01 -- Corporate Inn Hotel vs. Lizo, G.R. No.

148279, May 27, 2004

Facts:

On September 30, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that
respondent Jennevie Lizo was illegally dismissed by herein petitioner and entitled her to
backwages and separation pay. Upon appeal, the NLRC dismissed the same for being
late. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. A petition for certiorari before the CA
was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner may be allowed to disregard the mandatory 10-day
period of perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner may not be allowed to disregard the mandatory period of
perfecting an appeal.

In Ginete vs. CA, 296 SCRA 38 (1998), it was held that, “the right to appeal is a
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or
rules.”

Here, the NLRC Rules, akin to the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law,
have the force and effect of law; and such NLRC rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. Thus, petitioners are mandated to perfect their appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law and failure to do so renders the
judgment of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
02 -- St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998

Facts:

The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no

employer-employee relationship existed between the parties, therefore, his office had
no jurisdiction over the case. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which set aside
the decision and remanding the case for appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition alleging that NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of NLRC.

Ruling:

Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of NLRC.

In San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No. L-39195, May
15, 1975, it was held that, “ there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review
is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it
is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”

Here, appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all
such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the
relief desired. Thus, this case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
03 -- D’Armoured Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. vs. Orpia, GR No.
151325, June 27, 2005

Facts:

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision against the petitioner to pay the
respondents for underpayment, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund of firearms bond. When the decision
became final and executory and upon respondents’ motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of
execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of garnishment upon the Foremost
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an existing services agreement.
Thus, petitioner’s receivables with Foremost were garnished. Petitioner filed before the
NLRC a Motion to Quash/ Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment but it was denied,
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the garnished amount is exempt from execution.

Ruling:

No, the garnished amount is not exempt from execution.

In Gaa vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985), it was held that, “the exemption
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to
favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to this
class usually look to the reward of a day’s labor for immediate or present support, and
such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other.”

Here, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to
juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning
from the ‘personal services’ rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires
that such earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtor’s family.
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the exemption.
04 -- Rubberworld Phils, v. NLRC, 336 SCRA 433, July 26, 2000

Facts:

Rubberworld filed with DOLE a notice of temporary shutdown of operations to take

effect on September 26, 1994. Before the effectivity date, however, Rubberworld was
forced to prematurely shutdown its operations. Thus, private respondents filed with
NLRC a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation
pay. Consequently, Rubberworld filed with SEC a petition for declaration of suspension
of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. Accordingly, SEC ordered the
suspension of all actions for claims against Rubberworld. Petitioner then filed a motion
to suspend proceedings before the labor arbiter. However, it was not acted upon,
instead it rendered a decision and declared Rubberworld guilty of ILLEGAL SHUTDOWN
and ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents their separation pay. Upon appeal,
NLRC affirmed the decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the DOLE, Labor arbiter and NLRC may legally act on the claims
of respondents despite the order of SEC to suspend all actions against the company
under rehabilitation.

Ruling:

No, they may not legally act on the claims.

In Barotac Sugar Mills v. CA, 275 SCRA 497 (1997), it was held that, “Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is clear that "all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships
or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended accordingly." The law did not make any exception in
favor of labor claims.”

In BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 262 (1990), it was held that,
“The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the
management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his
powers free from any judicial or extra judicial interference that might unduly hinder or
prevent the 'rescue' of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue
would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver,
whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the
corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.”

Here, the labor case would defeat the purpose of an automatic stay. To rule
otherwise would open the floodgates to numerous claims and would defeat the rescue
efforts of the management committee. This finds ratiocination in that the power to hear
and decide labor disputes is deemed suspended when the SEC puts the corporation
under rehabilitation.
05 -- Genuino vs. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342, December 04, 2007

Facts:

Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank. She then filed a complaint

before a Labor Arbiter for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages. The
Labor Arbiter finds the dismissal without just cause and ordered to reinstate complainant
immediately to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits,
with backwages. On appeal, NLRC reversed the judgment by Labor Arbiter and declared
that the dismissal is for just cause, however, it reiterated the award to pay the salaries
due to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll.

Issue:

Whether or not Citibank (employer) has the right to require Genuino (dismissed
employee) to refund the salaries she received while the case was on appeal and later
finds that the dismissal is valid and for just cause.

Ruling:

Yes, the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee to refund the
salaries received.

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule 1, Sec. 7 provides that,
“If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the
ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed
employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case
was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed
employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective
bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices.”

Here, considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll
reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be
paid the salaries.
06 – Garcia vs. PAL, G.R. No. 164856, 20 January 2009

Facts:

Petitioners were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when law enforcers
raided the PAL Technical Center. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for
transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages. the Labor Arbiter decided in their favor, thus ordering PAL to
immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to said
promulgation, SEC placed PAL under rehabilitation. Hence, PAL filed an urgent motion
for injunction before the NLRC which was granted in which the said proceeding was
SUSPENDED. In 2007, Upon manifestation of PAL, it informed the Court that SEC
granted its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the
Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning
that of the Labor Arbiter, now that respondent has exited from rehabilitation
proceedings.

Ruling:

Yes, petitioners may collect their wages.

In Air Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. NO. 148247, August 7, 2006, it was held that,
“if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement
order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary
he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
period.”

Here, the "refund doctrine" easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the
Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee, to
make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during the
pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final
unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of
insolvency. Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice principles
behind the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly favorable to management. Under
such scheme, the salaries dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond posted in
installment by the employer. For in the event of a reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision
ordering reinstatement, the employer gets back the same amount without having to
spend ordinarily for bond premiums. This circumvents, if not directly contradicts, the
proscription that the "posting of a bond [even a cash bond] by the employer shall not
stay the execution for reinstatement."
07 – Tres Reyes vs. Maxim’s Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003

Facts:

Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause for the
severance of his employment, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. However,
the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the
collision and sustain the validity of his dismissal. Instead of filing the requisite pleading
for appeal, petitioner filed a "Motion for Partial Reconsideration" with the NLRC. The
NLRC opted to treat petitioner’s motion as an appeal. It reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied. A petition
was filed before the CA alleging that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to petitioner’s motion considering that it was a prohibited pleading under the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. CA decided in favor of respondent. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an appeal

to the NLRC.

Ruling:

Yes, said motion can be considered as an appeal.

In Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 242 (2000),

it was held that, “Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the
application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.”

Here, strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award

of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an
appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an appeal. Had the court a quo, to use its
own words, "carefully perused the case records," it would have readily seen that said
pleading had complied with the technical requirements of an appeal.
08 – Legahi vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122240, November 18, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner entered in a contract of employment as Chief Cook. However, he was

asked by the Shipmaster to prepare cost statement. Intimated that he did not know
how to do such work as it was not part of the duties of a chief cook, and when he finally
deferred from performing said tasks, a committee was formed and informed petitioner
in meeting held for that purpose, that he was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s dismissal is valid.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner’s dismissal is not valid.

In Molato v. NLRC, 266 SCRA 42 (1997), it was held that, “To constitute a valid
dismissal from employment, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be
for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee
must be accorded due process, the elements of which are notice and the opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself.”

Here, the petitioner was not given due process when the notice apprising him of
the charges and the notice of dismissal were done in one morning all in the January 14
committee hearing failing to give reasonable time to answer the charges hurled against
him or to defend himself.
09 – San Miguel Corporation vs. Del Rosario, G.R. NOS. 168194 & 168603,
December 13, 2005

Facts:

On April 17, 2000, respondent was employed by petitioner as key account

specialist. On March 9, 2001, petitioner informed respondent that her probationary
employment will be severed at the close of the business hours of March 12, 2001. On
March 13, 2001, respondent was refused entry to petitioner’s premises. Respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and underpayment/non-payment
of monetary benefits. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that respondent was a
probationary employee whose services were terminated as a result of the excess
manpower that could no longer be accommodated by the company. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring respondent a regular employee because her employment
exceeded six months and holding that she was illegally dismissed as there was no
authorized cause to terminate her employment.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is a regular employee of petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent is a regular employee.

In Agoy v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 636, 648 (1996), it was held that, “In termination cases,
like the present controversy, the burden of proving the circumstances that would justify
the employee’s dismissal rests with the employer.”

In Buiser, et al., v.. Hon. Leogardo, etc., et al., 216 Phil. 144, 150 (1984), it was
held that, “the period of probationary employment may exceed six months when the
parties so agree, such as when the same is established by company policy, or when it is
required by the nature of the work.”

Here, none of these exceptional circumstances were proven in the present case.
Hence, respondent whose employment exceeded six months is undoubtedly a regular
employee of petitioner. The continuous employment of respondent as an account
specialist for almost 11 months, from April 17, 2000 to March 12, 2001, means that she
was a regular employee and not a temporary reliever or a probationary employee.