G.R. No.

90501 August 5, 1991 - ARIS

(PHIL.) INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. :
AUGUST 1991 - PHILIPPINE
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
- CHANROBLES VIRTUAL LAW
LIBRARY

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 90501. August 5, 1991.]

ARIS (PHIL.) INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO
DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA,
REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO,
FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO,
MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA, Respondents.

Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for Petitioner.

Zosimo Morillo for respondent Rayos del Sol.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy & Associates for Private

Respondents.Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment
introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (PD. No. 442, as amended) allowing
execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a
labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section
2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing
the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section
17) of the said Interim Rules.

The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took
effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘ARTICLE 223. Appeal.

x x x

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or

separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall
either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.ʼ"

This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.

Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No.
6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. — In so far as the

reinstatement aspect is concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be
executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted
back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely be
reinstated in the payroll.

The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement.

x x x

SECTION 17. Transitory provision. — Appeals filed on or after March 21,

1989, but prior to the effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the
requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the
Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library

The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are
not disputed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner,

aggrieved by managementʼs failure to attend to their complaints concerning
their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous,
requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing
that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of
their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the
managementʼs office to protest its long silence and inaction on their
complaints.

On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the

private respondents, who were identified by the petitionerʼs supervisors as
the most active participants in the "rally", requiring them to explain why they
should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their
explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company
rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and
public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted
actions.

Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal

against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC
at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein as
NLRC-NCR-00-04-01630-88.

After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June
1989 a decision 1 the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate

within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de
Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos
del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Besmonte, Apolinario Gagabina, Aidam
(sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho, Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their
former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already
filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited
backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman.

All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion
For Issuance of a Writ of Execution 2 pursuant to the above-quoted Section
12 of R.A. No. 6715.

On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal. 3

On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial
Appeal. 4

On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal. 5

On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition 6 to the motion for

execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending
appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its
effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given
retroactive effect 7 and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to
pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional
obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it
would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the
benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply 8 filed on 1 September 1989,
complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given
retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to
it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on
21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.

Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989. 9

On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order 10 granting the

motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution "as far
as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with
the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence
thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the
NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after
March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim rules which must
conform with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 2) or as may be
directed by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor
Arbiters before March 21, 1989. With more reason these interim rules be
made to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof (sic) was
rendered thereafter. 11

Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
October 1989 12 raising the issues adverted to in the introductory portion
of this decision under the following assignment of
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND
IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY,
ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS
FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A.6715 IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS—IT
BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.

B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN (SIC)

REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR
ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO
PENDING LABOR CASES."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to
comment on the petition.

Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment on 20 November 1989. 13 Meeting squarely the issues raised by
petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and
automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found
unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the
state and the contested provision "is then a police legislation."cralaw
virtua1aw library

As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely

procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its
effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a rule of
procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional
provision on protection to labor.

On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation 14

informing the Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the
Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder 15 to the Comment of

the Solicitor General.

In the resolution of 11 January 1990, 16 We considered the Comments as

respondentsʼ Answers, gave due course to the petition, and directed that
the case be calendared for deliberation.

In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of

the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as the
implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules,
allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the reinstatement
aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, petitioner submits that said portion violates the due process
clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It
argues that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the
employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be
compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to
the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is
consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the destruction of the
employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken
sympathy for or misplaced antipathy against any group, but evenhandedly
and fairly. 17

To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of

reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following consequences:
(a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional employees or adjust
the duties of other employees simply to have someone watch over the
reinstated employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to
the employer, (b) reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable,
employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and
embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to
commit similar, if not graver infractions.

These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely

conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding of the
nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.

Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot
be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party
or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be
applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The
right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is
a statutory privilege of statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations
or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an
appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one
such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court
allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the
discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. 19

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6716, Article 223 of the
Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending
their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a

decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once
more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor
and the workingman.

These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman

for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the nation, for
the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution, 20 which
principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of
shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential
use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. Incidentally, a study of the
Constitutions of various nations readily reveals that it is only our
Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human
Rights. Thus, by no less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid
down the strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article
addresses itself to specified areas of concern — labor, agrarian and natural
resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health, working women,
and peopleʼs organizations—and reaches out to the underprivileged sector
of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, aptly
describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter." 21

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to
express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully
underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the
Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. 22 Labor is an
indispensable partner for the nationʼs progress and stability.

If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is

authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the
discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases
of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases,
the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood,
their only means of support for their family — their very lifeblood. To Us,
this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his
sound discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions
reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently
overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.

The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by
the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a
valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an
employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the
State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory
that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State,
that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 23 Then, by and
pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate
implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although
temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a
continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed
or separated employee and his family.

The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule
are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed
constitutional. 24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the-
constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. 25 In Paredes, Et. Al. v.
Executive Secretary, 26 We stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between
two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and
the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which
will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After
all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task
of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a
constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is
void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice
Malcolmʼs aphorism is apropos: ‘To doubt is to sustain.ʼ" 27

The reason for this:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on

each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. . .
. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive
authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long
as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision,
the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the
case will be decided on other available grounds." 28

The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not
deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the Order of the Labor
Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure of the
appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover, the questioned interim
rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given
retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character,
promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218 (a)
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as a mended. Settled is the rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. 29 There are no vested
rights in rules of procedure. 30 A remedial statute may be made applicable
to cases pending at the time of its enactment. 31

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 35-43.

2. Annex "G" of Petition; Id., 69.

3. Annex "D" of Petition; Id., 44-57.

4. Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 58-61.

5. Annex "F" of Petition; Id., 62-68.

6. Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo, 71-75.

7. Article 4, Civil Code.

8. Annex "I" of Petition; Id., 76-77.

9. Annex "J" of Petition; Id., 78-80.

10. Annex "A" of Petition; Id, 28-30.

11. Rollo, 30.

12. Id., 2-27.

13. Rollo, 87-93.

14. Id., 103-104.

15. Rollo, 105-108.

16. Id., 110.

17. Citing Reyes v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 48705, 9 Feb. 1989;
Colgate Palmolive Phil. Inc. v. Ople, 163 SCRA 323; Cabatan v. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 323; Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corp., 156
SCRA 392.

18. Aragon v. Araullo, Et Al., 11 Phil. 7; U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218;
Layda v. Legaspi, 39 Phil. 93; Aguilar v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; Santiago v.
Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397; Abesames v. Garcia, 98 Phil. 769; Gonzalez v.
CA, 3 SCRA 465; Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 138; United CMC Textile
Workers Union v. Clave, 187 SCRA 346; Tropical Homes Inc. v. NHA, 152
SCRA 540; Municipal Govt. of Coron v. Cariño, 154 SCRA 216; and
Ozaeta v. CA, 179 SCRA 800.

19. Section 2, Rule 39.

20. Article XIII, Section 3.

21. Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. V, pp. 945, 1010.

22. Article II, Section 18.

23. Manila Electric Co. v. NLRC, supra, citing Euro-Linea, Phil. Inc. v.
NLRC, 156 SCRA 78. See also PAL, Inc. v. PALEA, 57 SCRA 498; Phil.
Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC, 106 SCRA 444.
24. La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon, 179 SCRA 828; People
v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324.

25. Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30.

26. 128 SCRA 6, 11.

27. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385.

28. La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon, supra, citing Isagani A.

Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1989 ed., p. 232.

29. People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764; Alday v. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521;
Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. IAC, 133 SCRA 168; Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., Et. Al. v. Asuncion, Et Al., 170 SCRA 274.

30. Paras, E.L., Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. I, 1984 ed.,
p. 22, citing Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 507; People v.
Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764; Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144; Laurel v. Misa, 76
Phil. 372.

31. Enrile v. Court of First Instance, 36 Phil. 574; Hosana v. Diomano, 56

Phil. 741.