Afghan Civil War (1992–1996)

War in Afghanistan (1992–1996)

Part of the conflict in Afghanistan (1978–present)

Much of the civil infrastructure was ruined in Kabul due to the war. This photo is
presumably from 1993.

Date 28 April 1992 – 27 September 1996

(4 years, 4 months, 4 weeks and 2 days)
Location Afghanistan
Result
Taliban victory, Collapse of the Islamic State of Afghanistan
Thousands of civilians killed, millions driven from their homes,[1]
Kabul heavily damaged.[2]
Grave mistreatment of civilians (rape, murder, looting,
extortion)[3]
Taliban conquest of Kabul and most of Afghanistan,[4] and
establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Civil war continues (1996–2001)

Belligerents

Islamic State of Hezb-e Islami Taliban (from late

Afghanistan Gulbuddin (until late 1994)
* Jamiat-e Islami 1994) Supported by:
* Shura-e Nazar Supported by: Pakistan (after
* Jebh-e Nejat-e Pakistan (until 1994)
Melli 1994)
* Harakat-i-Inqilab Al Qaeda (from early
* Harakat-i Islami Hezb-i Wahdat 1996)
* Ittehad-e Islami (after Dec. 1992)
* Hezb-e Islami Supported by:
Iran
 Khalis (until mid-1992) Junbish-i Milli
Supported by: (Jan. 1994-Aug. 1994)
Saudi Arabia Supported by:
Uzbekistan
Hezb-i Wahdat
(until Dec. 1992) Regional Kandahar Militia
Supported by: Leaders
Iran

Junbish-i Milli (until

1994)
Supported by:
Uzbekistan
Commanders and leaders

Burhanuddin Gulbuddin Mohammed Omar

Rabbani Hekmatyar Osama Bin Laden
Ahmad Shah Ayman al-Zawahiri
Massoud Abdul Ali Mazari
Sibghatullah Karim Khalili
Mojaddedi
Mohammad Nabi
Abdul Rashid
Mohammadi
Dostum
Hussain Anwari
Abdul Rasul
Gul Agha Sherzai
Sayyaf
Abdul Haq

Abdul Ali Mazari

Karim Khalili

Abdul Rashid
Dostum

This article covers a part of the contemporary Afghan history that started between 28 April 1992, the day
that a new interim Afghan government was supposed to replace the Republic of Afghanistan of President
Mohammad Najibullah, and the Taliban's conquest of Kabul establishing the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan on 27 September 1996.[5]

On 25 April 1992, a civil war had ignited between three, later five or six, mujahideen armies, when
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) refused to form a coalition government with other mujahideen groups and tried to
conquer Kabul for themselves. After four months, already half a million residents of Kabul had fled the
heavily bombarded city.
The following years, several times some of those militant groups formed coalitions, and often broke them
again. By mid 1994, Kabul's original population of two million had dropped to 500,000. In 1995–96, the
new militia Taliban, supported by Pakistan and ISI, had grown to be the strongest force. By late 1994, the
Taliban had captured Kandahar, in 1995 they took Herat, in early September 1996 they took Jalalabad,
and eventually in late September 1996 they captured Kabul. Fighting would continue the following years,
often between the now dominant Taliban and other groups (see Afghan Civil War (1996–2001)).

Contents
Background
Outline of civil war (1992–96)
War over Kabul (28 April 1992–93)
War expanding (1994)
War over all Afghanistan, superiority Taliban (1995–96)
Participants
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin / Pakistan's ISI
Jamiat-e Islami
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
Ittehad-e Islami / Saudi Arabia
Hezb-i Wahdat / Iran
Junbish-i Milli / Uzbekistan
Taliban / Pakistan
Atrocities
Bombardments
Timeline
1992
April–May
June–July
August–December
Kandahar During the Same Time
1993
January–February
Afshar
March–December
1994
January–June
July–December
1995
January–March
April–September
October–December
1996
January–September
Taliban take-over
 Aftermath
See also
References
Bibliography
External links

Background
In March 1992, President Mohammad Najibullah, having lost the Soviet Union support which upheld his
government, agreed to resign and make way for a neutral interim government. Several mujahideen
parties started negotiations to form a national coalition government. But one group, the Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, presumably supported and directed by Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), did not join the negotiations and announced to conquer Kabul alone. Hekmatyar
moved his troops to Kabul, and was allowed into the town soon after 17 April. This left the other
mujahideen groups no other choice than to also enter Kabul, on 24 April, to prevent Hekmatyar from
taking over the city and the country.[6][7]
This ignited a civil war between five or six rivalling armies, (nearly) all backed by foreign states. Several
mujahideen groups proclaimed an 'interim government' on 26 April 1992 but this never attained real
authority over Afghanistan.

Outline of civil war (1992–96)

War over Kabul (28 April 1992–93)

For background/explanation on the start of the fighting, and on the (ineffective) 'interim
government', see: Afghan Civil War (1989–92), § Militias fight in Kabul (24–27 April 1992)

Fighting and rivalry over Kabul had started on 25 April 1992, involving six armies: Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin, Jamiat-e Islami, Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, Ittehad-e Islami, Hezb-i Wahdat and Junbish-i
Milli. Mujahideen warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin), after talks with
mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-e Islami) on 25 May 1992, was offered the position of
prime minister in President Mujaddidi's – paralyzed – 'interim government'. But this agreement shattered
already on 29 May when Mujaddidi accused Hekmatyar of having rocket-fired his plane returning from
Islamabad.[8]

By 30 May 1992, Jamiat-e Islami and Junbish-i Milli mujahideen forces were fighting against
Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin again in southern Kabul. In May[9] or early June, Hekmatyar
started shelling Kabul all around,[8][10] presumably with substantial support from the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI).[9] Junbish-i Milli and Jamiat-e Islami in June shelled areas south of Kabul,
Ittehad-e Islami and Hezb-i Wahdat were fighting each other in west Kabul. At the end of June 1992,
Burhanuddin Rabbani took over the interim Presidency from Mujaddidi, as provided in the Peshawar
Accords[8] – a paralyzed 'interim government' though, right from its proclamation in April 1992.[11]

In the rest of 1992, hundreds of rockets hit Kabul, thousands, mostly civilians, were killed, half a million
people fled the town. In 1993, the rivalling militia factions continued their fights over Kabul, several
cease-fires and peace accords failed.[12] According to Human Rights Watch, in the period 1992–95, five
different mujahideen armies contributed to heavily damaging Kabul,[13][14] though other analysts blame
especially the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin group.[9][15]

War expanding (1994)

In January 1994, Dostum's Junbish-i Milli forces and the Hezb-i Wahdat joined sides with Hekmatyar's
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin.[12] Fighting this year also broke out in the northern town of Mazar-i-Sharif. In
November 1994, the new, Islamic-inspired militia Taliban conquered Kandahar city, by January 1995
they controlled 12 Afghan provinces.[16]

War over all Afghanistan, superiority Taliban (1995–96)

In 1995, the battle in all Afghanistan raged between at least four parties: the Burhanuddin Rabbani
'interim government' with Ahmad Shah Massoud and his Jamiat-e Islami forces; the Taliban; Abdul
Rashid Dostum with his Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami forces; and the Hezb-i Wahdat; some of those last
three at times formed (informal) alliances.[12] The Taliban captured Ghazni (south of Kabul) and Maidan
Wardak Province (west of Kabul) and in February approached Kabul. In March 1995, Abdul Ali Mazari,
leader of Hezb-i Wahdat, allied with Taliban and let the Taliban enter Kabul. Massoud heavily
bombarded Kabul, driving Hezb-i Wahdat and Taliban out. The Taliban then continued shelling Kabul
and attacking Massoud's forces in Kabul.

In 1996, the Taliban grew stronger, as analysts say with decisive support from Pakistan.[17] This induced
some other warring factions to form new alliances, starting with the Burhanuddin Rabbani 'interim
government' and Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in early March. In July, a new
government was formed by five factions: Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul
Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e Islami, the Harakat-i-Islami, and Hezb-i Wahdat's Akbari faction. Such alliances
did not stop the advance and victories of the Taliban. On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, controlling
already considerable parts of western, southern and eastern Aghanistan, conquered Kabul and
pronounced their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.[5]

Participants

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin / Pakistan's ISI

According to the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan in 1989–1992, Peter Tomsen, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
was hired in 1990 by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to conquer and rule Afghanistan in
the benefit of Pakistani interests, which plan was delayed until 1992 as a result of US pressure to cancel
it.[18]
In April 1992, according to self-made Afghan historian Nojumi,[19] the Pakistani intelligence agency
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped Hekmatyar by sending hundreds of trucks loaded with weapons
and fighters to the southern part of Kabul.[20] In June 1992, Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin ('Islamic party') troops started shelling Kabul.[21] The Director of the Centre for Arab and
Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, Amin Saikal, confirmed the Pakistani support in
1992 for Hekmatyar: "Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. ... Islamabad
could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders ... to subordinate their own nationalist
objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. ... Had it not been for the ISI's logistic
support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target
and destroy half of Kabul."[9]

Jamiat-e Islami
Jamiat-e Islami (‘Islamic Society’) was a political party of ethnic Tajiks, and included one of the
strongest mujahideen militias in Afghanistan since 1979. Its military wing was commanded by Ahmad
Shah Massoud

Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami ('Islamic Revolution Movement'),
became the Vice President of Afghanistan in the Mujahideen government. However, when the
Mujahideen leaders opened their weapons at each other and the civil war in Afghanistan started, he
resigned from his post and forbade the troops loyal to him from taking part in the war. He remained in
Pakistan and tried his best to stop the war between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.[22][23] In 1996, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Most of the Taliban leaders
were the students of Molvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.[24] Mohammadi, however, maintained a good
relationship with the Taliban.

Ittehad-e Islami / Saudi Arabia

The Sunni Pashtun Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan ('Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan') of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was supported by Sunni Wahabbi Saudi Arabia, to maximize
Wahhabi influence.[21] After the forced withdrawal of the demoralised Soviet forces in 1989, and the
overthrow of the Mohammad Najibullah regime in 1992, Sayyaf's organization's human rights record
became noticeably worse, underlined by their involvement in the infamous massacres and rampages in
the Hazara Kabul neighbourhood of Afshar in 1992-1993 during the Battle of Kabul.[25] Sayyaf's faction
was responsible for, "repeated human butchery", when his faction of Mujahideen turned on civilians and
the Shia Hezb-i Wahdat group in west Kabul[26] starting May 1992.[25] Amnesty International reported
that Sayyaf's forces rampaged through the mainly Shi'ite Tajik (Qizilbash) Afshar neighborhood of
Kabul, slaughtering and raping inhabitants and burning homes.[27] Sayyaf, who was allied with the de
jure Kabul government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, did not deny the abductions of Hazara civilians, but
merely accused the Hezb-i Wahdat militia of being an agent of the theocratic Iranian government.[25]

Hezb-i Wahdat / Iran

The Shia Hazara Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan ('Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan') of Abdul Ali
Mazari was strongly supported by Shia Iran, according to Human Rights Watch, with Iran's Ministry of
Intelligence and National Security officials providing direct orders.[21]After the fall of Kabul, the Afghan
political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accords. The Peshawar
Accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional
period to be followed by general elections. According to Human Rights Watch:

The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an
entity created in April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. ...
With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties... were
 ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. ... Hekmatyar's Hezbe Islami, for its
part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and
launched attacks against government forces but the shells and rockets fell everywhere in
Kabul resulting in many civilian casualties.[28]

The Hezb-i Wahdat initially took part in the Islamic State of Afghanistan and held some posts in the
government. Soon, however, conflict broke out between the Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat of Mazari, the
Wahabbi Pashtun Ittehad-e Islami of warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf supported by Saudi Arabia.[28][29][30]
The Islamic State's defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud tried to mediate between the factions with
some success, but the cease fire remained only temporary. As of June 1992, the Hezb-i Wahdat and the
Ittehad-e Islami engaged in violent street battles against each other. With the support of Saudi Arabia[29]
Sayyaf's forces repeatedly attacked western suburbs of Kabul resulting in heavy civilian casualties.
Likewise, Mazari's forces were also accused of attacking civilian targets in the west.[31] Mazari
acknowledged taking Pashtun civilians as prisoners, but defended the action by saying that Sayyaf's
forces took Hazaras first.[32] Mazari's group started cooperating with Hekmatyar's group from January
1993.[33]

Junbish-i Milli / Uzbekistan

The Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan ('National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan') militia of former
communist and ethnic Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum was backed by Uzbekistan.[9] Uzbek
President Islam Karimov was keen to see Dostum controlling as much of Afghanistan as possible,
especially in the north along the Uzbek border.[9] Dostum's men would become an important force in the
fall of Kabul in 1992. In April 1992, the opposition forces began their march to Kabul against the
government of Najibullah. Dostum had allied himself with the opposition commanders Ahmad Shah
Massoud and Sayed Jafar Naderi,[34] the head of the Isma'ili community, and together they captured the
capital city. He and Massoud fought in a coalition against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[35] Massoud and
Dostum's forces joined together to defend Kabul against Hekmatyar. Some 4000-5000 of his troops, units
of his Sheberghan-based 53rd Division and Balkh-based Guards Division, garrisoning Bala Hissar fort,
Maranjan Hill, and Khwaja Rawash Airport, where they stopped Najibullah from entering to flee.[36]

Dostum then left Kabul for his northern stronghold Mazar-i-Sharif, where he ruled, in effect, an
independent region (or 'proto-state'), often referred as the Northern Autonomous Zone. He printed his
own Afghan currency, ran a small airline named Balkh Air,[37] and formed relations with countries like
Uzbekistan. While the rest of the country was in chaos, his region remained prosperous and functional,
and it won him the support from people of all ethnic groups. Many people fled to his territory to escape
the violence and fundamentalism imposed by the Taliban later on.[38] In 1994, Dostum allied himself
with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud,
but in 1995 sided with the government again.[35]

Taliban / Pakistan
The Taliban ('the students') have been described as a movement of religious students (talib) from the
Pashtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan who had been educated in traditional Islamic schools
in Pakistan.[13] The movement was founded in September 1994, promising to 'rid Afghanistan of
warlords and criminals'.[16] Several analysts state that at least since October 1994, Pakistan and
especially the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were heavily supporting the Taliban.[16][39][40]
Professor Amin Saikal stated: "Hekmatyar's failure to achieve what was expected of him [later]
prompted the ISI leaders to come up with a new surrogate force [the Taliban]."[9] Also a publication of
the George Washington University stated: when Hekmatyar in 1994 had failed to "deliver for Pakistan",
Pakistan turned towards a new force: the Taliban.[41]

Ahmad Shah Massoud, involved in the political and military turmoil of Afghanistan since 1973 and
therefore not an impartial observer, in early September 1996 described the Taliban as the centre of a
wider movement in Afghanistan of armed Islamic radicalism: a coalition of wealthy sheikhs (like Osama
bin Laden) and preachers from the Persian Gulf advocating the Saudi’s puritanical outlook on Islam
which Massoud considered abhorrent to Afghans but also bringing and distributing money and supplies;
Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies; impoverished young students from Pakistani religious schools
chartered as volunteer fighters notably for this group called Taliban; and exiled Central Asian Islamic
radicals trying to establish bases in Afghanistan for their revolutionary movements.[42]

Although Pakistan initially denied supporting the Taliban,[43] Pakistan’s Interior Minister Naseerullah
Babar (1993–96) would state in 1999[44], "we created the Taliban",[45] and Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani
President in 2001-2008 and Chief of Army Staff since 1998, wrote in 2006: "we sided" with the Taliban
to "spell the defeat" of anti-Taliban forces.[46] According to journalist and author Ahmed Rashid,
between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan on
the side of the Taliban.[47]

Atrocities
In 1992–93 in Kabul, the factions of Hezb-i Wahdat, Ittehad-e Islami, Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin regularly targeted civilians for attack, intentionally fired rockets into occupied civilian homes,
or randomly fired into civilian areas.[14] In January–June 1994, 25,000 people died in Kabul due to
fighting, with targeted attacks on civilian areas, between an alliance of Dostum's (Junbish-i Milli) with
Hekmatyar's (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin) against Massoud’s (Jamiat-e Islami) forces.[48]

In 1993–95, leaders of Jamiat-e Islami, Junbish-i Milli, Hezb-i Wahdat and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
could not keep their commanders from murder, rape and extortion, just as also the various warlords in
north Afghanistan descended to such horridnesses.[13]

Bombardments
In 1992–95, Kabul was heavily bombarded and damaged. Some analysts emphasize the role of Hezb-e
Islami Gulbuddin in "targeting and destroying half of Kabul"[9] or in heavy bombardments especially in
1992.[15] But Human Rights Watch in two reports stated that nearly all armies participating in the 1992–
95 period of war contributed to "destroying at least one-third of Kabul, killing thousands of civilians,
driving a half million refugees to Pakistan": Jamiat-e Islami, Junbish-i Milli, Hezb-i Wahdat, Hezb-e
Islami Gulbuddin[13] and Ittehad-e Islami.[14]

As of November 1995, the Taliban also engaged in bombing and shelling Kabul, causing many civilians
to be killed or injured.[49][50]

Timeline
1992

April–May
As of 28 April, an interim government under interim President
Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, with interim minister of defense Ahmad
Shah Massoud, claimed to be governing Afghanistan, as agreed
in the Peshawar Accords.[11][6]

But soon, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami

Gulbuddin again infiltrated Kabul trying to take power. This
forced other parties to advance on the capital as well. Already
before 28 April, the Mujahideen forces that had fought against
Russian troops with help from the US had taken command of Map showing political control in
[7] Afghanistan in 1992, following the
Kabul and Afghanistan. Hekmatyar had asked other groups
collapse of the Najibullah
such as Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami and the Khalis faction to join
government.
him while entering Kabul, but they declined his offer and instead
backed the Peshawar Accords. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin entered
the city from the south and west but were quickly expelled. The forces of Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e
Nazar entered the city, with agreement from Nabi Azimi and the Commander of the Kabul Garrison,
General Abdul Wahid Baba Jan that they would enter the city through Bagram, Panjshir, Salang and
Kabul Airport.[51] Many government forces, including generals, joined Jamiat-e Islami,[51] including the
forces of General Baba Jan, who was at the time in charge of the garrison of Kabul. On 27 April, all other
major parties such as Junbish-i Milli, Hezb-i Wahdat, Ittehad-e Islami and Harakat had entered the city as
well.[21] After suffering heavy casualties, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin forces deserted their positions and
fled to the outskirts of Kabul in the direction of Logar province.

The Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin had been driven out of Kabul, but were still within artillery range. In May
1992 Hekmatyar started a bombardment campaign against the capital, firing thousands of rockets
supplied by Pakistan.[9] In addition to the bombardment campaign, Hekmatyar's forces had overrun Pul-
e-Charkhi prison while still in the centre of Kabul, and had set free all the inmates, including many
criminals, who were able to take arms and commit gruesome crimes against the population.[52] With a
government structure yet to be established, chaos broke out in Kabul.

The immediate objective of the interim government was to defeat the forces acting against the Peshawar
Accord. A renewed attempt at peace talks on 25 May 1992 again agreed to give Hekmatyar the position
of prime minister, however, this lasted less than a week after Hekmatyar attempted to shoot down the
plane of President Mujaddidi.[21] Furthermore, as part of the peace talks Hekmatyar was demanding the
departure of Dostum's forces, which would have tilted the scales in his favour.[21] This led to fighting
between Dostum and Hekmatyar. On 30 May 1992, during fighting between the forces of Dostum's
Junbish-i Milli and Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami in the southeast of Kabul, both sides used artillery and
rockets, killing and injuring an unknown number of civilians.[51]

June–July
In June 1992, as scheduled in the Peshawar Accords, Burhanuddin Rabbani became interim president of
Afghanistan.
From the onset of the battle, Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e Nazar controlled the strategic high areas, and
were thus able to develop a vantage point within the city from which opposition forces could be targeted.
Hekmatyar continued to bombard Kabul with rockets. Although Hekmatyar insisted that only Islamic
Jihad Council areas were targeted, the rockets mostly fell over the houses of the innocent civilians of
Kabul, a fact that has been well-documented.[21][53] Artillery exchanges quickly broke out escalating in
late May–Early June. Shura-e Nazar was able to immediately benefit from heavy weapons left by fleeing
or defecting government forces and launched rockets on Hekmatyar's positions near the Jalalabad
Custom's Post, and in the districts around Hood Khil, Qala-e Zaman Khan and near Pul-e-Charkhi prison.
On 10 June it was reported that Dostum's forces had also begun nightly bombardments of Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin positions.[15]

Particularly noticeable in this period was the escalation of the fight in West Kabul between the Shi'a
Hezb-i Wahdat forces supported by Iran and those of the Wahhabist Ittehad-e Islami militia supported by
Saudi Arabia. Hezb-i Wahdat was somewhat nervous about the presence of Ittehad-e Islami posts, which
were deployed in Hazara areas such as Rahman Baba High school. According to the writings of Nabi
Azimi, who at the time was a high ranking governor, the fighting began on 31 May 1992 when 4
members of Hezb-i Wahdat's leadership were assassinated near the Kabul Silo. Those killed were Karimi,
Sayyid Isma'il Hosseini, Chaman Ali Abuzar and Vaseegh, the first 3 being members of the party's
central committee. Following this the car of Haji Shir Alam, a top Ittehad-e Islami commander was
stopped near Pol-e Sorkh, and although Alem escaped, one of the passengers was killed.[54] On 3 June
1992, heavy fighting between forces of Ittehad-e Islami and Hezb-i Wahdat in west Kabul. Both sides
used rockets, killing and injuring civilians. On 4 June, interviews with Hazara households state that
Ittehad-e Islami forces looted their houses in Kohte-e Sangi, killing 6 civilians. The gun battles at this
time had a death toll of over 100 according to some sources.[55] On 5 June 1992, further conflict between
forces of Ittehad-e Islami and Hezb-i Wahdat in west Kabul was reported. Here, both sides used heavy
artillery, destroying houses and other civilian structures. Three schools were reported destroyed by
bombardment. The bombardment killed and injured an unknown number of civilians. Gunmen were
reported killing people in shops near the Kabul Zoo. On 24 June 1992 the Jamhuriat hospital located near
the Interior Ministry was bombed and closed. Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e Nazar sometimes joined the
conflict when their positions came under attack by Hezb-i Wahdat forces and in June/July bombarded
Hezb-i Wahdat positions in return. Harakat forces also sometimes joined the fight.

August–December
In the month of August alone, a bombardment of artillery shells, rockets and fragmentation bombs killed
over 2,000 people in Kabul, most of them civilians. On 1 August the airport was attacked by rockets. 150
rockets alone were launched the following day, and according to one author these missile attacks killed as
many as 50 people and injured 150. In the early morning on 10 August Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin forces
attacked from three directions – Chelastoon, Darulaman and Maranjan mountain. A shell also struck a
Red Cross hospital. On 10–11 April nearly a thousand rockets hit parts of Kabul including about 250 hits
on the airport. Some estimate that as many as 1000 were killed, with the attacks attributed to Hekmatyar's
forces.[15] By 20 August it was reported that 500, 000 people had fled Kabul.[56] On 13 August 1992, a
rocket attack was launched on Deh Afghanan in which cluster bombs were used. 80 were killed and more
than 150 injured according to press reports. In response to this, Shura-e Nazar forces bombard Kart-I
Naw, Shah Shaheed and Chiilsatoon with aerial and ground bombardment. In this counterattack more
than 100 were killed and 120 wounded.[21]
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin was not however the only perpetrator of indiscriminate shelling of civilians.
Particularly in West Kabul, Hezb-i Wahdat, Ittehad-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami all have been accused of
deliberately targeting civilian areas. All sides used non-precision rockets such as Sakre rockets and the
UB-16 and UB-32 S-5 airborne rocket launchers.

In November, in a very effective move, Hekmatyar's forces, together with guerrillas from some of the
Arab groups, barricaded a power station in Sarobi, 30 miles east of Kabul, cutting electricity to the
capital and shutting down the water supply, which is dependent on power. His forces and other
Mujahideen were also reported to have prevented food convoys from reaching the city.

On 23 November, Minister of Food Sulaiman Yaarin reported that the city's food and fuel depots were
empty. The government was now under heavy pressure. At the end of 1992 Hezb-i Wahdat officially
withdrew from the government and opened secret negotiations with Hizb-I Islami. In December 1992,
Rabbani postponed convening a shura to elect the next president. On 29 December 1992, Rabbani was
elected as president and he agreed to establish a parliament with representatives from all of Afghanistan.
Also notable during this month was the solidification of an alliance between Hezb-i Wahdat and Hezb-e
Islami Gulbuddin against the Islamic State of Afghanistan. While Hizb-i Islami joined in bombardments
to support Hezb-i Wahdat, Wahdat conducted joint offensives, such as the one to secure Darulaman.[57]
On 30 December 1992 at least one child was apparently killed in Pul-i Artan by a BM21 Rocket
launched from Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin forces at Rishkor.[58]

Kandahar During the Same Time

Kandahar was filled with three different local Pashtun commanders Amir Lalai, Gul Agha Sherzai and
Mullah Naqib Ullah who engaged in an extremely violent struggle for power and who were not affiliated
with the interim government in Kabul. The bullet riddled city came to be a centre of lawlessness, crime
and atrocities fuelled by complex Pashtun tribal rivalries.

1993

January–February
The authority of Burhanuddin Rabbani, interim President since June 1992 and also the leader of the
Jamiat-e Islami party, remained limited to only part of Kabul; the rest of the city remained divided among
rival militia factions. On 19 January, a short-lived cease-fire broke down when Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
forces renewed rocket attacks on Kabul from their base in the south of the city supervised by Commander
Toran Kahlil.[59] Hundreds were killed and wounded while many houses were destroyed in this clash
between Hizb-i Islami and Jamiat-e Islami.

Heavy fighting was reported around a Hezb-i Wahdat post held by Commander Sayid Ali Jan near Rabia
Balkhi girls' school. Most notable during this period was the rocket bombardments that would start
against the residential area of Afshar. Some of these areas, such as Wahdat's headquarters at the Social
Science Institute, were considered military targets, a disproportionate number of the rockets, tank shells
and mortars fell in civilian areas.[60] Numerous rockets were reportedly launched from Haider-controlled
frontlines of Tap-I Salaam towards the men of Division 095 under Ali Akbar Qasemi. One attack during
this time from Hezb-i Wahdat killed at least 9 civilians.[61] Further rockets bombardments took place on
26 February 1993 as Shura-e Nazar and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin bombarded each other's positions.
Civilians were the main victims in the fighting, which killed some 1,000 before yet another peace accord
was signed on 8 March. However the following day rocketing by Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
and Hezb-i Wahdat in Kabul left another 10 dead.[62]

Afshar
See the main article for more information:

The Afshar Operation was a military operation by Burhanuddin Rabbani's Islamic State of Afghanistan
government forces against Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Hezb-i Wahdat forces that took place in
February 1993. The Iran-controlled Hezb-i Wahdat together with the Pakistani-backed Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin of Hekmatyar were shelling densely populated areas in Kabul from their positions in Afshar.
To counter these attack Islamic State forces attacked Afshar in order to capture the positions of Wahdat,
capture Wahdat's leader Abdul Ali Mazari and to consolidate parts of the city controlled by the
government. The operation took place in a densely populated district of Kabul, the Afshar district.
Afshar district is situated on the slopes of Mount Afshar in west Kabul. The district is predominantly
home to the Hazara ethnic group. The Ittehad-e Islami troops of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf escalated the
operation into a rampage against civilians. Both Ittehad and Wahdat forces have severely targeted
civilians in their war. The Wahhabist Ittehad-e Islami supported by Saudi Arabia was targeting Shias,
while the Iran-controlled Hezb-i Wahdat was targeting Sunni Muslims.

March–December
Under the March accord, brokered by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
Rabbani and Hekmatyar agreed to share power until elections could
be held in late 1994. Hekmatyar's condition had been the resignation
of Massoud as minister of defense. The parties agreed to a new
peace accord in Jalalabad on 20 May under which Massoud agreed
to relinquish the post of Defense Minister. Massoud had resigned in
order to gain peace. Hekmatyar at first accepted the post of prime
minister but after attending only one cabinet meeting he left Kabul
again starting to bomb Kabul leaving more than 700 dead in
bombing raids, street battles and rocket attacks in and around Kabul. Rabbani and Hekmatyar
Massoud returned to the position of minister of defense to defend the handshaking after signing a
city against the rocket attacks. power-sharing deal on March 7,
1993. However Hekmatyar soon
returned to fighting against
1994 Rabbani's government.

January–June
In January 1994, Dostum, for different reasons, joined with the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hezb-e
Islami Gulbuddin, along with their new allies of Hezb-i Wahdat and Junbish-i Milli, launched the Shura
Hamaghangi campaign against the forces of Massoud and the interim government. During this, Hezb-e
Islami Gulbuddin was able make use of Junbish's air force in both bombing the positions of Jamiat-e
Islami and in resupplying their men. This led to greater artillery bombardment on behalf of Hezb-e Islami
Gulbuddin.[53] Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Junbish-i Milli were able to hold parts of central Kabul
during this time. Junbish forces were particularly singled out for committing looting, rape and murder,
for the sole reason that they could get away with it.[63] Some commanders such as Shir Arab, commander
of the 51st regiment,[53] Kasim Jangal Bagh, Ismail Diwaneh ["Ismail the Mad"], and Abdul
Cherikwere[21] particularly singled out. According to Afghanistan Justice Project, during this period until
June 1994, 25,000 people were killed. Areas around Microraion were particularly bloody. By now the
population of Kabul had dropped from 2,000,000 during Soviet times to 500,000 due to a large exodus
from Kabul.[64]

July–December
According to Human Rights Watch, numerous Iranian agents were assisting Hezb-i Wahdat, as "Iran was
attempting to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence in the new government".[9][21][65] Saudi
agents "were trying to strengthen the Wahhabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittehad-e Islami faction to the
same end".[9][21] "Outside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own
security and political agendas."[41] Human Rights Watch writes that "rare ceasefires, usually negotiated
by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani (the
interim government), or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly
collapsed within days."[21]

The Taliban movement first emerged on the military scene in August 1994, with the stated goal of
liberating Afghanistan from its present corrupt leadership of warlords and establish a pure Islamic
society. It was reported in the December 2009 edition of Harper's Weekly that the Taliban originated in
the districts around Kandahar city.[66] By October 1994 the Taliban movement had according to
academic consensus and on-the-ground reports attracted the support of
Pakistan [67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74] which saw in the Taliban a way to secure trade routes to Central Asia
and establish a government in Kabul friendly to its interests.[75][76][77][78] Pakistani politicians during
that time repeatedly denied supporting the Taliban.[43][79] But senior Pakistani officials such as Interior
Minister Naseerullah Babar would later state, "we created the Taliban"[45] and former Pakistani President
Musharraf would write "we sided" with the Taliban to "spell the defeat" of anti-Taliban forces.[46]

In October 1994 a bomb struck a wedding ceremony in Qala Fathullah in Kabul, killing 70 civilians. No
fighting had been witnessed in the area in several days according to reports.[80]

Also in October 1994, the Taliban revolted in Kandahar. On October 12, 1994, the Taliban scored their
first victory when they captured the Kandahar district of Spin Boldak.[66] They then captured Kandahar
city on 5 November 1994 and soon went on to capture most of the south.

By the end of 1994, Junbish-i Milli and Dostum were on the defensive in capital Kabul, and Massoud's
forces had ousted them from most of their strongholds. Massoud more and more gained control of Kabul.
At the same time Junbish was able to push Jamiat-e Islami out of Mazar-e Sharif.

1995

January–March
Interim President Rabbani refused to step down at the end of his term on 28 December 1994, and on 1
January UN peace envoy Mahmoud Mistiri returned to Kabul.[5] On 10 January Rabbani offered to step
down and turn over power to a 23-member UN interim administration if Hikmatyar agreed to withdraw.
On 12 January a cease fire was agreed, but bombing began again on 19 January, killing at least 22.[5]
Between 22 and 31 January, Dostum's Junbish-i Milli party bombed government positions in Kunduz
town and province, killing 100 people are and wounding over 120. The town fell to Dostum on 5
February. Rabbani further delayed his resignation on the 21st, stating he would resign on the 22nd.[5] In
late January, Ghazni fell to the Taliban. Hikmatyar lost hundreds of men and several tanks in the battle,
which included a temporary alliance between the Taliban and the forces of Rabbani.[5]

Meanwhile, the Taliban began to approach Kabul, capturing Wardak in early February and Maidan Shar,
the provincial capital, on 10 February 1995. On 14 February 1995, Hekmatyar was forced to abandon his
artillery positions at Charasiab due to the advance of the Taliban, who were, therefore, able to take
control of this weaponry. During 25–27 February clashes broke out in Karte Seh, Kote Sangi and Karte
Chahar between government forces and Hezb-i Wahdat, resulting in 10 dead and 12 wounded.[5] In
March, Massoud launched an offensive against Hezb-i Wahdat trapping Wahdat forces in Karte Seh and
Kote Sangi. On 8 March, unable to retreat with the Taliban in the rear, Hezb-i Wahdat's leader Abdul Ali
Mazari allied himself with the Taliban, allowing them to enter Kabul, although many of Wahdat's forces
joined Massoud instead. At this time, Massoud's forces heavily bombarded Western Kabul, managing to
drive Wahdat out. According to other reports, the forces of Jamiat-e Islami also committed mass rape and
executions on civilians in this period.[81] The Taliban retreated under the bombardment, taking Mazari
with them and throwing him from a helicopter en route to Kandahar. The Taliban then continued to
launch offenses against Kabul, using the equipment of Hizb-e Islami. While the Taliban retreated, large
amounts of looting and pillaging was said to have taken place in south-western Kabul by the forces under
Rabbani and Massoud against ethnic Hazaras.[82] Estimates of civilian casualties from this period of
fighting are 100 killed and 1000 wounded.[5]

Starting on 12 March 1995 Massoud's forces launched an offensive against the Taliban and were able to
drive them out from the area around Kabul, retaking Charasiab on 19 March and leading to a period of
relative calm for a few months. The battle left hundreds of Taliban dead and the force suffered its first
defeat. However, while retreating, the Taliban shelled the capital, Kabul. On 16 March, Rabbani stated,
once again, that he would not resign. On 30 March, a grave of 22 male corpses, 20 of which were shot in
the head, was found in Charasiab.[5]

April–September
On 4 April, the Taliban killed about 800 government soldiers and captured 300 more in Farah Province,
but were later forced to retreat.[5] In early May, Rabbani's forces attacked the Taliban in Maidan Shar.[5]
India and Pakistan agree to reopen their diplomatic missions in Kabul on 3–4 May. On 11 May, Ismail
Khan and Rabbani's forces recaptured Farah from the Taliban. Ismail Khan reportedly used cluster
bombs, killing 220–250 unarmed civilians.[5] Between 14 and 16 May, Helmand and Nimruz fall to
Rabbani and Khan's forces. On 20 May, Hezb-i Wahdat forces captured Bamiyan. On 5 June, Dostum's
forces attacked Rabbani's forces in Samangan. More than 20 are killed, and both forces continue to fight
in Baghlan. On 9 June, a 10-day truce was signed between the government and the Taliban. On 15 June,
Dostum bombed Kabul and Kunduz. Two 550-pound (250 kg) bombs are dropped in a residential area of
Kabul, killing two and injuring one. Three land near the defence ministry.[5] On 20 June, the government
recaptured Bamiyan. On 23 July, Dostum and Wahdat managed to recapture Bamiyan. On 3 August, the
Taliban hijacked a Russian cargo aircraft in Kandahar and captured weapons intended for Rabbani. The
Government captured Girishk and Helmand from the Taliban on 28 August, but were unable to hold
Girishk. In September, Dostum forces captured Badghis. The Taliban were able to capture Farah on 2
September, and Shindand on the 3rd. On 5 September, Herat fell, with Ismail Khan fleeing to Mashhad.
Some attribute this to the informal alliance between Dostum and the Taliban, along with Dostum's
bombing of the city.[5] Iran followed by closing the border. On 6 September, a mob swarms the Pakistani
embassy in Kabul, killing one and wounding 26, including the Pakistani ambassador.

October–December
On 11 October, the Taliban retook Charasiab. The National Reconciliation Commission presented its
proposals for peace on the same day. On 15 October, Bamiyan fell to the Taliban. Between 11–13
November 1995 at least 57 unarmed civilians were killed and over 150 injured when rockets and artillery
barrages fired from Taliban positions south of Kabul pounded the civilian areas of the city. On 11
November alone, 36 civilians were killed when over 170 rockets as well as shells hit civilians areas. A
salvo crashed into Foruzga Market, while another struck the Taimani district, where many people from
other parts of Kabul have settled. Other residential areas hit by artillery and rocket attacks were the Bagh
Bala district in the northwest of Kabul and Wazir Akbar Khan, where much of the city's small foreign
community lived.[49] In the north, Rabbani's forces fought for control of the Balkh Province, reclaiming
many districts from Dostum.

On 20 November 1995, Taliban forces gave the government a 5-day ultimatum in which they would
resume bombardment if Rabbani and his forces did not leave the city. This ultimatum was eventually
withdrawn.[49] By the end of December, more than 150 people had died in Kabul due to the repeated
rocketing, shelling, and high-altitude bombing of the city, reportedly by Taliban forces.[82]

1996

January–September
On 2–3 January, Taliban rocket attacks killed between 20 and 24 people and wounded another 43–56.[5]
On 10 January, a peace proposal was presented to the Taliban and opposition. On 14, January Hikmatyar
blocks Kabul's western route, leaving the city surrounded. However, in mid-January, Iran intervened and
the Khalili faction of Hezb-i Wahdat signed a peace agreement that lead to the opening of the Kabul-
Bamiyan road. On 20 January, factional fighting broke out among the Taliban in Kandahar. On 1
February, Taliban jet-bombed a residential area in Kabul, killing 10 civilians. On 3 February, the Red
Cross began to airlift supplies into Kabul.[5] On 6 February, the road is used to bring in more food. On 26
February, Hikmatyar and the pro-Dostum Ismaili faction of Sayed Jafar Nadiri fought in Pul-i Khumri,
Baghlan Province. Hundreds were killed before a ceasefire was reached on 4 March and the Ismaili
faction lost 11 important positions.[5]

In 1996, the Taliban returned to seize Kabul.[83] Analyst Ahmed Rashid considers the Taliban at that time
to have been decisively supported by Pakistan; also less renowned sources suspect Taliban to have had
support from Pakistan, considering their heavy weaponry.[50]

On 7 March, Hikmatyar and the Burhanuddin Rabbani government signed an agreement to take military
action against the Taliban.

On 11 April, the government captured Saghar District in Ghor Province from the Taliban, along with
large stores of ammunition. Fighting continues, however, in Chaghcharan, and the Taliban captured
Shahrak district.[5] On 4 May, the Iranian embassy in Kabul was shelled and two staff members were
wounded. On 12 May, Hikmatyar's forces arrived in Kabul to help defend against the Taliban. On 24
May, another peace agreement was signed between Rabbani and Hikmatyar. On 24 June, Rasul
Pahlawan, an Uzbek military leader in Afghanistan, was killed in an ambush near Mazar-i Sharif. This
would later have significant impact on the balance of power in the North.

On 3 July, a 10-member cabinet is formed. Hikmatyar's party got the ministries of defense and finance;
Rabbani got the ministries of interior and foreign affairs; Sayyaf's party got education, information and
culture, while Harakat-i-Islami got planning and labor and social welfare and the Hezb-i Wahdat Akbari
faction got commerce. 12 other seats were left open for other factions.[5]

On 8 August government forces captured Chaghcharan, but lost it again. On 11 September, Jalalabad fell
to the Taliban, who then marched on Sarobi. On 12 September, the Taliban captured Mihtarlam in
Laghman province. On 22 September, Kunar province fell to the Taliban.[5]

Taliban take-over
On 25 September, the strategic town[5] of Sarobi, an eastern
outpost of Kabul, fell to the Taliban[84] who captured it from
interim government troops.[5] 50 people were killed and the
Taliban captured many arms from fleeing government soldiers.[5]

On 26 September, with the Taliban attacking Kabul,[5] interim

minister of defense Ahmad Shah Massoud in his headquarters in
northern Kabul concluded that his and President Rabbani’s
interim government's forces had been encircled,[84] and decided
to quickly evacuate[84] or withdraw[5] those forces to the Map showing political control in
Afghanistan in the fall of 1996,
north,[84][5] to avoid destruction.[84] Also Hekmatyar, leader of
following the capture of Kabul by the
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, withdrew from Kabul.[5] Taliban.

By nightfall,[84] or on the next day of 27 September,[5] the

Taliban had conquered Kabul.[84][5] Taliban's leader Muhammad Umar appointed his deputy, Mullah
Muhammad Rabbani, as head of a national ruling council which was called Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.[5] By now, the Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan.[4]

Aftermath
In its first action while in power, the Taliban hung former President Najibullah and his brother from a
tower, after they had first castrated Najibullah[85] and then tortured them to death. All key government
installations appeared to be in Taliban's hands within hours, including the presidential palace and the
ministries of defense, security and foreign affairs.

On 5 October 1996, the Taliban attacked Massoud's forces in the Salang Pass but suffered heavy losses.
On 1 October, Massoud retook Jabal Saraj and Charikar. Bagram was taken back a week later. On 15–19
October, Qarabagh changed hands before being captured by Massoud and Dostum's forces.[5] During 21–
30 October, Massoud's forces stalled on the way to the capital. On 25 October, the Taliban claimed to
have captured Badghis province and started to attack Dostum's forces in Faryab. On 27–28 October, anti-
Taliban forces attempted to recapture Kabul but were unable to do so. On 30 October Dara-I-Nur District
in Nangarhar province fell to anti-Taliban forces but was retaken in early November. Fighting also
occurred in Baghdis province with no significant gains from either side. Ismail Khan's forces were flown
in from Iran to support the anti-Taliban alliance. On 4 November, Dostum's forces bombed the Herat
airport and anti-Taliban forces took control of Nurgal district in Konar province. Between 9 and 12
November, Dostum's jets bombed the Kabul airport, and between 11 and 16 approximately 50,000
people, mostly Pashtuns, arrived in Herat province, fleeing the fight in Badghis. On 20 November, the
UNHCR halted all activities in Kabul. On 21–22 December, anti-Taliban demonstrations occurred in
Herat as women demanded assistance from international organizations, but it was violently dispersed. On
28–29 December a major offensive is launched against Bagram airbase and the base is surrounded.[5]

The United Front, known in the Pakistani and Western media as the 'Northern Alliance', was created in
opposition to the Taliban under the leadership of Massoud. In the following years over 1 million people
fled the Taliban, many arriving to the areas controlled by Massoud. Freed from the horrific situation that
had stopped his plans for Afghanistan in Kabul, Ahmad Shah Massoud established democratic structures
in the areas under his control. The events of this war lead to the Afghan Civil War (1996–2001).

See also
Sieges of Kabul
Afghan Civil War (1996–2001)

References
1. See sections Bombardments and Timeline 1994, Januari-June
2. See section Bombardments
3. See sections Atrocities and Timeline
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Arbitrary Killings: Civilians in Kabul (https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa11/015/199
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50. Video 'Starving to Death', Massoud defending Kabul against the Taliban siege in March
1996. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzPcMB9SQz0&feature=search) (With horrifying
pictures of civilian war casualties.) By Journeyman Pictures/Journeyman.tv. Retrieved on
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19529-4. "Pakistani involvement in creating the movement is seen as central"
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Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001 (https://www.open
societyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf) (PDF) (Report).
Afghanistan Justice Project. 2005.
Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden,
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (https://archive.org/details/isbn_978014102
0808). Penguin Group, London, New York etc. ISBN 0-141-02080-6.
Corwin, Phillip (2003). Doomed in Afghanistan: A UN Officer's Memoir of the Fall of Kabul
and Najibullah's Failed Escape, 1992 (https://books.google.com/books?id=5CZEJQGwoaA
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Gutman, Roy (2008). How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the
Hijacking of Afghanistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=A9eqvc-Ru3cC&pg=PP1). US
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Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002). The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization,
Civil War, and the Future of the Region (https://books.google.com/books?id=wR-4qmiOAvU
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External links
Afghanistan – the Squandered Victory by the BBC (documentary film directly from the year
1989 explaining the beginning of the turmoil to follow)
Afghanistan 1989 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-YGVQm_fALY) on YouTube
Massoud's Conversation with Hekmatyar (original document from 1992)
 The Conversation (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVMdc_2R6LY) on YouTube
Commander Massoud's Struggle by Nagakura Hiromi (from 1992, one month after the
collapse of the communist regime, after Hekmatyar was repelled to the southern outskirts of
Kabul, before he started the heavy bombardment of Kabul with the support of Pakistan)
Hekmatyar attacks Kabul but is repelled (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKhmRlKXc
hs) on YouTube
Massoud is popular among the people who also trust him to rebuild their country (https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4wIWtOgqJU) on YouTube
Massoud tries to prevent war between Ittehad and Wahdat (https://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=ANuw_YwK7kc) on YouTube
Massoud talks about his convictions (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YX8tEQHQ_
g) on YouTube
Starving to Death Afghanistan (documentary report) by Journeyman Pictures/ABC Australia
(from March 1996)
Taliban attack Kabul and Massoud (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzPcMB9SQz0)
on YouTube

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