Appellant - NMCC 09

Team Code: NMCC - 09
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY

7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MINDIA
In SLP No. / 2019
Xing TV and Ors. …Appellants

v.
Union of Mindia and Ors. …Respondents
IN THE MATTER ARISING OUT OF:

Order passed by the Hon’ble High Court of State of Mindia under
Article 226 of the Constitution of Mindia, 1950
Memorial for Xing TV and Others

IMS UNISON 7TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................... IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... X
ISSUED RAISED ............................................................................................................... XIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................XIV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1
I. WHETHER THE NON-RECUSAL OF JUSTICE MARK FROM THE CASE HAS RESULTED IN GRAVE
PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT BY STRICT VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR
NOT?----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.1. There exists personal bias in all real likelihood ..........................................................1

1.2. Principles of natural justice are violated .....................................................................5
1.3. As there is violation of fundamental fairness, right to appeal is established ..............9
II. WHETHER THE COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE IB MINISTRY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND THE DECISION OF BLANKET BAN WAS ARBITRARY AND UNTENABLE IN LAW OR NOT? 9
2.1. The Committee violated due process of law .............................................................10
2.2. The blanket ban imposed was arbitrary, capricious and untenable in law ................12
III. WHETHER THE APPELLANT VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF MR. SODHI, OR WHETHER
IT WAS A MERE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF PRESS OR NOT? ------------------------------------- 16

3.1. The Appellant published authentic news under the right to press and freedom of
speech ........................................................................................................................16
3.2. The Appellant has not violated the right to privacy of Mr. Sodhi ............................20
3.3. The There exists no grounds of defamation or violation of privacy .........................22
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... XV
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................................XVI
( ii )

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

¶ Paragraph
AC Appellate Court
AIR All India Reporter
All ER All England Law Report
Anr. Another
Art. Article(s)
Const. Constitution of India, 1950
Cir Circuit Court Appeals
Edn. Edition
EWCA England and Wales Court of Appeals
GLR Guwahati Law Report
J. Justice
KB King’s Bench
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
p. Page
QB Queen’s Bench
R. Rule
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Report
Supl. Supplementary
U.S. United States
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
( iii )

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
INDIAN JUDGEMENTS
1. A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27 ...................................................... 10
2. A.L. Kalara v. Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 316. ................................................... 13
3. Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143 .................................................. 18
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 722. ...................................................... 12
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898. .................................................... 9
6. Basheshar Nath v.The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan, AIR 1959
SC 149.......................................................................................................................... 13
7. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757 ..................................... 16, 18
8. E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3; AIR 1974 SC 555. ........................... 11
9. Gopal Dass Sharma v. The District Magistrate, Jammu & Anr, AIR 1973 SC 213;
1973 (2) SCR 969; 1973 (1) SCC 159. ........................................................................ 20
10. Gupta Enterprises v. Delhi Pollution Control Committee and Anr., (2008) ILR 1
Delhi 940. ..................................................................................................................... 14
11. Indian Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.,
1959 S.C.R. 12 ....................................................................................................... 15, 17
12. Indraprastha People and Anr. v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 13802013
SCC OnLine Del 1380 ................................................................................................. 16
13. K. I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431, 488............................................. 5
14. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369. . 19
15. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 SCR 375. ................................................... 11
16. Kashmir University v. Md. Yasin, AIR 1974 SC 238. ................................................ 13
17. KasturiLal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J &K, AIR 1980 SC 1992 .............................. 14
18. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461. ...... 11
19. Leena B Dam v. State of Assam and Ors., (2006) 2 GLR 653. ..................................... 8
20. Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1974)
2 SCC 402. ................................................................................................................... 12
21. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248. ...................... 11
22. O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 789. .................. 19
23. Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR AIR 2000 SC 3689. ............................................. 14
( iv )

24. P.D. Dinakaran v. Judges Inquiry Committee & Anr. (2011)8 SCC 380 .................. 2, 3
25. Papanasam Labour Union v. Madura coats Ltd, 1995 AIR 2200, 1995 SCC (1) 50117,
19
26. PK Ghosh v. JG Rajput, AIR 1996 SC 513 ................................................................... 8
27. Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1994 SC 2233 .................................. 13
28. Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak (343 U.S. 451). ........... 1
29. R.Rajagopal v. State of TamilNadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632 .............................................. 21
30. Ramakrishna v. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 ............................................................ 13
31. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611.................................................. 5, 6
32. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124. ...................................... 15, 20
33. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (Nationalization of banks case), (1970),
1 SCC 248, 1970 AIR 1970 SC 564. ........................................................................... 10
34. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 212............................ 12
35. Sita Ram v. State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 745. .................................................................. 9
36. Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion & Ors., CIVIL
APPEAL NOS.7326-7327 OF 2018, ¶ 122 [Accessed at:
https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/24405/24405_2018_Judgement_30-
Oct-2018.pdf] ............................................................................................................... 16
37. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain 1975 SCR (3) 333............................................................. 18
38. Suman Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1983 SC 1235............................ 13
39. Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC
808.................................................................................................................................. 5
40. Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2011) 1 SCC 496 ................. 20
FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS
41. Associated Provincial Pictures v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 .................. 15
42. Browning v. Foltz 837 F.2d, 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1989) .................................................. 4
43. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), 556 U.S.(2009). .............. 4
44. Ex Partes McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259. .................................................................. 8
45. In Re Pinochet, [1999] All ER AC 18, pp.132 G-H-133 A-C. ...................................... 6
46. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) .............................................................. 13
47. Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co, 59 U.S. 272 (1856) ............................. 11
48. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ........................................................ 8
(v)

49. Locabail UK Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. [2000] QB 451, [85] .............................. 5
50. Lowell v. Griffin, (1939) 303 US 444. ........................................................................ 16
51. Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon [(1969) 1 QB 577, 599] ................. 3
52. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. ............................................................... 22
53. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) ................................................................ 16
54. R (Ngole) v. University of Sheffield ([2019] EWCA Civ 1127) ................................. 15
55. R v. Gough, (1993) AC 646. .......................................................................................... 9
56. R. v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, [1923] All ER Rep. 233 .................................... 7
57. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S (1935) 295 U.S. 495. ....................................... 14
58. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co. 729 S.W.2d 768, 844-45 (Tex. App. 1987) .................... 8
59. United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563, (1966) .................................................. 8
60. United States v. Story 716 F.2d, 1088, 1091(6* Cir 1983) ........................................... 4
BOOKS REFERRED
1. 2, H.M., SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 970 (4th edn. New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2010). ........................................................... 10
2. 7, Constituent Assembly Debates, 848 (New Delhi: Secretariat, Government of
India, 1948-1949) ......................................................................................................... 10
3. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF CONSTITUTION 162 (3rd
edn., London: Macmillan and Co, 1889) ....................................................................... 9
4. Black's Law Dictionary, 1303 (8th ed. 2004) ................................................................ 3
5. DURGA DAS BASU COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Justice S.S.
Subramani & Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah (et. al. eds.), 5759 (9th Ed., Vol. 6, 2014).
......................................................................................................................................12
6. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS.
Mohan Law House, (2010) ........................................................................................ 3, 6
7. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, 103
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,2010)................................................................ 10
8. I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 276 (8th Ed, Wadhwa & Co.)............................. 13
9. JOHAN NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (St. Paul Minnesota: St. Paul Minn.
West Publishing Co. 1978) .......................................................................................... 11
10. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1080 (5th edn., Nagpur: LexisNexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, 2005). ..................................................................................... 10
( vi )

11. N. JAYAPALAN, INDIAN SOCIETY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 531 (Atlantic Publishers
& Distributors, 2001) ................................................................................................... 14
12. P. ISHWARA BHAT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 90 (Kolkata: Eastern Law House Private
Ltd. 2004) ....................................................................................................................... 9
13. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, (Routledge, 7th Edn, 2002) ........................................... 4

14. T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, “The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court”,
in, SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, B.N. kirpal, et.al., (ed.) 193 (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, Seventh impression 2011) ................................................................. 9
ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

1. Alan Rose, The Model Judiciary - Fitting in with Modern Government, 4 THE JUD.
REV. 323 at 326 (1999) ................................................................................................. 8
2. Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd ed,
2007) .............................................................................................................................. 5
3. Chief Justice R. C. Lahoti, First M. C. Setalvad Memorial Lecture on "Canons of
Judicial Ethics " 45 UNIV. OF NEW BRUNSWICK L. JOUR. 81 (1991)............................ 6
4. Jeffrey W Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK L. REV. 589 at 621-
627 (1987) ...................................................................................................................... 3
5. Mittal, Right to Equality And The Indian Supreme Court, 14, The American Journal
of Comparative Law 426-428 (1965) .......................................................................... 14
LEGISLATIVE REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

1. Report of the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, Vol. 1, (Ministry
of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2003) ............................................................ 12
2. VI Amendment of USA Constitution. ......................................................................... 12
MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES
1. ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2011. ............................................................... 3
2. Guideline 6, http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-2010.pdf ...................... 19
3. Guideline 7 http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-2010.pdf ....................... 20
4. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial
Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as
( vii )

revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The
Hague, November 25-26, 2002,
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.
pdf (Last visited on 12.09.2019, 21:35pm). ................................................................... 7
( viii )

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellants respectfully submit the instant matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Mindia under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order passed by Hon’ble High Court.1
This petition is maintainable as there are quintessential aspects regarding fundamental rights
of the Appellant that forms substantial questions of law, that are to be decided by this Hon’ble
Court.
1
Article 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
( ix )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Factual background:
Mindia is a Sovereign Democratic Republic Country with certain constitutional provisions
regarding the three organs of the State, Press and privacy of the citizens. Mr. Vijay Lalit
Sodhi (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Sodhi”) is a business tycoon in Mindia, with political
ties and broadly expanded businesses with speculations that he had funded the election
campaign of the ruling party resulting in a clasp over the government. He was also the
chairman of a Women Helpline NGO, that provided pro-bono services for the welfare of
women in society, for which, he was awarded by various State Governments and the
Central Government. He had two daughters, (i) Chinky Lalit Sodhi (hereinafter referred to
as “Chinky”), an established and well reputed Lawyer at the Supreme Court of Mindia,
who completed her masters in Law from Sondon with a full funded scholarship from the
Government; and (ii) Pinky Lalit Sodhi, who won the prestigious Fhoding Scholarship
through which she got admitted into the Forward University to pursue master's.
2. Timeline of events:
Date Event/ Occurrence of instances
11/04/2019 Billion Dollar contract for manufacturing Time Machine given by the
government to My Rules Pvt. Ltd. owned by the Mr. Sodhi.
26/04/2019 Fling Times a daily newspaper, controlled by the Xing TV, published the
news regarding the time machine contract.
30/04/2019 Xing TV telecasted a breaking news where many private and obscene
pictures of Mr. Sodhi with different women were revealed, after which he
was immediately removed from the position of the chairman from his
NGO, while his company's share prices also suffered a major pitfall.
1/05/2019 Mr. Sodhi lodged an FIR against Xing TV as the news violated his right
to privacy and caused irreparable harm to his business and reputation.
05/05/2019 Mr. Sodhi filed a formal complaint before the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, while Xing TV had already telecasted that show thrice on
(x)

their news channel with the highest TRP. Simultaneously, six women ex-
employees filed a complaint against Mr. Sodhi in the police station
alleging that he was a person with a questionable character, who often
asked them for personal favours, and subsequently got all of them sacked
from their jobs when they tried to oppose or expose him.
Few Ms. Chinky had filed a complaint against Xing TV before the IB Ministry,
months as one of their associated journalists clicked a picture of her with Mr. Patlu
prior Sikka and telecasted it with catchy headlines; after which, her fiancé, Mr.
Kabir Singh, broke up his ties with her. Later on, it was found that it was
a mere assumption made out and the channel was ordered to scroll an
apology in her name for 24 hours for the next 7 days.
1/05/2019 Mr. Sodhi along with his PR team held a press conference where they told
the media that the complaint filed by the ex-employees of Mr. Sodhi were
false, fabricated and hence baseless; by justifying that they were sacked
from their jobs because of leakage of confidential data pertaining to the
Time Machine Contract to the media and that Xing TV with Fling Times
are deliberately trying to frame Mr. Sodhi and his family members.
03/05/2019 Fling times published news revealing termination of Mr. Sodhi’s six
employees, out of which, four were removed from their job in the month
of January and February, 2019.
10/05/2019 Xing TV received a show-cause notice from the Ministry of IB for

personal appearance. Xing TV in their reply to notice stated that, they had
received an anonymous tip containing a video clip of Mr. Sodhi, which
they telecasted under their right to broadcast, respecting the general public
interest. However, the committee, unsatisfied with these justifications,
imposed a blanket ban on Xing TV for 10 days with immediate effect on
the ground of insufficient rationale, while the latter contended that they
have investigated the authenticity of the images and videos broadcasted on
TV as a true story which was hence, important news in public interest.
11/05/2019 The blanket ban attracted many criticisms where some newspapers printed
that, Mr. Sodhi used his clout to ban Xing TV and a rumour spread that,
( xi )

one person among the committee members was his relative. Moreover,
one scholar also wrote that the government used its right to press for a
friend.
3. Petition before the HC of Mindia:

Aggrieved by the decision of the Committee, Xing TV filed a petition in the Hon'ble High
Court of the State of Mindia, which was listed before Filan J Mark and Manuradha JJ.
Justice Mark had once written a letter of Recommendation Mr. Sodhi’s daughter when she
was his judicial clerk, that also helped her in bagging the scholarship. Further, Justice Mark
had also Co-authored an article “Media cannot enter into private affairs” that was referred
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in another matter. Thus, Xing TV moved an application for
recusal of Justice Mark based on a possibility of bias and conflict of interest due to the said
letter of recommendation. However, Justice Mark didn't recuse himself and this news
attracted high publicity and attention from the general public. Later, Justice Mark upheld
the decision of the committee stating that “Media should think before broadcasting” and
ordered Xing TV to pay additional cost as damages to Mr. Sodhi with an explicit mention
to allow the latter to approach Civil court for further monetary claims.
4. Consequences of the HC decision:

The decision of Justice Mark was not appreciated by the press community as a bad
precedent and a direct threat to freedom of the press. One of the newspapers printed that
the monetary fine imposed was a mere result of resentment due to allegations made on the
Judge’s recusal. Aggrieved by the decision of Hon'ble High Court, Xing TV filed an
appeal in the apex institution of the country.
( xii )

ISSUED RAISED
Issue I:
Whether the non-recusal of Justice Mark from the case has resulted in grave prejudice to the
appellant and caused strict violation of the principle of natural justice or not?
Issue II:
Whether the Committee set up by the IB ministry violated due process of law and the
decision of blanket ban was arbitrary and untenable in law or not?
Issue III:
Whether Xing TV violated the right to privacy of Mr. Vijay Lalit Sodhi, or whether it was a
mere exercise of freedom of press or not?
( xiii )

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. WHETHER THE NON-RECUSAL OF JUSTICE MARK FROM THE CASE HAS RESULTED IN
GRAVE PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT AND CAUSED STRICT VIOLATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the non-recusal of Mark, J. has resulted
in grave injustice to the Appellant. The facts in the present matter clearly show that Mark, J.
had a personal bias towards the cause of Mr. Vijay Lalit Sodhi, the complainant/petitioner in
the original High Court petition as Mark, J. had written a letter of recommendation for the
complainant’s daughter which requires a professional/ fiduciary relationship. Additionally, he
had a pre-determined stand on the extent of freedom that the media should exercise in its
reporting and the same can be clearly ascertained from his article on the subject. Further, given
personal bias which is established by the above-mentioned facts and settled case laws, the non-
recusal of Mark, J. violates principles of natural justice by making him a judge in his own
cause. This, in turn, shows that there has been violation of fundamental fairness by making
Mark, J. a judge in his own cause.
II. WHETHER THE COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE IB MINISTRY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AND THE DECISION OF BLANKET BAN WAS ARBITRARY AND UNTENABLE IN LAW OR
NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Committee set up by the Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting to look into the complaint filed by Mr. Vijay Lalit Sodhi violates
due process of law. The Committee is not in consonance with the basic requirements of due
process and also does not comply with the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995.
Further, the decision given by the Committee is arbitrary and untenable in law as it is violative
of the basic principles of natural justice, principle of reasonableness and arbitrariness under
Part III of the Constitution. The Appellants were not given a chance to appeal against the order
of the Committee which again violates due process. Further, the quantum of punishment is
excessive as a ten-day blanket ban on the Appellant has no basis in law or is proportionate to
the alleged action.
( xiv )

III. WHETHER XING TV VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF MR. VIJAY LALIT SODHI,
OR WHETHER IT WAS A MERE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF PRESS OR NOT ?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Appellant has not violated the right
to privacy of Mr. Vijay Lalit Sodhi and the reporting against the complainant is a mere exercise
of freedom of press. The Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(a) guarantees Freedom of
Speech and Expression to every citizen of India and the Courts have extended the same to the
Press vide multiple case precedents into arenas of freedom of profession and freedom of
speech. Further, the reporting by the Appellant does not violate any restrictions as enumerated
under Article 19(2) or create an exception to freedom of speech under the ambit of reasonable
restrictions. Further, the Appellant has not violated the Right to Privacy of the complainant as
this right has certain restrictions such as public interest. The reporting against the complainant
helped women who had been sexually harassed by the complainant to come forward and file
complaints; it also facilitated disclosure and dissemination of information to the public at large.
Hence, any claims of defamation or other legal actions against the Appellant is baseless in law
as the allegations made in the report were true and lawful.
( xv )

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE NON-RECUSAL OF JUSTICE MARK FROM THE CASE HAS RESULTED IN
GRAVE PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT BY STRICT VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL JUSTICE OR NOT?
It is most humbly contended that the non-recusal of Mark, J. has resulted in grave
injustice to the Appellant as [1.1.] personal bias in all real likelihood is present; [1.2.]
the non-recusal has violated principles of natural justice; [1.3.] there has been violation
of fundamental fairness.
1.1. THERE EXISTS PERSONAL BIAS IN ALL REAL LIKELIHOOD

1.1.1. A Judge, while assuming office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the
Constitution of India, that: " I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution
of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India,
that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment
perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill will and that I
will uphold the Constitution and the laws".
1.1.2. Recusal is "removal of oneself as a judge or policy maker in a particular matter,
especially because of a conflict of interest."2 The practice of recusal i.e. when and how
an individual Justice should be excluded from participating in a specific case, where he
has some interest—has been debated since the founding in the United States of America
and United Kingdom.3 The doctrine of judicial recusal enables, and may require, a
judge who has been, appointed to hear and determine a case to stand down from that
case and leave the disposition of it to another colleague or colleagues. Hence, a duty is
cast upon all judges to consider adjudication without favour to or ill will against any
parties and in situations of such relations, a Judge is mandated to recuse himself/herself
in the interest of justice. This was clearly violated by Mark, J. who had prior
professional/ fiduciary relationship with Mr. Sodhi’s daughter and failed to recuse
himself.
1.1.3. Further, the judicial oath in England and Wales that is adopted in common law,
mandates to do justice “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Fear and favour
2
Black's Law Dictionary, 1303 (8th ed. 2004).
3
Jeffrey W Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK L. REV. 589 at 621-627 (1987).
(1)
are the enemies of independence, which is a state of being. Affection and ill-will
undermine impartiality, which is a state of mind. But independence and impartiality
are the twin pillars without which justice cannot stand, and the purpose of recusal is
to underpin them. That makes the law relating to recusal a serious business.”4
Justice Mark had personal bias against the Appellant

1.1.4. A pecuniary (bias) interest, however small it may be, disqualifies a person from acting
as a Judge. Other types of bias, however, do not stand on the same footing and the
Courts have, from time to time, evolved different rules for deciding whether personal
or official bias or bias as to subject matter or judicial obstinacy would vitiate the
ultimate action/order/decision. It is, thus, evident that the English Courts have applied
different tests for deciding whether non- pecuniary bias would vitiate judicial or quasi-
judicial decision. Many judges have laid down and applied the `real likelihood' formula,
holding that the test for disqualification is whether the facts, as assessed by the court,
give rise to a real likelihood of bias. Other judges have employed a `reasonable
suspicion' test, emphasizing that justice must be seen to be done, and that no person
should adjudicate in any way if it might reasonably be thought that he ought not to act
because of some personal interest. 5
1.1.5. The Apex Court of India referred to the test applied in Australia speaking through
Gleeson, C.J., in determining whether a Judge was disqualified by reason of the
appearance of bias, i.e. whether a fair- minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend
that the Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of
the question require to be decided and gave the following reasons for making a
departure from the test applied in England: "That test has been adopted, in preference
to a differently expressed test that has been applied in England, for the reason that it
gives due recognition to the fundamental principle that justice must both be done,
and be seen to be done. It is based upon the need for public confidence in the
administration of justice. If fair-minded people reasonably apprehend or suspect that
the tribunal has prejudged the case, they cannot have confidence in the decision."
1.1.6. The hypothetical reasonable observer of the judge's conduct is postulated in order to
emphasise that the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the
4
GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS. Mohan Law House, (2010),
p 11.
5
P.D. Dinakaran v. Judges Inquiry Committee & Anr. (2011)8 SCC 380, ¶ 42.
(2)
judiciary, and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity
or performance of their colleagues as the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the
person being observed is "a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or
affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the
prejudicial".6 Thus, in cases of non-pecuniary bias, the `real likelihood' test has been
preferred over the `reasonable suspicion' test and the Courts have consistently held that
in deciding the question of bias one has to take into consideration human probabilities
and ordinary course of human conduct.7
1.1.7. Lord Denning M.R. has observed that in considering whether there was a real likelihood
of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the
chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does
not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one
side at the expense of the other. But rather, the Court looks at the impression which
would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if
right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood
of bias on his part, then he should not sit.8
1.1.8. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the judicial process demands that a judge move
within the framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for
ascertaining them. It mandates a thought process dispassionately and to submerge
private feeling on every aspect of a case. It specifically noted: “There is a good deal of
shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact
is that on the whole judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial
functions...But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence
of feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing that such
unconcious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly lead
others to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in
judgment. They do this for a variety of reasons. The guiding consideration is that the
administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be
so in fact.”9
6
P.D. Dinakaran v. Judges Inquiry Committee & Anr., (2011)8 SCC 380, ¶ 71.
7
Ibid.
8
Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon [(1969) 1 QB 577, 599].
9
Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak (343 U.S. 451).
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1.1.9. The most widely shared is Rule 2.11(A) of the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."10
Similarly, most of Rule 2.11(A)'s specific rules on disqualification also apply across
US courts. A judge should always, by rule recuse herself (be disqualified) when:
a) She is biased against one of the parties,11
b) She has previously served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,12
c) She has an economic interest in the subject matter of greater than de minimis
value,13
d) She is related to a party or lawyer in the proceeding within the third degree of
kinship,14
e) She has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts,15 or
f) She has made improper ex parte communications during the course of the
proceeding.16
1.1.10. These rules per se are largely common-sensical and without controversy. In addition to
abovementioned code, courts of USA have also given some guidelines.17 For instance,
a reasonable man test where a judge is required to recuse himself only if a reasonable
person with knowledge of all facts and circumstances would conclude that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.18
1.1.11. The Supreme Court of United States in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.19 signaled
that the time was right for states to shore up the foundations of the impartial judiciary.
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion made clear that states can require recusal
even in situations that do not give rise to questions of constitutional significance. Justice
Kennedy noted that "States may choose to adopt recusal standards more rigorous than
due process requires."20
10
R. 2.11(A)(1). ,Canon 2, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2011.
11
See Browning v. Foltz 837 F.2d, 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1989)
12
R. 2.11(A)(6)(a), Canon 2, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2011.
13
Rule 2.11(A)(3), Canon 2ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2011.
14
R. 2.11(A)(2), Canon 2, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon, 2011.
15
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES,
(Routledge, 7th Edn, 2002). § 6.4.1, at ch.12(1996).
16
R. 2.9(A), Canon 2, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2011.
17
United States v. Story 716 F.2d, 1088, 1091(6* Cir 1983).
18
Ibid.
19
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), 556 U.S.(2009).
20
Ibid, at 2267.
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Pre-decided notions or scholarly opinions of judges constitute personal bias

1.1.12. Justice Markandey Katju, followed the practice of automatic recusal when he withdrew
his name from the Novartis case by saying that it would not be proper for him to deal
with the appeal filed by Novartis.21 His withdrawal from the case was apparently meant
to preclude fears of bias in the MNC camp on account of an article he had written five
years earlier against liberal grant of pharma patents.
1.1.13. Judges are entitled to exercise the rights and freedoms available to all citizens. It is in
the public interest that judges participate in the life and affairs of the community, so
that they remain in touch with the community. On the other hand, appointment to
judicial office brings with it some limitations on private and public conduct. By
accepting an appointment, a judge agrees to accept those limitations.22
1.1.14. The English Court of Appeal has held that anyone writing in an area in which he sits
judicially has to exercise considerable care not to express himself in terms which
indicate that he has preconceived views which are so firmly held that it may not be
possible for him to try a case with an open mind.23
1.1.15. Hence, there was personal bias by Mark, J. evidenced through the articles authored by
him against the Appellant’s right to freedom of speech24 and also a personal bias via a
fiduciary relationship between him and Mr. Sodhi’s daughter.
1.2. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ARE VIOLATED

1.2.1. The principles of Natural Justice have developed with the growth of civilization and
the content thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the level of civilization
and Rule of Law prevailing in the community.25 Duty to act fairly and impartially is
ingrained in Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution. Indian courts have nourished these
values with reference to administrative decision making and emphasized on the test of
'real likelihood of bias.' What is relevant according to Supreme Court is the
reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party.26 Justice
21
Lamenting that "many of the medical drugs available in the market are too costly for the poor people in
India", Katju said in his article that "ways and means should therefore be thought out for making these
drugs available to the masses at affordable prices".
22
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2nd edn, 2007).
23
Locabail UK Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. [2000] QB 451, [85].
24
Moot Proposition, ¶¶ 18, 21.
25
K. I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431, 488 per R. N. Mishra J.
26
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611.
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must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right minded people
go away thinking: the judge was biased.27
1.2.2. It is one of the settled principles of a civilised legal system that a Judge is required to
be impartial. It is said that the hallmark of a democracy is the existence of an impartial
Judge. It all started with a latin maxim Nemo Judex in causa Sua which means literally
- that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, and this maxim should be held sacred
as it is not to be confined to a case in which he is a party but applies to a cause in which
he has an interest.28
1.2.3. The fundamental principle is that a man may not be a judge in his own cause. This
principle, as developed by the courts, has two very similar but not identical
implications. First it may be applied literally: if a judge is in fact a party to the litigation
or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome then he is indeed sitting as a
judge in his own cause. In that case, the mere fact that he is a party to the action or has
a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome is sufficient to cause his automatic
disqualification. The second application of the principle is where a judge is not a party
to the suit and does not have a financial interest in its outcome, but in some other way
his conduct or behaviour may give rise to a suspicion that he is not impartial, for
example because of his friendship with a party. This second type of case is not strictly
speaking an application of the principle that a man must not be judge in his own cause,
since the judge will not normally be himself benefiting, but providing a benefit for
another by failing to be impartial.29
Principles of impartiality and independence are violated

1.2.4. There is another rule which requires a Judge to be impartial.30 The theoretical basis is
explained by Thomas Hobbes in his Eleventh Law of Nature. He said: "If a man be
trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of Nature that he
deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be
determined but by war. He therefore, said that is partial in judgment doth what in
him lies, to deter men from the use of judges and arbitrators; and consequently,
against the fundamental law of Nature, is the cause of war."
27
Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law, (1982), 87.
28
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808.
29
In Re Pinochet, [1999] All ER AC 18, pp.132 G-H-133 A-C.
30
Ibid, at ¶¶ 10, 11.
(6)
1.2.5. Impartiality, thus refers to a state of mind and attitude of the court or tribunal in relation
to the issues and the parties in a particular case, while 'independence' refers not only to
the state of mind or attitude, but also to a status or relationship to others particularly to
the executive branch of government that rests on objective conditions or guarantees.31
1.2.6. The requirement in short is that the judge must be impartial and must decide the case
objectively on the basis of the evidence on record. A person cannot take an objective
decision in a case in which he has interests. This rule of disqualification is applied not
only to avoid the possibility of a partial decision but also to ensure public confidence
in the impartiality of the adjudicatory process.32 A decision which is a result of bias is
void and the trial is "coram non-judice".33
1.2.7. Grant Hammond, a former Judge of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand has traced out
principles on the law of recusal as developed in England.34 He has explained that the
central feature of the early English common law on recusal was both simple and highly
constrained: Canon law has provided for recusal if a judge was suspected of partiality
because of consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity with a party, or because of his
subordinate status towards a party or because he was or had been a party's advocate. In
contrast to the relatively sophisticated canon law, which provided for recusal if a judge
was suspected of partiality because of consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity
with a party, or because of his subordinate status towards a party or because he was or
had been a party's advocate.35
1.2.8. A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. A judge shall disqualify himself or herself
from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable
to decide the matter impartially.36 To be disqualifying, the actual or apparent bias of the
31
Chief Justice R. C. Lahoti, First M. C. Setalvad Memorial Lecture on "Canons of Judicial Ethics " 45
UNIV. OF NEW BRUNSWICK L. JOUR. 81 (1991).
32
R. v. Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy, [1923] All ER Rep. 233 (Per Lord Hewart, C.J.).
33
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 11.
34
R.GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS (Hart Publishing, 2009).
35
Ibid, at 11.
36
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted
by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief
Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002,
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf (Last visited on
12.09.2019, 21:35pm).
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judge must be directly relevant to the proceeding at issue, and the bias must be personal,
as opposed to judicial, in nature.37
1.2.9. Judges must be seen to be objective and impartial. In their personal lives, judges must
avoid words, actions or situations that might make them appear to be biased or
disrespectful of the laws they are sworn to uphold. One of the critical functions of
judiciary, as a branch of government responsible for the application and interpretation
of law, is to ensure that "justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be
done".38
1.2.10. Credibility in the functioning of the justice delivery system and the reasonable
perception of the affected parties are relevant considerations to ensure the continuance
of public confidence in the credibility and impartiality of the judiciary.39 In Texaco, Inc.
v. Penrizoil Co.,40 the courts had declined to order the recusal of a trial judge who had
received a $10,000 campaign contribution from Pennzoil just two days after the
company filed its answer. Thus, any such acts of a judge that awakens doubts against
his/her credibility or impartiality must result in recusal, which was not followed in the
current case, in spite of multiple criticisms against non-recusal.41
There is bias according to real danger and reasonable suspicion test

1.2.11. Alan Rose, a former President of the Australian Law Reform Commission once
observed42 that justice, and the appearance of that justice being delivered, is
fundamental to the maintenance of the rule of law. Justice implies - consistency, in
process and result — that is, treating like cases alike; a process which is free from
coercion or corruption; ensuring that inequality between the parties does not influence
the outcome of the process; adherence to the values of procedural fairness, by allowing
parties the opportunity to prevent their case and to answer contrary allegations, and
unbiased neutral decision making; dignified, careful and serious decision-making and
an open and reviewable process. Hence the Court have consistently held that even the
possibility of bias would suffice to nullify an order passed or an action taken.43
37
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); See also United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563,
(1966).
38
Ex Partes McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259.
39
PK Ghosh v. JG Rajput, AIR 1996 SC 513.
40
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co. 729 S.W.2d 768, 844-45 (Tex. App. 1987).
41
42
Alan Rose, The Model Judiciary - Fitting in with Modern Government, 4 THE JUD. REV. 323 at 326 (1999).
43
Leena B Dam v. State of Assam and Ors., (2006) 2 GLR 653.
(8)
1.2.12. In one of the earliest cases of common law, the Court of Appeal noticed that there are
two lines of authority propounding two different tests for determining disqualification
of a Judge on the ground of bias as the (i) real danger test and (ii) reasonable suspicion
test.44
1.2.13. Subsequently, Lord Goff noted that in such a case, not only is it irrelevant that there
was in fact no bias on the part of the tribunal, but there is no question of investigating,
from an objective point of view, whether there was any real likelihood of bias, or any
reasonable suspicion of bias, on the facts of the particular case. The nature of the interest
is such that public confidence in the administration of justice requires that the decision
should not stand.45 As the Judge had pre-decided notions against exercise of free speech
by Media and its regulation, there was a real danger in impartial adjudication of the
case. In arguendo that the other twin test is applicable, even then, there were reasonable
suspicions that he was biased as he had favoured the Respondent in earlier
circumstances by extending a personal recommendation letter to his daughter.46
1.3. AS THERE IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS , RIGHT TO APPEAL IS
ESTABLISHED
1.3.1. The Supreme Court has held that a single right of appeal is more or less a universal
requirement under the right to life and liberty rooted in the conception that men are
fallible, that judges are men, and that making it necessary to be doubly sure before
irrevocable deprivation of life or liberty is effected, by a full-scale re-examination of
the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness or procedure.47
Hence, there is an essential requirement that there should be a re-examination of facts
by a different bench who are not defeated by the provisions of law of recusal, in order
to provide justice to the Appellants.
II. WHETHER THE COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE IB MINISTRY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AND THE DECISION OF BLANKET BAN WAS ARBITRARY AND UNTENABLE IN LAW
OR NOT?
44
R v. Gough, (1993) AC 646.
45
Ibid, AC p.661 F-G.
46
47
Sita Ram v. State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 745.
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It is humbly submitted that the Committee set up by the IB ministry imposed a blanket
ban without any reasonable grounds established in law or any statutory provisions
empowering such actions. Hence, [2.1.] the Committee violated due process of law;
[2.2.] the blanket ban imposed was arbitrary, capricious and untenable in law.
2.1. THE COMMITTEE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS OF LAW

2.1.1. Due process is often equated with the concept of natural rights which has proven
controversy. The word “due” in America has been interpreted as ‘reasonable’, ‘just’,
and ‘proper.48 Supreme Court of America first examined the meaning of due process
where, Benjamin, J., per curium stated that the phrase ‘due process of law’ were
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning of as the words ‘by the law of the
land’ used in Magna Carta. 49
2.1.2. The expression ‘due process of law’ is not used in any provisions of the Indian
Constitution. However, the due process can be inferred through the Articles 14, 19, 20,
21 and 22 together. Article 21 in its draft form was Article 15. It provided that “No
person shall be deprived of his life or liberty without the due process of law.”50 But the
Drafting Committee at a later stage proposed the substitution of the expression “except
according to procedure established by law” for the words “without due process of law.”
The Drafting Committee justified the amendment because the word due process gives
scope for judicial supremacy to determine the content of law which is likely to create
confusion and hurdles in the social transformation. Honourable members of the
Constituent Assembly expressed that “the right conferred by article 15 is the most
fundamental of the Fundamental Rights in this chapter, because it is the right which
relates to life and personal liberty without which all other rights will be
meaningless.”51
2.1.3. The 11 judges bench of Supreme Court in Bank Nationalization case52 overruled the
view of Gopalan53 and opined that each fundamental right is not complete code but
48
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1080 (5th edn., Nagpur: LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa,
2005).
49
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co, 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
50
2, H.M., SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 970 (4th edn. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing
Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2010).
51
7, Constituent Assembly Debates, 848 (New Delhi: Secretariat, Government of India, 1948-1949).
52
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (Nationalization of banks case), (1970), 1 SCC 248, 1970 AIR
1970 SC 564.
53
A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 27, at 69.
( 10 )
interdependent which laid the foundation for due process clause in the Indian legal
system.
2.1.4. The justness of the Constitution is saved by the theory of basic structure which reflected
the value of substantive due process of law which is akin to the US substantive due
process of law, which is based upon the philosophy of natural law and justice since
Kesavananda Bharti’s case.54
2.1.5. The Menaka Gandhi55 decision is now accepted as the starting point of the introduction
of due process clause in India after incorporating the concept of non-arbitrariness
articulated in Royappa56 under Article 21. The Court held that it was axiomatic that a
law prescribing a procedure for deprivation of life and personal liberty under Article 21
could not be any sort of procedure but it has to be one that is neither arbitrary nor unfair
or unreasonable.57 Justice Bhagawati observed that a law depriving a person of personal
liberty and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21
has to stand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19
which may be applicable in a given situation. Ex-hypothesis it must also be likely to be
tested with reference to Article 14. On principle, the concept of reasonableness must,
therefore, be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21 having regard to
the impact of Article 14 on Article 21.58
2.1.6. The following ingredients are considered as part of both substantive and procedural due
process:
i) Adversary process is fair method to adjudicate the civil dispute and criminal trial.59
ii) Neutral or impartial Judges of Court or Tribunal.60
iii) An opportunity to make oral representation before the Judges or Jury.
iv) An opportunity to present evidence or witness.
v) Right to pre-trial discovery of evidence.61
vi) Decision of Court must be supported by the reasons, i.e. speaking order.
54
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
55
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248.
56
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3; AIR 1974 SC 555.
57
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 SCR 375.
58
Supra note 56, at 252.
59
Report of the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System, Vol. 1, (Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, 2003), p.65.
60
Ibid.
61
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
( 11 )
2.1.7. The due process is a command that the government shall not be unfair to the people.
Procedural due process determines whether government has taken an individual’s life,
and liberty without the fair procedure required by the statute.62 Hence, the committee
set up by the Ministry of IB failed to follow due process and fair procedure63 in
providing an opportunity to justify the claims of the Appellant by imposing a blanket
ban without lawful grounds. Further, the entire concept of due process is violated by
the committee as one of the members adjudicating in the same, was a relative of Mr.
Sodhi which shows prejudice in the matter.64
2.2. THE BLANKET BAN IMPOSED WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNTENABLE IN LAW
2.2.1. Rule of Law embodies the doctrine of supremacy of law. As expounded by Dicey, Rule
of Law envisages “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power and excludes the existence of
arbitrariness of prerogative, or even wide discretionary authority on the part of
government.”65 The necessary element of rule of law is that the law must not be
arbitrary or irrational and it must satisfy the test of reason.66
2.2.2. Indian judiciary has acquired vast powers to supervise and invalidate any Union or State
action, whether legislative or executive or of any public authority which is perceived
by the Court to be ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’.67 Further, due process concept has
strengthened the procedure of law by integrating all of its components and by
addressing each of them with the principle of equality and fairness.68
2.2.3. Rule of law is the unique characteristic of the English Constitution which suggests that
no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary
courts of the land. In other words, the rule of law is contrasted with every system of
62
JOHAN NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (St. Paul Minnesota: St. Paul Minn. West Publishing Co.
1978).
63
Moot Proposition, ¶ 12, 13.
64
Moot Proposition, ¶ 14.
65
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF CONSTITUTION 162 (3rd edn., London:
Macmillan and Co, 1889).
66
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.
67
T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, “The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court”, in, SUPREME BUT
NOT INFALLIBLE, B.N. kirpal, et.al., (ed.) 193 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Seventh impression
2011).
68
P. ISHWARA BHAT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 90 (Kolkata: Eastern Law House Private Ltd. 2004).
( 12 )
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or

discretionary powers of constraint.69
The test of reasonableness is violated

2.2.4. The doctrine of classification is not paraphrase of Art. 14, it is merely a judicial formula
for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and
therefore constituting denial of equality.70 A test of arbitrariness would be to see
whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned Act and if so,
if it satisfies the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act
and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act
otherwise and in a manner, which does not disclose any discernible principle which is
reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness.71
2.2.5. Further the Supreme Court observed that: “The principle of reasonableness, which
legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-
arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure
contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in
conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive: otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement
of Article 21 would not be satisfied.”72
2.2.6. Supreme Court observed in Km. Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.73 that every action
by a competent authority must have an effective check against arbitrariness and abuse
of power. Further, it noted that non-arbitrariness in a public action must be for public
good instead of an abuse of power.
2.2.7. All authorities must act within the limits of their powers and provisions constructed by
it74. As stated by Bhagwati, J., Article 14 enunciates a vital principle which lies at the
core of republicanism pointing towards egalitarian socio-economic order.75 The
equality clause is intended to strike at real and substantial disparities and arbitrary or
capricious actions of the executive and it would be contrary to the object and
69
Supra note 43, at 110.
70
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 722.
71
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 212.
72
Ibid, at 284.
73
Ibid.
74
DURGA DAS BASU COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Justice S.S. Subramani & Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah (et. al. eds.), 5759 (9th Ed., Vol. 6, 2014).
75
Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1974) 2 SCC 402.
( 13 )
intendment of the equality clause to exalt delicate distinctiveness, shades of harshness

and theoretical possibilities of prejudice into legislative inequality or executive
discrimination.
2.2.8. According to a widened interpretation of Art. 14, one need not allege any discrimination
vis-à-vis others. Arbitrary or unreasonable actions, according to the Court, are per se
discriminatory.76 Hence, the blanket ban imposed, without a reasonable classification
or intelligible differentia under Article 14 is ultra vires the Constitution by violation of
fundamental rights of the Appellant.
There has been arbitrary exercise of executive power

2.2.9. Exercise of all administrative powers vested for public authority must be structured
within a system of controls informed by relevant reasons in relation to the object which
it seeks to serve and reason in regard to the manner in which it attempts to do so. Article
14 is violated by powers and procedures which themselves result in unfairness and
arbitrariness. Administrative powers should be exercised within definite limits in the
reasonable discretion of the designated authority. Vesting of an absolute and
uncontrolled power in such authority falls outside the Constitution altogether.77
2.2.10. In Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S.78, the Supreme Court of United States stated
that a grant of large unspecified power is incompatible with rule of law. As per Dicey’s
Rule of Law, law had to be opposed to influence of arbitrary powers and excluded from
the ambit of arbitrariness. Further, discretionary power is incompatible to rule of law
and hence, Court must draw limits to strike a balance between executive efficiency and
legal protection of citizens.
2.2.11. If any statutory body created by a legislation, goes beyond the area of its power, the act
is ultra vires and is of no effect.79 Even if the statute which conferred power to the
executive is not discriminatory, the executive order which derived its power from the
statute can be challenged under A.14 on the grounds of being discriminatory,80 or
arbitrary,81 as Article 14 does not allow the State to discriminate between persons.82
76
A.L. Kalara v. Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 316.
77
Suman Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1983 SC 1235.
78
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S (1935) 295 U.S. 495.
79
Kashmir University v. Md. Yasin, AIR 1974 SC 238.
80
Ramakrishna v. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538, ¶550.
81
Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1994 SC 2233.
82
Basheshar Nath v.The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan, AIR 1959 SC 149, ¶25.
( 14 )
2.2.12. Court may interfere if an administrative policy is unconstitutional, or beyond the

provision of an Act or regulation, or is ultra vires the authority of an administrative
instrumentality, or contrary to statutory policy or larger public policy.83Article 14,
therefore, is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive organs of the
State and the other subordinate authorities. It protects us from both legislative and
executive tyranny by way of discrimination. Thus, when any executive order violates
fundamental rights, it will be quashed by the judiciary as to keep the excesses of the
executive at bay.84 The Hon’ble Supreme Court is the repository of fundamental rights
of the citizens.85
2.2.13. Since Maneka Gandhi’s case,86 the Courts have adopted the Wednesbury principle87
that if the classification was an arbitrary act of the state under A.12 of the Constitution,
A.14 would strike it down.88 The test for arbitrariness is whether the executive acted
illegally or omitted reasonable factors or its opinion was one which no reasonable man
would have taken.89 Arbitrariness is primarily an action performed by the executive
capriciously without adequately determining principle and classifying based on
unfounded nature of things.90
2.2.14. The England and Wales Court of Appeal has signalled that a blanket ban on the freedom
of expression of those who may be called ‘traditional believers’ cannot be
proportionate, as it would require something further, such as comments that were
abusive, used inflammatory language of the speaker’s own, or were condemnatory of
any individual.91 Thus, a blanket ban92 on mere exercise of free speech rights enshrined
in the Constitution would be arbitrary in law and a capricious attempt at depriving the
Appellant of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
83
I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 276 (8th Ed, Wadhwa & Co.).
84
Gupta Enterprises v. Delhi Pollution Control Committee and Anr., (2008) ILR 1 Delhi 940.
85
N. JAYAPALAN, INDIAN SOCIETY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 531 (Atlantic Publishers & Distributors,
2001).
86
Supra note 56.
87
Associated Provincial Pictures v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223.
88
KasturiLal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J &K, AIR 1980 SC 1992 ¶14.
89
Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR AIR 2000 SC 3689.
90
Mittal, Right to Equality And The Indian Supreme Court, 14, The American Journal of Comparative Law
426-428 (1965).
91
R (Ngole) v. University of Sheffield ([2019] EWCA Civ 1127).
92
( 15 )
III. WHETHER THE APPELLANT VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF MR. SODHI, OR
WHETHER IT WAS A MERE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF PRESS OR NOT ?
It is humbly submitted that the impugned High Court order violates the freedom of
speech and expression of the Appellants and other media houses under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. It is contented that [3.1] the Appellant published authentic news
under the right to press and freedom of speech; and that [3.2] The Appellant has not
violated the right to privacy of Mr. Sodhi and is not liable for any legal action.
3.1. THE APPELLANT PUBLISHED AUTHENTIC NEWS UNDER THE RIGHT TO PRESS AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
3.1.1. Blackstonian concept of freedom of press which was expressed as early as in 1769
contained four basic points93, which still form the crux of the concept of press freedom.
They are as follows:
1. Liberty of the press is essential to the state.
2. No previous restraints should be placed on the publications.
3. That does not mean there is press freedom for doing what is prohibited by law.
4. Every freeman has the undoubted right to lay what sentiment he places before the
public, but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
3.1.2. Freedom of speech and expression means the right to express one’s own convictions
and opinions freely by means of mouth, writing, printing pictures or any other mode. It
thus includes the expression of one’s ideas through any communicable medium or
visible representation, such as gesture, signs and the like94. The expression connotes
also publications and thus the freedom of press is included in this category. Free
propagation of ideas is the necessary objective, and this may be done on the platform
or through the press. The freedom of propagation of ideas is secured by freedom of
circulation. Liberty of circulation is essential to the freedom as the liberty of
publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value95. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment serves not only the needs of the
polity but also those of the human spirit – a spirit that demands self-expression.96
93
Press and the Law (1990) by Justice A.N.Grover; at 7, ¶ 23.
94
Lowell v. Griffin, (1939) 303 US 444.
95
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
96
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
( 16 )
3.1.3. The Appellants humbly contend that the freedom of the press which is part of the
freedom of the expression is hallmark of any democracy and is part of the fundamental
right under Article 19(1)97 of the Constitution of India. This Court has held that freedom
of speech and expression includes within its scope the Freedom of the Press. 98 The
Appellants contend that through the telecast on 30th of April, 2019, they were merely
publishing the information that was of public interest and were not making any wild
and reckless allegations which would hurt the Right to Privacy of the Respondent.
3.1.4. The freedom of expression is a pivotal component of our individual development - as
human beings and as 'political animals' - and to improve and radicalize democracies.
The invention of the press constituted the turning point for the debates about freedom
of expression. Guaranteeing each individual's right to freely seek, receive or impart
information while interacting with other individuals ceased to be enough. It was
necessary to go beyond, upholding this right allied by an intermediary that radically
magnified the outreach of opinions, information and ideas: the mass media.99
3.1.5. The right to impart and receive information is a species of the right of freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. A citizen has the
fundamental right to use the best means of imparting and receiving information and as
such to have an access to telecasting for the purpose.100
3.1.6. Topics considered worthy of a broadcast arise from the public and the public itself is
the targeted audience. It is rightly said that media revolves around society because
people provide the news and are the recipients of the news.101 The Right to Press
includes, within its ambit, the Right to comment on public affairs as was stated by the
Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman v. State of J&K102. This Right to comment on public
affairs includes the right to criticize people holding public post and also to criticize the
public policies.
3.1.7. Further, the telecast regarding the Respondent created a safe environment for six female
ex-employees of the Respondent to come out of silence and file complaints regarding
97
INDIA CONST. Art. 19, cl. 1.
98
Indian Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors., 1959 S.C.R. 12,
99
Indraprastha People and Anr. v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 13802013 SCC OnLine Del 1380,
¶ 14.
100
Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion & Ors., CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7326-
7327 OF 2018, ¶ 122 [Accessed at:
https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/24405/24405_2018_Judgement_30-Oct-2018.pdf].
101
Indraprastha People and Anr. v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1380¶ 4.
102
Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757
( 17 )
his questionable actions during their employment. Any damage or loss caused to the
Respondent is not primarily because of the Appellant but is essentially a result of the
complaints. These complaints were independent complaints and the Appellants cannot
be held responsible for the fall in share prices and the termination of the chairmanship,
as these were the results of allegations raised against the Respondent by the six ex-
employees.
3.1.8. In Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India,103 it has been held that the freedom of
press has three essential elements. They are:
i) Freedom of access to all sources of information,
ii) Freedom of publication, and
iii) Freedom of circulation.
3.1.9. The Appellants in the instant matter collected a parcel that contained information
regarding the behavior of the Respondent104, which falls under the first element stated
above. Published the information on 30th April, 2019, exercising the second element as
stated above105. The third element was met when the Appellants telecasted the show
multiple times on the same day106. Thus, it is clear that the appellants were well within
their Right to the Freedom of Press.
3.1.10. Further, this Hon’ble Supreme Court in Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura coats
Ltd107 has laid down the reasonability of the restrictions under Articles 19(2) to 19(6)
as follows:
i) The restriction should have a direct or proximate or reasonable connection or link
between itself and the object sought to be achieved.
ii) The restriction in order to be reasonable must not be excessive that is, it should
not go beyond the need to avoid the mischief or injustice. It should not be
arbitrary.
iii) The restriction to be reasonable should not be abstract. But no fixed principles
can be laid down and the standards of reasonability would vary from case to case
and time to time.
iv) While interpreting the term reasonable, the court should keep in mind the complex
issues of the society and the intention of the legislature of the statute in question
103
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India,(1985) 2 S.C.R. 287
104
105
106
107
Papanasam Labour Union v. Madura coats Ltd, 1995 AIR 2200, 1995 SCC (1) 501.
( 18 )
v) The term reasonable is of dynamic nature and hence the judiciary should keep an
elastic and practical approach while interpreting the term.
vi) It is imperative for the court to analyse the social control before any restrictions
can be imposed on the fundamental rights.
vii) For the interpretation of term reasonable, it is necessary for the court to examine
the social welfare and the need of prevailing social norms and values.
The word reasonable has to satisfy the test of procedural reasonability as well as
substantive reasonability.
viii) For a restriction to be reasonable must be in conformity with the test of Article
14 of the Constitution. It means the restrictions should not be excessive or
discriminatory.
ix) While interpreting the term reasonability the courts have to keep in mind the
Directive principles of the state policy.
3.1.11. In the instant matter, the impugned order by the IB ministry, upheld by the High Court
has overlooked these limitations to restriction. The 10 Day ban placed on the Appellants
was unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the
Appellants were well within their Right to Freedom of Press while telecasting of the
news item concerning the Respondent and the order of the High Court ignored these
Rights guaranteed to the Appellant by the constitution.
3.1.12. The Apex Court was of the opinion that “imposition of a blanket ban on the
publication of certain photographs and news items, etc. will lead to a situation where
the newspaper will be publishing material which caters only to children and
adolescents and the adults will be deprived of reading their share of
their entertainment which can be permissible under the normal norms of decency in
any society.”108
3.1.13. The right to know, receive and impart information has been recognized within the right
to freedom of speech and expression.109 Right to know has some broad special purposes
to serve:110 1) It helps to attain self-fulfillment. 2) It assists in the discovery of truth. 3)
It strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision-making. 4) It
provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance
between stability and social change, etc. To achieve all these objectives, it is important
108
Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143.
109
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain 1975 SCR (3) 333.
110
Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1973 AIR 106. ; Marsh v. Alabama (1945) 326 U.S. 501.
( 19 )
to secure every possible means of getting information to enable people make an

informed decision. Hence, in the present case, the 10-day blanket ban on media shocks
the conscience of this country.
The prohibition does not pass test of reasonability

3.1.14. In Papanasam case111 , the Supreme Court has stated that the following principles and
guidelines should be kept in view while considering the constitutionality of any act on
ground of reasonability of restriction : The restriction must not be arbitrary or of an
excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of felt need of the society and
object sought to be achieved. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or reasonable
connection between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
3.1.15. No fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal application in all cases
and a restriction imposed on a fundamental right must not be unbridled. Any restriction
is unreasonable if it is not in proportion to the mischief sought to be removed (Doctrine
of proportionality).
3.1.16. In Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar112 and O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph,113 the
constitutional validity of certain service rules which imposed a blanket ban on
government employees from participating in demonstrations were under question. The
Supreme Court ruled that the service rule prohibiting all forms of demonstration
without showing any proximate link with public disorder was unconstitutional and void.
3.1.17. In the present case, the substantial information and statements which are related to Mr.
Sodhi is already in public domain and people have the knowledge of such issue but to
properly exercise it requires the press to publish the opinion and statements to
encourage people to express their own opinion.
3.2. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF MR. SODHI
3.2.1. The Appellants humbly submit that the 10-day ban placed on the Appellant, by the
Information & Broadcasting committee was an infringement of the Right to Press of
the Appellant as the information regarding the Respondents in now public information
and continues to be available to the public. The Press Council of India’s norms of
111
Supra note 101.
112
AIR 1962 SC 1166, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369.
113
AIR 1963 SC 812, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 789.
( 20 )
journalism114 also states that, ‘…So, however, that once a matter becomes a matter of
public record, the Right to Privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate
subject for comment by the Press and the media, among others’.
3.2.2. Additionally, the Right to Print Views and Opinions is part and parcel of the Freedom
of the Press. The Supreme Court of India has laid down in Gopal Dass Sharma v. The
District Magistrate, Jammu & Anr,115 that the freedom of press includes printing of
editor’s or author’s views. Thus, the inclusion the press’ views are not beyond the scope
of the Freedom of the Press.
3.2.3. In Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal116, the Court recognized that
there is a difference between Right to Privacy exercised by a ‘private person’ as
opposed to ‘a public figure’117. The aforementioned case states, “He acts for the public
good, in the discharge of his duties, and is accountable for them. The character of
protection, therefore, afforded to the two classes — public servants and private
individuals, is to be viewed from this perspective.” It is the Appellant’s case that Mr.
Sodhi is a public person as he was the chairman of a Women Helpline NGO and the
head of a publically listed company118, under such circumstances the Appellants felt it
was merely exercising its freedom to press as recognized by this Court in various past
cases.
3.2.4. The Press Council of India’s norms of journalism clearly states that, ‘The Press shall
not intrude or invade the privacy of an individual, unless outweighed by genuine
overriding public interest, not being a prurient or morbid curiosity.’119 The public
debate or discussion on public platform on issues of the public interests is part of free
and fair democracy.
3.2.5. The arguments of the Respondents that the repeated telecasting of the show regarding
the Respondent is baseless as the right to free press not only includes to publish views
but it also includes to dispense and circulate those views in the entire society as was
decided in Romesh Thappar, v. State of Madras.120
114
Guideline 6, http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-2010.pdf.
115
AIR 1973 SC 213; 1973 (2) SCR 969; 1973 (1) SCC 159.
116
Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2011) 1 SCC 496.
117
Also recognized by the Press Council in Guideline 7 http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-
2010.pdf.
118
119
Guideline 6, http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/NORMS-2010.pdf
120
Romesh Thappar, v. State of Madras1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594.
( 21 )
3.3. THE THERE EXISTS NO GROUNDS OF DEFAMATION OR VIOLATION OF PRIVACY

3.3.1. The Appellants contend that the mere publication of article of public interest without
any malice towards the Respondent cannot be considered as defamation as United
States Supreme Court in its landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan121 ruled
that every inaccurate statement should not be actionable unless it is made with malice.
This is because erroneous statements are unavoidable in free debate in a democracy and
must be tolerated if freedom of expression is to have ‘the breathing space it needs to
survive’ The Supreme Court of India too has taken a similar stand in R. Rajagopal v.
State of TN.122
3.3.2. As the information published by the Appellants was in the interest of general public,
the Appellants should not be penalized vide bans or restraint on freedom of speech as
it would amount to violation of fundamental rights of the Appellant under Articles 14,
19 and 21. Further, the entire news episode was broadcasted from an anonymous tip
which was later verified to be true and hence, no grounds of defamation or intention to
frame Mr. Sodhi by violation of privacy would arise.
121
376 U.S. 254.
122
(1994) 6 SCC 632, at 649.
( 22 )
PRAYER
WHEREFORE in light of the issued raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That, the non-recusal of Justice Mark from the Hon’ble High Court has resulted in grave
prejudice to the appellant by causing strict violation of principles of natural justice;
2. That, the Committee set up by the IB ministry violated due process of law and the decision
of blanket ban was arbitrary, capricious and untenable in law;
3. That, the Appellant has not violated the right to privacy of Mr. Vijay Lalit Sodhi, as the
news published was authentic and a mere exercise of freedom of press.
AND/OR
Pass any other order or relief it may deem fit and proper, in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
For This Act of Kindness, the Appellant Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Sd-/
Counsel(s) for the Appellants
( xv )
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Indian Legislations
 The Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995.
 The Cable Television Network Rules, 1994.
 The Press Council of India Act, 1978.
Books
 DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW, University of Washington- Seattle – Wm.C. Brown
Publishers, Dubuque, Iowa, (1987).
 SITA BHATIA, FREEDOM OF PRESS, Nice Printing Press, New Delhi, (1997).
 SWATI DESHPANDE, ‘MEDIA AND LAW –A REPORTER‘S HANDBOOK’, AMIC India and
UNESCO (2006).
Articles and Journals

 Clari E. Gorman, Publicity and Privacy Rights: Evening out, the Playing Field for
Celebrities and Private Citizens in the Modern Game of Mass Media, 53 DEPAUL L.REV.
1247, (2004).
 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the limits of law, 89 YALE L.J.421, 426 (1980).
 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.REV.193(1890).
( xvi )

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IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF MINDIA

In SLP No. / 2019

Xing TV and Ors. …Appellants

IN THE MATTER ARISING OUT OF:

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. III

1.1. There exists personal bias in all real likelihood ..........................................................1

IT WAS A MERE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF PRESS OR NOT? ------------------------------------- 16

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, (Routledge, 7th Edn, 2002) ........................................... 4

ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

LEGISLATIVE REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Date Event/ Occurrence of instances

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

10/05/2019 Xing TV received a show-cause notice from the Ministry of IB for

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

3. Petition before the HC of Mindia:

4. Consequences of the HC decision:

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

GRAVE PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT AND CAUSED STRICT VIOLATION OF THE

PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR NOT?

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

Memorial for Xing TV and Others

NATURAL JUSTICE OR NOT?

1.1. THERE EXISTS PERSONAL BIAS IN ALL REAL LIKELIHOOD

Justice Mark had personal bias against the Appellant

Pre-decided notions or scholarly opinions of judges constitute personal bias

1.2. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ARE VIOLATED

Principles of impartiality and independence are violated

There is bias according to real danger and reasonable suspicion test

1.3. AS THERE IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS , RIGHT TO APPEAL IS

2.1. THE COMMITTEE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS OF LAW

government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or

The test of reasonableness is violated

intendment of the equality clause to exalt delicate distinctiveness, shades of harshness

There has been arbitrary exercise of executive power

2.2.12. Court may interfere if an administrative policy is unconstitutional, or beyond the

WHETHER IT WAS A MERE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF PRESS OR NOT ?

to secure every possible means of getting information to enable people make an

The prohibition does not pass test of reasonability

3.3. THE THERE EXISTS NO GROUNDS OF DEFAMATION OR VIOLATION OF PRIVACY

Articles and Journals

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