 's species-character " (CW , 3 , p . 2 7 6 ) . If,
however, as is the case under capitalism, man is forced to produce under
an alien will and is prevented from appropriating the produ ct of his own
labor, the species loses its species character, and individuals, although
capable , are prevented from interacting in such a way that the "need on
the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other . " Man is
estrange d from the species. He is forced to interact with other members
of the species in a way that goes against the specie s ' natural abilitie s ,
since, to t h e worker, a n alien will determines what is produ ced , an d how
an d for whom something is produce d : "estranged labour . . . changes for
him [ i.e. , man ] the life of the species into a means of individual life . . . .
I n tearing away from man the object of his production , therefore , estrange d
labour tears from h i m h i s species-life, his real obje ctivity a s a member of
the species" ( CW, 3 , pp. 2 7 6-2 7 7 ; MEW, EB l .T. , pp. 5 1 6- 5 1 7). Estranged
labor thus makes " man 's species-life a means to his physical existe nce "
( CW, 3 , p . 2 7 7 ) . It "estranges the life of the species and individual life ,
and . . . makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life
of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form " (CW , 3 , p . 2 7 6 ;
MEW, E B l . T. , p . 5 1 6). 8
The form of human interaction under capital and wage labor is there­
fore quite different from what it could be according to the species-nature.
S pecies membership becomes a mere formality , and interaction in pro­
ductive life (species-life ) a mere means to sustain physical existence . For
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 37

Marx , it is very obvious that "the pro position that man 's species-nature
is estranged from him means that one man is estranged fro m the other"
(CW, 3, p. 2 7 7 ; M EW, EB 1 .T . , p . 5 1 7) . At yet another place he states:

An imme diate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the
product of his labour, from his life activity , fro m his species-nature is
the estrange ment of man from man . When man confronts himself, he
confronts the o ther man . What applies to a man 's relation to his work ,
to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man 's rela­
tion to the other man , an d to the other man 's labour and obj e ct of
labour (translation mine ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , pp. 5 1 7-5 1 8 ) . 9

In the Grundrisse, Marx reiterate s this conclusion when he states that

universal pro duction on the basis of exchange value "produces . . . the
alienation of the individual from himself and others" ( G , p. 1 6 2 ; MEW, G ,
p . 80) .

ESTRANGEMENT O F T H E CAPITALIST

Here we consider the question as to whether nonworkers-those who

are not engaged in production-are also estranged. First , we must remind
ourselves that, although the workers are subj e ct to an alien will and power ,
that will and power is mediated by other human beings . "I f my own activity
does not belong to me , " asks Marx , "if it is an alien , a coerced activity ,
to who m , then , does it belong?" His answer is that it belongs "to a being
other than myself. " "The alien being to whom labour and th e product of
labour belongs, in whose service labour is done and for who se benefit the
pro duct of labour is provided , can only be man himself" (CW , 3 , p. 2 7 8 ;
MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 1 8) . Capitalists , a s the human agents o f capital , are also
the hu man agents of the alien power controlling the workers . As members
of the nonworking class and subject to constraints such as co mpetition ,
they represent the alien will to which the workers are subjecte d . S in ce the
worker is continually forced to resell his labor power to capital , he con­
tinually renews his estrange ment through his activity which is compelled
to follow an alien will. Of course , the capitalist is not compelled to sell
his labor for an existence, but he, too , is a member of the species , and
his human nature is the same as that of others . Although not forced to
sell his labor power, the capitalist is still not a free agent, and , as we have
seen , is compelled to live in a situation in which man is estranged from
38 ESTRANGEMENT

man . Since the workers are prevented from interacting with others in
such ways as their human nature enables t he m , their interaction with the
agents of capital is also marked by estrangement . From the capitalists'
point of view, this estrangement is not the result of their own labor
activity, as is the case with workers . It is merely a condition th at confronts
them as a result of their relationship with the workers . Marx elaborates
this point when he says:

First it has to be noted that everything which appears in the worker

as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears in the non-worker
as a state of alienatio n , of estrangement . .Secondly , . . . the
. .

worker's real, practical a ttitude in production and to the produ ct (as

a state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting him as a
theoretical attitude" (CW, 3 , p. 2 8 2 ; M EW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 2 2 ) .

Although both worker and capitalist are estrange d , the estrangement,

because of differences in the social position , has a different impact on the
two groups. As Marx writes in The Holy Family:

The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same
human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and
strengthened in this self-estrangement , it recognises estran gement as
its o wn power and has in it the semblance of a human e xi stence. The
latter feels annihilate d in estrange ment ; it sees in it its own powerless­
ness an d the reality of an inhuman existence (CW, 4, p. 3 6 ; MEW, 2 ,
p. 37).

While the capitalist 's existence resembles a human existence , i t is never­

theless not what it could be according to the nature of man and the species .

T H E CAPITALI ST'S RE LATI O N S H I P TO T H E W O R K E R

As already indicated, "the capitalist, as capitalist, is simply the personifi­

cation of capital , the creation of labour with its own will and personality
which stan ds in opposition to labour" (TS 3 , p. 2 9 6 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p. 2 90) .
It must be kept in min d , however, that for capi tal to be capital an d for the
capitalist to be a capitalist , the capitalist must not only possess money. He
 BEING COERCED I NTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 39

must simultaneously have a social situatio n in which the means and con­
ditions of production are separated from those who produce . Thus, Marx
say s that

it is not t he o wnership of money which makes the capitalist a capitalist .

For money to be transformed into cap ital , the prerequisites for capital­
ist pro duction must exist , whose first h istorical presupposition is th at
separation . The se paration , and therefore the existence of the me ans of
labour as capital , is given in capitalist productio n ; this sep aration which
constantly reproduces itself and expands , is the foundation of produc­
tion (TS 3, p. 2 7 2 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p. 2 67 ) .

Given the separation o f the means and conditions o f produ ction from
the worker, money can assume the form of capital ; through the capitalist
as an agent, money in its historically new form is now capable of employ­
ing labor. " Ca pital e mploys labour, " writes Marx , and "the m eans of pro ­
ductio n, t h e material con ditions of labour" ( all various forms of capital)
are not subsu med by the worker, "but he is a means for the m " (TS 1 ,
p . 3 90 ; M EW, 2 6 . 1 , p . 3 66 ) . On the other hand, the capitalist as the agent
of capital , contrary to previous noncapitalist forms of produ ctio n , " does
not rule over the labourer through any personal qualities he may h ave ,
but only insofar as he is 'capital ' ; his domination is only that of material­
ise d labour over living labour , of the labourer's product over the labourer
himself" (TS 1 , p. 3 90 ; MEW, 2 6 . 1 , p. 3 6 6) .
To say that the capitalist is "only capital personifie d " and that "his
soul is the soul of capital" ( C l , p . 2 24) is to imply that the capitalist him­
self is under certain constraints, and therefore not a free agen t h imself,
since "capital has one single life impulse , the tendency to create value and
surplus-value, to make its constant factor, the means of pro duction , absorb
the greatest possible amount of surplus-labour" (C l , p . 2 2 4 ; MEW, 2 3 ,
p . 247 ) . Despite the fact that the capitalist as a person is motivated by
the o p portunity to retain and consume surplus value (see MEW, 24, p . 3 8 7 ) ,
the capitalist's actions are constrained b y the free competition which
"brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production , in the shape of
external coercive laws having power over every in dividual capitalist " (C l ,
p . 2 5 7 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 2 8 6 ) . I f, under capital , human life is treated reck­
lessly , it is the result of the total conditions under which cap ital operates
and co mpetes. " Hence , " Marx says, "capital is reckless of the health or
40 ESTRANGEMENT

length of life of the labourer, unless force d by society not to be reckless "
(translation mine ; 1 0 MEW, 2 3 , p . 2 8 5 ) . With regard to the re cklessness of
capital , he asserts that "looking at things as a whole , all this does not , in­
dee d, depend on the goo d or ill will of the individual capitalist " (C l ,
p . 2 5 7 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 2 8 6 ) .

A COMMENT ON MARX'S TE RMI N O LOGY:

..

ENTA USSER UNG, ENTFR EMD UNG, ALI ENATI ON

The word "alienation " is often used as the translation of the German
wor ds Entiiusserung and Entfrem dung. However, use of this word is n ot
consistent. In the Collected Works, Entfremdung tends to be rendered by
the English word "estrangement , " while Enttiusserung is usually translated
as "alienation . " This is exempl ifie d by the sentence "In the estrangement
(Entfremdung) of the object of labour is merely summarised the estrange­
ment (Entfremdung) , the alienation (Enttiusserung) , in the activity of
labour itself" ( CW, 3, p . 2 7 4 ; MEW, EB 1 . T. , p. 5 1 4). Yet, the Progress
Publishers e dition of Theories of Surplus- Value and Capital ( C 3 , p . 8 5 ;
MEW, 2 5 , p . 9 5 ) renders Entfremdung by the word "alienation , " as ex­
emplified by "This alienation (En tfremdung) of the conditions of pro ­
duction corresponds . . . " (TS 3 , p p . 2 9 6 , 5 3 0 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p p . 2 9 0 , 5 1 9 ) .
Similarly , Nicolaus, in Marx's Grundrisse, translates Entfrem dung with
"alienation, " while at another place translating Entausserung w ith "dis­
possession " (G, pp. 1 5 0, 1 60-1 6 2 , 6 7 4 ; MEW, G, p p . 6 8 , 7 8 -80, 5 66) .
We will now consider what German words Marx used to convey the
terms "alienatio n . " While a few examples will have to suffice in this short
space , they are sufficiently representative to allow an opinion on the
subject. There seems to be evidence that Marx used the term to mean pri­
marily , and possibly exclusively , the German word Enttiusserung. Marx
translates alienation in J ames Stuart 's sen tence " Labour, which through
its alienation creates a universal equivalent , I call industry " (CPE , p . 5 8 )
with t h e word Enttiusserung (MEW, 1 3 , p . 44) . I n the Grundrisse Marx
also uses the English word "alienation" interchangeably with and to
design ate the German word Entiiusserung (MEW, G, p p . 7 2 2 -7 2 3 ) .

Because money i s the general equivalent, the general po wer of pur­

chasing, everything can be bought, everything may be transformed into
money. But it can be transformed into money o nly by being alienated
(alieniert), because the owner alienates (entiiussert) h imself from it.
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 41

Everything is therefore alienable , or in different for the individual, external

to him. Thus the so-called inalienable (unverii.usserlichen) , eternal pos­
sessions, and the immovable, solid property relations corresponding to
them, break down in the face of money (translation mine). [When
"alienation " renders a German word, the particular German word was
put in parentheses. " Everything is therefore alienable " is Marx 's own
sentence. ]

Since t here is a discre pancy in the ways in which Marx and some translators
use d the term "alienation , " it is important to see whether and how these
differences can be reconciled . The above quotation shows that Marx uses
Entiiusserung and Veriiusserung (or their derivatives) interch angeably . Both
words can describe the situation in which somebody divests (veriiussert,
enta'ussert ) himself of something, be it property in the form of a th ing,
lan d , or one 's labor power. Marx predominantly uses En tci'usserung, not
Vera'usserung, to describe this situation an d , as we have seen , translates
it wit h the word "alienatio n . "
A well-known Latin-German dictionary of 1 844 ( Freund) , translates
the Latin word alienatio with Vera·u sserung and Enta'usserung. It adds
that, figuratively speaking, alienatio can also be translate d as Entfremdung,
Sichentfernen van jeman dem, A bfall, A bneigung. The verb alieno is similar­
ly translate d by this dictionary . Although Marx did use the wo rd Entfrem­
dung in the Grun drisse and the w ord fre md o ften throughout his work ,
he did not apparently use the term "alienatio n , " or any derivative there-
of, to mean the German words Entfremdung or fremd. He did, however,
use the term to translate the nonfigurative words Enta'usseru ng and Ver­
iiusserung.
Since Marx used the word En ta'usserung to render the English "aliena­
tion , " it will be use ful to consult a Latin-English dictionary for its ren der­
ing on the word alienatio . Based on the Freu nd Latin-German edition of
1 844, an English e dition appeared in 1 8 5 4 (An drews) , thus indicating how
the terms alienatio and alieno were understood then. I n this work, alienatio
is ( 1 ) the transferring of the possessions of a thing to another, so as to
make it his pro perty ; (2) the transferring of one 's self, that is, the going
over to another; a separation , desertion . Unlike the German , no distinc­
tion is made between figurative and nonfigurative speech , although the
conveyed mean ings are the same . Alieno is defined in this way : ( 1 ) To
make one person another; to make something the property of another; to
alienate , to transfer by sale ; to remove , to separate , to make foreign;
42 ESTRANGEMENT

(2) (referring to the se cond ren dering of alienatio ) to withdraw or re­

move anyone from friendship for or love to anyone, to alienate, estrange,
set at variance , to make enemie s . Again , no differentiation between figura­
tive and nonfigurative speech is made .
It can therefore be concluded that it is not in corre ct to translate both
Entiiusserung and Entfremdung as " alienatio n , " but that su ch a rendering is
not optimal . Hence, Entfremdung should be translated as "estrangement" and
Entiiusserung as "alienatio n " (see also Schacht, 1 9 7 1 : 80-8 1 ) , for Marx
himself seemed to have reserve d the term "alienation " for Entausserung
( An drews, 1 8 5 4) . There is another reason that would strongly support a
differentiation between the two terms. While it is possible to "transfer the
possession of a thing to another," it does not follo w that this Entausserung
( "alienation") designates estrangement (En tfremdung) . Marx is objecting
to a very particular alienation (Entausserung) , namely , that which allows
the previous o wner of a thing to be affe cted in a way that is beyon d his
contro l . Thus, Marx assu mes that it is human nature , if not interfered with ,
to satisfy the nee ds of one in dividual with the product of an other . On this
basis, Marx sees human interaction as qualitatively different from that of
animals. However, Marx also assu mes that it is human nature to alienate
(entiiussern ) a thing such that another individual 's needs may be satisfie d ,
since otherwise all t h e pro ducts would have to be consumed b y t h e pro­
ducer an d could not become the pro perty of another in order that the
other 's needs may be satisfied . Under capital , the conditions arc quite dif­
ferent. First , labor power is alienated , as a result of which the worker also
loses control over his product . Second, since he is coerced into selling his
labor power and loses control over the products of his labor, his own
pro duct confronts him as an obj e ct that is subject to another's will , an
alien will. The producer is estranged (entfremdet) from his p roduct be-
cause he was forced to alienate (entaussern) his labor power in return fo r
a wage an d the abandonment of control over h is product of labor .
It can now be easily seen why a clear distinction should be made be­
tween En tausserung and Entfre mdung. Although for Marx they are not
mutually exclusive, 11 under such social forms as exist, for example, u nder
capital, Entausserung can and must exist if man is to live according to his
nature. Marx 's vision of commu nism therefore consists of a soc iety in
which products are mutu ally pro duced and consumed without permitting
anyone to become an alien po wer over anyone. 1 2
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 43

NOTES

1 . I n this respect , it is important to note that Marx promoted a daily limit

on working hours. He urged the workers to u nite and to push through the ap­
pro priate legislation in the form of a class action .
2. Other passages make the same point:

What does the primitive accumulation of capital , i.e., its historical genesis,
resolve itself into? In so far as it is not imme diate transformation of slaves
and serfs into wage-labourers, and therefore a mere change of fo rm , it only
means the ex pro priation of the immediate pro ducers, i .e . , the dissolution of
private property base d on t he l abour of its owner (C l , p. 7 1 3 ; M E W , 2 3 , p. 7 8 9 ) .

The wage-slave , just like t h e real slave , cannot become a creditor 's slave due t o
his position . (C 3 , p . 5 9 5 ; M E W , 2 5 , p . 609) .

In Theories of Surplus Value and Grundrisse, M arx also compares slavery and wage
l abor, statin g that wage l abor is based on domination mediated throu gh the market,
while slavery or other forms of forced l abor are based on direct domin ation of one
part of the society by the other (MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p. 3 9 1 ; MEW, G , p . 6 5 5 ) .
3 . Consi der also the following quote : "The process, therefore , th at clears the
way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away
from the l abourer the possession of his means of production . " ( C l , p . 668; MEW,
2 3 , p. 742) .
4. In chapters 5, 6, and 8 I discussed Marx 's comments on how h u m an be ings
ever mana ge d to start a process that by its very n ature became a detriment to them
and prevented them from l iving accordin g to t heir inalien able n ature .
5. " Conditions of labour" (Arbeitsbedingungen ) may not adequ ately convey
the mean ing of the German word. A rbeitsbedingungen are the conditions under
which labor is performed. "Conditions, " however, stan ds for all p arameters to
whic h labor is subject.
6. Since, before entering on the p rocess, his own labour h as already been
alienated from himself by the sale of his labo ur-power, has been approp riated by
the capitalist and incorp orated with capital , it must, during the process, be realised
in a product that does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also
the p rocess by which the capi talist consumes labour-power, the p roduct of the
labourer is incessantly converted , not only into commodities, but into capital,
into value that sucks up the value-creating power, into means of subsistence that
buy the person of the labourer, into means o f p roduction that command the p ro­
ducers (C l , p. 5 3 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 9 6 ) .

7. "To which he relates as his own inorganic being" is rendered in the Nicolaus
tran slation as "to which he relate s as to his own inorganic being" (G, p. 497). See
also Marx 's use of the word "inorganic" in the Manuscripts where he seems to u se
it as an adje ctive to n ature outside man 's organ i c body (MEW, E B 1 .T ., p p . 5 1 5 -
44 ESTRANGEMENT

5 1 6) . The same is the case for other p assages in the Grundrisse (MEW, G, p p . 3 7 5 ,
3 84- 3 90) .

" [ N ) atural conditions of producti o n " incl udes also any raw m aterials contained
on the p l anet earth (MEW, G, p . 3 84) .

Fo r further el aboration , consider the following passages :

Another presu pposition is the separation of free labour from the obj ective con ­
ditions of its realizatio n - from the means of labour and the material for labour .
Thus, above all , release of the wo rker from the soil as his natural worksh op­
hence dissolu tion of small , free l an ded property as well as of commu nal land­
ownership resting o n the oriental commu ne (G, p. 4 7 1 ; MEW, G, p. 3 7 5 ) .

I t i s not the unity o f living and active humanity with the n atural , inorganic
con ditions of their metabolic exchange with nature , an d hence their approp ria­
tion of natu re , which re quires explanation or is the result of an hi storic process ,
but rather the separation be tween the se inorgan ic con dition s of human existence
and this active existence , a separation which is completely posited only in rela­
tion of wage labour and capital . I n the rel ations of slavery and serfdom this
se paration doe s not take place ; " (G, p. 489 ; MEW, G , p. 3 89) .

8. Here I disagree with G i ddens ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 5 - 1 6 ) and Petrovi c who makes a similar

argument ( 1 967: 147). Giddens su ggests that estra ngement from the species must be
seen as "a separation fro m socially ge nerated ch aracteristics and p ro pensities. " Capital­
ism, he maintains, has c reated a poten tial wh ich , if real ized, could b ring abo u t Marx ' s
envisioned society . S u c h a realization is con stantly be ing fru strate d u nder capital i sm ,
a n d estran gement i s the result.
According to the interpretation given in this stu dy, for Marx estran gement is
not the frustrated realization of a potential created by the historical mode of p ro ­
duction known t o us as capital ism . On t h e contrary , it may b e called t h e frustrated
abil ity (that is, the inability) to live according to what is human nature -not poten tial ,
but factual an d e mpirically verifiable human nature .
Giddens assu mes his position in part to avoid and warn again st an interpretation
that postul ates that estrangement results from a sep aration from what might be called
a "state of nature ." Such a postulate may imply certain assumptions concerning man 's
goodness, intelligence, creativity , and the like . Clearly , Marx did not believe that
estran gement resulted from civilization preventing man from living according to a
"state of n atu re . " Stil l , Marx hol ds that estrangement results from the inability to
l ive according to one's nature . This nature is defined by means of an empirical com­
parison with an imals, an d not by projection in the sense that so cial theorists some­
times have projected a "state of n ature . " In h is concept of "human n ature in general , "
there i s no nostalgia o r anything that might b e viewed as h istorically relative . Hence,
Marx 's "human natu re in general " cannot be compared with theories on a state of
 BEING COERCED INTO SELLING ONE ' S LABOR POWER 45

nature postulate d by a Rousseau or Hobbes. Giddens doe s not make this mistake ,
but in avo i ding it he neglects to see that estrangement results when m an is p revented
from l iving according to his nature .
Giddens' interpretation of Marx 's theory of estrangement is problematic in other
ways as well . How can estrangement be the fru strated realization of a socially cre ated
potential if it is a precon dition for the development of this p oten tial ? As will become
evident l ater, all devel o p ment of the produ ctive powers of man is seen to occur at
the expense of estran gement. Only after sufficient development has o ccurred does
Marx see a society without estran gement ( communism) as real izabl e . He gives a
partial mo dification of this position for the case of Russi a ; see his letter to Sassulitsch
(M EW, 1 9 , p . 242 ) and the preface to the secon d Russian edition of the Manifesto
(MEW, 4, p p . 5 7 5- 5 7 6) . Estran gement, however, existed in Marx 's view long before
the capitalistic foun dations for communism were laid. The period of primitive ac­
cu mulation may be cited as an example . During this perio d , wage labor was becom­
ing more u niversal , an d, although Marx wou l d not claim that the fou n dations for
co mmunism had been laid by that time , it can be shown that the wage labourer
coul d su bject neither his labor power nor the product of his labor to his own will .
In short, he was estran ge d .
9. " Species-nature " is m y translation of Gattungswesen . S e e my discussion o n
p p . 1 7- 2 2 ; s ee also CW, 3 , p . 2 7 7 .
1 0. The Progress Publishers e dition translates wo es nicht durch die Gesell­
schaft zur Rucksicht gezwungen wird as "unless under compulsion fro m society "
(C l , p. 2 5 7 ) .
1 1 . A t first , i t may appear that Marx did not distinguish between Entiiusserung
and Entfremdung in the French e dition of Capital, the translation of wh ich he ap­
prove d. Thus, " Da vor seinem Eintritt in den Prozess se ine e igene Arbeit ihm selbst
e n t fre m d e t , dem K a p i t a l isten angeeignet and d e m K a p i tal c i nverl e i b t ist , " is trans­
l ate d by " So n travail, de'j � ali e'n e' , fait propri e'te' du cap italiste et incorpore au cap ital ,
me me avant que le proc � s commen ce . On closer inspection, entfremdet here refers
to the fact that the worker's labor power is being taken away from h i m , even before
the process of pro du c tion can begin , to become the p roperty of capit al . Entfremdet
therefore carries the mean ing of entiiussert in the sense that, even before the p rocess
of production begins, the worker's labor power has been alienate d fro m him and h as
b ee n made the p roperty of cap i t a l , t h a t is, the property of t h e c a p i t a l i s t as the age nt
of cap i tal (MEW, 2 3 , pp. 5 9 6- 5 9 7 ; Le Capital: Livre I , p . 4 1 3 ) .
Marx sometimes uses the two words alienation and estrangement i n conjunc­
tion with each other, merely separating them by a comma . This is nothing but a
technique to emp hasize that, although the meanings of the two words are different,
t hey are not mutually exclusive under capital ( see MEW, E B 1 .T . , pp . 5 1 2 , 5 1 4,
5 1 8, 522).
1 2. Although I have criticise d translations that ren der Entfremdung a s " al iena­
tio n " instead of as "estrangeme n t , " whenever quotes from t hese sources are used ,
the transl ation is not chan ge d so that as much authen ticity as possibl e can be pre­
served. The reader must therefore remember that when sources o ther than the
Collected Works are quotes, "alien ation " could stan d for Entfremdung .
4
THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

In an atte mpt to review what Marx saw as key elements of capitalism , topics
su ch as surplus value and division of labor must be addresse d .

LA BOR T H E O R Y O F VALUE, S U RPLUS V A L U E

A full revie w of the e conomic debates in which Marx engaged con cerning
the labor theory of value is not possible here , nor will I elaborate on what is
known to day as the "transformation proble m . " Labor theory of value , sur­
plus value , an d e xploitation will be defined not in terms of price but in terms
of time, as Marx did throughout much of his work . For an account of the
prin cipal ways in which he analyzed capitalist society , this pro cedure will
be ade quate and not misleading.
Because the worker is force d to sell his labor power an d to let it be sub­
ject to an alien will , he not only becomes estrange d , but also " divests h im-
self (entaussert sich) of labour as the force pro ductive of wealth " (G, p. 3 0 7 ) . 1
Through this exchange in which the worker receives wages, the capitalist
controls t he labor of the worker and beco mes the owner of the product of
labor (see MEW, 2 3 , pp. 1 99-200 ) . In the Grundrisse, Marx writes that the
"separation between labour and property in the product of labour, between
labour an d wealth , is thus posite d in this act of exchange itself" ( G , p . 3 07 ;
MEW, G, p. 2 1 4) . He explicitly postulates that labor is the source of we alth
48 ESTRANGEMENT

and that , since t he produ ct of labor does not belong to the w orker, it is the
capitalist who appro priates this wealth . The capitalist, of course , does not
stockpile his wealth in the form of the product produced by the labor power .
The capitalist pro duces for a market on which he sells the commodities, an d
in turn , through the me dium of mone y , he accumulates the wealth in the
form he desires, be it t he means of pro ductio n or other forms of wealth . In
order to accu mulate wealth , however, the capitalist must be able to sell
his commodities above the cost of production .
Marx assu mes that, on the average , commo dities are sold above cost.
Cost, however, is nothing e lse but the labor time embodied in a commodity
for which the worker is compensated by the panicular capitalist, plus the
cost of all materials re quire d to produce the co mmodity . The raw materials
in themselves include labor cost and surplus value which one capital ist
pays to t he other. Generally , an individual capitalist can sell his commodities
above cost only if the worker is not fully compensate d for the labor per­
formed. Expressed in terms of labor time , it can be said that a p articular
worker also produces during a certain nu mber of hours without being com­
pensate d fo r this production . The commodities produced during this time
are at no labor cost ; nevertheless, they are appro priate d by the capitalist
who can then sell them at whatever price the market will bear. I n terms
of each particular product, it is therefore possible to say that it contains
a ponion of labor time for which the worker was not compensate d , al­
though he was forced to spen d the time in the service of the capitalist
as an obligation in return for receiving wages. Marx calls the labor time
which the worker performs without compensation surplus labor, and
compensate d labor he calls necessary labor time. I n the following p as-
sage , he su mmarizes his notions of labor value :

The value of every commodity is the pro duct of labour; hence this is
also true of the value of the product of the annual labour or of the
value of society 's annual co mmodity-product. But since all labour
resolves itself 1 ) into necessary labour-time , in which the labourer
repro duces merely an e quivalent for the capital advanced in the pur­
chase of his labour-power, an d 2) into surplus-labour, by which he
sup plies the capitalist with a value for which the latter does not give
any e quivalent, hence surplus-value , it follows that all commodity­
value can resolve itself only into these two component parts, so that
ultimately it forms a revenue for the working-class in the form of
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 49

wages, an d for the capitalist class in the form of surplus-value. As

for the constant capital-value , i .e . , the value of the means of produc­
tion consumed in the creation of the annual product , it cannot be e x­
plained h o w this value gets into that of the new product (except
for the p hrase that the capitalist charges the buyer with it in the sale
of his goo ds) , but ultimately , since the means of production are them­
selves products of labour, this portion of value can, in tu rn, consist
only of an e quivalent of the variable capital and of surplu s-value,
of a pro duct of necessary labour and of surplus-labour. The fact that
the values of these means of production fun ction in the h ands of
their e mployers as capital-values does not prevent them fro m having
"originally , " in the hands of others if we go to the bottom of the mat­
ter-even t hough at some previous time-resolve d themsel ves into the
same two portions of value , hence into two different sources of revenue
. . . the matter presents itself differently in the move ment of social
capital, i . e . , of the totality of individual capitals , fro m the way it pre­
sents itself for each in dividual capital considered separately , hence
fro m the standpoint of each individual capitalist. For the latter the
value of co mmo dities resolves itself into 1 ) a constant element (a
fourth one, as Adam Smith says) , and 2 ) the sum of wages and surplus­
value, or wages, profit, and rent . But fro m the point of view of society
the fourth ele ment of Adam S mith , the constant capital-value, dis­
appears (C2, p. 3 8 8 ; MEW, 24, p p . 3 8 3 -3 84) .

Once the labor theory of value is accepte d , that is, once it is recognized
that all wealth and the value of all commo dities are a function of the labor
time e mbo died in it ,

the independent, material form of wealth disappears and wealth is

sho wn to be simply the activity of men . Everything which is not the
result of hu man activity , of labour, is nature , and , as such , is not social
wealth. The phantom of the world of goods fades away and it is seen
to be simply a continually disappearing and continually reproduced
obj e ctivisatio n of human labor. All solid material wealth is only transi­
tory materialisation of social labour, crystallisation of the p roduc-
tion process whose measure is time , the measure of a movement itself .
The manifold forms in which the various component parts of wealth
are distributed amongst different sections of society lose their apparent
50 ESTRANGEMENT

independence. Interest is merely a part of profit, rent is m erely surplus

profit. Both are consequently merge d in profit, which itself can be re­
duced to surplus-value, that is to unpaid labour. The value of the com­
mo dity itself, however, can only be reduced to labour-time (TS 3 ,
p . 4 2 9 ; MEW, 2 6. 3 , p . 42 1 ) .

A s soon as the postulate that "the value of the commodity itself can
only be re duced to labour-time " is accepted , it also becomes clear why
both l abor and the means of production are continually deval ued . Let
us consider Marx's argu ment in The Po verty of Philosophy, a work that he
repeate dly mentioned in his later writings and that repre sent s the fou nda­
tion of any of the economic theories which he developed later in his life :
" It is i mportant to e mphasize the point that what determines value is not
the time taken to pro duce a thing, but the minimum time it could pos­
sibly be pro duced i n , and this minimum is ascertaine d by co mpetition "
(CW, 6, p. 1 3 6 ; MEW, 4, p. 9 5 ) . Since the exchange value of a commodity
is base d on the minimum labor time , the method and means of produc­
tion used in the production of commo dities are subject to constant change .
Thus, if the pro ductivity of labor can be augmented sufficiently through
the employ men t of new methods and/or means of productio n , the pre­
viously used means of production may become obsolete (devalued) befo re
its life-span is exhausted. Similarly , without going into the various con­
tingencies of a particular situation , it is po ssible to say that , since less
labor time is re quire d to produce the same commodity if productivity is
increased , labor will be less costly ( devalued) . Here as well competition
will bring about a reduction of wages as a result of a greater abundance of
workers.

Co mpetition implements the law according to which the relative value

of a product is determined by the labour time needed to p roduce it.
Labour time serving as the measure of marketable value becomes in
this way the law of the continual depreciatio n of labour . . . . There
will be de preciation n ot only of the commodities brought into the
market, but also of the instru ments of production and of whole plants
(CW, 6, p. 1 3 5 ; M EW, 4 , pp. 94-9 5 ) .

I n view o f the fact that labor devalues, that i s , that the workers looking
for work become more numerous and therefore replaceable as productivity
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCI ETY AND ECONOMY 51

increases, the employer also has less , o r n o , incentive to protect human life
an d health. This leads Marx to observe that the capitalist mode of produc­
tion is wasteful bot h with respect to human resources and to m aterial
means :

The capitalist mode of pro duction is generally , despite all its niggard­
liness, altogether too prodigal with its human material , j u st as, con ­
versely, thanks to its method of distribution of products through com­
merce and manner of competition , it is very pro digal with its material
means, and loses for society what it gains fo r the individu al capitalist
( C 3 , pp. 8 6-8 7 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 9 7 ) .

W e have seen that according to Marx t h e capitalist qua cap italist can
exist in his co mpetitive world only if he can appro priate eno ugh products
of unpaid labor. This surplus value is generally realized and is tran sformed
into the appro priate fo rm of wealth through exchange . The p roducts of
labor are exchange d to re cover both fixed an d variable expen se (capital)
as well as to obtain additional capital from the surplus produ ct produced
by unpaid labor. Since , under capital, the pro du cts of labor are produced
for a market , in contrast to personal use by the capitalist or the worker ,
exchange is of prime importance to the capitalist. Only thro ugh e x change
can he re cover his outlays in constant and variable capital as well as obtain
additional capital fro m the surplus pro duct appropriated . The capitalist,
then, pro duces for exchange , he produces co mmodities ( Waren ) in con-
trast to o nly use value. He produces for the exchange valu e 2 of a par­
ticular thing, not for its u se value.The capitalist produces only commodities,
things which in exchange will yield sufficient money , because only through
exchange can he both recover his original capital outlays and obtain ad­
ditional capital . This is not to say that the commodities produced do not
also have use value . They obviously do since it is through exchange that
in dividuals satisfy their needs and that , under capital, individuals obtain
those pro ducts of labor (co mmodities) that will be of use to them (see
MEW, 2 3 , pp. 5 5 , 5 7 , 62 ; C l , pp. 48 , 50, 54) . The capitalists' interest is
in the exchange value of commodities, as opposed to their use value, since
it is only through exchange and the value obtained therein that the capitalist
can recover his additional outlays an d enlarge his original cap ital . When
Marx discusses exchange in general , he says that "what . . . concerns pro­
ducers when they make an exchange , is the question , how much of some
52 ESTRANGEMENT

other product they get for their own ? in what proportions the products
are exchangeable ? " (C l , p. 7 9 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 89). This observation is equally
applicable for the capitalist , who depends on the exchange of his com­
mo dities in order to obtai n , through the medium of money , the commodi­
ties he re quires for his o wn personal consumption as well as for continuing
his process of accumulation .
In summary , it can be said that , under capital , things of use value are
exchanged and through this exchange obtain an exch ange value . Once
things of use value are being exchanged an d p roduced for exchange they
are com modities. Commodities contain both a use value and an exchange
value. Con cerning the distinction between the two kinds of value , Marx
notes :

A thing can be of use-value , without having value . This is the case when ­
ever its utility to man is not due to labour. Such are air, virgin soil,
natural meadows , etc . A thing can be useful, and the product of
hu man labour, without being a commodity . Whoever dire ctly satisfies
his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indee d , use­
values , but not commo dities ( C l , p. 48 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 5 ) .

An d concerning the transformation of things with use values into com­

mo dities, Marx remarks that

it is only by being exchanged that the products of labor acquire , as

values, one uniform social status, distin ct from the sensually differen t
ways by which they can exist as objects of utility . This division of a
pro duct into a useful thing an d a value becomes practically important ,
only when exchange h a s acquired such a n extension that useful articles
are produced for the purpose of being exch anged, and their character
as values has therefore to be taken into account , beforehan d , during
pro duction (MEW, 2 3, p. 87 ; translation mine) . 3

We have seen that Marx distinguishes between two forms of value which
a pro duct of labor can assume and that the capitalist who produces for the
market is intereste d in the exchange value of a commo dity . "Hence com­
modities must be realise d as values before they can be realised as use-values , "
writes Marx , since t h e commo dities will n o t b e brought to market (that is,
 THE NATURE OF CAP IT ALI ST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 53

they will not be purchasable for use) in case they do not yield the ap­
pro priate exchange value ( C l , p. 89 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 1 00) . As the product of
labor assu mes a different form of value in exchange , so does the labor em­
bo die d in the product.

At first sight, a co mmodity presented itself to us as a complex of two

things-use-value and exchange-value . Later on , we saw also th at labour ,
too , possesses the same two-fold nature ; for , so far as it finds expression
in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it
as a creator of use-values (C l , pp. 48-49 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 6 ) .

All productive activity i s "nothing but the expenditure of human labour­

power . . . productive expen diture of human brains , nerves, and muscle s . "
(C l , p . 5 1 ; M E W , 2 3 , p . 5 8 ) . Although t h e above is t h e case , p rodu ctive
activity which produces a thing with a particular u se value is qualitatively
different fro m that which produces a different object of utility . Thus,
"tailoring and weaving are necessary factors in the creation of the use­
values, coat and line n , precisely because these two kinds of l abour are of
different qualities " (C l , p. 5 2) . With respect to the general definition of
productive activity , tailoring and weaving are only "two different modes
of expen ding hu man labour-power" ( C l , p. 5 1 ) . Nevertheless , these two
different modes of productive activity are characteristic of the production
of very distinct use values such as coats an d line n . I f in the production
an d exchange of commodities exchange value is of prime importance , the
mo de of expending hu man labor power also becomes unimportant in the
pro cess of exchange . What gives a product a particular use value is the
distinct skill that transforms the elements of nature into an object of
utility . Thus , use value is create d by a particular mode of expending labor
power. Exchange value , on the other h an d , is not derived from any p ar­
ticular mode of expending labor power. Whether a product will exchange
against other goods in certain proportions is not dependent on the quality
(mode) of the labor power expende d , but on its quantity . Accordingly ,
commodity pro du ction is bound only by the quantity of " p roductive
expen diture of hu man brains, nerves and muscles" and not by any mode
in which hu man brains, nerves an d muscles are expended in the p rocess of
pro du ction . The mere quantitative expenditure of hu man brains , nerves ,
an d muscles, however, is an activity of which any indivi dual is capable . It
54 E STRANGEMENT

is simple labor. Since simple labor is the common deno minator of all
human beings , it is incapable of reflecting the uniqueness of human labor
which , through its particular mode , creates a certain use value .
Exchange value , then , is not determined by any particular mode of
expended labor power. According to Marx , "The value of a commodity
represents hu man labour in the abstract , the expenditure of human labour
in general" (C l , p . 5 1 ) (MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 9) . A commodity , he says, "may be the
pro duct of the most skilled labour, but its value , by equating it to the
pro duct of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the
latter labour alone " ( C l , p . 5 1 ). 4 At another place he write s :

O n t h e o n e hand all labour is, speaking physiologically , a n expenditure

of human labour-power, and in its character of identical abstract human
labour, it creates an d forms the value of commo dities. On the other han d ,
all labour i s the expenditure of human labour-power i n a special form
and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful
labour, it produces use-values" (C l , p . 5 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 6 1 ) .

Fo r a commo dity t o b e exchan ged in certain proportio n s , it must be

co mpare d with other goods. The proportion in which a certain commodity
exchanges against other commo dities is determined by the quantity of
abstract simple labor embodied in it. E ssentially , individuals who exchange
commo dities merely compare the amount of simple labor embodied in each
co mmodity and e quate the labor of others on a society-wide scale :

Whenever by an exchange , we equate as values our different products,

by that very act , we also equate , as hu man labour, the different kinds
of labour ex pen ded upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless
we do it. Value , therefore , does not stalk about with a label describing
what it is (C l , p. 7 9 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 8 8 ) .

Although exchange is possible o n this basis a n d although the capitalist can

recover his initial outlay and augment h is total capital on the basis of such
exchange , a contradiction is involve d . In the act of exchange , two things
of different u se value are equate d and then exchanged in certain propor­
tions as if their u se values could be e quated . Marx accepts Aristotle's view
and , quoting Aristotle , claims that " 'it is . . . in reality impossible that
 THE NATURE OF CAP IT AUST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 55

such unlike things c a n b e co mmensurable ' -i .e . , qualitatively equal . " Never­

theless, in dividuals do exchange things of different use value in certain
pro portions as if use value could be e qu ated and quantified . " Suc h an e qual­
isation can only be something foreign to their real nature " (C l , p. 6 5 ;
MEW, 2 3 , p . 74) , that is, t o the real nature o f the things with different
use values to be exchange d . The contradiction exists insofar as commodities
are exchange d for use. Use value is not quantifiable , however. Although a
commo dity has an exchange value that m akes this commodity acquirable
for use , what is measure d is not the commodity 's use value but the quantity
of abstract labor power e mbodied in it .
In summary , Marx lists three peculiarities that arise when things of un­
equal use value are exchange d : ( 1 ) "Use-value beco mes the form of mani­
festation , the phenomenal form o f its opposite , value " ( C l , p. 62 ; MEW,
2 3 , p . 7 0) ; ( 2) " concrete labour becomes the form under which its op­
posite , abstract hu man labour, manifests itself" (C l , p. 6 4 ; MEW, 2 3 , p .7 3 ) ;
and ( 3 ) "the labour o f private in dividuals takes the form o f its oppo site ,
labour directly social in its form" (C l , p . 64; MEW, 2 3 , p . 7 3 ) . The labor
of private in divi duals can be said to beco me social in its form in the sense
that private labor must pro duce use value for others (C l , p . 7 8 ; MEW, 2 3 ,
p . 8 8 ). This is so because the worker is forced to produce ac cording to an
alien will and be cause he is prevented fro m appropriating his own product
of labor. I nstead, he must produce for a market ; he must pro duce com­
mo dities that the capitalist will sell to the highest bidder. The worker must
pro duce commo dities which when exchanged will be of utility to others .
J ust be cause labor has become social in its form-"although , like all other
co mmo dity-pro ducing labour, it is the labour of private individuals"-
it manifests itself in products that are " directly exchange able with other
com modities" ( C l , p. 64; MEW, 2 3 , p . 7 3 ) . Accordingly , Marx states in
the third volume o f Capital:

No pro ducer, whether in dustrial or agricultural , when con sidered by

himself alone , pro duces value or commo dities. His pro duct becomes
a value and a co mmodity only in the context of definite social inter­
relations. I n the first place , in so far as it appears as the expression of
social labour, hence in so far as the individual producer's labour-time
counts as a part of the social labour-time in general ; and , secon dly , this
social character of his labour appears impressed upon his product through
56 ESTRANGEMENT

its pecuniary character and through its general exchangeability deter­

mined by its price (C 3 , pp. 6 3 8-6 3 9 ; MEW, 2 5 , p p . 6 5 1 -6 5 2 ) .

Since , i n order for commo dity exchange t o o ccur, i t must re duce

all qualitatively different private labor to abstract labor (the mere ex­
penditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles) , it becomes social in
its nature , being based on the most common denominator un derlying
all labor regardless of its different qualities. However, labor is social
not only in its nature , but in distinct ways. From the moment things
of utility are produced for exchange ,

the labour of the individual producer acquires so cially a two-fold

character. On the one han d , it must , as a definite useful kind of
labour, satisfy a definite social want , and thus hold its place as part
and parcel of the colle ctive labour of all , as a branch of a social divi­
sion of labour that has sprung up spontaneously . On the other han d ,
it c a n satisfy the manifold wants of the individual producer himself,
only in so far as the mutual exchangeability of all kinds of useful
private labour is an establishe d social fact , and therefore the private
useful labour of each producer ranks on an equality with that of all
others (C l , p. 7 8 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 8 7 ) ; see also MEW, 2 3 , p. 8 9) . 5

Inso far as a pro ducer can satisfy his manifold wants only by exchanging
the product of his labor, he must be indifferent to the use value of the
product of his labor. Exchange an d exchange value become more important
than use value , once co mmo dity exchange has reached a cert ain scale .

The pro duct is increasingly pro duce d as a commodity in the strict

sense of the word, its exchange-value becomes the more independent
of its i mmediate existence as use-value-in other words its pro duc-
tion beco mes more and more independent of its consumption by the
pro ducers and of its existence as use-value for the producers-the more
one-si ded it itself becomes, an d the greate r the variety of commodities
for which it is exchange d , the greater the kinds of use-values in which
its exchange-value is expresse d , and the larger the market for it becomes .
The more this happens, the more the product can be produced as a
co mmo dity ; therefore also on an increasingly large scale . The producers '
indifference to the use-value of h i s product i s expressed quantitatively
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 57

in the amounts in which he pro duces it , which bear no relatio n to his

o wn consumption needs , even when he is at the same time a consumer
of his own product" (C 3 , pp. 268-2 6 9 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 264) .

S U RP L US VALUE AND EXPLOITATI ON

Since all value ori gi nates in labor, the worker can be said to work for the
capitalist without being compensate d fully . He is forced to su pply surplus
labor, the product of which becomes surplus value on exchange . The capital­
ist as an individual is the mere personification of capital , wh ile the worker
is the mere personifi cation of labor. The capitalist is also con strained in his
behavior by co mpetition , that is, by capital as it is personifie d through
other capitalists. Therefore , the rate at which surplus value is extracte d
depends n o t so m u c h on t h e individual capitalist a s on capital as a whole
an d as personifie d by all its agents. Although the rate at wh ich surplus
value is extracte d fro m labor may vary , capital 's "single life i mpulse , the
tendency to create value and surplus-value " (C l , p. 224) remains . 6 Hence ,
its emphasis is on exchange value a n d n o t on use value , since i t is only
through exchange that surplus value can be realized . The economy comes
to a halt not because the needs that are met through use values are satisfied,
but because profits that are based on exchange value are not realized (MEW ,
2 5 , p. 269) :

[ C) apitalist production is in itself indifferent to the particular use-value,

an d distinctive features of any commodity it produ ces . I n every sphere
of production it is only concerned with producing surplu s-value , and
appropriating a certain quantity of unpaid labour incorporated in the
pro duct of labour. An d it is likewise in the nature of the wage labour
subordinate d by capital that it is indifferent to the specific character
of its labour and must submit to being transformed in accordance with
the re quirement of capital an d to being transferred fro m one sphere of
production to another ( C 3 , p. 1 9 5 ; MEW, 2 5 , p . 2 0 5 ) . 7

Capital 's simple life impulse is the creation of value and surp lus value by
-
co m pelling workers to create surplus in a process of pro duction in which
labor controls neither the process of production nor the pro duct of its
o wn labor. I n this sense , it is possible to speak of exploitation . Marx states
that production founde d on capital creates a situation in which man ex-
58 ESTRANGEMENT

ploits man (MEW, 2 3 , p. 74 3 ) , that is, capital exploits labor (MEW, 2 3 ,

p . 3 0 9) . I t also creates a

syste m of general exploitation of the natural and human qualities,

a system of general utility , utilising science itself just as much as all
the physical and mental qualities , while there appears nothing higher
in itself, nothing legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social
production and exchange ( G , p. 409 ; MEW, p. 3 1 3 ) .

Historically , capitalist production i s not the "inventor" o f su rplus value .

Thus , if, historically speaking,

the labourer nee ds all his time to produ ce the necessary means of sub­
sistence for himself and his race , he has no time left in which to work
gratis for others . Without a certain degree of pro ductiveness in his
J abour, he has no such superfluous time at his disposal ; without such
su perfluous time , no surplus-labour and therefore n o cap italists, no
slave-owners, no feu dal lords, in one word no class of large proprietors
(translation mine ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 34) . 8

According to Marx , capitalist pro duction is the most effe ctive system of
exploitation.

[ E )very enterprise engaged in commodity production becomes at the same

ti me an enterprise exploiting labour-power. But on ly the capitalist pro­
duction of commo dities has become an epoch-making � ode of exploita­
tion , which, in the course of its historical developmen t , revolutionises,
through the organisation of the labour-pro cess and the enormous im­
provement of technique , the entire economic structure of society in a
manner eclipsing all former e pochs (C2 , p . 3 7 ; MEW, 2 4 , p . 4 2 ) .

The question may b e aske d a s t o why the capitalist system is most success­
ful in exploiting labor power, that is, in appropriating surplus labor. Marx's
answer is unequivocal :

[ I ] t is . . . clear that in any given economic formation of society, where

not the exchange-value but the use-value of the product predominates,
surplus-labour will be limite d by a given set o f wants which may be
 THE NATURE OF CAP IT ALI ST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 59

greater or less , an d that here no boundless thirst for surplus-labour

arises fro m the nature of the production itself. Hence in antiqu ity
over-work beco mes horrible only when the object is to obtain exchange­
value in its specific independent money-form ; in the production of gold
and silver (C l , p. 2 2 6 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 2 5 0 ) .

A s soon a s pro duction becomes primarily production for exchange , certain

processes are set in motion which will pro mote particularly extreme exploi­
tati o n , which according to Marx can be witnessed under capital and com­
modity-producing slavery. In a commo dity-pro ducing econ o my , the more im­
mediate community ceases to be the primary consumer of its products . In­
stead, those whose exchange bid is the highest become the con sumers .

Hence the negro labour in the Southern States of the American Union
preserved so mething o f a patriarchal character, so long as pro du ction
was chiefly directe d to i mmediate local consumption . But in propor­
tio n , as the export of cotton became of vital interest to these states ,
t h e over-working of t h e negro a n d sometimes the using u p o f his life
in 7 years of labour became a factor in a calculate d and calculating
syste m. It was n o longer a question of obtaining fro m him a certain
quantity of useful products. It was now a question of pro duction of
surplus-labour itself ( C l , p p . 2 2 6-2 2 7 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 2 5 0) .

Under capital , high wages do not prove the absence of exploitation . The
boundless thirst for surplus value exists even then .

[ T] he wh ole capitalist system of production turns on the prolongation

of this gratis labour [ i . e . , surplus-labour] by exten ding the working
day or by developing the pro du ctivity , i .e . , the greater intensity of
labour power, etc . , that , conse quently , the system of wage labour is
a system of slavery , and indeed a slavery which becomes m o re severe
in pro portio n as the social pro ductive forces of labour develop , whether
the worker receives better or worse payment (CGP , p. 1 5 ; MEW, 1 9 ,
p . 2 6 ; see also MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 47 3 ) .

As capitalist commo dity production becomes in creasingly efficient and

widespread, exploitation also increases under capital , j ust as it did under
slavery which became increasingly commo dity-produ cing.
60 ESTRANGEMENT

DISC U S S I ON

Marx maintains that commo dity production was present in most histor­
ical peri o ds, because at least so me use value was produced fo r exchange and
for use by communities other than one's o wn . He argues that in his torical
periods with commodity production such production was based on e xploita­
tio n . Although he may be correct in the h istorical sense , it is conceivable
that commo dity production could exist without exploitation , and vice
versa. Hypothetically speaking, for example , commodity production could
exist without exploitation wherever isolated producers whose labor pro­
ductivity is high enough pro duce some of their produ cts spe cifically for a
market. It coul d also exist in a so ciety where the total produ ct of labor
is colle ctively appropriated, providing the community as a whole also pro­
duces for exchange . On the other h an d , exploitation alone could take place
even if no pro ducts are specifically pro duced for exchange as long as so me
nu mbers of the society have the power to coerce others into producing
more than they need and are able to appro priate this surplu s .
Engels has a co mment on this to pic . When Marx states that in order for
a worker to produce a co mmo dity "he must not only produce use-values,
but use-values for others , social use-values , " Engles interjects as follows:

An d not only for others , without more . The medieval peasant pro ­
duced quit-rent-corn for h i s feudal l o r d an d tithe-corn for his p arson .
But neither the quit-rent-corn nor the tithe-com became co mmodities
by reason of the fact that they had been produced for others . To be­
come a commo dity a pro duct must be transferred to another, whom it
will serve as a use-value , by means of an exchange ( C l , p. 48 ; MEW, 2 3 ,
p. 55).9

I a m inserting the parenthesis because its omission has often given rise
to the misunderstanding that every pro duct that is consumed by some
one other than its producer is considered in Marx a commodity (C l , p. 48)

It c an therefore be conclude d that the quit-rent-corn consumed by the

feudal lord, although the pro du ct of exploitation , is neither a commodity
nor the result of co mmo dity production . Not all quit-rent-com may be
consumed, however, in which case it may be exchanged for other things
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 61

and thus assume the nature o f a commo dity . This exchange may be ac­
cidental in the sense that only the corn left over after the lor d 's consump­
tion, if any , may be exchange d . Exchange may also be planned , in which
case the a mount of quit-rent-com demanded from the peasant is set at a
level that will predictably allow for exchange . In this sense , the peasan t ,
a s labor_ under capital , is force d t o produce things specifically f o r exchange ,
the difference being that the peasant 's livelihood does not completely de­
pen d on the exchange of his total product. Rather , the peasan t reproduces
his labor for himself, while the worker un der capital is prevented from
doing so , so much so that even his existence comes to be threatened (TS 3 ,
p . 4 1 6 ; M EW, 2 6. 3 , p . 408) . Only the peasant's surplus, and not his total
pro duct, is appropriated by another class. The surplus product produced
may be appropriated to a greater or lesser extent , thus reflecting a higher
or lower level of exploitation, or more or less commodity production. Engels '
re mark should not be understood to mean that , under feuda lism , com­
modity production did not exist . It should merely indi cate that not all
the pro ducts of surplus labor be come co mmodities, even tho ugh they are
appro priate d and consumed by individuals other than the producers .
Marx 's examples suggest that for him commo dity -producing slavery
and the capitalist mode of production pri marily lend the mselves to a
boundless thirst for surplus labor. While exploitation was often quite
horrible under feu dalism, we must conclude that Marx does not believe
that there existe d a boundless thirst for surplus labor under feudalism
which arose directly "from the nature of the production itself. "
Here it may be objected that the feudal lords were in competition
fo r lan d and that, therefore , each individual feudal lord was also con­
straine d by the actions of all the members o f his class . According to
Marx, the in dividual capitalist also does not determine the level of sur-
plus labor extracted fro m the workers and the level of re cklessness brought
upon them. He , too , is constrained in his action by competitio n , that is,
by capital ( personfied in the capitalists) as a whole. Similarly, it m ay be
argued that the level of exploitation in feu dalism was set and determined
not by the wants of any particular lord, but by the level of co mpetition
among the lords. Furthermore , since there was competition for lan d ,
theoretically , a s under capital , a boundless thirst for surplus labor could
develop depending on the level and nature of competitio n . N o doubt, the
burden on the peasants was often extreme. Why , then , according to Marx.
62 ESTRANGEMENT

did this boundless thirst not develop under feudalism? Aside fro m the fact
that the acquisition of land did not totally depend on the level of surplus
labor extracted, as is sh own by feudal marriage strategies, the extraction of
surplus labor itself was limited by the fact that the bulk of the population
controlle d the means of pro du ction needed to reproduce itself. Thus, al­
though surplus labor in its various forms needed to be made available to
the lord, the pro duction through which the feu dal population secured its
o wn existence was not de pendent on the lord , and a degree of human auton­
o my was preserved .
This can b e said neither of slavery n o r of labor under capital . Marx's
analogies of wage labor with slavery illustrate this fact . Because of this
autono my , pro ductive activity could not be subject to the will of the
lords and the develo pment of commo dity production was limite d . Al­
though co mmo dity production did occur, it was limited in scale . As a
result, exploitation , according to Marx , never reached the in ten sity it
did under capital and commo dity-producing slavery . Both cap ital an d
slavery syste matically destroyed the health of the pro ducers and reduced
their life expectancy .

THE I NABI LITY TO APPROP RIATE ONE'S

P R O D UCT O F LABOR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Under capital , the worker, in exchange for a wage , is prevented from ap­
pro priating the pro duct of his labor . He is forced to produce in excess of
what he is being co mpensate d , an d he is engage d in commodity p roduc­
tion rather than in the production of use values to be consumed without
prior exchange . Therefore , unlike feudal production , under capital the
pro ducer's total product belongs to the capitalist and is produ ced not for
use but for exchange . That part of the total product which results fro m
uncompensated labor ( i .e . surplus labor) for t h e capitalist is also exchange d ,
a n d through this exchange takes on a form desirable for t h e capitalist . The
capitalist can augment his capital , if he docs not consume the surplus value ,
which he will again advance in a constant form as means of production and
materials and a variable form as wages. In this o peration , the capitalist is
subject to co mpetition which , in turn , influences the form in which capital
is put back into circulatio n .
T h e manner in which capital i s advan ced and p u t into circulation deter­
mines the conditions of production to which the workers are subject. It
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 63

can readily be seen that , under capital , the worker loses all control over
the state of things inasmuch as he must sell his labor in order to e xist
and, conse quentl y , inasmuch as he is prevented fro m controlling the
pro duct o f his labor. Since he does not o wn any means of pro duction
and must sell whatever is left to him-his labor power-he even depends on
the capitalists to advance capital so that he can sell his labor power in re­
turn for a livelihood. The capital advanced in the form of wages is simply
objectifie d labor-labor that the capitalists appropriated from the workers
in the first place . The worker can therefore be said to have become de­
pendent on the pro duct of his own labor even for his liveliho o d , in ad­
dition to being de pen dent in terms of the conditions of productio n. The
pro duct of his o wn labor confronts him in a way that he does not con-
trol in any way , not even to the extent that he can secure his e xisten ce .
The product of his o wn labor, owned by and mediated through the capital­
ist in every way , confronts him as an alien force.
I n the 1 844 Man uscripts , Marx already remarks that capit al is accumu­
lated labor, which constitutes wealth. Wealth in a society is advanced "when
the capitals and the revenues of a country are growing. " This is possible
only be cause

more and more of his products are being taken away fro m the worker ,
that to an in creasing extent his own labour con fronts him as an o ther
man 's pro perty an d that the means of his existence an d his activity
are in creasingly concentrate d in the hands of the capitalis t" (CW, 3 ,
p . 2 3 7 ; MEW, E B 1 .T. , p . 47 3 ) .

The fact t hat the product i s being taken away fro m the worker means "that
it exists o utside him, in depen dently , as something alien to h i m , and that
it becomes a power on its o wn confronting him. It means that the life which
he has conferre d on the object confronts him as something h ostile an d
alie n " (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 2 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 1 2 ) . 10 As more and more of the
pro ducer's pro duct is taken away from him , the wo rker is in creasingly con­
fronted not only by his own labor as another man 's property , but by the
fact that exchange relations become ever more uncontrollable . Thus, the
more numerous the products are that are being taken away from him , the
more expanded commodity production , the more extended commodity
production has become. As the market is continually exten ded , 1 1 " its
interrelations and the con ditions regulating them assume more and more
64 ESTRANGEMENT

the form of a natural law working indepen dently of the produ cer , an d
become ever more uncontrollable " (C 3 , p . 2 4 5 ; MEW, 2 5 , p . 2 5 5 ) . Marx
even goes so far as to say that, for the worker, capital "piles up dangerous­
ly over and against him." The consequences are premature death , the
worker's decline to a machine , more competitio n , an d , for so me, even
starvation and beggary ( CW , 3 , p. 2 3 8 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 474) .
The observable phenomenon of capital accumulation and its con­
sequences for those who produce the wealth being accumulated are sum­
marized by a passage fro m the Grundrisse :

[ A ] ll the progress of civilization, or in other words every increase in the

po wers of social production (gesellschaftliche Pro duktivk r�fte) , if you
like , in the pro ductive po wers of labour itself-such as results from
science , inventions, division and combination of labour , improved
means of communication , creation of the world market , machinery
etc .-enriches not the worker but rather capital ; hence it only magnifies
again the power dominating over labour; increases only the productive
power of capital . Since capital is the antithesis of the worker, this mere­
ly increases the o bjective po wer stan ding over labo u r . The transfo rma­
tio n of la bour ( as living, purposive activity) into capital is , in itself,
the result of the e xchange between cap ital and labour , in so far as it
gives the capitalist the title of o wnership to the product of labour
(an d command over the same) (G , p. 3 0 8 ; MEW, G, p. 2 1 5 ) . 1 2

Marx com pares the fact that the laborer, through the capitalist , is con ­
trolle d by his own product of labor to religi o n : "as in religion, man is
governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalist production, he
is governed by the products of his o wn hand" ( C l , p. 5 8 2 ; M EW , 2 3 , p. 649) .
On t he other han d , Marx observes that in bourgeois society o ne can mis­
leadingly think that the individual h as great freedo m , while in fact the op­
posite is the case .

[ P ] recisely the slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest

free do m because it is in appearance the fully developed in depe nden ce
of the in dividual, who considers as his o wn freedom the uncurbed
movement , no longer bound by a common bond or by man , of the
estrange d elements of his life , such as property , industry , religion ,
etc . , whereas actually this i s his fully developed slavery an d inhumanity
(CW, 4, p. 1 1 6 ; MEW, 2 , p . 1 2 3 ) .
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOM Y 65

One manifestation of capital 's domination of labor and of the workers '
confrontation with the product of their labor and condition s of pro­
du ction as powers independent and alien to them can be seen in the de­
velopment and nature of the division of labor. Thus , a particular division
of labor emerges with commo dity production . I t can be said that

[ T ] o all the different varieties of values in use there correspond as many

different kinds of useful Jabour, classified according to the orde r ,
genus, spe cies , an d variety to which t h e y belong in t h e social division
of labour. This division of labour is a necessary condition for the pro­
duction of commo dities , but it does not follow, conversely , that the
pro duction of commo dities is a necessary condition for the division
of labour. I n the p rimitive Indian co mmu nity there is social division
of labour, without pro duction of commodities ( C l , p. 49 ; M EW, 2 3 ,
p . 5 6 ).

It is not only in Capital that Marx made this o bservation con cerning the
origin an d nature of the division of labor . As was shown earlier, estrange­
ment occurs when man must subject his will to an alien will in order to
gain an existence and when , as a result , he is also preven ted fro m appropriat­
ing the product of his o wn labor. The product of his own labor , capital ,
confronts him in its various forms as constant and variable capital . As a
result , certain con ditions of labor are imposed on the worker :

[L)abo ur i s only an expression of human activity with in alienation,

of the manifestation of life as the alienation of life, the divisio n of
labo ur, too is therefo re nothing else but the estranged, alienated
positing of human activity as a real activity of the species or as
activity of man as a species-being (CW, 3 , p . 3 1 7 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p. 5 5 7) .

Estrange ment fro m t h e product o f one 's labor, a s well a s t h e accompany­

ing division of labor based on alienate d labor , can exist only if p rivate
property exists. Without the institution of private property , the private
appropriation of the pro ducts of the labor of others would be impossible ,
and the worker could not become dependent on the capitalist's resources
for his existence. Likewise , since the division of labor under capital is
expressive of " nothing else but the estrange d , alienated positing of human
activity , " it is also depen dent and rests on private property ( CW , 3 , p . 3 2 1 ;
MEW, E B l .T . , p . 5 6 1 ) . 1 3
66 ESTRANGEMENT

In t he Grundrisse, Marx postulates that "exchange and division of

labour reciprocally con dition one another" ( G , p. 1 5 8 ; MEW, G, p. 7 6 ) .
With capital 's boundless thirst for surplus value , realized , in part , by in­
creasing the volu me of co mmodities exchange d , the division of labor
increases an d the in creased division of labor further enhances an expan­
sion of exchange . Marx observes that , through this process , which h as a
mo mentum of its o wn , the amount of simple labor in a society also in­
cre ases. "Just as in bourgeois society , " 14

a general or a banker plays a great part , but mere man , on the other
hand , a very shabby part , so here with mere human labour. I t is the
expen diture of simple labour-power, i .e . , of the labour-power which ,
on an average , apart from any special development , exists in the organ­
ism of every ordinary individual . Simple average labour, it is true,
varies in character in different countries and at different times, but in
a particular society it is given. Skilled labour counts only as simple
labour intensified, or rather, as multiplie d simple labour, a given
quantity of skilled being considered equal to a greater qu antity of
simple labour . Experience shows that t his re duction is constantly
being made ( C l , p . 5 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 9) .

An illustration fro m The Poverty of Philosophy may make this point

so mewhat clearer: " [ W] hat characterises the division of labour inside
mo dern society is that it engen ders specialties, specialists , and with them
craft-idiocy " (CW, 6, p. 1 90 ; MEW, 4 , p. 1 5 7 ) . And in Capital Marx
writes that "not only is the detail work distributed to the different in­
dividuals, but the in dividual himself is made the automatic motor of a
fractional o peration . " (C l , p. 340; MEW, p . 3 40) .

NOTES

1. Consi der the following statement in this con tex t:

I t wou l d be wron g to say that l abour which produces use-values is the only
source of the wealth produced by it , that is of material we al t h . Since l abour
is an activity which adapts for some purpose or other, it needs material as a
prere qu isite . Different use-values contain very different p roportion s of l abou r
and natural products, but u se -val ue al ways comprises a natural e lement (CPE,
p . 36; MEW, 1 3 , p . 2 3 ) .
 THE NATURE OF CAP ITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 67

2. It should be kept in mind that when Marx speaks of exchange value , he

often merely u ses the wor d Wert (value ) . Also , when writing exchange val u e
rather t h a n value o n l y , the following passage in Capital is of importan ce :

When at the beginning of this chapter, we sai d , in common parlan ce ,

that a co mmo dity i s bot h u se-value and exchange-value , we were , accurately
spe aking, wron g. A commodity is a use-value or object of u til ity , and a value.
I t manifests itself as this two-fold thing, that it is, as soon as its value assumes
an independent fo rm-viz ., the form of exchange value . I t never assumes this
form when isolate d , but only when placed in a value or exchange rel atio n with
another commodity of a different kind. When once we know this , su ch a mode
of expression does n o harm ; it simply serves as an abbreviation (C l , p. 6 6 ;
MEW, 2 3 , p . 7 5 ; see also Engels' comme n t in C l , p . 4 8 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 5 5 ) .

3 . The word sinnlich (sensual) remains untranslated i n C l , p . 7 8 . This i s a

lack inasmu ch as man assesses the u tility of an object through sen se p erceptio n ,
while value i s n o t de termined through sense perceptio n .
4. For Marx , skilled l abor is labor that , through some training, requ ires
faculties that go beyond the mere expen diture of hu man brains, nerves, an d
mu scles. Since training re qu ires an initial expen diture , skilled labor, he states,
commands higher wages. I t is not that its real wages are higher and that therefore
the surplus product produced by it less; it is exploited to the same degree (MEW,
23, p p . 2 1 2, 3 6 0 ; M EW, 25, p p . 1 5 1 , 3 1 1 ) .
The above concepts must b e viewe d with some skepticism . A s M arx writes
in a footnote :

The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour rests in p art on pure
illusio n , or to say the least, on distinctio n s t hat have long since ceased to be
real , an d t hat survive only by virtue of a traditional convention ; in p art on
the helpless condition of some gro ups of the working-class , a condition that
prevents them from exactin g equally with the rest the value of their l abour­
power. Accidental circumst ances here play so great a part, that these two
forms of labour sometimes change places. Where , for in stance , the physiqu e of
the working class has deteriorate d, an d is, relatively speaking, exh auste d ,
which i s t h e case in a l l countries with a well developed capitalist productio n ,
t he lo wer forms of labour, which deman d great expenditure of muscle, are
in general consi dered as skille d, compared with much more delicate forms
of labour ; the latter sink down to the level of u n skilled labour (C l , p . 1 9 2 ;
MEW, 2 3, p . 2 1 2) .

5 . For additional elaboration or commentary o n social l abou r, se e C l , p p . 7 8 ,

80; MEW, 2 3 , p p . 88, 9 0 ; and C 3 , p p . 8 1 - 8 2 , 88 , 1 04, 5 1 6 ; MEW, 2 5 , p p . 9 2 ,
9 9 , 1 1 3 , 5 3 3 . Among other things, i n M E W 2 5 , Marx directly relates credit ,
waste of human l ives, and so on to the social nature of labor , that is, that all
pro duction is commodity p roduction .
68 ESTRANGEMENT

I n t his con text , it is u seful to point out the mean in g of terms su ch as

"average simple labo r , " " average labo r , " "universal labo r , " "cooperative l abor, "
" d i rectly associated labo r , " and " common l ab o r " :

1 . "einfache Durc hschnittsarbeit is "simple l abour power . . . which , o n an

average , apart from any special devel opme n t , exists in the organism of
every or dinary in dividu al " ( C l , p. 5 1 ; M EW, 2 3 , p. 59 and see also p. 2 1 3 ) .
2 . Durchschnittsarbeit (average labor) can also mean "average paid l abor "
( see MEW, 2 5 , p. 3 1 1 ) .
3 . allgemeine A rbeit (un iversal l abor) and gemeinschaftliche A rbeit ( co­
o perative labor) :

Both kin ds play their role in the process of p roduction , both flow one
into the other, bu t both are also differentiate d . Un iversal l abour is all
scientific labou r, all discovery and all inventions. This l abour depends p art­
ly on the u tilisation of the labours of those who have gone before . Co­
o perative labou r , on the other han d , is the direct co-operation o f individuals
( C 3 , p . 1 04; MEW, 2 5 , p. 1 1 4) .

4. Marx u ses vergesellschaftete Arbeit inconsiste ntl y . Thus, it can mean "associated
l abor, or common labor" as is re qu ired, fo r example , to operate big machinery
( C l , pp. 3 64- 3 6 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 407 ) . I t can also mean " dire ctly associated "
l abor as is made clear in the sentence "Owen p re-sup posed directly associate d
l abo ur, a form of production that is entirely in consistent with the p roduction
of commo dities" (C l , pp. 97-9 8 ; MEW, 2 3 , pp. 1 09- 1 1 0) .

6 . The capital ist does not buy labor power i n order to satisfy , through the
product o f this labo r , his personal wants or needs. H e buys it for the p roduction of
surplus value (C l , p . 5 8 0 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 647 ) .
7 . Marx makes the same observation elsewhere :

[ T ) he real barrier of capitalist p roduction is capital itself It is that capi tal and its
self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point , the motive and the
purpose of produ ction ; that production is only production for cap ital and not
vi ce versa, the means of production are not mere mean s for a con stant expansion
of the l iving p rocess of the society of produ cers (C 3 , p. 2 5 0 ; MEW , 2 5 , p. 260) .

8. Transl ation mine insofar as I render braucht by "needs" instread of by "wants . "

Capital h a s not invented surplu s-labour. Wherever a part of society p ossesses

the monopoly of the means of produ ction , the laboure r , free or n o t free , must
add to t he working-time nece ssary for its own maintenance an ex tra working­
time in or der to produce the mean s of subsistence for the owners of the means
of productio n , whether this proprietor be the Atheni an aristocrat , E truscan
theo crat , civis Romanus, Norman baro n , American slave-owner, W allachian
Boyard, modern landlord o r capitalist ( C l , p. 2 26 ; MEW, 2 3 , pp. 249-2 5 0 ) .
 THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 69

9 . Ho wever, it wo u l d be incorrect to infer that commodity production only

characterizes capitalist society . In t he secon d volu me of Capital , Marx mentions
that commodities can be produced u n der various modes of p ro ductio n :

N o matter whether commodities are t h e o u t p u t o f produ ction based on

slavery , of peasants ( C hinese , I n dian ryots) . of communes (Dut ch East
I n dies) , of state enterprise (such as existe d in former epo chs of Russian
history on the basis of serfdom) or of half-savage hunting tribe s , e tc . -as
commodities and money they come face to face with t he money and com­
mo dities in wh ich the in dividual capital presents itself. ( C 2 , p. 1 1 3 ; M EW,
24, p . 1 1 3 ) .

I n t h e third vol u me o f Capital, w e can re ad:

No matter what the basis on which products are p rodu ce d , which are thrown
into circulation as co mmoditie s-whether the basis of the primitive community ,
of slave productio n , of small peasant and petty bou rgeois, or the c ap ital ist
basis, the character o f products as commod it ies is not altered . . . . The ex tent
to which products e n ter trade an d go through the merchants' hands depends
on the mode of production , an d reaches its maximum in the ultim ate devel o p ­
ment of capitalist produ ctio n , where t h e produ ct is produced solely a s a com­
mo dity, and not as a direct means of subsistence (C 3 , p. 3 2 5 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 3 3 7 ) .

1 0. In Theories of Surplus- Value ( Vol . I l l ) , Marx again states that accu mulation
is " the conversion of surplus-value into capital . " The unpaid labor embodied in
surplus l abor, which has been converted into capital , con fron ts the worker as

the totality of the objective conditions of la bour. In t his form it confronts him
as an alien property with t he resu l t that the cap ital which is antecedent to his
l abour, appears to be independent of i t . . . . the conditions of labour confront
the individual wo rker in an ever more gigantic form and in cre asingly as social
forces, the chance of his taking possession of them himsel f as is the case in
small-scale in dustry disappears (TS 3 , p p . 3 5 2- 3 5 3 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p p . 344-34 5 ;
see also CW, 3 , p . 2 7 5 and MEW, E B l .T . , p . 5 1 5 as referre d t o o n p . 3 4 of
t he present text) .

1 1 . For reasons whi c h , according to Marx , are inherent in cap ital ism but which
cannot be addressed here .
1 2 . T h e following quo tes may further illustrate t h e nature of t h e dominating
forces controlling the worker. The worker is confron ted wit h

capital , as master over l iving labour capacity, as val ue endowed with its own
might and wil l . . . " All this, " says Marx , " arose from the act of exch ange, in
which he exchan ge d his living labour capacity for an amou nt of obje ctified
labour, except that this obj e ctified labour-these external conditions of his
bein g, and t he independe n t externality (Ausseribmsein ) (to him) of these ob-
70 ESTRANGEMENT

jective conditions-now appear as posited by himself, as bis own pro duct,

as his own self-objectification as well as t he objectification of himself as a
power independent of himself, which moreover rules over him, ru les over him
through his own actions (G, p . 45 3 ; MEW, G , p. 3 5 7 ) .

O n e manifestation of t h e condition that the worker i s dominate d by h i s own

pro duct in such a way that everythin g has an alien will an d is independent of h im
is for Marx the worker's attitu de to ward that which dominates him independent of
his will .

Finally, we have earlier seen that, in fact , the labourer looks at the social
nature of his labour, at its combination with the labour of others for a com­
mon purpose , as he wou l d at an alien power ; the condition of realising this
combination is alien property , whose dissipation wou l d be totally in different
to him if he were not compelled to economise with it. The situation is qu ite
different in factories owned by the labou rers themselves. (C 3 , p. 8 5 ; MEW, 2 5 ,
p p . 9 5-96) .

[ I ) f landed p roperty became people's property then the whole basis of capital i st
production woul d go, the foun dation on which rests the confront ation of the
wor ker by t he conditio n s of labour as an indepen dent force (TS 2 , p. 97; MEW ,
2 6 . 2 , p. 9 7 ) .

1 3 . Later, I discu ss to what extent estrangement is dependent o n l y on cap ital

rather t han on private pro perty as such, of which capital is merely one h istorical
form.
1 4. C l , p . 5 1 , leaves out bourgeois, although it is contained in MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 9 .
5
MARX'S EVALUATION OF
THE CONDITION OF MAN
IN PRECAPITALIST SOCIETIES

Marx illustrated his theory of estrange ment by analyzing the nature of

capitalist society , and he defined human nature in order to show how capital­
ism prevents man from living according to his nature . Based on the analysis
of production and life under capital , he was able to demonstrate the various
ways in which individuals are prevented from living according to their nature
and fro m making use of the abilities they are endowed with by nature . How­
ever, because Marx's effort was devote d primarily to obtaining a better under­
standing of the principles governing capitalist society , it cannot necessarily
be conclu ded t hat his theory of estrangement could not also be valid in the
analysis of noncapitalist social formations. Thus , it remains to be investigated
whether Marx 's theory of estrangement contains properties that also can
apply to noncapitalist societies. O f course , since Marx does not generally
talk about estrangement in noncapitalist societies, this assessment will
have to be based on inference.

THE D E LI N EATI ON O F THE CAPITALIST MODE O F P ROD UCTION

Since commodity production seems to be a reality in various social for­

mations, the question arises as to what exactly distinguishes capitalist pro­
duction from n oncapitalist production . Marx contends that the level at
which co mmodities are produced distinguishes the two .
72 ESTRANGEMENT

The pro duct appears as a co mmodity in the most varied organ isms of
social production . Conse quently what characterises capital ist produc­
tion would then be only the extent to which the product is cre ated
as an article of commerce , as a co mmodity , and hence the extent also
to which its o wn constituent ele ments must enter again as articles of
commerce , as commo dities, into the economy from which it emerges.
As a matter of fact capitalist produ ction is commodity production
as the general form of productio n . But it is so and becomes so mo re
and more in the course of its develo pment only because labour itself
appears here as a co mmodity . . . . For this reason capitalist production
(and hence commo dity production) does not reach its fu ll scope until
the direct agricultural pro ducer becomes a wage-labourer ( C2, pp. 1 1 9-
1 2 0 ; MEW, 24, p p . 1 1 9- 1 20).

Capitalist production is distinguished from the outset by two character­

istic features.
First. I t produces its products as commodities. The fact that it produces
commo dities does not differentiate it fro m other modes of produ ctio n ;
but rather the fact that being a co mmodity is the dominant and deter­
mining characteristic of its products. This implies, first an d foremost,
that the labourer himself comes forward merely as a seller of com­
mo dities, and thus as a free wage-labourer, so that labour appears in
general as wage-labour. . . The second distinctive feature of the capitalist
mode of pro duction is the production of surplus-value as the direct aim
and determining motive of productio n . Capital produces essentially
capital , and does so only to the extent that it pro duces surplus-value .
( C 3 , pp. 88 1 -88 2 ; MEW, 2 5 , p p . 8 8 7 -8 8 8 ) .

Un der capital , the nature an d basis of authority are clearly distinct fro m
those in noncapitalist pro duction . As a conse quence , although the extrac­
tion of surplus value is not unique to capital , the form in which it is ex­
tracted differs fro m that in noncapitalist productio n .

The authority assu med b y t h e capitalist as t h e person ification of capital

in the direct process of pro duction , the so cial function performed by
him in his capacity as manager and ruler of pro duction , is essentially
different fro m the authority e xercised on the basis of pro duction of
means of slaves, serfs, etc. (C 3 , p. 8 8 1 ; M EW, 2 5 , p. 888) .
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT ALIST SOCIETIES 73

Un der capital , t he worker is subj ect to the authority of the capitalist as a

result of exchange , and not as a result of human bondage an d political or
theocratic do min ation .

Whereas , on t he basis of capitalist pro duction , the mass o f direct pro­

ducers is confronted by the social character of their production in the
form of strictly regulating authority and a social mechanism of the
labour process organised as a complete hierarchy -this authority
reaching its bearers, however, only as the personification of the con­
ditions of labour in contrast to labour, and not as political or theo cratic
rulers as un der earlier modes of pro duction -among the bearers of this
authority , the capitalists themselves, who confront one another only as
co mmo dity owners , there reigns complete anarchy within which the
social interrelations of production assert themselves only as an over­
whelming natural law in relation to individual free will (C 3 , p. 88 1 ; MEW,
2 5 , p . 888; see also MEW, G , pp. 3 67-3 68) .

COMMUNITI E S I N WHICH PROPERTY WAS H E L D IN COMMON

If capitalist society is characterized by primarily commodity produc­

tio n , earlier non capitalist social formations are characterized by the ab­
sence of systematic co mmo dity production . The question arises as to
what types of exchange ex ist in societies " based on property in common" -
societies of the form of "a patriarchal famil y , an ancient Ind ian community,
or a Peruvian Inca State . " First, however, it must be no ted that Marx dis­
tinguishes between various ty pes of exchange . For example , he states that
savages often do not e xchange one particular use value for another; instead ,
"a chaotic mass of articles are offered as the e quivalent of a single article "
( C l , p. 9 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 1 0 2 ). Barter differs fro m the type of exch ange
often found with savages as well as from the type of exch ange character-
'
istic in cap italist society.

The dire ct barter of products attains the elementary form of the

relative expression of value in one respect , but not in ano ther . That
form is x Co mmo dity A = y Commodity B . The form of direct barter
is x use-value A = y u se -value B. The articles A and B in th is case are
not as ye t commo dities, but beco me so o nly by the act of barter. The
first ste p made by an o bj e ct of utili ty towards acquiring exchange-
74 ESTRANGEMENT

value is when it forms a non-use-value for its owner, and that happens
when it forms a superfluous portion of some article re qui red for his
imme diate wants ( C l , p . 9 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 1 02) .

Capitalism syste matically produces more commodities than the pro ducer
needs an d , more i mportantly , it produ ces directly for e xchange . Unlike a
barter econo my under which pro ducts beco me co mmodities only through
the act of exchange, u nder capital products immediately become com­
mo dities.

I n t he direct barter of pro ducts, each commo dity is dire ctly a means
of exc hange to its o wner, an d to all other persons an equivalent, but
that only insofar as it has use-value for the m. At this stage , therefore ,
the articles exchange d do not acquire a value-form independent of their
o wn use-value , or of the individual needs of the exchangers (C l , p p . 9 1 -
9 2 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 1 0 3 ) .

If, however, individuals consistently barter, exchange be comes a regular

social p rocess an d the desire for foreign use values becomes an every day
pheno menon.

[ l ] n the course of time, therefore, some portion at least of the products

of labour must be produ ce d with a special vie w to e xchange . From
that moment the distinction becomes firmly established between the
utility of an object for the purpose of consumptio n , and its utility
for the purposes of exchange . Its use-value becomes distinguished
fro m its exchan ge -value . On the other han d , the quantitative p ro por­
tion in which the articles are exchangeable , becomes depe ndent on
their pro duction itself. Custo m stamps them as values with definite
magnitudes" (C l , p. 9 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 1 0 3 ) .

Marx postulates that exchange begins a t the point where the community
sto ps (MEW, 2 3 , p p . 2 5 , 1 02- 1 0 3 , 1 87 ) . That is, it exists between com­
munities. If me mbers of two different co mmunities engage regularly in
direct barter, their products beco me commodities on a regular basis, al­
though they may not be co mmo dities fro m the very outset of their pro ­
duction . Ho wever, "as soon . . . as pro ducts once become commodities in
the external relations of a community , they also , by reaction , become so
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN P RECAPITALIST SOCIETIES 75

in its internal in tercourse . " The communities based on common p roperty to

which Marx referre d had not yet become subject to this process. In their
internal relations, products had not become commodities be cause the com­
munities' external relations consisted o f an e xchange that at best was in­
fre quent and erratic. While no set pattern had emerge d , some exchange
may have occasionally o ccurre d .

( T ] hose small a n d extremely ancient I ndian communities, s o m e of which

have continued do wn to this day , are b ased on possession in com-
mon of the lan d , o n the blending of agriculture and handicrafts, and on
an unalterable division of labour, which serves , whenever a new com­
munity is starte d , as a plan an d scheme ready cut and drie d . . . . The
chief part of t he products is destine d for direct use by the community
itself, and does not take the form of a co mmodity . Hence , production
here is independent of that division of labour brought about, in I ndian
so ciety as a whole , by mean s of the exchange of commodities. I t is
the surplus alone that beco mes a co mmo dity , an d a portion of even
that, not until it has reached the hands of the State , into whose h ands
fro m time imme morial a certain quantity of these pro ducts h as found
its way in the shape of ren t in kind. (C l , p. 3 3 7 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 7 8 ) .

I t is now possible t o return t o o u r original question as to what type o f

exchange exists with socie ties " based on pro perty i n commo n . " According
to Marx , co mmodity pro duction does not e xist within su ch c ommunities,
and there is no or only minimal barter between the members . This does
not mean that some in dividuals do not produce more than they need fo r
the mselves. On the contrary , there are surplus products , some of which
are exchange d with o ther co mmunities (barter) , some given as tribute to
govern ment , an d the rest distribute d among the members . St rictly speaking,
this distribution of products internal to the community "based on property
in commo n " is a form of exchange , sin ce the surplus of "A" may benefit
" B " and inverse , or the pro ducts of one type of manufacture may benefit
those who manufacture a different product (MEW, 2 3 , p p . 3 78-3 7 9 ) . The
decisive point is that this process occurs without the p ro du cts becoming
co mmo ditie s , either by being exchange d in barter fashion or, worse , by
being produced for a market in which exchange value an d use value h ave
already become distinguishe d as separate forms of value . According to
which criteria, then , are products exchange d in communities "based on
76 ESTRANGEMENT

pro perty in co mmon ? " To my knowle dge , Marx does not answer this
question. Engels, however, says in A nti Diihring that both work and pro d­
ucts for consumption are distribu ted according to tradition and needs
(MEW, 20, p . 2 8 8 ) . I m plicitly , Marx makes the same asse rtion when dis­
cussing the Inca Indians : " [ T ] ransp ortation played a prominent role in the
l an d of the Incas, although the social product neither circulated as a com­
modity nor was distribute d by means of barter" (C2 , p. 1 5 2 ; MEW, 2 4 ,
p . 1 5 2) .

COMMUNI STI C SOCI ETI E S BASED O N THE GENTI LE O RGANI Z ATION

It is useful to know how Marx views so cieties that have no products

to be exchange d or t hat do not exchange with other communities. As is
well known , both in his vie ws and his techniques of reasoning Marx relies
heavily on the work of L. H . Morgan. Morgan 's method is on e of evolution­
ary pre di ction in reverse . Instead of pre dicting the state into which a given
society will evolve , a state about which we have no informat ion whatso­
ever, knowledge about the history of societies is used to infe r the ty pe of
society fro m which they evolve d . For exampl e , information on tribal
societies is use d to infer the social organization from which t hese tribal
societies evolved. Thus, the attempt is made to construct a view of society
and its organi zati onal stru cture for a period in human history for which
we have no living examples.
In this context , it is not important to assess whether the method used
by Marx, as well as Engels and Morgan , is appro priate . Nor is it impera­
tive to discuss whether Marx was corre ct in his inferences concerning the
ori ginal con dition of societies. What is important is to note some of his
vie ws o n this su bject, since they will be helpful in assessing his theory
of estrangement.
Unfortunately , Marx's thinking o n societies in the original condition
is available only in a rather incomplete and sketchy form. Through Lawren e<
Krader, however, some of Marx's views in the Ethnological No tebooks
have become available to a larger circle . Largely with the help of the
Notebo oks, an attempt is made here to e xtract those Marxian views that
may have a bearing o n the interpretation of his theory of estrangement .
Even so, the No tebooks do not give us a complete account of his thinking
on societies in the original state . To escape this limitation , so me use of
Engels' writings will be made on this subject. Certainly it would be better
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT ALIST SOCIETIES 77

to have Marx 's complete views, but under the circumstan ces , it is better to
" su p plement" Marx 's thinkin g on the subject rather than rely solely on
the Ethnological Notebooks. This proce dure is j ustifie d ( 1 ) because Engels
had access to Marx's notes on Morgan and used the m for his book on the
origin of the family , and (2 ) because in view of their in timate friendship
and their mutual cooperation until Marx 's death , Engels ' views can be
assu med not to have deviated signifi cantly fro m those of Marx in this
respect. As Engels tells us in his fore word , Marx intended to write a
book on the family similar to the one Engels wrote shortly after Marx's
death in 1 88 3 . A close exchange of ideas must have taken place , and there
is no eviden ce t hat the two disagree d significantly co ncerning communist
societies based on the gentile organization .
According to Engels (MEW, 2 1 , p. 7 1 ) , Marx often said that the key
to un derstan din g our own primitive age can be found among the American
I n dians. This primitive age at first consiste d of life in the form of hordes,
a form of human life that Marx thought could not be fou nd anymore and
that was "far belo w the lowest savage now living" (EN , p. 1 2 5 ) . Sexual
relations at this level are characterized as "pro miscuous interco urse " and
"the ruder flint implemen ts found over part of the earth 's su rface , and not
use d by existing savages, attest extreme rudeness of man 's con dition " ( E N ,
p . 1 2 5 ) . After man emerge d from this primitive habitat , he co mmenced as
a fisherman to s pread over continental areas ( E N , p . 1 2 5 ) . Thus, the first
stage of the family was formed. It was the consanguine family wh ich "re cog­
nize d pro miscuity within defined limits" ( E N , p . 1 2 5 ) . Furth er organiza­
tion into gentes (kinship) occurre d within which brothers an d sisters were
pro hibited fro m marrying, although monogamy had not been established
an d sexual access was not limited to one p artner . Gen s, the general name
for organizational forms in which kinship was derived from one ancestral
mot her-sin ce as a result of promiscuity the father was not known -we re
democratically o rganized. The council of the gens with the I ro quois was
the instru ment of government and had supreme authority over gens.

[E]very adult male and fe male member had a voice upon all questions
brought before it; it elected and deposed its sachem and chiefs . . . it
con doned o r avenged the murder of a gentilis, it a dopted persons into
the gens. It was the germ of the higher co uncil of the tribe, and of that
still higher of t he co nfederacy, each of which was co mposed exclusively
of chiefs as represen tatives of the gentes . . . All the members of an
.
78 ESTRANGEMENT

Iroquois gens perso nally free, bound to defend each o ther 's freedo m;
equal in privileges and perso nal rights. Sachem and chiefs claiming to
su periority ; a bro therho o d bo und together by the ties of kin. Liberty,
Equality, and Fraternity, though never formulate d , were cardinal
principles der gens and those the unit of a so cial and govern mental
syste m, the foundation on which I ndian society organized ( E N ,
p. 1 5 0 ; translation mine where necessary ; see also EN , p . 1 6 2 ) .

Marx notes that " [ i ] n th is lower a n d middle ethnical period de mo cratic

principles were the vital element of gentile society " ( E N , p . 1 72 ; trans­
lation mine where necessary ) . The sachems, who were the counselors of
the peo ple , were re quire d to make unanimous decisions concerning all
public questions. Such unanimity was essential to the validity of every
public act ( E N , p. 1 70 ; see also E N , p p . 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 an d MEW, 2 1 , p . 2 1 ) .
Marx also notes that all the members o f an I ro quois gens were person al­
ly free . Thus, even

{M]ilitary q uestio ns usually left to the actio n of the volu ntary prin ciple.
Theoretically each tribe at war with every o ther tribe with which it had
not fo rme d a treaty of peace. Any perso n at liberty to organize a war
party and conduct an expe dition wohin he wollte . He anno unced bis
project by giving a war-dance and inviting volunteers . . . When a tribe
was menaced with an attack, war parties were formed to meet it in
much the same manner. Where forces so raised were unite d in one body ,
each under its o wn war-captain and their joint movements determined
by a council of these captains ( E N , p. 1 62 ) .

Sin ce the Iro quois were organized according t o the principle of consanguin­
ity , it can be inferred t hat they practiced a communistic life -style . Marx
remarks that " co mmunism in living seems to have originated in the neces­
sities of the co nsanguine fa mily " ( E N , p. 1 1 5 ). Although a certain office
may have passed from father to son , it does not follow that there was
here ditary successio n . As shown above , the Iroquois membe rs of the gen s
h a d the power t o elect and recall their representatives. If successio n from
father to son occurred, it was "by the free co nsent of the people . " Accord­
ing to Marx, hereditary succession came "fro m force (usurpation) " ( E N ,
p. 1 7 3 ) .
O n this level of social and economic development , with regard t o the
labor time re quired for individuals to insure subsistence pro p agation of
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT AUST SOCIETIES 79

the species, Marx comments in the Grun drisse that " [in) the lowest stages
of pro duction . . . few human needs h ave yet been produce d , and thus few
to be satisfied. Necessary labour is therefore restricte d , not because labour
is productive, but because it is not very necessary " ( G , p. 3 9 8 ; M EW, G,
p. 3 0 2 ) . Although few produ cts are being produced at this level of develop­
ment , it does not follow that the re is no surplus. Ho wever , "in the less
pro ductive stages of exchange , people exchange nothing ino re than their
superfluo us labour time ; this is the measure of their exchange , which there­
fore extends only to superfluous products , " while under capital " the exis­
tence of necessary labour time is conditional on the creation of superfluous
labour ti me " ( G , p. 3 9 8 ; MEW, G, pp. 3 0 1 - 302) .
Certainly , Morgan 's description of communism asso ciated with con­
sanguineous kinshi p relations appealed to Marx in many ways . Yet , it
would be wrong to conclude that Marx "approve d " of life at this stage of
develop ment and proclaime d it to be the ideal human condition. Already
in the Manuscripts, he shows a certain kind of contempt for the "simplicity
of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed
to go beyond private property , but h as not yet even reache d it " (CW , 3 ,
p . 2 9 5 ; M EW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 3 5 ) . He states his obj e ctions to p rimitive com­
munism more precisely in Capital :

[ T ) hose ancient social organisms of produ ction are , as compared with

bourgeois society , extremely simple and transparent. But they are
foun de d either on the i mmature development of man individually ,
who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him with his
fellowmen in a primitive tribal community , or upon direct relations
of subjection . They can arise and exist only when the development of
the pro ductive power of labour has not risen beyon d a low stage , an d
whe n , therefore , the social relations within the sphere of material
life , between man and man , an d between man and nature , are cor­
respondingly narrow (C l , p p . 8 3 -84; MEW, 2 3 , p p . 9 3 -94) .

I n The Origin of the Fa mily, Private Property and the State, Engels
elaborates on this theme.

[ T ] he gentile constitution in its best days, as we saw it in America,

presup posed an extremely sparse population over a wide are a . Man 's
attitu de to nature was therefore one of almost complete subj ection to
a strange incomprehensible power, as is refle cted in his childish rel igious
80 ESTRANGEMENT

conceptions. Man was bounded by his tribe , both in relation to strangers

fro m outside the tribe and to himself; the tribe , the gens, and their in­
stitutions were sacre d and inviolable , a higher power established by
nature , to which the individual subjected h imself unconditionally in
feeling, thought , and action . However impressive the people of this
e poch appear to us, they are completely undifferentiated from one
another ; as Marx says, they are still attached to the navel string of the
primitive co mmunity ( O F , p. 8 8 ; MEW, 2 1 , p. 9 7 ) .

For Marx , the communistic primitive community is not the ideal state
of existence, although in some respects it was attractive to h im. If, at
one time , these primitive societies were communistic , however , wh at factors
contribute d to t he decay of this communism? I n the following pages, again
with t he help of Engels' writings , an attempt is made to reconstru ct Marx's
thought con cerning the historical developments that led to the "fall from
the simple moral greatness of the old gentile so ciety " (O F , p . 88) and
starte d the process of civilization for these societies.
Engels co mments that the organization of the Iroquois people was
doo me d to collapse and that the highest form of their so cial organization­
the confe deracy of tribes-already marked the beginning of its collapse .
As evidence , he cites the I ro quois' atte mpts to subjugate others and the
fact that war was common and only later mitigated by self-interest (OF ,
p. 87 ; MEW, 2 1 , p . 9 7 ) . The more profound source of decay lay elsewhere ,
however. According to Marx , the differences in the distribution of personal
pro perty were primarily responsible for the beginning crack in the founda­
tions of communism. Marx's examples are not necessarily drawn from the
Iro quois, however, since Marx 's assumption is that the slightly more
developed so cial forms from which the examples are often drawn were at
one time also communistic . Conse quently , evidence of the e mergence of
personal pro perty is not confined to the I ro quois, and according to Marx
an d Engels, can also be found in the history of other societies. I n the
German Ideology, Marx and Engels propose the idea that "re al private
property began with the ancients, as with modern natio ns, with movable
property" (CW, 5 , p . 8 9 ; MEW, 3 , p . 6 1 ) . And in his Ethnological Note­
bo oks Marx notes that at the stage o nly slightly h igher in development
than that of the Iroquois there is a

great increase in personal property and so me changes in the relations

of perso ns to lan d. The territorial do main still belonged t o the tribe
in common; but a portion now set apart for support of the govern -
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT ALIST SOCIETIES 81

ment, another for religio us uses, and a still more important portio n ­
that fro m which the people drew its subsistence, divided among the
several gentes, o r communities of perso ns who resided in the same
pueblo . . . . In dividual ownership of ho uses and lan ds excluded by
com munal property of lan ds by gentes or communities of persons,
joint-tenement ho uses and mo de of o ccupatio n by related families
. . . . Their lan d is held in co mmon, but after a person cultivates a
lot he has the perso nal claim to it which be can sell to one of the
co m munity. ( E N , p. 1 3 2 ; translation mine where necessary ) .

Here Marx is referring t o the Laguna Pueblo I n dians who m he states

are an example of the stage of development slightly higher th an the one
of the Iro quois.
Of the Mogui Village Indians, he remarks that they "now h ave flo cks
of sheep, ho rses and mules and considerable other personal p roperty "
( E N , p . 1 3 2 ; translation mine where necessary) . On this leve l , Engels
points out that , in contrast to the lowest levels of developmen t , a steady
surplus may be pro duce d , facilitating a regular exchange and a division
of labor that is not based merely on sex , age , and physical strength ( O F ,
p. 1 5 0 ; MEW, 2 1 , p . 1 60) . 1 Citing Marx , Engels maintains that "the
pro perty differences within one and the same gens . . . transformed its
unity of interest into , antagonism between its members ." These property
differences were also accompanied by "greed for riches" (see also E N ,
p . 1 2 8) an d transforme d the whole gentile constitution, with its roots i n
the peo ple , i n gens, phratry , a n d tribe , into i t s opposite :

[ F ) rom an o rganization of tribes for the free ordering of their own affairs
it becomes an organization for the plundering and oppression of their
neighbors ; and correspondingly its organs change fro m in struments of
the will of the people into indepen dent organs for the domination and
o ppression of the people ( O F , p. 1 5 0 ; MEW, 2 1 , p. 1 60) .

According to Engels , at this point in history the threshold of civilization

was reache d ( O F , p . 1 5 0 ) . 2

MARX'S U S E O F T H E T E RM " P RIVATE P RO P E RTY"

In his Ethnological No tebo oks, Marx does not , to my knowledge , use the
term " private pro perty. " As we have seen , however, he does use the terms
82 ESTRANGEMENT

" property " (Eigentu m ) , "objects of ownership" ( E N , p p . 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 ) ,

" personal property , " a n d "indivi dual ownership " (EN , p . 1 3 2 ) . These
terms are used in the context of describing how the original co mmunism
was undermine d by the une qual accumulation of products by individuals.
These may not have been isolated in dividuals , but in contrast to the pre­
vious form of communistic ownership , it was personal property and a form
of private property . This may also have been Engels' reason for o ccasionally
substituting the term Privateigentum (private property) with Sondereigentum
(separate o wnership of) for his later e ditions of The Origin of the Family,
Private Property and the State (see MEW, 2 1 , p p . 5 8 , 1 5 6 ) , wh ile in his
first edition he used Privateigentum with no qualification . The substitution
allowe d him to emphasize that it was not Privateigentum in the sense known
today , but neither was it communal pro perty anymore . The following p as­
sage fro m Engels illustrates this p oint :

But to who m did this new wealth belong? Originally to the gens, with­
out a doubt. Private property in herds must have already started at an
early perio d , however . . . . What is certain is that we must not think of
hi m as a property o wner in the modern sense of the wor d . And it is
also certain that at the threshold of authentic history we already find
the herds every where separately o wned (Sondereigentum) by heads of
families, as are the artistic products of barbarism--metal implements,
luxury articles an d, finally , the human cattle -the slaves ( O F , p . 48 ;
MEW, 2 1 , p. 5 8 ) .

For Marx the term Privateigentum seems to refer primarily t o property

as appropriated in the city-states of Rome and Greece , under feudalism,
an d under capitalism. This can be said despite the fact that Marx , in the
German Ideology, says t hat "real private pro perty began with the ancients ,
as with modern nations, with movable property " (CW , 5 , p . 8 9 ; MEW, 3 ,
p . 6 1 ) . On the contrary , his emphasis o n real private property can be seen
as a conscious distinction from the way he co mmonly uses the term "p rivate
pro perty ," namely , to designate the ownership of the means of production ,
be it in t he form of feu dal landholdings or machinery under capital . Thus,
in the Manuscripts, Marx maintains that feudal property in lan d was the
beginning of the domination of private property and that it was the root
of private property (MEW, E B l .T . , pp. 5 0 5 -5 0 6 ) . In the Ma nuscripts he
also states that
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT AUST SOCIETIES 83

only at the culmination of the development of private property does

this, its secret , appear again , namely , that on the one hand it is the
pro duct of alienated labour, and that on the other it is the means
by which labour alienates itself, the realisatio n of this alienatio n
(CW, 3 , p . 2 8 0 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p . 5 2 0) .

As a result of the p rivate o wnership of the means of production , it is pos­

sible to coerce others into giving up their product of work , or a portion
of it, in return for a wage . This, in turn , perpetuates the abili ty of some
to compel others to sell their labor. The o wners of the means of produc­
tion are able to maintain their property and accumulate mo re only if
surplus labor can be extracte d fro m others , whose existence depends
on earning a wage .
The term "private property " is also used in Marx 's Theories of Surplus­
Value in such a way as to designate clearly the private ownership of the
means of productio n .

The original unity between t h e worker a n d t h e con ditions of produc­

tion (abstracting from slavery , where the labourer himself belongs to
the objective conditions of production) has two main forms : the
Asiatic communal system ( pri mitive communism) and a small-scale
agriculture base d o n the family (and linked with do mestic industry)
in one form or another. Both are embryonic forms and both are
e qually unfitte d to develop labour as so cial labour and the p roductive
po wer of social labour. Hence the ne cessity for the separation , for
the rupture , for the antithesis of labour and property (by which
pro perty in the conditions of production is to be understood) . The
most extre me form of this ru pture , and the one in wh ich the pro­
ductive forces of social labour are also most po werfully developed,
is capital . The original unity can be re -established only on the material
foundation which capital creates and by means of the revolution s
which, in the process of this creation , the working class and th e whole
society undergo (TS , 3, pp. 422-4 2 3 ; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , pp. 4 1 4-4 1 5 ) .

And i n Capital, Marx mentions that the "legal vie w o f free p rivate owner­
ship of land, arises in the ancient worl d only with the dissolution of the
organic order of society , an d in the modern world only with the develop­
ment o f capitalistic pro ductio n " (C 3 , p. 6 1 6 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 6 2 9 ) .
84 ESTRANGEMENT

In summary , Marx reserved the term "private property " to designate

private o wnership of the mean s of production , and he use d o th er terms
to design ate the privately accu mulated produ cts which were not means
of pro duction . Thus, the personal and unequ al accumulation of herds and
other objects which undermined t he communism of the gen s cannot be
considere d to be means of productio n . Accordingly , he used the term
" personal property" rather than "private pro perty . " Unfortu nately ,
Marx 's death prevented him fro m showing how unequally accumulate d
personal property led to the ownership of the means of p ro duction (private
property) . Hence, Engels' work on the origin of the family an d private
property assumes an important place in the interpretation of Marx's
thought.

NOTES

1. Similarly, Marx writes about the Russian community that owned large
parts of land in common and combined work in agriculture with handicraft .
Those communities were not engaged in commo dity production an d adjusted
their craft activities to the agricultural seasonal production schedule. Craftman­
ship complemente d agricultural production (MEW, 24 , p p . 2 4 3 -2 44) . Thus the
Russian community , too, was quite resistant to being torn apart by commerce .
·
In this context Marx says that
The obstacles presented by the internal solidi ty and organisation o f pre­
capitalistic, national modes of production to the corrosive influence of
commerce are strikingly illustrated in the intercourse of the English with
I ndia an d China. The broad basis of the mode of production here is formed
by the unity of small-scale agriculture and home in du stry , to wh ich in India
we should add the form of village communities built upon the common owner­
ship of land, which i dentically, was the original form in China as well. I n I ndia
the English lost no time in exercising their direct political and eco nomic power,
as rulers and landlords, to disru pt these small economic communities. English
commerce exerte d a revolutionary influence on these commun ities and tore
them apart only in so far as the low prices of its goods served to destroy the
spinning and weaving industries, which were an ancient integrating el ement
of this unity of in dustrial and agricultural produ ctio n. And even so this work
of dissolution proceeds very gradually . And still more slowly in China, where
it is not reinforced by direct political power. The substantial economy and
saving in time afforde d by the association of agriculture with manufacture
put up a stu bborn resistance to the products of the big industries, whose
prices incl u de the faux frais of the circulation process which pervades them .
Unl ike the English, Russian commerce, on the other hand, leaves the economic
groundwork of Asiatic pro du ction untouched (C 3 , pp. 3 3 3-3 34; MEW, 2 5 , p. 3 46.
See also C l , p. 3 3 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 3 7 2 ) .
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPIT ALIST SOCIETIES 85

2. It would, of cou rse , be incorrect to assume that the increase in personal

pro perty e merged from one day to the next. Marx notes that "the objects of
ownership increase , of course, in every 'successive ethnical period' . . . . The
gro wth of property is thus closely connected with the increase of inventions
and disco veries, and the improvements of social institutions which mark the
several ethnical perio ds of human progress' ' (EN, p. 1 2 7 ; transl ation mine where
necessary) . Nevertheless, a significant unequal accumulation of perso nal property
occurre d primarily at the stage of "barbarism ," to use Morgan 's terminology, which
was ado pte d by Marx an d Engels. Concerning the decay of the Greek gens , Engels
shows how changes in inheritance patterns led to unequ al accumulation on the p art
of in dividuals. The fact that specific individuals of a household rather than the com­
munity of gentiles inherite d the possessions of individuals after the death of in­
divi duals (see EN, p . 1 2 8) was crucial for the future of communism b ased on gens.
Engels writes:

Thus in the Greek constitution of the heroic age we see the old ge ntile order
as still a living force . But we also see the beginnings of its disintegration :
father-right, with transmission of the property t o the chil dre n , b y which ac­
cumulation of wealth within the family was favored and t he family itself be­
came a power as against the gens; reaction of the inequality of wealth o n the
constitution by the formation of the first ru diments of hereditary nobility
and monarchy ; slavery, at first only of prisoners of war , but already p reparing
the way for the enslavement of fellow-members of the tribe and even of the
gens; the old wars be tween tribe and tribe already degenerating into systematic
pillage by land and sea for the acqu isition of cattle , slaves an d tre asure, and be­
coming a regular source of wealth ; in short, riches praised an d respected as
the highest good and the old gentile order misused to justify the violent seizure
of riches ( O F, pp. 96-9 7 ; MEW, 2 1 , p. 1 0 5) .

Similarly, Engels comments at the end of his chapter on the I roquois:

[ T ) he power of this primitive community had to be broken, and i t was broken.

But it was broken by influences which from the very start ap pear as a degrada­
tion , a fall from the simple moral greatness of the old gentile society . The
lowest interests-base greed, brutal ap petites, sordid avarice, selfish robbery
o f the common wealth -inaugurate the new, civilised, class society . It is by
the vilest means, theft, violence , frau d, treason -that the old classless gentile
society is undermined and overthrown ( O F , p. 88; MEW, 2 1 , p . 9 7 ) .

Krader suggests that "in Marx's conception the office o f the chief had been op­
pose d to t he collectivity within it not only in the period of the dissolution of the
gens an d tribe , but before, since , contrary to Morgan, the chief was elected only
in theory " (EN, pp. 3 7 , 42). Krader cites Marx 's excerpts on Maine as evidence:

[ T i o Maine, . . . the q uite natural function of the chief of the gens, furthermore
of tribe, natural j ust because he is their chief (and theoretically always "elected") ,
86 ESTRANGEMENT

appears as "artificial " and "mere administrative authority , " whereby , from
the archaic point of view , it is exactly the arbitrariness of the mo dern pater
familias, as the private family, which is "artificial " (EN, p. 3 0 9 ; translation
mine where necessary).

Marx 's remark "theoretically always 'elected' " does not warrant the conclusion
that the chief was "elected o nly (my emphasis) in theory " and that Marx perceived
the office of the chief to be in opposition to the collectivity . To be certain about
this, one wou l d need additional information , but su ch evi dence was not found in
Engels or Marx , nor does Krader cite additional evidence. Moreover, in the quoted
excerpt on Maine, Marx does n.ot seem to directly evaluate whether the office of
the chief was in opposition to the collectivity. He merely states that theoretically
the chief was al ways elected. However, he indirectly evaluates the extent to which
the chief's position was not arbitrary when he asserts that the positio n of the modern
paterfamilias was artificial . Marx seems to make the point , against Ma ine , that,
since the chief is in theory always elected, his position , contrary to that of the
paterfamilias, was not arbitrary an d artificial . I f anything can be con clude d , it
would be the opposite of what Krader conclu ded, namely , that the office of the
chief was not necessarily in opposition to the collectivity .
Krader may also put a somewhat misplaced emphasis on Marx 's thinking on
right an d obligation :

Hegel had conceive d the political relation as the balance of right and obliga­
tion ; in this matter, Marx had followed him . . . . In the community the balance
of right an d obligation is a traditional development, whereas in the polity
the balance must be redeveloped by appeal to force , to reason , to sentiment
on disposition , and the l ike ; in the latter case the balance becomes artificial ,
as a device of civilization ( EN, p . 67) .

However, Engels writes that for the community , that is, the gentile communistic
organization before it reached the threshol d of civilizatio n , the distin ction between
rights and duties cannot be made .

This simple organization suffices completely for the social con ditions out of
which it sprang. It is nothing more than the grouping natural to those condi­
tions, and it is capable of settling all conflicts that can arise within a society
so organized. War settles external confl icts; it may end with the annihilation

of the tribe , but never with its subjugation . It is the greatness, but also the
limitatio n , of the gentile constitution that it has no place for ruler an d ruled .
Within t h e tribe there i s a s y e t no difference between rights a n d du ties; the
question whether participation in public affairs, in blood revenge or atone­
ment, is a right or a duty , does not exist for the Indian ; it would seem to him
just as absurd as the question whether it was a right or a duty to sleep , eat ,
o r hunt ( O F, p . 1 44; MEW, 2 1 , p p . 1 3 2-1 3 3 ) .
 THE CONDITION OF MAN IN PRECAPITALIST SOCIETIES 87

The question , then , is not one of a balance of right and obligation as Krader, without
citing Marx , suggests. Rather, it is one of the existence or nonexistence of the no­
tions of right an d obligation . If, in the absence of other evidence, we can take
Engels' view as a proper reflection of what Marx th inks on this top i c , it must be
conclude d that Marx di d not think of life in the gentile communistic organization
as one in which rights and obligations are balance d, be it through traditional de­
velo pment or not. One woul d have to perceive of life in such a society as subject
to no other means of social control than public opinio n , and also outside the realm
of any definition of what is right and what is obligation . Hence , the question of
balance between right and obligation woul d not even enter into the p icture . It is
Engels' vie w that public opinion was the only means of coercion . For him , "the
gentile organization had grown out of a society which knew no internal con tra­
dictions, and it was only adapted to such a society. It possessed no means of
coercion except public opinion " (OF, p. 1 5 4; MEW, 2 1 , p. 1 64) .
6
THE DIVISION OF LABOR
AND I TS CENTRALITY FOR MARX'S
THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT

According to Marx , the division of l abor under the communism of primitive

society was base d on age , sex , and physical stre ngth (MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 7 2 ) .
This division was , therefore , not yet a true division of labor. " Division of
labour only beco mes truly such from the moment when a division of
material an d mental labour appears" (CW, 5 , pp. 44-4 5 ; M E W , 3 , p. 3 1 ) .
At t his point , ho wever, private pro perty has also arisen . " Division o f labour
an d private pro perty are , after all , identical expressions: in the one the
same thing is affirmed with referen ce to activity as is affirmed in the other
with reference to the product of th e activity " ( CW , 5, p . 46 ; M EW, 3 ,
p . 3 2).
Marx's treatment of t h e emergence of t h e division o f labor is similar
to that of the e mergence of private pro perty . Although there was personal
pro perty at earlier stages of development , it was not private property as
Marx ten ds to use the term ; and although there had been a division of
labor, it became truly one only with the e mergence of private property ­
with the e mergence of a division between mental and material labor. I n
Cap ital, Marx also postulates that true division of labor goes beyond a
physiologically based one and is acco mpanied by e xchange . It is based
on exchange and o n the trend that products have beco me commodities
90 ESTRANGEMENT

(MEW, 2 3 , pp. 3 7 2-3 7 3 ) . Thus private property , commo dity exchange ,

an d a society-wi de division of labor that is not based on physiology oc­
cur simultaneously , at least for analytical purposes, in the Ethnological
No tebooks; however Marx very well realizes that there may be some
"grey areas . "
The division of l abor occurs o n two different levels: on t h e level o f
a society a s a whole , an d on the level of a firm , for example, among in­
dividual workers. I n precapitalist society , the division of labo r on the
level of the whole society e merge d fro m the "material conditions of
pro duction" and was legally formalized much later. Marx believes that
this was the case under patriarchal regi mes as well as under the feu dal
and caste syste ms. Un der these forms of social organizatio n , the division
of labor of the whole society was based on distinct rules of authority ,
while in capitalist society there is no such distin ct rule (MEW , 4 , p . 1 5 1 ) :
" [ M ] o dern society knows n o other rule, n o other authority for th e dis­
tribution of labor than free co mpe tition " (MEW, 4, p . 1 5 1 ; translation
mine) . 1 Marx postulates that since, on the level of society , the only o ther
authori ty that determines the division of labor is free competition , the
mo re the division of labor is determined by the entre p reneur 's authority
on the level of the firm. As long as the societal division of labor was based
on legally fo rmalize d rules , the division of labor in the various production
sho ps was little developed (MEW, 4 , p. 1 5 1 ) . The following rule can be
establishe d :

The less the division o f labor within a society i s determined b y an

authority , the more is the division of labor developed within a work­
sho p and the more it is subject to the authority of a single individual .
Accordingly, with respect to the division of labor, the authority in
the worksho p and the one in the society are in an inverse relationship
to each other (MEW, 4 , p . 1 5 1 ; translation mine ? see also MEW, 2 3 ,
p . 3 7 8 and C l , p . 3 3 7 where Marx reiterates this idea) .

At this point Marx compares the division of labor under capitalist and
precapitalist societies.

If, in a so ciety with capitalist pro duction , anarchy in the so cial division
of labour and despotism in that of the wo rkshop are mutual conditions
the one of the other, we fin d , on the contrary, in those earlier forms of
THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 91

society in which the separation of trades has been spontaneously de­

veloped, then crystallized, an d finally made permanen t by law, on the
one han d , a specimen of the organisation of the labour of so ciety , in
accordance with an approve d an d authoritative plan , and on the other,
the entire exclusion of division of labour in the worksho p , or at all
events a mere dwarflike or sporadic and acci dental development of
the same (C l , p. 3 3 7 ; M EW, 2 3 , p p . 3 7 7-3 78) .

The division of labor on the shop level is enhanced by the fact that the
workers in a particular workshop become more numerous (MEW, 4 , p. 1 5 2 ) ,
an d b y the increased concentration of the means of production a n d the
introduction of machinery that ten ded to accompany this concentration
(MEW, 4, p . 1 5 3 ; see also MEW, E B l .T . , p. 4 7 3 ) . Marx suggests that , on
the whole , machinery in crease d the division of labor in society , simplified
work in the sho p , con centrated capital , and fractionalized man (CW , 6 ,
p . 1 8 8 ; MEW, 4, p . 1 5 5 ) . Since t h e division of labor increase s with the
concentration of the tools of pro duction , he pro poses that e ach sign ificant
invention in mechanical technique results in an increase d division of labor.
In itself, this division calls for new mechanical inventions (M EW, 4 , p. 1 54),
pro ducing a trend toward ever simpler, unskilled labor (MEW, 1 3 , p. 1 8 ) .
Although the worker a s a worker loses i n general productive ability because
his level of skill fa lls , the productive p o we r of capital i n c reases. "The divi­
sion of labour develops the so cial pro ductive power of so cial labour, but
at the expense of the general pro ductive ability of the worker " (TS 2 , p. 2 3 4 ;
MEW, 2 6 . 2 , p . 2 3 2 ) . In this respect, Marx follows Adam S m ith who held
that "the farmer practices a trade requiring more intelligence than the manu­
facturing worker , who is subject to the division of labour" (TS 2 , p. 2 3 4 ) .
The increase d social pro ductive power-brought about b y a n increase in
the division of labor-however, "confronts the worker . . . as an increased
productive power, not of his labour, but of capital, the force th at dominates
his labour" (TS 2 , p . 2 3 4) .
The capitalist mo de of pro duction is not the only case in which an in­
crease in the division of labor can be said to have consequences that are
beyond the control of individuals and that can affect their lives in ways
not necessarily expecte d originally . An economy with trade relations exceed­
ing those of a barter economy , but not re aching the magn itude of capital-
ist exchange relations, may be taken as an example .
92 ESTRANGEMENT

[ T ] hc circulati o n of co mm odities differs from the direct exchange of

pro ducts (barter) , not only in form, but in substance . . . B 's com­
mo dity re places that of A, but A an d B do not mutually exchange
those co mmodities. It may , of course , happen that A and B make
simultaneous purchases, the one fro m the other; but such exceptional
transactions are by n o means t he necessary result of the general
conditions of the circulation of commodities . We see here , on the one
hand, how the exchange of commo dities breaks through all local and
personal bounds inseparable from direct barter, and develops the
circulation of the products of social labour; and on the other h an d ,
now it develo ps a whole network of so cial relations spontaneous in
their growth and entirely beyond the control of the actors (C l ,
pp. 1 1 3- 1 1 4 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 1 2 6 ; see also MEW , 2 3 , p . 1 2 1 ) .

Although t he barter-ty pe of exchange differs i n form an d substance from

an econo my involving a currency , still Marx believes that an established
barter economy tends to enhance commo dity production . The enhan ce ment
of co mmo dity pro duction , however, is likely to lead to forms of exchange
involving a curre n cy an d enhancing the fu rther division of labor on the basis
that a greater number of transactions can take place in or between given
societies. Therefore ,

circulation bursts through all restrictions as to time , place , and individuals ,

i m pose d by direct barter, and this it effe cts by splitting u p , into the anti­
thesis of a sale and a purchase , the direct i dentity that in barter does
exist bet ween the alienation of one 's o wn and the acquisition of some
other man 's pro duct ( C l , p. 1 1 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 1 2 7 ) .

Since circulation bursts through all restrictions a s t o time , place , and indi­
viduals, Marx concludes that the division of labor in manufacture , for
exa mple , excluding modern in dustry base d on machinery ,

acquires the best adapte d form at first by experience , as it were behind

the backs of the actors , and then , like the gu ild handicrafts, strives to
hol d fast that form when once foun d , and here and there succeeds in
kee ping it fo r centuries. Any alteration in this form , except in trivial
matters , is solely o wing to a revolution in the in struments of labour
(C l , p. 3 4 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 8 5 ) .
THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 93

Under capital , the division of labor is determine d by free competi tion , which
itself is the result of a further increase in the number of exch ange relation­
shi ps. With free co mpetition as the sole "authority . . . determining the
division o f labor"-and thus replacing any former authority determining
the division of labor-it becomes easy to see why Marx names this state of
affairs "anarchy in the social division of labo r . "
Marx describes how t h e development of commodity production proceeds
until it beco mes the general form of production :

[ T ] he same conditions which give rise t o the basic condition o f capitalist

pro ducti o n , the existence of a class of wage-workers , facilitate the
transition of all co mmo dity production to capitalist commodity p ro ­
duction. As cap italist production develops, it has a disintegrating, resol­
vent effect on all older forms of pro duction, which, designed m ostly
to meet the direct needs of the producer, transform only the e xcess
pro du ced into co mmo dities. Captailist pro duction make s the sale of
pro du cts the main interest , at first ap parently withou t affecting the
mode o f pro duction itself. Such was for instance the first effec t of
capitalist wo rl d commerce on such nations as the Chinese , I ndians,
Arabs, etc. But, secondl y , wherever it takes root capitalist production
destroys all forms of commo dity production which are based either on
the self-e mploy ment of the pro ducers, or merely on the sale of the
excess product as commo dities. Capitalist production first makes the
pro ductio n of commo dities general and then , by degrees, transforms
all commo dity _pro duction into capitalist commodity pro duction
(CZ, p . 3 6 ; M EW, Z4, pp. 4 1 -4Z ) .

Once commodity production becomes capitalist commodity p roductio n ,

the division of labor i s totally uproote d from the traditionally set pat­
terns and develo ps in a thoroughly unchecked manner:

When pro du ction by means of wage-labour becomes universal , com­

mo dity pro ductio n is bound to be the general fo rm of pro ductio n .
This mo de of pro duction , once i t i s assu med to b e general, carries i n
its wake an ever increasing division o f social labour, that i s t o say an
ever growing differentiation of the articles which are produced in the
form of commo dities by a definite capitalist , ever greate r division of
co mple mentary process of production into independent p ro cesses
( C Z , p p . 3 5 - 3 6 ; MEW, Z4, p. 4 1 ) .
94 ESTRANGEMENT

I N V OLUNTARY DIVISION OF LABOR

Although the division of labor in precapitalist so cieties that exch anged

commo dities reste d upon a formal authority , and was the refore not subject
to the anarchic con ditions created by free competitio n , it cannot be said
that it was not based on coercion . This division of labor as well as that
under capital is an involuntary division .
The division o f labor and private property are two sides of the same
coin for Marx . One does not exist without the other. The division of
labor between the city and the countryside , for example , can rest only on
private pro perty .

[ T ] h e co ntradictio n between town and coun try can only exist within
the frame work of private property . I t is the most crass expression of
the subjection of the individual under the division of labo ur, under a
definite activity forced upon him-a subjugation which makes one
man into a restricted town-animal , another into a restricted country ­
animal , an d daily creates anew the conflict between their interests .
Labour is here again the chief thing, power o ver individuals, and as
long as this power exists, private property must exist (CW , 5 , p . 6 4 ;
M E W , 3 , p. 5 0) . 3

Clearly, private pro perty is acco mpanied by an involuntary division of

labor which, along with private property , is to be abolished . M arx main­
tains that the involuntary division of labor created the possibility of
contradictions within a society

because the divisio n of labour implies the possibility , nay the fact, th at
intellectual and material activity , that enj oyment and lab our, produc­
tion an d consumption , devolve on different individuals, and that the
only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in negat­
ing in its turn the division of labour (CW, 5 , p. 45 ; MEW, 3 , p. 3 2 ) .

Man i s su bsu me d n o t only under a division o f labor which is imposed

on him, but also under a class. Being subsumed predestines his life-con­
dition . These two conditions can be eliminated only by the abolition of
private pro perty and the involuntary division of labor (MEW , 3 , p . 5 4) .
Marx argues that the co mmunist revolution will differ from previous
 THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 95

revolutions insofar as it will not merely create a new distribution of

labor leaving the kind of activity untouched . I nstead, it will be directed
against the hitherto existing kind of productive activity and the involun­
tary division of labor 4 (MEW, 3, pp. 6 9-7 0) .
I t would see m that individuals under capital are freer than they were
e arlier because their l ife circumstances are more subject to chance . Exactly
the o p posite is the case , however, since they are more subject to impersonal
forces (MEW, 3 , p . 7 6) . This point of view is in agreement with the pos­
tulate that, un der capital , the division of labor is based only on the authority
of free competition and not, as earlier, on a formal-legal authority . Accord­
ingly , labor, too , compe tes under capital and is considered to be free. The
indivi dual is nevertheless subsumed under the division of labor and is
coerce d by the authority of free competition which also determines the
divisio n of labor. For the individual this division is involuntary .

[ T ]he a prio ri system on which the division of labour, within the work­
sho p, is regularly carried out, becomes in the division of l abour within
the society , an a posterio ri, nature-imposed necessity , con trolling the
lawless caprice of the producers , and perceptible in the barometrical
fluctuations of the market-prices . Division of labour within the wo rk­
sho p i mplies the undisputed authority o f the capitalist over men , that
are but parts of a mechanism that belongs to him. The division of
labour within the society brings into contact in dependent commodity­
pro ducers, who acknowledge no other authority but that of competi­
tion , of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their mutual interests
(C l , p. 3 3 6 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 7 7 ; see also MEW, G, p. 484) .

A logical conse quence of this is that " Labour is free in all civilised countries;
it is not a matter of freeing labour but of abolishing it " (CW , S , p . 2 0 5 ;
MEW, 3 , p . 1 8 6) .

In the origin of private pro perty and commo dity exchange , Marx also
saw the origin of an involuntary division of labor. The involuntary division
of labor spans all human history past the point at which the division of
labor was base d merely on sex , age , and physical strength. His writings in
the Grun drisse (MEW, G, pp. 3 69-3 74, 484) , as elsewhere (for example ,
MEW, 2 3 , pp. 9 3-94) , illustrate this with regard to pre capitalist societies.
This emphasis on the involuntary nature of the division of labor is
directly j uxta pose d to the need to have a voluntary division of labor.
96 ESTRANGEMENT

An d finally , the division of labour offers us the first example of the

fact that , as long as man re mains in naturally evolved society , that is,
as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and th e common
interest , as long, therefore as activity is not voluntarily , but naturally ,
divi de d, man 's o wn deed becomes an alien power opposed to him,
which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon
as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular ,
exclusive sphere of activity , which is forced upon him and from which
he cannot escape ( CW, 5 , p. 47 ; MEW, 3 , p. 3 3 ) . 5

This emphasis on the involuntary nature of the division of labor is one

of our main criteria for interpreting Marx 's theory of estrange ment. The
next section shows the absolute centrality of Marx 's emphasis on the in­
voluntary nature of the division of labor in his theory of estrangement.

INVOL UNTA RY DIVISION O F L A B O R AND

ITS CENTRALITY TO THE T H E O RY OF ESTRANGEMENT

As discusse d in Chapter 2, Marx has two conceptions of hu man

nature . First , those characteristics that distingu ish man fro m animals
biologically can be said to constitute the unchanging aspects of hu man
nature . Man is a conscious being and can relate to others in ways that
ani mals cannot. Second , there is for Marx that type of human nature that
is historically conditioned. Although man has always been distinct from
the ani mals on immutable biological grounds, his specific hu man nature ,
as contrasted with his general human nature , has undergone changes in
history . Marx's theory of estrange ment derives only fro m his biologi cal
definition of hu man n ature , however. Man , according to Marx , is estranged
because he is prevented from living according to his nature . Specifically ,
the worker is estrange d from the product of his labor and the act of pro­
duction because he is prevented from subj e cting either of the two to his
will ; nonetheless, he does have a natural ability to do so ; this ability
distinguishes him biologically fro m animals and makes him specifically
hu man . Being prevented fro m subjecting both the product of o ne 's labor
and the act o f pro duction to one's own will results directly in man 's
estrangement from himself, fro m nature , fro m his species-be ing , and fro m
other men .
The worker's inability to subject both the act of production an d the
pro duct of his labor to his o wn will indicates the presence of a coercive
 THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 97

con dition . I n deed, capital controls labor , and the worker is forced to sell
his labor po wer if he wants to maintain his physical existence. Under
capital , "labour is therefore not voluntary , but coerce d ; it is forced
labour" (CW, 3, p. 2 7 4 ) . The coercion is not simply a matter of one
in dividual coercing another. The capitalist is only the perso nal agent of
capital and is himself constrained by factors that lie outside his influence .
Co mpetition is one case in point . That work is coerced and not voluntary
de pen ds on factors that are beyond the control of any particular in­
dividual ; these factors have become in depen dent, alien forces . Work is
coerce d because the societal division of labor as such is involuntary .
I n the previous sections, we have shown that Marx believes that the
division of labor in society has been involuntary ever since the destruc­
tion of primitive communism. Under capital , competition became the
regulator, but the involuntary nature of the division of labor was not
abolished. Competition in the marketplace determines the n ature of
the divisio n of labor in a society or among n ations as well as in a p ar­
ticular in dustry . Although the capitalist determines what to produce
and subjects the labor power and the product of labor to his will , he
does so for reasons outside his control . Nevertheless , it is an alien will
to which the worker is subjected and to which he must , con trary to his
natural ability , subject his labor power. As a result, he, in agreement with
others, cannot determine what is to be produce d , how products are to
be pro duced, an d for what purposes. Man , unlike the animals , is by
nature capable of doing so . Therefore , production un der cap ital can
exist only at the expense of the workers' estrangement. 6
The involuntary n ature of the division of l abor is central to Marx 's
theory of estrange ment. The common denominator of all forms of
estrange ment can be found in the involuntary nature of the d ivisio n of
labor. Because of it the worker is coerced into subjecting his labor
power to an alien will. The capitalist himself must be viewe d as merely
an agent of capital , an actor who , although enj oying his social position ,
is himself constrained by the laws of the market. The divisio n of labor ,
however, although t h e result of the actions of in dividuals (e xchange) is
generated involuntarily , thus leading to the subj ection of man to an
alien will.

NOTES

1. Kennt is transl a ted h e re as " knows" rather t h a n as " h as . " ( See CW , 6 , p . 1 84.)
2 . For the translation given in the Collected Works , see CW, 6 , p . 1 8 5 .
98 ESTRANGEMENT

3. See also MEW, 3, p. 3 2 for a similar statement, namely , that the division of
l abor is involuntary . In addition, see M EW, 3, p. 6 6 .
4. Here Marx, as in M EW, 3 , p p . 54, 77, mentions that Arbeit (l abor) must be
abolished. This does not mean that Marx envisions a leisure society without labor.
On close inspection , it becomes evident that the word Arbeit can be substituted
by "involuntary division of labor" or "involu ntary l abor. " If man is su bsumed under
a division of labor, it c a n n o t b e said that h is p ro du ctive activity is volun tary, t h at
is, that his labor is voluntary .
5. I n the Manuscripts, M arx says t h a t if man relates to h i s " o w n act i v i t y as
an unfree activity , then he relates to it as an activity performed in the servi ce, under
the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man " (CW, 3, p p . 2 7 8-2 7 9 ;
MEW, E B 1 .T., p. 5 1 9 ; translation mine ; [ the German verbalten i s n o t optimally
transl ate d by "to treat," since "to treat" refers to the subject's perce ption , while
"to relate" does not ex clusively so . ]
6 . T h e question a s t o whether Marx's theory of estrangement i s also applicable
to pre capitalist societies, in which the division of labor was also involuntary , is
discussed in Chapter 8.
7
TRUE COMMUNISM AND I TS
BASIS ON A VoLUNTARY
DIVISION OF LABOR

Thus far, it has been argued that Marx's theory of estrangement rests
on his observation that productive activity is based on an involuntary
division of labor. This emp hasis is examined further on the basis o f
Marx 's vie ws on communism , since h e suggested that communism was
a desirable goal , through which man would be free from estrangement
(MEW, E . 1 .T . , pp. 5 3 6- 5 3 7 ) . However, if communism is the desired
form of social organization in which man is not estranged , we would
expect-if our emphasis on the centrality of the involuntary division
of labor to Marx's theory of estrangement is corre ct-that M arx views
communism as a form of social organization based on a voluntary division
o f labor. When discussing the ways in which Marx envisioned communism,
we will consider only those writings that . deal directly with the division
of labor under communism, and that might imply a form of social or­
ganization base d on an involuntary division of labor. If Marx 's writings
reveal substantial evidence that he envisioned communism as a form of
social organization base d on a voluntary division of labor, our emphasis
on the centrality of the involuntary division of labor to Marx 's theory
of estrange ment will be consi derably strengthened .
Whenever we refer to communism here , we do not mean that transi­
tional form of society which Marx in his Man uscripts called " crude com-
1 00 ESTRANGEMENT

munism. " Rather, we mean "true communism , " or that form of social
organization which Marx perceive d to be the most ideal . At this point,
it is immaterial whether Marx 's communism is realizable or whether it
re mains a utopia. This is a totally different question . Marx 's vision
of co mmunism is of i mportance here because it helps isolate the basis
and properties of his theory of estrangement . The reader is therefore
advised to suspend his questions con cerning the realizability of Marx 's
vision of co mmunism and to take what Marx has to say on the subj e ct
of co mmunism as an aid in deciphering Marx 's thought in general and his
theory of estrangement in particular.

TRUE COMMUNISM

In the German Ideology, Marx proclaims that the communist revolu­

tion "re moves the division of labor" (CW, 5 , p. 3 80 ; MEW, 3 , p. 3 64) .
What he means, of course , is that the involuntary division of labor, and
not the division of labor as such, will be abolished. Ne ither does Marx
envision co mmunism as a society of isolated in dividual producers who
are not subject to the coercion of the division of labor. Rather, his
vision is of man coo perating freely , and voluntarily .

Let us now picture to ourselves, by way of change , a community of

free in dividuals, carrying on their work with the means of production
in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals
is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community .
All the characteristics of Robinson's labour are here repeated , but with
this difference , that they are social , instead of individual (C l , p p . 8 2 -
8 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 92).

This theme is reiterated in t h e Critique of t h e Go tha Program me in which

Marx again focuses n ot on the division of labor as such , but on that divi­
sion of labor which subj ugates man .

[ I ] n a higher phase of communist society , after the enslaving subordina­

tion of in dividuals under the division of labour, and therewith also
the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished ;
after labour, fro m a mere means of life , has itself become the prime
necessity of life ; after the productive forces have also increased with
 TRUE COMMUNISM 101

t h e all-round development of t h e individual , a n d all t h e sp rings of co­

o perative wealth flow more abun dantly-only then can the narrow
horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe
on its banners : fro m each according to his ability , to each according
to his needs ! (CGP, p. 1 0 ; MEW, 1 9 , p. 2 1 ) .

Marx does not always make an explicit connection to communism when

mentioning the voluntary division of labor and juxtaposing, as well as
preferring, it to the i nvoluntary one . Nevertheless , the message seems to
be the same , namely , that the ideal condition is one in which the d ivision
of labor is based on voluntary cooperation rather than a forced one (see
also MEW, 3, p. 7 2 ) . For example , in the German Ideo logy (MEW, 3 , p. 74)
Marx mentions that the alien forces under which the individual is sub­
su me d can be abolished only if indivi duals directly subsume the division
of l abor. He adds that this can be done only through the colle ctivity , wh ich
will in turn allow the develo pment of one's talents. Only through the col­
lectivity or community of individuals can personal liberty be gained .
In the German Ideology, we encounter the famous passage on the society
with an involuntary division of labor in which man is

a hunter, a fisherman , a shepherd , or a critical critic , and must remain

so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood ; whereas in com­
munist society , where nobody has one exclusive sphere o f activity but
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regu lates
the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one
thing to day and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in
the afternoon , rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, j ust as
I have in min d , without ever beco ming hunter, fisherman , shepherd
or critic (MEW, 3, p. 3 3 ; translation mine .) 1

Marx 's point of vie w is even carried over and applied to the arts . Here , too ,
Marx criticizes the coercive nature of the involuntary division of labor and
its un desirable conse quences, consequences that do not arise if the division
of labor is voluntary .

[ T]he exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals,

and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this , is
a consequence of division of labour . . . . In any case , with a communist
1 02 ESTRANGEMENT

organisation of society , there disappears the subordination of the artist

to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely fro m the division
of labour, and also the subordination of the individual to some definite
art , making him exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc . ; the very name amply
expresses the narrowness of his professional development an d his depen­
dence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters
but only people who engage in painting among other activities" (CW, 5 ,
p. 3 94 ; MEW, 3 , p p . 3 78-3 7 9) .

It can be sai d, then , t hat Marx does no t only believe that under communism
the division of labor will be a voluntary one and that there will be a full and
free development of each individual (MEW, 2 3 , p. 6 1 8 ) . In a logically con­
sistent manner, he concludes that " [ c ] ommunism deprives no man of the
power to appro priate the pro ducts of society ; all that it does is to deprive
him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by mean s of such ap­
pro priation" (CW, 6 , p . 5 00 ; MEW, 4 , p. 4 77 ) . Hence , what distingu ishes
communism is "not the abolition of property generally , but the abolition
of bourgeois pro perty " (CW, 6, p . 498 ; MEW, 4, p. 47 5 ) . Agai n , Marx
obj ects not to the private appropriation of products but to that kind of
private appro priation of products which leads to the creation of an involun­
tary division of labor, that is , to the subjugation of the labor of others.
Later in his life , he took the same theoretical position when analyzing the
reasons why the co mmunism of early primitive societies bro ke down .
When the labor of others is no longer subj ugated , the exploitation of
man will also be terminated . The question that arises then is how pro­
duction will occur. I n The Po verty of Philosophy, Marx suggests that
pro duction will be organized on the basis of consensus, thus making
coercion su perfluous .

What is today the result of capital and the competition of workers

among themselves will be to morrow, if you sever the relation between
labour an d capital , an actual agreement based upon the relation be­
tween the su m of productive forces and the sum of existing needs"
(CW, 6 , p. 1 4 3 ; MEW, 4 , p . 1 04) .

Not only is such free coo peration based on consensus devoid of coercion ,
"the social relations of the individual producers , with regard both to the ir
labour an d to its products, are in this case perfectly simple an d intelligible ,
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 03

and that with regard not only to production but also to distribution "
( C l , p. 8 3 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 9 3 ) . This could not be sai d for the bourgeois
form of social organization which is based on an involuntary division of
labor. I n bourgeois so ciety , as in earlier epochs, the division of labor de­
velo pe d behind the back , as it were , of individuals , thus preventing the
social relations of the individual producers from becoming "perfectly
simple an d intelligible . "
The exchange of products a s i t occurred under capitalist a n d precapital­
ist social formations will also cease to exist un der communism :

Within t h e co-o perative society base d on common ownership of the

means of pro duction , the produ cers do not exchange their products;
just as little does the labour employed o n the products ap pear here
as the value of these products , as a material quality possessed by
the m , since now, in contrast to capitalist society , individual labour
no longer exists in an indirect fashion but dire ctly as a c omponent
part of the total labour " (CGP, p. 8; MEW, 1 9 , p. 1 9) .

Earlier, in The Po verty of Philo sophy, Marx made the same p o int when
referring to communism: " [ I ] n principle, there is no exch ange of prod­
ucts-but there is the exch ange of the labour which co-operates in pro­
duction" ( CW , 6, p. 1 4 3 ; MEW, 4, p. 1 04) . The emphasis is on coopera­
tion , and the fact that in dividuals are freely engage d in coo peration . In
contrast, under productio n based on an involuntary division of labor,
they are brought together by force. Again wit h co mmunism as a point
of reference , Marx states :

[ I ] f it is assu med that all members of society are imme diate workers,
the exchange of e qual quantities of hours of labour is possible only
on con clusion that the nu mber of hours to be spent on material pro­
duction is agreed on beforehan d . But such an agreement negates in­
dividual exchange (MEW, 4, p . 1 04) . 2

Under communism, then , individuals distribute their products but do

not exchange them. Distribution occurs on the basis of need , however .
According to Marx , under communism products do not beco me com­
mo dities through the act of exchange , nor is there any commodity pro ­
duction in the sense that products are specifically pro duced for exchange .
1 04 ESTRANGEMENT

Without commo dity production , the separation of a product 's use value
from its exchange value will also cease . And since exchange value-which
is determined by the relative amount of labor time embodied in a given
product-will be nonexistent as a category , p roduction decisions will no
longer be made on the basis of whether the relative amount of embodied
labor is low enough as to realize a su rplus value upon being exchange d .
The production of u s e values will no longer depend on a product's e x ­
change value since products will n o t be produced for exchange , b u t will
be produced directly fo r use instead. Marx makes this point in The Po verty
of Philosophy :

" [ I ] n a future society, in which class antagon ism will have ceased, in
which there will no longer be any classes , use will no longer be deter- ·
mined by the minimum time of production ; but the time of produc­
tion devoted to an article will be determined by the degree of its social
utility " (CW, 6 , p . 1 3 4 ; MEW, 4 , p. 9 3 ) .

An d i n the Grun drisse h e writes that

as soon as labour in the direct form has cease d to be the great well­
spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure ,
and hence exchange value [ must cease to be the measure ] of use value
. . . . With that , pro duction base d o n exchange value bre aks down
( G , p . 7 0 5 ; MEW, G, p . 5 9 3 ) .

Thus far, i t has been shown that , for Marx, communism i s a society
base d o n a voluntary division of labo r. This voluntary divisio n of labor
can be guarantee d o nly if p roperty that could be used to subjugate o thers
is held in common. In addition , the division of labor under communism
can be voluntary only if products are not exchanged, although distributed
differentially on the basis of need, and production is regulated on the basis
of consensus with everyone freely cooperating. Since Marx 's theory of
estrangement comes directly fro m h is observation that man under capital
is coerced into a life-situation in which he is prevented from living accord­
ing to his nature , it can be con cluded that communism eliminates estrange­
ment. Communism is the solu tio n to estrangement because it is based on a
voluntary division of labor an d thus lacks the coercion responsible for
man 's estrangement.
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 05

There is yet another way in which Marx considers the voluntary division
of labor to be crucial. I f throughout the history of so cial life under an in­
voluntary division of labor, man has been coerced in various way s , history ,
too , has not been made consciously. The conscious making of h istory is for
Marx a logical outcome of a society based on a voluntary division of
labor.

[ I ] n history up to the present, it is certainly likewise an empirical

fact that separate in dividuals have , with the broadening of their
activity into world-historical activity , become more and more en­
slaved under a power alien to them ( a pressure which they h ave con­
ceive d of as a dirty trick on the p art of the so-called world spirit,
etc . ) , a power which has be co me more and more enormous and ,
in the last instance, turns out to be the world market . . . . A ll­
ro und de pendence , this pri mary natural form of the wo rld-historical
co-o peratio n of in dividuals, will be transfo rmed by this communist
revolution into the control an d conscious mastery of these powers,
which, born of the action of men on one another , have till now over­
awed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them (CW, 5 ,
pp. 5 1 -5 2 ; MEW, 3 , p . 3 7 ) .

Similarly , Marx mentions that the communistic social organization

will end the subjection of production to the forces of supply and de­
man d, since man will directly control exchange and production (MEW,
3, p. 3 5 ) . "The reality which communism creates is precisely the true
basis for ren dering it i mpossible that anything should exist independently
of in dividuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the pre­
ceding intercourse of in dividuals" (CW , 5, p . 8 1 ; MEW, 3, p. 70) . Thus,
for Marx,

co mmunism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns

the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercou rse , an d
for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved p remises as
the creations of hitherto existing men , strips them of their natural
character and subjugates them to the power of the unite d in dividuals
( CW , 5 , p. 8 1 ; MEW, 3, p. 70) .

An d in the German Ideo logy he writes that

1 06 ESTRANGEMENT

with the community of revolutionary proletarians . . . who take their

con ditions of existence an d those of all members of society under
their control . . . it i s as individuals that the individuals p articipate
in it. For it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced
stage of mo dern productive forces, of course) which puts the condi­
tions of the free development and movement of individuals under
their control-conditions which were previously left to chan ce and
had acquire d an inde pendent existence over against the separate in­
divi duals pre cisely because of their separation as individuals and be­
cause their inevitable association , which determined the division of
labour, had, as a result of their separation, become for them an alien
bond ( CW, 5 , p . 8 0 ; MEW, 3 , p p . 74-7 5 ) .

We have been investigating the various ways i n which Marx views

so cial organization under communism. Not only has it become apparent
that Marx directly vie ws communism to be founded on a voluntary divi­
sion of labor, it is also the case that Marx 's overall vision of life under
communism does not contradict the thesis that , for Marx, the voluntary
division of labor is central when it comes to communism. Thus , Marx 's
vie ws of the distribution and ownership of products under communism,
as well as his theory of history , are directly derived from the postulate
that co mmunism is base d on a voluntary division of labor. What has
e merged is that as the involuntary division of labor is central to Marx's
theory of estrangement, the voluntary division of labor envisioned under
co mmunism is central to Marx's vision of a world without estrangement .
Therefore , we find that our emphasis on the centrality of the involuntary
division of labor to Marx 's theory of estrange ment is justifie d and th at
our argument is considerably strengthene d .

COMMUNISM AS T H E E LIMINATION O F THE CONFLICT

B ETWEEN THE I NDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP

Marx 's vision of the i deal life as one in which there is a voluntary
division of labor implies that individuals are coerced neither by other
individuals nor groups of individuals . This is not to say that in dividuals
will not have conflicts of interest under co mmunism . Marx e xplicitly
states that in dividuals will cooperate on the basis of consensu s ; pro­
duction and distribution will occur u pon agreemen t . What is p articular
to Marx 's vision of communism is the fact that , although differences
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 07

of interest may occur, they are overcome by consensus free o f coercion .

He argues against those who , following Max S timer, see social life in
general as a stru ggle between general and personal interests (CW, 5 , p. 245 ;
MEW, 3 , p. 2 2 8) . Marx says that "the communists by no means want , as
Saint Max believes, . . . to do away with the 'private individual ' for the
sake of the 'general ' , selfless man " (CW , 5 , p. 247 ; MEW, 3, p. 2 2 9 ) .

[ c ) ommunist theoreticians, the only communists who have time to

devote to the study of history , are distinguished precisely by the
fact that they alone have discovered that throughout history the
"general interest" is create d by individuals who are define d as
" private persons " . They know that this contradiction is only a
see ming one because one side of it, what is called the "ge neral
interest" , is constantly being produced by the other side , private
interest, an d in relation to the latter it is by no means an independent
force wit h an inde pendent history -so that this contradiction is in
practice constantly destroyed and re produce d . Hence it is not a
question of the Hegelian "negative unity " of two sides of a contra­
dictio n , but of the materially determined destruction of t he pre­
ceding materially determined mode of l ife of in dividuals , with the
disappearance of whi ch this contradiction together with its unity
also disappears (CW, 5 , p . 247 ; MEW, 3 , p . 229) . 3

Accordingly , those who view the subj e ct of private versus ge neral in­
terest as not deter mined by history have great difficulty in understan d­
ing the co mmunists.

{C]o mmunism is quite incomprehensible to our saint because the com­

munists do not o ppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to ego­
ism, nor do they express this contradiction the oretically e ither in
its sentimental or in its highflown ideologi cal form; they rather
demonstrate its material source , with which it disappears of itself
(CW, 5 , p. 247 ; MEW, 3 , p. 2 2 9 ) .

This material force consists o f t h e continuous development o f the

human forces of pro duction. This development of "the capacities of
the human s pecies takes place at the cost of the maj o rity of human in­
divi duals and even classes, in the end it breaks through this contradiction
and coincides with the development of the individual " (TS 2, p. 1 1 8 ;
1 08 ESTRANGEMENT

MEW, 26.2, p. 1 1 1 ) . 4 Hence , for Marx, co mmunism can be founded only

after productivity has reached a certain level. Productivity , defined as the
time needed to produce a given p ro duct, facilitates the creatio n of a society
in which individuals freely cooperate and in which there is no longer any
struggle between personal and general interests . Histori cally speaking, then,
Marx's vision of a society based on a voluntary division of labo r can be re­
alized only if the foundations for it have been laid in man's increased alterna·
tives through increase d produ ctivity . This increase in alternatives is for
Marx a necessary con dition for the existence of a society in which the
development of "the capacities of the hu man spe cies . . . coin cides with
the development of the individual . "
For Marx , another condition must b e present for the abolition o f the
conflict between personal and general interests . Marx sees communism
acco mpanied by a change in the consciousness of individuals . I n the
German Ideology, he writes that in co mmunism

we are . . . concerned with individuals at a defin ite historical stage

of development and by no means merely with in dividuals chosen
at ran do m , even disregarding the indispensable communist revolu ­
tio n , which itself is a general condition for their free development.
The individuals' consciousness of their mutual relations will , of
course , likewise be co mpletely change d , an d , therefore , will no more
be the "principle of love" or devo u ment than it will be egoism ( CW,
5, p. 4 3 9 ; MEW, 3, p. 4 2 5 ) . 5

Since the "principle of love " or devoument will exist as little as the no­
tion of egoism, it must be inferre d that under communism in dividuals
will no longer perceive such dichotomies as personal versus general in­
terest which are so c haracteristic of so cieties with private property ,
that is, with an involuntary division of labor. I n contrast, it can now be
reiterated what co mmunism, for Marx , is not.
Although communism enables in dividuals to associate freely , it can­
not be conceived of as providing the social environment condu cive to
the peculiarities of an individual . Thus, individuals cannot be compared
with a plant which, in order to grow, must be provide d by nature with
water, soil , sunshine , and the like . Communism must not be envisioned
as a society in which each individual has a claim to be nurtured according
to the peculiarity of his person . Marx gives the following criticism of the
grou p who calle d the mselves the true socialist :
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 09

The de man d for a true socialist society is based on the imaginary

demand of a coco-nut palm that the "totality of life " should furnish
it with "soil , warmt h , sun , air and rain " at the North Pole . This claim
of the in dividual on society is not deduced fro m t he real development
of society but fro m the alleged relationshi p of the metaphysical
characters-individuality an d universality . You have only to inter-
pret single in dividuals as representatives , e mbodiments of individuality ,
an d society as the embo di ment of universality , and the wh ole trick
is done. An d at the same time Saint-Simon 's statement about the
free develo p ment of the capacities has been corre ctly expressed and
placed u pon its true foundation . This correct expression co nsists in
the ab.s urd state ment that the individuals forming society want to
preserve their " peculiarity " , want to re main as they are , while they
de man d of society a transformation which can only proceed from a
transformation of the mselves " (CW, 5 , p . 4 7 6 ; MEW, 3 , p p . 464-4 6 5 ) .

THE DEVE LOPMENT O F THE INDIVI D UAL

Not only an analysis of Marx's vision of communism can show that

Marx considered estrange ment to be the result of an involun tary divisio n
of labor ; the postulate that the involu ntary nature of the division of
labor is central to his theory of estrangement can also be sho wn to be
valid with regard to his views on the development of the ind ividual . The
individual is seen to be at his highest level of develo pment when the
dichotomy between necessary labor an d disposable time , that is free
time, no longer exists.
Marx pointed out t he imponan ce of in crease d spare time in several
works. He agrees with Ricardo 's postulate that "wealth is disposable
time, an d nothing more " (MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p. 2 5 2 ) . For Marx, disposable
time is time for the free development of the individual (MEW , G , p . 5 2 7 ) .
The in dividual can spend free time i n such a way as t o b e free from any
coercion that normally acco m panies necessary labor time , th at is, the
time necessarily spent in the service of a capitalist in order to make a
livelihoo d . Un der capital , however, as a result of the capitalist's appro pria­
tion of surplus value , disposable time is unequally distribute d . The work­
er works more hours than he is compensated for, thus allowing the capital­
ist to lead a l ife of leisure . The capitalist does not need to spend necessary
time in order to have a livelihood (MEW, G, p. 5 2 7 ) . He i s , however, in­
tereste d in reducing the worker's disposable time because of his need to
1 10 ESTRANGEMENT

increase the surplus value , that is, the time for which the wo rker receives
no compensation .

[ A ] part from extremely elastic bounds, the n ature o f the e xchange

of co mmodities itself imposes no limit to the working-day , no
limit to surplus-labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a
purchaser when he tries to make the working-day as long as pos­
sible , and to make , whenever possibl e , two working-days out of
one . On the other han d , the peculiar nature of the commodity sold
i mplies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer
maintains his right as seller when he wishes to re duce the working­
day to one of definite normal duration . There is here , therefore, an
antino my , right against right, both equ ally be aring the seal of the law
of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it th at in
the history of capitalist produ ction, the determination of wh at is a
working-day presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle be­
tween collective capital , i.e., the class of capitalists , an d collective
labour, i . e. , the working-class (C l , p . 2 2 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 249) .

Marx considers the outco me of this struggle i mportant :

Time is the roo m of hu man develo pment . A man who has no free
time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime , apart from the mere p hysi cal
interru ptions by sleep , meals, and so forth , is absorbed by h is labour
for the capitalist , is less than a beast of burden (WPP, p p . 67-6 8 ;
MEW, 1 6, p . 144) .

As a consequence , Marx approves o f the legally limited wo rking-day since

it "shall make clear ' when the time which the worker sells is ended , and
when his o wn begins ' . " He exclaims " Quantum mutatus ab illo ! " (C l ,
p . 2 8 6 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 3 2 0). For Marx the working-day should be clearly
l i mited because it increases , or at least makes possibl e , the planned use
of one's disposable time for one's own purposes . In this regard Marx
cites Engels who writes that the Ten Hours Act the worker "is enabled
to prearrange his o wn minutes for his o wn purposes . " He shares Engels'
hope that since the factory acts have made the workers masters of their
o wn time, they have been given " a moral energy which is dire cting them
to the eventual possession of political power" ( C l , p. 2 8 6 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 3 2 0) .
 TRUE COMMUNISM 111

The i mportan ce of the struggle for disposable time can be summed u p by

a passage fro m Capital :

The intensity an d productiveness of labour being given , the time

which society is bound to devote to material pro duction is shorter ,
an d as a conse quence , the time at its disposal for the free develop­
ment, intellectual and social, of the individual is greater, in propor­
tion as the work is more an d more evenly divided among all the able­
bodie d members of society , and as a particular class is more and more
de prived of the po wer to shift the natural burden of labour fro m its
own shoulders to those of another layer of society . In this direction,
the shortening of the working-day fin ds at last a limit in the general­
isation of labour. In capitalist so ciety spare time is acquire d for one
class by converting the whole life-time of the masses into labour­
time (C l , p . 496; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 5 2) . 6

The increase of spare time is important because , for at least a part of the
day , the worker is not subject to direct d omination. Marx , th erefore,
sees the struggle for disposable time as one th at enhances the conditio n
in which man will be free from do mination by other men , in cluding
by social forces alien to him. It is a struggle in which Marx sees an at­
tempt to escape the involuntary division of labo r . In its place should
co me a society base d o n a voluntary division of labo r an d devoid of the
dichotomy between free time and necessary labor time . For this to o ccur,
Marx postulates the necessity of historical development . I t will be re called
that Marx considered the individual in primitive communistic societies to
be still "tied" to the co mmunity as an unborn infant is tied t o the mother
through the u mbilical cord. Of the Asian social formations , based on
pro perty hel d in common he says that they re mained stable because ,
among other things , " the individual does n o t become independent vis­
a-vis the commune. " For this reason, even th ough individuals may have
spare time at their disposal , the availability of free time to individuals is
merely a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Suppose now such an eastern bread-cutter requires 12 working-hours

a week for the satisfaction of all his wants. Nature 's dire ct gift to
him is plenty of leisure time . Before he can apply this leisure time
pro ductively for himself, a whole series of historical events is required
(C l , p. 48 2 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 5 3 8 ) . 7
1 12 ESTRANGEMENT

The historical events of which Marx speaks are those events that will in­
crease man 's productive powers, although they may occur at the expense
of his spare ti me . Marx makes the assumption that as long as man does
not ade quately control natu re , the options for his individual develop ­
ment , a s well a s that of society , are limited, although spare time may be
rel atively abundant. While the productive powers are being developed ,
the foun datio ns are laid not only to bring nature in creasingly under man 's
control , but also to enable the individual to cooperate freely . The goal is
both to sever the u mbilical cord by which primitive man is tied to society
and to shake loose all forms of so cial do mination that have accompanied
man as the develo p ment of the pro du ctive powers has pro ceeded through­
out history. Agai n , as with co mmunism, the true development of the in­
dividual is possible only if the productive powers of man are developed
sufficiently and the involuntary division of labor is abolished ; if man is
less subject to the blind forces of nature ; and if he can live free from the
coercio n of other men . For example :

In fact, t he real m of free do m actually begins only where l abour which

is determined by necessity (Not) and by external expediency ( iiussere
Zweckmiissigkeit) ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond
the sphere of actual material pro duction . J ust as the savage must wrestle
with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life , so must
civilise d man , and he must do so in all social formations an d under all
possible modes of pro ductio n . With his development this realm of
physical necessity expands as a result of his wants ; but, at the same
time , the forces of pro duction which satisfy these wants also in crease .
Freedom in this fiel d can only consist in socialised man , the associated
producers, rationally re gulating their interchange with nature , bring-
ing it under their common control, instead of being rule d by it as by
a blind force (als von einer blinden Macht) ; and achieving this with
the least expen diture of energy an d under conditions most favorable
to , an d worthy of, their hu man nature . But it nonet � eless still remains
a realm of necessity . Beyond it begins that development of human
energy which is an end in itself, the true re alm of freedom , which , how­
.
ever, can blossom forth only with this real m of necessity as its basis.
The shortening of the working-day is its basic prere quisite (M EW, 2 5 ,
p . 8 2 8 ; translation mine) . 8

Clearly , as is pointed out above , Marx sees the shortened wo rking-day as

 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 13

an important ste p in the struggle for a society devoid of an involuntary

division of labor. The stru ggle is aided 9 by the tendency in the capitalist
mode of pro duction to reduce the labor time needed to produce com­
modities and thus increase the productivity . Un der capital , this ten den cy
is desirable because i t results in a greater surplus which the capitalist can
appro priate . With the abolition of the capitalist mode of pro duction ,
production is no longer base d on "the reduction of necessary labour time
so as to posit surplus labour" (G, p. 706) . Rather , there will be a "general
reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimu m , which then
corresponds to the artistic , scientific etc. development of the individuals
in the time set free , and with the means created , for all of the m " ( G ,
p. 7 0 6 ; MEW, G , p . 5 9 3 ) .
I t must not therefore b e concluded that a dichoto my between neces­
sary labor an d disposable time will persist in a society based on a voluntary
divisio n of labour, a society in which labor time ceases to be the measure
of wealth an d hence , in which "exchange value [ must cease to be the
measure ] o f use value" (G, p . 7 0 5 ) . Neither must it be assumed that, if
capital ism is no longer a real ity , productivity gains coul d no longer be
realized. The facts are quite the contrary . For Marx, the re duction in
necessary labor time to a mini mum will in itself lead to an increased level
of pro ductivity .

[ T ] he saving of labour time [ is] equal to an increase of free time, i . e . ,

time for t h e full development o f the individual , which in tu rn reacts
back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest pro­
ductive power. Fro m the stan dpoint of the direct production process
it can be regarde d as the production of fixed capital, this fixed capital
being man himself (G, p p . 7 1 1 -7 1 2 ; MEW, G , p . 5 9 9 ) .

Similarly , a maximum of disposable time feeds back upon the individuals

insofar as they become transformed : " Free-time-which is both idle time
and ti me for higher activity-has naturally transformed its possessor into
a different subject , and he then enters into the dire ct pro ductio n process
as this different subject" (G, p. 7 1 2 ; MEW, G, p. 5 99) . Marx suggests that
"it goes without sayin g . . . that direct labour time itself can not remain
in the abstract antithesis to free ti me in which it ap pears fro m the perspec­
tive of bourge ois economy" (G, p. 7 1 2) .
This theme i s reiterated i n Theories of Surplus-Value.
1 14 ESTRANGEMENT

[ l i t is self-evident that if labour-time is reduced to a normal length

and , funhermore , labour is no longer performed for someone else , but
for myself . . . it acquires a quite different, a free character, it becomes
real social labor . . . -the labour of a man who has also disposable time
must be of a much higher quality than that of the beast of burden
(TS 3 , p. 2 5 7 ; M EW, 26. 3 , p. 2 5 3 ) .

Marx cautions, however, that "labour can not become play , as Fourier would
like, although it remains his great contribution to have expressed the sus­
pension not of distributio n , but of the mode of production itself" ( G ,
p. 7 1 2) . I nstead, Marx describes the production process under communism as
a process that is

both discipline, as regards the hu man being in the process of becoming

and , at the same time , practice [ Ausiibung] , experimental scien ce ,
materially creative and o bjectifying science, as regards the human being
who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of
society " (G, p. 7 1 2 ; M E W , G , pp. 5 9 9-600) .

In this discussio n of Marx's vision of communism, it became evident that,

for Marx , co mmunism is a society based on a voluntary division of labor.
This confirmed our postulate that the involuntary division of labor
Marx observed in capitalist an d many precapitalist societies is central
to his theory of estrange men t , since communism, for Marx , is above
all a society devoid of estrangement . The centrality of the involuntary
division of labor in Marx 's theory of estrangement is also clear with
regard to Marx 's views of the development of the individual . For Marx ,
the true development of the in divi du al cannot co me about u ntil the
whole society is freed fro m the involuntary division of labor and the
forces of pro duction have been developed sufficiently . This is so even
for the class which in a given society may not be forced to work for a
living. Thus, just as much as the capitalist is estrange d , he and society
are also p revented from full and free development as long as the involun­
tary division of labor prevails. Marx's views on the development of the
individual are, therefore, intricately related to his assessment of the con­
sequences of the involu ntary division of labor. Insofar as these views call
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 15

for a voluntary division of labor such that the individual may fully and
freely develop , the full development of the individual coincides with
and de pen ds on the establishment of communism. An d insofar as this
development can occur only in a society devoid of estrangement, it
can be concluded that the centrality of the involuntary divisio n of
labor to Marx's theory of estrangement indire ctly also derives from his
views on the development of the individual .

DISCUSSSION

As we have see n , Marx believes that communism will be fo unded on

and will depend on the productivity gains realized under capital . The in­
herent capitalist tendency to lower the amount of labor time u sed in the
pro duction of commo dities does in fact result in a gre ater level of pro ­
ductivity . Thus, t h e necessary labor time c a n b e set t o a minimum while
maximizing the amount of free time. However, this very maximization of
free time will lead to fu rther produ ctivity increases. 1 0 An increase in pro­
ductivity therefore represents a step in the direction of elimi nating
scarcity , particularly in Marx 's vision of a communist society in which
exploitation ceases to exist. The question that arises is whether com­
munist society will be free fro m scarcity . There is no evidence showing
that Marx believed communist society will be , or even could be , devoid
of any scarcity . Even under communism, man will have to wo rk for h is
maintenance as well as for that of his offspring.
Scarcity is a maj o r point of discussion in Knecht's work. In his com­
parison of Sartre 's and Marx's theory of estrangement, Kne cht ( 1 97 5 )
points out that Sartre 's the ory o f estrangement is more broadly con­
ceived than Marx 's. 1 1 Sartre deliberately set ou t to establish a theory of
estrange ment that would not be bound to an d derived fro m specific
historical con ditions. His theory rests on the assu mption that scarcity
does e xist and that it exists independent of any socioe conomic organiza­
tio n . Because of this scarcity , with which individuals must cope, in­
dividuals become estranged in the process. As a consequen ce , Sartre also
tends to view social organ ization as a means of cop ing with scarcity which
results in the estrange ment of the individual . Thus , because of scarcity one
man appears to the other as a coercive "anti-man , " in any hi storical period
and in all hu man rel ationships, including the family and the community
of frien ds ( Knecht , 1 97 5 : 87) . According to Sartre , estrange ment can be
1 16 ESTRANGEMENT

eliminate d only if scarcity is overcome. However, while Sartre does not

state that scarcity will never be overcome , he does maintain that estrange­
ment can slowly be reduced even under scarcity ( Knecht , 1 9 7 5 : 9 8 ) .
Although Marx does not assume the end of scarcity under communism ,
he is not as concerned about it as Sartre and does not cite it as the basic
cause of past or fu ture estrangement. Sartre incessantly pursues the problem
of estrangement fro m the point of view of how the indivi dual will directly
or in directly experience interference fro m other individuals, because of
the un derlying phenomenon of scarcity . Marx , however, assu mes that com­
munism will be accompanied by a change in consciousness . "We are . . .
con cerned with in dividuals at a definite historical stage of development
an d by no means merely with in divi duals chosen at rando m , " he says.
Thus, Marx, while not assuming the absence of scarcity , is able to say
t hat un der communism the development of the forces of production "coin­
cides with the development of the in dividual ." Since "th e individuals'
consciousness of their mutual relations will . . . be completely changed, "
an d production and distribution will be based on agreement with every­
one partici pating freely , Marx does not believe scarcity results in renewed
estrange ment. He thinks that the consciousness of in dividuals u n der com­
munism will constantly ide ntify the development of individu als with that
of society. Sartre sees this unity as unstable , although he does envision
situations in which a grou p of individuals cooperate freely without the
coercion of anyone. Such a group, Sartre argues, can be a co llectivity of
individuals involve d in storming the Bastille, or any other gro up with
homogeneous goals ( Knecht, 1 9 7 5 : 2 1 0) . Ho wever, as a result of the
persisting scarcity , such groups are unstable and tend to become coercive .
Thus, Knecht ( 1 9 7 5 : 2 7 4) writes that scarcity is the direct cause of the
failure of associations previously free fro m estrangement.
Sartre can visualize situations in which the consciousness of individuals
would be so change d that a group could achieve ho mogeneity with respect
to its me mbers' goal-directedness. All the same , he is certain that this
change is not likely to persist in the long run . I t may therefore be con­
clu ded t hat Sartre , although admitting some historical influences on in­
dividuals, excludes others. For example , the associated in dividuals in­
volved in the storming of the Bastille were subj ect to definite h istorical
influences bringing about that change in consciousness leading to the un­
coerced cooperation in storming the Bastille. Unlike Marx, S artre would
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 17

not postulate that the establishment of co mmunist so ciety would bring

about a change in consciousness so persistent that , despite the continuous
presence of scarcity , estrangement would never reappear. Sartre may there­
fore be accused of basing his theory of estrange ment on a concept of the
individual that is not sufficiently historic. Such a claim could be substantiated
by the fact that his theory of estrangement is derived not fro m historical
categories but from the prin ciple of scarcity , which in itself is assumed to
be independent of h istorical conditions. For Sartre , scarcity is a reality of
life transcendin g historical periods (Knecht, 1 97 5 ) . Accordingly , con trary
to Marx, estrange ment is not seen as a phenomenon associated with dis-
tinct historical phases. Although estrange ment may be ove rcome , on ce
overco me it is not assu med that this overco ming, while in itself an event
of history , will receive history 's "seal of guaran tee " as Marx tended to
postulate . As one example of the way in which Marx lin ks the abolition
of estrangement to a definite historical perio d, the following pronounce-
ment fro m the Manifesto may be cite d : " I n place of the old bourgeois
society , with its classes and class antagonisms , we shall have an asso cia-
tio n , in which the free development of each is the condition for the free
develo pment of all " (CW, 6, p. 5 0 6 ; MEW, 4, p . 482) .
For Marx , this can only be the consequence of a revolutio n introdu cing
a new historical epoch. By means of a revolutio n , the proletariat " makes
itself the ruling class , and , as such , sweeps away by force the old condi­
tions of production , then it will, along with these conditions , h ave swept
away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes
generally , and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class "
(CW, 6, p. 5 0 6 ; MEW, 4, p. 482) .
Unlike Sartre , Marx envisions communist society as stable inasmuch
as estrange ment will not reoccur. History will have changed both the con­
sciousness of in dividuals and the form of social organ ization so as to
"gu arantee " nonestrange ment. According to this view, the relation ship
of the in dividual to society is " deduced fro m the real development of
society ," and not the allege d relationship of the metaphysical characters­
individuality an d universality " (CW, 5, p. 4 7 6 ; MEW, 3 , p. 4 64 ) .
Marx also refuses t o neglect t he historical context . Becau se Marx sees
the relationship of the in dividual to society within primitive societies in
historical terms, it is incorrect to assume , as Hobbes tended to do , that a
strong individual will begin to dominate weaker ones. To make such an
1 18 ESTRANGEMENT

assumption , says Marx, is to start with a notion of isolated individuals,

and not with the in dividual that is historically linked to othe r individuals
in specific ways.
Marx admits that "there is no natural obstacle absolutely preventing
one man fro m disburdening hi mself of the labour re quisite fo r his own
existen ce , and burdening another with it, any more , for in stance, than
uncon querable natural obstacles prevent one man fro m eating the flesh
of another" (C l , p. 4 7 9 ) . A general pattern of domination will occur
only with an initial development of the pro ductiveness of labor:

It is only after men have raised themselves above the rank of animal s ,
when therefore their labour h a s been t o some extent socialise d , that
a state of things arises in which the surplus-labour of the one becomes
a con ditio n of existence for the other ( C l , p. 47 9 ; MEW, 2 3 , pp. 5 3 4-
5 3 5) .

The historical conditions are , therefore , extremely important i n explain­

ing the behavior of in dividuals. J ust as social relations change in h istory ,
so does consciousness . According to Marx , the perception of an antimony
between the private an d the general interest is also historically con ditioned
and is directly linked to the institution of private pro perty . Hence , it is
only natural that he assu mes t hat different historical conditions (for example ,
those of primitive society or co mmunism) will produce different social rela­
tions an d a different consciousness of mutual relations in the individuals.
Just as the do minati on of some over others was unlikely in primitive society ,
Marx thinks it unlikely that estrangement will recur under co mmunism and
that some will again begin to dominate others. The condition of nonestrange­
ment u nder communism is for Marx -and in contrast to Sartre-stable.
That Marx views communism as a society with no reemergence of estrange·
ment can be illustrate d in yet another way . As has been shown , Marx sees
communism as a type of society in which products are distributed on the
basis of nee d. The unequal accu mulation of personal pro perty an d the sub­
sequent exchange of such accu mulate d pro perty brought about the down-
fall of pri mitive co mmunism as exemplified by the Iroquois I ndians. As
Engels re marke d , this process brought the I ro quois to the threshold of
civilizatio n. On the basis of this initial regular exchange , the division of
labor an d private pro perty arose . The division of labor developed and grew
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 19

without the consent of the in dividuals involve d . Un der communism , how­

ever, there is no room for the exchange of products an d commodity pro­
duction . Marx believes that the " mechanisms" that transformed primitive
communist society an d propelled history ever since will cease to exist
and will not reemerge sin ce production will n o longer be based on e xchange
value but on agreement with products being collectively appropriated and
distribute d on the basis of need . Hence, history will be consciously directed
history , an d the division of labor will cease to be formed independently of
the will of individuals :

The reality whi ch communism creates is pre cisely the true basis for
rendering it i m possible that anything should exist indepen dently of
individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a pro du ct of the pre­
ceding intercourse of in dividuals (CW, 5 , p. 8 1 ; MEW, 3 , p . 70) .

In history u p to the present it is certainly like wise an empirical fact

that separate in dividuals have . . . beco me more and more enslaved
un der a power alien to them . . . a power which has beco me more an d
more enormous and, in the last instan ce , turns out to be the world
market . . . All-ro und dependence, this primary natural form of the
world-historical co-o peration of individuals , will be transformed by
this co mmunist revolution into the control an d conscious mastery
of t hese powers, which, born of the action of men on one another,
have till now overawed an d ruled men as powers co mpletely alien to
them ( CW, 5 , p. 5 1 ; MEW, 3 , p. 3 7 ; see also MEW, 3 , p. 3 5 ) .

For Marx co mmunism i s not the end o f history . Rather, i t i s the begin­
ning o f a new type of history-co nsciously dire cted history 1 2 . It is made
possible by the elimination of " mecahnisms " such as exchange , com­
mo dity productio n , and the resulting involuntary division of labor which
hitherto pro pelle d it. As long as these " me chanisms" are absent, Marx
sees no reason to believe that communism will be an unstable social con­
dition despite the pre sence of some scarcity . In this respect, Marx differs
fro m Sartre .
The question may be asked now whether Marx also perce ived man
under the co mmunism o f primitive societies to be free fro m estrangement.
It may be recalled that Marx and Engels th ough t these individuals were free
1 20 ESTRANGEMENT

fro m coercion by others an d were therefore not subject to th e involuntary

division of labor to be introduced only after exchange relatio nships have
emerge d . Conse quently , Marx does not speak of estrange men t or alien
social forces do minating man in primitive co mmunistic societies. If estrange­
ment results fro m an involuntary division of labor, which in itself is a
pro duct of society , it must be concluded that , for Marx , man in primitive
communistic societies is not estranged. Nonetheless , he does not consider
this con dition , primitive communism, to be desirable because man is still
severely under the do mination of nature and tied to his community as if
through an umbilical cord. Only with the introduction of regular exchange
does man first sever his symbiotic ties to the community and develop
the forces of production that will eventually allow the realization of com­
munism. Thus , while man cannot be said to be estranged under primitive
co mmunism, he is incapable of that type of life envisioned under com­
munism since neither society nor the in dividual have yet become developed .
The development of man 's pro du ctive powers and the in dividual has re­
sulted in estrange ment. Until a certain level of development has occurred ,
increases in the pro ductive powers of man are for Marx only p ossible
through estrange me n t . If, therefore , the development of the fo rces of
pro ductio n helps man bring nature under gre ater control ( although result­
ing in estrangement) , scarcity is in part overcome at the price of estrange­
ment, at least for certain historical periods. 1 3 At the price of estrangement,
man increases his alternatives vis-a-vis nature an d , therefore , develops him­
self as well as diminishes scarcity . 1 4
Scarcity must not be seen primarily as an independent variable definable
in ahistorical terms. For Marx , scarcity also seems to be closely linked with
the level of in dividual development. Historically , as the individual develops,
new nee ds are create d , and what is considered to be scarce may ch ange be­
cause of certain histori cal developments. This cannot be said of animals
whose needs are physiologically derivable an d , therefore , not subject to
historical change . Needs are ahistorically determinable with animals:

The different forms of material life are , of course , in every case

depen dent on the needs which are already developed, and the p ro duc­
tio n , as well as the satisfaction , of these needs in an historical process ,
which is not found in the case of a sheep or a dog.(CW , 5 , p . 8 2 ;
MEW, 3 , p. 7 1 ) .
 TRUE COMMUNISM 121

I n Capital Marx points o u t that "at the dawn of civilization t h e productive­

ness acquire d by labour is small , but so too are the wants which develop
with and by the means of satisfying them" ( C l , p. 4 7 9 ; M EW, 2 3 , p. 5 3 5 1 5 ;
see also quote in note 9 ; MEW, 2 5 , p . 8 2 8 ) .
F o r Marx , the n , t h e development of man 's productive p o we rs is initially
accompanied by estrangement. This development proceeds u nder com­
munism in the absence of estrangement . Ho wever, only if necessary labor
time can sufficiently be re duce d by the development of pro ductive forces
is co mmunism perceive d to be realizable .

[The] develo p ment of productive forces . . . is an absolutely necessary

practical pre mise , because without it privation , want is m erely made
general, and with want the struggle for necessities would begin again ,
and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restore d (CW , 5 ,
p . 49 ; MEW, 3 , p p . 3 4-3 5 ) . 1 6

The re duction of necessary labor time can be equated with a re duction

in scarcity or an increased satisfaction of needs. However, because ne w
nee ds are create d as the forces of produ ction devel o p , scarcity remains a
relative concept not solely definable according to physiological premise s .
Scarcity, along with nee ds, c a n therefore be said t o b e create d a s t h e pro­
ductive powers of man develo p . On the whole , the produ ctive forces are
thought to develop faster so that under communism man can minimize
the necessary labor time and establish a society based on a voluntary
division of labor. S o me scarcity will still be present , even if only because
nature can never be fully controlled .
"J ust as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to
maintain an d re produce life , so must civilized man , and he must do so in
all social formations and under all possible modes of produ ctio n " (C3 ,
p. 8 2 0 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 8 2 8 ) . Here Marx apparently contradicts a position
he took earlier. In the Man uscripts, he says that man , in con trast to animals,
" produces even when he is free fro m physical need an d only truly pro­
duces in freedo m therefro m" (CW , 3, p. 2 7 6 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 5 1 7 ) .
Consi dering his work a s a whole , i t seems that Marx did not e quate "true
pro ductive activity" with that activity which occurs free fro m physical
nee d. Rather, he envisio ned a society in which production would occur
on the basis of freely cooperating in dividuals regardless of the basis for
1 22 ESTRANGEMENT

this cooperatio n . Thus, as long as man is able to satisfy his p hysical needs
without being dominate d by an alien wil l , he is not estranged and the
division of labor is a voluntary one .
Marx does acce pt the fact that man is " determined , forced , " by h is
nee ds , but he is quick to add that in this case "it is only my own nature
. . . which exerts force u pon me ; it is nothing alien . " Only if production
is determined on the basis of exchange do my needs become a coercive
force for others as well ( G , p. 245 ; MEW, G , p. 1 5 7 ) . Again , it can be
seen that Marx's main emphasis is on the way needs are satisfie d , not
on the i dea that man must produce in order to satisfy his needs. For
Marx , communism is that form of social organization in which man is
capable of producing, without coercio n , the products re quire d to satisfy
his nee ds, since neither pro duction nor distribution rests on exch ange
an d the division of labor is voluntary .

MARX'S DEFINITION OF HUMAN NATU RE RECON SIDERED

According to Marx, communism is not a society in which the in dividuals

forming that society " want to preserve their 'peculiarity ' , while th ey de­
mand of society a transformation which can only procee d fro m a trans­
formation of themselves. " Marx docs not outline what human nature will
be u nder co mmunism. He is not co ncerned with human nature as it mani­
fests itself in the various types of behavior and characters of individuals
living under communism. He often criticizes those who , by e xtrapolating
fro m behavior under capital , claimed to h ave found the ingre dients of
hu man nature. This criticism was intended to relativize state ments about
human nature which others thought to be absolute , and not to explicitly
outline human nature under communis m .
Marx was very concerned about human nature in another way . Earlier ,
we stated t hat Marx's theory of estrangement was derived fro m a biological ,
and not an historical , conception of human nature. Thus, man, unlike the
animals, was found to be a pro ducer capable of pro ducing according to his
will, and insofar as man is forced to su bject his labor power and the prod­
uct of his labor to an alien will he can be said to be estranged. Marx
depicts co mmunism as society without estrangement , a society in which
neither one 's labor power nor the product of one's labor is subject to an
alien will . Coo peration is free and the division of labor voluntary . Com-
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 23

munism therefore permits man to live according to his nature , a nature

based not on characteristics that may change in histo ry but o ne that is
biologically unique to man .

NOTES

1. The translation is mine insofar as wie icb gerade L ust babe is transl ated
by "as I have in mind" rather than by "as I have a mind," as it appears in CW,
5, p. 47.
2 . Marx uses the term imm ediat (travailleurs imm ediats ) , which c an be trans­
lated by "immediate." However, imm ediat designates the con dition of someone
qui agit, qui p ro duit sans interm ediaire. (See Walther v. Wartburg, Franz osiscbes
Ety mologiscbes Worterbucb, Basel: Helbing & Lichtenbahn, 1 9 5 2 , p . 5 7 1 ) .
3 . Marx criticizes not only those who see a conflict between the private
and the �neral inter est from a historical perspective , but also those who see no
such diver�nce as long as the individuals in an exchan� socie ty are allowed to
pursue their private interests.

The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest
and only his private interest ; and thereby serves the private interests of all ,
the �neral inte rest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that
each individual's pursuit of his private interests promotes the totality of
private interests, the �neral interest. One could just as well de duce from this
abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the
others' interests, so that , instead of a general affirmation , this war of all
against all pro duces a �neral negation. The point is rather that private in­
terest is itself already a socially determine d in terest, which can be achieved
only within the con ditions laid down by society and with the means pro­
vide d by society ; hence it is boun d to the reproduction of these conditions
and means. I t is the interest of private persons; but its content as well as the
form and means of its realization is given by social conditions independent of
all ( G , p. 1 5 6 ; MEW, G, p. 74) .

4. Marx elaborates on this theme elsewhere . When discussing the nature of

the capitalist, he says that

fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the

human race to produ ce for production's sake ; he thus forces the develop­
ment of the pro ductive po wers of society , and creates those material con­
ditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of so ciety , a
society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the
ruling principle (C l , p. 5 5 5 ; MEW, 2 3 , p. 6 1 8 ; see also MEW, 1 9 , p. 1 7 ; MEW,
G, p. 7 1 6 , and M EW, 3 , p . 424) .
1 24 ESTRANGEMENT

5 . In the Grundrisse, Marx uses the same argument when discussing the
reasons why in primitive society a strong individual did not dominate weaker
ones an d thus forcefully extract labor from them.

It is of course very simple to imagine that some powerful , p hysically dominant

in dividual , after first having caught the animal, then catches humans in order
to have them catch animals; in a word, uses human beings as another n aturally
occurring condition for his reproduction (whereby his own labou r reduces
itself to ruling) like any other n atural creature . But su ch a notion is stu pid­
correct as it may be from the standpoint of some particul ar given clan or
commune-because it proceeds from the development of isolated Individuals.
But human bein gs become in dividuals (vereinzelt) through the process of
history (G, p . 496 ; M EW, G, p. 3 9 5 ) .

I mplicit i n this statement i s the postulate that i t is inconceivable for a "primitive "
individual even to consider perceiving his interest to be prior to the o ne of others,
that is, to subordinate o t h e rs to his will i n such a manner that he benefits from t h e
not e x p l a i n the de­
subordination . At t h i s p o i n t , we s h o u l d a l s o r e c a l l that Marx did
cay of pri mitive communism by the fact that some began to dominate others by
virtue of personal physical strength. Rather, he explained it on the basis that
personal property was une qually appropriated leading to social proce sses, as a
result of which some became the subordinates of others.
6. In Theories of Surplus- Value, Marx maintains the same theme in a some­
what more arithmetic form:

Assume that the productivity of in dustry is so advanced that whereas earlier

two-thirds of the population were directly engaged in material produ ction,
now it is only one-third. Previously 2 / 3 produced means of subsistence for
3/ 3 ; now 1 / 3 pro duce for 3 / 3 . Previously 1 / 3 was net revenue (as distinct
from the revenue of the labourers) , now 2 / 3 . Leaving (class) contradictions
out of account, the n ation woul d now use 1 / 3 of its time for direct produc­
tion, where previously it nee de d 2 / 3 . E qually distributed, the whole 2/3
woul d have more time for unproductive labour and l eisure (MEW, 26 . 1 ,
p . 1 89 ; translation mine).

The Progress Publishers' translation ( TS l , p. 2 1 8 ) translates the l ast sen tence i n

would
t h e foll o w i n g way : " Eq u al l y dist r i b u t e d , all ( th a t is, t h e w h o l e p o p u l at i o n )
have 2/ 3 more time for unproductive labour and leisure ." This translation can­
not be correct because of the arithmetic. If a population previousl y spent one­
third of its time as spare ti me (while two-thirds were needed to produce sub­
sistence ) , it now has two-thirds in the form of sp are time , while only one-third
of the time is used for the direct production of subsistence . The spare time in­
creased by 1 00 percent and not, as the translation implies, by 66-1 / 3 percent.
The German " Gleichmassig verteilt, h :it ten alle 2/3 mehr Zeit" is therefore best
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 25

translated as " Equally distributed, the whole 2 / 3 woul d have more time . "
Furthermore, i f e qu ally distributed , t h e capitalist class would have less-not more ­
spare time than previously, since it, too , must now spend one-third of its time
producing means of subsistence.
7. Marx continues by saying that "before he spends it in surplus-labour for
strangers, compulsion is necessary. If capitalist production were introdu ced , the
honest fellow wo uld perhaps have to work six days a week , in order to appropriate
to himself the pro du ct of one working-day" (C l , p. 4 8 2 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 5 3 8) .
8. A ussere Zweck ma ssigkeit is not optimally translated by " mund ane
considerations" (C 3 , p. 8 2 0) . I t implies that the worker who is uncoerced by
·
necessity (No t) or by "external expediency " (� ussere Zweckm �ssigkeit )
has no mundane considerations. Marx 's emphasis rather is o n coercion brough t
about b y No t o r au ssere Zweck massigkeit and not on whe ther con siderations
are mundane or not.
The phrase als von einer blinden Macht is misleadingly translated in the Pro­
gress Publishers' e dition by "as by the blind forces of Nature" ( C 3 , p . 8 2 0) .
In Roman society, which was based on slavery, the ties between the in­
dividual and the commu nity were severed. W hile "the indivi du als may appear
great, " Marx maintains that "there can be no conception here of a free and full
development either of the individual or of the society , since such development
stands in contradiction to the original relation " (G, p . 487; MEW, G, pp. 3 86-
3 8 7 ) . Impl icit here is the notion that the free and full development of the in­
dividual cannot come about unless the productive forces are sufficiently de­
veloped. Although slavery brought about a certain development , it was limited.
The free an d full development of the in dividual and society was impossible
since the options, though in crease d, were still too limited. Also implicit here is
the idea that, unless all men are free from coercion (involuntary division of
labor), neither the in divi duals nor society can develop freely and fully even
though some in dividu als have the spare time for their development through
which in turn they may appear great.
9.

[ Capital ) diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase

it in the su perfluous form; hence posits the su perfluous in growin g measure
as a condition-question of life or death-for the necessary. On the one
side, then, it calls to life all the powers of science and of nature , as of social
combination and of social intercourse , in or der to make the creation of wealth
independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the other side ,
it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces
thereby created, and to confine them within the limits require d to maintain
the already created value as value. Forces of productio n an d social relations­
two different sides of the development of the social individual-
appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to p ro-
duce on its l imited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material
1 26 ESTRANGEMENT

conditions to blo w this foundation sky-high . "Truly wealthy a nation ,

when t h e working day is 6 rather than 1 2 hours " (G, p . 7 06 ; MEW, G , p p .
5 9 3-594).

1 0. In Anti-Diihring (MEW, 20, p p . 2 7 4 , 2 7 6} , Engels also maintains that a

society that is free d from the l imits of capitalist p roduction will be able to ad­
vance further because it creates new forces of produ ction . This advance will be
possible because aban donment of the previous division of labor and its replace­
ment by a division of labor will allow for the education of many-side d in dividu als
who will also u n derstan d the scientific basis of all industrial productio n . Quoting
Marx, he points to the fact that under capital the factory system itself is already
moving in such a direction:

[ T ] he e m p l o y m e n t of mac h i n e r y d o e s away w i t h the necessit y o f c r y st alliz­

ing this distribution after the manner of Manufacture , by the con stant annexa­
tion of a particular man to a particular fu nctio n . Since the motion of the
whole system does not procee d from the workman , but from the machinery ,
a change of persons can take place at any time without an interruption of the
work (C l , p. 3 9 7 ; MEW, 2 3 , pp. 44 3-444) .

Engels states that once the economy no longer suffers under recurrent crises
and the means of production are no longer privately owned, a p ractically limit­
less increase in production will occur. In con trast to the development postulated
above, the one postulate d here is seen only as a function of a reduction of l osses
(M EW, 20, p. 2 6 3 ) .
1 1 . Schaff ( 1 964: 1 1 0) maintains that it is impossible, a s Sartre did, t o merge
ex istentialism with Marxism. Schaff considers Sartre's attempt a failure because
of the resultin g in herent p hilosophical contradictions. (See also Schaff, 1 964:
22, 26, 76, 78, 1 09.)
1 2. " For it is the asso ciation of in dividuals (assuming the advance d stage of
modern productive forces, of course ) which puts the conditions of the free de­
velopment and movement of individuals under their control -con dition s which
were previously left to chance and had acquired an inde pendent existence over
against the separate individuals." (CW, 5, p. 80; MEW, 3, p. 7 5 ) .
1 3 . As pointed o u t earlier, Marx envisions t h e further developme n t of the
forces of production also under communism but not at the expense of estrange­
ment.
1 4. Here " diminishing scarcity " means that , through the development of the
forces of production, a society 's necessary l abor time is dimin ished. However,
necessary labor time is in itself historically determined ; what is necessary can­
not be see n as invariable.
1 5 . We note that BedUrfnis is translated by "want" rather than by "need."
0
In light of Marx 's use of the term BediJ rfnis, it is difficult to j ustify one transla­
tion exclusively over another, although I prefer the translation "need . " For a
further treatment , see Agnes Heller, 1 9 7 6 .
 TRUE COMMUNISM 1 27

1 6. Criticizing Max Stimer, Marx says in the German Ideology :

In real ity, of course , what happened was that people won freedom for them­
selves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their
ideal of man , but by the existing productive forces. All emancipation carried
through hitherto has been based, however, on restricted productive forces.
The production which these productive forces could provide was insufficient
for the whole of society and made development p ossible only if some persons
satisfied their nee ds at the expense of others, and therefore some- the minority ­
obtained t h e monopoly of development, while others-the maj ority-owing to
the constant struggle to satisfy their most essential needs, were for the time
being ( i.e., until the creation of new revolutionary productive forces) excluded
from any development. Thus, society has hitherto always developed within
the framework of a contradiction-in antiquity the contradiction between free
men an d slaves, in the Middle Ages that between nobility and serfs, in modem
times that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (CW , 5, p. 4 3 1 -4 3 2 ;
MEW, 3 , p. 4 1 7 ) .
8
I s ESTRANGEMENT LIMITED
TO CAPITALIST SocIETIES?

If t he foregoing interpretation of Marx, with its emphasis on the in­

voluntary nature of the division of labor, is correct , it would h ave to
be concl u de d that man is estranged whenever an involuntary divisio n
of labor exists. Such a conclusion would be the logical consequence of
a theory t hat postulates estrangement to result from the involuntary
nature of the division of labor an d that assumes the lack of any estrange­
ment under communism because of the absence of such a division of
labor. I n this chapter, instead of merely drawing the logical c onsequen ces,
the attempt is made to investigate Marx 's views on precapitalist , non­
communistic societies in order to determine whether such a conclusion
holds up and how the conclusion can be termed valid.

ESTRANGEMENT AND P R ECAPITALI STIC ,

NONPRIMITIVE SOCI ETI ES

Marx thinks the division of labor became involuntary following the

destruction of the co mmunism of primitive societies. This belief is more
concretely expresse d in Marx's discussion of the nature of the master­
servant relation (Herrscbaftsverh'iiltnis) :
1 30 ESTRANGEMENT

Basically the appro priation of animals , land etc. cannot take place
in a master-servant relation , although the animal provides service .
The presu pposition of the master-servant relation is the appropria­
tion of an alien will ( G , pp. 5 00-5 0 1 ; MEW , G , p . 400) .

In the master-servant relation , the same condition is given as under

capital ; namely , that labor power is subject to an alien will an d is no
longer directed by the will of the in dividual who exerts this p o wer. The
master can appro priate an alien will because of his ownership of the
lan d 1 and the resulting depen dency of others on him:

[ F ] eu dal landed property is already by its very nature huckstered

land-the earth which is estrange d fro m man an d hence co nfronts
him in the shape of a few great lords. The domination of the land
as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed
pro perty . The serf is the adjunct of the land (CW , 3 , p. 2 6 6 ; MEW,
E B l .T . , p. 5 0 5 ) .

U n der precapitalist servitude , j ust a s u nder c apital , the serf a n d h i s labor

power are subject to an alien will , an d at least a portion of the p roduct
of labor is appropriate d by the master. This action can be seen as a viola­
tio n of hu man nature since , fo r Marx , man is by nature capable of con­
sciously directing productive activity with his will and also of subje cting
the product of his labor to his volition . Under servitu de , as under capital ,
this condition is not given, and man is prevented from living according to
his nature. Man must therefo re emancipate himself fro m all servitude
(Knechtschaftsverhiiltnisse) , t he most recent of which is that of capital :

Fro m the relationship of estranged labour to private property it fol­

lows further that the emancipation of society from private property ,
etc . , fro m servitu de , is expressed in the po litical form of the eman cipa­
tio n of the wo rkers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake , but
because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human
e mancipation-and it contains this, because the whole of human servi­
tude is involved in the relation of t he worker to productio n , and all
relations of servitu de are but modifications and consequences of this
relation (CW, 3 , p . 2 8 0 ; MEW, EB l .T . , p. 5 2 1 ) .
 IS ESTRANGEME NT L I MITED TO CAPITALIST SOC IETIES? 131

Marx's analysis o f precapitalist economic formations goes beyond the

narrowest definition of the master-servant relationship . Neve rtheless , the
in divi duals who are in any way dependent remain unfree for him:

It is furthermore evident that in all forms in which the dire ct labourer

remains the " possessor" of the means of production and l abour con­
ditions necessary for the production of his own means of subsistence ,
the property relationship must simultaneously appear as a dire ct rela­
tion of lordship and servitude , so that the direct p roducer is not free ;
a lack of freedo m which may be reduced from serfdom with enforced
labour to a mere tributary relationship . The direct producer, according
to our assu mption , is to be found here in possessio n of his own means of
pro ductio n , the necessary material labour conditions required for th e
realisation of his labour an d the production of his means of subsistence
. . . . Under such con ditions the surplus-Jabour for the no minal o wner
of the land can only be extorted fro m them by other than economic
pressure , whatever the form may be . This differs from slave or planta­
tion economy i n that the slave works under alien conditio n s of pro­
duction and not indepen dently . Thus, conditions of perso nal dependence
are requisite, a lack of personal freedom , no matter to what extent , and
being tied to the soil as its accessory , bondage in the true sense of the
word (C 3 , pp. 7 90-7 9 1 ; MEW, 2 5 , p p . 798-7 9 9 ) .

Even though the tributary relationship implies freedom from enforced

labor in which labor power is directly subsumed under an alien will , our
thesis still holds. Because of an alien will , the individual is forced to expend
labor power, in the form of surplus labor, for the nominal owner of the
lan d. Against his will, he is compelled to pro duce a surplus he cannot ap­
pro priate . In additi o n , although his labor power is not directly subje cted to
an alien will , he is not free to produce any type of surplus . Thus, as under
capital , he is free neither in deciding what total surplus is to be produced
nor in appro priating all of the surplus and disposing over it . Marx describes
the nature of coercio n existing in this case :

Rent in kind presup poses a higher stage of civilization for the direct
pro ducer, i .e . , a higher level of development of his labour and of
society in general. And it is distinct fro m the pre ceding form in that
1 32 ESTRANGEMENT

surplus-labour nee ds no longer be performed in its natural form , thus

no longer under the direct su pervision and compulsion of the land­
lord or his representatives; the direct producer is driven rather by force
of circumstances than by direct coerci o n , through legal enactment
rather than the whip , to perform it on his o wn responsibility . Surplus­
production , in the sense of produ ction beyond the indispensable needs
of the direct producer, and within the field of pro duction actually
belonging to him, upon the land exploited by himself instead of, as
earlier, upon the nearby lord's estate beyond his own l and , has already
become a self-understood rule here . In this relation the direct producer
more or less disposes of his entire labour-time , although , as previously ,
a part of this labour-time , at first practically the entire surplus portion
of it, belongs to the landlord without compensation ; except that the
landlord no longer directly receives this surplus-labour in its natural
form, but rather in the pro ducts' natural form in which it is realised
( C 3 , pp. 7 94-7 9 5 ; MEW, 2 5 , p. 8 0 3 ) .

S peaking o f the source of value and the appropriatio n o f surplus value ,

Marx compare s the coercion u n der pre capitalist social formations to wage
labor :

T h e substan ce of value is and remains nothing b u t expended labour­

power . . .. A serf for instance expends his labour-power for six days,
and the fact of this expenditure as such is not altered by the circum­
stance that he may be working three days for himself, on his own
fiel d , and three days for his lord , on the field of the latter. Both his
voluntary labour for himself and his forced labour for his lord are
equally labour; so far as this labour is considered with reference to the
values, or to the useful articles created by it , there is no difference in
his six days of labour. The difference refers merely to the different
conditions by which the expenditure of his labour-power during both
halves of his labour-time o f six days is called forth . The same applies
to the necessary an d surplus-labour of the wage-labourer ( C 2 , p. 3 90 ;
MEW, 24, p . 3 8 5 ) .

I n Theories of Surplus- Value , h e states: " Serf-labour (just as slave-labour)

has this in common with wage-labour, in respect to rent , that the latter is
 IS ESTRANGEMENT L I MITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES? 133

paid in labo ur not in pro ducts, still less in money " (TS 3 , p . 40 1 ; MEW,
2 6. 3 , p . 3 92) .
In general , other co mments of Marx on p recapitalist econ omic forma­
tions may be noted, particularly as they address the nature of coercion :

Hence , the historical movement which changes the producers into wage­
workers, appears , on the one han d , as their emancipatio n s fro m serf­
do m and fro m the fetters of the guilds, . . . . But , on the other h an d ,
these new freedmen became sellers of themselves o n l y after they had
been robbe d of all their o wn means of production , an d of all the guar­
antees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements . . . . The
startin g-point of the development that gave rise to the wage labourer
as well as to the capitalist , was the servitude of the labourer. The ad­
vance con sisted in a change of form of this servitude , in the transforma­
tion of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation (C l , p. 669 ;
MEW, 2 3 , p . 7 4 3 ) .

And although Marx often points to the Asiatic precapitalist so cial forma­
tion as an example of a stable , persisting organization , resistant to the
un dermining forces o f exchange , he is very critical of the way some surplus
is appropriate d through coercion :

Rent (as the Physio crats con ceive it b y re miniscence of feudal conditions)
appears historically (and still on the largest scale among the Asiatic
peo ples) as the general form of surplus labour, of labour p erformed
without pay ment in return . The appro priation of this su rplus labour
is here not mediated by exchange , as is the case in capitalist so ciety ,
but its basis is the forcible do mination of one section of so ciety over
the o ther. (There is, accordingly , direct slavery , serfdom or political
de pen dence) (TS 3 , p. 400; MEW, 2 6 . 3 , p. 3 9 1 ) .

Although man i s subject t o an alien will under pre capitalist economic

formations, the manner in which this subjection occurs diffe rs from capital ,
the main distinction being the absence of exchange as the basis of all pro­
duction . I n pre capitalist social formations, the estranged elements of life
are still bound by man and are not subj ect to exchange relations and the
resulting competitio n :
1 34 ESTRANGEMENT

Precisely the slavery of civil so ciety is in appearance the greatest

freedo m because it is in appearance the fully developed in dependence
of the indivi dual , who considers as his o wn freedom the uncurbed
move ment , no longer bound by a common bond or by m an , of the
est ranged elements of his life , such as property , industry , religion , etc . ,
whereas actually this i s his fully developed slavery an d inhumanity .
Law has here taken the place of privilege (CW, 4, p . 1 1 6 ; MEW, 2 ,
p. 1 23).

Similarly , i n the German Ideology, Marx writes that

in imagination , in dividuals see m freer under the dominan ce of the

bourgeoisie than before , because their conditions of life seem accidental ;
in reality , of course , they are less free , because they are to a greater ex­
tent governed by material forces " (CW, 5 , p p . 78-7 9 ; MEW , 3 , p . 76) 2
.

Clearl y , although coercion is a fact in p recapitalist societies , it increases

with increased exchange relationships. It would be a mistake , however, to
think that coercion was based only on personal dominan c e , that the estran ge d
ele ments of l ife were bound only by man . Marx's emphasis rather is on the
degree to which either personal or impersonal forces were the source of
coercion which resulted in the subjection of man to an alien will :

When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system

of exchange , of exchange values and of money , or which correspond
to an undeveloped degree of these , then it is clear from the outset that
the in dividuals in such a society , although their relations appear to be
more personal, e nter into connection with one ano ther only as individ­
uals imprisoned within a certain definition , as feudal lord an d vassal ,
landlord an d serf, etc. , or as members of a caste etc . or as members of
an estate etc . . . . ( As re gards the illusion of the "purely personal rela­
tions" in feu dal time s , etc. , it is of course not to be forgotten for a
moment ( 1 ) that these relation s , in a certain phase , also took on an
objective character within their o wn sphere , as for example the develop­
ment of lan de d pro prietorship out of purely military relations of sub­
ordinatio n ; but (2) the objective relation on which they founder has
still a limite d , primitive character an d therefore seems personal , while ,
 IS ESTRANGEMENT L I M ITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES? 1 35

in the modern world , personal relations flow purely out of relations

of pro duction and exchange (G, p p . 1 6 3 -1 6 5 ; MEW, G , p p . 80-8 2 ) . 3

The extent to which the estranged elements of life were still controlled
by man , at the expense of having exchange relation s , allows Marx to con­
clude that feu dal institutions provi ded certain guarantees o f existence . For
example , even serfs tended to own some land an d were allowed a share in
common lan ds (MEW, 2 3 , pp. 743-7 4 5 ) . Although coercion was a fact,
under precapitalist so cial formations i t ten de d to affect in divi duals quite
differently than did the ty pe of coercion encountere d under capital :

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper han d , has put an end
to all feu dal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder
the motley feu dal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors " , and
has left remaining n o other nexus between man and man than naked
self-interest, than callous " cash payment " . It has drowned the most
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm , of
philistine senti mentalism, in the icy water of egotistical cal culation .
I t has resolved personal wo rth into exchange value, an d i n place of
the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set u p that single ,
unconscionable freedom- Free Trade . In one word , for exploitation ,
veile d by religious and political illusions, it has substitute d naked,
shameless, dire ct , brutal ex p l o i t ation (CW, 6 , p p . 48 6-48 7 ; M E W , 4 ,
pp. 464-46 5 ) .

Thus far, the follo wing has been established . O n the one h an d , individ­
uals and their labor powe r were subject to an alien will even under pre­
capitalist social formations. The product of labor, too , was o nly in p art
appropriated by the pro ducers themselves. On the other han d , although
the alien will appears to have been asso ciated primarily with individuals,
since the estrange d life elements were still predo minantly bound by man ,
impersonal , objective relations were also present. Marx 's thesis th at the
division of labor has been an involuntary one ever since the emergence of
private pro perty , which i tself is the result of estranged labor and e xchange ,
i s therefore n o t contradicted . For i n precapitalist society , t h e producers
could not organize all pro duction on the basis of agreement, nor was ex­
change , which in itself causes division of labor , nonexistent.
1 36 ESTRANGEMENT

DISC USSI ON

Given the above assessment o f the nature of precapitalist society , it

must logically be concluded that, since Marx thought the division of labor
was involuntary , in divi duals are estrange d . This purely logical argument
is not contradicted when we consider Marx 's account of co n crete life­
situations under pre capitalist social formations . Thus , it was possible to
show how, according to Marx, in dividuals and their labor power are subject
to an alien will. This subjectio n , as under capital , prevents man from living
according to his nature , with the conse quence that he is estranged. Man is
estranged by virtue of the same evidence an d reasoning Marx himself ap­
plie d in his analysis of estrange ment under capital . The conditions under
which man is estrange d may be different from those of capitalist pro duc­
tio n , but estrange ment nevertheless exists . Man is not free as is the case
under communism where estrange ment is nonexistent (see also MEW,
2 6. 3 , p . 5 1 4; M EW, 4, p . 462).
Marx illustrate d his theory of estrange ment with examples from , and
an analysis of, capitalist society . Therefore , in conne ction with precapital­
ist social formations, he only infre quently uses the term "estrangement" or
"estrange d . " He does mention that under feudalism the earth is estranged
fro m man and "confronts him in the shape of a few great lords. "
He also speaks of landed property as being " alienated (entiiussert)
man" and of precapitalist private property as being "man's
actual externalisation (Entausserung) " and "external to oneself (Sicb­
iiusserlichsein ) " (CW, 3 , p p . 2 9 1 -2 9 3 ; MEW, E B 1 .T . , p p . 5 3 1 -5 3 2 ) . 4
On the whole, however, there is little use of the vocabulary that ac­
companie d Marx's early analysis of capitalist society . Of course , it must
also be pointed out that most of Marx's efforts were not devoted to the
analysis of precapitalist society but primarily to capitalist society , thus
further influencing our ju dgment that he made only scant use of such
terms as Entfre mdung and Entiiusserung in his analysis of precapital ist
society . It would be a mistake, however, to conclu de that Marx's theory
of estrange ment has no validity when it concerns precapitalist society .
This theory shoul d not be assesse d on the basis of purely semantic criteria.
Rather, vocabulary should merely be seen as a "tool " in conveying a p ar­
ticular theory , implying that to some extent at least a theory can be con­
veyed with different sets of vocabulary .
 IS ESTRANGEMENT LIM ITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES? 137

I t follows that once t h e postulates of Marx 's theory of estrangement­

as he illustrates with reference to capitalist society-can clearly be defined
and isolate d, it is also possible to investigate whether the same postulates
are being used in t he analysis of precapitalist social formatio ns. This is the
way we proceeded in this work . First, the postulates of Marx 's theory of
estran ge ment, as he u sed it in his analysis of capitalist society , were identi­
fie d. Then, in the first part of this chapter, it was found that Marx u ses
the same postulates when analyzing precapitalist social formations. The
conclusion was drawn that , although the vocabulary Marx use d seldom in­
clu ded the words "estrange ment" and "alienation , " man can still be said
to be estrange d even under precapitalist social formations (excluding
pri mitive co mmunistic societies) . The major elements of Marx's theory
of estrangement are not the words "estrangement" or "alien ation " or
derivatives thereof, but the notion of the involuntary division of l abor.
This notion also gui des Marx's analysis of pre capitalist so cial forma-
tions ( see also MEW, 3, pp. 68-7 7 ) .

I S M A R X A N ANTI-I NDUSTRIALIST ROMANTICI ST?

Dawydow ( 1 964: 5 0) maintains that Marx had a precon ceived i deal of

the "nature" of work and the "normal " relationship of the worker to his
work according to which he analyzed work under capital . Marx did not
hold such an ideal , however. This is not to say that he did not envision
work as different under communism or that he did not admit th at pre­
capitalist and capitalist work differed . More important for Marx is the
necessity that man be able to subject his labor power and its product to
his o wn will and be able to live according to his nature . This necessity is
the sine qua non of any society in which man is not estrange d , regard-
less of the "nature " of work or the worker's relationship to it. In a society
devoid of estrange ment, man can be envisioned to have many dimensio ns.
Such a vision of man may al�o be justified for communism. H o wever,
Marx never maintains that man in a society devoid of estrangement must
be many-sided an d that work must be of a certain nature . Neither estrange­
ment nor nonestrangement is seen to depend on a definition of the ideal
nature of work. It does, however, fully depend on whether one 's labor
power an d pro duct of labor are subject to an alien will . Following Daw­
y do w's suggestion that Marx has a preconceived ideal of the n ature of
1 38 ESTRANGEMENT

work when analyzing work under capital , I srael ( 1 97 1 : 2 6 3 ) asserts that

this ideal was influenced by the romanticist criticism of industrial society :

The i deas concerning self-realization appear now to have been in­

fluence d by the existing conditions in preindustrialized, p re-capitalist
society , being a part of the romanticist criticism of industrialized
society. Among other things this criticism contained nostalgi c , though
probably not very realistic , views as to the work situation of the artisan ,
whose situation probably influenced Marx's ideal . The artisan could
perhaps be seen as able to realize himself in his work activity . 5

A closer look at the writings of Marx reveals that Israel 's suggestion is not
very convincing. It is, of course , true that Marx thought pre c ap italist so ciety
was less rule d than capitalist society by forces not controlle d by man . He
also admits that feu dal society , for example , offered certain guarantees
an d degrees of freedom that were afterwards lost . It is also true that Marx
believed that labor under the guild-corporation system was "still half
artistic , half end-in-itself etc. Mastery , " and that the capitalist was him-
self still a master-journeyman 6 ( G , p. 497 ; MEW, G , p. 3 9 7 ) :

His position as master rests not only on his ownership of the condi­
tions of pro duction , but also on his o wn skill in the particular work .
With the pro duction of capital an d fro m the very outset , the point is
not this half-artistic relation to labour-which corresponds gene rally
with the develo p ment of the use value of labour, the devel opment of
particular abilities of direct manual work , the formation of the human
han d etc. The point fro m the outset is mass , because the point is ex­
change value and surplus value . The principle of developed capital is
precisely to make special skill superfluous , and to make manual work
directly physical labour, generally superfluous both as skill and as
muscular exertion ( G , p. 5 8 7 ; MEW, G, pp. 48 1 -482 ) . 7

Even the guild-corporation system , which was not tied to the landholding
class, made some material guarantees for the workers and human bonds
that were lost u nder capital. " As j ourneyman (a genuine one) there is a
certain communality in the consumption fund possessed by the master .
While it is not the j ourney man 's property either, still , through the laws
 IS ESTRANGEMENT L I M ITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES? 1 39

of the guild, traditio n etc . , at least co-possession etc . " ( G , p . 498 ; MEW,
G, p. 397).
W e may therefore conclude that precapitalist, p reindustrial society of­
fere d con ditions that in some ways were more dignifying than the wage
slavery by which it was replaced. The estranged elements of life were still
pre do minantly controlle d by man rather than man being controlled by
the forces of exchange which escaped the control of the participants.
While Marx recognized t hese comparative differences, it would be a mis­
take to think he was i dealizing preindustrial , pre capitalist so ciety . 8 For
example , when discussing primitive accumulatio n , the early accumula­
tion of capital , Marx suggests that it could occur only by tran sforming
serfs and slaves into wage laborers and by means of "the expropria-
tion of the i mme diate produ cers , i . e . , the dissolution of private property
base d on the labour of its o wner" (C l , p. 7 1 3 ) . This mean s , of course ,
that the immediate producers also became wage laborers . Historically ,

private pro perty of the labourer in his means of pro ductio n is the
foun datio n of petty industry , whether agricultural , manufacturing ,
or bot h ; petty industry , again , is an essential condition fo r the de­
velo pment of social production and of the free individuality of the
labourer himself. Of course , this petty mode of productio n exists
also under slavery , serfdo m, and other states of depen den ce . But it
flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy , it attains its adequate classical
form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means
of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he
cultivates , the artisan of the tool which he han dles as a virtuoso (C 1 ,
p . 7 1 3 ; M EW, 2 3 , p . 789) .

Again , Marx alludes to the fact that the artisan 's work was h al f artistic.
Ho wever, he immediately points out the historical limits of this mode
of pro ductio n in both agriculture an d industry :

This mode of pro duction pre-supposes p arcelling of the soil , an d

scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the con­
centration of these means of production , so it also excludes co­
o peration , division of labour within each seperate pro cess of pro­
duction, the co ntrol over, and the productive application of the forces
1 40 ESTRANGEMENT

of Nature by society , an d the free develo pment of the social pro­

ductive powers . I t is co mpatible only with a system of pro duction ,
and a society , moving within n arrow and more or less primitive bounds .
To perpetuate it would be , as Pecqueur rightly say s , "to de cree uni­
versal mediocrity . " At a certain stage of development it brings forth
the material agencies for its o wn dissolution . Fro m that moment new
forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society ; but the
old social organisation fetters them an d keeps them down . It must
be annihilate d ; it is annihilated. I ts annihilation , the transformation
of the individualise d an d scattere d means of pro duction i nto socially
con centrated ones, of the pigmy pro perty of the many into the huge
pro perty of the few . . . . Self-earned private property , that is base d ,
s o to say on t h e fusing together of the isolate d , independent labour­
ing-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by
capitalist private property , which rests on exploitation of the nominal­
ly free labour of others, i.e . , on wage-labour (C l , pp. 7 1 3 -7 1 4 ; MEW,
2 3 , pp. 7 89-7 90) .

Marx writes these words without any sign of regret for what was "lost"
as a result of the advance of the capitalist mo de of pro duction . In this
respect , he differs remarkably from the ro manticists who mo urn the old
social order disappearing in the face of rising capital.

I n earlier stages of develo p ment the single individual seems to be

developed more fully , because he has not yet worked out his relation­
ships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powe rs
and relations o pposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return
to that ori gi nal fullness as it is to believe that with this complete empti­
ness history has co me to a standstill . The bourgeois viewpoint has never
advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this ro mantic view­
point, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis
up to its blessed end (G, p. 1 6 2 ; MEW, G, p. 80) .

In summary , Marx recognizes the differences between the capitalist and

precapitalist mode of production and the individual 's fuller development
in precapitalist society . Even though for him work in precapitalist society
often assu mes half-artistic proportions, he does not endorse it as an ideal
 IS ESTRANGEMENT L I MITED TO CAP IT ALI ST SOCIETIES? 141

to b e pursue d or regained. There are two reasons fo r this . First , h i s ideal

is communism, which is based on the development of the productive forces
of man . Precapitalist production is little developed , however, and p re­
cludes further development . Thus , it effectively excludes itself as an e x­
ample of pro duction under communism as envisioned by Marx . 9 And since
the pre capitalist artisan with his half-artistic work cannot be separated
from t he mode of pro duction in which he was active , he , too , is effectively
exclude d as an example of productive activity under communism. On this
basis , Marx can say that it is ridiculous to yearn for a return to that o riginal
fullness of the individual at earlier stages of development . He would there­
fore agree with t hose who maintain that it is unrealistic to desire the re­
e mergence of a society of artisans. However, those who hold such views
often wrongly assert that Marx's vie w of the ideal society en tails such an
unrealistic desire .
That Marx cannot legitimately be criticize d , as Israel does , for having
been influenced by ro manticist , unrealistic , and nostalgic criticism of in­
dustrialized society is evident through yet another example . In The Po verty
of Philosophy, he criticizes Proudhon in the following way :

M. Proudhon , not having un derstood even this one revolution ary side
of the automatic workshop, takes a step backward and proposes to the
worker that he make not only the twelfth part of a pin, but su ccessively
all twelve parts of it. The worker would thus come to kno w and realise
t he pin. This is M. Prou dhon 's synthetic labour . . . .
To sum u p , M . Proudhon has not gone further than the petty­
bourgeois i deal . An d to realise this ideal , he can think of nothing bet­
ter than to take us back to the j ourneyman or, at most, to the master
craftsman of the Middle Ages. It is enough , he say s somewhere in his
boo k , to have create d a masterpiece once in one 's life , to have felt
o neself j ust once to be a man . Is not this, in fo rm as in co ntent , the
masterpiece deman de d by the craft guild of the Middle Ages (CW6 ,
p . 1 90 ; MEW, 4, p . 1 5 7 ) . 1 0

Here we see that Marx 's vision of the future does not exclude techniques
of pro duction that are generally associated with in dustrial so ciety , the
automatic factory being a case in point. In additio n , Marx 's observation
that "the auto matic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idio cy " (CW6 ,
1 42 ESTRANGEMENT

p. 1 90) and is revolutionary must be taken seri ously . On the basis of a

higher level of productivity , Marx foresees a new type of fullness of in­
dividual development , a fullness that is not modeled after that of earlier
stages of development:

What characterises the division of labour inside modem so ciety is th at

it engen ders specialities, specialists, an d with them craft-idiocy . . . .
What characterises the division of labour in the automatic work­
sho p is that labour has there co mpletely lost its specialised character .
But the mo ment every special development stops, the need for uni­
versality , the tendency towards an integral development o f the indi­
vidual begins to be felt (CW 6 , p . 1 90 ; MEW, 4, p. 1 5 7 ) .

Marx does n o t envision t h e ideal society a s o n e in which labor pro ductivity

is low and in which the individual develops that type of fullness associated
with the pre capitalist artisan . Rather, he sees the productive p o wer of man
to be high , enabling the in dividual under communism to develop in ways
hitherto unknown .
This brings u s t o the second reason why Marx does not endorse th e quasi­
artistic natu re of the precapitalist mode of pro duction as an ideal to be pur­
sue d. He does not picture communism as a society in which the means of
productio n are split and held by many individuals , since "it i s the associa­
tion of in dividuals (assu ming the advance d stage of modern productive
forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development an d
movement of individuals u n der their control " (CW 5 , p . 80; MEW, 3 , p . 7 5 ) .
Yet, precapitalist production was based on the fact that many owned the
means of production necessary to maintain themselves through th eir in­
dividual and isolated labor (Selbstbe tiitigung, or self-activity ) . Marx calls
this type of activity "one-side d" (CW 5 , p. 8 2 ) , and he maintain s that "al­
though isolated labour (its material conditions presupposed) can also create
use values, it can create neither wealth nor culture " (CGP, p. 5 ; MEW , 1 9 ,
p . 1 7) .
Again , Marx hands down a strong indictment o f the type of work found
in precapitalist, preindustrial society . But there is another basis for the re­
j ection of this type of work which relates to Marx's notion o f the develop­
ment of the individual . This development is still incomplete in precapitalist
societies . (See also the discussion on the development of the individual in
chapter 7 . ) Although the artisans owned the means for their self-activity ,
 IS ESTRANGEMENT L I M ITED TO CAP IT ALI ST SOCIETIES? 1 43

"they the mselves remained subordinate to the division of labour an d their

o wn instrument of productio n " (CW 5 , p . 8 8 ; M EW , 3, p . 68 ) . Under com­
munism, however, man will no longer be subject to the involuntary division
of labor, thus enabling "the development of a totality of capacities" (CW5 ,
p. 8 7 ; MEW, 3 , p . 68) .
These two factors then-lack of pro du ctivity an d the concomitant lack
of develo p ment of the individual in pre capitalist society-show why Marx
is not an anti-in dustrial romanticist. Co mmunist society , after capital has
"laid the appro priate foun dations," is seen as the only society in which the
fullest possible develo p ment of the individual can occur. This development
cannot be understood to mean that in dividuals will become latter-day
artisans, since the mode of production will vary greatly fro m th at of pre­
capitalist societies. Ho wever, this in itself does not preclude th at individuals
will not also be artists.

NOTE S

1 . For Marx, "estranged labour is t h e direct cause of private property " ( C W , 3 ,

p. 2 8 0 ; M EW, E B 1 .T., p. 5 2 1 ). This does not contradict his postulate that the in­
voluntary division of l abor and private property occurred simultaneously, since
the immediate conse quence of the ap propriation of the l abor power o f others by
some is private pro perty.
2. Similarly in M EW, G, p . 8 1 .
3 . I t could b e said t hat Marx contradicts himself in Capital. There h e says that ,
since personal de pendence characterizes the social relations of produ ction in the
Mi ddle Ages and

personal dependence forms the ground-work of society , there is no necessity

for labour and its products to assume a fantastic form different from their
reality. They take the shape , in the transactions of society , of services in kind
and payments in kind. Here the particular and natural form of labour, and not ,
as in a society based on production of commodities, its general ab stract form
is the immediate social form of labour (C l , p p . 8 1 -8 2 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 9 1 ) .

While h e admits i n the Grun drisse that objective relations exist under the feudal
order, the above statement could be considered contradictory . A closer loo k at
another passage in Capital may resolve this apparent contradiction :

[ F ) ro m t h e moment there is a free sale , b y t h e l abourer h i mself, of l a b o u r­

power as a commodity . . . that commodity production is generalised and
becomes the typical form of production . . . . O nly when and whe re wage­
labour is its basis does commodity production impose itself upon society
as a whole. (C l , p p . 5 5 0-5 5 1 ; MEW, 2 3 , p . 6 1 3 ) .
1 44 ESTRANGEMENT

Hence, commo dity production did exist u n der feu dalism, which in itself coul d
represent one form o f obj ective rel ations in addition t o military subordination .
Rather, the co mmo dity production remains limited as long as perso n al dependence
persists. The matter is one of emphasis.
4. In the Manuscripts, Marx writes that "all human activity hitherto h as been
labour-that is, indu stry-activity estranged from itself" (CW, 3, p. 3 0 3 ; M E W , E B
1 .T . , p p . 542- 5 4 3 ) .
Commenting on t h e economic the ory of t h e P hysiocrats, Marx points o u t that
"Physiocracy represents directly the decomposition of feu dal property i n eco­
nomic terms, but it therefore just as directly rep resents its economic metamor­
phosis and restoration, save that now its langu age is no longer feu dal but e co­
nomic . " However, with the P hysiocrats "labour is not yet grasped i n its gen erality
and abstractio n : it is still bound to a particular natural element as its matter, and
it is therefore only recognise d i n a particular mode of existence deter mined by
nature. It is therefore still only a specific, particular alien ation of man . " (CW,
3 , p. 2 9 2 ; M EW, E B 1 .T . , pp. 5 3 1 - 5 3 2 ) .
5 . I srael seems t o have su perimposed the notion o f self-real ization o n the
though t of Marx. To my knowledge, Marx docs not use a notion of self-realization
to analyze the worker 's situation. If this notion has any place in Marx 's thought,
it is in conjunction with the notion that man should be able to subj e ct his labor
power to his o wn will an d to appropriate the product of his l abor. It is inappropriate ,
however, for I srael to view sel f-realization as a negative fu nction of indu strial society
and as a positive fu nction of preindu strial society. It would be equally inappropriate
to view the notion of self-re al ization in psychological terms. Shoul d one want to de­
fine self-realization in terms of l abor as a manifestation an d devel opment of human
capacities, Marx would reply by saying: " How cou l d l abour ever be anything but
a ' manifestation of human capacities' ? " (CW, 5, p. 482; MEW, 3, p. 4 7 1 ) .
6. "Capitalist himself still master-journeyman " (G, p . 497). Here the word
"capitalist " is u se d in the figurative sense , indicating that the master does own the
consumption fu nd, a great p art, if not all , of the means of pro du ction (see also
MEW, G, p. 3 9 7 ) , an d does extract a surplus from his workers. However, neither
wage labor nor exchange has yet developed fully. C ap ital is therefore not truly
capital and the maste r is not a capitalist as Marx generally uses the term .
7. At another place in t h e Grundrisse, Marx states:

For exampl e , in guild and craft l abour, where capital itself still has a limited
form, an d is still entirely i mmersed in a p articular substance, hence is not yet
capital as such, Jabou r, too, appears as still immerse d in its particular sp ecificity :
not in the totality an d abstraction of labour as such, in which it confronts
capital . That is to say that l abour is of course in each singl e case a specific
labour, b u t ca p i tal can come i n to relation with every specific labour (G, p p .
296-297 ; MEW, G, p. 2 04) .

8. Th is is j ust as much a mistake as it would be to label Marx a mere t rade un ion­

ist on the basis that he supp orts the attempts of workers to obtain a higher wage
at the expense of the capitalists' profi t (WPP, p p . 7 7-78 ; MEW, 1 6, p p . 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 ) .
 IS ESTRANGEMENT LIM ITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES? 145

9 . Only through capital , at the expense of the laborer's private o wnership

of his means o f produ ction , does further development occur.
10. Referring to the modern farmer, the cap italist and the worker , he asserts
that

they feel an attachment only for the price of their pro du ctio n , the monetary
produ ct. Hence the jere miads of the reactionary parties, who offer up all
their prayers for the return of feu dalism, of the goo d old patriarchal l ife , of
the simple manners and the virtu es of our forefathers. The subje ction of the
soil to the laws which dominate all other in dustries is an d always will be the
subject of intereste d condolences (CW6, p. 2 0 2 ; MEW, 4 , p. 1 70) .

Note that Marx calls those w h o envision o r call for a retu rn of t h e precap italist
mode of pro du ction reactionaries. Thus, he politically rejects those values which
some claim are present in his thought. A similar rej ection occurs in the Manifesto
when petty-bourgeois socialism is being discusse d :

I n its positive aims, however, this form of social ism aspires e ither t o restoring the
ol d means of pro du ction and of exchan ge , and with them the old p roperty rela­
tions, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of produ ction and
of exchan ge , within the framework of the ol d property relations that have been ,
an d were bou n d to be , exploded by those means. In e ither case , it is both reaction­
ary an d Utopian (CW6, pp. 509- 5 1 0; M EW, 4, p. 48 5 ) .
9
THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT

Before anything can be said about the scope and applicability of Marx's
theory of estrange ment, we must clarify whether it is legitimate to speak
of only one theory of estrange ment. If it is not legitimate to speak of only
one theory , it will have to be specified which theory of estrangement is
referred to when addressing the a pplicability of Marx's theory of estrange­
ment.
So me stu dents of Marx maintain that he abandone d the terms "estrange­
ment" an d "alienatio n " in his later work , an d based on this assertion , they
argue that Marx also abandone d or change d his theory of estrangement.
This argu ment is weak on at least two counts. First , t he content of a theory
should not, and cannot, be evaluated solely on the basis of whether a certain
vocabulary is present. Thus, by investigating the properties of Marx 's theory
of estrange ment in the foregoing analysis, it was p ossible to show that these
pro perties do not change , although the vocabulary may undergo some
changes. It was shown that Marx's theory of estrange ment is derived from
his definition of hu man natu re, a definition that is p resen t in b oth his early
and later work. Man is said to be estrange d if, contrary to his n ature , he is
prevente d from subjecting his labor power, as well as the product of his
labor, to his o wn will . If one is so prevented , the existence of an involun­
tary division of labor can be implie d . If, therefore, it can be shown that
1 48 ESTRANGEMENT

Marx, throughout his work, maintained the same definition of human na­
ture as well as his search for a society with a voluntary divisio n of labor,
it can be concluded that his theory of estrangement remaine d the same
throughout his work , regardless of any changes in his vocabulary from the
early to the later writings . As shown above , Marx adhered to an unaltered
definition of human nature , and the notion of an involuntary division of
labor is absolutely central to his theory of estrangement. Throughout his
work , he viewed the desirable society as one with a voluntary division of
labor and , therefore, free fro m estrangement. As a conse quen ce , we can
conclude that Marx's theory of estrangement re mained the same .
Second, those who maintain that Marx abandoned or ch anged his theory
of estrange ment on t he b asis that he abandoned the terms "alienation " and
"estrange ment , " are at least partially incorrect in their assertions. In an
excellent treatment of the subject, Meszaros ( 1 97 2 ) shows that in many in­
stances Marx continued to use the above terms in his later works and did
not abandon them at all. 1 As can be seen from t he quotes given so far,
this study confirms Mesza'.ros' assessment. Marx did , indeed m ake use of
the terms in his later writings , though not as fre quently as in his Man u ­
scripts , an d h i s theory o f estrange ment re mains u n change d throughout his
works sin ce the theory 's properties were never abandoned or altered .
Israel ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 6 ) suggests that Marx abandoned his theory of estrange­
ment for a theory of reification . He bases this argu ment on the assertion
that Marx change d his theory of hu man nature . Before the Theses o n
Feuerbacb, I srael claims , Marx adhered to a philosophical anthropological
position which claims

a general abstract hu man nature which contrasts with t he idea that

hu man nature is a historically determined product that changed as
societal conditions change . In the sixth of his "Theses on Feuerbach "
Marx explicitly rejects this anthropologi cal position by asserting th at
man 's nature is the totality of his societal relations. By doing so he
also re moved one of the essential pre conditions for his theory of aliena­
tion. I t was abandone d , but reappeared in a new form as the th eory
of reification ( Israel, 1 9 7 6 : 47). 2

I srael' s position, shared by LeoGrande, ( 1 9 7 7 ) is fundamen tally in­

correct, however. While Marx undisputably took Feuerbach to task for
not seeing man in an historical light, his theory of estrangement was never
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S TIIEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 149

based on a theory of human nature that did not take h istory into account.
Rather , as shown in Chapter 2, this theory was derived fro m a biological
definition o f human natu re. This definitio n is not subj ect to the historical
relativism argu ment, an argument with which Marx not only criticizes
Feuerbach's understanding of human nature but also Bentham's and
others'. The biological definition is empirically arrived at by comparing
man with animals. This becomes in the thought of Marx "human nature
in general , " while those aspects of human nature that are subj e ct to his­
torical change signify "human nature as modified in each h istorical period . "
A s pointed o u t earlier in a different context, I srael does not note t h i s very
important distinction. Thus, he reaches some wrong conclusions con cern­
ing Marx's adherence to his theory of estrangement as formu lated in the
Manuscripts. That I srael does not appreciate this distin ction fully can be
observed in the following passage which , consequently , is very unclear.
Israel says that Marx differentiates between " ( 1 ) ' human nature at a given
historical period' being a consequence of man 's existing social relations
and ( 2 ) man 's 'general human nature as it is changed in the historical
process' , though always being a consequence of the so cial relations he
has create d himself" (I srael 1 97 1 : 5 7 ) . 3
Israel 's and LeoGrande 's thesis presents some additional pro blems. First,
as shown in Chapter 2, those who argue that Marx did not c onceive human
nature to be socially con ditioned until he wrote the Theses o n Feuerbacb
are factually incorrect. 4 Second, it is not meaningful to argu e that Marx
aban doned his early theory of estrange ment in favor of a theory of reifica­
tion, since even his early and only theory of estrangement is a theory of
reification. The present study shows abundant evidence 5 that in his early
work Marx already perceived man under capital to be dominated by an
alien will an d alien forces, by the products of his own labor. Pre cisely
this element of reification has always distinguished Marx 's concept of
estrangement from Hegel's, in which estrangement is seen to result from
the mere objectification of labor. 6 We do not argue here that Marx paid
the same attention to the processes of reification in his Man uscrip ts as
he did in his later works starting with the German Ideology . However,
a distinction between his theory of estrangement and his theory of reifica­
tion is not only arbitrary but also unj ustified. The differential attention
he paid to processes of reification is quite a different matter, since Marx 's
theory of estrangement is categorically also a theory of reifi c ation . Man
is estranged because both his labor power and the product of h is labor
1 50 ESTRANGEMENT

are subject to an alien will , that is, because man is subj ect to an involuntary
division of labor, a division that he controls neither at his place of work
nor in the society at large . Under communism, this would not be so and
estrangement would be abolished.

THE QU ESTION O F B E I N G M O R E O R LESS ESTRANGED

The secondary literature dealing with Marx 's theory of estrangement

often asserts that estrangement can have different magnitudes. That is,
Marx's theory of estrangement is viewed in such a way that estrange-
ment as such is seen to exist to a greater or lesser exte nt . 7 For example ,
Ollman ( 1 97 6 : 1 3 2 , 245-246, 2 5 2 , 3 08) generally speaks of degrees of
estrangement, as does Meszaros ( 1 97 2 : 249) and Petrovic ( 1 9 6 7 : 149- 1 5 0) ,
while Mandel and Novack ( 1 9 7 3 : 4 3 ) and Meszaros ( 1 9 7 2 : 249) speak of
progressive de-estrangement, or a .Qecreasing trend of estrangement. Archi­
bal d ( 1 97 6: 69-70) speaks of differences of estrangement among classes,
"between capitalist and n on-capitalist societies" and between " currently
capitalist societies and their own histories . "
According t o Marx , all estrangement i s essentially re ducible t o the
fact that man is subject to an alien will , that is, an involuntary division
of labor. Moreover, man under precapitalist social formations can also be
said to be estrange d as long as the division of labor can be shown to be an
involuntary one. Whether it be the involuntary division of labor under
feu dalism or capitalism, estrangement remains estrangemen t . Estrange­
ment, which for Marx is the byproduct of any involuntary division of
labor, is therefore a qualitative an d not a quantitative pheno menon . If
Marx is not to be misinterpreted, estrangement must be viewed as a di­
choto mous phenomenon. It exists wherever man is prevented from liv­
ing according to his nature, as a result of the subjection of his labor
power an d the product of his labor to an alien will . It ceases to exist
under co mmunism where man is free from the domination of other
men and where the division of labor is therefore a voluntary one. Marx 's
concept of estrangement cannot therefore be interpreted as a phenom­
enon of different magnitu des. Man either is or is not estranged ; estrange­
ment either exists or it does not exist. This position is the direct logical
consequence of Marx 's theory of estrangement as interprete d here . I f
it is correct, then no evidence t o t h e contrary should be found in the
writings of Marx , and indeed , this seems to be the case .
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 151

Marx does, of course , mention that the alien forces that control man
have beco me more powerful, and increasingly so , ever since the emergen ce
of private pro perty an d the involuntary division of labor.

I n the present e poch , the do mination of material relations over in­

divi duals, an d the suppression of individuality by fortuitous circum­
stan ces , has assumed its sharpest an d most universal form , thereby
setting existing in dividuals a very definite task . It has set them the
task of replacing the do mination of circumstances an d of chance
over in dividuals by the do mination of individuals over ch ance and
circumstances . . . . This task, dictate d by present-day relations, coin­
cides with the task of organising society in a communist way (CW5 ,
p. 4 3 8 ; MEW, 3 , p. 424).

In the Holy Fa mily , he writes :

All co mmunist an d socialist writers proceeded from the observation

that . . . all progress of the Spirit had so far been progress against the
mass of mankin d, driving it into an ever more dehumanised situation .
They therefore declare d "progress" (see Fo urier) to be an inadequate ,
abstract phrase; they assumed (see Owen among others) a fundamental
flaw in the civilized wo rld ( CW , 4 , p. 84 ; M E W , 2, p. 8 8 ; see also MEW,
E B 1 .T. , p. 5 4 3 ) .

When Marx says that the alien forces that control man are becoming
more an d more powerful, he is referring to the consequences of estrange­
ment an d not of estrangement as such . While the consequen ces of estrange­
ment can be viewe d as more or less severe (that is, they can be viewed in
terms of magnitu de) , this is quite different fro m viewing estrangement as
such in terms of a magnitude. Even when Marx uses the term "estrange ­
ment" (Entfremdung) in t h i s context , it designates the alien force th at in­
creasingly do minates man in the form o f the obje ctive conditions of pro­
duction, that is, capital . The conversion of surplus labor into capital or
accu mulation "reveals that . . . unpaid labour of the worker confronts
his as the to tality of the o bjective co nditio ns of lab o ur. In this form it c on­
fro nts him as an alien property with the result that the capital which is
antecedent to his labour, ap pears to be independent of it" (TS 3 , p . 3 5 2 ;
1 52 ESTRANGEMENT

MEW, 26. 3 , p. 3 44). At another place, the same theme is fu rther elaborated
in the following way :

With the advance in the productivity of so cial labour, accompanied

as it is by the growth of constant capital , a relatively ever increasing
part of the annual pro duct of labour will , therefore , fall to the share
of capital as such , and thus property in the form of capital (apart from
revenue) will be constantly increasing and proportionately that part of
value which the individual worker and even the working cl ass creates ,
will b e steadily decreasing, compared with the product of their p ast
labour that confronts them as capital. The alienation and the antagonism
between labour-po wer an d the objective con ditions of labour which
have beco me independent in the form of capital , thereby grow con­
tinuously (TS 2 , p . 4 1 6 ; MEW, 2 6 . 2 , pp. 4 1 7-4 1 8) . 8

Clearly , in the context in which the term Entfremdung is use d here , it does
not designate categoric estrangement , that is, that man is estranged because
his labor po wer and the pro duct of his labor are subject to an alien will .
Rather, it signifies that , given categoric estrangement , the consequences
t hereof become more and more overpowering. The alien property con­
fron ting the worker is in creasingly powerful. The categorically estranged
product of man 's labor confronts him in ever more "estranging " ways,
being ever more drastic to his existence and survival as a human being.
During feudalism, the estrange d elements of life tended to be bound by
man ( see Chapter 8), thus pro ducing conditions that were ofte n more digni­
fying. This is not the case under capital . In both cases, however, man is
estrange d because of his subjection to an i nvoluntary division of labor.
It must therefore be concluded that Marx clearly distingu ishes between
estrange ment as such an d the consequences of estrangemen t . The con­
se quences of estrange ment do not reflect on the magnitude o f estrange­
ment as suc h , inasmuch as estrangement as such is a qualit ative and not a
quantitative pheno meno n . Indeed, the Marxian system of thought allows
for only a se paration between estrangement as such and the conse quences
of estrangement . It can be shown in many ways that a distin ction must be
made between the two if Marx 's theory of estrangement is not to be vio­
lated. Several of these ways will be discussed here.
If estrangement were thought to have a magnitu de , it would logically
have to be conclude d that man 's estrangement is greater or less be cause
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 153

his subjection to an alien will is greater or less . As can imme diately be

seen , ho wever, this is an absurd conclusion inasmuch as an alien will re­
mains an alien will , for "alien will" or "involuntary division of labor"
are qualitiative and not quantitative phenomena.
The objection may be made that subjection to an alien will may o ccur
only part of the ti me , or for some peo ple not at all . Hence , i t could be
maintaine d that under feu dalism, the serf was forced to wor k the land of
the lord only during some days of the week, while on the other days of
the week he was allowe d to care for his o wn subsistence by working his
o wn lan d . In additio n , the example of the capitalist may be give n , who
is forced neither to sell his labor power nor to p ro duce a product th at
could become subject to an alien will . The answer to this objection lies
first in t he recognition t hat Marx himself does not distinguish between
the estrange ment of the capitalist an d that of the worker in qu antitative
terms. He believes they are both estrange d , although he considers the con­
sequences of the capitalist 's estrange ment to be different from those of
the worker. 9 For the capitalist , estrangement at least has conse quences
that entail the "se mblance of a human existen ce . "
The capitalist i s also subj e ct t o the involuntary division o f labor . As
has already been pointed out , he is merely the human agent of capital ,
an d as a hu man being he is subject to forces that he does not contro l .
An example of t h i s control is competition which regulates t h e capitalist 's
activities in terms of investment and exchange of products. In fact, his
class status as a capitalist designates his involvement in an involuntary
division of labor . 1 0
Fro m t h e vantage p o i n t of Marx 's theory of t h e development of the
in divi dual , the capitalist cannot develo p freely and fully , even if he
manages to live in luxury . Marx's pronouncement on the Ro man nobility
may be applied in this context . Although in ancient Rome " the in­
dividuals may a ppear great , . . . "there can be no conception here of a
free and full develo pment either of the individual or of the society , since
such develo pment stands in contradiction to the original relati o n " (see
chapter 7, footnote 8). As a consequence, unless all are free from domina­
tion of man by man , the development of individuals remains limited even
for those whose life has "the semblance of a human existence . " We there­
fo re agree with Oilman ( 1 9 7 6: 1 5 6) when he says that the capitalist's
estrange ment also "stands out not only in all he is but in all he is not.
Communist fulfillment is equally unavailable to both classes . " This relates
1 54 ESTRANGEMENT

to our discussion of the estrangement from the species and fro m man .
Since the interaction among human beings in situations where man
do minates man is not in accord with the n ature of the specie s , man is said
to be estranged fro m the species and from one another. Although the
capitalist , like the Ro man , may h ave abundant time an d resources, his
in dividual development remains stunted . The reason is that he is not
interacting with others according to the natural ability of the species,
that is, in such a way that the "need on the part of one can be satisfied
by the product of the other." (See also Chapter 2 . )
Fro m various points of view, then , Marx's concept o f estrange ment
cannot be viewe d as a quantity rather than as a quality . Estrangement
as such , which is a qualitative phenomenon , must be strictly distinguished
fro m the conse quences of estrange ment , which is a quantitat ive phenom­
enon . Stu dents of Marx have too often failed to make this important
distinction . As a result , even if unknowingly , Marx is inter preted from a
reformist perspective. Regardless of the consequences of estrangement,
the only society Marx advocate d was one free fro m estrangement-free
fro m any do minati o n of man by man . It is therefore impossible to
measure estrange ment without misinterpreting Marx in the process .
Conse quently , Archibal d's ( 1 97 6 : 6 9-70) suggestion that we measure
what Marx calle d estrangement, in o rder to determine differences in
estrangement among classes and societies, is very misleading.
Seeman bases his rationale for his work o n estrangement o n the
same misleading atte mpt to measure what Marx calls estrangement .
Seeman says that his work represents an atte mpt to " make mo re or­
gani ze d sense of one of the great traditions in sociological though t ; and
to make t he traditional interest in alienation more amenable to sh arp
empirical state ment" ( Seeman , 1 9 5 9 : 5 1 1 ) . He reiterates this rationale
in his paper "The Urban Alienation : Some Dubious Theses from Marx
to Marcuse" :

T o speak o f dubious theses about alienation i s t o suggest an interest

in secularizing this more or less "sacre d " concept ; it is to suggest
that there is so mething here about which an empirical demonstration
has to be made-the critical , evocative , and even ro mantic spirit that
has infused the literature on alienation , whatever its very valid uses
in so me respects , being no substitute for clarity an d rigor (Seeman ,
1 97 l a : l 3 5) .
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 155

As well intentioned as Seeman 's position may be , it misses the point.

What Marx calle d estrange ment is in need neither of "clarity and rigor,"
nor of a "sharp e m pirical " statement of the kind Seeman intends to
provide . I t can simply not be measure d , although Marx himself derived
what he called estrange ment empirically . Admittedly , the empiri cal
catego ries Marx used are of a different empirical order than those See-
man has in min d. Nevertheless, they are empirical categories . By i nvestigat­
ing t he differences between man and animal , Marx determines what he
calls human nature in general . As a result of being subject to an involuntary
division of labor, however, man is prevented fro m living according to his
nature an d is estrange d . Marx's notion of estrangement is a s traigh tforward ,
logical procedure based on empirical data. Thus , man is estranged as long
as his labor po wer an d the product of h is labor are subject to an alien will.
Ho wever-an d this point See man and others fail to re cognize -the subjec­
tion to an alien will is an occurrence of a dichotomous kind ; the subjec­
tion either exists or it does not exist, an d it is therefore not measurable
in terms of quantitities.

WHAT MARX CALLS ESTRANGEMENT: A CAUSE OF

C E RTAI N I D E NTI FIABLE BEHAVI O R O R ATTITUDES ?

Stu dents of Marx in various disciplines have been mistaken not only
in their atte mpt to measure estrangement , but also in viewing estrange­
ment as such as the cause of certain identifiable behavior or attitudes .
This i s true o f those who are concerne d with operationalizing and measur­
ing estrangement as well as of Schaff ( 1 9 7 0a : 1 0 7 , 1 3 5 , 22 3 , 2 2 5 , 2 2 7 ),
who im plies that estrange ment le ads to "the arms race , " "national ism , "
"racial hatre d , " "religious intolerance , " "certain forms o f family organiza­
tio n , " " depersonalization ," "impoverishment of hu man personality , "
a n d "discrepancies in artistic tastes a n d o pinio n s . " Israel ( 1 9 7 1 : 8 3 -84)
makes similar inferences. He postulates that if individuals are unable to
live according to their hu man nature , as Marx understan ds it, they will
experience estrange ment. To assume that individuals can experience
their estrange ment presu pposes that i ndividuals can make causal inferen ces
as to which feelings are caused by what Marx calls estrangement and which
feelings are caused by so mething else . The e mphasis here is not on whether
the feelings can be i dentified perfectly. Rather , it is on the implicit or
explicit assu mption , which stu dents of Marx often hol d , that Marx's
1 56 ESTRANGEMENT

theory of estrange ment lends itself to making c ausal inferences. Accord­

ing to this assumptio n , it is postulated , for example , that estrangement
causes certain identifiable feelings or "disl:repan cies in artistic tastes
and o pinions. " 1 1 The interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement
given in this stu dy , however, shows this view to be incorrect .
The reasons why behavior, feelings , or attitudes cannot meaningfully
be said to be caused by estrangement lie in the lack of variance. Thus ,
nothing is known about the state of nonestrangement (true communism) .
Neither is estrange ment under feudalism or capitalism seen to exist in
greater or lesser quantities; rather, Marx views it as a dichotomous phenom­
eno n . As a result, variance can not be obtaine d from historical comparisons.
The same holds true for inter or intrasocietal comparisons, since there as
well estrange ment does not lend itself to measurement.
Hen ce , man is estrange d, because he is subject to an involuntary divi-
sion of labor, but it is impossible to determine how estrangement c auses
certain i dentifiable behavior, feelings , or attitudes. Theoretically , such a
determination could be made only if it was possible to observe behavior,
feelings, or attitu des u n der conditions of nonestrangement or various degrees
of e st ra n ge me nt . Therefore , any h y pothesis or claim i m p l y i ng that estrange ­
ment, as defined by Marx, is the cause of certain identifiable kinds of be­
havior, feelings , or attitu des in the present society must be termed specula­
tive an d cannot be verifie d empirically because of a lack of variance . 1 2 Of
course , we maintain that what Marx calls estrangement is no t m anifest in
certain ty pes of behavior, attitu des , or feelings ; this woul d clearly be an
untenable positio n . According to Marx's theory of estrangement, it is im­
possible to i dentify which particular behavior, attitudes, or feelings are
caused by the fact that man is estranged and therefore would not exist
under n onestrangement. I srael and Schaff are not the only scholars who
point to estrangement as the cause of certain identifiable behavior, feel-
ings , or attitudes. Others (Strmiska, 1 97 4 : 1 1 2 an d Rousset, 1 97 4 : 2 5 1 ,
for example ) are also mistaken o n this point, although some , for example,
Israel ( 1 97 1 ) and Gabel , et al. ( 1 9 74) are very critical of previous attempts
to measure estrange ment.
Nu merous social scientists whose intention it is to measure estrangement
also view estrange ment as a cause and often theoretically link their enter­
prise with Marx 's theory of estrange ment ( Dean , 1 9 6 1 ; Barakat , 1 9 6 9 ;
See man , 1 9 5 9, 1 97 l a , 1 9 7 1 b ) . With the help of some theoretical reason ­
ing, estrange ment is seen to cause particular a n d i dentifiable so cial o r
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S TIIEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 1 57

psy chological pheno mena which then serve as indicators o r dimensions of

estrange ment. Social scientists postulate that , when me asure d , these in­
dicators o r dimensions will directly reflect the degree and nature of estrange­
ment . As we already pointed out in this chapter, estrangement cannot be
measure d if Marx is not to be misinterpreted . What is of particular interest
right now, however, is the widespread notion that estrange ment can be seen
to cause identifiable behavior, feelings , or attitudes , and how this notion
manifests itsel f with those social scientists whose attempt it is to measure
estrangement.
Seeman has pioneered in the attem pt to measure estrangement, and
many have followed in his footsteps ( Fischer, 1 97 3 ; Neal an d Rettig,
1 96 7 ; Dean , 1 96 1 ; an d Middleton, 1 96 3 ) . 1 3 Seeman ( 1 9 7 2 a : 3 8 7 ) assumes
that estrange ment causes i dentifiable and particular feelings or attitudes.
He defines his measures as follows:

1. Powerlessness-There is not much that I can do about most o f the

i mportant problems that we face today .
2 . Meaninglessness-Things have become so compli cated in the world
to day that I really don't understand just what is going on .
3 . Normlessness-In order to get ahead in the world to day , you are
almost forced to do some things which are not righ t.
4. Cultural estrange ment-I am not much intereste d in the TV p rograms ,
movies , an d magazines that most people seem to like .
5 . Social isolation-I often feel lonely .
6. Self-estrangement in work-I really don't enjoy most of the work that
I do , but I feel t hat I must do it in order to have other things that I
need and want.

I f the subject who is confronted with these measures discove rs in her/him­

self the same feelings or perceives his surroundings in the same way , he is
said to be estranged. Thus, estrange men t as Marx understands it is p ostulated
to cause identifiable and particular feelings which in turn , if measure d , are
seen to confirm the existence of estrange ment.
Did Marx himself believe that particular and i dentifiable attitudes or
-
feelings resulte d from what he called estrangement? For this answer, our
analysis will fo cus on certain passages in his early work .
It has been shown (Walliman n , 1 9 7 5 : 2 80) that translations of a p articular
passage fro m Marx wrongly imply that he saw estrangement as the cause of
158 ESTRANGEMENT

certain feelings, attitudes, or behavior. These misleading tran slations appear

at least in Tucker ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 0 5 ) and Israel ( 1 9 7 1 : 5 2 ) . 14 Tucker 's te xt says
that the pro pertied class "experiences the alienatio n as a sign of its o wn
power," while Israel's states that the proletariat "feels itself crushed by
t his self-alienation " (e mphasis mine ) . In both instances, estrangement is
postulate d to generate certain identifiable feelings or experiences, while in
fact Marx di d not i mply this at all :

[ T ] he propertied class a n d t h e proletariat present t h e same human

self-estrange ment. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened
in this self-estrangement, it recognises estrangement as its o wn po wer
and has the se mblance of a human existence . The latter feels annihilated
in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an
inhu man existence (CW, 2, p . 3 6 ; MEW, 2, p. 3 7 ) . 1 5

The consequences of estrangement, as the above passage indicates, differ

according to one 's social position and in ways that can be con tradictory .
Thus, the propertie d class feels at ease and strengthene d , wh ile the pro­
letariat feels annihilated in its estrangement . 1 6 Under these c ircumstances ,
it would not make any sense to postulate , for example , that estrangement
causes a feeling of annihilatio n , since it could equally be maintained that
estrangement also causes the o pposite feeling. Yet, Seeman p ro ceeds on
the assu mption that estrangement causes specific and identifiable feel­
ings or attitudes . If these feelings or attitudes can be found to be p resent
in individuals , estrange ment is considered to be present. Acco rding to
our interpretation , however , estrangement is not defined by the feelings
or attitudes it causes, but by the fact that man is subj ect to an involuntary
divisio n of labor and is unable to live according to his nature .
In this context , the following passage must also be considered:

What, then , constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that
labour is external to the worker , i . e . , it does not belong to his in­
trinsic nature ; that in his work , therefore , he does not affirm him­
self but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy , does not
develo p freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body
and ruins his mind. The worker therefo re only feels himself outside
his work, and in his work feels o utside himself. He feels at home
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 1 59

when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at

home. His l abour is therefore not voluntary , but coerced ; it is forced
labour (CW, 3 , p. 2 7 4 ; MEW, EB 1 .T . , p. 5 1 4). 1 7

It would be wrong to conclude from this quotation that Marx saw certain
feelings or attitu des result fro m estrangement, and th at estrangement can
be i denti fie d with such feelings o r attitudes. Rather, this passage must be
interpreted within a framework that distingu ishes estrangement as such
fro m its conse quences. Since the worker is force d to sell his labor power
"labor is external to the worker" ; it is "forced labour. " Hence the worker
is estranged. In very general terms, his and the estrangement of all other
individuals allows for a world which they do not fully control , which they
do not fully subject to their own will . It allo ws for a worl d in which , un­
like under co mmunism, man is dominated an d subject to an involuntary
divisio n of labor affe cting all . However, not all are equally affected. For
example , the workers are force d to sell their labor power. The capitalist ,
although subject to an involuntary division of labor and therefore estrange d ,
is n o t compelled to sell h i s labor power. A s a result , h e is not subj e ct to
many of the conse quences brought about by circumstances he does not
control . For the worker, the worl d he does not control has quite d ifferent
consequences. For him, it means that work is external to him , that he
feels unhappy , and so fort h .
T h e existence of estrangement in general (that is, the existence of any
involuntary division of labor) allows for the emergence of so cietal stru ctures
an d processes that are not under the conscious control of so cietal members
and that have had different consequences in different historical epochs.
These co nse quences may be perceived as "burdensome , " 1 8 although estrange­
ment remains a constant in view of the persistence of an invo luntary divi­
sion of labor.
Here I disagree with Ollman ( 1 97 6 : 1 3 2) who fails to make a clear dis­
tinction between estran gement as such and its various consequences. He
maintains that the "forms of alienation differ for each class because
their position and style of life differ, and , as expected, the p ro letariat 's
affliction is the most severe . " On the contrary , estrangement is a con­
stant since all are subject to an involuntary division of labor and are pre­
vente d fro m living according to their n ature . According to our opinion ,
only the consequences of estrangement vary . However, this is not the
same as saying that the forms of estrangement vary .
1 60 ESTRANGEMENT

Within any particular historical peri o d , these so-cietal structures and

pro cesses can also be seen to h ave agreeable consequences. Although both
the capitalists an d the workers are estrange d , being subject to an involuntary
division of labor, the processes that arose because of estrangement affect
both classes quite differently .
It is therefore meaningful to speak of estrangement as that condition
which brings about a social world that escapes full control by the partici­
pants. It is meaningless to view estrange ment as a cause of particular,
i dentifiable feelings , behavior, and attitudes. First, such a cause cannot
be verified because of a lack of variance and , second, such feelings, be­
havior, and attitudes can never be identified as the only ones resulting
fro m estrange ment. Third, Marx himself did not view estrangement as
the cause of only a sele ct number of identifiable feelings , attitudes, and
behaviors . Any attempt to do so would imply that estrangement con­
stitutes only certain phenomena perceived to be undesirable or arbitrarily
selecte d by the so cial scientist.

ESTRANGEMENT AS AN
OBJ ECTIVELY DEFINED CONCEPT

I t is frequently debated whether Marx's concept of estrangement should

be define d according to objective or subjective criteria. ( See , for e xample ,
Israel , 1 9 7 1 ; Schacht , 1 97 1 ; and Fischer, 1 9 7 6 . ) Subj ective criteri a are
seen to involve "a state of min d , " while a definition based on o bjective
criteria "involves a condition of the whole or parts of society " (Mizruchi ,
1 964:46).
Base d on our interpre tation of Marx's theory of estrangement, it can
be concluded that Marx defines estrangement according to obje ctive cri­
teria: i ndividuals are estranged because they are subject to an involuntary
division of labor, and not because they exhibit a certain "state of min d . "
The rather fruitless debate on whether estrangement is objectively or
subjectively defined is partially attributable to the fact that students of
Marx have not separated estrangement as such from the consequences of
estrangement. Thus, many have mistaken particular consequences for the
elements defining estrangement . Seeman 's social-psychological operation ­
alizations are a case in point. However, a s h a s already been established,
estrange ment cannot be define d on the basis of certain manifestatio ns,
since the manifestations vary fro m one historical epoch to another as
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 161

well as in a given po pulation at a given time . Accordingly , once a separa­

tion is made between estrange ment as such and the consequences of
estrange ment , it immediately becomes obvious that estrange ment cannot
be defined on the basis of a "state of min d" which individu als exhibit,
since any su ch "state of mind" must be seen as a consequence of estrange­
ment .

NOTES

L For detail s, the reader is advised to consult M ilsz ;ros ' study ( 1 9 7 2 : 2 1 7-27)
directly .
2 . Apparently , without knowing of Israel 's work ( s e e Israel , 1 9 7 6 a n d 1 9 7 1 ) ,
LeoGrande ( 1 97 7 ) advances the same thesis concerning Marx 's dep arture from his
theory of estran ge ment outlined in the Manuscripts.
3. It may also be pointed out that n either M ilsz ;ros ( 1 9 7 2 : 148, 1 6 3 , 1 70) nor
Oilman ( 1 9 7 6 : 74, 8 0-8 1 , 8 5 , 92, 1 1 0) makes a well-define d distinction between the
two definitions of human nature in Marx .
4. See also Chapter 2, note 2. In the Manuscripts, Marx says that Feuerbach's
great achievement is "the establishment of true materialism and of real science, by
making the social rel ationship of 'man to man' the basic p rinciple of the theory . "
And in a letter to Feuerbach in August 1 844, Marx wrot e :

In these writings y o u h ave -whether intentionally I do n o t kn ow-given a

p hiloso p hical basis to socialism, and the commu nists, too , have simil arly
u n derstood these wo rks in that sense. The unity of man with man based on
the real differences between men , the concept of human species transferred
from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this other than the
concept of society ! (McLellan, 1 9 7 1 : 1 84) .

Marx had apparently revise d his ap praisal of Feuerbach by the time he wrote the
Theses on Feuerbach; nevertheless, his concept of man was one of so cial man .
Yet, I srael writes that "in the sixth of his 'Theses on Feuerbach' Marx explicitly
rej ects this anthropological position by asserting that man 's nature is the total ity
of his social relatio ns" (Israel , 1 9 7 6 : 47).
5 . See also Chapter 2, pp. 62- 7 1 .
6 . Similarl y , Luk;cs' identification o f estrangement with objectification in
his History and Class Co nsciousness may be mentioned. However , Luk;cs re­
treated fro m this position later in his l ife by admitting that th e interpretation
in this book was too Hegelian (Luk ;cs, 1 970: 2 5 ) .
7. Since no distinction is usually ma de between Marx 's u se of the terms
"estran gement" and "alienatio n , " stu dents of Marx speak of alienation as exist­
ing to a greater or l esser extent, referring to what is here called estrangement as
existing to a greater or lesser extent.
1 62 ESTRANGEMENT

8" Entfre mdung (estran gement) is u se d by Marx. As already indi cate d

Entfre mdung should be translated estrangement, and not alienati o n .
9 . S e e chapter 2, p p . 3 7- 3 8 .
1 0" As earlier, " division of labor" also includes the division of l abor in
society as a whole "
1 1 . "Cause" is u s e d here t o designate even t h e mere association of specific
behavior, feelings, or attitu des with estrangement.
1 2. It is indeed ironical that, according to this analysis, those social scientists
may be sai d to be speculative who , according to their own intentions, wish to
avoid spec1 .tive statements. In this context, Seeman's ( 1 9 7 1 a : 1 3 5 ) p assage cited
above may be recal l e d.
1 3 . It is impossible to address and critically deal with all the literature that has
been built up around the attempt to measure estrangement . Seeman is therefore
selected here as a representative example of a whole grou p of scholars.
1 4. The translation of the same passage in the Collecte d Works, which appeared
after my paper (Wallimann , 1 9 7 5) was in press, avoids the same mistakes.
1 5. Note also that "estrangeme nt" rather than "alienatio n " is correctly used
here to translate Entfremdung.
1 6. Similarl y , the consequences of estrangement are distin guished from estrange­
ment as su ch (that is, from the inability to subject one 's labor power and produ ct
of l abor to one's own will) in other p assages:

• the more obj e cts the wo rker produces the less he can p ossess a n d the more
. •

he falls u n der the sway of his product, capital.

All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is
relate d to the pro duct of bis la bour as to an alien obj ect (CW, 3, p. 2 7 2 ; MEW,
E B 1 .T., p . 5 1 2) .

(According t o t h e economic laws the estrangement o f the worker i n h i s object

is expressed thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume ;
the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more u nworthy he becomes;
the better formed his pro du ct, the more deformed becomes the worker; the
more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes the worke r ; the more
powerful l abour beco mes, the more powerless becomes the worker ; the more
inge nious labour becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the
more he becomes nature's servant.) (CW, 3, p. 27 3 ; MEW, EB 1 .T., p. 5 1 3 ) .

This estrangement manifests itself i n part i n that the sop histicati on o f needs
and of the means [of their satisfaction ] on the one side produces a bestial
barbarism, a complete , cru de, abstract simplicity of need, on the other ; or
rather in that it merely reproduces itself in its o p posite (CW, 3, p. 3 0 7 ; MEW,
EB 1 .T., p . 548).

W hile these statements share the distinction between estran gement and its con­
sequences, they also show t hat the consequences of estrangement differ. The con­
se quences simultaneously represent wealth and poverty , re finement and barbarity ,
SCDPE AND APPLICABILITY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ESTRANGEMENT 1 63

sophistication and crude simpl i city . In su m , the consequences of estrangement en­

tail contradiction s.
.
1 7. Note that Marx talks in the above quote of "alienatio n " (Fn t a usserung)
and not of "estran geme nt" (F.ntfremdung) , thus not implying that estrangement
as such causes specific feeli ngs. As is shown below, labor power mu st be sol d , which
is a type of coercion causing specific feelings.
1 8. See also O iserman ( 1 96 5 : 7 9 ) .
10
CONCLUSIONS

Marx distinguishes between two concepts of human nature : general

human nature , which refers to those human qualities that are invariable ,
and specific human nature, which consists of qualities that may vary from
society to so ciety and in history . Marx derived his conce p t of human nature
in gen eral from a comparison of man with animals. Estrange ment results
when man is prevente d fro m living according to his hu man nature , th at is,
general hu man nature . Unfortunately , students of Marx have not made a
clear distinction between the two concepts of human nature embo died in
his work, and as a result, his theory of estrangement has frequently been
misunderstood and inadequately interpreted. Our interpretation therefore
stands in o pposition to Petrovi c 's ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 46) . Translating Wesen with
"essence " i nstead o f " nature , " and using, as does Oilman , "alienation "
instead of "estrange ment , " he says that "if alienation of man from his es­
sence is to be possible , his essence must not be conceive d as something that
all men have in co mmon." We also fin d Ollman's ( 1 9 7 6 : 1 3 5 ) view to be
misleading and lacking in clarity, as is evident in the following statement:
"If alienation is the splintering of human nature into a number of mis­
begotten parts, we would expect communism to be presented as a kind
of reunification." By clearly making this distin ction, we have laid the
1 66 ESTRANGEMENT

foun dation for a logi cally consistent an d n ovel interpretation of Marx's

theory of estrangement.
Marx illustrate d his theory in the context of his analysis o f capitalist
society and wit h particular fo cus on that part of society which depends
on selling labor power. Thus, it could be shown how the workers, for
example , are prevented fro m living according to their human nature , an d
in which ways they can therefore be viewed as estranged. Marx's theory
of estrangement does not end with the estrangement of the worker, al­
though for various reasons he took sides with the workers and described
their plight and misery in great detail . He s pecifically speaks also of the
estrange ment of the capitalist . What is it that prevents the capitalist fro m
living according to his nature , since unlike the worker he is not forced to
sell his labor power?
To resolve this pro blem , Marx's views on the division of labor are
analyzed in detail in this book. It has been found that throughout his
work 1 Marx advo cates a society with a voluntary division of labor and
that in his early work he dire ctly associates estrangement with the fact
that the division of labor is an involuntary one. The nature of a so ciety 's
division of labor is therefore the overriding category determining whether
in divi duals in this society are estranged. 2 This interpretation is consistent
with the writings of Marx , not only with respect to his view that the capital­
ist is also estranged, but also with his vision of communism i n which he
postulates that neither estrangement nor an involuntary division of labor
will exist. To regard the nature of the division of labor in a society as the
decisive criterion o n the basis of which man is said to be estranged must
be considered a significant departure from existi ng interpretations of
Marx 's theory of estrangement.
It is maintained here that, according to Marx, the nature o f the division
of labor must be the central criterion deciding the existence or nonexistence
of estrangement. Thus, estrangement is a dichotomous phenomenon . I t
exi sts in the absen ce of a voluntary division o f labor, and i t i s n o t envisioned
to exist under co mmunism. Students of Marx have not tended to give central
importance to the division of l abor when interpreting his theory of estrange­
mento Rather, they generally treat the division of labor as only an aspect
of estrangement, whereby it has usually been emphasized that under capital
the worker must perform minute , re petitive , and unchallenging tasks . While
this statement may be factually correct and Marx himself may have given
 CONCLUSIONS 1 67

similar illustrations, such an emphasis is highly misleading when we turn to

an interpretation of Marx's theory of estrange ment. As is maintained here,
the emphasis must be not on the kin d of involuntary division of labor , but
on the very involuntariness of it. Marx advocates that all involuntary division
of labor be abolished. Even though an involuntary division is made more
"bearable" by hu manizing work in various ways, the involun tary nature
of the division of labor persists. Similarly , to envision communism as a
society with a voluntary division of labor does not imply that individuals
will not perform different tasks. Marx 's vision of the many-sided
individual is not contradicted here. There are good reasons to believe
that the in dividual would be many-sided under communism. However,
Marx's vision does not imply that there will be n o "spe cializ ation " or
"routinization " of work , on a voluntary basis , under commu nism.
It only means that in dividuals are not socially coerced into performing
certain tasks. Unfortunately , this is not made as clear as it sh ould be.
Ollman ( 1 97 6 : 2 1 1 ) , for e xample , makes the following unqualified state­
ment : " . . . the best known descriptions of communism-a 'cl assless
society ' , a time when 'the division of labor has come to an end' and
when 'private pro perty has been abolishe d'-are full alternatives."
Ollman ( 1 97 6: 1 5 8- 1 60) also fails to specify that the involuntariness
of the division of labor is manifested by the fact not only that individuals
are "locked" into one activity , but also that particularly under capital
the produc ers never determine what is to be produced and fo r what purp oses.
Therefore , as long as there is commo dity production , regardless of whether
individuals are "locked" into one p articular activity , the division of labor
will be an involuntary one. That is, the market as such will as an impersonal
force coerce in dividuals into certain p roductive activities as long as these
individuals are de pendent on commo dity pro du ction for a livelihood. Here
lies the i mportance of Marx's insistence that production under communism
will have to be base d on agreement and not exchange . For M arx , the in­
voluntary division of labor can be abolished only by the abolition of pro­
duction based on exchange , regardless of whether pro ductio n o n exchange
"locks" individuals into a single position . 3
Walter Kaufmann 4 is particularly insensitive to this impo rtant issue.
Referring to Marx 's vision of a society with a voluntary division of labor
in which individuals will no longer be "locked" into an exclu sive sphere
of activity , he maintains that "one of the results of the social mobility in
1 68 ESTRANGEMENT

the United States-lateral as wel l as u pward-is that a waiter , for example ,

is much less likely to feel . . . that his role defines him, freezes him . . . .
Thus the alienatio n implicit in the d ivision of labor is diminished significant­
ly . " Kaufmann also states that Marx's dream, to a significan t degree, "is
realized in the United States of America. It is not in the least unusual for
the same person to have many different j obs before he is thirty . "
Schacht ( 1 97 1 : 1 0 0) , on t h e other han d , misunderstands Marx's theory
of estrange ment and concept of an involuntary division of labor in another
way . He faults Marx for seeing estrangement as resulting from individuals
being subject to an alien will:

Consider, for example , a camera man in a film stu dio , or a member of

an orchestra. The "labor" of both is not and cannot be "self-directed "
and "spontaneous. " In each case i t i s directed b y another man-the
dire ctor or the condu ctor.

As a consequence , Schacht suggests that "it would seem more fruitful to

drop all reference to the mediation of an 'alien will '. " This conclusion is
decide dly unjustifie d an d neglects Marx's contention that

all labour in which many in dividuals cooperate necessarily requires a

commanding will to co-ordinate an d unify the process , an d functions
which apply not to partial operations but to the total activity of the
workshop , much as that of an orchestra conductor. This is a produ ctive
job, which must be performed in every combined mode of production
( C 3 , p . 3 8 3 ; MEW, 2 5 , p . 3 9 7 ) .

Working under a co mmanding will i n situations o f coo peration does not

auto matically imply th at the divisio n of labor is an involuntary one . On
the contrary , just as cooperation can be voluntary cooperation , accept­
ing "a commanding will to co-ordinate an d unify the process " can also
be a voluntary act. Therefore , Marx distinguishes between this case of
cooperation and coordination and that in which coordinating activity
also entails coercion :

The labour of supervision and management, arising as i t does out o f an

antithesis, out of the su premacy of capital over labour, and being
 CONCLUSIONS 1 69

therefore commo n to all modes of pro duction base d on class contra­

dictions like the capitalist mode , is directly and inseparably connecte d ,
also under t h e capitalist syste m, with productive functions which all
co mbined social labour assigns to in dividuals as their special tasks (C 3 ,
p . 3 8 6 ; MEW, 2 5 , pp. 3 9 9-400 ; see also C 3 , p . 3 8 5 ) .

ESTRANGEMENT AND T H E
A B O LI TI O N O F PRIVATE P R O P E RTY

When we maintain that according to Marx the division of labor must

be the central criterion deciding the existence or nonexistence of estrange­
ment, we are able to provide an answer to the long-standing debate on
whether estrangement is abolished with the abolition of the private
ownership of the means of pro duction . In our view, Oiserman ( 1 96 5 :
84-89) is incorrect when he maintains that estrangement necessarily
disappears with any so cialization of the means of production . Any
socialization of the means of pro duction does not in itself guarantee
a voluntary division of labor. It does not in itself guarantee a condition
in which there is no do mination of man by man , that is , a con dition in
which man is allowed to live according to his nature and is not subject
to an alien will.
We need not engage in a detailed analysis of present-day so cialist
societies to observe that they are not the realization of Marx 's vision
of co mmunism, a society in which estrange ment would be n onexistent
and the division of labor voluntary. Engels , we might say , foresaw the
problem of present-day socialist countries when he maintained that ,
the more productive forces the state takes over,

the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage-earners ,

proletarians. The capitalist relatio nship is not abolished ; it is rather
pushe d to an extreme. But at this extre me it changes into its oppo­
site . State o wnership of the pro ductive forces is not the solution
of the conflict , but it contains within itself the formal means , the
handle to the solution (AD, pp. 3 1 2-3 1 3 ; MEW, 20, p. 260) . 5

A few pages later, Engels points out how communism is to be achieved

(note that he refrains fro m using the word "state " ) :
1 70 ESTRANGEMENT

The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to

commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the pro­
duct over the producer. . . . Men 's own social organisation which has
hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by Nature
and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves
. . . . It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm
of freedom.
To carry through this world-emancipating act is the historical mis­
sion of the modern proletariat (AD, p. 3 1 8 ; MEW, 20, p. 2 64) . 6

One may hold the opinion that this world-emancipating act of which
Engels speaks has not fully occurred in present-day socialist countries,
7
although "the handle to the solution" is there.
As a consequence, it is the division of labor, and not the existence or
nonexistence of private ownership of the means of production, which
must serve as the criterion in deciding whether estrangement exists. Accord­
ing to our interpretation, then, Marx's theory of estrangement is directly
extendable and applicable to socialist countries. Those who do not give
central importance to the division of labor in interpre ting Marx 's theory
of estrangement are necessarily led to other conclusions. Knecht ( 1 9 7 5 :
2 1 7) , for example, asserts that Marx's theory of estrangement cannot be
applied to societies in the " transitional stage" to communism. He believes
that Marx's theory is only an instrument for the critique of capitalism. A
critical analysis of the "transitional stage" requires first that the theory
undergo a revision, and he thinks this revision is provided by Sartre. "With
Sartre, the concept 'estrangement' does not only serve as an instrument in
the critique of capitalism."
Ollman ( 1 97 6 : 2 5 2-2 5 3 ) is compelled to maintain a similar position for
similar reasons. He argues that because present-day socialist countries
regulate production and consumption via a plan rather than the market,
Marx's theory of estrangement "loses a full half of its meaning." He does
not mean to

imply that the alienation which is found in "communist" countries

cannot or should not be studied or treated theoretically, but the inter­
action of these men and these particular societies can only be adequately
grasped by a theory which focuses on the decisive role of the plan, the
 CONCLUSIONS 171

party , the state and the bureaucracy generally . Marx's theory of alien a­
tion is not such a theory .

However, Marx's theory of estrangement c an very well serve as an instru ­

ment for the critique of to day's socialist countrie s , since , according to our
interpretation , estrange ment consists of the fact that man is prevente d from
living according to his nature because of the existence of an involuntary
division of labor. 8 Moreover, we can do so without necessarily accepting
an e xistentialist position , 9 implying, as Sartre does, that estrangement is
basic to all human existence at all times. ( See also Chapter 7 and Schaff,
1 964) . Marx's concept of estrange ment re mains a concept bound only to
definite historical periods . As Ludz ( 1 97 6 : 8) and Remmling ( 1 967 : 1 5 2 )
indicate , estrange ment arises with the downfall of primitive c ommunis m ,
a n d according to Marx, it e n d s with communism. 10 Estrangement comes
into existence with the advent of an involuntary division of l abor and is
abolished not necessarily with the abolition of private property , but with
the introduction of a voluntary divisio n o f labor. Our interpretation of
Marx's theory of estrange ment is therefore also compatible with Marx's
theory of history .

A NOTE ON TH E APPLICABI LITY O F

MARX'S T H E O RY O F E ST RANGEMENT

I n the pre ce ding chapter, we show that , if Marx is not to be misinter­

preted "estrangement" cannot be measured or viewed in quantitative
terms. 1 1 We also demonstrate t hat according to Marx estrangement as
suc h cannot meaningfully be viewe d as a cause for specific behavior ,
feelings , or attitudes. Since mainstream American sociology, h o wever,
has attempted both to quantify estrangement and to p ostulate it as a
cause of certain behavior, feelings, or attitudes, the question arises as to
the use of Marx's theory of estrange ment .
Essentially , the use of Marx 's theory of estrangement is of a qu ite
different order than was commonly thought. Remmling ( 1 9 6 7 ) already
showed ho w Marx is an exponent of total suspicion . I ndee d , his system
of thought allows Marx to be an all-encompassing an alyst and critic of
society , and his theory of estrangement is the basic building block upon
which the rest of his analysis rests. I t consists of an empi ? cal statement of
1 72 ESTRANGEMENT

what man's nature is and a reason why , throughout much of history , man
has been prevented fro m living according to his nature . This theory of
estran ge ment, coupled with the demand that man be able to live accord­
ing to his nature , provides Marx with both the basic framework for inter­
preting the social worl d and the goal the interpretation is to serve . Hence ,
the demand that all involuntary division of labor must b e abolishe d if
man is to live unestranged, that is, according to his nature . As Marx's
analysis is total , his deman ds are total demands. Nothing short of a total
change 12 can rid man of his condition of estrangement.
In attempting to measure what Marx calls estrangement and in postulat­
ing that only certain behavior, feelings , and attitudes are caused by estrange­
ment, mainstream sociology does not consider Marx 's thrust for total
change . 1 3 However, the usefulness of Marx's theory of estrangement for
sociology lies exactly in its power to critically conceptualize so cial reality
and to employ it in the service of so cial change . For this to o ccur , however,
Marx's vision of a future society based on a voluntary division of labor must
not be rejected as "utopian . " At least the possibility must be accepte d that
society could indeed be organized such as to allow for a voluntary division
of labor. However, o n ly praxis will tell.

NOTES

1. We disagree with Mandel ( 1 9 7 1 : 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 ) who says that only with German

Ideology did Marx view estrangement in the context of the division of labo r.
2. We disagree with Plamenatz ( 1 97 5 : 1 5 0) who maintains that Marx " does
not even make it plain what kind of division of labour it is that produ ces al ienatio n . "
Plamenatz 's obje ctions to Marx 's treatment of t h e division of labor an d its central i ty
to "estrangement" can be overcome by making a distinction between a voluntary
and involuntary (that is, "estrangement-pro ducing") division of labor.
3 . Knecht ( 1 97 5 : 1 44-1 45) ap propriately remarks that under cap ital even the
capitalist is subject to the i n dependent and impersonal forces brough t about by
exchange, thus i mplying that the capitalist is also subject to an involuntary division
of l abor. This is in agree ment with Marx's view that the capitalist is also estrange d .
To argue that Marx al ways thought estrangement wou l d result from the in­
voluntary nature of the division of labor is to disagree with those (for example,
Dawydow, 1 964: 5 8 , 61) who maintain that only with the German Ideology did
Marx view the voluntary division of l abor as a solution to estrangement. Similarl y ,
Tucker ( 1 96 5 : 1 8 5) i s mistaken when h e claims that only with t h e German Ideology
was the "alienated self-relation . • transformed into a social rel ation of produc­
•

tio n , an d this was given the name ' division of labou r ' . "
 CONCLUSIONS 1 73

4. See Schacht ( 1 9 7 1 : xliii, xl-xliv).

5. We do not mean to say that Engels' views accurately describe the p resent
political and economic system of present-day socialist cou ntries. Rather, we mean
that Engds touches upon the main issue involve d. Thus, the issue is n ot whether
the Soviet Union is capitalistic , but whether the means of p roduction in that country
have been "socialized" in such a way as to maintain an involuntary d ivision of
labor, that is, ine qu ality and cl ass relationships. For further discussions, see
Bettelheim, 1 97 6 ; Chavan ce, 1 9 7 7 ; Sweezy , 1 9 7 7a, 1 97 7b ; and Szyman ski , 1 9 7 7 .
6 . B y quoting Engels her e , i t i s u nl ikely that Marx 's theory o f estrangement
will be misinterprete d, since Marx su pporte d and cooperate d with Engels in writ­
ing Anti-D u bring and is himself the author o f a chapter. ( See also Engels' preface
for the e dition of 1 88 5 ; MEW, 20, p. 9.)
In his Critique of the Go t ha Progra m, Marx also points to the n ecessity of
abolishing class differences:

Instead of the i ndefinite conclu ding p hrase of the paragraph-"the removal

of all social an d political e quality "-it ought to have been said that with
the abolition of class differences all the social and political inequ ality aris­
ing from them wou l d disappear of itself (CGP, pp. 1 5- 1 6 ; MEW, 1 9 , p. 2 6) .

Abolishing i n e quality is n o t Marx 's only goal. For example, i n t h e Man uscripts
he makes a distinction between crude commun ism and "true " communism. Crude
communism stands for that p hase in which private property has become abolishe d ,
b u t in which society has n o t eliminated coercion a n d t h e bare leveling of every­
one's positio n :

Co mmunism is t h e positive ex pression of annulled private property -at first

as universal private property • .This type of communism-since it negates
• •

the personality of man in every sphere-is but the logical expression of p rivate
property, which is this negation. General envy con stituting itself as a p owe r is
the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in
another way • Cru de co mmunism is only the culmination of this envy
• • •

and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. It has

a definite, limite d standard. How l ittle th is annulment of p rivate p ro perty is
really an ap pro priation i s in fact proved by the abstract negation of the en tire
world of culture and civilisatio n , the regression to t he unnatural simplicity
of the poor and cru de man who has few needs and who has not o nly failed to
go beyond private property , but has not yet even reached it" (CW, 3, p p . 294-
29 5 ; MEW, EB 1 .T., pp. 5 3 4- 5 3 5) .

T h e first p ositive annulment of private property - c ru de communism-is thus

merely a manifestatio n of the vileness of private property , which wants to set
itself up as the positive co m munity system (CW, 3, p. 2 9 6 ; MEW, EB 1 .T.,
pp. 5 3 5- 5 3 6).
1 74 ESTRANGEMENT

I n addition to Engels' p assage, we have also been able to demonstrate th at Marx

himself in his own writings was not en dorsing just the abolition of the private
ownership of the means of production . We thus have been able to strengthen our
argu ment that the division of labor is the central criterion deciding whether or
not estrangement exists.
7. In retrospect, it may be maintained that Marx and Engels were overly
optimistic with respect to the ease with which class society could be abolished
after the abolition of private property. This optimism is not, however, to be
taken as evidence for the thesis that , for Marx an d Engels, estrangement neces­
sarily is abolished with t he abolition of the private ownership of the means of
production .
8. We d o n o t en dorse Ollman's view that Marx's theory of estrangement main­
tains its full meaning an d analytical power only in the context of capitalism, a
society dominate d by market relationships. Rather, we reiterate that a distinction
must be made between estrangement as such an d the consequences of such estrange­
ment. Because man is estran ge d , his life begins to be determined by forces he does
not fully control. These forces at first appear in the form of personal domination
an d later in impersonal form, as exchange becomes universal. Regardless of the
nature of the consequences, man remains estranged for Marx as long as an involuntary
division of labor exists. It is our view that Marx only illustrated his theory of estrange­
ment when analyzing capitalist society. Even by giving examples as to how man is
prevented from living according to his nature under capital, his theory of estrange­
ment does not become a theory bound to capitalism. Marx coul d have illustrated
his theory just as well by choosin g examples from feudalism, but this woul d have
defeated his political intentions. Of course , new conceptualizations are needed for
the study of the consequences of estrangement in "communist" coun tries and of
the processes that continually prevent man from living according to his nature.
But Marx's theory of estrangement need not be "adapted" since an involuntary
division of labor remains an involuntary division of labor, although the coercion
manifests itself in various forms an d co mplexities.
9. Or to argue from an ethical point of vie w as Oilman seems to think.
1 0. It is inappropriate to speak of estrangement from nature u nder primitive·
communism-as does Krader ( 1 9 7 5 : 2 3 7-2 3 8 , 2 7 1 -272) . Although Marx does view
primitive man as dominated by nature, his theory of estrangement refers only to
social forms of domination. However, Marx holds that the division of labor under
primitive communism was volunta ry ; hence, the absence of estrangement. To our
knowledge, Marx also does not mention estrangement when referring to societies
under primitive commu nism, although he views primitive communism as by no
means ideal.
1 1 . O nly the conse quences of estrangement can be viewed in quantitative terms.
Thus, the fact that man does not fully control his life�ituation-the fact th at he
is estrange d- may result in more wealth for some and more misery for others; a feel­
ing of strength in the bourgeoisie and a feeling of debasement in the proletariat. I n
contrast, estrangement a s su ch remains a constant for all who are subject t o a n in-
 CONCLUSIONS 1 75

wluntary division of labor, as much as nonestrangement is the condition for man

under communism where Marx envisioned a voluntary division of labor to exist.
1 2. An event that has been "prepared" by the course of previous history ,
throughout which the consequences of estrangement are seen to have developed
in su ch a way as to make communism realizable.
1 3 . If "estrangement" is to be use d in this way , it would be advisable either to
drop the term alto gether or to distinguish it clearly from Marx's use of the term.
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-- . 1 9 7 1 a. "The Urban Alienations: Some Dubious Theses fro m Marx
to Marcuse , " jo urnal of Perso nality and So cial Psycho logy 1 9 , n o . 2
( August ) : 1 3 5- 1 4 3 .
- . 1 97 1 b. " Alienati o n : A Map ," Psycho logy To day (Augu st) : 8 3 -84 ,
94-9 5 .
-- . 1 97 1 c . "Co m munity an d Control i n a Metropolitan Setting. " I n
P . Orleans an d W. R. Ellis, J r. (eds.) , Race, Change a n d Urban So ciety.
Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications, p p . 4 2 3 -4 5 0 .
 SELECTED B I B L I OGRAPHY 1 89

--. 1 9 6 7 . "On the Personal Consequence of Alienation in Work , " A meri­

can So ciological R eview 3 2 , n o . 1 ( Febru ary) : 2 7 3 -2 8 5 .
-- . 1 9 5 9. " On the Meaning o f Alienation , " A merican So ciological R e view
24, no. 5 (October) : 7 8 3-79 1 .
Shepard , J on M . , an d T . R . Panko . 1 974. " Al ienation an d So cial Referents , "
So ciology a n d So cial Research 5 9 , n o . 1 (October) : 5 5 -6 1 .
Soubise, L. 1 96 7. " L'alienation politique chez Jes neo-marx istes, " Projet
( April ) : 3 89-408 .
Strmiska , Zdenek. 1 9 74. " Structure d e l a problematiqu e , sociologique marx­
ienne et notion d'alienatio n . " In J oseph Gabel, B . Rousse t, and Trinh
Van Thao (eds. ) , L 'alienatio n aujo urd 'hu i. Paris: E ditions anth ropos,
pp. 4 3 - 1 1 7 .
Sullivan, J . P. (ed . ) . 1 97 5 . " Marxism and the Classics , " Areth usa 8 , no . 1
(S pring) : 5-20 1 .
Sweezy , Paul M . 1 97 7 a . " Bettelheim on Revolution fro m Above : The
USSR in the 1 9 20s , " Mo n thly Review 29, no . 5 (October) : 1 -2 0 .
--. 1 9 7 7 b . " On the Relations o f Pro du ction in the U S S R " (Reply to
Bernard Chavance) , Mo n t hly Review 29 no . 1 (May ) : 1 3 -2 0 .
Szy mansky , Al . 1 9 7 7 . " So cialism or Capitalism in t h e U S S R , " Sci ence
a n d So ciety 4 1 , n o . 3 ( Fall ) : 3 3 8- 3 44.
Tatsis, N . , an d G. Zito . 1 9 7 5 . "Marx, Durkheim and Alienat ion : Toward
a Heu ristic Typology , " Social Theory and Practice 3 , no. 2 ( Fall ) : 2 2 3-
24 5 .
Tu dor, Bill . 1 97 2 . " A S pecification of Relationships Between J o b Com­
plexity and Powerlessness , " A merican So cio logical Review 3 7 , no. 5
( October) : 5 9 6-604.
Walliman n , Isidor. 1 97 9 . Review of " Estrangement, Alienation and Ex­
ploitati o n : A Sociological Approach to Historical Materialis m " by
J ohn Torrance . New York : Columbia University Press, 1 9 7 7 . Co n ­
te mpo rary So ciology 8 , no. 2 (March) : 2 7 0-27 1 .
-- . 1 97 5 . " Alienation: I n Marx and Modern Empirical Sociology ,"
Zeitschrift fur Soziologie 4, n o . 3 (July) : 2 7 3 -2 8 2 .
Walto n , P . A. Gambl e , a n d J . Coulter. 1 9 7 0 . "I mage of Man in Mar x , "
So cial Theo ry a n d Practice , 1 , no. 2 ( Fall) : 69-8 5 .
Weisko pf, E . Ch. 1 96 5 . " Entfremdung historisch gesehen , " Deutsche
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 1 3 : 7 1 1 -7 20.
Win field, Richard . 1 97 6 . "The Logi c of Marx's Capital , " Telos, No.
2 7 (Spring) : 1 1 1 - 1 3 9 .
INDEX

Alienation, 40-4 5 , 1 5 8- 1 5 9 Bedeschi, G . , 4

cap italism and, 3 8 Bees, 1 3 , 1 7, 34- 3 5
l abor, 3 2- 3 3 Bel l , D . , 2 2
social isolation, xix Bentham, J . , 1 4- 1 5 , 1 49
social science, xviii Bettelheim, C . , 1 7 3
varieties of, xviii-xix Betteridge, H . T., 1 8
Alien wil l , 29- 3 1 , 36, 47, 5 5 , 1 30- 1 3 3 Biological ch aracteristics, man vs.
involuntary division of l abor, 29- 3 1 , animal , 1 1 -1 4
9 7 , 1 2 3 , 1 50-1 5 5 Bottomore, T . , Karl Marx Early Writ­
Ancient I n dian Community, 7 7 ings, 5
Animal nature. See Human nature Bourgeois society, 66, 1 0 3 , 1 1 7, 1 3 5
Anti D ubring ( Engels) , 76, 1 2 6, 1 7 3
Archibald, W . P., 1 5 0, 1 5 4 Cap ital
Aristotle, 1 2 , 1 5 , 5 4 coercion and, 2 5 - 2 7, 3 1 , 1 04- 1 0 5
Artisans , 1 3 9- 1 4 2 collective , 1 1 0
Arts, 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 human nature and, 3 1
Asiatic Communal Syste m , 8 3 , 1 3 3 p ower of, 26- 30, 4 3
Authority, 90, 9 5 value, 4 9 , 5 2- 5 3
Capital (Marx ) , 40-45, 5 5 , 65-6 7, 6 9 ,
Barakat, H . , 1 5 6 79, 8 3 , 8 9 , 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 4 3
Barter, 9 2 , 9 5 and estrangement, 1 5 2- 1 5 3
noncapitalist societies, 74- 7 5 Capitalism, 34, 4 3
Beauty, 1 2 , 3 5 division o f labor, 9 0- 9 3
1 92 INDEX

estrangement, 1 1 4, 1 66 Economic and Philosophical MSS of

noncap italist societies, 7 3- 8 5 1 844. See Manuscripts (Marx)
values, 47-69 1 844 Manuscripts. See Man uscripts
Capitalist production , 5 1 , 1 1 0, 1 1 3 , (Marx)
1 40 Engels, F . , 9, 6 7 , 7 7 , 79-8 1 , 84- 8 7 ,
social characteristics, 2 5 - 2 7 , 7 1 -7 3 1 1 0, 1 1 8- 1 1 9 , 1 69 , 1 70- 1 7 4
values, 47-69, 7 2 - 7 3 Anti Duhring, 7 6, 1 2 6, 1 7 3
Cap ital ists Origin of the Family, 7 9 , 8 2
estrangement, 3 7- 3 8 , 4 3 Entiiusserung, 40-42 , 4 5 , 1 3 6 . See also
"free agent," 3 7- 3 9 Alienation
relationsh ip t o worker, 2 5 - 2 7 , estrangement, 1 62- 1 6 3
3 8-40 Entfremdung, 40-42, 4 5 , 1 3 6 , 1 5 2 ,
Chavance, B . , 1 7 3 1 6 2- 1 6 3 . See also Alienation ;
Chiodi , P., 45 Estrangement
Class, 1 04, 1 1 7 Estrangement
Coercion, 9 7-98, 1 1 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 3- 1 34 alian will, 29- 3 1 , 3 6
and labor power, 25-45 consequences of, 1 5 2-1 60
Collective labor, 1 1 0 division of labor, 96-99, 1 04, 1 4 7 ,
Commodities 1 66- 1 69
exchange, 50-54 human nature , 1 1 - 2 2 , 44-4 5 , 1 4 7
p roductio n, 5 2- 5 3 , 9 2-9 3 labor power, 2 5-45
value, 47-69 measurements of, 1 54- 1 5 8 , 1 6 2
Communism, 9 7- 1 2 7 , 1 4 1 - 1 4 3 , 1 5 0- precapitalist society , 7 1 -8 7 , 1 29-
1 5 1 , 1 66- 1 69 , 1 7 3- 1 74 1 37
individualism, 1 0 2- 1 0 3 properties of, 1 4 7
noncap ital ist societies, 78-87 reification , 1 48- 1 49
property , 1 2 2 scarcity, 1 1 5- 1 1 7 , 1 20
social organization, 99- 1 00 Ethnological Notebooks (Marx), 7 6-
Com m unist Manifesto (Marx), 1 1 7 , 7 7 , 80-8 1 , 90
145 Exchange of commodities, 7 3 - 8 7 , 1 1 0
Competition , S O Exchange value, 47-69, 1 1 3 , 1 3 5
Consanguinity, principle o f, 7 7-79 noncapitalist societies, 7 3 - 8 7
Consciousness, 1 2- 1 3 , 16, 3 4- 3 5 , 1 0 8 , Existentialism, estrangement, 8, 1 1 5-
1 1 6- 1 1 7 1 1 9, 1 2 8 . See also Sartre, J . P .
Critique of the Gotha Programme
(Marx), 1 00, 1 7 3 Feudalism, 1 30, 1 3 6, 1 44, 1 5 0- 1 5 3 , 1 5 6
Feuer, L., 8
Dawydow, J . N . , 1 3 7 , 1 7 2 Feuerbach , L., xi, 1 5 , 1 6, 1 4 9 , 1 6 1
Dean , D . , 1 5 6 Fischer, E . , 1 5 7 , 1 60
Division of labor, 9 9- 1 2 7 urban alienation, xviii
estrangement , x i i , 1 66- 1 72 Fixed capital, 1 1 3
involuntary , 1 00, 1 47- 1 5 6 Fourier, C . , 1 1 4, 1 5 1
levels of, 90-9 1 Fran kfort School , 3 , 4
ori gi n and nature of, 6 5 -66 " Free agent," 2 7 , 3 7- 3 9
social organi zation and, 99 Freedom, 1 1 2 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 7
value, 47-69 Fromm, E . , 3 , 20
 INDEX 1 93

Gens, 7 7 , 8 1 Kaufmann, W . , 1 67- 1 68

Gentile society, 7 8- 7 9 , 8 5 - 8 6 Knecht, I . , 1 1 5- 1 1 7 , 1 70, 1 7 2
German Ideology (Marx ) , 1 1 , 8 0 , 8 2 , Krader, L., 76, 8 5- 8 7 , 1 74
1 00- 1 0 1 , 1 0 5 , 1 08, 1 2 7, 1 3 4,
1 49, 1 72 Labor, 1 3- 1 4, 3 2 , 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 . See also
Giddens, A . , 44-45 Division of Labor
Gotha Programme. See Critique of and noncapitalist societies, 78-79,
the Go tha Programme (Marx) 1 3 7- 1 3 9 , 1 4 3- 1 44
Gru n , K., 1 5- 1 6 and p rivate p roperty, 9 4- 9 6
Grundisse ( Marx ) , 1 7 , 2 9 , 3 5 , 3 7 , 40- skilled, 6 7
4 1 , 4 3 -44, 47, 64, 66, 79, 1 04, social , 8 3 , 9 1
1 2 4, 1 4 3- 1 44 surplus, 6 1 -6 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 1 - 1 3 2
Guddat , K. H . , Writings of th e Yo ung theory o f val ue, 4 7 n
Marx, 5 Labor power, 5 3 , 9 7-98, 1 49
Guild corporation system , 1 3 8- 1 44 coercion, 2 5-45
estrangement, 2 5-45 , 1 5 2- 1 5 5 ,
Hegel, G. H., x i , 86, 1 49, 1 6 1 1 5 8- 1 5 9, 1 66
"negative unity , " 1 0 7 Labor val ue, 47-69
Heller, A . , 1 26 Laguna Pueblo Indians, 8 1
Holy Family (Marx ) , 3 8 , 1 5 1 Language, a n d human nature, 1 3 , 2 3
Human nature, 5 , 3 1 , 3 5- 3 6, 96, 9 8 , 1 2 2 LeoGrande, W . , 1 48- 1 49
biological, 1 1 - 1 4, 9 6 Life activity, 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 6 , 3 4
ch aracteristics of, 1 1 - 2 2 Ludz, P., 1 7 1
comparison to an imal n ature, 1 1 - Lukacs , G . , 1 6 1
1 7 , 1 20
concepts of, 1 6 5 , 1 7 2 McLellan , D . , 5 , 1 6 1
estrangement, x i i , 1 1 - 2 2 , 42-4 5 , Mandel , E . , 1 5 0, 1 7 2
1 48- 1 49 , 1 5 4 Manifesto. See Co mmunist Manifesto
historical , 1 4- 2 2 (Marx)
social , 1 7 Mannheim, K., 3
species being, 1 7- 2 2 Man uscripts (Marx ) , 1 7 , 2 1 , 44, 6 3 ,
7 9 , 8 2 , 9 •99, 1 2 1 , 1 4� 1 4•
Individual , development o f , 1 06- 1 1 5 , 1 49 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 3
1 2 3 , 1 5 3- 1 5 5 , 1 66 Marcuse , H . , 3, 1 5 4
p ri mitive soc ieties, 1 24- 1 2 5 Markovi c , M., 5
I ndustrial society, 1 3 9- 1 4 2 Marx , K .
I roquois I n dians, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 0 , 8 5 , 1 1 8 Capital, 40, 4 5 , 5 5 , 6 5 - 6 7 , 6 9 , 7 9 ,
Israel, J . , 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 8- 1 49, 83, 89, 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 143
1 5 5 - 1 5 6 , 1 5 8 , 1 60- 1 6 1 Co mmunist Manifesto, 1 1 7 , 1 4 5
Critique o f the Go tha Programme,
J ordo n , Z. A., 8 1 00, 1 7 3
Ethnological Notebo oks, 7 6 - 7 7 ,
Karl Marx, Early Texts (McLellan ) , 80-8 1 , 9 0
5, 1 6 1 German Ideology, 1 1 , 80, 8 2 ,
Karl Marx Early Writings ( Botto­ 1 00- 1 0 1 , 1 0 5 , 1 08, 1 2 7, 1 3 4,
morc ) , 5 1 49 , 1 7 2
1 94 INDEX

Grundrisse, 1 7, 29, 3 5 , 37, 40-4 1 , a n d private property, 1 3 0, 1 3 9-

43-44, 47, 64, 66, 7 9 , 1 04, 143
1 24, 1 4 3- 1 44 " Principle o f love ," 1 0 8- 1 09
Holy Family, 3 8 , 1 5 1 Privateigentum, defined, 8 2
Manuscripts, 1 7, 2 1 , 44, 6 3 , 6 9 , Production, Means of, 3 3 , 7 1 -76
8 2 , 89-99 , 1 22 , 1 44, 1 48- 1 49 , division of labor, 9 1 -9 3 , 1 00-
161, 173 1 0 5 , 1 70- 1 7 1 , 1 74
Poverty of Philosophy, 50, 66, noncapitalist society , 8 0-8 7
1 02-1 04, 1 4 1 Productive activity, 5 3-69
Theories of Surplus Value, 40, 69, Prop erty , common , 7 5-76
8 3 , 1 1 3 , 1 24, 1 3 2 Property, private , 70, 9 0-9 5 , 1 02 ,
Theses on Feuerbach, 1 48 - 1 49 , 1 1 8- 1 1 9 , 1 74
161 an d estrangement, 1 69- 1 7 1
Master-journeyman , 1 3 8, 1 4 1 , 1 44 precapitalist societies, 1 30, 1 3 9-
Master-servant relations, 1 2 9- 1 3 1 143
Mej a , V . , 3 Proudhon, P. J . , 1 4 1
M e sz � ros, I . , 6-7, 1 48, 1 50, 1 6 1
Middleton, R . , 1 5 7 Remmling, G . , xi-xv, 3 , 6 , 1 7 1
Milligan , M., 4 Rent, 1 3 1 - 1 3 3
Mizruchi, E. H . , 1 60 Ricardo, D . , 1 09
Mogui Village I n dians, 8 1 Roman society, 1 2 5 , 1 5 3- 1 54
Money, 40-4 1 , 48, 5 1 - 5 2 Rousset, 8 . , 1 56
Morgan , L . H . , 7 6- 7 7 , 7 9 , 8 5 Ruge , A. , xi

Saint-Simon, C . H., 1 0 9
Neal , A . G . , 1 5 7
Nicolaus, M., 44 Sartre , j . P., 8, 1 1 5- 1 1 9 , 1 28
Noncapitalist societies, 7 3- 8 7 , 9 7-98, and scarcity, 1 70- 1 7 1
Scarcity, 1 70- 1 7 1
1 1 8- 1 20, 1 24- 1 2 5
and estrangement, 1 1 5- 1 1 7 , 1 20-
barter, 7 3-74
1 2 1 , 1 26
communism and, 7 8- 8 7
Schact, R . , 7, 1 60, 1 68, 1 7 3
exchange , 7 3 - 8 7
Schaff, A . , 8, 20, 1 2 8 , 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 , 1 7 1
private property, 80- 8 7 , 94, 1 1 8
Schwarz, T. , 6 , 8
use value in, 74- 7 5
Seeman , M.
measurements of estrangement,
O iserman , T. I . , 8 , 1 6 3 , 1 6 9
1 54- 1 5 8 , 1 62
Oilman, 8 . , 4, 1 5 0, 1 5 3 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 5 ,
varieties of alienation, x vi ii-xix
1 6 7 , 1 70, 1 74
Self-estrangement, 3 4
Origin of the Family ( E ngels) , 79, 8 2 s ik, o . , 6
Slave labor, 29- 3 0
Peruvian I n c a State, 7 3 , 7 6 Slavery, 4 3 , 1 2 5 , 1 2 7
Petrovi � , G . , 44, 1 50 , 1 6 5 commodity production , 2 9 - 3 0 ,
Plamenatz, J . , 1 7 2 61-63
Poverty o f Philosophy (Marx ), 50, 6 6 , Smith , A . , 1 3- 1 4, 4 9 , 9 1
1 0 2- 1 04, 1 4 1 Socialists, 1 08- 1 09 , 1 69-1 7 3
Precapital ist societies, 1 29- 1 3 9 Social organization, 9 9- 1 0 1 , 1 06-
and estrangement, 7 1 - 8 7 1 0 7 , 1 3 4- 1 3 5 , 1 40
 INDEX 1 95

division of labor, 9 9 - 1 00 Urban alienation, xviii

isolatio n , xix Use value, 47-69 , 1 04
Social relations, 1 3 4- 1 3 5 noncap italist societies, 7 3-7 5
Social science, and alienatio n , xviii productio n , 5 0- 5 2
Species-being, 1 6- 2 2 , 4 5 , 1 08 pro du ctive activity, 5 3 -69
and productive life, 3 5- 3 7
Stimer, M . , 1 07 , 1 2 7
Value. See Exch ange value ; Use
Stoics, 1 2 , 1 5
val u e ; Surplus value
Strmiska, Z., 1 5 6
Surplus value, 4 7-69, 7 2- 7 3 , 1 1 0,
1 32 Wage l abor, slavery , 2 9 , 30, 4 3
and exploitation, 5 7-62 Wages, 2 5-29
Sweezy, P. M., 1 7 3 Wallimann , I., 1 5 7 , 1 6 2
Swingewood, A . , 7 Wartburg, W. V . , 1 2 3
Szymanski, A . , 1 7 3 Wealth , 4 7-49 , 1 0 1 , 1 04, 1 09
Weber, M., 3
Tatsis, N . , 1 0 Weimar Republic, 3
Terminology , comments o n , 40-42 , Work, nature of, 1 3 7- 1 3 9
68-69 Workers
Theories of Surplus Value (Marx ) , 40, as commodity, 2 7- 3 0
69, 1 1 3 , 1 24, 1 3 2 " free agent," 2 7 , 3 7- 3 9
Theses on Feuerbach (Marx), 1 48- p ro duction, 3 2- 3 4
1 49 , 1 6 1 p roduct of l abor, 62-66
Time , 1 09- 1 1 3 , 1 24 surplus val ue , 62-66
labor, 48, 50, 7 8 , 1 04, 1 1 4, 1 2 1 Writings of the Young Marx ( Guddat ) ,
and workers, 1 1 0 5
Tithe corn , 60-6 1
"Transformation proble m , " 4 7
Tucker, R . C . , 1 5 8, 1 72 Zito , G. V . , 10
Abo ut the Author

Isidor Wallimann is a Lecturer at the School of Social Work, Basie , and

at the Institute of Sociology , University of Bern, Switzerland . He has
written numerous articles for scholary publications including Socio logy,
The R eview of Black Political Eco n o my, and Zeitschrift fuer Sozio logie.
,!7IA3B3-ccajgi!