CASE DIGEST 1-4

1. BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J.

FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.

FACTS:

*Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of
several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased
husband.

* Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on
June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel
for the plaintiff, they filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.

*Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.

*Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her
case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco,
and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court,
wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.

In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about
May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal
separation of a woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him
(Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian
to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the
Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing to
accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales
of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in
Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no
objection to defending the Syrian;

That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted
against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had
made; that according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon,
but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's
deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the
same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her
action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that
the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked
Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the
name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;

That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was
informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in
looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned
legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she
was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava's attention to what he
(Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
 That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him
a letter which had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to
Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request
that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case
was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without keeping
it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last meeting
until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of
the case;

That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating
that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other
attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his

answer.

*The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of
Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that
already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco,
and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the
point of creating the relation of attorney and client.

ISSUE:

WON attorney and client relationship relation was established.

HELD:

*Relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued.

*To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. .

*An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or

counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating
his client's cause in open court

*Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on
the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the
latter.

Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without
the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section
19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the
 confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client." There is
no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from
acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each
other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted.

*Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former during
that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.

*There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the
realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has
given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the
contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney
resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for
consultation and advice was conceived and authorized.

*The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did
not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter
was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its
contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from
which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter
binds and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had
written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is
information imparted to the firm.

*The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date
Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right
to ask for his disqualification.

We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

2. ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

FACTS:

*Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo,
seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former
client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.

*Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division,

Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED).

*Complainant's husband filed Civil Case for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the
dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.

*In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7,
1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant.
*On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC
of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty.
de Leon.

*Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
Penal Code.

*Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her
children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. Complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live
Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and
their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.

*Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. Complainant Mercado alleged
that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She
claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their
privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.

*Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth
which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to
him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said
about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The
birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.

*The Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

*The IBP found the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

ISSUE:

WON respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.

HELD:

*In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and
public interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems
to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and
continues even after the client's death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to
its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him
upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's
tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to
his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of
rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause.

The factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client

relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.

-Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on

privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of

disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.

*The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. Complainant did not
even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims
were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated
the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the
civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these
facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.
*Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-
client privilege.

3. MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.

FACTS:

*AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant
charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and
Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

*Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was
the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that,
sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential,
she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate
and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent)
would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

*Complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, of criminal
and disciplinary actions against the latter. What precipitated the filing was when respondent,
then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the
complainant's promotion.

*According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed
a COUNTER COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the
last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And
also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was
also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.

*Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of
disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking
respondent's legal advice.

*Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about
the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact
matters of common knowledge in the BFP.

*IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution which ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stating that the information related by
complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication."
Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have
violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation,"
thus respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the
complainant.
ISSUE:

WON lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.

HELD:

Yes. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a
friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then
receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between
the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the
ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed
during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the
client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no
contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.

In Burbe v. Magulta;

-A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is
established.

*Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.

*The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach
of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

*The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.
Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the
Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges
against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with
complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears
clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that,
in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.
4. SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ALFREDO E. KALLOS, respondent.

FACTS:

*A verified complaint, written in the vernacular of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria
Dajac was filed against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

*Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,1 Judge Kallos was complainants’ counsel of
record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City involving the recovery of
hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the
defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the
possession and ownership of the 4,514 square lot in Albay Cadastre." On appeal, the decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory,

*Several years thereafter, the respondent filed in the same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before
the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order
constituting in his favor an attorney’s lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in
favor of the complainants representing his attorney’s fee. He based his motion on a written
contingency agreement on attorney’s fees for professional services rendered whereby he is
entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this
agreement had already been implemented when "one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the
sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the
other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third. However, he misplaced a copy of said
written agreement.

*The complainants filed the subject verified complaint. Complainants pray for three things.
First, they pray for an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share
attorney’s fees." They assert that the respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to
show in court proof of the alleged written contingency fee agreement. They also belie
respondent’s insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the said agreement had already been
implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by the sheriff was given to him
as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff were given to them.
However, the respondent "forced" them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January 1990
involving a parcel of land valued in the document at ₱10,000, but actually worth more than
₱500,000, in payment of his attorney’s fees. While they did not want to sign the document
because respondent appeared in their case only during execution, they were constrained to do
so for fear that something adverse might happen to their case, as the respondent so warned
them. The latter told them that they would not have won the case were it not for his services.

*The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of the property involved in
said Deed of Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant to Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,
lawyers are prohibited from buying their client’s properties when the same are still the object of
litigation. To prove that the respondent was still their counsel when the sale took place, the
complainants attached to their complaint the Motion to Terminate Services dated 23 June 1994,
which was based on respondent’s being remiss in his duties and responsibilities as their lawyer,
and the Order of the court dated 29 June 1994, approving the termination.

*Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC judge
for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.
*The respondent denies the allegations against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is
due him. He vehemently denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage.
He insists that he was never remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as
complainants’ counsel.

*The respondent further alleges that the existence of the agreement on attorney’s fees was
admitted by complainant Shirley Loria Toledo as evidenced by the order issued by the court on
01 March 2002, which states that Ms. Toledo came to the court informally informing it that she
had a copy of the contract on attorney’s fees.

*As regards the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent admits that he was still complainants’
lawyer when the lot was transferred in his name. The lot was given to him by the complainants
and their mother, pursuant to their written contingency agreement, as his 1/3 share in the
three parcels of land levied upon by the sheriff to settle the accrued rentals awarded in the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the decision. He did not pay for it. The figure
appearing on the document was written only to facilitate the transaction. He never compelled
the complainants and their mother to sell to him the parcel of land. Neither did he tell them that
nothing would happen to their case without him.

*Finally, the respondent asserts that his claim for attorney’s fees is still being litigated in Civil
Case No. 4879. Thus, the instant complaint is premature.

*The complainants insist that there is no basis for respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees for the
following reasons: (1) the respondent failed to present the agreement on attorney’s fees; (2)
attorney’s fees were not awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3) Civil Case No.
4879 is in its execution stage.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is entitled to the property as attorney’s fees.

HELD:

*It is fundamental that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in
which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. The respondent
chose to file his claim for attorney’s fees in the same case in which he served as counsel for the
complainants. As mentioned, this is a proper remedy under our jurisdiction and is preferred to
an independent action as it avoids multiplicity of suits. Besides, the right to recover attorney’s
fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered.
Moreover, the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s services and is in a better position to decide the question of fees.

*Undisputably, respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees is under litigation. Since respondent’s
claim for attorney’s fees in the main case has not yet become final, the objection of prematurity
obtains, as a contrary holding may be preemptive of a final judicial determination of factual and
evidentiary matters inherent in the claim. Clearly, the reliefs asked by the complainants are
judicial in nature. And, if only for an orderly administration of justice, the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 4879 should be allowed to continue and take its course, and the claim of the
respondent judicially settled first.

*The act of demanding attorney’s fees for services rendered is not a ground for an
administrative sanction. As long as a lawyer honestly and in good faith serves and represents
the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his service.

*Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their
clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of the court is not only
to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid
their just and lawful fees.

K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera ,14 citing Albano v.
Coloma:

-While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is
entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. So, also, he must be
protected against clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due.

*The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship that justifies the collection of attorney’s fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the complainants and the
respondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of respondent’s claim for attorney’s
fees and the reasonable amount thereof.

The instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit.