3) Eastern Mediterranean Maritime V Surio
3) Eastern Mediterranean Maritime V Surio
3) Eastern Mediterranean Maritime V Surio
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154213. August 23, 2012 ]
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND
AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., PETITIONERS, VS.
ESTANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO
MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA,
ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BATTUNG, GREGORIO
ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL
MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, JESUS
MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE
GARFIN AND SALESTINO SUSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December 21,
2001 affirming the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
declaring itself to be without appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) involving petitioners’
complaint for disciplinary action against respondents.[1]
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-
repatriated respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of
discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers
Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15,
1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving
overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the
POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action.
Petitioners received the order of dismissal on July 24, 1996.[2]
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a
partial appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents
should be administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they were on board
MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
[3] thus:
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their
motion. They received the denial on July 8, 1997.[4]
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus. Citing St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[5] however, the Court referred the petition to the CA on November 25,
1998.
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus,
holding that the inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA
blacklist/watchlist were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the
exclusion of the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review
the matter, viz:
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules &
Regulations (1991) provide:
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public
respondent has no jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases decided by
[the] POEA involving contract workers. Clearly, the matter of inclusion
and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA
Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the
exclusion of the public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate
jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public respondent when it issued the assailed Decision and
Order, dated March 21, 1997 and June 13, 1997, respectively, dismissing
petitioners’ appeal from the decision of the POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the
same is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC
had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had
not provided for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of
Labor who had exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative
matters decided by the POEA.
Ruling
Petitioners’ adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over
the POEA’s decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against
respondents was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042,
through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the
Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases
administrative in character involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic
Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative
matters affecting and involving such workers. This intent was even expressly
recognized in the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. – The POEA shall exercise original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are
administrative in character, involving employers, principals,
contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers.
Section 29. Venue – The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule,
may be filed with the POEA Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA
regional office of the place where the complainant applied or was
recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with which the
complaint was first filed shall take cognizance of the case.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.
Petitioners’ position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively
to the review of the POEA’s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents
has no support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in
application unless the contrary is expressly provided,[8] or unless the law is
procedural or curative in nature,[9] there is no serious question about the retroactive
applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA’s decision on
petitioners’ disciplinary action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042
was a procedural law due to its providing or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is
procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda. De Mangubat,[10] when it –
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners’ complaint by virtue of the case being
then still pending or undetermined at the time of the law’s passage, there being no
vested rights in rules of procedure.[11] They could not validly insist that the
reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the
disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic
Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when
petitioners took their appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and
considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to
appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its
passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired.[12] Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new
statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the
provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly,
petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege
established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point
out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be
observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.
[13] This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character,
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations
specifically provides, as follows:
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of
the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA,
being correct on its conclusions, committed no error in upholding the NLRC.
SO ORDERED.