Lakebend File 2

Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 26 Filed: 01/10/2020 Page 1 of 7
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION Civil Action No.1:19-cv-00282-A
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE, AND JOHN
DOE DEFENDANTS NOS. 1 - 10
Defendants.
-and-
BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION,

INC., BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., DINSMOR PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION, INC., AND PALISADES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
Interested Parties and Putative

Intervenors.
JOINT MOTION OF BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DINSMOR PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION, INC., AND PALISADES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. TO
INTERVENE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF FILING MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Bridgewater Owners Association,
Inc. (“BOA”), Bridgewater II Owner’s Association, Inc. (“BOA II”), Dinsmor Property
Association, Inc. (“Dinsmor”), and Palisades Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Palisades”)
(collectively, “Intervenors”) jointly move this Court to intervene for the limited purpose of filing
a motion to set aside a default judgment. In support thereof, Intervenors state as follows:
1. On November 6, 2019, BOA filed suit against Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc.
(“Ridgway Lane”), David L. Lane (“David Lane”), and David W. Lane (“David W. Lane”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging, inter alia, that Defendants converted or misappropriated at
least $500,000 that was held in accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of BOA.
See BOA v. Ridgway Lane, et al., 1:19-cv-272-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).
2. On November 8, 2019, BOA II filed suit against Ridgway Lane and David Lane
alleging, inter alia, that they converted or misappropriated at least $343,000 that was held in
accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of BOA II. See BOA II v. Ridgway Lane, et
al., 1:19-cv-276-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).
3. On November 14, 2019, Dinsmor filed suit against Ridgway Lane and David
Lane alleging, inter alia, that they converted or misappropriated at least $216,000 that was held
in accounts at Community Bank in trust for the benefit of Dinsmor. See Dinsmor v. Ridgway
Lane, et al., 1:19-cv-283-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.)
4. On November 22, 2019, Palisades filed suit against Defendants alleging, inter
alia, that Defendants converted or misappropriated at least $87,000 that was held in accounts at
Community Bank in trust for the benefit of Palisades. See Palisades v. Ridgway Lane, et al.,
1:19-cv-291-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).
5. BOA and BOA II—the first two plaintiffs to file complaints against Defendants—
have taken extraordinary action to preserve Defendants’ assets so they and other aggrieved
homeowners’ associations in the area can maximize recovery on what appears to be a $2.5
million aggregate loss.
6. For instance, BOA and BOA II each obtained a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) against Defendants to prevent dissipation of assets. See, e.g., TRO, 1:19-cv-276-A
2
(Nov. 12, 2019) [MEC No. 14]. That TRO was twice extended. See, e.g., First Modified TRO,
1:19-cv-276-A (Nov. 19, 2019) [MEC No. 18]; Second Modified TRO, 1:19-cv-276-A (Nov. 27,
2019) [MEC No. 19].
7. BOA’s and BOA II’s joint efforts proved effective and necessary. For instance,
on November 12, 2019, David W. Lane transferred his principal residence to his wife by
quitclaim deed, presumably to protect his assets from a future judgment. Further, BOA’s and
BOA II’s TROs prevented David Lane from accessing funds—which include funds possibly
stolen from homeowners’ associations or comingled with associations’ funds—from local bank
accounts.
8. On December 12, 2019, BOA and BOA II obtained a preliminary injunction to
preserve Defendants’ assets and maintain the status quo until the litigation is ultimately resolved.
See, e.g., Preliminary Injunction Order, 1:19-cv-276-A (Dec. 12, 2019) [MEC No. 24].
9. To date, 11 homeowners’ associations have sued Defendants for conversion or
misappropriation of association funds, among other things. All these associations, Lakebend
included, have directly benefited from BOA’s and BOA II’s joint efforts—undertaken
early, with alacrity, and at significant expense—to prevent dissipation of Defendants’ assets
and preserve them for the benefit of all.
10. Additionally, and in connection with their preliminary injunctive relief, BOA and
BOA II have received sworn statements from David Lane and David W. Lane that disclose the
identity and value of assets that may be used to satisfy judgments. Roughly speaking, such
assets appear to have a combined value of a few hundred thousand dollars, only a fraction of the
associations’ aggregate loss.
3
11. On December 20, 2019, Lakebend Homeowners Association (“Lakebend”)
obtained default judgments against Defendants in the amount of $1,238,500. [MEC No. 19]
Both David Lane and David W. Lane have since answered and have filed motions to set aside the
default judgment, but Lakebend is contesting the Lanes’ motion. [MEC Nos. 21 – 25]
12. Intervenors do not know why or how Defendants failed to answer Lakebend’s
complaint within the allotted time, particularly because Defendants appear to have timely
answered every other complaint with which they have been served and have defended BOA’s
and BOA II’s efforts to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
13. Whatever the cause, be it excusable neglect or otherwise, Intevenors (and all other
homeowners’ associations injured by Defendants’ conduct) risk aggravated injury if Lakebend’s
default judgment is not set aside.
14. Defendants do not have the assets to satisfy a $1,238,500 judgment. But this
much is clear: even partial satisfaction of that judgment—which includes a $1,000,000 punitive
award—would leave Intervenors without any hope of recovery or even partial recovery from
Defendants.
15. Intervenors would be severely prejudiced if not permitted the opportunity to
intervene and move this Court to set aside the default judgment. To be sure, it would be unjust
and inequitable for Lakebend’s default judgment to foreclose Intervenors’ opportunity to recover
even a fraction of their losses from Defendants, particularly and especially because Defendants
fortuitously failed to timely respond to Lakebend’s complaint.
16. Intervenors have an unqualified right to intervene. Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2) (Intervention of Right) states:
Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
4
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
17. Intervention should be permitted when the putative intervenor’s “interest would
be prejudiced substantially if [a] judgment against [a party] remained final.” Guaranty Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 383 (Miss. 1987).
18. When “the potential for prejudice to [the intervenor] [i]s sufficiently great at the
time the motion for leave to intervene [i]s filed,” the “motion should…be[] granted.” Id.
19. For intervention under Rule 24, “[a]ll that is necessary is that [the intervenor]
establish an interest in the rights that are at issue in the litigation.” Id. at 384.
20. Further, intervention should be allowed by “those who might, in a practical sense,
be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action.” Id.
21. Courts should give “the benefit of the doubt to the one seeking intervention,
particularly where intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is claimed.” Id. at 385; see also id.
at 386 (circuit court abused its discretion by denying intervention for the purpose of moving to
set aside a default judgment).
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Intervenors respectfully request this Court
permit them to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of filing a motion to set aside
Lakebend’s default judgment against Defendants.
* * * *
This, the 10th day of January, 2020.
5
Respectfully submitted,
BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS BRIDGEWATER OWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC. ASSOCIATION, INC.
DINSMOR PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, PALISADES HOMEOWNERS

INC. ASSOCIATION, INC.
By: /s/ Chadwick M. Welch ___________ By: /s/ Roy H. Liddell____________

Chadwick M. Welch (MSB No. 105588) Roy H. Liddell (MSB No. 1252)
Their Attorney Their Attorney
OF COUNSEL: OF COUNSEL:
C. Maison Heidelberg (MSB# 9559) Roy H. Liddell (MSB# 1252)

Chadwick M. Welch (MSB# 105588) Wells Marble & Hurst
WATSON HEIDELBERG PLLC 300 Concourse Blvd., Suite 200
2829 Lakeland Drive, Suite 1502 Ridgeland, Mississippi 39157
Flowood, Mississippi 39232 Telephone: (601)-605-6900
Telephone: (601) 939-8900 Facsimile: (601)-605-6901
Facsimile: (601) 932-4400 Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
6
Certificate of Service
I, Chadwick M. Welch, do hereby certify that I have this day caused a copy of the
foregoing Joint Motion of Bridgewater Owners Association, Inc., Bridgewater II Owners
Association, Inc., Dinsmor Property Association, Inc., and Palisades Homeowners Association,
Inc. to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Filing Motions to Set Aside Default Judgment to be
filed with the Clerk of Court on the MEC System, which caused notification to be delivered to all
counsel of record.
Dated: January 10, 2020 /s/ Chadwick M. Welch

Chadwick M. Welch
7

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF
v. CAUSE NO: 19-282

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE,
AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 - 10 DEFENDANTS
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Motions Docketed as 20 and 24)
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lakebend Homeowners Association by and through counsel, and
Responds to the Defendants Motions to Set Aside Default (docket number 20 and 24), to wit:
The Default Judgment was entered against the Defendants Ridgeway, Lane & Associates,
David L. Lane, and David W. Lane, were properly taken, now each of the defendants seeks to set
aside the default against each, yet each of the defendants sit differently in their failure to respond
to the Complaint.
David W. Lane
Counsel for David W. Lane, (the son) argues, to his credit, that he spoke with the below
signed counsel prior to the entry of the default judgment and that such communication manifested
an intention to respond. (Though the reliance on BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014)
is misplaced, as discussed below).
Admittedly a phone call was had between counsel, during which time Counsel for David
W. Lane, (the son) did express that his client claims to have had no knowledge of the massive
scheme to steal from this Plaintiff, or from others, but rather that the theft was committed by David
L. Lane, (the father), and that David L. Lane would be accepting responsibility for his terrible
betrayal of the trust that so many had placed in him. During that call the below signed counsel
also inquired about insurance and other sources which may be available to satisfy any judgement
against the defendants. Counsel for the Defendant expressed that they were presently not aware
of any insurance. At no time during that conversation was the question of default, or extension,
raised by either party.
The only logical inferences that were drawn from that call between Counsel were that the
father would not actually be presenting a defense, and that if money was being spent by any party
to defend against the criminal acts, it was money already stolen from the Plaintiff and others.
That being said, with regard to David W. Lane (the son), the Plaintiff takes the position
that if he is now pleading that he has a colorable defense, then this matter of setting aside the
default should be left to the sound discretion of the Court.
David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates
However, with regard to Defendants David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane &
Associates, the Plaintiff is of the position that setting aside the Judgment is not reasonable under
the circumstances. While pursuant to Mississippi Rules 55 and 60(b), a default judgement may be
set aside as a result of accident and/or mistake, in these circumstances the course of conduct of
embezzling funds took place for decades, and default after admission of that crime does not justify
setting aside the default.
Mississippi Courts typically uses a three prong analysis when considering setting aside a
default, and analyze “(1) the nature and legitimacy of the defendant's reasons for his default, i.e.,
whether the defendant has good cause for default, (2) whether [the] defendant in fact has a
colorable defense to the merits of the claim, and (3) the nature and extent of prejudice which may
be suffered by the plaintiff if the default judgment is set aside.” Emery v. Greater Greenville Hous.
& Revitalization Ass'n, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 15 (2019).
2
1. The reasons for allowing the default are not compelling. It is suggested that Defendant
was ill and somehow this illness prevented him from responding, while simultaneously
arguing that they were represented and were responding to other suits. Clearly, these
Defendants illness did not preclude participation in litigation, and there is no good
cause for failing to answer.
2. Colorable defense is the most important element to be demonstrated by a defendant
seeking to set aside a default. (See BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014)).
And while affidavits are no longer needed to demonstrate a colorable defense, more
than a “wing and a prayer” is required. These Defendants have offered no colorable
defense to the long running scheme of stealing the money they were entrusted to
protect. In fact, the only information given to these Plaintiffs is that David L Lane, (the
father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates, have admitted the wrongdoing.
3. Nature and Extent of Prejudice. With the operations of the business shut down, and no
apparent insurance, collection of this embezzled money by this Plaintiff will only be
made more difficult with time, and the defendants squander, hide, and spend any
remaining wealth. Further, if the claim of Defendant illness is of merit, then there is
concern that such illness will make it impossible for the Defendant to satisfy judgment,
assuming there is no imprisonment.
Where David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates’ only possible reason
to attempt to set aside the Judgment is to delay recovery of funds belonging to the Plaintiffs, which
are surely being spent to further support the country club life style of David L. Lane, it will operate
continuing and extreme prejudice to set aside the default judgment.
Finally, relying on BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So. 3d 90 (2014), the Defendants argue
3
that they did not have notice under the relaxed appearance standards of Rule 55(b), because the
appeared in other matters which this Plaintiff is not a party. However, this argument is misplaced,
as the court in BB Buggies actually found that the party did not manifest a clear intent to the
Plaintiff the intent to appear. The Court in BB Buggies stated “The one phone call and one email
from the Textron Parties' Louisiana attorney, who did not represent them in the Mississippi case,
did not indicate a clear intent to defend and did not constitute an appearance for Rule 55(b)
purposes. In the precedent cases in which the courts found that the parties had appeared for Rule
55(b) purposes, the attorneys had extended conversations, exchanged multiple letters, discussed
the need for more time to answer, or the parties actually filed something with the court.” Id at 100.
(See also Kumar v. Loper, 80 So. 3d 808, 813-14 (Miss. 2012) (letter sent before case was filed
and one phone call from former attorney did not constitute an appearance); American States Ins.
Co. v. Rogillio, 10 So. 3d 463 (Miss. 2009). (one phone conversation between insurance company's
claims specialist and plaintiff's attorney, the content of which was disputed, did not constitute an
appearance); Williams v. Kelly, 872 So. 2d 783, 785-86 (¶¶ 11-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)
(defendant had not appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes even though he attended a deposition
pursuant to a subpoena prior to being named as a party in the case, and even though his attorney
attempted to contact plaintiff's attorney).
There was no communication between parties indicating an intent to appear, and as such
the default was reasonably taken.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff prays that the motions be
dismissed, and for such other relief as just and reasonable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 7th day of January, 2020.
4

ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF
BY: /s/ Michael J. Wolf

MICHAEL J. WOLF
OF COUNSEL:
MICHAEL J. WOLF – (MSB# 99406)

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.
101 Highpointe Court, Suite C
Brandon, MS 39042
Telephone: (601) 213-9636
Direct Tel/Fax: (601) 371-3939
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I filed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
to the Clerk of Court using the MEC electronic filing system which sent notification to all counsel
of record.
This the 7th day of January, 2020.
__/s/ Michael J. Wolf__________

MICHAEL J. WOLF
5
LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF

ASSOCIATION
V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AND FOR OTHER RELIEF
COMES NOW Defendants, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc., by and
through counsel, and file this their Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief,
and in support thereof would show unto the Court the following:
I.
Rule 55(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment
by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that good cause exists to set
aside the Docket Entry of Default [Doc. No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19].
II.
Specifically, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that said
Docket of Entry of Default [Doc. No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19] should be set
aside pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 55 and Miss. R. Civ. P 60(b) (1)(2)(4) and (6). David L. Lane
and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would show that said default judgment is based upon
1
Plaintiff’s accident and/or mistake, and that but for such, the Default Judgment would not have
been entered. Mr. Lane will proffer in camera or offer under a sealed record, his serious and
permanent medical problems that have affected his memory and judgements at times.
David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would further show that David W.
Lane’s counsel spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the entry of default. David W. Lane’s
counsel manifested to Plaintiff’s counsel a clear intent to defend Plaintiff against the alleged
claims. Additionally, the news was replete with notice that David L. Lane and Ridgeway Lane &
Associates, Inc., were represented by Merrida Coxwell, and that answers had been filed by him in
similar civil actions. As such, Plaintiff’s counsel had notice that David L. Lane and Ridgway,
Lane & Associates, Inc. appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes. BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon, 150 So.3d
90, 99 (Miss. 2014). It is certainly a well-known custom and professional courtesy in these types
of cases to call an attorney who might be counsel for another before taking a Default Judgement.
David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. would further show that they have a
colorable defense to the claims brought by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the
Default Judgment is vacated. Additionally, Defendants would show that, pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6), other reasons justify relief from the judgment, including serious and permanent health
conditions affecting Mr. David L. Lane.
III.
In the alternative, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc. respectfully
requests that this Court rescind its Default Judgment and grant a full hearing so they may be given
the opportunity to properly defend themselves.
2
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant, David L. Lane and Ridgway,
Lane & Associates, Inc. respectfully requests that this Honorable Court receive and file their
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief and, upon a hearing on said motion,
set aside the Default Judgment and grant any other relief allowed by law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 26th day of December 2019.
DAVID L. LANE and RIDGWAY, LANE &

ASSOCIATES, INC.
/s/ Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell

Attorney for David L. Lane and
Ridgway, Lane & Associates, Inc.
MÉRRIDA (BUDDY) COXWELL (MB# 7782)

COXWELL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
Post Office Box 1337
Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1337
Telephone: (601) 948-1600
I, Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell, attorney for Defendant, David L. Lane and Ridgway, Lane &
Associates, Inc., do hereby certify that I have this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC
system, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
And for Other Relief, which sent electronic notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 26th day of December 2019.
/s/ Mérrida (Buddy) Coxwell

MÉRRIDA (BUDDY) COXWELL
3

ASSOCIATION
V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
COMES NOW Defendant, David W. Lane, and files this his Answer and
Affirmative Defenses in response to Plaintiff=s Complaint, and in support thereof, would
show the following:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
David W. Lane affirmatively asserts all defenses available under Rules 8 and 12 of
the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and reserves the right to assert additional defenses
as discovery progresses.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The assessment of punitive damages, if any, violates David W. Lane=s
constitutional rights under Article I, ' 8 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and the United States
Supreme Court=s decisions in Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, State Farm Mut. Auto
1
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, and the Mississippi
Constitution.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
David W. Lane would affirmatively show that at all times complained of herein,
he, along with several others, was solely an employee of Ridgway Lane, was never a
stockholder or principal of Ridgway Lane, never entered into a contract with the Plaintiff,
and never made or participated in business decisions or negotiated with Plaintiff, and that
all actions taken by him were pursuant to instructions from his superiors and that all
funds or other remunerations received by him were solely from his employer, Ridgway
Lane.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
David W. Lane affirmatively asserts his constitutional rights, including but not
limited to his 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination. David W. Lane
specifically reserves said rights and does not waive his 5th Amendment rights in this
action or any other civil or criminal action by this Answer.
ANSWER
Without waiving his 5th Amendment rights and all other constitutional rights
David W. Lane now responds to Plaintiff=s Complaint, as follows:
2
1. David W. Lane is without sufficient knowledge or information to confirm
or deny the allegations of Paragraph 1 of the Complaint.
2. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff=s Complaint contains allegations against a
defendant other than David W. Lane, which requires no response from David W. Lane.
To the extent that a response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.
3. Paragraph 3 of the Complaint contains allegations against a defendant other
than David W. Lane, which requires no response from David W. Lane. To the extent
that a response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.
4. David W. Lane admits the allegations of Paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
5. Paragraph 5 of the Complaint contains allegations against fictitious
defendants, which requires no response from David W. Lane. To the extent that a
response is required, David W. Lane denies such allegations.
6. David W. Lane does not dispute jurisdiction but denies any wrongdoing or
that any alleged duty to the Plaintiffs have been breached.
7. David W. Lane does not dispute venue but denies any wrongdoing or that
any alleged duty to the Plaintiffs have been breached.
8-26. David W. Lane denies the allegations made in paragraphs 8-26 of the
Complaint.
Complaint.
3
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
4
David W. Lane denies all the allegations in the un-numbered Paragraph following
Paragraph 71 of the Complaint, beginning, AACCORDINGLY,@ and further denies the
un-numbered paragraphs A. through E. and specifically denies that Plaintiff is entitled to
any of the requested relief or any relief whatsoever.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, David W. Lane respectfully requests
that this, his Answer and Affirmative Defenses be received and filed, that the Court would
deny Plaintiff any relief as requested in Plaintiff=s Complaint, and that the Court will
dismiss said Complaint with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 23rd day of December, 2019.
DAVID W. LANE
By:/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Attorney for David W. Lane
MICHAEL J. MALOUF, JR., ESQ.

MSB NO. 10466
Malouf & Malouf
501 E. Capitol Street
Jackson, MS 39201
(601) 948-4320
[email protected]
5
I, Michael J. Malouf, Jr., attorney for David W. Lane, hereby certify that I have
this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC system, a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Answer and Affirmative Defenses which sent electronic notification
of such filing to all counsel of record.
DATED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.
/s/ Michael J. Malouf, Jr.

Michael J. Malouf, Jr.
6

ASSOCIATION
V. CAUSE NO. 19-282

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AND FOR OTHER RELIEF
COMES NOW Defendant, David W. Lane, by and through counsel, and file this his
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and For Other Relief, and in support thereof would show
unto the Court the following:
I.
Rule 55(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance
with Rule 60(b).
David W. Lane would show that good cause exists to set aside the Docket Entry of Default [Doc.
No. 16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19].
II.
Specifically, David W. Lane would show that said Docket of Entry of Default [Doc. No.
16] and the Default Judgment [Doc. No. 19] should be set aside pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 55
and Miss. R. Civ. P 60(b) (1)(2)(4) and (6). David W. Lane would show that said default
judgment is based upon Plaintiff’s misrepresentations, accident and/or mistake, and that but for
1
such, the Default Judgment would not have been entered. David W. Lane would further show
that his counsel spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the entry of default, during which David
W. Lane’s counsel manifested to Plaintiff’s counsel a clear intent to defend Plaintiff against the
alleged claims. As such, David W. Lane appeared for Rule 55(b) purposes. BB Buggies, Inc. v.
Leon, 150 So.3d 90, 99 (Miss. 2014). David W. Lane would further show that he has a
colorable defense to the claims brought by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the
Default Judgment is vacated. Additionally, David W. Lane would show that, pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6), other reasons justify relief from the judgment.
III.
In the alternative, David W. Lane respectfully requests that this Court rescind its Default
Judgment, and grant a full hearing so he may be given the opportunity to properly defend
himself.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant, David W. Lane, respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court receive and file his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and
For Other Relief and, upon a hearing on said motion, set aside the Default Judgment and grant
any other relief allowed by law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.
DAVID W. LANE

Attorney for David W. Lane
2
MICHAEL J. MALOUF, JR., ESQ.

MSB NO. 10466
Malouf and Malouf
501 E. Capitol Street
Jackson, MS 39201
(601) 948-4320
[email protected]
I, Michael J. Malouf, Jr., attorney for Defendant, David W. Lane, do hereby certify that I
have this day filed with the clerk of court, via the MEC system, a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment And for Other Relief, which sent
electronic notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 23rd day of December, 2019.

Michael J. Malouf, Jr.
3

a/k/a LAKEBEND PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION PLAINTIFF
v. CAUSE NO: 19-282

DAVID L. LANE, DAVID W. LANE,
AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 - 10 DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Lakebend Homeowners Association a/k/a Lakebend Property
Owners Association, by and through counsel, and moves the Court for Judgment by default and in
support of said Motion would show unto the Court that the Defendants, Ridgway Lane &
Associates, Inc., David L. Lane and David W. Lane, were served with process on November 15,
2019 and that more than thirty (30) days have expired since the date of said service, and the
Defendants made neither answer nor defense and are wholly in default.
1. On December 17, 2019, the Clerk of the Court entered default as against these
Defendants. Judgment is now sought against these Defendants and each of them in an amount of
Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($235,000.00), plus punitive damages in
the amount of One Million Dollars and 00/100 ($1,000,000.00), and attorneys fees and costs in an
amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($3,500.00).
2. The Plaintiff requests that a hearing be held at the earlies opportunity pursuant to
MRCP Rule 55(b), and that a judgment be entered in the amount of One Million Two Hundred
Thirty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($1,238,500.00).
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff prays judgment in the amount
of One Million Two Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100
($1,238,500.00) be entered against the Defendants, Ridgway Lane & Associates, Inc., David L.
Lane and David W. Lane
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 17th day of December, 2019.

ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF
BY: /s/ Michael J. Wolf

MICHAEL J. WOLF
OF COUNSEL:
MICHAEL J. WOLF – (MSB# 99406)

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.
101 Highpointe Court, Suite C
Brandon, MS 39042
Telephone: (601) 213-9636
Direct Tel/Fax: (601) 371-3939
2
Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282 Document #: 1 Filed: 11/14/2019 Page 1 of 14

Lakebend File 2

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lakebend File 2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lakebend File 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case: 61CI1:19-cv-00282-a Document #: 26 Filed: 01/10/2020 Page 1 of 7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Interested Parties and Putative

JOINT MOTION OF BRIDGEWATER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Bridgewater Owners Association,

Association, Inc. (“Dinsmor”), and Palisades Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Palisades”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging, inter alia, that Defendants converted or misappropriated at

al., 1:19-cv-276-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).

Lane, et al., 1:19-cv-283-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.)

1:19-cv-291-A (Rankin Cnty. Cir. Ct.).

million aggregate loss.

2019) [MEC No. 19].

8. On December 12, 2019, BOA and BOA II obtained a preliminary injunction to

9. To date, 11 homeowners’ associations have sued Defendants for conversion or

and preserve them for the benefit of all.

associations’ aggregate loss.

11. On December 20, 2019, Lakebend Homeowners Association (“Lakebend”)

and BOA II’s efforts to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.

homeowners’ associations injured by Defendants’ conduct) risk aggravated injury if Lakebend’s

default judgment is not set aside.

15. Intervenors would be severely prejudiced if not permitted the opportunity to

fortuitously failed to timely respond to Lakebend’s complaint.

16. Intervenors have an unqualified right to intervene. Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2) (Intervention of Right) states:

Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 383 (Miss. 1987).

be disadvantaged by the disposition of the action.” Id.

set aside a default judgment).

Lakebend’s default judgment against Defendants.

This, the 10th day of January, 2020.

BRIDGEWATER II OWNERS BRIDGEWATER OWNERS

DINSMOR PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, PALISADES HOMEOWNERS

By: /s/ Chadwick M. Welch ___________ By: /s/ Roy H. Liddell____________

C. Maison Heidelberg (MSB# 9559) Roy H. Liddell (MSB# 1252)

foregoing Joint Motion of Bridgewater Owners Association, Inc., Bridgewater II Owners

Dated: January 10, 2020 /s/ Chadwick M. Welch

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

LAKEBEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

v. CAUSE NO: 19-282

RIDGWAY, LANE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

RESPONSE TO MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

is misplaced, as discussed below).

raised by either party.

default should be left to the sound discretion of the Court.

David L Lane, (the father), and Ridgeway Lane & Associates

setting aside the default.

& Revitalization Ass'n, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 15 (2019).

cause for failing to answer.

2. Colorable defense is the most important element to be demonstrated by a defendant

assuming there is no imprisonment.

continuing and extreme prejudice to set aside the default judgment.

attempted to contact plaintiff's attorney).

the default was reasonably taken.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff prays that the motions be

dismissed, and for such other relief as just and reasonable.

By: /s/ Chadwick M. Welch _ By: /s/ Roy H. Liddell__

/s/ Michael J. Wolf________