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VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 8, 1991 343

People vs. De Joya

*
G.R. No. 75028. November 8, 1991.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff­appellee, vs.

PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant­appellant.

Evidence; Dying Declaration.—It has been held that a dying

declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact. x x x The reason upon which
incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was
prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that
he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by
the statements which he was prevented from making. That
incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon
which dying declarations are received.
Criminal Procedure; Acquittal on reasonable doubt.—The
totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus
consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a
number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not
necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had
indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after
prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the
instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt
which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after
considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence
supporting the judgment of conviction. The Court must,
accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant’s guilt of the
crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable
doubt.

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APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 14.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused­appellant.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. De Joya

FELICIANO, J.:

In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto

de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial
Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan
with the crime of robbery with homicide committed as
follows:

“That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the

municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence
and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1)
necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y
Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and
prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior
strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by
stabbing and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her
body with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly
caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.
That in the commission of the offense, the following
aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse of superior
strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3)
disregard of age and1 sex; (4) abuse of confidence.
Contrary to law.”

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At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16
May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of:
abuse of

________________

1 Rollo, p. 42.

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VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 8, 1991 345

People vs. De Joya

superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88

years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed
against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of
P550.00.
The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to
be confined immediately in the National Penitentiary pending
review of his case by the Supreme Court.
The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the
record of this case to
2
the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.”

In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of

which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the
lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The facts have been summarized in the brief of the
Solicitor General in the following manner:

“The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac­Valencia,

together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and
Herminia Valencia’s 88­year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are
residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981,
p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at
Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia

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teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN,

March 11, 1980, p. 7).
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac­Valencia
left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then
[sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October
12, 1978, p. 3).
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o’clock. And at
3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).
At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that same day, the
spouses Valencia’s neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong,
together with a friend, went out of the former’s house to visit a
friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the
direction of the Valen­

_______________

2 Rollo, p. 48.

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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. De Joya

cia’s house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joja standing and

holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia’s. (TSN, June 11,
1981, pp. 2­4).
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia
Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood.
He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held
her hands and asked her: “Apo, Apo, what happened?”. (TSN,
March 11, 1980, p. 10).
x x x [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: “Si
Paqui”. After saying these words, she let go of Alvin’s hand and
passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and 17).
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his
lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana
Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac­
Valencia to inform her of what happened. (TSN, Id).
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: “Mommy, Mommy, apo
is drenched in her own blood.” (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 20).
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a
tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN,
Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother
lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the
television. Her mother’s hands were stretched open and her feet
were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother’s ears. She
then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked
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Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN,
October 12, 1978, pp. 25­26).
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o’clock that same
afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor
declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which
caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her
mother’s ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor.
Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did
not issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27­
29).
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her
mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was
likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id.,
p. 15).
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the
groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet
(aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was
missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. (TSN,
October 12, 1978, pp. 15­17).
When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at
the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray.
She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain
Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits “A” to “A­11”; TSN, October 12, 1978, p.
17).

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VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 8, 1991 347

People vs. De Joya

Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said
doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be
embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33­34).
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step­in
(Exhibit “B”) by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room
downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was
lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 24­25).
Herminia was able to recognize the said step­in because of its
color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her
husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife
of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the
old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.).
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During
the second day of the four­day wake, Herminia saw herein
appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the
cabinet of the (Valencia’s) house. (TSN, Id.).
On February 3, 1978, a post­mortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico­legal officer of the
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National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of

the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was ‘shock, secondary to
punctured wound neck’ (Exhibit “D­1”) situated at the right side
of the neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and
thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the
neck to the opposite side”. (Exhibit “D­2”).”

In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the

factors which led to the judgment of conviction against
appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the
trial court, were the following:

“In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the

circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to
by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying
statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two
weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled
over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the
consent of the latter; that Exhibit ‘B’ (step­in beach walk type)
which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body
of the victim was identified by Herminia as the step­in that she
gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw accused
wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their
house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused
in the afternoon of January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the
yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused

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348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. De Joya

admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of

Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that
it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to
the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the
dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked
her ‘Apo, Apo, what happened?’ and she answered, ‘Si Paki’, then
she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is
this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his
testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus
the dying statement of the deceased leads only to one fair and
reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the
crime.”

Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements

taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De

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Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:

1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim

to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10­year old boy:
“Si Paqui”;
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia
Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took
place two weeks before the robbery and homicide,
between the appellant and the deceased over the
use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from
the Valencia’s house without the consent of the
victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, (“step­in beach
walk type”) which according to Herminia, she found
near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away
from the body of the victim, and which Herminia
identified as one of the pair that she had given to
the wife of the accused the previous Christmas
Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around
3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the
yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a
bicycle and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the
deceased during the four­day wake.

We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim

when the 10­year old Alvin Valencia asked his
grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house
drenched with blood: “Apo, Apo, what happened?” The
deceased victim said: “Si Paqui”. After uttering those two
words, she expired. It is not disputed that “Paqui” is the
nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted
at once, however, that the words “Si Paqui” do
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VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 8, 1991 349

People vs. De Joya

not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two

words could have been intended to designate either (a) the
subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had
been intended to designate the subject, we must note that
no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were
designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note
once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The
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phrase “Si Paqui” must, moreover, be related to the

question asked by Alvin: “Apo, Apo, what happened?”
Alvin’s question was not: “Apo, Apo, who did this to you?”
It has been held that a dying declaration to be
admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in
itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of
his statement, but that his statement of any given fact
should be a full expression of all that he intended
3
to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine
of completeness has also been expressed in the following
terms in Prof. Wigmore’s classic work:

“The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar.

The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as
it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it
goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the
death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an
interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement
which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person
wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable,
because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of
a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying
person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection
that 4he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to
tell.” (Italics supplied)

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are

generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
weight, is that

_______________

3 Daughters v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 94 A.L.R., 673 (1934);

State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). See also Connor v. State, 171 A.2d
699 (1961).
4 Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. V, Section 1448, p. 251 (1940).

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People vs. De Joya

since the declarant was prevented (by death or other

circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what
he did say might have been qualified by the statements
which he was prevented from making. That incomplete

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declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of

truthfulness which constitutes
5
the basis upon which dying
declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the
deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words “Si
Paqui”, the deceased had intended to name the person who
had thrust some sharp instrument through and through
her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not
say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted
her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a
dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the
bloody deed.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court
are purely circumstantial in nature. When these
circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can
be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion
that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia
Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was
supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia’s
death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a
motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a
violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive
where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens
the case of the prosecution.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single
slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the
living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely
be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was
indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had
given to appellant’s wife, who was also the sister of
Herminia’s husband. Rubber or beach

________________

5 See cases collected in Annotation: “Admissibility of dying declarations

as affected by their incompleteness,” 94 A.L.R. 679 (1934).

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People vs. De Joya

walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple

manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not
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hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as

the pair that Herminia gave to appellant’s wife. And even if
conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered,
and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had
worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the
presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and
directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying.
At most, under that assumption, the presence of that
slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the
accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there
mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that
appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house
of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of
Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found
many persons in the house viewing the body.
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the
accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00
p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a
bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act
or circumstance that would show that appellant had
perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of
the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no
basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age,
had just slain an 88­year old woman by skewering her
through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the
Valencia house.
Appellant’s failure to present himself to pay his respects
to the deceased or her immediate family during the four­
day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant
was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained
that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on
his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had
dropped in the Valencias’ house in the afternoon Eulalia
Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was
lying in state) along with several other persons. His
reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is
not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with
the trial judge that such behaviour was “contrary to the
ordinary experience of man” although respect for the dead
is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.
In the Solicitor­General’s brief, it is casually contended
that
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the circumstantial evidence against appellant included:

“the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto6 de Joya
through his counsel to settle the case amicably”. We have
examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed
to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal
charge amicably. That testimony, given by Arnedo
Valencia, son­in­law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and
brother­in­law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as
follows:

Q You also testified that before the release of the accused

from the municipal jail, you had a conversation with
him, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this conversation about?
A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar
and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar can talk with
me, everything will be settled.
Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?
A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.
Q When was this?
A The time he was fetched out of jail.
Q You are referring to the municipal jail?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally
was able to see Atty. Aguilar?
A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar
and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to
happen.
Q What did you say?
A I said if it will be settled, well and good.
Q Anything else that transpired?
A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my
wife and her sisters.
Q Did he tell you he can settle this?
A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very
reason why he told me because I was very certain as to
what happened.
Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you
were discussing this with his lawyer?
A Yes, sir.

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_______________

6 Appellee’s Brief, p. 24.

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People vs. De Joya

Q He heard what his lawyer was telling you?

A It is possible because he is only one or two meters
distance away.
Q Did the accused say anything?
A None, sir.” (Italics supplied)

We find the above testimony quite impalpable and

inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant,
through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal
charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of
Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides
that:

“Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of

compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not
admissible in evidence against the person making the offer.
However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.” (Italics
supplied)

We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the

above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of
the deceased victim that “an offer of compromise” had been
made “by the accused” nor that “an implied admission of
guilt” on the part of the appellant may be reasonably
inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no
mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle
the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we
must assume that the trial court either did not believe that
appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or
considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to
have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and
killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness
and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that
an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as
serious as robbery with homicide.

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The totality of the case made out against appellant De

Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying
declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or
collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling
inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain
Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that
the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is
insufficient to induce that moral certainty of
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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. De Joya

guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled
after considering the nature and speculative character of
the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds
that appellant’s guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide
was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16
May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto
de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
It is so ordered.

          Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño­Aquino and

Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Decision reversed.

Note.—The rule on the admissibility of a dying

declaration does not determine its weight and credibility.
Its weight and credibility must de determined by the courts
under the same rules used in testing the weight and
credibility of any other testimonial evidence. (People vs.
Alegarbes, 173 SCRA 64.)

——oo——

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