RULE 130, Sec.

2 prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper
WITNESSES motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

Same; Same; Res Gestae; Court a quo correctly considered the statement given by the
G.R. No. 87236. February 8, 1993.* victim Landa Robert to Herminia Sia as part of the res gestae.—The court a quo
correctly considered the statement given by the victim, Landa Robert, to Herminia Sia
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTOR TANEO y as part of the res gestae. Landa's declaration that it was the appellant who struck her was
CAÑADA, alias OPAO, a certain BEBOT ESCOREAL and a certain ROY given while she was still at the ground floor of the Perpetual Succour Hospital awaiting
CODILLA, accused. to be admitted for treatment. She was rushed to the said hospital immediately after the
incident in question and was operated on for four (4) hours starting at 8:00 o'clock that
Criminal Law; Evidence; Credibility of witnesses; When the issue of credibility of a evening until 12:00 midnight. She died five (5) days later.
witness is concerned, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court.—At the outset, it is to be observed that at the bottom of the assigned errors is Same; Same; Same; Before evidence of the res gestae may be admitted, three (3)
the issue of the credibility of witnesses Herminia Sia and Victor Taneo. Deeply requisites must concur.—The following three (3) requisites must concur before evidence
embedded in our jurisprudence and amply supported by an impressive array of cases is of the res gestae may be admitted: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
the rule that when the issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, the appellate court occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and observed his immediately attending circumstances.
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance
and value had been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of Same; Same; Same; Same; No uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate
the case. the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declaration.—The cases are
not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling
Same; Same; Same; The mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not event from the making of the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were
disqualify him from becoming a witness.—Appellant insists that Victor Taneo's voluntarily and spontaneously made "so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
credibility is questionable because the latter had earlier been charged in two (2) criminal presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such
cases for robbery; the former admits, however, that these cases were dismissed for circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation.
failure to prosecute. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as
provided for in the succeeding sections, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, Same; Same; Alibi; It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political prevail over the positive identification of the accused.—Since the appellant had been
belief, interest in the outcome of the case or conviction of a crime unless otherwise identified, his defense of alibi must fail. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. People vs.
of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As
Taneo, 218 SCRA 494, G.R. No. 87236 February 8, 1993
a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person from being
presented as a witness unless otherwise provided by law.
The above-named accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide by
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of evidence to show any reason or motive why Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of Cebu City in an Information1 filed on 29
December 1986 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, the accusatory portion of
witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that
which reads:
no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.—
At his arraignment, Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty to an information which
charges conspiracy. He was not discharged as a state witness—a sure guarantee of That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1986, at about
5:30 p.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
acquittal—and he did not impute criminal responsibility solely on the appellant. Thus, if
Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with
he were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have been moved by a strong,
one another, armed with bottle (sic) of beer grande and RC Cola, with deliberate intent
improper and ulterior motive. That motive must have been established; appellant failed
to do so. In the absence of evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses for the and by means of force upon things, to wit: by entering the inhabited house of one
Herminia Sia y Sy and once inside, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and

1
consent of said Herminia Sia y Sy, the owner thereof, did then and there take, steal and Trial on the merits against Roy Codilla then ensued. The witnesses who testified for the
carry away the following: prosecution were Dr. Herminia Sia, accused Victor Taneo, Pat. Enrico Ministerio and
Dr. Jaime Perez, and those who testified for the defense were accused Roy Codilla,
one (1) sharp cassette valued at P 3,500.00 Police Cpl. Jovito Roa, Lolit Cabriana and Felicidad Pareño. The evidence for the
one (1) Denonet Karaoke valued at 7,000.00 parties is summarized by the trial court as follows:
one (1) Sony cassette recorder 1,000.00
Fifty (50) pcs. cassette tape 2,000.00 Dr. Herminia Sia, an Optometrist, is a resident of Saint Michael Village at Banilad,
one (1) Casio calculator 100.00 Cebu City. Her clinic is located at Junguera Street, Cebu City. Two years ago, sometime
————— in 1984 when she lost two big cassette recorders in her residence, she decided to hire the
TOTAL P 13,600.00 services of a guard. A Sgt. Codinas and an army man named Bros, recommended
accused Roy Codilla to her.
valued in all (sic) at P13,600.00, belonging to said Herminia Sia y Sy, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the amount of P13,300.00, Philippine Currency; and with intent Employed on a daily basis, accused Codilla spent most of his time in securing the
to kill, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon Linda (sic) Banilad residence. There are (sic) times though that he would guard the Junguera clinic
Aglipa Robert, maid of Herminia Sia y Sy, owner of the said house, who was the only for a few hours. On one occasion at the clinic, Codilla introduced to Dr. Sia Bebot
person inside the house at that time, by hacking said Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert with said Escoreal as his friend.
bottle of beer grande and RC Cola at her head and face, thereby inflicting upon her the
following physical injuries: When Codilla started bringing his friends to the house of Dr. Sia, the latter felt peeved
because Codilla's friends were of questionable and suspicious-looking characters (sic).
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST She was told by Codilla that his companions were jeepney dispatchers in the downtown
MASSIVE PNEUMONIA BL area. Not being at ease with such situation, she fired Codilla.
CEREBRAL CONTUSION
OPEN DEPRESSED COMMUNIATED FX FRONTAL Almost two years later, at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 22, 1986, Dr. Sia's
AREA (R) MULTIPLE LACERATIONS ON THE FACE neighbors Nicky Padriga and Ricardo Ferrer went to her clinic and informed her that
some persons who burglarized her house were apprehended by them and that they
as a consequence of which said Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert died instantaneously. brought the injured maid, Landa, to a hospital.

CONTRARY TO LAW. At the Mabolo Police Station, she saw Victor Taneo, a young
boy — Arnel Go and Jose Robert — her houseboy and brother of her maid, Landa
Only accused Victor Taneo y Cañada and Roy Codilla were apprehended. Accused Robert. She inquired from Jose why he was at the police station and the latter replied
Bebot Escoreal has remained at large and an alias warrant for his arrest issued on 9 that after Taneo and Go were arrested, he was brought along by the police for
February 1987 had been returned unserved for the reason that he is not known at the questioning. Jose further disclosed that he was invited by Roy Codilla for a round of
given address.2 beer drinks at a small store behind Dr. Sia's residence and that when he returned to the
house, his sister was already injured. The young boy, Arnel, explained that Roy invited
On 9 February 1987, Roy Codilla, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty while him to go to Dr. Sia's house. Victor Taneo claimed that it was Roy Codilla who told him
Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty.3 In view thereof, the trial court4 issued an to go along with him (Codilla) to the house of Dr. Sia to get some valuables, like
Order finding the latter guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of cassette recorders. She saw blood-stains inside her house splattered in the kitchen, on a
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the order reads: beer bottle and on the telephone set.

WHEREFORE, finding accused Victor Taneo y Cañada guilty beyond reasonable doubt At the groundfloor of Perpetual Succour Hospital, the severely injured and bloody maid
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged and appreciating in his favor the managed to reveal to her (Dr. Sia) in the presence of Corazon Gonzales and Patrolman
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, he is hereby sentenced to suffer RECLUSION Lopez, that Roy Codilla was the who (sic) struck her.
PERPETUA.

It appearing that the articles stolen were recovered, no pronouncement as to indemnity.5

2
Co-accused Victor Taneo, alias Opao (Kalbo) testified that he is a jeepney dispatcher Arresting officer Rico Ministerio declared that in response to a phone call, he and some
(barker). Bebot Escoreal, another accused herein who has remained at large, is his long- police companions went to the house of Dr. Sia and took custody of Taneo and Arnel
time friend who is also a barker at Juan Luna Street, Cebu City. Go who were captured en (sic) flagrante delicto by the civilians of St. Michael Village.
The following day, they arrested Roy Codilla at the Duty Free Shop at Lahug, Cebu
On December 22, 1986 at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw Bebot Escoreal talking City.
to a person. He approached Escoreal and the latter introduced him to the person who
turned out to be Roy Codilla. After knowing each other, the conversation continued with Dr. Jaime Perez testified that on December 22, 1986 he treated Landa Robert for
Codilla saying that he (Codilla) planned to rob the house of his former employer, Dr. multiple lacerations in head (sic) and face caused by a blunt object. Five hours later, the
Sia, as his revenge. Codilla then told him (Taneo) to procure money to be used in patient died due to compression (sic) of vital brain centers. He issued the corresponding
entertaining Dr. Sia's houseboy, Jose Robert. They were briefed by Codilla that in the death certificate (Exh. "A").
house of Dr. Sia are a maid and houseboy. Codilla stated that after the robbery has been
pulled (sic), Codilla will bring them to Manila. With his P20.00, they, Codilla, Arnel For the defense:
Go, Escoreal and himself, boarded a jeepney towards the place of Dr. Sia.
Police Cpl. Jovito Roa, a guard at BBRC testified that on November 23, 1987, he caught
While houseboy Jose Robert and househelper Landa Robert were cleaning the yard, two persons digging a tunnel at BBRC and one of them was Victor Taneo. Upon
Codilla entered the Sia premises for the purpose of inviting Jose Robert outside. Codilla inquiry, Taneo told him that actually Roy Codilla has nothing to do with the robbery-
told his companions to stay behind at the corner street and to wait for his signal. Later, homicide in Dr. Sia's residence. He cannot recall, though, who the other inmate was.
he saw Codilla placing his arm around the shoulder of Jose proceeding towards the store Neither can he recall until now the name of the BBRC investigator at that time. Taneo
where the houseboy was offered some drinks. After the agreed signal of Codilla, placing told him that the reason why he (Taneo) implicated Codilla was because the
his right hand on the right side of his head, they went inside the house of Dr. Sia. complainant (referring to Dr. Sia) promised him P300.00 but only P200.00 was given to
Leaving behind Jose at the store, Codilla joined them. Escoreal stayed outside as him.
lookout. Once inside, Codilla boxed the maid hitting her in the midsection of the Accused Codilla, testified that in 1982 he was enlisted in the Philippine Army. He was
stomach. The maid fell on the floor and Codilla ordered them to finish her off as she can discharged in 1984 fro (sic) having gone AWOL. In April 1984, he was hired by Dr. Sia
identify them. He and Codilla got coke bottles under the dining table and struck the as security guard of her residence at St. Michael Village, Banilad, Cebu City. On May,
maid on her forehead, head and mouth. They took from a room Sony (sic) Cassette 1985, Dr. Sia terminated his services.
Recorder, Sharp (sic) Cassette Recorder and some tapes, while Arnel Go in another
room, gathered some calculators. He denied the charge that he and Taneo committed robbery-homicide in Sia (sic)
residence at 5:30 p.m. of December 22, 1986 because on that day he was in the house of
Outside the house with the loot, Codilla directed him and Arnel Go to pass out one way Jose Robert, his friend, who just arrived from Manila and went home at 10:30 o'clock in
while Codilla and Escoreal will proceed to the main road. Along the way, he and Arnel the morning of said day, passing first in his aunt's house at Camp Lapulapu..
were arrested and were brought back to the house of Dr. Sia. There they saw the
neighbors carrying the body of the maid who was still alive and moaning. Later, the He came to know co-accused Taneo only after he was arrested by the police on
houseboy arrived. December 25, 1986.

In jail (BBRC) Codilla offered him P2,000.00 to save him (Codilla) because he has a During his employment as guard, he sleeps (sic) in the bedroom of Dr. Sia since there
wife and children. are two beds — one for her and the other for him. Dr. Sia used to call him whenever she
counts (sic) her money and deposit (sic) them in the safe inside her room. There were
At the outset he refused, but the wife of Codilla forced him to receive the money with two instances when she let him count a sizeable sum of money. He has never taken any
her plea that I (sic) save her husband for the sake of their family. Every visit of the wife valuable thing from the Sia residence.
of Codilla to jail, he was given money by Mrs. Codilla which totalled all in all P400.00.
In Court, he pointed at the wife of Codilla. His mother paid Roy Codilla P400.00 Dr. Sia instigated Taneo to implicate him because at one time that Dr. Sia hired
because she bulked (sic) at the idea of saving Codilla. And even if he were given the somebody to lob a grenade in the house of the wife of her boyfriend, he stopped her. (A
promised sum of P2,000.00, he still would take the witness stand considering that he picture of the alleged boyfriend Eliezer Magdales was produced by him in Court Exh.
landed in jail because of Codilla. "1"). That is the only reason why Dr. Sia wanted him to be jailed.

3
On cross examination, he testified that while employed by Dr. Sia, he has (sic) good revenge,"8 and considering the statement given by Landa to Dr. Sia at the hospital —
relations with her. Dr. Sia even at times gave him T-shirts aside from his pay. Living in that she, Landa, was struck by Roy Codilla — as part of the res gestae,9 the trial court,
the Sia house are the doctor herself, her four children, houseboy Jose Robert and maid in its Decision dated and promulgated on 14 December 1988,10 found the accused Roy
Landa Robert. He was ordered by Dr. Sia to throw a hand grenade at the house of her Codilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of
(Sia's) boyfriend which (sic) he relented. As a result, she scolded him and then he left the decision reads:
for Manila. In November, 1986, he returned to Cebu and went to the house of Dr. Sia
but houseboy Jose told him that the doctor was not there. On December 22, 1986, at WHEREFORE, finding accused Roy Codilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
10:00 a.m. he returned to Dr. Sia's house to say hello because it was Christmas time and crime of robbery with homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
besides, the houseboy invited him to a drinking spree. He found out that the persons in perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally with accused Victor Taneo the heirs of the
the Sia residence were only the houseboy Jose, maid Landa and Pableo, the water- deceased Landa Robert the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
gatherer. When he, Jose and Pableo went to the liquor store, only the maid was left in
the house. After partaking one bottle of beer grande at 11:00 a.m. he proceeded to the The Sentence on accused Taneo contained in the Order dated February 9, 1987 insofar
house of his brother at Hipodromo where he stayed until 4:00 p.m. From there he went as indemnification is concerned is hereby modified.
home to Camputhaw, Lahug.
SO ORDERED.
He meet (sic) co-accused Taneo only at the prison cell at Mabolo Police Station. There
Taneo told him that he (Taneo) does not know him. He only knew Bebot Escoreal. He The trial court rejected Codilla's defense of alibi because his residence in barangay
was picked up by some policemen near his home. Before his arrest, he did not know the Camputhaw, the place where he claims to have been at the time of
arresting officers, thus, he has no quarrel of misunderstanding with them. the robbery, "is only less than an hour by jeepney to the Sia residence in
Banilad . . . It was therefore not physically impossible for Codilla to be at the scene of
Mrs. Lolit Cabriana, a volunteer worker in the jail ministry testified that she met Taneo the crime when the crime was committed." 12 Moreover, Codilla was positively
in jail and he told her that he killed the maid of Dr. Sia in St. Michael's Village at identified by Taneo who had no motive to perjure his testimony.
Talisay, Cebu using an empty beer bottle. His companion at that time was only Bebot
Escoreal. She knows Roy Codilla and she asked him why he was in jail and the latter Accused Roy Codilla, hereafter referred to as the Appellant, seasonably filed his Notice
answered that he was not in the house of Dr. Sia when the crime was committed. Codilla of Appeal,13 manifesting therein that he is appealing the decision to the Court of
told her that he was then in his house at Lahug and in his brother's house at Lahug and in Appeals. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should have been elevated to this
his brother's house in Mandaue City. Court. On the other hand, for obvious reasons, accused Taneo did not interpose an
appeal.
Later, on cross-examination, she declared that for the four years of her missionary work
in BBRC jail she did not have an occasion to talk to Codilla because he is not under her The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals which,
bible class. however, forwarded them to this Court on 10 March 1989.14 This Court accepted the
appeal on 20 September 1989.15
Felicidad Pareño of Camputhaw, Lahug, Cebu City testified that she is a neighbor of
accused Codilla. Her house is two houses away. Her closeness to the mother of Codilla In his brief, the appellant, through his counsel de officio16 who were appointed as such
is such that they treat each other like sisters. by this Court due to the death of his counsel de parte,17 submits the following
assignment of errors:
In the afternoon of December 22, 1986, she was in the Codilla residence for their prayer
meeting and she saw for the first time accused Codilla at past 4:00 o' clock that I. The Trial Court erred in considering the alleged statement of the victim, Landa
afternoon viewing TV in the second floor of their house. She went home at about that Roberts (sic), as part of the res gestae.
time also and never saw Codilla anymore.6
II. The Trial Court erred in giving weight to the testimony of appellant's co-accused,
Giving full faith and credit to the prosecution's version of the incident, particularly to the Victor Taneo.
testimonies of Dr. Sia, which it describes to be straightforward, without hesitation and
concise."7 and that of Victor Taneo who "[V]ividly in detail, . . . disclosed how he met III. The Trial Court erred in declaring that accused-appellant's identity was
Codilla" and how the latter "laid his plan to 'hit' the house of his former employer for established.18

4
 decide the question, having heard the witness himself and observed his deportment and
In support of the first assigned error, appellant claims that the alleged statement of manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had
Landa Robert could have been made at least four (4) hours after the occurrence of the been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the results of the case.21
incident — a considerable lapse of time. Hence, per People v. Roca,19 it cannot be said
that the declarant did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive her statement. We have painstakingly examined the records of this case and the transcripts of
Neither can such statement qualify as a dying declaration because it does not concern stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses and find no cogent reason to
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death and that at the time it disregard the rule and give way to the exception. The full faith and credit given by the
was made, the declarant was not under the consciousness of an impending death. As a trial court to the testimonies of the Herminia Sia and Victor Taneo are supported by the
matter of fact, it is doubtful if Landa did indeed make the statement considering that as evidence. In fact, the tenor of the assigned errors and the arguments summoned to
testified to by the doctor who had treated her, she had impaired consciousness; besides support them betray the appellant's realization of the infirmity of his stand. Were it not
Mrs. Sia's companions, one Corazon Gonzales and a policeman named Lopez, were not for the gravity of the offense charged and the penalty imposed, this conclusion could
presented to corroborate Sia's testimony. have written an early finis to the appeal. But then, We are called to squarely meet the
issues raised by the assigned errors.
Anent the second assigned error, appellant contends that in view of the first error and the
inadmissibility of the statement of Landa Robert, the prosecution was left with nothing 1. The court a quo correctly considered the statement given by the victim, Landa Robert,
save for the testimony of Victor Taneo which, however, is weak and does not constitute to Herminia Sia as part of the res gestae. Landa's declaration that it was the appellant
sufficient basis for the appellant's conviction. In the first place, Taneo admitted to Pat. who struck her was given while she was still at the ground floor of the Perpetual
Ministerio that he (Taneo) and Bebot Escoreal were the ones who manhandled the maid. Succour Hospital awaiting to be admitted for treatment. She was rushed to said hospital
Second, Taneo's credibility as a witness is questionable; he had twice been apprehended immediately after the incident in question and was operated on for four (4) hours
for robbery under P.D. No. 532, and had twice been prosecuted therefor in Criminal starting at 8:00 o'clock that evening until 12:00 midnight. She died five (5) days later.
Case No. CBU-5871 and Criminal Case No. CBU-5881 before Branches XVI and XIV
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Both cases, however, were dismissed on the ground The following three (3) requisites must concur before evidence of the res gestae may be
of failure to prosecute. Appellant then pontificates: "From a hardened soul like Victor admitted: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
Taneo's, it is very difficult to elicit the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
truth."20 In addition thereto, appellant alleges that Taneo's testimony would indicate that statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
the same was for sale as the latter claimed that he was asked by Roy Codilla to testify in circumstances.22
his favor for the amount of P2,000.00, but that Codilla's wife could only raise P400.00.
In People vs. Ner,23 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, held:
The third assigned error is premised on the assumption that the appellant's conviction is
based solely on the bare allegation of Mrs. Sia that the victim, Landa Robert, had . . . All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae,
identified Codilla as her mauler, and on the testimony of Victor Taneo which, as is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who
claimed in the first and second assigned errors is inadmissible and weak. Appellant then made the declaration24 before he had time to think and make up a story,25 or to concoct
faults the prosecution for not presenting Jose Robert who could have attested to the or contrive a falsehood,26 or to fabricate an account,27 and without any undue influence
appellant's presence and participation in the crime or shed light on Taneo's claim that (a) in obtaining
the appellant went to the Sia house ahead of the rest to distract Jose Robert's attention by it,28 aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
inviting him to a drinking spree and (b) the appellant left Jose at the sari-sari store and circumstances.29
went back to Sia's house.
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurence of
The appeal is devoid of merit. the startling event from the making of the declaration. What is important is that the
declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made "so nearly contemporaneous as to
At the outset, it is to be observed that at the bottom of the assigned errors is the issue of be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made
the credibility of witnesses Herminia Sia and Victor Taneo. Deeply embedded in our under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation . .
jurisprudence and amply supported by an impressive array of cases is the rule that when ."30
the issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, the appellate court will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to

5
In the instant case, We find the interval of time between the robbery and the infliction of 2. Appellant insists that Victor Taneo's credibility is questionable because the latter had
the injuries upon Landa Robert, and her making of the statement, which the appellant earlier been charged in two criminal cases for robbery; the former admits, however, that
claims to before (4) hours or more, to be sufficient and adequate to bring such statement these cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of
to be so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction or Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections, all persons who
occurrence which it illustrated or explained. Landa was brought to the hospital where can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
she made the statement immediately after the commission of the crime. Given her witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case or conviction
condition at that time — she was hovering between life and death — she could have of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
hardly been expected to conjure up a story or concoct and contrive a falsehood by Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him
falsely imputing upon the appellant responsibility for her injuries. There is as well no from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify
doubt that the principal act in question was a startling occurrence upon which Landa's such person from being presented as a witness unless otherwise provided by law.35 At
statement about her assailant relates to. In short, all the requisites for the admission of his arraignment, Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty to an information which
such statement as part of the res gestae are present. charges conspiracy. He was not discharged as a state witness — a sure guarantee of
acquittal36 — and he did not impute criminal responsibility solely on the appellant.
Appellants claim that Landa could not have uttered the incriminatory words because she Thus, if he were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have been moved by a
had "impaired consciousness," as testified to by the doctor, is pure speculation. She gave strong, improper and ulterior motive. That motive must have been established; appellant
her statement while she was still awaiting treatment in the hospital. There is no evidence failed to do so. In the absence of evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses
on record to show that at the time she did so, she was in no condition to speak, utter a for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no
word or answer questions. Moreover, appellant's counsel failed, on cross-examination, improper motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.37
to extract from the doctor any admission that "impaired consciousness" would include
inability to speak or answer a question, or that such a condition existed for some time 3. Since the appellant had been identified, his defense of alibi must fail. It is a
before he had seen or examined the patient. Neither was expert testimony introduced to fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
prove that the injuries sustained by Landa rendered her unconscious upon their infliction identification of the accused. 38
or sometime thereafter — specifically, when she had reached the hospital.
The prosecution's failure to present Jose Robert — a fact capitalized upon by the
As to the appellant's insinuation that Mrs. Sia may have fabricated her testimony appellant in his third assignment of error — was not fatal. At best, Robert's testimony
regarding Landa's statement, suffice it to restate what We had said earlier: The full faith would have been merely corroborative.
and credit accorded by the trial court to her testimony is supported by the evidence and
its observation of her demeanor. Declared the lower court: Prescinding from all the foregoing, We find the appealed decision of the trial court to be
in accordance with the facts and applicable laws and jurisprudence. Except for the
The Court painstakingly scrutinized the testimonies of the witnesses of both sides indemnity which is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 to conform with
including close examination of the demeanor of those who took the stand. the present policy of this Court, the said decision must be affirmed.

The testimony of Dr. Sia was straightforward, without hesitation and concise.31 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of 14 December 1988 of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Criminal Case No. CBU-10135 is hereby AFFIRMED,
While it may be true that Dr. Sia's companions, Corazon Gonzales and a policeman (a subject to the above modification on the indemnity. As modified, the indemnity is
certain Lopez), could have been presented to corroborate her testimony, such non- hereby increased to P50,000.00.
presentation did not affect the probative value of such testimony for, as even the
appellant candidly admits, the testimony of the companions could only be corroborative. Costs against the appellant.
As such, therefore, their testimonies were properly dispensed with and their non-
presentation did not imply suppression of evidence and did not prove to be fatal to the SO ORDERED.
prosecution's
case. 32 Besides, if the appellant was honestly convinced of the falsity of Sia's Note.—The positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses as to his
testimony and the fact that none of her companions would corroborate her story, he participation in the crime cannot be overcome by his mere denial (People vs. Bocatcat,
should have availed of the compulsory process to have them produced as his own Jr., 188 SCRA 175). People vs. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494, G.R. No. 87236 February 8,
witnesses, or even as hostile witnesses.33 1993

6
G.R. Nos. 85248-49. July 6, 1994.* On 6 July 1994 we affirmed the conviction of accused Sgt. Jerry Balanon of murder on
two (2) counts as well as the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each count imposed by the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SGT. JERRY Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City.1
BALANON, accused-appellant.
On 4 April 1994, appellant informed this Court that he was withdrawing his appeal
Criminal Law; Witness; Testimony; Alibi; Appellant’s alibi cannot stand in the face of purportedly because he could no longer wait for the decision to be handed down. He
his clear and positive identification by Acasio who, appellant even admitted, had no ill maintained that he has served his sentence of "double life imprisonment" of fourteen
will to implicate him.—In the present recourse, accused-appellant basically raises (14) years and four (4) months from the time of his incarceration on 22 December
factual issues. He stresses his presence at the SOUTHCOM headquarters in the morning 1980.2 On 18 April 1994 the Judicial Records Office (JRO) received the letter of Sgt.
of 3 November 1980, contrary to the testimony of prosecution witness Rogene Acasio, Balanon, and on 28 April 1994 transmitted it to the Clerk of Court of the First
also an inmate, that he was drinking liquor with Balanon and the victims. Appellant’s Division.3
alibi cannot stand in the face of his clear and positive identification by Acasio who,
appellant even admitted, had no ill will to implicate him (Balanon) in the crime. On 31 May 1994 Sgt. Balanon wrote a second letter inquiring how he could withdraw
Moreover, there is no compelling reason to depart from the assessment of the credibility his appeal as he had sought the assistance of his counsel de oficio but did not receive
of the witnesses made by the trial judge who, unlike the reviewing court, had the any response from him.4 On 16 June 1994 the JRO received the letter of the accused,
occasion and opportunity to observe their demeanor and detect any badge of fabrication. and on 17 June 1994 transmitted it to the Clerk of Court, First Division.
But even granting arguendo appellant’s claim to be true, this does not contradict the
testimonies of other prosecution witnesses that he shot the victims to death. Upon investigation conducted by the Clerk of Court of the First Division, it was
revealed that the one in charge of receiving pleadings in the First Division was Ms.
Same; Same; Same; Remedial Law; Conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by Barbara C. Lopez, Records Officer II.5 The records show that Ms. Lopez received the
law shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses.—Appellant faults the trial two (2) letters of Sgt. Balanon on 28 April 1994 and 17 June 1994, respectively; that she
court for giving credence to the testimony of Acasio who was not only probably drunk, had the letters attached to the rollo and transmitted them to the Agenda Division for
but was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public documents as well; hence, apt to reporting only on 26 October 1994; that, acting on the letters, the Court noted them in
fabricate his testimony. But, probability is not evidence, and even if Acasio took the agenda of 16 November 1994 and required Atty. Virginia Ancheta-Soriano, Clerk of
alcohol, it does not follow that he was drunk. Moreover, a drunk person is competent to Court of the First Division, to explain why the letters of Sgt. Balanon were belatedly
testify on what he sees or experiences, however limited or hazy his perception may be. brought to the attention of the Court.
In the same way, a hijacker or a falsifier is not necessarily a liar. Under the Rules of
Court, conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for In her Memorandum dated 2 June 1994 to Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla, Chairman,
disqualification of witnesses. First Division, Atty. Soriano reported that Ms. Lopez verbally admitted her failure to
forward the letters to the Agenda Division within a reasonable time and apologized for
Same; Same; Same; Inconsistency in testimony of the witness is too trivial to affect the the delay. According to her sister Ms. Lilian Pimentel who also works with the Court,
straightforward account of the shooting of the victims by appellant.—Ms. de la Cruz Ms. Lopez was unable to submit her written explanation because she was confined at the
could be referring to two instances when accused came close to Ms. Sinsuan, i.e., when Makati Medical Center.
the latter was already inside the bus and when she was still boarding the bus, and the
follow-up question of the prosecutor referred to the instance when the witnesses were In her letter to Atty. Soriano dated 11 January 1995 Ms. Lopez explained that she
still boarding. But even if we consider as inconsistent this portion of Ms. de la Cruz’ repeatedly requested for the rollo of this case from the Rollo Room on four (4) separate
testimony, this is too trivial to affect their straightforward account of the shooting of the occasions, i.e., on 29 April 1994, 26 May 1994 and 7 and 21 June 1994,6 but failed to
victims by appellant. receive it; that when she was given clearance to transmit the pleadings without the rollo,
she made an inventory of all pleadings, segregating those due for reporting from those
Same; Murder; Treachery; There is treachery when the victims were shot unexpectedly, which were not; that she then placed in one (1) folder the pleadings which need not be
and were not in a position to defend themselves.—The qualifying circumstance of reported and set it aside; that she placed in another folder the temporary rollos
treachery is not disputed since the victims were suddenly shot, unexpectedly, and were containing the pleadings that had to be reported and noted their case numbers in an
not in a position to defend themselves. People vs. Balanon, 233 SCRA 679, G.R. Nos. index card; that unfortunately, Ms. Lopez inadvertently filed the letters of Sgt. Balanon
85248-49 July 6, 1994 in the folder containing pleadings that did not require reporting.

7
 administration of justice. Upon them lies the stability of the judicial system and,
Ms. Lopez further explained that she could not rely on her list of cases where she ultimately, the confidence of the people in our courts.
requested for the rollos - to remind her of pleadings that remained unacted upon -
because of the number of papers that regularly passed her table. Consequently, she had Evidently, Ms. Lopez lacks devotion to duty and perseverance to overcome difficulty.
to depend on the pleadings actually on file in her folder which she relied upon to remind As a Records Officer she should exert all reasonable efforts to obtain the rollo of a
her of the rollos of the cases not yet delivered to her. She claimed that she was unaware particular case where a pleading is to be attached for reporting, and if the rollo is not
all the while that the two (2) letters of appellant Balanon were placed in the wrong available due to causes not attributable to her, she should have the subject pleading
folder until someone requested for them. reported just the same in a temporary rollo. It may be apropos to stress that only when
the rollo cannot be obtained through or under the usual office procedure, or after a long
On 17 January 1995 Atty. Soriano submitted a Supplemental Memorandum-Report to period has already elapsed, shall a pleading be reported in a temporary rollo. The rollo
Mr. Justice Padilla. According to her, while the evidence showed that Ms. Lopez indeed after all is necessary to check on the accuracy of the report in the agenda.
requested for the rollo from the Rollo Room four (4) times without favorable response,
this could not exonerate her from administrative liability since Ms. Lopez could have WHEREFORE, MS. BARBARA C. LOPEZ, Records Officer II, Office of the Clerk of
used a temporary rollo for the purpose. Assuming that her efforts to obtain the rollo Court, First Division, is SUSPENDED for two (2) weeks without pay effective upon
were futile, she should have transmitted the letters just the same to the Agenda Division receipt hereof for her inordinate delay in transmitting to the Agenda Division the two (2)
even without the rollo. Obviously, her shortcomings were due not to the unavailability letters of appellant Sgt. Jerry Balanon notifying this Court of his intention to withdraw
of the rollo but because the letters had been erroneously filed in another folder. his appeal. She is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Soriano informs the Court that she has replaced Ms. Lopez as the employee in
charge of receiving pleadings for transmission to the Agenda Division in view of her Let copy of this Resolution be attached to her personal file.
propensity to commit such mistakes in the performance of her duties, and that she has
reminded the Chief of Division to closely supervise her subordinates to avoid a SO ORDERED.
repetition of the same act. Atty. Soriano recommends that Ms. Lopez be accordingly
admonished. Notes.—Treachery is present in case of sudden attack even if the victim was able to
parry first hacking with a wood marker (People vs. Sacayan, 113 SCRA 199).
It may be recalled that in Tan Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93640, 7 January
1994) a similar imprudence or indiscretion was committed in the First Division by the Minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential
same Ms. Barbara C. Lopez. In that case, Ms. Lopez received the "Manifestation and credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable (People vs.
Motion to Withdraw Petition" of petitioner on 24 November 1993 but failed to transmit Ansing, 196 SCRA 374). People vs. Balanon, 233 SCRA 679, G.R. Nos. 85248-49 July
the same to the Agenda Division for reporting until a decision had already been 6, 1994
promulgated. Ms. Lopez again attributed the delay in the transmittal of the
aforementioned manifestation and motion to the unavailability of the rollo despite her
repeated requests from the Rollo Room. According to her, she accidentally found the
rollo of the Tan Chun Suy case on 25 January 1994 at the Judgment Division of the
Judicial Records Office after it was directly forwarded to it upon promulgation of the
decision on 7 January 1994. In that incident Atty. Soriano rebuked Ms. Lopez and
warned her to be more circumspect in obtaining rollos of cases, suggesting to her that to
be earnest in her purpose she should have made a formal request signed by the Clerk of
Court authorizing her to follow-up rollos for proper reporting.

The Tan Chun Suy incident undoubtedly placed the Court in a bad light. We are again
faced with the same predicament. Officers and employees of the Court have the bounden
duty to judiciously manage their official affairs and adopt measures to improve the
system of filing, recording and transmitting of pleadings and court processes to ensure
efficiency in their workflow. Court employees are vital tools in the effective

8
G.R. No. 129667. July 31, 2000 Same; Same; The absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant does not
destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof.—Nor does the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC BAID Y OMINTA, absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of rape since
accused-appellant. ejaculation is never an element thereof. What consummates the felony is the contact of
the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of his victim without her
Words and Phrases; “Schizophrenia”; Explained.—Complainant is suffering from consent. Neither is it required that lacerations be found in the victim’s hymen.
schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder of unknown etiology, characterized by disturbance
in thinking involving a distortion of the usual logical relations between ideas, a Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; The accused cannot question in his appeal the
separation between the intellect and the emotions so that the patient’s feelings and his or qualification of one presented as expert witness if he did not raise any objection to his
her manifestations seem inappropriate to his or her life situation, and a reduced tolerance qualification in the trial court—objections not timely raised are deemed waived.—
for the stress of interpersonal relations so that the patient retreats from social intercourse Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an
into his or her own fantasy life and commonly into delusions and hallucinations, and expert witness. However, he cannot do this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr.
may, when untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked deterioration or Salangad’s qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross-examined her
regression in his or her behavior though often unaccompanied by further intellectual on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, §36, objections not
loss. timely raised are deemed waived.

Witnesses; Mental Illness; Schizophrenia; It has long been settled that a person should Same; Same; The fact that an expert witness was hired by the family of the complainant
not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone; It is established that to give expert testimony does not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her
schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits testimony unworthy of consideration; The problem of the credibility of the expert
of memory.—Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of discretion.—The
perceptions to others. Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony
particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them, x x x as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim unworthy of consideration. As has been said: . . . Although courts are not ordinarily
(“inappropriate affect”) during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such
questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent. of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant’s consciousness considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand,
and memory, it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
of consciousness and gross deficits of memory. It has long been settled that a person possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness,
should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone. the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion
Same; Same; Witnesses; In the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of
on the part of the presiding judge, his findings as to their credibility are entitled to all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails,
utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The
stand.—The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is
witnesses presented during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
clearly and credibly established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence absence of an abuse of that discretion.
would only be a mere surplusage. In this case, the trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged accused- Same; Same; Where the rape victim is feeble-minded, the force required by the statute is
appellant guilty. In the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the the sexual act itself.
part of the presiding judge, his findings as to their credibility are entitled to utmost
respect as he had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand. Same; Same; Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feeble-
minded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple.—Even assuming then that the
complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with accused-appellant, the copulation

9
would fall under the third paragraph of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in view of Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having suffered from
the fact that complainant was mentally ill. schizophrenia since 1988. In December 1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic
in Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her mental condition.3 On the other hand,
Same; Alibi; Requisites.—Accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. He claimed accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
that, at the time of the incident, he was in his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping.
For the defense of alibi to be believed, the following requisites must be met: (a) his On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the patients'
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense must be proven; room. He woke the complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the same time
and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. touching her foot. Complainant took the cigarette. As she smoked it, accused-appellant
caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she afterward removed her pants. It
Same; Same; The defense of alibi is unavailing where the accused was identified by the turned out she was not wearing any underwear. Accused-appellant also removed his
victim herself who harbored no ill motive against him.—Accused-appellant’s testimony pants and the two had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they transferred under the bed and
itself demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First, his declaration that he was in continued their sexual intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused-appellant had an
another room of the clinic is uncorroborated. Second, the room in which he said he was orgasm. A female patient who had been awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she
sleeping at that time of the incident was only a few meters away from the patients’ room failed to do so, she went out to call the two nurses on duty. The nurses responded but,
where complainant was confined. Third, he admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he was when they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant had already put on her
allowed to enter the patients’ room anytime for purposes of checking on the patients. pants.4
Above all, his alibi cannot be given credence because complainant has pointed to him as
the culprit of the rape. In cases in which the accused-appellant was identified by the Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-
victim herself who harbored no ill motive against him, the defense of alibi was rejected. legal examination. She told him what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the
People vs. Baid, 336 SCRA 656, G.R. No. 129667 July 31, 2000 incident into writing5 and then gave her a physical examination. His report stated:6

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon FINDINGS:
City, finding accused-appellant Eric Baid y Ominta guilty of the crime of rape against
Nieva Garcia y Saban, a mental patient, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
Fairly developed, and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale
The information against accused-appellant, based on the complaint filed by the offended brown areola and nipples from which secretions could be pressed. Abdomen is flabby
woman and her mother, alleged - and soft.

That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said GENITAL:
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there [willfully],
unlawfully and feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
patient suffering [from] schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have with the pale brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her disclosed an abraided posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep
consent. healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice offers moderate
resistance to the introduction of the examining finger and the virgin-sized speculum.
CONTRARY TO LAW Vaginal canal is wide with flattened rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and
consistency.
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of the
case on the merits proceeded. CONCLUSION:

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr. Herminigilda Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the
medico-legal officer who examined the complainant. There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.

10
REMARKS: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined in and penalized by Art.
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram negative diplococci and for 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby sentences the
spermatozoa. said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is further ordered
to indemnify the victim Nieva Garcia y Saban the amount of P50,000.00, as moral
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior of the complainant's damages.
genitalia, could have been recently caused by a hard blunt object, such as an erect penis
during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr. Reyes found that IT IS SO ORDERED.
complainant was suffering from mental illness and that she had lapses in the course of
her interview.7 Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape.12

Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He stated that he had been a nurse-aide of the Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder of unknown etiology,
Holy Spirit Clinic since September 18, 1995. His job was to watch the patients, characterized by disturbance in thinking involving a distortion of the usual logical
especially when they become violent. He also fetched them from their homes. He relations between ideas, a separation between the intellect and the emotions so that the
admitted that he knew the complainant but claimed he did not know the reason for her patient's feelings and his or her manifestations seem inappropriate to his or her life
confinement. He denied the allegations against him. He testified that, on the date and situation, and a reduced tolerance for the stress of interpersonal relations so that the
time referred to by the complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located patient retreats from social intercourse into his or her own fantasy life and commonly
about ten meters from the room where complainant was staying. He admitted, however, into delusions and hallucinations, and may, when untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go
that to go to the patients' room, he did not have to pass by the nurses' station. He said he on to marked deterioration or regression in his or her behavior though often
knew that, at the time in question, there were two nurses on duty and ten patients in the unaccompanied by further intellectual loss.13 The following are the symptoms of
room. He described the patients' room as having an area of about eight by five square schizophrenia:
meters with wooden beds arranged one foot apart from each other.8
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a
Accused-appellant was questioned by the trial court. He testified that on December 22, significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):
1996, he was on duty from 4 p.m. to 12 midnight. He was a stay-in nurse-aide of the
clinic. He stated that the clinic consisted of two floors and five rooms. The room where (1) delusions
complainant and the other patients were staying and his quarters were both on the
ground floor of the building. He admitted that the clinic was for the mentally ill and that, (2) hallucinations
as a nurse-aide, he was supposed to know the status of every patient and his job was to
watch them and pacify them whenever they become violent. He said he was very well (3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
acquainted with the behavior of the patients considering the length of time he had been
working in the clinic. He claimed, however, that he did not specifically know from what (4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
ailment complainant was suffering, but only that she was undergoing treatment because
of mental deficiency.9 (5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition

On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited to give Note: Only one criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or
cigarettes to patients. He further admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could enter the hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's
patients' room anytime to check their condition and see to it that the lights were turned behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each other.
off when they were not needed. He further stated that he was not investigated by the
police when he was invited to their headquarters.10 B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the onset
of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work, interpersonal
On June 20, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision,11 the dispositive portion of relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset (or when
which reads: the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve expected level of
interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).

11
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This 6- negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed that complainant had sexual
month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully treated) intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6) the probability was that her
that meet criterion A (i.e., active-phase symptoms) and may include periods of allegations of rape were merely a product of her fantasy.17
prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or residual periods, the signs
of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative symptoms or two or more We disagree.
symptoms listed in criterion A present in an attentuated form (e.g., odd beliefs, unusual
perceptual experiences). Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a
witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to
D. Schizoaffective and mood disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective disorder and mood others.18 Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly
disorder with features have been ruled out because either (1) no major depressive, relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them. Thus she testified:
manic, or mixed episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-phase symptoms;
or (2) if mood symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative to the duration of PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
the active and residual periods.
Q Miss Nieva Garcia, are you still confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles St.,
E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the Cubao, Quezon City?
direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a
general medical condition. A Not anymore, sir.

F. Relationship to a pervasive developmental disorder: If there is a history of autistic Q On December 22, 1996, do you know whether you are at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los
disorder or another pervasive developmental disorder, the additional diagnosis of Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon City?
schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are also present for
at least a month (or less if successfully treated).14 A Yes, sir.

Schizophrenia is classified into five subtypes, namely, paranoid, disorganized Q Why were you there, Miss Witness?
(hebephrenic), catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual.15
A My mother asked me if I want to be confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic and I chose to
Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist and consultant at be confined at the Holy Spirit because during that time, I was then taking my medicine.
the Medical Center in Muntinlupa, the Perpetual Help Medical Center, the Philippine
National Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was presented as an expert witness. Q At around three o'clock in the morning of December 22, 1996, do you know where
According to her, complainant was, at the time of the incident, suffering from an were you?
undifferentiated type of schizophrenia, described as having the characteristic symptoms
of schizophrenia but does not fit the profile for paranoid, disorganized, or catatonic A Yes, I was lying on the bed inside the Holy Spirit Clinic.
schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that complainant seemed to shift from one type of
schizophrenia to another. Complainant was catatonic when she first treated her, a Q And while lying on the bed, inside the Holy Spirit Clinic, do you know what
situation where the patient shows waxy flexibility (e.g., when a limb is repositioned, that happened then, Miss Witness?
limb remains in that position for a prolonged period of time as if the patient is made of
wax), mutism or agitation, and the patient mimics words and actions during A At that time, there was a person shorter than the person (witness pointing to the
examination. Later, complainant became paranoid, i.e., suspicious, hostile and person dressed in yellow t-shirt whose name when asked, answered the name Eric Baid)
aggressive. She also manifested a behavior where she mumbled and smiled to herself.16 and that person is smaller than the person inside the courtroom was disturbing
"kinakalabit" another person inside the room.
It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have
been given credence by the trial court. It is argued that: (1) there were serious Q And what happened after that first man entered the room at the Holy Spirit Clinic?
inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony in court; (2) the
prosecution failed to present witnesses to corroborate her testimony; (3) complainant A The girl was trying to avoid the other person because at that time, the accused Eric
failed to identify accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-legal examination were Baid was entering the room.

12
Q And what happened after Eric Baid entered the room? Q When Eric Baid was already on top of you, do you know if the small man entered
again your room?
A When Eric Baid entered the room as if he knew me already and he asked me, "Nieva,
gusto mo ng sigarilyo?", at the same time, Eric Baid was touching my foot. A No, sir.

ATTY. VENTURANZA: Q And then, what happened when Eric Baid placed himself on top of you?

I would just want to manifest that the witness while testifying, she was smiling. A I agreed.

PROSECUTION: (to the witness) Q Agreed to what?

Q And after he asked you whether you like a stick of cigarette and touched your foot, A I agreed to the sex.
what happened next, Madam Witness?
Q You mean to say that you and Eric Baid has sexual intercourse while on top of your
A I said yes. bed?

Q And what happened next after you said yes, I liked cigarette? A Yes, sir.

A After that, he caressed me. Q And what happened during the sexual intercourse while both of you were on top of
the bed?
COURT: (to the witness)
A Somebody was awakened and told me, "Hoy, asawa mo ba iyan? Kinukubabawan
Q How did he caress you? ka." and I answered no.

A He went on top of me. Q And was Eric Baid, was he able to consummate that sexual intercourse, Miss
Witness?
COURT: (to the prosecutor)
A Yes, sir.
Go ahead.
Q And more or less, how long did the sexual intercourse last, Miss Witness?
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
A Around three to five minutes.
Q How about the other man who entered earlier, what happened him?
COURT: (to the witness)
A The smaller person went in and out of our room twice, the first time that he went, he
touched the other woman beside me on the foot but the woman resisted and shouted. Q Why, was he able to insert his private organ into your private organ?
After that, the second time, the other man went inside the room, he touched the other
woman but the woman shouted and that smaller one went outside of the room. A Yes, your Honor.

Q When Eric Baid placed himself on top of you, where was that other man? Q What did he do when he was able to insert his private organ into your private organ?

A: He was no longer there. A As if his orgasm suddenly appeared.

PROSECUTION: (to the witness) Q Do you understand when you say as if his orgasm suddenly appeared?

13
A They are like what they call, your Honor, as if "naiputok". Q And you were at his back left inside the room?

Q And what did he do when according to you "naiputok"? A No, Sir.

A As if it was okay for him. Q Where were you then?

Q You were wearing an underwear? A I was just inside the room in my bed not at his back, sir.

A None, your Honor. Q You were already on your bed when he was about to leave the room?

Q You were actually naked? A Yes, Sir.

A I was wearing pants but I have no panty. Q At that time that sex affair transpired between you and the accused, you did not even
know his name?
Q But who removed your pants?
A Yes, Sir.
A I was the one, your Honor.
Q You were only told later on about this person?
Q What about Eric Baid, what was he wearing?
A Yes, Sir.
A He was also wearing pants.
ATTY. SALATANDRE: (to the Court)
Q Who removed the pants of Eric Baid?
That will be all, Your Honor.
A He was the one.19
COURT:
When complainant was questioned on cross and redirect examination, she explained
how she was able to identify accused-appellant, to wit: Any redirect?

ATTY. SALATANDRE: PROSECUTION:

Q You said a while ago that when the sex affair happened it was dark so all throughout Yes, your Honor.
you did not see the face of the accused?
COURT:
A During that time it was dark but the latter part when he opened the light, I saw his
face, sir. Go ahead.

Q When the light was opened, he was about to leave the room? PROSECUTION:

A About to leave, sir. Q You said that you were only able to identify the accused when he put on the lights,
when he was about to leave the room, how far were you from the accused?
Q He was already facing the door?
A This distance, sir. (parties stipulated a distance of four meters, more or less)
A Yes, Sir.
Q You said that you saw his face at that time?

14
 With regard to the alleged inconsistencies between complainant's sworn statement24 and
A Yes, sir. her testimony as to the number of times she and accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse and where they did the same, an examination of the evidence for the
Q And before this incident of December 22, 1996, were there any other occasion that he prosecution, particularly complainant's sworn statement and her interview with the
had any sexual intercourse with you? examining medico-legal officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse
with her in different positions at various places in the same room. When complainant
A None, sir. testified, she stated that, aside from the fact that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her on her bed, he made her transfer later under the bed. Be that as it
Q And you often saw him as attendant in that clinic? may, complainant has consistently established in all of her statements that he had sexual
intercourse with her on her bed. Whether or not he had sex with her near the window
A Yes, sir. and while facing him is of no moment and does not negate the finding of rape. Whatever
may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They
Q And when you said that room was dark, is it totally dark or was it only a little dark? show that complainant's testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the
probative value of her testimony, they reinforce it.25
A Little light, sir. It was a little bit dark and a little bit light. (medyo may ilaw)
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients were
Q So the time that you had sexual intercourse with the accused at that time, you can sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the
identify the face of this person? commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and
place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the malefactor and the
A Yes, sir. victim are not alone.26

COURT: (to the witness) The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses
presented during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and
Q You said that medyo may ilaw, where was the light emanating at about 3:00 in the credibly established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence would only be
morning? a mere surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged accused-appellant guilty. In the
A From the window outside, the room can be illuminated through the window, Your absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding
Honor. judge, his findings as to their credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand.28
Q So when the light came from outside, was the source from the moon, from the bulb of
the Meralco post or from another light coming from another building or house? Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding
of rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof.29 What consummates the felony is
A It is the light actually coming from the ceiling of the building of the clinic which was the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of his victim
outside the window, Your Honor.20 without her consent.30 Neither is it required that lacerations be found in the victim's
hymen. We have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a rape charge to
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim prosper as long as the victim categorically and consistently declares that she has been
("inappropriate affect") during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering defiled.31 In this case, aside from complainant's positive testimony, the medical
questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from examination of the complainant showed an abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that
schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent. she had recent sexual intercourse.32 That the deep healed lacerations found on the
complainant's genitalia may have been caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
and memory,21 it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding
of consciousness and gross deficits of memory.22 It has long been settled that a person Accused-appellant also claims that complainant could have been hallucinating in
should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.23 alleging that she had sexual intercourse with him on December 22, 1996. In answer,
suffice it to say that complainant was steadfast and consistent in stating that she was

15
raped by accused-appellant. She maintained her allegation of rape when she was Q Meaning she will just agree?
physically examined by the medico-legal officer, when she made her statement to the
police and again when she testified in court.33 A She has said so when I asked her. She was just offered a cigarette.

Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding of lack of consent on the part of the Q Meaning if she opens her legs, she does not understand what she was doing?
complainant to the sexual act. As the facts show, complainant herself admitted that she
agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of cigarette. However, it should be A She probably knew what she was doing but when we say an intelligent consent, she
stressed that complainant was in no position to give her consent. As Dr. Salangad said in has weighed the pros and cons on an action and its future significance and also based on
her testimony: the upbringing, sir.

COURT: Q That she was on top of the bed, then the accused allegedly opened the zipper of his
pants and pulled down the pants up to his knees and placed himself on top of the patient
Q If you claim that the private complainant is suffering from this kind of illness, and tried to insert his organ to her organ and the girl said she agreed to it because she
schizophrenia, and manifests behavior to the effect that she can not be active during likes it, does it mean all those things that transpired she does not know or understand
lucid intervals now if she is suffering from this kind or mental state, can she give an what was happening?
intelligent consent considering that the private complainant is already above 20 years of
age? A She knew what was happening but there is a difference in her judgment, in her
discernment. A child can be asked to lie down and knows that somebody was on top of
A In her case, I would say no, Your Honor. him or her and that is the thing of being aware. But the judgment of the consent itself,
the significance, the effect, we all know that a normal person does not do these unless he
Q I will rephrase my question. Because when I asked to give an intelligent consent, you or she contemplates it.
might be referring to acts that are very important to her like, for example, "do you want
to eat?" of course, she will give an intelligent consent. "Do you want to sleep?" of Q I just do not know if I am correct, my interpretation about what you are saying is that
course, she will give an intelligent consent? physically they are doing that, meaning the organ of the accused was inserted into the
organ of the patient allegedly but the girl did not resist, the girl did not comment
A Yes, Your Honor. whatsoever because she did not understand what is happening?

Q But things that would destroy her honor or reputation like for example having sex COURT:
with her, can she give an intelligent consent?
No, she did not say that she did not understand what was happening, she can not discern.
A No, Your Honor.
A Let me give you a little information. In the psychological state of mentally ill patients,
Q In other words, she would not know the consequences of her consenting to such a the basic instinct of a person is very prominent. They respond, they eat and they can
proposal to have sex? have sex, that is normal and they are just responding on the level of their basic instinct.
When you are a mature person or a normal person and you have attained maturity and
A Yes, Your Honor. clearness of mind, you now, of course, try to put things into their proper perspective,
socially and morally, that is where upbringing and education come in. I would say that
.... the patient's case, she is more responding in an instinctual level without the use of
intellect.34
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an
Q She can not give an intelligent consent to sex, your patient? expert witness. However, he cannot do this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr.
Salangad's qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross-examined her
A Yes, sir. on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, §36, objections not
timely raised are deemed waived.

16
 the questions. Though she may not have totally lost her memory, it was shown that she
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert was suffering from an impairment of judgment, which made her incapable of giving, an
testimony as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her intelligent consent to the sexual act. It has been held that where the rape victim is feeble-
testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said: minded, the force required by the statute is the sexual act itself.37

. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place Even assuming then that the complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the accused-appellant, the copulation would fall under the third paragraph of Art. 335 of the
case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that complainant was mentally ill. Sexual
province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, intercourse with an insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic
his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he woman is rape, pure and simple.38
has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the
fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the At any rate, complainant said in her sworn statement that she was afraid of accused-
matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his appellant because of the nature of his job as a nurse-aid. Thus she stated:
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when 28. Tanong : Ikaw ba ay natatakot kay Eric?
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20
Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the Sagot : Kaunti lang, dahil sa trabaho niya.39
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.35 As Dr. Salangad explained:

It has not been shown in this case that the trial court abused its discretion in appreciating ATTY. SALATANDRE:
the testimony of Dr. Salangad so as to justify setting aside its findings.
Q Meaning that when she was asked on page 2 "Tanong 27 Q - Ikaw ba ay tinakot o
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides: sinaktan ni Eric? S - Hindi naman po." This is her own answer, nobody threatened her at
that time?
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances. A Yes, sir, but may I add. There was no direct threat but in her situation she was brought
there for confinement and treatment and for safekeeping. She is in a situation wherein
(1) By using force or intimidation; the attendants and the nurses are all authorities around her, who dictate what to do. I
believe that there was some kind of threat or force in that level, although there was no
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and direct threat in the action.

(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. COURT:

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Q In the mind of Nieva Garcia, who were those that might be threatening to her?

To warrant a conviction for rape under paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman need not be A The accused somehow had made the threat. Because in their daily activity, the
proven as completely insane or deprived of reason.1âwphi1 The phrase "deprived of attendants and nurses dictate the things to do, they follow, they are bosses in the clinic,
reason" has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or they are in that kind of situation always, Your Honor.
deficiency or some form of mental retardation, those who are feebleminded although
coherent.36 Q That explains your presence during the investigation?

That the complainant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape is shown A To assist her in order that she is not afraid and in response to earlier question of
by the fact that she was in the clinic precisely because of such illness and by her counsel if the patient was directly threatened or intimidated during the act, I am giving
behavior at the trial, during which she would smile for no reason at all while answering you a general situation in an institution, in this kind of institution. Sometimes they are

17
restrained if they go out of line, they are ones who restrain them, the attendants and the G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001
nurses do these, Your Honor.40
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
As already stated, accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. He claimed that, at the petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents.
time of the incident, he was in his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping. For the
defense of alibi to be believed, the following requisites must be met: (a) his presence at Appeals; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense must be proven; and (b) it Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.41 appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive—the Court is not bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
Accused-appellant's testimony itself demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First, his below.
declaration that he was in another room of the clinic is uncorroborated. Second, the
room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of the incident was only a few meters Witnesses; Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court’s
away from the patients' room where complainant was confined. Third, he admitted that, appreciation of the witness’ testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the
as a nurse-aide, he was allowed to enter the patients' room anytime for purposes of highest respect.—Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who
checking on the patients. Above all, his alibi cannot be given credence because testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue
complainant has pointed to him as the culprit of the rape. In cases in which the accused- of credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better position to pass
appellant was identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill motive against him, judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their
the defense of alibi was rejected.42 deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better position to observe the witnesses,
the trial court’s appreciation of the witness’ testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in candor, deserves the highest respect.
accordance with our recent rulings that moral damages may be awarded in rape cases
without any need of proof of moral suffering. However, in addition, civil indemnity in Same; It is axiomatic that a witness’ interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a
the amount of ₱50,000.00 should have been awarded the complainant consistent with ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating
the ruling that rape victims are entitled to such an award without need of proof except the need for caution in considering the witness’ testimony, does not of itself operate to
the fact of the commission of the offense.43 On the other hand, the plea of the reduce his credit—his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if it is otherwise
prosecution that the indemnity should be raised to ₱75,000.00 cannot be granted because clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, may be relied
such amount is awarded only in cases of qualified rape. In this case, there were no upon.—It is axiomatic that a witness’ “interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a
qualifying circumstances raising the penalty to death.44 ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating
the need for caution in considering the witness’ testimony, does not of itself operate to
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City is reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it)
AFFIRMED with the modification that, in addition to the award of ₱50,000.00 for moral is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may
damages made by the trial court, complainant should be indemnified in the amount of be relied upon.” In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
₱50,000.00. Divinaflor’s testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the premises, this
Court will not and cannot take issue.
SO ORDERED.
Same; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; It is an elementary rule in evidence that when a
witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to
his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify.—In the same vein, the issue
of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of his predecessor-in-interest
since 1939 is likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objection was never
made by petitioner on the ground of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on this matter
at any stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary rule in evidence that: “when a
witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to
his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial
that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is

18
incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if the "Lot 10739 of the cadastral survey of Oas, Albay is one of the parcels of land subject of
incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes these cadastral proceedings. When this case was called for initial hearing, nobody
apparent.” offered any opposition. Whereupon, an order of general default against the whole world
was issued. Claimant was allowed to present his evidence.
Same; Same; Child Witnesses; It is well-established that any child regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make known his Lot 10739 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of Riceland situated at Maramba,
perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is Oas, Albay containing an area of 10,775; on the East by Lot 10738; on the South by Lot
examined; The requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of 10716; and on the West by Lot 10716. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial
observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.—Be that Listana who began possession and occupying the same in the concept of owner, openly,
as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939. He planted palay and
time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in harvested about 60 cavans of palay every harvest season. He declared the land in his
1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in name under Tax Dec. No. 1987 (Exh. 1). On May 21, 1973, claimant acquired
Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and ownership of the land by means of deed of absolute sale (Exh. 2). He caused the same to
Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The be declared in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1442 (Exh. 3). There was another
fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not reassessment under Tax Dec. No. 35 (Exh. 3-a). He continued planting on the land and
render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child all the products are used for the benefit of his family.
regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can
make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts The land was surveyed in the name of the previous owner per certification of the
for which he is examined. The requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) CENRO (Exh. 4). The cadastral survey costs had been paid in the amount of P72.08
capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. under Official Receipt No. 50652483 (Exh. 5) and the certification thereof (Exh. 5-a).
There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing All the realty taxes has likewise been paid up to the current year per Official Receipt
qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness’ knowledge of the fact to which he No. 6422679 (Exh. 6) together with the certification of the Municipal Treasure of Oas,
testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact Albay (Exh. 6_A).
during childhood, that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the
years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioner’s claim There are no liens or encumbrances and neither are there persons claiming adverse
that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana’s possession since it appears ownership and possession of the land. The lot does not infringe the public road, river or
undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see stream. It is not part of a military reservation, Public Park, watershed or the
Listana possessing the land. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451, G.R. No. government's forest zone. The lot has not been utilized as a bond in civil or criminal
116372 January 18, 2001 cases or as collateral for a loan in any banking institution. There is no pending petition
for its registration under Act 496 known as the Land Registration Act or an application
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for the issuance of free patent with the Community Environment and Natural Resources
which seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February Office (CENRO). Claimant is not legally disqualified from owning disposable property
8, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29578 entitled "The Director of Lands, Petitioner-Appellant of the public domain."3
v. Romeo Divinaflor. Claimant-Appelle"1 which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 12, rendered in favor of private respondent Romeo Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has "satisfactorily
Divinaflor.1âwphi1.nêt possessed and occupied this land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously,
adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939 very much earlier to June 12, 1945,"
This case stems from Cadastral Case No. N-11-lV initiated, pursuant to law, by the the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10739 in the name of the
Director of Lands, as petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay (Branch Spouses Romeo Divinaflor and Nenita Radan.
12). In due time, Romeo Divinaflor filed his answer to the petition relative to Lot No.
10739 with an area of 10,775 square meters situated in Oas, Albay, claiming ownership The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the
of said lot by virtue of possession for over thirty years. The facts, as found by the trial trial court that claimant-appellee and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows. 10739 since 1939 is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. The Director contended
that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 and the

19
certificate of real estate tax payment is dated 1990. It was further contended that the Q Does the land encroach any road, river or stream?
testimony of Romeo Divinaflor was largely self-serving, he being the applicant.
A No, sir.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement appealed from. It ruled:
Q Is this part of a military reservation, public park, watershed or the government's
"To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations and forest zone?
tax receipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of "open,
continuos, peaceful and adverse possession" which appellee has convincingly A No, sir.
established. Repeatedly, appellant hammers the fact of possession into the record by
appellee's testimony on cross-examination. Thus: Q Have you paid all the taxes on the land?

ASST. PROV'L. PROS. CRISOSTOMO: A Yes, sir.

Q You said that you bought this land from Marcial Listana, and you are referring us Q What about the cadastral costs?
to this deed of sale?
A I also paid the same
WITNESS:
Q What do you do with the land now?
A Yes, sir.
A I planted palay during rainy season.
Q This land is located at Maramba?
Q How many cavans of palay for you harvest every agricultural season?
A Yes, sir.
A I get 40 cavans of palay every harvest season but sometimes more and sometimes
Q Since when did Marcial Listana begin possessing this land? less, during summer month I plant corn and harvest about 8 cavans of unhooked corn.

A Since 1939. Q If and when this land will be titled, in whose name would you like the title to be?

Q What was Marcial Listana doiong on the land? A In our names, my wife and myself.

A He was planting palay and sometimes corn. PROSECUTOR CRISOSTOMO;

Q In what concept was he possessing the land? That is all."4

A In the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and "While it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts, may be considered as evidence of
exclusively. a claim of ownership, and when taken in connection with possession, it may be valuable
in support of one's title by prescription. Nevertheless, the mere payment of taxes does
Q Do you know whether there are disputes involving the boundaries of the land. not confer nor prove it. (Viernes, et al. Vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286. See also Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133
A No, sir.
The omission to declare the land in question for taxation purposes at the inception of the
Q Are there also persons claiming adverse ownership and possession of the land? tax system in 1901 of this country does not destroy the continuous and adverse
possession under claim of ownership of applicant's predecessors in interest. Fontanilla
A No, sir. vs. Director of Lands, et al., CA-G.R. No. 8371-R Aug. 4, 1952.

20
Finally, appellant asseverates that the testimony of appellee is insufficient to prove imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree
possession for being self-serving, he being one of the applicants. We remind appellant no. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48(b) now reads:
on this score that self-serving evidence comes into play only when such is made by the
party out of court and excludes testimony which a party gives as a witness at the trial. "(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
(See N.D.C. vs. Workmen's Compensation, et al., 19 SCRA 861; 31 C.J.S. 952)."5 open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
Motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision having been denied, the June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filling of the application for
Director of Lands has brought the instant petition raising the sole issue of- confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions to a certificate of title under
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS AQUIRED REGISTRABLE TITLE the provisions of this chapter."
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Interpreting the above-quoted provision, the Court stated in Republic vs. Court of
Petitioner Director of Lands assails the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground Appeals12 that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
that the law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain
must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial "(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioner argues that Divinaflor failed to adduce notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial
sufficient evidence to prove possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 for or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
the following reasons; (1) Divinaflor failed to present sufficient proof that his complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant,
predecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has possessed the lot since 1939; and (2) a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.'
Divinaflor in incompetent to testify on his predecessor's possession since 1939
considering he was born only in 1941, and in 1945, he was only 4 years old. There is no dispute that the subject lot is alienable and disposable tract of public land.
Since claimant Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of Lot 10739 from Marcial
We find no reversible error in the assailed judgement. Denial of the instant petition I Listana by deed of absolute sale dated May 21, 1973,13 the pivotal issue is whether his
proper in light of the well-entrenched doctrine upholding the factual findings of the trial predecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has been in possession of the land since June 12,
court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.6 It is likewise very basic that only errors 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership.
of law and not of facts are revisable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, which is the very rule relied upon by petitioner.7 The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by
While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that law, is a question of fact14 which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and the
follow in support thereof pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us Court of Appeals. Such factual finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented in the courts a quo in complete most compelling reasons. None has been adduced in the case at bar.
disregard of the well-settled rule that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. This possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue on having
Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of
in the proceedings below."8 Indeed, It is not the function of the Supreme Court to assess testifying.15 Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's
and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by the appreciation of the witness' testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the
parties particularly where the findings of both the trila court and the appellate court on highest respect.16
the matter coincide.9
Further, it is axiomatic that a witness' "interest in the outcome of a case shall not be
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol10 that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating
No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July the need for caution in considering the witness' testimony, does not of itself operate to
26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 194211 which provided for a simple thirty- reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it)
year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may
be relied upon."17 In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found

21
Divinaflor's testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the premises, this the earliest tax declaration presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax
Court will not and cannot take issue. payment is dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases23 that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it
In the same vein, the issue of incompetence of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates
his predecessor-in-interest since 1939 in likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A the fact of possession, especially in the instant case where there are no other persons
timely objection was never made by petitioner on the ground of incompetence of claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
Divinaflor to testify on this matter at any stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary
rule in evidence that: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court resolves to
AFFIRM the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 which
"When a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to sustained the JUDGEMENT of the Regional Trial Court rendered on July 27, 1990
object to his examination on the ground of incompetence to testify. If a party knows granting the registration of little to herein private respondent.
before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a
witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if SO ORDERED.
the incompetence appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes
apparent."18

Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility
becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence
will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence.19 The
failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflor's
testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is
therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.

Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving

at the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known.20
True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing
in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and
Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The
fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not
render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child
regardless of age,can be a competent witness id he is capable of relating truthfully facts
for which he is examined.21 The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are:
(a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of
communication.22 There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the
foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness' knowledge of the fact to
which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of
the fact during childhood that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced
through the years up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject
petitioner's claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession
since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had
occasion to see Listana possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property
for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that law not in possession of
the land as required the predecessors since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that

22
G.R. Nos. 118828 & 119371. February 29, 2000.* opinion, adequately established the liability of Lagunday, LAGARTO, and CORDERO
for raping and killing Angel Alquiza. She not only proved to be competent but also
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HENRY truthful in her narration of what transpired on 2 August 1994. Her sworn statement
LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA @ might not entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but we have ruled that in case of conflict
“Booster,” accused-appellants. between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the latter
generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Mental Retardates; Psychiatric Evaluation; A by their nature, they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant.
psychiatric evaluation made upon order of the trial court is in the nature of an official
document in aid of judicial determination.—–From the moment Barlam surfaced as an Same; Same; Same; Motive; The absence of evidence of any improper motive actuating
eyewitness to the crime, accused-appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO, through a witness as the principal witness of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the
counsel, have desperately tried to disqualify her on ground of incompetence. Obviously conclusion that no such improper motive existed at the time she testified and her
aware of the futility of any objection to Barlam’s testimony on account of the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.—–It must also be noted that Barlam
psychiatric finding by the NCMH, after three examinations, that “she may be deemed absolutely has no motive to falsely testify against LAGARTO and CORDERO. The
competent,” the defense attacked instead the damaging contents of the NCMH absence of evidence of any improper motive actuating her as the principal witness of the
psychiatric evaluation report anchored on the following grounds: (1) said report is prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
hearsay because the doctors who prepared and issued the same were not presented in existed at the time she testified and her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
court, and (2) it was not offered in evidence by the prosecution. This argument fails to
consider the very nature of the NCMH report. Having been made upon order of the trial Same; Alibi; Alibi is a relatively weak defense, and it is further emasculated in the
court, such report is in the nature of an official document in aid of judicial absence of any showing that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at
determination. It is not evidence for the prosecution or against the defense but a the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the moment it was being perpetrated.
document—–a scientific report—–prepared and issued by an entity totally removed
from the criminal proceedings, hence, indifferent, objective, and impartial. To be On 31 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, per Judge Lorenzo
utilized by the trial court, it need not be offered in evidence by the prosecution because B. Veneracion, handed down a judgment in Criminal Case No. 94-138071 and Criminal
the court may take judicial notice of its existence and composition. It is also for this Case No. 94-138138, finding accused-appellants Henry Lagarto y Petilla (hereaffer
reason that its contents cannot be rejected on account of being hearsay. LAGARTO) and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela (hereafter CORDERO) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping and slaying seven-year old Alquiza y Lagman (hereafter
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even a mental retardate or a feebleminded person could Angel) in the early hours of 2 August 1994. They were initially sentenced to suffer the
qualify as a competent witness.—–Barlam could certainly perceive and make known her penalty of reclusion perpetua in each with damages. In our Decision of 12 October 1995
perception to others. Even if she is deaf, she saw what happened on 2 August 1994. She in G.R. Nos. 119987-88 (319 Phil. 364), a special civil action for certiorari filed by the
related what she saw to the police on 4 August 1994; to the psychiatrists who examined Office of the Solicitor (OSG) questioning the propriety of the sentence imposed, we
her at NCMH on 26, 29, and 31 August 1994; and to the trial court on 26 August, 3 and ordered the court to impose the correct penalty prescribed by law in light of its findings
4 October 1994. Did she “intelligently” make known her perception to others, especially of and conclusions, i.e., the death penalty, subject to automatic review by us at proper
when she testified in court? Certainly, she did. Everybody understood her even if some time.
of her statements on minor points were inconsistent. A perusal of the transcript of
stenographic notes would readily reveal that counsels for the defense attempted in vain Conformably with the decision in G.R. Nos. 119987-88, Judge Veneracion on 22 May
to confuse her on relevant facts, even confronting her with her sworn statement—–a 1996 an Order correcting the sentence in Criminal Case No. 94-138071 and Criminal
clear indication that she connected with them “intelligently.” Because of Barlam’s Case No. 94-138138 and imposing the penalty of death. The Order was read in open
“deafness and associated mental retardation,” the defense harped that she should be court at the National Penitentiary.
disqualified from testifying. The disquisition above, notwithstanding, we have ruled that
even a mental retardate or a feeble-minded person could qualify as a competent witness. Thereafter, the records of these cases were forwarded to us far automatic review, in
accordance with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Section 10,
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits; In case of conflict between the contents of a sworn Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
statement and testimony in open court, the latter generally prevails since ex parte
affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because by their nature, they are The pertinent facts follow:
ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant.—–Barlam’s testimony, in our

23
At 5:10 p.m. on 2 August 1994, PO3 Edgardo E. Ko of the Western Police District Liver — multiple lacerations.
Command, Directorate for Investigation, Crimes Against Persons Division, Philippine
National Police, Manila, received an information from PO3 Mabilisan of Station 11 that Stab wounds: all elliptical, clean-cut edges, with a sharp and a blunt extremities in
a dead body in a sack was found at around 4:30 p.m. floating in the flooded street of Del different orientations.
Pan near the corner of Lavizares St., Binondo, Manila. Residents discovered the corpse
wrapped in a round yellow tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. The 1) 2.5 cms., forehead, right side; directed backwards, involving the soft, tissues;
responding policemen — PO3 Ko, SPO1 Edgardo Manuel, and PO3 Rosalie Fernandez fracturing the temporal bone; then to the right-cerebral hemisphere; with a depth of 7.0
— noticed the victim's feet and left hand protruding from the sack and round yellow cm.
tablecloth. They untied the sack and nylon cord and saw the victim, a young girl,
wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping wounds on the left ear and chin, her genitals 2) 2.0 cms., temple, left side; directed medially; involving the soft tissues; fracturing the
lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed in. They immediately brought the body temporal bone; then to the left cerebral hemisphere; with a depth of 5:0 cm
to the police morgue at Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel.1
3) 3.0 cms.; mandibular area, left side; fracturing the mandibular bone
A. certain Romezen Alquiza called the police station, inquiring about the body
recovered from Del Pan, Tondo, Manila, whose description matched his sister Angel Hemothorax, 500 c.c.
who, had been missing since the night of 1 August 1994. He was advised to proceed to
the Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel. Together with his mother Zenaida and some family Hemoperitoneum, 1,100 c.c.
members, Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel
Alquiza.2 He then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Brain — Hemorrhagic with minor portion missing.
Office to autopsy Angels body.3 Said office also issued a Certificate of Identification of
Dead Body,4 which was signed by Romezen. The autopsy was conducted by NBI Visceral organs, pale.
Medico-Legal Officer Ludivino J. Lagat, who concluded that Angel Alquiza died due to
multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries. The severity of her injuries were vividly Stomach, empty.
described in Autopsy No. N-94-1553,5 thus:
CAUSE OF DEATH:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, generalized. — MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, TRAUMATIC INJURIES.

Both eyes, missing. REMARKS: — Vaginal swab submitted to Chemistry Division for examination.

Hematoma: 5.0 x 9.0 cms., and 5.0 x 17.0 cms., right and left inguinal area. PO3 Ko's Advance Information,6 which was based on his investigation of Zenaida
Alquiza, Rosalina Puno, Alicia de la Vega, Ligaya Cordero, Mario Blorecia, and Eliseo
Abrasion: 4.0 x 5.0 cms., and 4.0 x 4.0 cms., periorbital area, right and left respectively; Sendiego, disclosed that at around 9:30 on the night of 1 August 1994, Angel, a seven-
12.0 x 4.0 cms., left thigh; 19.0 x 20.0 cms., posterior chest wall. year old Grade 2 student of the Rosario Almario Elementary School and a resident of
1200 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, went out to buy champorado from a store at nearby
Contused — hematoma: 10.0 x 9.0 cms., left side of the neck to the clavicular area. Kagitingan St. When she did not return after some time, the members of her family
searched for her in the neighborhood, but they did not find her. At around 1:25 p.m. of 2
Incised wounds: 14.0 cms, left pre-auricular area up to the temple; 21.0 cms, vagina, to August 1994, they reported her missing to the police. Rosalina Puno, the owner of he
the anus then to the sacral area with evisceration of the intestines, 2:0 cm. Knee. store at 1144 Kagitingan St., said that Angel did drop by her store at around 9:30 p.m. to
buy, champorado and ate it there before heading home via Bougainvillea7 St. Said street
Fractures: Axial fractures of the skull, open, compound; mandibular bone; right femur, is adjacent to Sunflower St. and leads to Tagumpay St., a dimly lit area used by
upper third; 1st to the 10th ribs, anteriorly right and left. CORDERO and his wife Ligaya as a parking space for their pedicabs.8

Dislocation, left hip joint. One of said pedicabs, "No. 14," was driven by a certain Abundio Lagunday on 1 August
1994 but was found the following day abandoned and covered with cartons and plastics

24
at the comet of Kagitingan and Salvacion Sts., near the junk shop of the late Mang Gorio S.: Gorio.
(Mauro Gregorio). Because of this, Ligaya Cordero was invited by the police on 3
August 1994 to answer some questions.9 Mario Blorecia, a scavenger and a friend of 07. T.: Saan ito lugar?
Lagunday, said the latter, who appeared nervous (balisa), came to him at around 6:30
p.m. on 3 August 1994, left the pedicab to his care (kasi nagkahulihan), and immediately S.: Kagitingan.
departed after covering the pedicab with scraps of carton and plastic. They both used to
work at the junk shop of Mang Gorio, which was later converted into a warehouse.10 08. T.: Ano pa iyo kita o dinig?

Follow-up investigation disclosed that around 9:30 p.m. on 1 August 1994, a certain S.: Kita ko bata takip ilong, at tali bibig, sigaw siya, saksak sa leeg.
Jose Soriano of 1155 Kagitingan St. was buying a cigarette at Rosalina Puno's store
when he saw Angel with Lagunday (akay ni Lagunday) at the corner of Bougainvillea 09. T.: Kita mo ba kung sino ang gawa nito sa bata?
and Kagitingan Sts. He did not think she was in any trouble because he knew Lagunday
sometimes picked up Angel from school.11 S.: Tatlo.

Based on these pieces of information, Lagunday was arrested on 4 August 1994 as the 10. T.: Kilala mo sila?
primary suspect in the case. During custodial investigation, and after he was apprised of
his constitutional rights, Lagunday admitted his culpability and pointed to two other S.: Oo.
men as his cohorts, namely, @ "Boboy" and @ "Boyet." In the ensuing investigation,
Lagunday also positively identified LAGARTO as one of companions on that fateful 11. T.: Asan sila nayon?
night.12
S.: Declarant was pointing to and positively identifying . . . ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY . .
A major breakthrough in the case was provided by a 50-year old widow and laundry . and HENRY LAGORTE . . . . .
woman by the name of Herminia Barlam, who was accompanied to the Homicide
Section on 4 August 1994 by SPO2 Enrico Miranda, a neighbor and occasional laundry 12. T.: Ano gawa nitong si Abundio sa batang babae?
client. She allegedly saw three men molest and kill a little girl inside the warehouse of
Mang Gorio during a downpour in the early hours of 2 August 1994. When asked if she S.: (declarant was demonstrating her fingers in a pumping motion and covering her
could recognize these men from a police line-up, she positively identified Lagunday and mouth).
LAGARTO as two of the men who raped and killed the girl.13 Her sworn statement,
taken by PO3 Ko with the aid of SPO2 Miranda, who acted as interpreter between the 13. T.: Ito isang turo mo, ano gawa sa batang babae?
investigator and the hearing impaired, is hereunder substantially reproduced:
S.: Saksak leeg batang babae (declarant was demonstrating with her right index finger
03. T.: Noong isang araw, petsa 2 ng Agosto 1994 . . . ano and nakita mo? pointing to her neck.)

S.: Nakita kong bata saksak . . . takip ilong at wala panty. 14. T.: Kilala mo ba ito dalawang turo mo?

04. T.: Sino ito bata iyo kita? S.: hindi kilala, pero isa Lando * takas, wale ipen.

S.: Hindi kilala pero liit lang. . . 15. T.: Ano gawa Lando sa bata babae?

05. T.: Saan mo kita bata saksak at takip bibig at ilong? S.: Palo ulo bata kahoy kapal.

S.: Doon marami lata at saka plastic. 16. T.: Ano gawa mo bago ikaw kita sila?

06. T.: Kanino ito lugar o sino may ari? S.: Ihi ako sa tabi bodega, kita ko sila butas.

25
17. T.: Asan na batang babae?
S.: Dalawa.
S.: Patay na suot puti damit ganda.
29. T.: Anong pangalan anak mo?
18. T.: Ikaw silip sa butas, ano iyo kita?
S.: Junior at Totoy.
S.: Bata babae saksak at kantot tatlo lalaki, at iyak iyak sigaw pa.
19. T.: Sino kita mo kantot bata babae? 30. T.: Totoo ba sabi mo?

S.: Iyon sampal ko kanina (declarant was referring to ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY who S.: Totoo, hindi ako nanloloko.
was slapped by the declarant during the line up)
31. T.: Susumpaan mo ba ito?
20. T.: Ano oras mo kita ito?
S.: Oo.14
S.: Alas 2 umaga, lakas ulan.
As the inquest continued, more suspects were brought in for questioning, namely, the
21. T.: Ano pa iyo kita? following persons implicated by Lagunday: Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta @ "Lando,"
Richard Baltazar y Alino @ "Curimao," and Catalino Yaon y Aberin @ "Joel."
S.: Bata patay at tali nila sako. Accused-appellant CORDERO @ "Booster" was not initially implicated by Lagunday;
hence, he was not indicted under the first Information dated 8 August 1994. When they
22. T.: Ano iyo gawa? were in detention together, however, Lagunday CORDERO as the mastermind15 and
pointed to Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon as their lookout. CORDERO was further
S.: Sigaw ako lakas at palo nila ako kahoy. linked to the crime by a certain laundry woman named Ofelia Lagman, who, having
washed laundry for Corderos several times; allegedly remembered seeing on top of their
23. T.: Sino palo sa iyo kahoy? washing machine a round yellow tablecloth matching the one in which Angels body was
wrapped. She also confirmed that the Corderos had a round table with a glass top.16 If
S.: Siya (declarant was pointing to and positively identified HENRY LAGARTO) further appeared that CORDERO had previously raped his two daughters although no
case was filed against him.17
24. T.: Ano yari ng ikaw sigaw lakas?
On the basis of these findings, criminal charges for rape with homicide were filed
S.: Wala pansin akin, at ako iyak. against the suspects by the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila. The first information,
dated 8 August 1994, was filed on 10 August 1994 and was docketed Criminal Case No.
25. T.: Ano pa iyo kita sa loob bodega? 94-138071, entitled People of the Philippines v. Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. "Jr. Jeofrey,"
and Henry Lagarto y Petilla. It stated thus:
S.: Iyak iyak bata tapos tigil na, patay na.
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
26. T.: Ikaw ba ay may asawa? conspiring and confederating together with one alias "LANDO", and other persons
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
S.: Patay na. another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and
Ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA
27. T.: Ano pangalan asawa mo? Y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby
warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece
S.: Tony. of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wiifully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledged the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA Y LAGMAN, a minor,
28. T.: Ilan anak mo? seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said

26
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "Jr. Jeofrey", HENRY LAGARTO Y PETILLA, and yellow tablecloth (Exh. "F"), a sack (Exh. "I"), nylon cord, exh. "H"); a piece of
one a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of embroidered cloth or crocheted curtain (Exh. "J"), and a girl's (Exh. "G").23
her death immediately thereafter.
Even as the trial judge deplored the sloppy handling of evidence by the police and their
CONTRARY TO LAW. lack of control over the crime scene,24 it was revealed during PO3 Ko's cross-
examination that CORDERO was investigated and attested on 8 August 1994 on the
The other information, dated 11 August 1994 and filed on 12 August 1994, and basis of Lagman's sworn statements before the NBI and the police, not on Lagunday's
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, is entitled of the People of the Philippines v. verbal confession.25
Ernesto Cordero y Maristela @ "Booster," Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta @ "Lando,"
Richard Baltazar y Alino @ "Curimao," and Catalino Yaon y Aberin @ "Joel." Its Dr. Ludivino Lagat, NBI Medico-Legal Officer; autopsied the body of Angel on 2
accusatory portion reads: August 1994, after receiving a request for autopsy (Exh. "A") and examining certificate
of identification (Exh. "B"), both signed by Angel's brother Romezen.26 His findings
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the disclosed that Angel died due to multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries. Both of
said accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR. her eyes were missing. Dr. Lagat found, among other injuries, two stab wounds on the
JEOFREY" and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have already been charged in the head and one at the neck; a head fracture which part of her brain was leaking out27;
Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under Criminal Case No. 94- severe head deformity due to force; an incised wound 21 centimeters long from the
138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior vagina to her anus up to the "sacral area with evisceration of the intestines" caused by a
strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by "sharp bladed weapon."28
taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly
bringing her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her On cross-examination, the defense, banking on a "possibility" that some of injuries of
head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, Angel might have been caused by other factors, suggested that Angel was ran over by a
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL motor vehicle before she was stabbed.29 When confronted about the absence of
ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and spermatozoa, Dr. Lagat said it "could be due to soaking (of the body in floodwater). It
consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates could be washed out." And the body was, indeed, washed at the Tres Amigos Memorial
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR. JEOFREY" and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA Chapel. Moreover, no spermatozoa was found because "the area was expose(d) and
caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter. there were some other things that were present in the area like the intestine,"30 which
spilled out of vagina.31
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ofelia Lagman, on whose statement CORDERO was initially arrested and investigated,
Prior to arraignment, however, the court was informed by the prosecution that Lagunday testified that when she heard the news about a child found dead in neighborhood, she
had been shot and killed while trying to grab the gun of one of his police escorts on 12 inquired and learned that it was Angel, her husband's niece. Angel had been missing
August 1994.20 Upon motion of the private prosecutor, Lagunday's name was dropped since the night of 1 August 1994. She learned that the body had been taken to the Tres
from the information. His co-accused in Criminal Case No. 138071, LAGARTO, and Amigos Memorial Chapel so she immediately went there. The sight that greeted her
other accused in Criminal Case No. 138138, all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. shivers down her spine because the round yellow tablecloth where Angels body was
Thereafter, upon motion of the prosecution,21 the two cases were consolidated.22 wrapped was familiar to her. She had seen one just like it in the house of CORDERO, a
neighbor whom she had known for four years so that she was able to positively identify
The prosecution relied mainly on the statements and testimonies of PO3 Ko, Dr. Lagat, him in court,32 and for whom she had done three-days' laundry work in the last week of
Herminia Barlam, Ofelia Lagman, and Rolando Javar. July 1994. She saw it on top of their washing machine, folded the way round materials
are folded. It was about a meter in diameter, made of a material like linoleum.33 On 3
The testimony of PO3 Edgardo Ko merely replicated the contents of his Advance August 1994, she decided to share this information with NBI. Five days later, on 8
Information dated 3 August 1994 (Exh. "K"), Progress Report 1 dated 5 August 1994 August 1994, she made a similar statement to the police.
(Exh. "L"), and Progress Report 2 dated 9 August 1994 (Exh. "M") on which the
criminal informations were based. He presented to the court some of the items recovered Another key witness, Rolando Javar, a mason and resident of 1190 Tagumpay St., said
with the body of Angel, which were marked as evidence for the prosecution, namely, a that between 9:30 and 10:00 in the evening of 1 August 1994, as he was going home in a
pedicab, he saw CORDERO and LAGARTO standing in front of the warehouse at

27
Kagitingan St., as if waiting for somebody. When he alighted in front of his house at psychiatric consultation and treatment, nor history of alcohorism and prohibited drug
Tagumpay St., he saw Lagunday driving "Ernie Sidecar No. 14," with Angels as use.
passenger.34 LAGARTO was one of the pedicab drivers of CORDERO.35
MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATIONS:
On cross-examination, Javar said that he first told his story to Angel's mother Zenaida
on 12 September 1994. She is his neighbor, while Ernesto CORDERO is his neighbor Initial examination revealed an adult female, sthenic (sic), fairly kempt in a dress.
and balae, the latter being the father of his son's wife. He was at first reluctant to tell Behaved and cooperative, but severe deafness was obvious and questions had to be
Zenaida about what he knew because of his relationship with the Corderos.36 repeated several times in a loud manner before she answered. She was able to state her
personal data accurately. She was oriented to time; place and person. She related "kita
Prosecution witness Herminia37 Barlam categorically pointed to CORDERO and bata babae" and indicated the height of the child with her hand. "Sinaksaksak" and made
LAGARTO as among the three men (the other one being deceased Lagunday) she saw a stabbing action with the forefinger at the throat of her companion, then she made
in the warehouse at Kagitingan St. at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. She witnessed slashing motions on each of her arms and groin. She pointed at her right eye, "tangal
how they stabbed the face and genitals of Angel, hit her with a piece of wood, raped her mata." She indicated that there were three men, one of them (she indicated eye glasses)
as she bled, and eventually killed her. She saw how they tied her hands and feet, stabbed the victim, and that another took the victim's earrings.
wrapped her lifeless form in a yellow tablecloth, and put her inside a sack. Because of
her hearing impairment, however, the defense sought to disqualify her on the basis of She explained that this happened at 3:00 A.M. ("alas tres, umuulan") and then
incompetence and repeatedly requested that she be taken to the National Center for demonstrated that she was urinating at a bodega. She further demonstrated that one of
Mental Health (NCMH) to determine if she was competent to testify.38 The court the men hit her with a piece of wood on her left elbow and knee, and showed her scars.
initially denied 39 said motion but eventually granted40 it. Nevertheless, on 26 August She was able to identify familiar objects, and was able to identify the 2 peso coins, 10,
1994, prior to her psychiatric evaluation, the court heard the testimony of Barlam. In 20, and 100 peso bills. She was able to do simple mathematic(al) operations. She related
essence, she said she was Kagitingin St. at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. She saw that she is no longer staying at their house "baka ako patayin." Mood was euthymic
three men and a child whose name, she later learned, was "Jingjing." One of the men (sic), affect adequate.
saw her and asked her to be quiet. This man hit her. Another man, who wore glasses,41
stabbed the child and tied the sack where the child's body was placed. She positively She was next examined on August 29 and 31, 1994 when she was given a battery of
(and angrily) identified these two men as LAGARTO and CORDERO. The third man psychological tests. On interview, she gave the same account of what she saw
was already dead.42 consistently, and expressed her irritation "paulit-ulit tanong." Attention span is short and
patient tends to confabulate when she unable to hear the question properly, hence gives
On 27 September 1994, the NCMH submitted to the court its Report43 on the inconsistent answer at times. She is friendly and tends toward familiarity with the
phychiatric evaluation of Herminia (Marina) Barlam. . . . signed by Dr. Benjamin D. interviewer, at times slapping the desk with her hand especially when embarrassed. She
Vista and Dr. Isagani S. Gonzales. The following is a verbatim reproduction of its tends to be anxious when many people are around.
contents:
Patient was recommended to an ear specialist for assessment and fitting of a hearing aid,
GENERAL DATA: after which psychological examinations were repeated and the patient re-interviewed.

MARINA DELOS SANTOS, 53 years old, female, single, Filipino, Roman Catholic, PHYSICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS:
unschooled, from 1267 Kagitingan St. Tondo, Manila brought for the first time to the
National Center for Mental Health on August 26, 1994 for examination. (B)ilateral deafness, all other findings with normal limits.

BACKGROUND HISTORY: PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION RESULTS:

From collateral interviews with relatives and friends, the patient has been deaf since Evaluation shows that patient is classified as having moderate mental retardation
birth and has not been given any formal education. She has worked as a balut vendor associated with deafness, which is characterized by a subaverage intelligence quotient
and laundry woman to help support her family consisting of two sons. She has been (between 35-55), but may achieve self-maintenance in unskilled or semi-skilled work
noted to function well in areas of self care and daily living. No assaultiveness (sic), under sheltered conditions, but needs supervision and guidance when under social or
irritability nor destructiveness were reported. There was no history of previous economic stress.

28
 On cross-examination Barlam declared that she already knew Angel before the incident
At present, she may be deemed competent based on the following finding: no evidence of 2 August 1994 because, at one time when she was washing some laundry, she had
of insanity of psychosis, a consistency in relating her story, she appreciates the meaning seen Angel eating porridge (lugaw). She noticed how pretty the girl was. On the other
of the oath she takes as a witness before the court, and is capable of cooperating with hand, she first saw CORDERO on that fateful day.48 Barlam proceed to narrate that she
counsel. saw Angel on her knees, with CORDERO standing beside her while LAGARTO stood
by the door. The man who was already dead, Lagunday, saw her, told her to leave, and
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: when she refused, went outside and hit her with a piece of wood on the left knee and
right elbow. CORDERO slashed the left side of Angel's face twice, then her vagina,
Because of her deafness and associated mental retardation, this patient is prone to gouged out her eyes, and took off her earrings. Both LAGARTO and Lagunday hit
anxiety, panic and inconsistency when threatened by intimidation or a large crowd of Angel's head with a piece of wood.49
people.
On re-direct examination, Barlam maintained that CORDERO was the one who slashed
The accuracy of her testimony will depend much on the cooperation of the people who Angel's vagina then raped her. ("Hiwa dito hiwa dito, anunta, anunta, hiwa kiki, tanda na
would examine her in court. Gubjonsson and Gunn (1982), as quoted in the Principles hiwa pa kiki.")50 When she was asked to identify the man who hit Angel with a thick
and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, state that "even a severely mentally handicapped piece of wood, she went straight to LAGARTO whom she slapped and boxed.51 As the
person may be capable of giving reliable testimony on items of basic fact," but "may defense tried to derail this witness by confronting her with her sworn statement where
demonstrate a high degree of suggestibility when an individual was unsure of the facts." she described the man who hit Angel with a piece of wood as a certain "Lando walang
For example, such patients may agree that the color of a green leaf is pink when unsure ipen," the prosecution clarified that while it is true that one of the accused, Rolando
of its real color, however, suggesting false perceptions that a pencil being held is getting Manlangit @ "Lando," in fact had no front teeth (bungal), the sworn statement was
increasingly hot may not be successful. prepared by PO3 Ko during the investigation conducted when she was not yet wearing a
hearing aid — a statement she never read because she was illiterate. In any case, the
An accurate testimony, therefore will depend much on an environment free distraction prosecution insisted that on the witness stand, Barlam was more than consistent in
and intimidations. (Emphasis ours) specifying the participation of Lagunday, CORDERO, and LAGARTO.52 The court
also observed that from a distance, LAGARTO looked as if his front teeth were
On the basis of the NCMH report, Barlam was fitted with a hearing aid and testified missing.53
anew on 3 October 1994. Her examination was marked by countless objections,
comments, and arguments of counsels. She began by saying that on the night of 1 After the prosecution had rested its case, the court, upon motion of PAO lawyer Atty.
August 1994, after drinking coffee, she went near the warehouse at Kagitingan St. to Jesse Tiburan, and without opposition from the prosecution, discharged accused
relieve herself. While there, she sensed some commotion inside so she peeped through a Manlangit, Yaon, and Baltazar in Criminal Case No. 94-138138 for insufficiency of
hole in the wall. She saw three men and a child. Two of these men were in the evidence. LAGARTO and CORDERO, however, objected to the discharge of Manlangit
courtroom and she identified them as LAGARTO and CORDERO. The other one was on the ground that he was allegedly identified by Barlam. In view of such objection, the
already dead.44 court reconsidered its order with regard to Manlangit, who, by counsel, waived the right
to present evidence and prayed that the case against him be deemed submitted for
Barlam was then shown six pictures of seven different girls (Exhibits "BB," "BB-1" to resolution.54
"BB-6"). She positively identified Angel Alquiza in one picture where angel was seated
beside another girl, both of them clad in "flower girl" attire.45 She added that one of the The defense of CORDERO and LAGARTO consisted mainly of denial and alibi.
men hit her knee and left elbow. They ordered her to leave, but she did not, so one of LAGARTO even posed insanity as an alternative defense, but this failed to convince the
them hit her with a piece of wood. Another man gouged out the child's eyes, cut off her trial court.55
ear, removed her earring, slashed her vagina, then raped her. She said this man wore
eyeglasses, all the while pointing at CORDERO.46 After the child was raped, a man hit CORDERO denied that he had anything to do with the rape-slay of Angel Alquiza. He
her head while another stayed by the door. They tied her feet, wrapped her in some maintained that around 7:30 p.m. on 1 August 1994, he was at home talking to a certain
yellow material, then put her in sack. She pointed to CORDERO as the man who Gerardo Eriste, who was asking his help in borrowing money from an Indian
wrapped the child in the yellow material. She even saw tears in the child's eyes when moneylender. After Eriste left around 9:30 p.m., he ate, rested, a video on television
she lit a small candle.47 with his children for about an hour before going to bed at about 11:00 p.m. He woke up
at 7:00 a.m. the following day and began counting the pedicab boundary money which

29
he would remit to the Indian moneylender. On 3 August 1994, around 11:00 a.m., police point and added that she had an argument with the woman who was apparently coaching
arrived at his house, saying he was being invited by Maj. Gacutan to the station. He Barlam to point to CORDERO. The woman was a companion of Angel's mother
denied any of knowledge of the incident in question, but he was nevertheless instructed Zenaida.66
to stay in the office. In the afternoon, he accompanied Maj. Gacutan to his house to see
their dining table which had a glass top instead of a tablecloth. Then, they went back to To show further that Lagunday did not implicate either CORDERO or LAGARTO, the
Station 2, where he stayed for about 12 hours, leaving around 1:00 or 2:00 in the defense presented Vivencio Singalawa, who testified that on 5 August 1994, when he
morning of 4 August 1994. He was allowed to leave because, apparently, he did not visited his friend Jr. Jeofrey (Lagunday's alias) shortly after lunch at Precinct 2, the latter
know anything about the killing of Angel. On 7 August 1994, he was again invited to allegedly confessed that he was the sole author of crime under investigation. Lagunday
the police station. There, Maj. Gacutan said he would be brought to the Homicide also mentioned the names "Lando," "Joel" and "Curimao" (the aliases of CORDERO's
Section at UN Avenue because they were being pestered by some members of the press. co-accused in Criminal Case No. 94-138138), who served as lookout. Lando was a
Maj. Gacutan even allegedly asked some money in exchange for his liberty. While in worker of Mang Gorio, while Joel and Curimao were scavengers (nagtutulak ng
detention with Lagunday, Manlangit, Yaon, and Curimao, he learned that Lagunday kariton). Singalawa, a barangay tanod, knew the warehouse at Kagitingan St. where the
implicated him upon the instance of two corpulent women who had visited the latter and crime was committed because he grew up in that place; yet, he claimed he did not know
banged his banged his head on the wall. He was detained for about 12 hours and left the CORDERO, who lived in the same barangay.67
station around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. on 8 August. On cross-examination, CORDERO said
he was unaware of the warehouse at Kagitingan St., which is about ten blocks from his LAGARTO denied any involvement in the crime and claimed he was also at home at the
house at Sunflower St.56 He also said that he did not know Lagunday prior to 8 August time of its commission. At the hearing of 4 August 1994, his attorney moved that he be
1994, even if the latter was one of their pedicab drivers, because his wife was the one taken to the NCMH for examination. The Court granted said motion, but as of the time
who dealt with them.57 LAGARTO was called to testify on 5 December 1994, the result of such assessment had
not yet been submitted to the court.68
CORDERO's alibi was corroborated by his daughter Emily58 and Gerardo Eriste.59
Under oath, LAGARTO said he was a garbage collector. On the night of 1 August 1994,
Rebuttal witness Maj. Franklin A. Gacutan, however, claimed that on 4 August 1994, he collected Rosita Besonia's trash, then asked rice from her as his customary "fee." He
while CORDERO was being questioned in relation to the case of Angel Alquiza, he told went home with a plate of rice, ate dinner, then slept on the floor by the door from 7:00
CORDERO he could leave because they have not yet found any evidence against him. p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the following day. On 4 August 1994, while on his way to his cousin at
He also denied the allegation that CORDERO was arrested because of media pressure Don Bosco, policemen in two vehicles — a car and an owner-type jeep — suddenly
and that the latter offered him a bribe.60 forced him into the jeep. A man in the car (Lagunday) was allegedly being compelled by
the other policemen to point him. In the evening, after spending some time at the Luneta
On cross-examination, Maj. Gacutan said Lagunday did not implicate CORDERO or detachment of the WPDC, he went home with the police because they were looking for
LAGARTO,61 and it was Barlam who pointed to CORDERO when the latter was a certain "Buboy Bungal." Although his brother's nickname was Buboy, the latter was
already in detention.62 And in the early hours of 4 August 1994, he and his men, not "bungal." In any event, they also brought Buboy to the Luneta detachment only to be
accompanied by Lagunday, inspected the warehouse where the alleged crime took place. released when it was confirmed that Buboy's front teeth were indeed intact. He denied
It was surrounded by houses and some street lights were on. They entered the dark the charges against him, as well as the allegation that he drove a pedicab for
warehouse but found no evidence. Peeping inside, nothing could be seen because of the CORDERO.69
darkness.63
LAGARTO's neighbors; Rosita Besonia70 and Janet Badilla,71 and his mother Noriana
SPO2 Enrico Miranda was summoned to testify on the veracity of the sworn statement Lagarto72 confirmed his alibi. When cross-examined, however, LAGARTO admitted he
of Barlam. Since they were neighbors and she laundered their clothes, they supposedly was alone at home at 7:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994.73
understood each other using crude sign language. In the investigation conducted by PO3
Ko on 4 August 1994, he acted as interpreter between the latter and Barlam. The defense In its Decision74 of 31 January 1995, the trial court, per Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion,
sought to capitalize on said sworn statement, where Barlam did not mention either the gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and convicted CORDERO and
name of LAGARTO or CORDERO.64 Moreover, during the hearing of 17 August LAGARTO for the crime of rape with homicide, but exonerated as follows:
1994, he allegedly saw Barlam outside the courtroom talking to another woman who
was showing to her a newspaper and pointing to a picture of CORDERO, but he did not WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the
hear what they were talking about.65 Another witness, Gloria Sigua, corroborated this Information as against ROLANDO MANLANGlT for lack of evidence, and finding

30
both accused HENRY LAGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO Y coached and (this) was very apparent constraining even the court to warn to (sic) private
MARISTELA "guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH prosecutor regarding his coaching of the witnesses. Witness Barlam had changed her
HOMICIDE charged in the Information of these cases, and sentencing both accused testimony several times and her general appearance would not merit belief against the
(with) the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law. constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the private 3. In failing to consider that by physical evidence, the bodega could not have been the
complainant the sum of P100,000 for the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the situs of the crime disproving thereby the claim that the victim was raped and killed
sum of P500,000 for moral damages; and the amount of P52,000 for actual damages inside is not also because no evidence or traces was found inside it but also because the
representing expenses incurred for the wake and funeral of the victim. They are further bodega which is not big — simply an uninhabited house, is within the heart of the
ordered to pay the cost of these suits. community and surrounded by houses and an unusual commotion or noise would
certainly invite attention.
SO ORDERED.
4. In failing to consider that Henry Lagarto demonstrated his innocence before the court
Disagreeing with the penalty imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed on 8 February and was supported by witnesses.
1995 a motion for reconsideration75 of the Decision, and asked that it be modified by
imposing the proper penalty of death instead of reclusion perpetua. In its Order dated 10 For his part, after several extensions, CORDERO filed on 29 September 1997, through
February 1995,76 the trial court did not take cognizance of the motion on the belief that counsel, his Appellant's Brief. He claims therein that the trial court committed grave and
"the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the reversible error in the following:
perfection of an appeal." This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General to elevate the
matter to this Court by certiorari. The petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 119987-88, was 1. In rendering the order dated May 22, 1996 and in considering the same as the
unanimously granted by the Court en banc on 12 October 1995, thus: promulgation of the penalty of death against accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 2. In failing to hold that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti.
case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the
penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent's judge's 3. In failing to hold that the evidence of the prosecution and defense both points (sic) to
finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape the fact that accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is completely innocent of the offense
with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 charged.
of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision
imposing the death penalty. 4. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution's (sic) witness Major
Franklin Gacutan is adverse against the prosecution and points to the fact that the
SO ORDERED.77 accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is innocent of the offense charged.

Accordingly, on 22 May 1996, Judge Veneracion promulgated an Order in open court at 5. In failing to hold that prosecution's (sic) witness Herminia Barlam is not qualified to
the National Penitentiary, imposing the proper penalty of death upon the accused.78 become a witness.

In his Appellant's Brief filed on 9 September 1997, LAGARTO pointed out that the trial 6. In taking into account of, and according evidentiary value to the finding and
court seriously erred: recommendation of (the) psychiatrist from (the) National Center for Mental Health.

1. In rendering a judgment of conviction on accused Henry Lagarto apparently by 7. In not finding as a fact that it is highly impossible and improbable for witness
conclusions or assumptions without considering the fact that there is no conclusive Herminia Barlam to have seen what had (sic) supposedly happened in the subject
evidence to show that Angel Alquiza was really raped and killed by somebody; warehouse on August 2, 1994.

2. In failing to consider that there was no credible and acceptable identification which is 8. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution's (sic) witness Heminia
free from doubt that anyone of the accused and more particularly Lagarto committed of Barlam is full of discrepancies and self contradictions.
participated in the commission of the crime charged. The prosecution witnesses were

31
9. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution witness Herminia Barlam is Pursuant to the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 119987-88
highly improbable and contrary to human experience. directing the imposition of the penalty of death upon the herein accused in consonance
to (sic) the findings that they had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under
10 In not finding as a fact that prosecution witness Herninia Barlam is a perjured, biased Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
and rehearsed witness. 7659, the penalty imposed to (sic) the herein accused, HENRY LAGARTO Y PETILLA
and ERNESTO CORDERO Y MARISTELA shall, as it is hereby imposed, be the
11. In failing to hold that the adverse result against the prosecution of the ocular penalty of death.
inspection is a proof that the accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is innocent of the
offense charged. Pursuant further to the aforesaid Decision, after this Order is duly promulgated, let the
entire record of these cases be returned to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic
12. In not finding as a fact that the testimonies of the other witnesses for the prosecution review.
are unworthy of belief.
SO ORDERED.
13. In failing to hold that conspiracy is (sic) not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution and that therefore criminal liability is individual, not collective, and thus while the other dealt with its promulgation:
exempts the herein accused-appellant from the offense charged.
When these cases were called, both accused appeared assisted by counsel de oficio,
14. In not finding as a fact that the late Abundio Lagunday was the sole author of the Atty. Jovito Salvador, PAO lawyer of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, who, was appointed
offense charged, counsel de oficio.

15. In failing to hold that the defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence In view of the failure of counsel on record Atty. Miguel Badando for accused Henry
for the prosecution is weak and came (sic) from (a) source that cannot be characterized Lagarto and Atty. Paterno Esmaquel for accused Ernesto Cordero to appear despite
as fully unbiased and disinterested. notice. (sic) Private Prosecutor Pete Prinsipe interposed no objection to the
promulgation of the Order in the absence of counsel on record.
16. In falling to hold that accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero was illegally arrested
and not accorded the right to preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Court ordered that the Order of this Court pursuant to the Decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court be promulgated by reading to both accused the same Order in
17. In holding (that) the accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is liable to private the language known and understood by both of them.
complainant for damages.
Thereafter, the order for the transmittal of the entire records of these cases to the
As the issues raised by LAGARTO are covered by CORDERO's assignment of errors, Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review is hereby reiterated.
we will concurrently dispose of them.
SO ORDERED.80
CORDERO claims that the trial court never amended or modified its Decision of 31
January 1995, as mandated by us in People v. Veneracion (G.R. Nos. 119987-88). He Both LAGARTO and CORDERO claim that the prosecution failed to prove the act of
argues that the trial court merely "ordered that its Order pursuant to the Decision of this death of Angel Alquiza because her death certificate was not proffered in evidence.
Honorable Court be promulgated by reading to both accused the same Order in the Instead, the prosecution presented the Autopsy Report (Exh. "C"), which allegedly
language known and understood by both of them" and did not state that the penalty cannot be considered as proof of the fact of death of Angel "because there was no proper
being imposed was death. and sufficient identification of the victim that was mentioned in said autopsy Report."81

CORDERO's apprehension is unwarranted because the trial court issued two orders in This issue, however, is answered in CORDERO's Brief itself: "The said Autopsy Report
open court at the National Penitentiary on 22 May 1996. The first was made in states that the body of the supposed victim, Angel Alquiza, was identified by a certain
compliance with our ruling in People v. Veneracion: Romezen Alquiza, a brother of the victim."82 The records show that Romezen
submitted to the NBI a request for autopsy and the NBI issued a Certificate of
Identification of Dead Body which he also signed.83 These were essential for the

32
autopsy which was eventually made by Dr. Lagat. In any case, there is no rule that CORDERO also claims he was never properly identified as one of the perpetrators of
specifies who may identify a victim. It is enough that such persons knows the one being the crime charged. Jose Soriano said he saw Angel with Lagunday on the night of 1
identified. Certainly, a brother of the victim can recognize his own sister even with her August 1994 and they "appeared normal." Barlam's sworn statement of 4 August 1994
manifest physical injuries. The prosecution cannot be faulted for not presenting other mentioned Lagunday, LAGARTO, and a certain Lando, but not CORDERO, a fact
witnesses to verify Romezen's identification, the choice of witnesses being a matter of confirmed by PO3 Ko and SPO2 Miranda. Maj. Gacutan said they had no evidence
legal strategy and prerogative. Neither was CORDERO denied any opportunity to cross- against CORDERO, so they allowed him to go home after he was initially invited to the
examine him regarding such fact because the Autopsy Report is an official document the police station. Vivencio Singalawa claimed Lagunday admitted sole authorship of the
authenticity of which is presumed. Its validly, therefore, cannot be collaterally attacked crime. And because he was not properly identified by the State's prime witness,
by putting Romezen on the witness stand.1âwphi1.nêt CORDERO suggests that Barlam was merely coached by the family of Angel to
implicate him.
As to the legal failure of the prosecution to prove the cause of Angel's death,
LAGARTO and CORDERO maintain that the fact of stabbing — which, according to We are not convinced. Jose Soriano could not have seen CORDERO with Angel that
the post-mortem findings of Dr. Lagat, was the cause of death of the victim — was not night because CORDERO was somewhere else at the time. Prosecution witness Rolando
adequately established. Dr. Lagat said that there might be other causes of death, such as Javar saw CORDERO and LAGARTO between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994
Angel being hit by a motor vehicle. But then, this is a mere probability. If we were to standing by the warehouse at Kagitingin; as if they were waiting for someone (palinga-
stretch this line of reasoning further, other possibilities may be apparent: Angel could linga). Javar is even related to CORDERO by affinity; his son being married to
have still been alive when she was ran over by the motor vehicle, as suggested by the CORDERO's daughter, so there appears no plausible reason for him to lie, especially in
defense; on the other hand, she could have already been dead at the time. Preliminary this case where his balae is faced with death sentence. On the other hand, whatever
police findings showed the that sack wherein Angel's body was placed was found along Lagunday revealed to Singalawa is purely hearsay, since Lagunday died even before
a truck route. In the flooded street, it could have easily been hit by a truck, thus, arraignment.
producing the cranial injury which the defense suggests might be the true cause of
Angel's death. Or, it is also likely that she could have been severely hit on the head by a As stated earlier, Barlam's sworn statement of 4 August 1994 was taken by PO3 Ko with
hard object. This last scenario, being supported by the testimony of prosecution witness the assistance of SPO2 Miranda. Since she is illiterate and at the time had not yet been
Barlam, seems more plausible. It is worth mentioning that Angel suffered numerous equipped with a hearing aid, it is highly probable that the essence of her narration was
injuries which could not all have been caused by a motor vehicle. Neither could the not captured in the translation and transcription. In any event, even if she did not name
defense explain why or how the body could be wrapped in a round yellow tablecloth, CORDERO in her sworn statement, she undoubtedly and consistently pointed to him
then put inside a sack, if Angel was still alive at the time. CORDERO even stresses that and LAGARTO in open court, even slapping and boxing them at times to demonstrate
his table has a glass top, instead of a mantle. He fails to consider the implication of this her indignation. We agree with the trial court that by her words and actions, Barlam had
fact: The round yellow tablecloth seen in his house by Ofelia Lagman in July 1994 was sufficiently and convincingly identified CORDERO and LAGARTO as two of the men
the one used in wrapping Angel's body because said tablecloth was no longer there after who raped and killed on 2 august 1994.
the incident in question. The prosecution, for its part, offered convincing and logical
answers to these questions, based on the testimonies of its witnesses. The manner in which Barlam testified in court betray not a single hint that anyone had
coached or coaxed her to implicate CORDERO. Defense witnesses Gloria Sigua and
It is further argued that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of rape because the SPO2 Miranda supposedly witnessed how a companion of Zenaida Alquiza showed
Autopsy Report did not categorically state that Angel was, in fact, raped. Dr. Lagat's Barlam a newspaper with CORDERO's picture in it. Sigua allegedly argued with this
examination revealed that Angel's genital injury was caused by a sharp-bladed weapon. woman after hearing her say, "ito ba, isama mo na ito sa pagturo."84 Yet, SPO2
Ultimately, CORDERO concludes, "the testimony of witness Barlam regarding the rape Miranda, who was standing beside Barlam at the time, heard nothing.85 What is even
in question cannot prevail over the aforesaid finding and autopsy report of Dr. Lagat." more telling is he believed there was nothing wrong with Barlam, save for her hearing
This is non sequitur. The finding that the incised wound on Angel's genitals was caused impairment, and that she was telling the truth.86
by a sharp-bladed instrument does not necessarily mean that she was not raped. Barlam,
whose competence and credibility as a witness was upheld by Judge Veneracion based For his part, Maj. Gacutan supposedly did not arrest CORDERO because had no
on the NCMH report and on his own observation of her deportment during the three evidence against him. The information supplied by prosecution Lagman and Javar,
days she testified in court, swore that she saw Angel being raped in the early hours of 2 linking CORDERO to the crime, was sufficient to give the police a reason to arrest him.
August 1994. Ultimately, CORDERO's role in the crime charged was duly established when he was
positively identified in court by Barlam as the cohort of Lagunday and LAGARTO.

33
From the moment Barlam surfaced as an eyewitness to the crime, accused-appellants Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime,
LAGARTO and CORDERO, through counsel, have desperately tried to disqualify her unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
on ground of incompetence. Obviously aware of the futility of any to objection to
Barlam's testimony on account of the psychiatric finding by the NCMH, after the three Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The
examinations, that "she may be deemed competent," the defense attacked instead the following persons cannot be witnesses:
damaging contents of the NCMH psychiatric evaluation report anchored on the
following grounds: (1) said report is hearsay because the doctors who prepared and (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
issued the same were not presented in court; and (2) it was not offered in evidence by such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
the prosecution.
(b) . . .
This argument fails to consider the very nature of the NCMH report. Having made upon
order of the trial court, such report is in the nature of an official document in aid of Barlam could certainly perceive and make known her perception to others. Even if she is
judicial determination. It is not evidence for the prosecution or against the defense but a deaf, she saw what happened on 2 August 1994. She related what she saw to the police
document — a scientific report — prepared and issued by an entity totally removed on 4 August 1994; to the psychiatrists who examined her at NCMH on 26, 29, and 31
from the criminal proceedings, hence, indifferent, objective, and impartial. To be August 1994; and to the trial court on 26 August, 3 and 4 October 1994. Did she
utilized by the trial court, it need not be offered in evidence by the prosecution because "intelligently" make known her perception to others, especially when she testified in
the court may take judicial notice of its existence and composition. It is also for this court? Certainly, she did. Everybody understood her even if some of her statements on
reason that its contents cannot be rejected on account of being hearsay. minor points were inconsistent. A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes would
readily reveal that counsels for the defense attempted in vain to confuse her on relevant
The fate of accused-appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO depends greatly on the facts, even confronting her with her sworn statement — a clear indication that she
credibility of Barlam as a witness. The trial court also recognized this, such that it connected with them "intelligently."
propounded numerous classificatory questions throughout the hearings of 3 and 4
October 1994, when Barlam was testifying on the witness stand after her psychiatric Because of Barlam's "deafness and associated mental retardation," the defense harped
examination, just to elucidate her responses amid the sea of queries unleased by the that she should be disqualified from testifying. The disquisition above, notwithstanding,
lawyers. It is in cases like this where we find ourselves adhering more to the principle we have ruled that even a mental retardate or a feeble-minded person could qualify as a
that factual findings of the trial court must be accorded respect and even finality on competent witness.90
appeal because the trial judge had every opportunity to question the witness, hear her
testify, and observe her demeanor and deportment.87 Exceptions to this rule exist, such Instead of finding Barlam, unfit to be a witness, the NCMH even bolstered her
as when the trial court's evaluation was arbitrarily made, or when some substantial fact credibility by declaring her to be competent and consistent in her recollection and
or circumstance which might affect the result of the case has been overlooked, narration of the events she witnessed on 2 August 1994. Barlam was ordered by the
misunderstood, or misapplied, but no such peculiarity is apparent in the case at bar.88 court to undergo psychiatric tests because she exhibited some aberrant behavior. Her
The trial court has "keenly observed (Barlam) during her testimony and . . . is convinced speech was fragmented, at times unintelligible or incongruous, but this was due in most
that she is speaking the truth."89 After poring over the voluminous records of this case part to her congenital deafness and anxieties. The fact remains that the thrust of her
and scrutinizing the assailed Decision of 31 January 1995, we see no reason to depart testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the events that transpired on 2
from this conclusion. August 1994 never varied. Against the recommendation of the NCMH that her
examination in court should be free from distraction and intimidation, defense counsels
We agree with the observation of the trial court that Barlam was referred to the NCMH literally tried every trick in the book to badger and confuse her, derail her testimony by
precisely upon the repeated motion of defense counsels. Because of her damaging confronting her with her sworn statement, and otherwise cast doubt on her capacity to
testimony, her disqualification was the best ploy for the defense. Barlam, however, testify. Yet, her testimony held.
adequately met the minimum requirements for qualifying as a witness under Sections 20
and 21, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, thus: When Barlam testified on 26 August 1994, prior to her psychiatric examination, she
declared thus:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their, qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception ATTY. PRINSIPE (Private Prosecutor):
to others, may be witnesses.

34
Q On August 2, 1994 at around 2:00 in the morning, will you tell the Court where May we request that the answer be stricken out of the record for not being responsive.
were you?
ATTY. BADANDO (Counsel de parte for Lagarto):
Will you (the interpreter) please whisper to the right ear (of the witness) because this is a
vital witness and we (the prosecution) will request repeatedly. Your honor, I would like to make an observation on record that I could not see any man
wearing an eye glasses.
WITNESS:
COURT:
Kalsada.
Sige.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL (Counsel de parte for Cordero):
WITNESS:
At this juncture, may we manifest that the answer of the witness is not responsive. The
only question is - - - (cut short) The man wearing eye glasses - - sinaksak ang bata.

COURT: COURT:

She answered "kalsada" Go down from where you, were and go to the person whom you said - - (cut short)

ATTY. PRINSIPE: ATTY. PRINSIPE:

Q Where is that street you mentioned? Before that your honor, I just want to make an important observation that immediately
after the witness pointed, that man Cordero, he removed his eye glasses, your honor.
A Kagitingan.
INTERPRETER:
Q And will you kindly tell the Honorable Court whether there was an unusual
incident that happened on that date and time? Please make it of record that the witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and she
is now going to the place - - - (cut short)
A It's Monday - - - (cut short)
COURT:
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
Point to the man.
May we manifest that the answer is not responsive to the question. The question is
whether there was an unusual incident that happened on that date and time. INTERPRETER:

A Oh, hindi ako nanloloko peksman. - - - and she is now pointing to a man, and when asked to identify himself, he claims that
he is Ernesto Cordero — and the other one is Henry Lagarto.
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Please related (sic) it to the Court.
The witness is very angry your honor, in pointing to the accused.91
A Mama na naka salamin - - -
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
You pinpointed Cordero a while ago, why did you pinpoint him?

35
A Iyan ang nakita ko. Iyan tali sako tapos tapon Moriones. The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and she is now going to the two
men, who, when asked to identify themselves claim(ed) that they are (sic) Ernesto
Q You stated that somebody was hogtied or tying a sack, do you know whatever Cordero and Henry Lagarto.
there was (anyone ) inside, that sack.
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
A Marami sako, maraming tali, damit ng bata sira-sira na.
Q You said that you saw Cordero tying the sack, why do you know, do you know the
xxx xxx xxx reason why he was tying that sack?

ATTY. PRINSIPE: ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

You were stating that you saw Cordero tying the sack, were there any other person Incompetent to answer. The only thing is because the witness - - - he is asking about
present during that tying of the sack? Cordero.

A Wala ngang tao. Lima kami, iyan, iyan, isa patay na. Anim iyon, patay na ang COURT:
isa.
Sustain.
ATTY. BADANDO:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
The first thing she said was "siya, ako at siya."
Q Why were you in that place you mentioned a while ago on that date and time?
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
A Iinom ako kape. Iiyak iyak bata. Nagugutom ako. Dinig sabi nang mama,
Yes, let it be on record. huwag ka ingay. - - tapos pinalo ako, sabi ko bakit iyak bata, tapos sabi ko wala na patay
na, ah ah ah.
ATTY. BADANDO:
FISCAL (Should be either Atty.; Esmaquel or Atty. Badando):
Which means three including herself.
Do not allow her to be relating a story.
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
You said three?
Who was the child you saw and you heard crying? What is the name?
A Iyong isa patay na.
ATTY. BADANDO:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Your honor, I object because she was (not) able to identify any child. What she stated
Will you please look around and see whether the two whom you are referring to are (earlier) is a certain Tetchie, a mother of that woman. There is no basis.
inside the courtroom?
COURT:
Will you please step down from the witness stand and approach the two, tap them on the
shoulder. Answer.

INTERPRETER: ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

36
 interpreter. The pages where they appear in the TSN are in parentheses. Fiscal Narciso J.
May I join the objection on the ground that earlier, she was asked - - - (cut short) Rosero, Jr. began the examination by asking what Barlam was doing in the morning of 1
August 1994 (or evening of 2 August 1994).
COURT:
A Iinom ako kape. Lalaba. Iihi ako. (24)
Let the witness answer. Objection overruled.
Iihi ako sa dulo. May tubig sa dulo. Doon ako huhugas. (25)
A Batang sinaksak.
FISCAL:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Q Were you able to finish washing?
Q Do you know the name of the child who was stabbed?
A Oh.
A Oh oh.
Q After you were able to finish washing, what did you observe, if any?
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
ATTY. BADANDO:
May we manifest that the witness failed to answer.
Very vague.
COURT:
COURT:
In the interest of justice, repeat the question.
Answer.
(Interpreter repeating)
A Kita ko tatlo lalake, isa bata apat tao, tatlo lalake isa bata. Totoo sinasabi ko.
A. Oho.
FISCAL:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Q These three male persons who you saw that morning — these three male
What is the name? persons whom you saw together with the female child, would you be able to recognize
these three male persons if you see them again? (27)
A Jingjing.
A Oho.
Q Why do you know that the name of the child is Jingjing?
Q Will you please look around inside the courtroom and find out whether they are
A Dinig ko sa kalsada. all here?

Q If I will show you the picture of Jingjing, would you be able to recognize her? INTERPRETER:

A Oho.92 The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and the witness now is slapping the
face of one male person — two male persons, and when asked to identify themselves,
On 3 October 1994, Barlam went back to court after being cleared by the NCMH to they claimed that they are (sic) Ernesto Cordero and Henry Lagarto.
testify and after being fitted with a hearing aid. Excerpts from that day's hearing are
hereunder quoted minus the objections, comments, and oral arguments of counsels. The A Isa patay na.
questions were translated into Tagalog and her responses quoted verbatim by the court

37
FISCAL:
The witness is pointing to the two accused, (33) which, when asked answered by the
Q How about the female child whom you saw in the company of these three male name of Ernesto Cordero.
persons, if you see her again; would you be able to recognize her?
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
A Oho. (28)
I would like to request, your honor, that the witness be admonished not to slap the
At this point, Barlam was shown six pictures of seven different girls from she correctly accused.
picked out the picture of Angel Alquiza.93
FISCAL:
WITNESS:
The actuation of the witness is merely a sign of her sincerity in conveying the truth to
Sabi nila, alis na, alis na sabi. Sabi ko ayoko, patayin na ninyo ako, hindi ako aalis. the Honorable Court. (34)

FISCAL: xxx xxx xxx

Q So what happened when you answered them that you will not leave, maski na FISCAL:
patayin ka.
Q Alright, aside from this "anunta, anunta", what did these two persons do next, if
A Malayo ako doon, binato ako ng kahoy. Hindi ako loloko. Totoo yon. any?

Q After you said one of these male persons hit you with a piece of wood on your A Isa palo ulo, isa alis diyan, isa pinto, diyan ka, sabi, diyan ka muna, isa palo ako
left knee and on your left elbow, what did you do next after that? tapos hikaw alis.

A Aalis mata, aalis tenga, aalis hikaw, hiwa dito, hiwa kiki niya." Pag hindi totoo, Q (A)fter all those things, what next did these three persons do?
ikukulong ako tapos. (32)
A Isa tali paa, pula, tapos isa dilaw, balot sako, kurtina, wala na, tapos na.
ATTY. BADANDO:
COURT:
Let it be made of record that. the witness is mentioning or motioning that after slashing
the child including the private part, she motion(ed) "anunta, anunta". The witness is Who was the one of the two accused who tie(d) the sack?
touching her index finger into her palm, and then pointing to her private part. That was
aside from slashing. INTERPRETER:

FISCAL: The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and (s)he is now going to the
accused — (cut short) (41)
Q Who, of these three male persons, who among them "anunta, anunta"?
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
ATTY. BADANDO:
May I manifest, your honor, that what has been pointed out by the witness is the accused
Your honor, let it be reflected also on record that the witness said that there was a person Lagarto, your honor.
who has an eyeglasses, but when we look(ed) around, there was no such person wearing
an eyeglasses. ATTY. BADANDO:

INTERPRETER:

38
Let it be recorded that what has been stated earlier, the one pointed was Cordero. It is The witness step(ped) down again to (sic) the witness stand and she is now pointing to
clear from the transcript of stenographic notes dated August 26, 1994 that when asked the accused Lagarto.
by (sic) the same question, the witness pointed to the accused Cordero as the one who
tie(d) the sack. COURT:

FISCAL: Who was the one who slashed the private part of the child?

That is already on record. A Iyan nga dalawa. Kulit mo kausap. Iihi ako, saan ako iihi ako.

ATTY. ESMAQUEL: FISCAL:

And now, the one pointed to was the accused Lagarto. (42) Q You stated a while ago that you heard a child somewhere crying, when you
heard somewhere a child crying, what did you do, if any?
COURT:
A Sabi ko, kawawang bata, tapos hiwa dito, tangal mata. Totoo iyon, hindi ako
Who was the one who wrapped her with the yellow tablecloth? nagsisinungaling. (44)

Q Iyan. ATTY. BADANDO:

COURT: The witness, a while ago, is motioning that tears (were) flowing down from the eye of
the child.
You go down again and point to the one who wrapped the child with the yellow
material? FISCAL:

A Iyan tali. Iyan na nga ho. Q How did you come to know that tears were flowing from the eye of the child?

COURT: A Sindi ako kandila, kita ko tulo

The witness pointed to the accused Cordero. INTERPRETER:

Q You said that the eye was taken out, who remove(d) the eye? Witness referring to her two eyes.

ATTY. BADANDO: WITNESS:

And the witness was shouting yanyanyan. Hina lang.

COURT: FISCAL:

Ayan, ayan. Q At the time you lighted the candle, how far were you from the child?

Q You said that the face, was slash(ed), who slash(ed) the face? (43). A Dito ako ihi, sa dulo, butas dito, dito bata.

A Kalbo. ATTY. BADANDO:

INTERPRETER: We would like to stipulate as to the distance that that is only one arm(s) length. (45)

39
 A Lima taon siya. Ito bahay, ito kalsada, ako lalaba. Ang ganda bata. (11)
FISCAL:
xxx xxx xxx
About one arm(s)length or one a half arm(s)length.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
Q Where was (sic) these three persons at the time you saw the child crying?
Q Before the incident which you saw on August 2, 1994, have you already met or
A Sa gilid. Dito kahoy, tapos tali sako, tapos balot dilaw, tali pula, tali paa. saw (sic) the accused Cordero? (15)

INTERPRETER: A Hindi pa.

Witness is motioning to her feet. Q So when for the first time did you see the man with an eye glasses?

WITNESS: A Noon nga, noong una doon. Tatlo iyan. Patay na isa.

Totoo ho, hindi ako nanloloko. Q When you said "noon nag, what are you referring to?

FISCAL: A Isa bata tatlo lalaki.

Q What was the attire of the child, if any, when you saw her crying, if any? Q And where did you see those three male(s) and one child?

A Dilaw daster may manggas. A Iihi ako dulo. Sindi ako kandila. Doon tubig huhugas ako, "uulan-ulan.

FISCAL: INTERPRETER:

Q At the time the portion of her body was slashed, and the private part of the body Witness is motioning the size of the candle.
was slashed (46) by the accused, what was her attire, was she still wearing that attire?
A Tapos ligo na ako. Ihi ako tapos dito rinig ko bata aray. Nihiwa na.
A Hindi na.
INTERPRETER:
Q What do you mean?
Witness is motioning to the eye, the ears, (16) the throat, the private organ.
A Patay na siya. Wala nang damit. (47)
A Ako nga palo kahoy. (17)
The following day, 4 October 1994, Barlam was cross-examined. Her testimony, as that
on direct, are similarly quoted and paginated: Barlam's erratic behavior became manifest as the hearing droned on, but so did the
clarity and consistency of her narration. She pretended picking lice off the interpreter's
Q Before the incident that you saw on August 2, 1994, did you already know head; she said her father's cousin was a tin can; she even allegedly exposed her private
Angel Alquiza? part to the defense counsels. There is no denying, however, that she saw Angel
surrounded by these three men — one a pedicab operator with a history of abusing even
A Oo. Kakain ng lugaw. his own daughters; the other two, scavengers and occasional pedicab drivers.
CORDERO stood before her as she knelt on the floor. LAGARTO stayed by the door.
Q When for the first time did you meet Angel Alquiza before that incident on Lagunday saw Barlam, shooed her away, then went after her and hit her with a piece of
August 2, 1994? wood when she would not leave. The left side of Angel's face was slashed twice by
CORDERO, who also gouged out her eyes and cut her vagina all the way to and beyond

40
her anus. He took her earrings. Angel's head was bashed in when she was hit with a knowledge of its existence, which is highly dubious considering that it is a roadside
piece of wood by LAGARTO and Lagunday.94 structure. His daughter Emily and Eriste supported his alibi, but only up to the time that
he supposedly slept at around 11:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994. LAGARTO, on the other
Even on re-direct examination, Barlam was certain that it was CORDERO who slashed hand, lived with his family at Parola Area D, Tondo, Manila, which is a jeepney and
Angel's vagina and raped her. ("Hiwa dito hiwa dito, anunta, anunta, hiwa kiki, tanda na tricycle ride from the warehouse at Kagitingan St. His neighbors, Besonia and Badilla,
hiwa pa kiki.")95 The one who hit Angel with a thick piece of wood was LAGARTO, and mother Noriana corroborated his story that he slept at around 7:00 p.m. on 1 August
and Barlam identified him in dramatic fashion by slapping and boxing him.96 When 1994 until 5:00 a.m. the following day. But on cross-examination, he admitted he was
confronted with her sworn statement where she said that the man who hit Angel with a all alone in their house when he slept.
piece of wood was "Lando walang ipen," it was made clear by the prosecution that such
sworn statement was made in connection with an investigation conducted by PO3 Ko The fact that LAGARTO and CORDERO were at home in the evening of 1 August and
when Barlam had not yet been fitted with a hearing aid. In fact, she did not and could in the morning of 2 August is no indication that they were there the whole time. They
not read such statement so it had to be "read" to her by SPO2 Miranda without her were both placed at the crime by two witnesses. Javar saw them in front of the
hearing aid. Barlam never deviated in relating to the court the complicity of Lagunday, warehouse between 9:30 and 10:00 on 1 August 1994, as if waiting for someone.
CORDERO, and LAGARTO in the rape-slay of Angel. In the assailed decision, the trial Barlam saw them inside the warehouse around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. CORDERO
court even observed that from afar, LAGARTO looked as if his front teeth were was the one who stabbed Angel in the face, slashed her organ, raped her, and tied her
missing.97 feet. LAGARTO hit angel on the head. Together with Lagunday, the three wrapped her
in yellow tablecloth identical with the one Lagman saw CORDERO's house, put her in a
Barlam's testimony, in our opinion, adequately established the liability of Lagunday, sack which they tied with a nylon cord, then, under a mantle of heavy rain, set her adrift
LAGARTO, and CORDERO for raping and killing Angel Alquiza. She not only proved in murky floodwater. Incidentally, CORDERO raises in issue the delay in which Javar
to be competent but also truthful in her narration of what transpired on 2 August 1994. reported to the authorities what he knew about Angel Alquiza's case. This was properly
Her sworn statement might not entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but we have ruled addressed by Javar when he said that he did not initially want to report the matter to
that in case of conflict between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open anyone because CORDERO was his balae.101 In the end, his conscience convinced him
court, the latter generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and to shun family ties in order to help bring justice to Angel.
inaccurate because by their nature, they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than
the affiant.98 Barlam may have strangely at times, but such idiosyncrasy has no bearing Besides, LAGARTO and CORDERO were positively identified by prosecution witness
on the consistency and veracity of her testimony. She repeatedly pointed to accused- Barlam as the authors of the crime charged. Their denial and alibi cannot prevail over
appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO as she spoke, and slapped, boxed, and glowered the positive identification and assertions of Barlam.102
at them when she was asked by the court to identify the malefactors. Neither can we
discount the psychiatric report which gave Barlam a clean bill of mental health. For LAGARTO and CORDERO make much of the perceived impossibility of committing
three days, she was examined by professional psychiatrists, but her story remained the the crime in the warehouse of Mang Gorio. Maj. Gacutan visited the place on 4 August
same. It was the same story she narrated in court, albeit with some minor 1994 and found its perimeter adequately lit and surrounded by residential houses, but its
inconsistencies. interior was so dark that anyone who peeped from the outside would not have seen
anything inside. He did not even find any evidence in the dark bodega.
It must also be noted that Barlam absolutely has no motive to falsely testify against
LAGARTO and CORDERO. The absence of evidence of any improper motive actuating This argument is untenable. It is established that rape is no respecter of time or place. It
her as the principal witness of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion can be committed in small, confined places, like a one-room shack and in the presence
that no such improper motive existed at the time she testified and her testimony is of other family members,103 or a small hut on a raft (alang).104 The same can be said
worthy of full faith and credit.99 of any other crime that accompanies and compounds the rape. In the case at bar, even if
there were houses around the warehouse and there was a lamppost nearby, there is no
LAGARTO and CORDERO deny the allegations against them and said they were dispute that Angel was assaulted therein at 2:00 in the morning during a heavy
sleeping in their respective homes at the time the crime was supposedly committed. By downpour. Under the condition then prevailing, the desolation of the warehouse and its
itself, alibi is a relatively weak defense; it is further emasculated in the absence of any immediate vicinity provided a perfect cover for the atrocities perpetrated against Angel.
showing that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the crime On the other hand, when the court conducted an ocular inspection of the warehouse on
scene or its immediate vicinity at the moment it was being perpetrated.100 CORDERO's 22 November 1992, it was noted that the holes through one or more of which Barlam
home is merely ten blocks from the warehouse at Kagitingan St. He denied any had witnessed the crime have been patched up. The protestation of CORDERO and

41
LAGARTO cannot be given serious consideration because the trial court gathered "from 7. During detention, Lagunday pointed to CORDERO as the alleged mastermind.
the Barangay Captain and other residents that there have been alterations in the
warehouse; that the opening had been covered, so much so that the actual conditions of 8 Barlam saw CORDERO slash Angel's face and genitals before raping her, while
the warehouse at the time of the commission of the offense are no longer obtaining LAGARTO stood by the door. Lagunday and LAGARTO both hit Angel's head with a
during the ocular inspection."105 LAGARTO and CORDERO likewise question the piece of wood. When angel was dead, they tied her feet, wrapped her in a round yellow
wisdom of this observation because there is allegedly no evidence, testimonial or tablecloth possibility owned by CORDERO, placed her in sack, then set adrift in the
otherwise, which would support it. The ocular inspection was, however, conducted with floodwater of Del Pan.
the assistance of the Barangay Captain and some residents. The conclusions of the court,
therefore, is not conjectural but based on information supplied by the escorts who were All these demonstrate that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
more familiar with the physical condition of the warehouse. LAGARTO, CORDERO, and Lagunday shared a common design to rape and kill Angel
Alquiza. Although there is no direct proof of such unity of purpose, conspiracy was
As regard Maj. Gacutan's investigation, which allegedly yielded no evidence against properly appreciated in these premises by the trial court because their individual acts,
LAGARTO and CORDERO, the trial court correctly observed that this is to be expected taken as a whole, showed that they were acting in unison and cooperation to achieve the
because Maj. Gacutan "did not take with him any (forensics) expert to any instrument to same unlawful objective.107 Under these premises. it is not even necessary to pinpoint
recover any physical evidence."106 Nonetheless, his failure to obtain any evidence from the precise participation of each of the accused, the act of one being the act of all.108
the crime scene does not ipso facto eliminate the fact that a crime was committed Thus, the trial court correctly observed that "conspiracy is established by the concerted
therein, especially in view of the damning testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. action of the accused in the commission of the crime as well as in their concerted efforts
after the commission of the crime as well as in their concerted efforts after the
The next crucial question to be resolved is whether LAGARTO and CORDERO, commission of the crime,"109 as when they attempt to dispose of the body of the victim
together with deceased Lagunday, conspired to rape and kill Angel. to hide their misdeed. In the case at bar, the trial court found that CORDERO,
LAGARTO, and Lagunday acted in concert to slay the victim and thereafter conceal her
The following undisputed facts must be taken into consideration and read in connection body by wrapping it in a round yellow tablecloth, putting it in a sack, and leaving it in
with Barlam's testimony: flooded street in Del Pan. Jurisprudence constantly points out that the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime may be considered to
1. On the night in question, Angel was last seen being led by the hand of Lagunday. show an extant conspiracy.110 Even if by Barlam's testimony it would appear that only
Javar saw Angel riding "Ernie Sidecar No. 14" which was driven by Lagunday. Ligaya, CORDERO raped Angel, LAGARTO is still liable for the crime of rape with homicide
wife of CORDERO, confirmed that on 1 August 1994, Lagunday drove "sidecar No. 14" because where conspiracy is adequately shown, the precise modality or extent of
which was part of their fleet of pedicabs. participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The applicable rule,
instead, is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them.111
2. LAGARTO was arrested by the police after Lagunday implicated him along with
accused Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon. CORDERO insists that the trial court erred in failing to hold that he was illegally
arrested and was not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation.
3. Eyewitness Barlam positively identified Lagunday and LAGARTO from a police
line-up as two of the tree men she saw raping and killing a girl in the abandoned This argument has no merit. CORDERO voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" when
warehouse of Mang Gorio at Kagitingan St. he was arraigned on 22 August 1994.112 By so pleading, he submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest, for the legality of an
4. Lagunday and his co-accused Manlangit both used to work for Mang Gorio at the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his persons.113 Besides, his act of
latter's junk shop, which is the abandoned warehouse where the crime took place. entering a plea when arraigned amounted to a waiver of the right to question any
irregularity in his arrest.114 It is too late for CORDERO to protest his arrest because a
5 Lagman told the NBI and the police that the yellow tablecloth where Angel's body was valid information had been filed against him, he was properly arraigned, trial
wrapped was the one she saw at the CORDERO residence. commenced and was terminated, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered
against him.115 Besides, his illegal arrest, if such was the fact, did not have any bearing
6. Javar saw CORDERO and LAGARTO in front of the warehouse on the night in on his liability since an allegation of an invalid warrantless arrest cannot deprive the
question as if they were waiting for somebody. State of his right to prosecute the guilty when all the facts on record point to his

42
culpability.116 Any irregularity in his arrest will not negate the validity of his
conviction duly proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.117 The award of P500,000 as moral damages, which no longer requires proof per current
case law,121 has to be reduced to P100,000.
LAGARTO and CORDERO were charged with and convicted and the special complex
felony118 of rape with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Current jurisprudence122 has fixed at 100,000 the indemnity in cases of rape with
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.: homicide.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, as
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: modified in the Order of 22 May 1996, in Criminal Case Nos. 94-138071 and 94-
138138 dated 31 January 1995, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants
---- HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA. and ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA is
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that said accused-appellants are hereby
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the victim, Angel L. Alquiza, the
When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall amounts of P100,000 as indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as
be death. exemplary damages, in addition to the P52,000 awarded by the trial court as actual
damages.1âwphi1.nêt
It having been established beyond any shadow of a doubt that LAGARTO and
CORDERO raped and killed her on the occasion of the rape, the mandatory penalty of In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
death is inescapable. Four Justices have continued to maintain their stand that R.A. No. Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these cases be
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar. Costs against accused-appellants.

In view of foregoing, it may no longer be necessary to consider if any of the qualifying SO ORDERED.
and generic aggravating circumstances alleged in the informations had been proven or if
any mitigating circumstance had been established. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. However, for
determining the civil liability, an appreciation of one aggravating circumstance — the
cruelty that attended the rape and killing of Angel — may be in order. Angel was a
seven-year old child. Her captors and tormentors were grown-up men. The Autopsy
Report (Exh. "C") listed her injuries: numerous hematomas, abrasions, contused-
hematomas, incised wounds, fractures, lacerations, and stab wounds. Both of her eyes
were missing. Her vagina was sliced, producing an incised wound 14 centimeters long
that went beyond her anus and causing disembowelment. This was done presumably so
that her underdeveloped organ could accommodate the organs of the assailants. She was
bleeding to death, her intestines spilling out, when CORDERO raped her in the presence
of LAGARTO and Lagunday. Her head was hit so hard that part of her brain began to
leak through the fracture. Angel Alquiza suffered through all these. She did not die
instantaneously. The cruelty inflicted was too much and could only come from persons
turned beast.

The presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty119 warrants the award of

exemplary damages,120 which we hereby fix at P100,000.

43
G.R. No. 96848. January 21, 1994. the examining doctor simply did not have the necessary equipment to make a more
thorough report. In fact, she suggested another examination at the Calbayog General
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO Hospital. At any rate, we have held that the absence of spermatozoa in the complainant’s
SALOMON Y OLPANGO @ “ALE,” @ “BOYET” and FELICIANO CONGE @ vagina does not negate the commission of rape; there may be a valid explanation for
PEPING, accused-appellants. such absence, as when the semen may have been washed away or when the rapist failed
to ejaculate.
Criminal Law; Rape; Witness; A mental retardate is not for this reason alone
disqualified from being a witness.—A mental retardate is not for this reason alone Same; Same; Same; Same; Defense of “manual rape” is inadmissible.—And now let
disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his us consider the interesting defense of what we may call Sylvia’s “manual rape” for lack
testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his of a more descriptive term. Admitting the laceration in Sylvia’s vagina, Salomon
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. Thus, in People v. nevertheless maintains that it was caused not by his penis but by Conge’s fingers.
Gerones, the Court accepted the testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had Conge’s purpose was to punish her and to disable her and thus prevent her from hitting
the mentality of a nine or ten-year old “because she was able to communicate her ordeal him again. The trouble with this defense is that it is too comical for words. It looks like a
. . . clearly and consistently.” In the case of People v. Rondina, this Court declared: “The bawdy-house skit featuring a mad avenger and his naughty fingers. Besides, the two
testimony of the offended party herself was especially telling and credible despite the accused and De Guzman have a confused recollection of how this remarkable incident
fact that she was somewhat mentally deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although she happened, the first perhaps in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence.
was really of limited intelligence, the complainant nevertheless did not forget the
harrowing experience she suffered during that frightful night in the bushes when the Same; Same; Same; The crime was committed with force and intimidation and against a
three men seared her memory with the lust they forced upon her. The tale she narrated in mental retardate who was able to relate the details of her outrage.—We are satisfied
court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in anguish and remembered with with the findings of the trial court that the appellants, in conspiracy with each other,
pain and as plain and unembellished as the simple life she led. If she spoke in forthright committed the crime of rape upon Sylvia Soria, with Salomon actually violating her as
language at the trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that horrible Conge helped restrain her while also frightening her with his bolo. The crime was
ravishment she could not push out of her mind.” committed with force and intimidation, and worse, against a mental retardate, who
fortunately was nevertheless able to narrate the details of her outrage. The theory of the
Same; Same; Same; Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility.—In the case defense is absurd. The trial court was correct in rejecting it. The assessment of the
before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia’s speech was slurred and it was evidence, especially the credibility of the witnesses, is the primary function of the judge
necessary at times to ask her leading questions, “her testimony was positive, clear, plain, presiding at the trial. We defer to the findings of the trial court in the case at bar, there
coherent and credible.” Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. We also being no showing that they were reached without basis. People vs. Salomon, 229 SCRA
believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases that a woman will not expose 403, G.R. No. 96848 January 21, 1994
herself to the humiliation of a rape trial, with its attendant publicity and the morbid
curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her The novel defense in this prosecution for rape is that the physical evidence of the
abuse. complainant's violation was caused not by the male organ but by the five fingers of one
of the appellants that were thrust into her vagina in anger and not lust. The defense
Same; Same; Same; It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an engine of faults the trial judge for giving credence to the complainant. It avers that her testimony
malice.—It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an engine of malice, should not have been accepted at all because she is admittedly a
especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma, as in this case. mental retardate and therefore unreliable per se.
There is no evidence that Sylvia’s father is an unnatural parent. Besides, the enmity These curious arguments will not be dismissed out of hand by this Court. The appellants
itself is in the view of the Court not deep enough to provoke the charge, assuming that are entitled to be heard in their defense, no less than the prosecution, although neither
Restituto Soria was willing to use his daughter to falsely accuse his enemy’s son. party is necessarily to be believed if its evidence falls short of the strict standards of the
Significantly, the complaint was filed by Restituto against the son and not the father law.
who was his real adversary.
The trial court found that on October 11, 1987, while Sylvia Soria, a
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Absence of spermatozoa in the complainant’s vagina 20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan,
does not negate the commission of rape.—The lack of a finding of spermatozoa during Gandara, Samar, Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting
Sylvia’s medical examination did not conclusively establish an absence thereof because for her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the ricefield some ten meters away. There

44
she was raped by Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her Salomon corroborated his co-accused. He testified that he saw the whole incident, being
brother Senecio, to whom she related her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to then about three-arms length away from the highway. 10 De Guzman agreed, saying that
their father. That same night, the family walked the three-kilometer distance to the he was also in the yard of his house at the time, and playing his guitar, when the
police station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his daughter by encounter occurred. 11
Salomon and Conge.1 Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital
by Dr. Susan Tanseco, who issued the following certificate:2 Both Salomon and Conge also protested that they had not gone to Masbate in order to
escape as the trial court held. They pointed out that they were in fact investigated by the
A physical examination has been done on Miss Sylvia Soria, 20 years of age, a resident police the day following the alleged incident but no action was taken against them. 12
of Brgy. Casab-ahan, Gandara, Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear, laceration on the The truth, they said, was that they had gone to Masbate to buy two horses on
labia minora at 6:00 o'clock position. There are isolated erythematous areas on both instructions from Salomon's father, Epifanio, who had given them P3,000.00 for this
thighs. There is also the presence of sandy particles on the genital area. Speculum exam, purpose. 13
however, showed negative findings.
Judge Ricardo A. Navidad disbelieved the accused and found them guilty as charged. As
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a conspirators, they were each sentenced to reclusion perpetua and held solidarily liable to
four-month search that they were arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after the complainant for P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P22,000.00 as moral damages,
being detained there for one month, they were taken back to Samar.3 Following a P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. They were also
protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed against them on August 9, ordered to pay the costs. 14
1988, with the Regional Trial Court in Calbayog City.4
In the appellants' brief (incorrectly denominated as a Petition for Review), the defense
The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in suggests that the testimony of Sylvia Soria is flawed because she is an insane person
detail the manner of her ravishment by Salomon with the help of his co-accused Conge. who was confined at the National Mental Hospital a few months before the alleged
She described how she was dragged to the ricefield by the two accused and there incident. 15 It is also argued that her testimony was fabricated at the instance of her
undressed against her will. As Conge spread and pinned her legs, Salomon mounted and father, who had a bone to pick with Salomon's father. The appellants insist that their
penetrated her, although with difficulty because she was still a virgin. She felt pain in own version of the incident is more plausible and should not have been rejected by the
her vagina and "something slippery." She could not cry out or repel the attack because trial court in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.
the two were stronger than she and Conge was holding a bolo.5 After her rape, Salomon
sucked and twisted her nipples and demanded that he suck his penis. Her low mentality A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in
was demonstrated in her angry testimony of her refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and
icedrop."6 credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make
them known to the court.16 Thus, in People v. Gerones,17 the Court accepted the
The prosecution presented several other witnesses, 7 including Dr. Tanseco, who testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or ten-
affirmed her medical certificate of the complainant's examination. On cross- year old "because she was able to communicate her ordeal... clearly and consistently." In
examination, she declared that the laceration in Sylvia's vagina could have been caused the case of People vs. Rondina, this Court declared:
by penetration of a blunt instrument such as an average-sized penis.8
The testimony of the offended party herself was especially telling and credible despite
The two accused flatly denied the charge against them. Conge swore that on the night in the fact that she was somewhat mentally deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although
question, Sylvia arrived at the highway and loudly demanded a lamp from the people in she was really of limited intelligence, the complainant nevertheless did not forget the
Epifanio de Guzman's house. He approached her and said there was no lamp to spare, harrowing experience she suffered during that frightful night in the bushes when the
whereupon, as he turned his back to leave, she hit him in the neck with a piece of wood, three men seared her memory with the lust they forced upon her. The tale she narrated in
causing him to stagger. In swift reaction, he caught Sylvia by the waist and pushed her court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in anguish and remembered with
to the ground and as she lay there exposed (she was not wearing any underwear), he pain and as plain an unembellished as the simple life she led. If she spoke in forthright
angrily shoved his five fingers into her vagina. Sylvia cried out at the top of her voice. language at the trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that horrible
Fearing that her relatives might come, he withdrew his hands and immediately left the ravishment she could not push out of her mind.
place.9

45
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and fingers. Conge's purpose was to punish her and to disable her and thus prevent her from
it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, hitting him again.
plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. We
also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases 18 that a woman will not The trouble with this defense is that it is too comical for words. It looks like a bawdy-
expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the house skit featuring a mad avenger and his naughty fingers. Besides, the two accused
morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement and De Guzman have a confused recollection of how this remarkable incident happened,
for her abuse. the first perhaps in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence.

The defense points to a supposed hostility between Sylvia's and Salomon's respective Conge declared in his affidavit that Sylvia hit him only once and then swore on direct
fathers due to a conflict over a piece of land and the administrative charge Epifanio filed examination that he was hit twice, whereas both Salomon De Guzman swore he was hit
against Restituto when they were both teaching at the local school. It suggests that this only once.25 Salomon and Conge said that Sylvia was wearing pants but De Guzman
was the reason for Sylvia's false charge against Salomon, who has simply been caught in insisted with equal certainty that it was a skirt.26 Salomon said Sylvia's pants were
the crossfire, as it were, between Restituto and Epifanio. pulled down to her knees, but Conge declared that she was completely disrobed, then
said the pants came down only to her ankles.27 Conge first said his fingers were spread
The connection is far-fetched. It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an when they thrust them inside Sylvia's vagina but, sensing the trial court's disbelief,
engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarassment and even recanted and said he put his fingers together in the shape of a cone before plunging them
stigma, as in this case. There is no evidence that Sylvia's father is an unnatural parent. into Sylvia's bared organ.28
Besides, the enmity itself is in the view of the Court not deep enough to provoke the
charge, assuming that Restituto Soria was willing to use his daughter to falsely accuse We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the appellants, in conspiracy
his enemy's son. Significantly, the complaint was filed by Restituto against the son and with each other, committed the crime of rape upon Sylvia Soria, with Salomon actually
not the father who was his real adversary. violating her as Conge helped restrain her while also frightening her with his bolo. The
crime was committed with force and intimidation, and worse, against a mental retardate,
The lack of a finding of spermatozoa during Sylvia's medical examination did not who fortunately was nevertheless able to narrate the details of her outrage. The theory of
conclusively establish an absence thereof because the examining doctor simply did not the defense is absurd. The trial court was correct in rejecting it. The assessment of the
have the necessary equipment to make a more thorough report. 19 In fact, she suggested evidence, especially the credibility of the witnesses, is the primary function of the judge
another examination at the Calbayog General Hospital.20 At any rate, we have held that presiding at the trial. We defer to the findings of the trial court in the case at bar, there
the absence of spermatozoa in the complainant's vagina does not negate the commission being no showing that they were reached without basis.
of rape; there may be a valid explanation for such absence, as when the semen may have
been washed away or when the rapist failed to ejaculate.21 The Court cannot conclude this opinion without remarking on the extraordinary lengths
to which an accused will go to falsify the truth and evade the sanctions of the law. The
The appellants decry the trial judge's conclusion that they had gone to Masbate to defense in this case is illustrative of such desperation. What the appellants have not
escape, but it appears that this was really their intention. In the first place, it is not true considered is that the Court is not without experience in detecting falsehood and should
that they were investigated before they left, for the fact is Salomon's father stopped the not have been expected to be deluded by the ridiculous story they blandly submitted.
investigation on the ground that there was no lawyer to represent them.22 It is also noted Counsel should remember that gullibility is not one of the traits of this Court.
that Salomon used another name in Masbate and called himself Boyet instead of Ale, his
real nickname.23 Salomon and Conge traveled from place to place in that province but WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the trial court is
were not able to buy a single horse during the four months that they were there. Instead, AFFIRMED, except for the award of moral, exemplary, and actual damages and
they used the P3,000.00 Salomon's father had given them not only for their daily needs attorney's fees, which were disallowed. The civil indemnity is retained at P30,000.00.
but also "in dancing and drinking," as Conge put it.24 Well indeed has it been said that Costs against the appellants.
"wicked flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold as a lion." The
appellants' trip to Masbate was unmistakably a flight from justice. SO ORDERED.

And now let us consider the interesting defense of what we may call Sylvia's "manual Notes.—If sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape then it
rape" for lack of a more descriptive term. Admitting the laceration in Sylvia's vagina, should follow that carnal knowledge with a seventeen year old girl whose mental
Salomon nevertheless maintains that it was caused not by his penis but by Conge's

46
capacity is that of a seven year old child would constitute rape (People vs. Atento, 196 GR No. L-25384. October 26, 1973.
SCRA 357).
JOSE CARANDANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. CABATUANDO, Judge of the
The private complainant who is a mental retardate but has the ability to make Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, the
perceptions known to others, is a competent witness (People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BATANGAS, and CONSUELO D. PANDY,
263). People vs. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403, G.R. No. 96848 January 21, 1994 respondents.

Certiorari; Special civil action of certiorari confined to questions of arbitrary acts

GR No. L-1709. 8 June 1948 affecting jurisdiction.— For a writ of certiorari to issue, it must not only be shown that
the board, tribunal or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse
ASCENCION ICUTANIM, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO HERNANDEZ, Judge of of jurisdiction, but also that there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
First Instance of Capiz, and DEMETRIO VINSON, Provincial Fiscal, respondents. the course of law.

CERTIORARI; EVIDENCE; COMPETENCY OF WITNESS, ERROR AS TO; Due process; Due process construed.—Due process contemplates notice and opportunity
APPEAL, CORRECTION BY.—Appeal, and not certiorari, is the proper remedy for the to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one’s person or property.
correction of any error as to the competency of a witness committed by an inferior court
in the course of the trial. Icutanim vs. Hernandez, 81 Phil. 161, No. L-1709 June 8, 1948 Self-serving evidence; Interested party’s testimony in court not self-serving.—Section
18, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party or any other person interested in
Petitioner is charged with parricide for having killed his child of tender age. At the trial, the outcome of a case may testify. The testimony of an interested witness should not be
the prosecution called to the witness stand his wife who is the mother of the deceased rejected on the ground of bias alone, and must be judged on its own merits, and if such
child. Petitioner objected to his wife testifying against him. The trial court overruled the testimony is clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may
objection, on the ground that the crime committed is against her; and for that reason the be believed. Neither can said testimony be said to be self-serving. This Court has said
rule invoked does not apply (section 26 [d], Rule 123). that self-serving evidence is an evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it
does not include a party’s testimony as a witness in court.
Complaining that the overruling of the objection is not only against the law but also
constitutes excess of jurisdiction and a grave abuse of discretion, petitioner seeks in this Injunction not proper remedy where event already happened.—The established principle
Court the annulment of said order and a writ directing the respondent court to refrain is that when the event sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition has already
from giving it effect until it hear from this Court as to what it should do in the premises. happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited because nothing more could be
done in reference thereto. Carandang vs. Cabatuando, 53 SCRA 383, No. L-25384
Without going into the merits of the question raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say October 26, 1973
that a writ of certiorari lies only when an inferior tribunal exercising judicial functions Petitioner Jose Carandang was the caretaker of private respondent Consuelo D. Pandy's
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and 1.5 hectare of coconut land situated at Puting-Buhangin, San Juan, Batangas. He had a
there is no appeal or other adequate, plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of house inside the landholding. He also owned a parcel of land adjoining it. On February
law. Granting, arguendo, that the ruling of the respondent court is erroneous, the remedy 21, 1963 respondent Pandy filed a verified petition (CAR Case No. 866) for ejectment
to correct the mistake is by appeal. To allow parties litigant to come to this Court for the and damages in the Court of Agrarian Relations of San Pablo alleging that petitioner, in
correction of errors committed in the course of the trial, which may be done on appeal, gross violation of the terms and conditions agreed upon between him and the landowner,
would unduly burden this Court with cases to be brought to it on appeal. had stubbornly refused and failed to clear the land of bushes and grasses, to take proper
care of the coconut land and improvements thereon, and to perform the necessary work
Petition denied, with costs against the petitioner. in accordance with the customs and proven practices in the locality; that petitioner had
been feeding his hogs and chickens with coconuts from the landholding; that he
gathered nuts and sold copra without notifying the respondent; and praying that
petitioner be dismissed as caretaker of the landholding and be ordered to pay as damages
the sum of P370.00, plus attorney's fees.

47
Petitioner, having been served, on March 8, 1963, with the summons and a copy of the Subsequently, the court ordered an ocular inspection of the landholding involved to
complaint, and having failed to file his answer, the agrarian court, acting on the motion determine the number of coconut trees that were one year, two years, and five years old.
filed by respondent, declared petitioner in default and set the reception of respondent's The report of said inspection, dated April 5, 1965, was submitted to the court.
evidence on July 2, 1963 before the commissioner of the court.
The court, in its order dated August 4, 1965, acting on the report of the ocular
On March 13, 1964, petitioner filed, through the Office of the Agrarian Counsel, a inspection, written and oral manifestations of respondent, and petitioner's affidavit
verified motion to set aside the order of default, alleging that the failure of petitioner to regarding the compensation claimed by him for the planting of the coconuts, considered
file an answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, and that petitioner had a valid paragraphs 2 and 3 of the decision satisfied, and directed the Clerk of Court to issue a
and meritorious defense, and praying that petitioner be allowed to file his answer. The writ of execution ordering petitioner to vacate the landholding.
court, on April 17, 1964, denied the motion for failure of movant "to allege either in his
motion to set aside order of default or in his supporting affidavit the facts constituting The writ of execution was served on September 4, 1965 upon herein petitioner by the
his alleged valid and meritorious defense." Provincial Sheriff.

After respondent had presented ex parte her evidence, the court rendered its decision Upon motion of respondent, dated October 5, 1965, the court, on October 28, 1965,
dated October 28, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: issued an order of demolition, ordering petitioner to remove at his own expense his
house from the landholding in question not later than November 15, 1965, and that
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: should he fail to do so, the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas was authorized to demolish
said house. This order was received by petitioner on November 24, 1965.
1. Ordering defendant Jose Carandang to vacate forthwith the landholding of 1.5
hectares owned by plaintiff herein before described subject to the provisions of Section Alleging that the execution of the order of demolition "would work unwarranted
22 of Republic Act 1199, as amended; hardship and irreparable damage and injustice upon petitioner who have not been
accorded his day in court and has not been paid the indemnification due him, and not
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P148.00 as damages, with interest having any adequate, plain and speedy remedy," the instant petition was filed on
at 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint on February 21, 1963, until fully paid; December 2, 1965 praying that a writ of certiorari, prohibition and injunction be issued,
and ordering respondent court to desist from further proceedings in the execution of the
decision in CAR case No. 866, enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from enforcing the writ
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the of execution and order of demolition, and, after hearing the petition, to declare null and
costs of this action. void the proceedings in said case.

Petitioner filed on December 24, 1964 a motion for reconsideration of the decision upon In its resolution dated September 6, 1965, this Court ordered respondent to file their
the grounds that the court erred in not lifting the order of default, and in not determining answer to the petition, and upon the posting of a bond, this Court, on December 16,
the value of the labor and expenses in the cultivation in accordance with the provisions 1965, restrained the Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution and order demolition.
of Section 22 of Republic Act 1199, as amended.
Respondent Consuelo D. Pandy, in her answer, alleged that the order of default was
The agrarian court issued, upon motion, an order of execution dated February 26, 1965, regularly issued on June 10, 1963 by the trial court; that it was only on March 13, 1964
but the court later set it aside for the reason that it was first necessary to determine the that petitioner filed a motion to have it set aside; that said motion to set aside was denied
indemnification that the defendant was entitled to pursuant to Section 22 of Republic on April 17, 1964, and the motion for reconsideration dated May 4, 1964 was also
Act No. 1199, and the court set for hearing the motion for execution for March 25, 1965. denied; that the decision dated October 28, 1964 was rendered in the valid exercise of
the court's jurisdiction; that the motion to reconsider the same, after having been heard,
Petitioner submitted to the court a "bill of accounting", dated March 25, 1965, for the was denied on February 1, 1965; that after the denial no action or step was taken by
value of his labor and plantings such as coconut, banana, black pepper, jackfruit, mango, petitioner despite the availability of remedies provided by law; that the filing by
santol and star apple trees, in the total amount of P9,000.00. petitioner of the "Bill of Accounting" indicated unerringly his conformity to the decision
insofar as the same ordered him to vacate the landholding, for in said Bill, he only
claimed indemnification under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199; that an ocular
inspection of the landholding was ordered to determine the indemnification due to

48
petitioner; that petitioner presented no opposition to the report dated April 5, 1965; that vs. Zulueta, L-16598, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 574, 578; Atlas Development and
petitioner, having been served with the writ of execution on September 4, 1965, made Acceptance Corporation vs. Gozon, L-21588, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 886, 891).
no step to question it; that the court set for hearing the motion for the order of
demolition but petitioner did not appear in said hearing in spite of having received Do the above-mentioned requisites for certiorari obtain in the instant case?
notice thereof; that the writ of execution had been served on petitioner and complied
with on December 3, 1965, i.e., ten days before respondent received copy of the petition It cannot be seriously contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
in the instant case; and that petitioner has not been deprived of his day in court or of the matter and the parties in CAR Case No. 866. Petitioner never claimed such want of
indemnification due him. As affirmative defense, respondent alleged that petitioner had jurisdiction either in the court below or in the instant petition. It cannot be gainsaid that
no cause of action, for there was no averment of any irregularity in the proceedings or the Court of Agrarian Relations had authority to try and hear, decide and determine, the
that the respondent judge had acted without jurisdiction. aforesaid case and to issue and enforce all its lawful orders relative to the case.

The Provincial Sheriff of Batangas, in his answer, alleged that petitioner's house had The question, therefore, to be determined is whether the respondent Court of Agrarian
already been demolished on December 4, 1965 by virtue of the trial court's order dated Relations exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion, and whether there
October 28, 1965. was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In his memorandum, counsel for petitioner argued that this is a special civil action under Was there an abuse of discretion on the part of the court when it declared petitioner in
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the purpose of annulling the proceeding in CAR Case default, and did not lift, upon proper motion, said order? Petitioner claims there was,
No. 866; that there is a cause of action, as is evident from this Court's resolution when he alleged that he "was not heard, even upon proper motion to lift the order of
requiring respondents to answer; that petitioner was denied his day in court when the default, all had been denied by the respondent judge, in short he (petitioner) had not
proper motion to lift the order of default was denied by the trial court; that the decis ion been afforded his right to due process of law." The record belies said claim. The record
was based on incompetent self-serving testimony of respondent Consuelo D. Pandy, so shows that petitioner had not been deprived of his right to be heard. The summons and
that the decision of ejectment was a grave abuse of discretion; that the execution of the copy of the complaint in CAR Case No. 866 were served upon petitioner on March 8,
decision and the demolition of petitioner's house on December 4, 1965, even after the 1963. No answer or responsive pleading had been filed within the reglementary period.
instant petition had been filed and shown to the Sheriff and respondent Pandy, was a The answer should have been filed within 5 days after service of summons, pursuant to
violation of the restraining order issued by this Court; that the trial court abused its Rule 7 of the Rules of Court of Agrarian Relations promulgated under the provisions of
discretion when it refused to adjudicate in whole the indemnification petitioner was Section 10 of Republic Act No. 1267, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
entitled to; that there being palpable excess of authority in depriving petitioner of his 1409. Having failed to answer, the trial judge, upon motion filed by respondent Pandy,
rights and property without due process of law, and the decision dated October 18, 1964 declared, on June 10, 1963, petitioner in default. The action of the CAR judge was
and the order of October 28, 1965, being in their nature interlocutory, certiorari is the perfectly legal. Under Rule 20 of the rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
proper remedy. provisions of the rules of court relating to courts of first instance which are not
inconsistent with the rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations are applicable to cases
Petitioner claims that the instant action is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the pending before the agrarian court. Even section 155 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Rules of Court. In a certiorari proceeding under section 1, Rule 65, of the Rules of Code (Republic Act No. 3844) provides that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall have
Court, the court is confined to questions of jurisdiction. The reason is that the function all the powers and prerogatives inherent in, or belonging to, the Court of First Instance,
of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction, to relieve and it shall be governed by the Rules of Court, provided that in the hearing,
persons from arbitrary acts — that is, of acts which they have no authority or power in investigation, and determination of any question or controversy pending before them,
law to perform — of courts and judges, and not to correct errors of procedure or the courts, without impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the
mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusion (Bustos vs. Moir and Fajardo, 35 Phil. technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases.
415, 417-418; Pacis vs. Averia, L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907, 914-915;
Albert vs. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA It cannot be seriously urged that the trial court abused its discretion when after having
948, 965; Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 915). For a declared petitioner in default, it proceeded to receive respondent's evidence and render
writ of certiorari to issue, it must not only be shown that the board, tribunal or officer judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven warranted. The
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of jurisdiction, but also that trial court simply acted in accordance with the provisions of the rules of court.
there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law (Jose

49
The trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion when it denied on April 17, civil action for certiorari. He cannot now avail of certiorari. Where petitioner had failed
1964, the motion dated March 13, 1964 to lift the order of default, for neither said to file a timely appeal from the trial court's order, he can no longer avail of the remedy
motion nor the affidavit supporting it stated facts constituting a valid and meritorious of the special civil action for certiorari in lieu of his lost right of appeal, if there is no
defense. Section 3, Rule 18, of the new Rules of Court, already in force as of that date, error of jurisdiction committed by the trial court (Mabuhay Insurance & Guaranty, Inc.
provided that the motion to set aside the order of default must show that the failure to vs. Court of Appeals, L-28700, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA, 245, 252).
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and that the movant
has a meritorious defense. Anent this matter it has been held that when a motion to lift Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to adjudicate in
the order of default does not show that the defendant has a meritorious defense and that whole the indemnification petitioner was entitled to as provided in section 22 of
his failure to answer the complaint on time is legally excusable, or that anything would Republic Act No. 1199. It is to be recalled that petitioner, having been declared in
be gained by having the order of default set aside, the denial by the court of the motion default, did not testify. It was to be expected that there was no evidence to show that
to lift the order of default does not constitute abuse of discretion (Manzanillo vs. petitioner was entitled to indemnification. Even then the trial judge, in the interest of
Jaramilla, 84 Phil. 809, 811). justice, set aside the order of execution dated February 26, 1965, and granted to
petitioner herein the benefits of section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199 providing for the
The trial judge likewise legitimately exercised his jurisdiction, when he rendered the payment of indemnification, as is shown by the order dated March 2, 1965, which
decision dated October 28, 1964, based on respondent's evidence, and when on February recited:
1, 1965 he denied the motion for reconsideration in open court.
Wherefore, plaintiff's motion for execution is hereby set for hearing on March 25, 1965
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that herein petition was given notice and at 9:00 o'clock in the morning ... to determine the said indemnification.
opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered. He was not denied of his right to
due process of law. Due process contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before Due hearing on the amount of indemnification was held and the court issued an order,
judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property. (Macabingkil v. Yatco, L- dated April 2, 1965, directing the ocular inspection of the subject landholding. Petitioner
23174, September 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 150, 157; Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. was present at the ocular inspection. The Report, dated April 5, 1965, on the ocular
Cadiao, inspection, determining the number of coconut trees and their ages, was submitted to the
L-28725, March 12, 1968, 22 SCRA 987, 994; Bermejo vs. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764, court. Petitioner did not file any objection to said report. The matter was set for hearing
775). on July 12, 1965, as per notice of hearing dated June 28, 1965. Petitioner did not appear
at the hearing. Another hearing on the report was set for August 4, 1965, but petitioner
Did the trial court commit a grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision again did not appear. The respondent judge therefore, issued the order of August 4, 1965
based on respondent's evidence on the ground that said evidence was self-serving? The awarding petitioner the amount of P173 as the "indemnification he is entitled to under
law itself provides that a party or any other person interested in the outcome of a case section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199," and the same time directed the Clerk of Court to
may testify (Section 18, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The testimony of an interested issue a writ of execution covering paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the decision
witness, this Court has said, should not be rejected on the ground of bias alone, and must dated October 28, 1964 in the sense that petition herein was ordered to vacate the
be judged on its own merits, and if such testimony is clear and convincing and not subject landholding. The order of the court further states that the plaintiff (respondent
destroyed by other evidence on record, it may be believed (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 134, herein) waived her right to the damages awarded to her in the decision of October 28,
138). Neither can said testimony be said to be self-serving. This Court has said that self- 1964 in excess of P173.00. Copy of this order was received by petitioner's counsel on
serving evidence is an evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not August 4, 1965. No step was taken to attack or assail this order of execution, or the
include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. vs. sufficiency of the indemnification. No motion for reconsideration or for new trial to call
Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-21724, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 861, 865- the attention of the court to the insufficiency of the indemnification or to the illegality of
866). the order was ever filed, until 3 months later when the instant petition for certiorari was
filed on December 2, 1965. Such inaction could mean only that petitioner was
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge committed an error in basing his decision completely satisfied with the order of August 4, 1965, otherwise he could have filed
on the testimony of herein respondent, the petitioner had a remedy by appeal and not by within the reglementary period the necessary motion for reconsideration or motion for
a petition for certiorari. Appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is new trial. The decision had become final; execution followed as a matter of course, and
provided in Section 156 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) the court cannot be accused of having exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not avail of this remedy. Instead, on discretion in ordering the execution.
December 2, 1965, after the period for appeal had lapsed, he filed the instant special

50
Can the trial court be accused of not having granted the whole indemnity to which prevented by injunction or prohibition has already happened, nothing more could be
petitioner was entitled? The indemnity to the tenant was governed by Section 22 of enjoined or prohibited because nothing more could be done in reference thereto.
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, which provides as follows: (Aragones vs. Subido, L-24303, September 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 95, 101.)

(4) The tenant shall have the right to be indemnified for his labor and expenses in the PREMISES CONSIDERED, this action for certiorari with prohibition and injunction
cultivation, planting, or harvesting and other incidental expenses for the improvement of must be dismissed, and the restraining order issued by this Court on December 16, 1965
the crop raised in case he is dispossessed of his holdings, whether such dismissal is for a is ordered lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
just cause or not, provided the crop still exists at the time of the disposition.
It is so ordered.
On the basis of said statutory provision, petitioner, in his "Bill of Accounting", dated
March 25, 1965, which he submitted to the trial court, claimed a total indemnity of
P4,000 for various trees, besides coconut trees, namely: coffee, banana, native atis, star
apple, Persian atis, black pepper tree, jackfruit, mango and santol, and P5,000 for his
labor for 16 years, making a total of P9,000.00. It is noteworthy that the aforequoted GR No. L-22995. June 29, 1967.
Section 22 enumerated the indemnity to which the tenant is entitled — "for his labor and
expenses in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other incidental expenses for the WILLIAM ADDENBROOK Y BARKER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
improvement of the crop raised." ... The landholding under consideration is a coconut PHILIPPINES, respondent.
land. The crop raised is coconut. The tenant is entitled to indemnity for the labor and
expenses in the cultivation, planting or harvesting of the crop raised on the land at the Court of Appeals; Supreme Court; Factual findings.—Credibility of witnesses is a
time of dispossession. The diverse fruit trees other than coconut which petitioner factual question not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
claimed to have planted were not for the improvement of the crop raised. The law does
not provide indemnity therefor. Thus in Paz vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-12570, Evidence; Witnesses; Competency of police investigator to testify on his findings.—A
April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1160, 1162, this Court held that it was an error for the Court of patrolman, who made an ocular inspection of the place where 'the vehicular accident
Agrarian Relations to order a tenant to be indemnified for the value of fruit trees on the occurred, is competent to testify on what he found in such ocular investigation, that is,
land, this Court saying that Section 22 "does not provide for indemnity for the value of on facts derived from his own perception.
permanent improvements existing on the land, ... nor for the expenses in clearing the
same upon taking possession thereof originally by the tenant. ... Such being the case, Criminal negligence; Motor vehicles; Speeding; Contributory negligence of victim.—
any award that may be made with regard to the value of said permanent improvements, The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that the
or the expenses of clearing the land, whether fruit land or talahib land, is improper and driver could not stop and avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car
unauthorized, and so the court a quo erred in including in the award an indemnity for the was being driven at an unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances.
items abovementioned."
Same; Where driver brought about the emergency.—While generally a driver is not held
From the above discussions it is evident that the trial court committed no abuse of accountable just because he failed to take the wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the
discretion and it did not exceed its jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioner, if he was not rule does not apply where the emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.
satisfied with the trial court's decision, was appeal. This petition for certiorari must Addenbrook vs. People, 20 SCRA 494, No. L-22995 June 29, 1967
necessarily be denied. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a
conviction by the Court of First Instance of Manila for homicide through reckless
In his prayer, petitioner prayed that pending the determination of the merits, the sheriff imprudence upon the petitioner William Addenbrook Y Barker.
be enjoined from enforcing the writ of execution and order of demolition issued by the
respondent judge. The record shows that the house of herein petitioner on the subject The appellate court's decision depicts the facts as follows:
landholding was demolished on December 4, 1965, as per Sheriff's Return dated
December 7, 1965. The order of this Court restraining the enforcement of the writ of . . . about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper of the Stanvac
execution and order of demolition was issued only on December 16, 1965. The Service Truck with Plate No. 2740, Manila, 960, while travelling southward along
demolition, therefore, could not have been made, as claimed by petitioner, in violation Marquez de Comillas being driven then by accused William Addenbrook, and in front of
of the restraining order. The established principle is that when the event sought to be House No. 1010, came into contact with the body of a pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo

51
with the result that the latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to
accused and his helper in the truck named Amando Valeriano, but was dead on arrival, it take the wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the
having been found that he had received abrasions on the left forehead, and contusions emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.
with lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints, and right buttocks and
waist and fracture of the skull, Exh. B, so that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case The other assigned errors raise questions of fact and credibility which this Court is not at
for homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused resulting in his conviction. . . . liberty to revise.

Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a distance of We, therefore, find no error in the appealed decision, and the same is hereby affirmed.
fifteen (15) paces, as shown by two (2) sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Costs against appellant, William Addenbrook y Barker. So ordered.
Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the occurrence of the
incident. From these facts, the appellate court found it difficult to believe that the van
was travelling at a slow and reasonable speed. Considering further that as postulated by
the accused himself, his view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of
house No. 1010, Marquez de Comillas, from behind which the deceased tried to cross
the street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his horn despite the
visual obstruction by the parked car, the Court of Appeals concluded that he failed to
observe that reasonable care required of a driver of a motor vehicle.

Appellant insists that such conclusion is error, and assails the credibility and
competency of witness Guzman.

Credibility of witnesses is a question of fact (Rumbaoa vs. Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812; Lim vs.
Calaguas, 83 Phil. 796) and, therefore, not reviewable by the Supreme Court. (Abeto vs.
People, 90 Phil. 581). The objection to patrolman Guzman's competency because he was
not presented as an expert witness, nor did he see the incident actually happen, is
untenable. What Guzman testified to are what he saw in his ocular investigation, such as
the two (2) sets of bloodstains and the 15 paces distance between them, that were facts
derived from his own perception.

The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the claim that the deceased suddenly darted
from behind the parked car. Neither did the trial court do so, considering the lack of
corroboration of petitioner's version, and the circumstance that the victim, being a
grown-up man, and not a child, would not have ignored the noise of the oncoming
vehicle, there being no reason shown for his disregarding the obvious danger.

At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to the
truck when he, as alleged by appellant, suddenly darted across the street, does not
exculpate the accused, since the latter was driving at excessive speed.

The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that the
driver could not stop and avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car
was being driven at an unreasonable rate of speed under the circumstances. (5 Am. Jur.
p. 612, sec. 195).

52
 RULE 130, Sec. 22 A — We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE Office and also when I testified in court in the case of my daughter Rosa
Ordoño but then my daughter Leonora Ordoño was still in Manila, sir.
GR No. L-39012, January 31, 1975
During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina
manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoño because he was
AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, Presiding Judge
already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoño.
of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and CONRADO V.
POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The case against Avelino Ordoño, where Leonora Ordoño was the complainant, was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal
Evidence; Witnesses; Disqualification of witnesses; Wife may testify against the Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented Catalina Ordoño as the second
husband who commits rape against their daughter.—Using the criterion judiciously prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense
enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found
perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
wife (the victim’s mother). That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and
traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the daughter is close to the mother Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following
who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as
and assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral herein enumerated:
or physical pain, she usually utters the word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name
(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent;
of the Lord. Ordoño vs. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270, No. L-39012 January 31, 1975
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case
by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with
against the other;
having raped his daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated
November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty four year old victim (Criminal Case No.
Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not consented expressly or impliedly to his
104). wife's testifying against him.
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoño's motion for
a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora
the reconsideration of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and
had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.
threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they
reported the crime to the police.
The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime
committed by him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the
Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped marital disqualification rule.
their other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with
that offense.
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be
restricted to crimes committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries,
Catalina Ordoño said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoño against Leonora was bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as
mentioned during the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoño for the rape committed
referring to any offense causing marital discord?
against Rosa Ordoño. Catalina's statement on this point is as follows:
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
Q — Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
incident involving Leonora Ordoño?
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of

53
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090, it was held under the statutory
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. provision that husband or wife shall in no case be a witness for or against the other,
694, 704). except in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, that the
wife was competent to testify against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for
In the Francisco case, the wife, as a rebuttal witness, was allowed to testify against the incest committed against his stepdaughter.
husband who was charged with having killed his son and who testified that it was the
wife who killed their son. In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539, it was held that the wife may testify
against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest committed against their
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid eleven-year old daughter because incest is a "crime committed against the wife". (See
down in Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said: Owens vs. State, 32 Neb. 167, 49 N.W. 226; Lord vs. State, 23 N.W. 507, 17 Neb. 526;
People vs. Segura, 60 Phil. 933).
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoño could testify against her
within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack husband, Avelino Ordoño, in the case where he is being tried for having raped their
or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the daughter, Leonora.
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed (by) one against the other. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.

Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded SO ORDERED.
that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother). * Notes.—Disqualification on account of relationship.—Full credence cannot be given to
a prosecution witness where it appears strange that of the many people present he alone,
That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family a close relative of the deceased, should be presented as eyewitness to the stabbing.
where, normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared (People vs. Calacola, L-18348, May 31, 1965).
her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need.
Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually The mere fact that the principal prosecution witnesses were related to the victim does
utters the word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord. not prove that they were prejudiced or biased, considering that their testimonies are clear
and convincing and corroborated by other witnesses. (People vs. Miranda, L-18508,
Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoño, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the February 29, 1964; People vs. Dajay,L-18509, February 29, 1964; People vs. Asmawil,
early morning of October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that L-18761, March 31, 1965; People vs. Libed, L-20431, June 23, 1965). Ordoño vs.
date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word, Avelino desisted. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270, No. L-39012 January 31, 1975

That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting
crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is
a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.

In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it was held that the wife was a competent witness
against the husband in a prosecution for rape committed by the husband against his
stepdaughter, who is the wife's natural daughter because the crime was "an outrage upon
nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as well as a crime against humanity itself".
The court adopted the interpretation that "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other" may refer to a crime where the wife is the
individual particularly and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the
husband is being prosecuted (See Dill vs. People, 19 Colo. 469, 475, 36 Pac. 229, 232).

54
GR No. L-568. July 16, 1947 ***** 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER, CASES OF, ENUMERATED BY COURTS AND
TEXT-WRITERS NOT EXCLUSIVE.—For obvious reasons neither text-writers nor
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JUAN the courts have attempted to make an enumeration of all possible cases of waiver. In the
FRANCISCO, defendant and appellant. very nature of things, it would be impossible to make a priori such a complete
enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. So long as the Legislature itself does not
1.CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; MOTIVE, WHEN UNNECESSARY.—It is not make its own statutory and exclusive specification of cases of such waiver, no complete
necessary to prove motive in case the commission of the crime is established as required and exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be attempted by the courts, for in the
by law. absence of such legislation the cases of waiver will be as indefinite in number as
indefinite are and always will be the varying and unpredictable circumstances
2.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE; INCOMPETENCY TO TESTIFY surrounding each particular case.
FOR OR AGAINST EACH OTHER; REASONS FOR.—"The reasons given by law
text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; REBUTTAL EVIDENCE SECURED TO BOTH STATE AND
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against ACCUSED.—The right to present rebuttal evidence is secured to the State, no less than
the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the provision further authorizing
danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer "new
security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question."
justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappines; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility 7.ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ILLNESS DIMINISHING
exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the WILLPOWER; CASE AT BAR.—Whether the accused be considered simpleton or an
other." (70 C. J., 119.) eccentric, or the case one of those well-nigh inexplicable phenomena in human conduct
where the judge finds himself at a loss to discover an edequate motivation for the proven
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS; REASONS FOR.—The rule that the husband acts of the accused,—indulging all reasonable intendments in favor of appellant, it was
and wife cannot testify for or against each other, as all other general rules, has its own held that when he committed the crime charged against him he must have been suffering
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses from some illness (of the body, the mind, the nerves, or the moral faculty) as is
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by contemplated in paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a mitigating
sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general circum-stance, namely, "such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of
rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his
no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the acts." People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, No. L-568 July 16, 1947
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, Juan
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law Francisco appeals to this Court and asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and
aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave to acquit him of the crime charged.
a void in the unhappy home.
On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery,
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER; CASE AT BAR.—The defendant, who was accused was being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that
of killing his son, testifying in his own behalf, not only limited himself to denying that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with
he was the killer, but went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the
the imputation of the crime upon his wife. Held: That in giving such testimony, the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of
husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its natural and necessary said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments,
consequences. By his said act, the husband—himself exercising the very right which he Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife
would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations—must be taken to running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments
have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a
such objection would have been available at the outset. half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his
child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.

55
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused himself that on the way to the house of the justice of the peace after the
accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is incident, he was being helped by the chief of police Iwahi when, according to him,
a virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by the Sergeant Pimentel told him that he was going to swear to the contents of Exhibit C and
justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the that if he would not do so Pimentel would shoot him (p. 17, ibid.); that (the same
latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of accused assured the court) Iwahi treated him well (t.s.n., p. 20, ibid.); and really from
the appellant. the entire testimony of this accused the good treatment accorded him by Chief of Police
Iwahi is clearly discernible. He was under preventive detention in the house of Iwahi
Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by the appellant before the justice of the and it was Iwahi who suggested or told him, after he had killed and dressed the former's
peace of Mansalay on March 5, 1945,. Exhibit C-1 is its English translation. In said pig, that he bring a kilo of the meat to his (appellant's) wife (p. 13, ibid.) It was also
affidavit appellant declares that: "I asked permission from the chief of police so that I Iwahi who allowed him to go to his house on the same occasion for the purposes of the
may be able to raise my bond and to indicate to me the house of one Guillermo procurement of his bail (p. 13, ibid.).
Gervasio, a policeman, and I was consented and the sergeant of police accompanied me
to my house; that upon arriving at the house, Sgt. Pacifico Pimentel allowed me to go up Under these circumstances, besides the complete absence of proof of any reason or
in order that I may be able to talk to my wife and the sergeant of police awaited me in motive why Pimentel should so threaten the accused, we find the accused's version
the stairs of the house; when I was in the house, I remembered what my uncle told me to incredible. On page 16 of the same transcript, answering a question by the Court of First
the effect that he would order someone to kill me because I am a shame and a dishonor Instance, the accused testified that he understands English and the translation Exhibit C-
to our family and suddenly I lost my sense and I thought to myself that if someone 1 of the affidavit Exhibit C is in that language.
would kill me it would be more preferable for me to kill myself; when I looked at the
bed I saw a scissor near my wife and unconsciously I picked up the said scissor and Other indications of appellant's lack of trustworthiness are: While on page 14 of said
immediately stabbed my wife whereupon I looked for my child on the bed and stabbed transcript he testified that he was the only one who went to the house of his wife
him; I killed my son Romeo Francisco whose age is more or less two years and after that because Pimentel, according to him, remained in the house of Roberto Magramo, on
I stabbed myself; after stabbing myself, I heard a shot and the sergeant of police asked page 13 he declared that he was accompanied by the sergeant of police of Mansalay,
me if I would surrender to him or not; I replied him "yes" then I lost my consciousness." Pacifico Pimentel to the house of his wife and that the chief of police ordered Pimentel
to so accompany him. Contradicting the same pretension of his having gone alone to his
Sergeant of Police Pimentel, whose veracity we find in the evidence no reason to doubt, wife's house is his own testimony on page 17 of the transcript wherein he assured
declared (p. 6, t.s.n., Lunar) that the accused confessed to him that because he was affirmatively the question of his own counsel whether Pimentel was the policeman who
already tired or disgusted with his life "on account of the accusation of his father-in- was with him to guard him on the occasion of his going to his wife's house; and really,
law" against him, he wanted to wipe out his family by stabbing his wife, his son and while he imputed upon his wife the wounding of their child, who died as a consequence
himself, and killing the three of them. The same witness also stated (p. 9, ibid.) that the thereof, he admitted that he did not tell this to the justice of the peace of Mansalay (p.
accused confessed to him that he stabbed his wife, his child and himself because he was 18, ibid.), and the reason he assigned for this passive conduct on his part to the effect
ashamed, as his father-in-law told him that he should rather die than live in shame for that he was afraid of Pimentel (p. 19, ibid.) is patently unacceptable, for no motive
having dishonored the family of his wife. whatsoever has been established to make us believe that the accused had reasons to be
so afraid of Pimentel. Appellant's testimony to the effect that Pacifico Pimentel was
The voluntariness and spontaniety of the confession contained in Exhibit C was testified testifying against him because Pimentel "being my guard that time he might be held
to by the justice of the peace of Mansalay and police sergeant Pimentel, one Sebastian responsible for allowing me to go alone" (p. 17, ibid.) is absolutely without merit. This
Punzalan, and the chief of police Alfredo Iwahi; that said justice of the peace had testimony clearly reveals a desire to show that because Pimentel allowed the accused to
previously read the contents of the same affidavit to the accused and that the accused go up the house while the former stayed at the foot of the stairs, said Pimentel would be
signed without any intimidation having been exerted in the presence of said justice of responsible for what had happened unless the accused was the one who killed the child
the peace; that the accused signed voluntarily in the session hall of the justice of the and wounded his wife rather than the wife having accidentally wounded the child and
peace court in Barrio Paclasan (pp. 26-27, ibid.) Pimentel testified, upon the same point, killed him and been stabbed by the accused, who also stabbed himself. As we said a
that no force was exerted upon appellant to state what is contained in the affidavit; that moment ago, we do not give any merit to this purpose in testifying against the accused
he had not maltreated or boxed the accused as pretended by the latter; that the contents to relieve himself of all responsibility for what had happened, it would have been more
of the exhibit were read to the accused; that he did not threatened the accused to shoot conducive to this result if Pimentel had testified that it was not the accused, whom he
the latter if he would not swear to Exhibit C before the justice of the peace, as declared had allowed to go upstairs unguarded, who was guilty, but his wife, of the wounding of
by said accused (pp. 25-26, ibid.) In this connection we note from the testimony of the the child, and that the accused wounded his wife only as the result of the obfuscation

56
produced by the child's death. And the fact that Pimentel gave the version which might through use of violence and intimidation. He also questions the admissibility of Exhibit
place no small blame on him for allowing the accused to go up the house alone, gives D on the ground that it has not been properly identified; and, with more vigor and
special weight to his testimony. stronger emphasis, he impugns the admissibility of the testimony of appellant's wife,
invoking the provision of section 26 (d) of Rule 123 prohibiting the wife and the
This case, as developed by the evidence for the prosecution, which has not been husband from testifying for or against each other.
destroyed nor enervated by that of the defense, presents a truly strange happening. But
the fact of the commission of the crime of parricide appears to us to have been As to Exhibit C, this document was sworn to and subscribed by said accused before the
established beyond reasonable doubt. As to the reasons impelling the commission of the justice of the peace of Mansalay. This official testified that he asked the prisoner before
act, the case is a strange one and admittedly not common. But while it is not necessary the latter signed said exhibit whether he understood the contents thereof, and that said
even to prove motive in case the commission of the crime is established as required by latter answered in the affirmative. The witness further declared that appellant signed the
law (U.S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil., 173; U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil., 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18 exhibit voluntarily and that said appellant said that the said affidavit was his (p. 10,
Phil., 495; U.S. vs. Balmori and Apostol, 18 Phil., 578), here we have a case of a crime ibid.). There is a total absence of evidence, besides the testimony of appellant himself, to
proven beyond reasonable doubt, not absolutely without a proven motive, but with proof show that his statements contained in said exhibit were extracted form him by the use of
of a motive testified to by the accused himself in his confession, strange though it be. violence and intimidation. While we are not unaware of the practice resorted to by some
But at times "truth is stranger than fiction," and it so happens here. The law must be peace officers of extracting admissions or confessions from persons accused of crime by
applied to the facts. the employment of third-degree methods, in the present case we fail to find from the
evidence sufficient proof to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of the peace
We have scanned and searched the evidence and the record diligently for facts and that Exhibit C was signed by appellant voluntarily and with a full understanding thereof.
circumstances which might sufficiently establish insanity or any allied defense, but we Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said Exhibit C were corroborated by the
have failed to find them. testimony of his wife on rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of the admissibility
of the wife's testimony.
As we construe the evidence, we believe that Exhibit C contains the truth, as narrated by
the accused himself who, at the time of making it, must have been moved only by the The rule contained in section 265 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers
determination of a repentant father and husband to acknowledge his guilt for facts on the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest;
which, though perhaps done under circumstances productive of a diminution of the second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it
exercise of will-power, fell short of depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts. necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an
We will have occasion to further consider this aspect of the case later. occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission
would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because where a want of
Exhibit C was signed and sworn to by appellant the day following the fatal event. domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
Presumably, on making this confession appellant had not yet had time to reflect upon testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 64;
the consequences of such a confession to himself — egoism was not yet allowed to 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A.L.R., 133), thus:
operate against the promptings of his conscience. But when on February 23, 1946 —
almost one year after — this man testified in his own defense in the Court of First The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in
Instance, he already had had ample opportunity to reflect upon those consequences. And any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
what happened? As in similar cases, he repudiated his confession, and alleged torture committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
and violence to have been exerted upon his person and his mind in order, so he now second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it
pretends, to extract it from him. As we find the confession to have been given necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an
voluntarily, we feel justified in concluding that its subsequent repudiation by the occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission
accused almost a year after must have been due to his fear of its consequences to would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of
himself, which he not improbably thought might cost him his own life. It was the domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
struggle between the noble and the ignoble in the man, and the latter, aided by instinct of testimony of the other. (70 C.J., 119.)
self-preservation, won.
However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
Defense counsel attacks the value of Exhibit C as evidence of guilt for the reason that between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the
the statements contained therein were not, counsel contends, given spontaneously but other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the

57
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the act upon his spouse, justice would be partial and one-sided if both the State and the wife
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be were to be absolutely precluded from introducing the latter's rebutting testimony.
preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be
and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but waived.
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Waiver of incompetency. — Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the
prosecution but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the
only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
upon her the killing of their son. (p. 15, ibid.) By all rules of justice and reason this gave examination in the usual manner. It is well-established that where an accused introduces
the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness his wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters
against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the the wife herself the germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that
right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered as
punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make
various possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a timely objection to the admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such
criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the
authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and admission, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that the witness's
social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well testimony is not admissible even with the other spouse's consent. Clearly, if the statute
as by those who may read the same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant provides that a spouse shall in no case testify against the other except in a prosecution
child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the law of common sense. for an offense against the other, the failure of the accused to object does not enable the
Presuming the husband who so testified against his wife to be endowed with common state to use the spouse as a witness. (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., section
sense, he must be taken to have expected that the most natural reaction which the said 1205, pp. 2060-2061.)
testimony would give rise to on the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to
deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same testimony, namely, Wharton, in note 10 at the foot of page 2060 of the cited volume refers us to section
the imputation that it was his wife who killed their little son. Upon the part of the 1149 appearing on page 1988 of the same volume, dealing with waiver objection to
prosecution, because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but incompetency of witnesses in general. We transcribe this section for convenient
went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the reference:
crime upon his wife. And upon the part of the wife, because of the reasons already set
forth above. Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held Waiver of objection to incompetency. — A party may waive his objection to the
to have intended all its aforesaid natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, competency of a witness and permit him to testify. A party calling an incompetent
the husband — himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon witness as his own waives the incompetency. Also, if, after such incompetency appears,
the ground of their marital relations — must be taken to have waived all objection to the there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the
latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want
available at the outset. of mental capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken
during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not be available on writ
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the all-important role of the State in this case. of error. If, however, the objection of a party is overruled and the ruling has been
The State being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be excepted to, the party may thereafter examine the witness upon the matters as to which
punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the rebutting he was allowed to testify to without waiving his objections to the witness's competency.
testimony in question, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the latter (Ibid., section 1149, p. 1988.)
himself who gave rise to its necessity. It may be said that the accused husband thought
that he would have more chances of convincing the court of his pretended innocence if It will be noted, as was to be expected, that in the last above-quoted section, the author
he pointed to his wife as having caused the death of their child, instead of simply mentions certain specific cases where the courts concerned hold that there was waiver,
denying that he was the author of the fatal act. To this we would counter by saying that but for obvious reasons neither the author nor said courts have attempted to make an
if he was to be allowed, for his convenience, to make his choice and thereby impute the enumeration of all possible cases of waiver. In the very nature of things, it would be

58
impossible to make a priori such a complete enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. to have been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to flow from his act of
So long as the Legislature itself does not make its own statutory and exclusive giving that testimony. At any rate, the trial court not only had the power to allow the
specification of cases of such waiver — and we doubt that it ever will — no complete State to utilize the wife as rebuttal witness, but also the discretion to permit "new
and exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be attempted by the courts, for in the additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." But even restricting the
absence of such legislation the cases of waiver will be as indefinite in number as wife's testimony to merely contradicting her husband's version that she was the one who
indefinite are and always will be the varying and unpredictable circumstances killed their child, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
surrounding each particular case. killer. With the testimony of both spouses upon the point, instead of that of the accused
alone, let justice take its course.
To illustrate, Mr. Wharton says above that the accused waives his or her privilege by
calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject As to Exhibit D, this document was a part of the record of the case in the justice of the
to cross-examination in the usual manner, the reason being that the State is entitled to peace of court which was expressly presented by the prosecution as evidence in the
question the spouse so presented as to all matters germane and pertinent to the direct Court of First Instance.
testimony. In the same way, and for a similar reason, when the herein appellant gave his
testimony in question in his defense, the State had the right to rebut the new matter But after all has been said and done, in justice to the accused, we believe that, whether
contained in that testimony consisting in the imputation upon his wife of the death of the we are dealing with a simpleton or an eccentric, or we have here one of those well-nigh
little boy. And that rebuttal evidence, which was rendered necessary by appellant's own inexplicable phenomena in human conduct where the judge finds himself at a loss to
testimony, could be furnished only by his wife who, as he fully knew, was alone with discover an adequate motivation for the proven acts of the accused, — indulging all
him and their son at the precise place and time of the event. This right to rebut is secured reasonable intendments in favor of appellant, we are of opinion that when he committed
to the State, no less than to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the the crime charged against him he must have been suffering from some illness (of the
provision further authorizing the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the body, the mind, the nerves, or the moral faculty) as is contemplated in paragraph 9 of
other party to offer "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a mitigating circumstance, namely, "such illness
So that if the waiver that we here declare to flow from the above-mentioned testimony of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
of appellant does not happen to be among those which were mentioned in the cases cited however depriving him of consciousness of his acts."
by Mr. Wharton, that is no reason against the existence of said waiver.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide by the penalty of reclusion
When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he perpetua to death. Article 63, paragraph 3, of the same code, provides that when the
could not, let us repeat, justly expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
such new matter in his testimony, through the only witness available, namely, the wife; aggravating circumstance, and the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied; in this case, in view of the above indicated
criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and circumstance and there being no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty is
basis of said testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral and social stigma of being reclusion perpetua, which was the penalty correctly applied by the trial court, which
thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of her own offspring. A decent penalty, of course, carries with it the accessory penalties provided for in article 41 of the
respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an average mother will tell us that such said Code. The accused should also be sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
a moral and social stigma would be no less injurious to her than a criminal punishment. Romeo Francisco in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
And if the wife should, in such a case and at such a juncture, be allowed to testify upon
rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should at least be the same as that of her husband. As above modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common sense. Since the husband ordered.
had testified that it was his wife who caused the death of the little boy, she should be
allowed to say that it was really her husband who did it. We hold that it is not necessary,
to justify such rebuttal evidence, and to declare the existence of the waiver upon which
it was based, that the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case by reason of
such testimony of her accused husband. The rule of waiver of objection to the
competency of witnesses generally does not require this prerequisite in the case between
husband and wife. Rather the rule makes the determination of the question hinge around
the consequences which by common sense, in justice and in fairness, should be deemed

59
G.R. No. 96602. November 19, 1991 question whether a new trial shall be granted on this ground depends on all the
circumstances of the case, including tne testimony of the witnesses submitted on the
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable and it
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is
true x x x.”
G.R. No. 96715. November 19, 1991
Same; Affidavit of desistance; Pardon by offended spouse.—Petitioner Neri also
RUBY VERA-NERI, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and contends that Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance and the compromise agreement operate
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS respondents. as a pardon meriting a new trial. The Court notes that the cases of People v. Camara
(supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra), were the very same cases
Criminal Law; Adultery; Constitutional Law; Right against self-incrimination.—The which petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602 which the Court has already held to be
Court, in the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise ruled on the claim that Mrs. inapplicable in the present case. The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the
Neri’s constitutional right against self-incrimination had been disregarded when her Revised Penal Code which provides: “ART. 344. x x x.—The crime of adultery and
admission to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed lain concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
with petitioner Arroyo was taken into account by the trial court. x x x As to the spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz, (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that: ‘The parties if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating offenders. x x x x x x x x x” While there is a conceptual difference between consent and
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is
from respondent-accused.’ (Italics supplied) In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the
peace officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation, hence, accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. Arroyo, Jr. vs.
petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs. Neri’s admission should have been rejected. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750, G.R. No. 96602, G.R. No. 96715 November 19, 1991

Same; Same; Doctrine of pari delicto not applicable.—We turn to the contention that In G.R. No. 96602, the Court summarized the facts of the case in this manner:
pari delicto “is a valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and concubinage and that in
such a case ‘it would be only a hypocritical pretense for such spouse to appear in court Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court
as the of fended spouse’.” In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner (RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo
Neri’s position. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio.
entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and
could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and
his wife’s infidelity, had “consented to, and acquiesced in the adulterous relations Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined under Article 333 of the Revised Penal
existing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the Code.
criminal proceedings.” In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto
but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, The essential facts of the case, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are
no such acquiescence can be implied the accused did not enter into any agreement with as follows:
Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons, and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair. Moreover, the concept of ... On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda
pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00
Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to contracts with a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave,
illegal consideration. Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses.
At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris'
Evidence; Recantation by witnesses.—Dr. Neri’s manifestation amounts in effect to an condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and
attempted recantation of testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion
not all recantations by witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial. In People v. Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's
Follantes and Jacinto, it was held that: “x x x [R]ecantation by wit nesses called on bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes
behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle defendant to a new trial. The later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three

60
of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. (Court of Appeals
Decision, p. 4) 1 2. The other prosecution witnesses' corroborative testimonies merely proved the
existence of an illicit affair but not that adultery was committed on the date and place in
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. question;
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that
a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and 3. Mrs. Neri's separate petition for review raised the issue of Dr. Neri's alleged
that her husband had later con traded marriage with another woman with whom he is subsequent marriage to another woman which, if proven would preclude either of the
presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals. spouses from filing charges of adultery or concubinage against each other.

Petitioner Arroyo filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96602) dated 8 February 1991 In G.R. No. 96715, petitioner Neri imputes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
which this court denied in a Resolution dated 24 April 1991.
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not granting the motion for
In the meantime, petitioner Neri filed a separate Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96715) reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioner;
dated 19 February 1991.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred by violating the constitutional rights of
Petitioner Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration dated 1 May 1991 and a motion petitioner against self-incrimination;
dated 23 May 1991 for consolidation o G.R. No. 96602 with G.R. No. 96715.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to take into consideration the
On 3 June 1991, G.R. No. 96715 was consolidated with G.R No. 96602 in the Third material inconsistencies of the testimony of the complaining witness; and
Division in accordance with long-stand ing practice of the Court.
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in discarding medical testimony as to
On 29 July 1991, the Third Division deliberated upon the case which was then assigned the physical impossibility of the petitioner to have committed the crime charged. 6
to the ponente for the writing of the Court's Resolution. 2
The issues in the consolidated cases may be summarized as follows:
On 26 August 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, dated 14 May 1991, 3 praying that
the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's 1. Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts
infidelity. 4 on his credibility;

Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the 2. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been
granting of new trial of the case claiming a basis for their motions Dr. Neri's violated;
manifestation. The Solicitor General was then asked to comment on the manifestation;
hi comment was filed with this Court on 18 October 1991. 5 3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto; and
In October 1991, the consolidated cases were, again in accordance with long-standing
practice of the Court, assigned to the First Division upon the assignment of the ponente 4. Whether or not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting of a new
to that division. On 4 November 1991, the consolidated cases were re deliberated upon trial.
by the members of the First Division who reached the same conclusion as the members
of the Third Division of the Court. Deliberating on the:

In his Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, petitioner Arroyo made the 1. Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, the Court believes that petitioner
following contentions: Arroyo has failed to show any ground that would warrant the Court reversing its
Resolution dated 24 April 1991; and on the
1. Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance which states that the case was filed out of "pure
misunderstanding' raises questions as to the truth of the alleged admission made by Mrs.
Neri;

61
2. Petition for Review docketed as G.R. No. 96715, the Court considers that petitioner The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
Ruby Vera Neri has failed to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or
issuing its Decision dated 21 May 1990 and its Resolution, dated 18 December 1990. admissions from respondent-accused.(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Arroyo did not convince this Court in G.R. No. 96602 to dismiss the criminal In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer nor an investigating officer
case on the basis of Dr. Neri's pardon. He, together with petitioner Neri, now cites the conducting a custodial interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs. Neri's
same affidavit in the effort to cast doubts on the credibility of Dr. Neri's testimony given admission should have been rejected.
before the trial court. However, in the Court's Resolution, dated 24 April 1991,
dismissing the Petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 96602, the Court held that: In the case of Aballe v. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), the Court held:

It has been our constant holding that: The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be
given in evidence against him.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well its
conclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who heard the confession,
the court being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the is competent to testify as to substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in
weight, since said court is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct and its substance.
attitude of witnesses at the trial. (Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987]; emphasis
supplied) Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not
applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an
Thus, the claim that Dr. Neri's testimony is incredible is unavailing at this stage. ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.
Besides, the Court does not believe that such an admission by an unfaithful wife was
inherently improbable or impossible. 7 (Emphasis supplied) We also note that the husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying
against his wife in criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other
The Court, in the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise ruled on the claim that (Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court).
Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been disregarded when her
admission to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed lain In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's
with petitioner Arroyo was taken into account by the trial court, to wit: testimony as he was a competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered
inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to
Dr. Jorge Neri was also presented as a witness and he testified that sometime in counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense."
December of 1982, he surprised his wife while she was looking at some photographs in
their bedroom in their house in Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Accused Ruby Vera Neri Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the
then turned pale and started for the door. Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr. Neri failure of Ruby Vera Neri to take the witness stand. In People v. Gargoles (83 SCRA
started looking around the dressing room and he came upon a Kodak envelope with film 282 [1978]), it was held that:
negatives inside. He took the negatives for printing and a few days later, armed with the
photographs which showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with another man, We have held that an accused has the right to decline to testify at the trial without
confronted Ruby Vera Neri. It was at this point that Ruby Vera Neri admitted to her having any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to go on the witness stand. Thus, a
husband that Eduardo Arroyo was her lover and that they went to bed in Baguio on 2 verdict of conviction on the basis, solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal of the
and 3 November 1982. accused to take the witness stand to deny the charges against him is a judicial heresy
which cannot be countenanced. Invariably, any such verdict deserves to be reserved.
xxx xxx xxx
Such situation does not obtain, however, in the case at bar. For while the trial court took
As to the constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that: note of the failure of defendant to take the witness stand to deny the charge against him,
the same was not the main reason, much less the sole basis, of the trial court in holding,

62
as credible the testimony of complainant, and in ultimately concluding that the crime of ... [R]ecantation by witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily
rape had been committed by the accused-appellant. (Emphasis supplied) entitle defendant to a new trial. The question whether a new trial shall be granted on this
ground depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the
Examination of the trial court decision here shows that said failure to testify was not the witnesses submitted on the motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is
sole nor the main basis of the conviction. Aside from accused's failure to deny Dr. Neri's exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not
testimony, the trial court also considered the testimonies of Dr. Neri and other satisfied that such testimony is true. ... 15 (Emphasis supplied)
prosecution witnesses and the photographs of the two accused in intimate poses (and
three of which showed them half naked in bed). 8 (Emphasis supplied) Succinctly put, the Court doubts the truthfulness and reliability of Dr. Neri's belated
recantation. Dr. Neri had two (2) previous occasions to make the claim contained in his
We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution for manifestation: first, in the compromise agreement 16 dated 16 February 1989 submitted
adultery and concubinage and that in such a case "it would be only a hypocritical before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in relation to Civil Case No. M-
pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended spouse." 9 001; and second, his affidavit 17 dated 23 November 1988 submitted to the Court of
Appeals. Instead, however, these two (2) documents merely stated that Dr. Neri had
In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner Neri's position. In the pardoned petitioners 18 and the complaint was filed out of "pure misunderstanding" 19
Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into an without hinting that Dr. Neri knew of the adulterous relations. It appears to the Court
agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other that Dr. Neri's manifestation was so worded as to attempt to cure the deficiency noted by
persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, the Court in the two (2) previous documents in the disposition of the petition in G.R.
had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the No. 96602:
accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal
proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to Petitioner will find no solace in the cases he cites, in support of his prayer to dismiss the
consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no case based on Dr. Neri's pardon. People v. Camara (100 Phil. 1098 (1957) is
such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. inapplicable as the affidavit there expressly stated that the wife had consented to the
Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly illicit relationship. In Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (135 SCRA 620 [1985]) a
filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair. case involving estafa, the criminal case was dismissed as the affidavit of desistance
specifically stated that the accused had nothing to do whatsoever with the crime
Moreover, the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in charged. In the present case, the pardon did not state that Dr. Neri had consented to the
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code illicit relationship petitioner and Mrs. Neri. Neither did it state that the case was filed
relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. 10 The case at bar does not involve against the wrong parties. 20
any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking to enforce.
Moreover, while the manifestation is dated 14 May 1991, which incidentally is also the
Petitioners also contend that Dr. Neri's manifestation which reads: date of petitioner Arroyo's motion for reconsideration, it was subscribed to only on 23
August 1991.
2. Even before I filed the complaint in court and before the pardon that I had extended to
my wife and her co-accused, I was in reality aware of what was going on between and Petitioner Neri also contends that Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the compromise
therefore, tacitly consented to my wife's infidelity, ... agreement operate as a pardon meriting a new trial. The Court notes that the cases of
People v. Camara (supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra) were the
should result in the dismissal of the case or, at the very least, in the remand of the case very same cases which petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602 which the Court has
for new trial claiming that in People v. Camara 11 it was held that "the consent of the already held to be inapplicable in the present case.
spouse is valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and/or concubinage." 12
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Dr. Neri's manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of testimony
given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by witnesses ART. 344. ... — The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
should result in the granting of a new trial. 13 In People v. Follantes and Jacinto, 14 it upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
was held that:

63
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties,
if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the As to the claim that it was impossible for petitioner Neri to engage in sexual intercourse
offenders. a month after her ceasarian operation, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
this is a question of fact which cannot be raised at this stage. In any case, we find no
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that reason to overturn the Court of Appeals' finding that "a woman who has the staying
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, power to volley tennis bags for fifteen minutes at the [John Hay] tennis court would not
21 nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given be incapable of doing the sexual act" which ball play was followed, as noted by the
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. 22 In the present case, the affidavit of Court of Appeals "by a picture taking of both accused in different intimate poses." 26
desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement
was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby
decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. DENIED for lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R.
Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated and signed after issuance of our Resolution in No. 96715 is hereby similarly DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 96602 on 24 April 1991.
Let a copy of this Resolution and of Dr. Neri's Manifestation and Motion subscribed on
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the 23 August 1991 be forwarded to the Department of Justice for inquiry into the possible
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once liability of Dr. Neri for perjury.
the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. 23
Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of
vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely
of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to
protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation
of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect find strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution ...

The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code o the Philippines in Article
149:

The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and
no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect.

In U.S. v. Topiño, 24 the Court held that:

... The husband being the head of the family and the only person who could institute the
prosecution and control its effects, it is quite clear that the principal object in penalizing
the offense by the state was to protect the purity of the family and the honor of the
husband, but now the conduct of the prosecution, after it is once commenced by the
husband, and the enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a matter of public policy
in which the Government is vitally interested to the extent of preserving the public peace
and providing for the general welfare of the community. ... 25 (Emphasis supplied)

64
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely
DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant, Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and
vs. TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,
Respondents. xxxx

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge
Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of 1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly
Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with violation Judge:1awph!l.net
of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable
The Facts SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without
any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious,
("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
Barrientos ("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered
judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. xxxx
The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT."
earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads: Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in
the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000,
as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997. xxxx

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and 4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant
DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one
hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T- THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable
78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must
issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to pay be corrected here and now!
Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)7 Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That
dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read: It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:

II. PREPATORY STATEMENT Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that
JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the
averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!

65
 errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters involved were
xxxx [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x14

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake
Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have
HOUSE: ‘stepped on the line and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly
contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold
GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge. On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and
penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16
xxxx
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba
defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli."
Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading
Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years
sight!8 with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future."17 This pleading turned out to be
the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give suspension from the practice of law.18
plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba- Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without
Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm. conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta,"
ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over."19 At any
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of
insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation, delicadeza because "[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before
Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman."20
who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned
counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-
disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing
Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence
courts of justice."13 She rationalized as follows: and ignorance21 and violating

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the
hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and subject of a preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On
bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

xxxx Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba
to explain why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared
incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba
contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a
disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine
cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental of P500.

66
 On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). inhibition with preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court
of Appeals.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No.
Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
notice.28 respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order
which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.29 violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme
IBP Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and Court."36
derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for
authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional
were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition
whole."31 for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.

The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge
Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s
reduced to three months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint
recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case. against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has
thus:33 not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged
order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether
xxxx the judge is administratively liable.37

3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The
Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first
Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule
involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was 7 of the Rules of Court:
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari
case before the Court of Appeals; SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him x x x.
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present
complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34 (Emphasis supplied) that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
The Court’s Ruling

67
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous implied consent.43 This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of
or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. the 30 July 2001 motion.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read
it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap or behavior before the Courts.
of paper to that of a court document.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because or have no materiality to the case.
of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this
practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor
spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following
this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible
pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.
admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of
falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground total and utter disrespect."44

for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the
the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
to him as the author of the motion. courts and judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the
scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to
for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40 profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high
esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.47
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons:
(1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use
which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest means,
controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case thus:
No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she had not "actually
participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case. Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt proceeding.
charge against him.41 This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42 Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba
assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala.
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these

68
administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as GR No. 22948. March 17, 1925
leverage against Judge Lacurom.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendant and appellant.
Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law
for a period of six months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of 1.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE; HUSBAND AND WIFE; PRIVILEGED
possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of COMMUNICATION.—Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the
P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case other comes into the hands of a third party, without collusion or voluntary disclosure on
No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file the the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the
appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible in evidence.
penalty of one year suspension.49
2.ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCHES.—The rule laid
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in down by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Boyd and Boyd vs. United
barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the States (116 U. S., 616) and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne vs. United States
prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50 (251 U. S., 385) in regard to evidence obtained by illegal searches, discussed.

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts 3.ID. ; ID. ; LETTERS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.—A letter written by a
would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether wife to her husband is incompetent as evidence in a criminal case against the latter
respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them where there is no indication of assent on his part to the statements contained in the letter.
as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short The letter may, however, be admissible to impeach the testimony of the wife if she goes
of the mark. upon the witness-stand in the trial of the case. People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626, No.
22948 March 17, 1925
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2)
years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco- This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this finding the defendant Fausto V. Carlos guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him
Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar to suffer life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and with the
infraction shall merit a more severe sanction. costs.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar,
to respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and on March 3, 1924, in Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the
all courts in the country for their information and guidance. defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She remained in the hospital
until the 18th of the same month, but after her release therefrom she was required to go
SO ORDERED. several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar at No. 40 Escolta, for the purpose of dressing
the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her
husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits, that of March 20,
1924, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while
defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant
further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic.
Notwithstanding this it nevertheless appears that he again went there on March 28th to
consult the deceased about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was
suffering.. He was given some medical treatment and appears to have made at least one
more visit to the clinic without revealing any special resentment.

On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the
Philippine General Hospital where he remained until May 18, 1924, and where he was

69
under the care of two other physicians. While in the hospital her received a letter
(Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate settlement of the account for the Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
professional services rendered his wife. Shortly after his release from the hospital the communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of
defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one
times without finding him in. On one of these occasions he was asked by an employee spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without
of the office, the nurse Cabañera, if he had come to settle his account, to which the collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
defendant answered that he did not believe he owed the doctor anything. thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and authorities there cited.) Such is the view of the majority
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and of this court.
found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then,
without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant pursued
him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a
and as a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The defendants distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's
made his escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the addressee
evening of the following day. by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could
by collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if they were
The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self- obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege
defense. He explains that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the amount should cease. (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2339.)
of the fee charged by the doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the time of
payment; that during the conversation upon that subject the deceased insulted him by The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to
telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the amount demanded he could send his have been issued and counsel for the defendant cites the causes of Boyd and Boyd vs.
wife to the office as she was the one treated, and that she could then talk the matter over United States (116 U.S., 616) and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne vs. United
with the decease; that this statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous States (251 U.S., 385) as authority for the proposition that documents obtained by illegal
manner that the defendant became greatly incensed and remembering the outrage searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case. In
committed upon his wife, he assumed a threatening attitude and challenged the deceased discussing this point we can do not better than to quote Professor Wigmore:
to go downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that the deceased thereupon took a
pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk and attacked the defendant, endeavoring The foregoing doctrine (i. e., that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
to force him out of the office; that the defendant, making use of his knowledge of illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence)
fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from the deceased and blinded by fury was never doubted until the appearance of the ill-starred majority opinion of Boyd vs.
stabbed him first in the right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and United States, in 1885, which has exercised unhealthy influence upon subsequent
fearing that the deceased might secure some other weapon or receive assistance from the judicial opinion in many States.
people in the adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time in the back.
The progress of this doctrine of Boyd vs. United States was as follows: (a) The Boyd
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle described is in conflict with the evidence Case remained unquestioned in its own Court for twenty years; meantime receiving
presented by the prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is very evident that it fails to frequent disfavor in the State Courts (ante, par. 2183). (b) Then in Adams vs. New York,
establish a case of self-defense and that, in reality, the only question here to be in 1904, it was virtually repudiated in the Federal Supreme Court, and the orthodox
determined is whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of simple homicide. precedents recorded in the State courts (ante, par. 2183) were expressly approved. (c)
Next, after another twenty years, in 1914 — moved this time, not by erroneous history,
The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore but by misplaced sentimentality — the Federal Supreme Court, in Weeks vs. United
constituted murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration States, reverted to the original doctrine of the Boyd Case, but with a condition, viz., that
Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in the illegality of the search and seizure should first have been directly litigated and
searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two days before established by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized; so that,
the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant after such a motion, and then only, the illegality would be noticed in the main trial and
contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

70
the evidence thus obtained would be excluded. ... (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. As we have already intimated, if Exhibit L is excluded, there is in our opinion not
2184.) sufficient evidence in the record to show that the crime was premeditated.

In the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case the United States Supreme Court adhered to its The prosecution maintains that the crime was committed with alevosia. This contention
decision in the Weeks Case. The doctrine laid down in these cases has been followed by is based principally on the fact that one of the wounds received by the deceased showed
some of the State courts but has been severely criticized and does not appear to have a downward direction indicating that the deceased was sitting down when the wound
been generally accepted. But assuming, without deciding, that it prevails in this was inflicted. We do not think this fact is sufficient proof. The direction of the wound
jurisdiction it is, nevertheless, under the decisions in the Weeks and Silverthorne cases, would depend largely upon the manner in which the knife was held.
inapplicable to the present case. Here the illegality of the search and seizure was not
"directly litigated and established by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the For the reasons stated we find the defendant guilty of simple homicide, without
things seized." aggravating or extenuating circumstances.

The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The sentence appealed from is therefore modified by reducing the penalty to fourteen
The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory
letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the penalties and with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant
either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the
letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he
had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The
letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one
originally privileged.

The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third
party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness.
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation
in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has
the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his
silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.

The Attorney-General in support of the contrary view quotes Wigmore, as follows:

. . . Express communication is always a proper mode of evidencing knowledge or belief.

Communication to a husband or wife is always receivable to show probable knowledge
by the other (except where they are living apart or are not in good terms), because, while
it is not certain that the one will tell the other, and while the probability is less upon
some subjects than upon others, still there is always some probability, — which is all
that can be fairly asked for admissibility. ... (1 Wigmore, id., par. 261.)

This may possibly be good law, though Wigmore cites no authority in support of his
assertion, but as far as we can see it has little or nothing to do with the present case.

71
GR No. 10396. July 29, 1915 From that sentence she appealed to this court. In this court she alleges that the lower
court committed several errors, both of law and of fact. Upon the question of fact, she
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TERESA CONCEPCION, alleges that the lower court committed an error in deciding that the evidence adduced
defendant and appellant. during the trial of the cause was sufficient to show that she was guilty of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
1.OPIUM; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF OPIUM; ANIMUS POSSIDENDI.—The
house of R, the husband of the defendant, was searched for opium. During the search R Upon that question the Attorney-General, in a carefully prepared brief in which he
told the defendant to take from the bed a can alleged to contain opium, and throw it analyzes the proof, reaches the conclusion that the facts are insufficient to show that she
away. She went to the bed, found the can, and at that moment was discovered by the is guilty of the crime charged.
policeman. She denied prior knowledge of the existence of the can. This f act was
supported by the declara-tion of her husband. There was no proof that she used opium in It appears from the evidence that on the night of the 2nd of December, 1913, several
any form. Held: That the proof was not sufficient to support the charges of the policemen went to the house of the defendant, where she was living with her husband,
complaint. Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving there, they obtained permission to enter and
immediately proceeded to make a search of the premises for opium. While there is some
2.WITNESSES; COMPETENCY; HUSBAND OR WIFE.—A husband cannot be dispute concerning the fact, we believe the proof shows that the defendant, during the
examined for or against his wife, without her consent; nor a wife for or against her time the policemen were searching the house, went to a bed located in the house, after
husband, without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage, or afterwards, be, being so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a pillow a small can of opium,
without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the said to contain about 7½ grams of opium, and attempted to throw it away. At that
other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or moment the policemen took possession of the can. There is some conflict in the proof as
proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime to just what took place at that moment. That the policemen inquired to whom the opium
committed by one against the other. (Par. 3, sec. 383, Act No. 190; sec. 58, General belonged is not denied. The conflict arises in the answer which was given to that
Orders No. 58.) At the common law the rule was that the husband and wife could not question. The defendant in the present case, according to some of the witnesses,
testify for or against the other, in any criminal proceedings, except in the prosecution of declared that it belonged to her. Her husband, Felix Ricablanca, according to some
one for criminal injury to the other. The rule is based-upon considerations of public witnesses, declared that he was the owner of the house and was responsible for
policy, growing out of the marital relation. To allow one to testify for or against the everything that was found within it. The policemen, at that moment, evidently believed
other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to that the opium belonged to the husband, Felix Ricablanca, for the reason that they
endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital relation. arrested him and took him to the pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a
violation of the Opium Law .He was later brought to trial and was acquitted.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION MADE IN ANOTHER CASE.—R declared in a
criminal action against himself. Later, in a criminal action against C, said declaration No complaint was presented against the present defendant until after a period of more
was presented as proof and accepted, over the objection of C. No proof was offered to than ten months had elapsed. The policemen who were present at the time the opium
show that R was not still alive. Said declarations are not only not admissible by virtue of was found certainly knew no more about the facts at the time the complaint was
the provisions of section 383 of Act No. 190 and section 58 of General Orders No. 58, presented against the present defendant than they did on the night when the opium was
but also by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Act of Congress of found and when they arrested her husband. The fact that the defendant took the opium
July 1, 1902. C, the defendant, was not given an opportunity "to meet the witness face to from under the pillow on the bed, at the request of her husband, seems to us to be
face." The acceptance of the testimony of her husband, E, given in another case, was in entirely supported by the proof. Her husband was a confirmed user of opium. He
absolute violation of her rights, and in direct contravention of the law. THE UNITED admitted that he was in the habit of smoking opium. That the defendant was temporarily
STATES vs. CONCEPCION, 31 Phil. 182, No. 10396 July 29, 1915 in possession of the opium is not denied, even by her. That her possession was such a
possession as is prohibited by the law, she strongly denies. The mere fact that she had in
her possession the opium for but a moment and took possession of it under her
The defendant was charged with a violation of the Opium Law. The complaint alleged husband's order, is not, in our opinion, such a possession of opium as is intended to be
that she had in her possession and under her control a quantity of opium. She was condemned by the law. She certainly did not intend, even remotely, to have in her
arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of possession opium. She did exactly what any other faithful wife would have done under
P300 and costs. similar circumstances. There is no proof that she was a user of opium in any form. There
is no proof that she knew that the can contained opium and consequently there is no

72
proof of the animus possidendi. In the absence of such proof there can be no conviction At the common law the rule was that husband and wife could not testify for or against
under the complaint for the illegal possession of opium. each other in any criminal proceedings, except in the prosecution of one for criminal
injury to the other. The common-law rule has been adopted in practically all of the
The appellant makes another assignment of error which presents an important question States of the United States. The rule is based upon considerations of public policy
of law. She alleges that the lower court committed an error in permitting the testimony growing out of the marital relation. To allow one to testify for or against the other would
of her husband to be presented against her over her objection. She alleges that the be to subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to endanger the
admission of that testimony was in violation of paragraph 3 of section 383 of the Code harmony and confidence of the marital relation. The cases supporting the rule are
of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions. Said paragraph provides: "A husband can not be innumerable.
examined for or against her husband without his consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without her consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, For the foregoing reasons, the sentence of conviction must be revoked, and it is hereby
without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed and the defendant discharged from
other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other."

It will be noted that said action prohibits a husband from giving testimony against his
wife without her consent, except in a civil action between husband and wife, and in a
criminal action when the crime was committed by one against the other. The present is GR No. L-25643. June 27, 1968.
not a civil action between husband and wife, neither it is a criminal action where the
crime was committed by one against the other. It would seem to clear, therefore, that the JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners, vs. HON.
testimony of the husband is not admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, JOSE
husband should not have been admitted. DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT & COLD
STORAGE Co., INC., and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
There still another objection to the admissibility of the testimony of the husband. His
testimony was not given in the present case. It was a copy of his declaration given in Evidence; Husband and wife; Rule that a husband cannot be examined for or against his
another case, in which he was the defendant and in which he was charged with the wife; Scope of its application; Reason for the rule; Case at bar.—A husband cannot be
illegal possession of the opium in question. It will be remembered that at the time the examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
opium was found in the house of the defendant, the husband of the present defendant husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
was arrested; that later a complaint was presented against him. During the trial he criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other (Sec. 20 [b], Rule 130,
testified in his own behalf. It was the testimony given in that case which was presented Rules of Court). This provision and rule deals with two different matters which rest on
as proof in the present case. He was not called as a witness. His testimony is not only different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each
not admissible under the provisions above quoted of section 383, but it is not admissible other’s behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against each other. The
under the Philippine Bill, which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face 130 is entitled “Disqualification by reason of x x x relationship.”
to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf." On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been offered (see U.S. v.
Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182; and People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694) for the privilege, the
The defendant was not given an opportunity "to meet the witness face to face." The true explanation which is after all the simplest (Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212) and which
acceptance of the testimony of her husband, given in another case, was in absolute constitutes the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege, “is the
violation of her rights and in direct contravention of the law .The presentation and natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be
acceptance of the testimony of the husband violated two well-recognized rules of law — the means of the other’s condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of
first, paragraph 3 of section 383 of Act No. 190, and [second], paragraph 2 of section 5 being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner (Id., sec. 2228, at 217).
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

73
In the case at bar where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had
the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without violating section 20(b) of
Rule 130? Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked
examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by
the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over the
offerred as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party (97 C.J.S. 477). Section 6 of objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of the Rules of Court:
Rule 132 (Rule on Direct Examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses) is a mere
concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife
wif e f rom becoming the means of the other’s condemnation. The said rule of discovery for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the
should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one’s other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a
spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains. Lezama vs. Rodriguez, 23 criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.4
SCRA 1166, No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf, as well
her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party as their privilege not to testify against each other.5 The fundamental theory of the
under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, without infringing on her marital common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is
privilege not to testify against her husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130. The trial the basis of the disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled
court, presided by the respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the affirmative and "Disqualification by reason of ... relationship."
required the wife to appear and testify. The petitioners sued for certiorari but the Court
of Appeals dismissed their petition1 and denied their motion for reconsideration.2 On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional reasons has been offered7 for the
Hence this appeal.3 privilege, the "true explanation [which] is after all the simplest"8 and which constitutes
"the real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the natural
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the
Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner.9
La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 39827. Named as
defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more than
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because of testify as an adverse party in the case and, indeed, in the light of the allegations both in
mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership the complaint and in the answer, the request was apparently one that could reasonably
of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an be expected to be made. Thus, the complaint charged
action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that summons was 13. — That in obtaining the judgment by default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of
served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, First Instance of Manila against the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default defendants, in gross and evident bad faith, and in fraudulent conspiracy, made it appear
against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons was served on Jose that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of P150,000.00
Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila from defendant Marciano C. Roque thru defendant Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon
acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that an authority vested upon defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the alleged Board of
court was void.1ªvvphi1.nêt Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. allegedly evidenced by the
minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors of the said corporation signed by
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the defendant Jose Manuel Lezama and attested to by Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita B.
company was placed under receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama Lezama and that defendants spouses Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita B. Lezama had
nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had authority manipulated the books of the corporation by making it appear that such fictitious loan
to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case 39827. They denied was then in existence.
entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim

74
On the other hand, the answer claimed
It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable
13. That the herein defendants specifically deny all the allegations contained in only against her.10 It is even suggested that "each may testify in his or her own behalf,
paragraph 13 of the complaint; the truth is, that the herein defendants have not conspired although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or against his or her
and acted in bad faith with the plaintiff [Marciano C. Roque] in Civil Case No. 39827 of own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other spouse."11
the Court of First Instance of Manila for the rendition of the said judgment referred to Upon the other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify will
therein; for the truth is, that the herein defendants, in their capacities as President- transgress section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if her testimony will support the
Manager and Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., believing as plaintiff's charge.
they believe that the obligation sought to be enforced by said civil action being
legitimate and the allegations of the complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one
of First Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem it wise to contest the same; that Marciano C. Roque to make it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
the obligation of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., which was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an adverse
the defendant Marciano C. Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent
Court of First Instance of Manila was legitimately contracted in accordance with law; scheme: "that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the
that said obligation was duly entered in the books of the corporation and that the said minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to
loan is not fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of the negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the
said corporation. books of the corporation."

Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the
deny the allegation that it was Paquita Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed meeting and will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry
the minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or
negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry in the beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her
books of the corporation. husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan transaction was above collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
board that Dineros, the company receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in
not as a spouse witness "for or against her husband," but rather as an adverse party in the order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner
case. entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.

It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays into his opponent's position Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife
on the strength of section 6 of Rule 132 which provides: cannot be examined "for or against her husband without his consent," it is further argued
that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may
Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may interrogate any not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his or her
unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or testimony could operate only against himself or herself.12
an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a
questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is
adverse party and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of
behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only examination of the wife is to prove that charge.
upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where the wife is a co- the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either
defendant in a suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness
testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud is merely a formal or nominal party.13
without violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?

75
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would GR No. L-46306. February 27, 1979
encourage alliance of husband and wife as an instrument of fraud; for then what better
way would there be to prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in fraud immune PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIANO C.
to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party? This CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
argument overlooks the fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the
means of the other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be Criminal Procedure; Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a
expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a situation deed of sale of conjugal house and lot where wife was made to appear as having given
where this natural repugnance obtains. far consent to the sale.—With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not demonstrated falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the
that there is no evidence available to him other than the Lezamas' testimony to prove the criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
charge recited in the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her
complaint with the office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are versed, and this case is ordered connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-
costs. wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
Notes.—The marital privilege provided for in Section 20 (b) of Rule 130 once waived is nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion
not claimable. Said section indicates that to the spouse-party alone belongs the privilege to point out in previous decisions, “identity of interests disappears and the consequent
and therefore only he or she can claim or waive it (Cf. Ortiz v. Arambulo, et al, 8 Phil. danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
98). security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.”
Illustrative of the application of the marital privilege is People v. Reyes, 42 O.G. 2833 Thus, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule. People vs. Castañeda,
and U.S. v. Melchor, 2 Phil. 588. Jr., 88 SCRA 562, No. L-46306 February 27, 1979

The rule on marital privilege should be distinguished with the so-called filial privilege On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private
provided for in Article 315 of the new Civil Code which reads: “No descendant can be respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of
compelled in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants.” Lezama vs. Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the
Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166, No. L-25643 June 27, 1968 crime of Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the Information, as
follows:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit
falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate
and forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by
said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of
said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book
No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby
making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said
sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2

76
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the
Rules Of Court which provides: witness-wife.

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons 1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it
enumerated. appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their
conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the
xxx xxx xxx sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the
deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust
other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a
under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which
committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against
her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for reconsideration petition 2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified
was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977. as a crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for
resolution. Thus, in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
the People of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent
Judge and praying that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid
issued by this Court enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of down in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is
(b) to require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES
Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
their Memorandum on September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
submitted for decision. 7
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues the rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a
determinative of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for crime committed by the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime
Falsification of Public Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. committed by the accused in that can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court,
Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that said criminal act "Positively
deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the sale undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she
did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the
against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification. crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a
third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect
of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the
act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial

77
Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition, which RULE 130, SECTION 23
seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken DEAD MAN STATUTE
collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that No. L-58164. September 2, 1983
there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions,
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO
"identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
ESPIRITU, assisted by her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORIO
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, et al., petitioners, vs. ST. CLARE’S
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T. GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO,
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to
assisted by ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc. et al.,
apply the martial disqualification rule.
respondents.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; INCOMPETENCY UNDER SEC.
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly 20(a), RULE 130, RULES OF COURT, CONSTRUED. — The plain truth is that Laura
observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they
dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are
he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not
prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed and complete impunity. Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its
alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. It may be said that competency to testify
1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, established in Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court, affects only the persons therein
Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, mentioned, and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in
1977, denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor
restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the
ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify prohibition. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166) By
against her husband. excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and by barring them from further
testifying, upon reasoning that unduly strained the meaning of the provisions of the
SO ORDERED. Rules of Court relied upon, the trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing
the truth in this case.
Note.—The husband’s sale of conjugal lot without the wife’s consent is not valid.
(Villocino vs. Doyon, 18 SCRA 1094; Reyes vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 369). 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEAD MAN’S RULE; INAPPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. —
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel
The wife may ask the court to renounce the administrative of conjugal properties from Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or
the husband for her protection. (Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 23 SCRA 1079). representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their
individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
A debt contracted by the wife is a debt of the conjugal partnership where the husband Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man’s rule. "It has been held that statutes
was negligent in allowing the wife to incur debts. (Garcia vs. Cruz, 25 SCRA 224). providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is
dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording,
An illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone over a piece of land paraphernal irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator
in character cannot bind nor affect the wife’s possession thereof. (Plata vs. Yatco, 12 or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of
SCRA 718). People vs. Castañeda, Jr., 88 SCRA 562, No. L-46306 February 27, 1979 an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that
the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are
sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law
by using the words ‘against the estate of such deceased persons,’ which convey the idea
of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that,

78
therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the 2. Declaring the plaintiffs (now petitioners) the owners in fee simple of the
person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid., aforedescribed property, pro-indiviso;
pp. 169-171)
3. Ordering the private defendants (now private respondents) to reconvey to the
3. ID.; ID.; IMPROVIDENT EXCLUSION AND PRECLUSION FROM plaintiffs the aforedescribed lot;
PRESENTING FURTHER PROOF; CASE AT BAR. — Prior to the issuance of the
court’s order of June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to have waived 4. Declaring the ‘Joint Venture Agreement’ executed by the defendant partnership and
their right to further present or formally offer their evidence," the following had testified the defendant corporation null and void and ineffective insofar as the plaintiffs are
as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde, Moises concerned;
Javillionar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura
Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should 5. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new transfer certificate
have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The of title in favor of the plaintiffs over the said lot;
offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting
him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on the 6. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to pay the
Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., p. 122) plaintiffs, actual and exemplary damages, the amounts of which they will prove during
the hearing of the instant case on the merit;
4. ID.; JUDGMENT RENDERED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF DEFENDANTS’
EVIDENCE DISREGARDING THAT OF THE PLAINTIFFS’; REMAND TO TRIAL 7. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to pay to the
COURT PROPER RECOURSE. — The trial court rendered its decision solely on the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00; plus costs of suit." (Printed Record
basis of the defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had on Appeal, pp. 116-118.)
presented on July 17, 1974 before the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs’
petition to disqualify the trial judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision Petitioners’ original and amended complaints alleged that during their lifetime the
sentences the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorney’s feet, apart from the costs of suit, spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
in the staggering amount of Two Million One Hundred Eighty Three Thousand and Five property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an
Hundred (P12,183,500.00) Pesos, without plaintiffs having been gives, the chance to area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The spouses had six children, named Andres,
complete their evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos
rebuttal evidence. The way the trial court and the Court of Appeals proceeded in this predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and
case, litigation became more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his
truth and mete justice. No other fairer course of action is demanded but for this Court to share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. Accordingly,
remand the case for further proceedings. upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot and
cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez, who earned a 50% share in the net
In their petition for review by certiorari, petitioners are seeking a reversal of the decision produce, the other 50% being retained by Andres Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation
of the former Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) dated April 30, expenses and real estate taxes on the property. Shortly after the beginning of the
1981 in CA-G.R No. 57597-R, and its resolution dated September 3, 1981 which denied Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero,
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration thereof. Our resolution of May 25, 1981 gave and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the
due course to the petition. harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could
continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner’s share in the produce
The action initiated by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal prayed for a for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until
judgment: shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero
died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the
"1. Declaring the in existence of the ‘Deed of Sale of Lands, Annex ‘A’ hereof, and petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres
‘Deeds of Absolute Sale’, Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’, as well as the Original Certificate of Guerrero.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Title No. 4591 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 339629 and 340842 of the
Registry of Deeds, null and void; The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No.

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4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Sometime during the Corporation averred that there is no privity of interest between plaintiffs and this
latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the defendant considering that the plaintiffs are not parties to the Joint Venture Agreement.
land approached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the
property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their Issues having been joined, the case proceeded to trial.
cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered the following: that
Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a ‘Deed of Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina Guerrero, testified as a witness of the plaintiffs
Sale of Land’ dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he that having had previous information that the disputed lot was borrowed from Andres
caused the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot No. 4752 and he was issued advance Guerrero and that Cristina Guerrero merely mortgaged it to Manuel Guerrero, he went to
Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that in the advance plan issued to him, it was the house of Manuel Guerrero in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, in 1968 at the
duly noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously surveyed for Andres Guerrero; that in behest of the plaintiffs, to inquire about the mortgage; that in reply, Manuel Guerrero
1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the defendants stated that the land had been sold but it would be changed with another lot of the same
Guerreros, filed an application for registration of land with the Court of First Instance of area; that in 1970, Sotero Cervantes and Laura Cervantes, children of Cristina Guerrero,
Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court and he went to see Manuel Guerrero at the Sta. Rita Church in Parañaque; that Sotero
ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors’ appeal to a higher and Laura asked if they could get the land back, that Manuel Guerrero answered that it
court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to the were better to change the disputed lot with another parcel of the same area and value;
applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of Deeds of that as he was not satisfied with the answer, Frisco Cervantes went to the Office of the
Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of Register of Deeds in Pasig, Rizal, where he obtained a copy of a Deed of Sale in favor
the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the registration of Manuel Guerrero which he delivered to the children of Andres
of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate No. 339629 Guerrero.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
in its stead; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants
Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clare’s Realty Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated as
Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the Officer-In-Charge of the Surveys Division, testified for the plaintiffs that in the
defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St. Bureau’s Lot Data Computation Book showing the list of claimants for Lot 4752, Case
Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT 4, Cadastre 299, Parañaque, Rizal, (Exhibit A), which was surveyed on December 10,
No. 340842 in the name of said realty company. 1957, Andres Guerrero is listed as claimant. The records of the Bureau of Lands from
1957 (when Lot 4752 was cadastrally surveyed for Andres Guerrero) until 1962 show
According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel no claimant to the property except Andres Guerrero. In 1962, the Bureau of lands
Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that received a letter with an affidavit attached to it from Manuel Guerrero requesting that an
Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it; that advance plan be made. Advance Plan No. 10008 was made without Andres Guerrero
Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of being notified. But in the advance plan, the Bureau of Lands listed Andres Guerrero as
Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer original claimant so that he would not be prejudiced when a case comes to trial.
certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the
plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the time of execution of the Deeds of Dominador Ramirez testified that during the rainy season of 1936, Andres Guerrero
Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that asked him to work on his land located at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an
long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to know area of four (4) hectares, more or less. As tenant, his agreement with Andres Guerrero
that the St. Clare’s Realty Company, Ltd. executed a "Joint Venture Agreement" with was that he would till the land in consideration of 50% of the harvests with Andres
the United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to develop the Guerrero shouldering the cultivation expenses. From 1936 to about 1941 or 1942, he
property into a residential subdivision; and that the said agreement was entered into in worked on the land and gave 50% of the produce to Andres Guerrero who went
gross and evident bad faith. personally to the field to get the same. In 1941 or 1942, he stopped working on the land
because war had broken out.
Separate answers were filed by the defendants Guerreros, St. Clare’s Realty Company,
Ltd. and United Housing Corporation. The defendants Guerreros alleged that Cristina On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had
Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property; that the action of the plaintiffs had been sick for a long time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that her
prescribed and they are guilty of laches. St. Clare’ s Realty Company, Ltd. averred that mother could walk only inside their house in Parañaque; that the money spent for the
its contract with United Housing Corporation was made in good faith. United Housing illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children,

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Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that On June 22, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that they did not waive
Andres Guerrero had lent to her. their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to
present rebuttal evidence; and that they were reserving the exercise of those rights upon
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros objected the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, prohibition
to the line of questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying "on matters and mandamus against the Presiding Judge of the trial court, which they were then
which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court." The trial court preparing to file.
having ruled that the witness "may answer", defendants’ counsel registered a continuing
objection. The court allowed the witness to continue her testimony subject to such Indeed, on June 25, 1974, plaintiffs instituted the said special civil action, which was
objection. (TSN, pp. 9-20, October 19, 1973.) docketed in the Court of Appeals as its CA-G.R. No. SF-03120. The action sought the
disqualification of the trial judge from continuing with the hearing of the case. On June
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was lent by Andres 27, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the petition outright. Copy of the resolution was
Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money to Cristina Guerrero received by the plaintiffs on July 2, 1974. They filed a motion for reconsideration on
for quite some time; that shortly after the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero July 17, 1974.
went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up the loans he
had extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo On the same date, July 17, 1974, the trial court rendered its decision with the following
Guerrero asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to attest to the fact that a dispositive part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
certain amount of money had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero.cralawnad
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants (and) against
On October 24, 1973, the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify the plaintiffs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules
of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial 1. Dismissing the complaint and Amended Complaint;
court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as
other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case. 2. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the private defendant Guerreros the amount of
P20,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 as
On February 12, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Motion For The Honorable Presiding Judge Of attorney’s fees;
This Honorable Court To Inhibit Himself And/Or To Transfer Case To Another
Branch." Oppositions to the said motion were filed. On April 26, 1974, the trial court 3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant St. Clare’s Realty Co. Ltd., the amount of
denied the motion. P1,923,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees;
At the continuation of the trial on June 14, 1974, plaintiffs and their counsel failed to
appear despite due notice and repeated previous warnings to their lawyer. Instead of 4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant United Housing Corporation the amount
appearing in court, plaintiffs, thru counsel, filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing, of P90,500.00 as actual damages; P100,000.00 for loss of goodwill and business
which was opposed by the defendants. On even date, the court issued an order as reputation, P80,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as lawyer’s fees; and
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
5. To pay the cost of suit.
"In view of the non-appearance of the plaintiffs as well as their counsel for today’s
hearing, they are deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby directed to cancel the Lis Pendens in Transfer
their evidence in court, and on motion of defendants’ counsels, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Certificate of Title No. 340842 in the name of the St. Clare’s Realty Co., Ltd., Book T-
Juan A. Carambas, is hereby authorized and commissioned to receive the evidence for 1971. Meanwhile, the defendant United Housing Corporation is ordered to proceed and
the defendants. After the defendants have closed their case, they are given 10 days continue with its commitments under the Memorandum Agreement dated October 12,
within which to file their respective memoranda and the case is deemed submitted for 1971." (Record on Appeal, pp. 259-261.)cralawnad
decision after receipt of the complete transcript of stenographic notes." (Record on
Appeal, p. 212.) On July 20, 1974, or three (3) days before plaintiffs received the decision, they filed
with the trial court a "Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela" praying that should the Court of
Appeals render an adverse resolution in CA-G.R. No. SF-03120, the lower court should

81
set aside its order of June 14, 1974 and allow plaintiffs to present other evidence, cross- amount of over two million pesos; and the error of ruling that the action was barred by
examine witnesses of the defendants, and present rebuttal evidence. prescription and laches. Petitioners underscore the procedural errors they attribute to the
lower courts which resulted in the deprivation of their full opportunity to ventilate their
On August 21, 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which case and prove the validity of their claim. They assail the ruling that their witnesses
they received on July 23, 1974. Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes "and others similarly situated" are disqualified to
testify; and that they waived the right to present their evidence when they failed to
Early in 1975, Judge Arsenio Alcantara who rendered the decision was replaced by appear at a hearing set by the trial judge during the pendency of proceedings taken by
Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. In her order of February 13, 1975, Judge Castro- the petitioners to disqualify him due to alleged hostility manifested by the latter towards
Bartolome resolved that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"1) The plaintiffs’ ‘Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela’ dated July 18, 1974, having been At this instance, We consider it unnecessary to discuss the substantive merits of the
passed upon by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara by the rendition of the Decision dated July petitioners’ cause of action. The record reveals that they have not yet completed the
17, 1974, is deemed to have been clearly denied by the Honorable Judge who penned presentation of their evidence. Whatever evidence they had previously presented were
the said decision; apparently not considered in the rendition of the questioned decisions for not having
been "formally offered." It does not strike Us as fair and just that the petitioners would
2) The plaintiffs’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated August 21, 1974 and be made answerable for damages in such a huge amount for having filed an allegedly
‘Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration’ dated August 22, 1974, have to be as they baseless and unfounded action without affording them the full opportunity of
are hereby, denied; establishing the merit of their claim. On the face of the record, We are convinced that
they had been denied that chance due to some mistaken and capricious application of
x x x pertinent procedural rules.

The first question of importance that engages the attention of this Court is whether or
5) The plaintiffs’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ and ‘Supplemental Motion for not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
Reconsideration’ are not pro-forma and have suspended the running of the period of testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule
appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library 130, of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

On February 21, 1975, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals where "Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. — The following
the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57597-R. On April 20, 1981, the Court of persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as
Appeals rendered its decision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph herein enumerated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision appealed from is hereby (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
affirmed, with modification in regard to damages as follows: (a) for the defendants prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
Guerreros, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P10,000.00 exemplary damages; (b) for the person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate
defendant St. Clare’s Realty Co., Ltd., P10,000.00 exemplary damages; (c) for the of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
defendant United Housing Corporation, P40,000.00 for loss of goodwill and business any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such
reputation and P10,000.00 exemplary damages. The actual damages and attorney’s fees became of unsound mind."cralaw virtua1aw library
are hereby maintained."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative
On May 27, 1981, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain
truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari. neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to
In their instant petition for review, petitioners have raised substantive and procedural establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
points on which the lower tribunals have allegedly erred. The substantive issues refer to disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero
the lack of basis for the grant of actual, moral and exemplary damages in the huge

82
did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.chanrobles appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph ed., p. 122.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the defendants,
established in the provision above quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, the witnesses discovered the following facts: In the 1930’s Andres Guerrero physically
and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate taxes for it, had the same cultivated
case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation expenses, and exclusively enjoyed the owner’s
nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition." share in the harvests. Andres Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister, Cristina Guerrero,
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.) before he died. Cristina Guerrero became ill prior to the year 1948. She could walk only
inside her house in Parañaque, Rizal. The money spent for her illness was borrowed
By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and by barring them from further from Manuel Guerrero. After the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero and
testifying, upon reasoning that unduly strained the meaning of the provisions of the Felicisimo Guerrero came to her house and the money loaned to her was totalled in the
Rules of Court relied upon, the trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing amount of P1,900.00. On December 10, 1957, the questioned lot was cadastrally
the truth in this case. surveyed and denominated as Lot 4752 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Andres Guerrero was
the lone claimant. Until 1962, no other person claimed the lot.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased
Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or The foregoing proofs bear materially on the questions raised by the plaintiffs as to
representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their whether or not: (1) Cristina Guerrero or Andres Guerrero owned the lot when the former
individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel purportedly sold it to Manuel Guerrero in 1948; (2) Cristina Guerrero really sold or
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule. merely mortgaged the land to Manuel Guerrero; (3) Manuel Guerrero and, after him, the
defendants Guerreros were buyers in good faith. Instead of insulating itself from
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify evidence that could lead it to the truth, the trial court should have addressed itself to the
where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with questions why: (1) if it is true that Cristina Guerrero was the owner of the disputed lot in
their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an 1948, the cadastral surveyors who actually repaired to the field listed Andres Guerrero
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be as the sole claimant of the property, (2) until 1962, no other person except Andres
noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other Guerrero claimed the lot as his own; (3) notwithstanding the purported deed of sale by
representative follows, which means that the word ‘representative’ includes only those Cristina Guerrero to Manuel Guerrero was executed on April 24, 1948, it was presented
who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, for registration with the Register of Deeds almost ten (10) years later only on February
capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words ‘against the estate of 27, 1958 (TSN, p. 15, January 9, 1974); (4) in the deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero, it is
such deceased persons’, which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the stated that he appeared in Parañaque, Rizal, before Atty. Jose D. Villena who was a
deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are notary public in Makati, Rizal; (5) the area of the land bought by Manuel Guerrero was
to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the 33,090 square meters whereas the area of the land sold by him to the defendants
personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid, pp. 169-171.) Guerreros was 42,299 square meters. The court also ought rather to have noticed the fact
that in the deed of sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero, it is stated that the subject parcel of
The next question that requires attention is whether or not the exclusion of plaintiffs’ land "is surrounded by muddikes besides the stone monuments that visibly marked all its
evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by "boundaries", which clearly indicate a previous survey and which may in turn lead to the
the respondent Court of appeals. Prior to the issuance of the court’s order of June 14, question if the deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero might have been made after the
1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to have waived their right to further present cadastral survey in 1957 and not in 1948.
or formally offer their evidence", the following had testified as witnesses of the
plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde, Moises Javillonar, Dominador The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the defendants’ evidence and
Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had presented on July 17, 1974 before the
was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs’ petition to disqualify the trial judge. As
that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision sentences the plaintiffs to pay damages
effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon and attorney’s fees, apart from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of Two
Million One Hundred Eighty Three Thousand and Five Hundred (P2,183,500.00) Pesos,

83
without plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to cross- GR No. L-27434. September 23, 1986
examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal evidence. The way the trial
court and the Court of Appeals proceeded in this case, litigation became more a game of GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P.
technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. No other fairer VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA,
course of action is demanded but for this Court to remand the case for further VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P.
proceedings.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA,
MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby set aside. Let COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.
the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin with instruction to the trial
court to allow the plaintiffs to complete their evidence, to cross-examine the defendants’ Evidence; The privilege to invoke the Dead Man’s Statute is waived by the defendant
witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence if they so desire, and thereafter to decide the where (a) he cross-examines the plaintiff; and (b) he files a counterclaim against the
case anew. plaintiff.—Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for
petitioners crossexamined private respondent Vicente. “A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s
SO ORDERED. deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s
lifetime.” It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against
private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual
capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as
defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been
brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Same; The Survivorship Disqualification Rule cannot be invoke where defendant

testifies as to communications made or contracts entered into with the agent of the
decedent while latter was alive.—Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the
adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases
in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the
adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had
with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner
Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either
confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said
contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the
testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not
actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not
negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was
subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Same; Same; Evidence; Laches; The written contract to sell in this case was
satisfactorily proved to have beennovated to a verbal lease agreement as shown by the

84
failure of respondent Vicente to demand the execution of a deed of sale or annotation of Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and
an adverse claim on the title to the sugarlands during his lifetime.—The novation of the Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration
written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and of the guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or
convincingly proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria
acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by
sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13 were petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva, thus:
delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently
registered in Villanueva’s name and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva likewise En consideracion a la garantia que Don Gaspar Vicente assume con la Cia. Gral. de
executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these Tabacos de Filipinas por el saldo de Don Santiago Villegas de P43,539.75 asumido por
were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward Don Joaquin Villegas el que Subscribe Praxedes T. Villanueva se compromete ceder es
asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding venta a Don Gaspar Vicente los campos nos. 3, 4 y 13 del plano de porcelario de la
during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his favor, Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, en compra projectada de la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de
or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said Filipinas. Estas campos representan 6-90-35 hectares por valor de P13,807.00 que Don
lots. If it were true that he made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of field no. 3 Gasper Vicente pagara directamente a Praxedes T. Villanueva
as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, he should have, upon refusal
of the latter to do so, immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter, instituted an Bais Central, Octubre 24, 1949.
action for recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to be annotated
on the certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3, containing an area of three (3) Fdo. Praxedes T. Villanueva
hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary
prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly believed he had any right Por: Fdo Genaro Goñi Apoderado 2
thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such inaction persisted even
during the pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account
intervened to seek exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as
of the late Praxedes Villanueva. only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only
the latter amount was debited from private respondent's account. The difference was
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA- supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such
G.R. No. 27800-R entitled, "Gaspar Vicente, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Genaro Goni, et. payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.
al., Defendants-Appellants" as well as from the resolution denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration. It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to
sell, Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros
The factual backdrop is as follows: Oriental. He thus went to private respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract/promise to sell However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the period of five (5) years starting with crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the
late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with gross income, said rent to be deducted from the money advanced by private respondent
TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have and any balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together with the
sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease.
offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by
Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the
between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent Gaspar Vicente three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva under TCT No.
embodied in a document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta." 1 T-4780 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. The fields were likewise mortgaged
by Villanueva to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), later transferred to the
Philippine National Bank on December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of

85
P334,400.00.3 thereafter proceeded to trial. Plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: then party-plaintiff
Gaspar Vicente, himself, who over the objection of therein defendants testified on facts
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, and Epifanio Equio a clerk of
1949-1950 milling season in January and February, 1950. TABACALERA Agency in the Bais Sugar Central. Defendants presented Genaro Goni,
who testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement.
On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a "Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor
of Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area On December 18, 1959, the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-
of 468,627 square meters, more or less. (Hacienda Sarria). A supplemental instrument heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering
was later executed by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include in the sale of June 17, fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or compensatory
1950 the sugar quota of the land. damages in the amount of P 81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross income of
field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59, and such other amounts as may be due
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted on from said field for the crop years subsequent to crop-year 1958-59, until the field is
November 24, 1951 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, docketed delivered to Vicente, and to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs.
as Special Case No. 777. Among the properties included in the inventory submitted to Therein defendant Goñi was relieved of any civil liability for damages, either personally
the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Field no. 13 or as administrator of the estate. 5
with an area of 1 hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares was listed as Lot no. 723 of the
inventory while fields nos. 3 and 4, with areas of 3 hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, Both parties appealed the decision to the then Court of Appeals; the plaintiff from the
and 1 hectare, 69 ares and 80 centares, respectively, were included in Lot no. 257 of the portion awarding damages on a claim that he was entitled to more, and defendants, from
inventory. the entire decision.

On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and On December 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming that of
the estate of the late Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent the lower court, with the modification that the amount of damages to be paid by
Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages before the then Court defendant-heirs to the plaintiff should be the total net income from field no. 3 from the
of First Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his capacity as crop year 1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the plaintiff plus interest thereon
administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed as at the legal rate per annum.6
Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but were denied the relief sought in a
contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on resolution dated February 9, 1967. Hence, the present appeal by certiorari whereby
October 24, 1949. He likewise prayed by way of attorney's fees and other costs the sum petitioners raise the following questions of law:
of P2,000.00 and for such other further relief which the court may deem just and
equitable in the premises. 4 MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE TESTIFY ON MATTERS OF FACT
OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH OF PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH
On October 25, 1954, petitioner Goni as defendant in Civil Case No. 2990, filed an CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND UPON HIS ESTATE. IN VIOLATION OF
answer with counterclaim for accounting of the produce of fields nos. 4 and 13, as well RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE 130, SEC. 20 PAR. (A)?
as the surrerder thereof on June 20, 1955, the end of the fifth crop-year, plus moral
damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. After an answer to MAY NOT A WRITTEN PROMISE TO SELL DATED OCTOBER 24,1949 BE
the counter-claim had been filed, private respondent Vicente amended his complaint on NOVATED INTO A VERBAL AGREEMENT OF LEASE DURING THE LIFETIME
September 1, 1955, to include a prayer for damages representing the produce of field no. OF THE PROMISSOR, WHOSE DEATH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 12, 1951,
3 from 1949-50 until delivery thereof to him. An answer with counterclaim to the BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUBSTANTIATED BY COMPETENT ORAL
amended complaint was duly filed, and on April 25, 1956, private respondent Vicente EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE?
amended his complaint anew to include as parties-defendants the heirs of the late
Praxedes Villanueva. SHOULD THE PROMISEE IN A PROMISE TO SELL, WHO PAID P12,460.24
WHICH WAS TO BE ACCOUNTED AND TO BE CREDITED AS RENTALS
On July 13, 1957, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, agreeing, among others, AFTER FIVE (5) YEARS OF LEASE, WHO IN HIS ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID
on the costs of production and produce of the three fields in question. The case NOT ALLEGE NOR PROVE DAMAGES, EXCEPT THE SUM OF P2,000.00 AS

86
ATTORNEY'S FEES, RECEIVE A JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES IN THE Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff
AMOUNT OF P74,056.35 WHICH CONSISTS OF P37,121.26 PLUS LEGAL in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for
INTEREST FOR THE CROP YEARS 1950-51 TO 1958-59 AND FOR P3,624.18 TO accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
P4,374.78 FOR EVERY CROP YEAR SUBSEQUENT TO 1958-59 PLUS counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring
INTEREST? 7 before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against,
but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the admissibility in
evidence of private respondent Vicente's testimony. Under ordinary circumstances, Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to
private respondent Vicente 8 would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows: transactions or communications which were had with the agent. 13 The contract/promise
to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado)
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private
enumerated: respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be
avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the
of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
person became of unsound mind. contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and or altered. 14 In order, however, that an obligation may be extinguished by another
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms,
of giving testimony.9 It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the 15 "Novation is never presumed. It must be established that the old and the new
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. 10 contracts are incompatible in all points, or that the will to novate appear by express
agreement of the parties or in acts of equivalent import. 16
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the
estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of lease was
protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of clearly and convincingly proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but
the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the
operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields
are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were
defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which subsequently registered in Villanueva's name and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva
deceased might have been interested to establish, if living. 11 likewise executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas.
All these were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross- toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by
examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document
taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross- in his favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of
examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. 12 It must title of said lots. If it were true that he made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of
further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent field no. 3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, he should have,

87
upon refusal of the latter to do so, immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter, It is the custom among the sugar planters in this locality that the Lessee usually demands
instituted an action for recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to an advance amount to cover the rental for the period of the lease, and the demand of an
be annotated on the certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3, containing an area of accounting will be only made after the expiration of the lease period. It was adduced
three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is the biggest among the three lots, an during the trial that the amount of P12,460.75 was considered as an advance rental of
ordinary prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly believed he had any the 2 lots which was leased to the Plaintiff, lots nos. 4 and 13; so we humbly believe that
right thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such inaction persisted there was no necessity on the part of defendant Mr. Genaro Goñi to make a yearly
even during the pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily demand for an accounting for the total production of 2 parcels leased to the plaintiff. 18
intervened to seek exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties
of the late Praxedes Villanueva. Petitioners, having clearly and sufficiently shown that the contract/promise to sell was
subsequently novated into a verbal lease agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a
The reason given by private respondent Vicente that field no. 3 was not delivered to him favorable decision on their counterclaim. Discussion of the third issue raised therefore
together with fields nos. 4 and 13 because there were small sugar cane growing on said becomes unnecessary.
field at that time belonging to TABACALERA, might be taken as a plausible
explanation why he could not take immediate possession of lot no. 3, but it certainly WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judicial
could not explain why it took him four years before instituting an action in court, and administrator of the estate of private respondent Gaspar Vicente and/or his successors-
very conveniently, as petitioners noted, after Villanueva had died and at the time when in-interest are hereby ordered to: a) surrender possession of fields nos. 4 and 13 of the
the verbal contract of lease was about to expire. Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria to petitioners; b) render an accounting of the produce
of said fields for the period beginning crop-year 1950-51 until complete possession
Both the trial and appellate courts chose to believe in the contract/promise to sell rather thereof shall have been delivered to petitioners; and c) to pay the corresponding annual
than the lease agreement, simply because the former had been reduced to writing, while rent for the said fields in an amount equivalent to 15% of the gross produce of said
the latter was merely verbal. It must be observed, though, that the contract/promise to fields, for the periods beginning crop-year 1950-51 until said fields shall have been
sell was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact of the late Praxedes Villanueva, an surrendered to petitioners, deducting from the amount due petitioners the sum of
indication, to our mind, that final arrangements were made by petitioner Goñi in the P12,460.24 advanced by private respondent Gaspar Vicente.
absence of Villanueva. It was therefore natural for private respondent Vicente to have
demanded that the agreement be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding effect upon SO ORDERED.
Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal lease agreement was negotiated by and
between Villanueva and private respondent Vicente themselves. Being close friends and
relatives 17 it can be safely assumed that they did not find it necessary to reduce the
same into writing.

In rejecting petitioners' contention respecting the verbal lease agreement, the appellate
court put much weight on the failure of petitioners to demand an accounting of the
produce of fields nos. 4 and 13 from 1950 to 1954, when the action for recovery of
property was filed. Such failure was satisfactorily explained by petitioners in their
motion for reconsideration filed before the then Court of Appeals, in this manner:

... Mr. Genaro Goni is also a farmer by profession and that there was no need for him to
demand a yearly accounting of the total production because the verbal lease agreement
was for a term of 5 years. The defendant Mr. Genaro Goni as a sugar planter has already
full knowledge as to the annual income of said lots nos. 4 and 13, and since there was
the amount of P12,460.25 to be liquidated, said defendant never deemed it wise to
demand such a yearly accounting. It was only after or before the expiration of the 5 year
lease that said defendant demanded the accounting from the herein plaintiff regarding
the production of the 2 lots that were then leased to him.

88
G.R. No. 74306. March 16, 1992.* In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971, Vicente
B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents. shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for
an order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ
G.R. No. 74315. March 16, 1992.* of preliminary attachment v. properties of defendants having possession of shares of
stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant corporation . . .
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, ENRIQUE RAZON, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents. xxx xxx xxx

Evidence; “Dead man’s statute.”—In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in
appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant,
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and
estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the
the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless possession of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian
the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was nor the appellant had paid any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in
filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of question . . .
stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. xxx xxx xxx
The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of
never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony was subject to cross- Manila.
examination by the private respon-dent’s counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner’s
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of
private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of
Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.
of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966
and registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant
then Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of
stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the
the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually
petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock. served and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique Razon wanted the
appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while Vicente From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971,
Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of
to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court denied both stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the
motions. Hence, these petitions. said shares cancelled.

The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows: The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to deliver
said shares to the plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by defendant Razon and
deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.

89
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed xxx xxx xxx
shares of stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators
to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:

Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of the late The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the
Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by
Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself an associate of him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased
the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law
late Chuidian delivered the said stock certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
of defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic) delivered it for deposit with the question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi
bank under the joint custody of the parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
August 7, 1971.
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered by the case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the
late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he
(defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private
incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the
July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o — 74306, pp. 66-68) defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of
alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly
Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to
his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed
unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a upon claims against the estate.
rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder
Evidence) States: Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private
respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192
enumerated. SCRA 209 [1990]):

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate object thereto. Thus:
of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such . . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the
person became of unsound mind." (Emphasis supplied) allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter

90
resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63,
may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with him. Once Corporation Code of the Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation Law)
admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to
disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E.
to, nor to strike it out on its own motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation.
Phil. 1.) Moreover, the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of
the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder
The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the
settled, we now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must
show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's by laws, if any,
participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74 SCRA 65 [1976]) or in
incorporators were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., accordance with the provisions of law.
Victor L. Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did
not start operations until 1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which
withdrew from the said corporation. The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the
placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends, among absence of the corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of
them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock, the provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case.
stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as nominal stockholder and with the
agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held by the petitioner but The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the
Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian in certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in
1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of stock the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35,
of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had in his possession the certificate of stock Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of
until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank of Commerce under stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the
the parties' joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial court's petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong to
order. Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he did not require an indorsement of the
certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late Juan Chuidian can not
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper conduct of
his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a
is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock. mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.

The petitioner's contention is not correct. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings
that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to
ruled: the testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T.
Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of transfer as overcome this testimony.
prescribed by law must be followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74 SCRA 65). As
provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68 otherwise known as the In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's
Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to decision declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of
the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee stock of E. Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the
by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v. pre-emptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall be valid, except as between the
The petition is impressed with merit.

91
 RULE 130, SECTION 24
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED
ownership.
COMMUNICATION
The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:
GR No. 13109. March 6, 1918
xxx xxx xxx
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. DALMACIO ANTIPOLO,
. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder issued to defendant and appellant.
him; second, to vote at meetings of the corporation; third, to receive his proportionate
share of the profits of the corporation; and lastly, to participate proportionately in the HOMICIDE; DYING DECLARATIONS; WITNESSES; HUSBAND AND WIFE.—
distribution of the corporate assets upon the dissolution or winding up. (Purdy's Beach The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to
on Private Corporations, sec. 554) (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87) testify on behalf of the defense or the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by
the deceased concerning the cause of his death. United States vs. Antipolo., 37 Phil. 726,
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: No. 13109 March 6, 1918

a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas,
resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, are charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. homicide and from that decision he was appealed. One of the errors assigned is based
upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man
b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of
it denied the petitioner's motion to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision of the the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The witness was called to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET stand and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what
ASIDE. The decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected upon the following
dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 ground:
shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T.
Chuidian. I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the widow of
the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not competent to
SO ORDERED. testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with
the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it
follows that this witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband
is the injured party.

Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the
disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a
husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties
to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of
her husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification
arising from the status of marriage.

These propositions were rejected by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to
the testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this objection counsel took
exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he
expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is sufficient at this time

92
to say that some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a degree that if A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife
proven to the satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the for or against her husband without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage or
accused, as they purported to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased, afterwards, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication
concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his injuries were due to made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil
fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused. action or proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the other.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision relates to the meaning
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against of the words "during the marriage or afterwards," and this doubt can arise only by a
the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other consideration of this phrase separately from the rest of the paragraph. Construed as a
in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties. whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which the testimony of a spouse is
offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the other is a party. The use of
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work on Criminal Evidence the word "afterwards" in the phrase "during the marriage or afterwards" was intended to
(second edition) on page 346: cover cases in which a marriage has been dissolved otherwise than by death of one of
the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of annulment or divorce.
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a competent witness for or against the
other in any judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a party. . . . If The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death,
either were recognized as a competent witness against the other who was accused of concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of
crime, . . . a very serious injury would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband the person charged with killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil., Rep., 530.) Such
and wife and the confidence which should exist between them. dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as against him.
(Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in several jurisdictions in
In Greenleaf's classical work on evidence, in section 337 [vol. I], the author says, in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying
stating the reasons for the rule at common law: declarations. In the case of the State vs. Ryan (30 La. Ann., 1176), cited by appellant in
his brief, the court said:
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting
seal of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and wife; and The next bill is as to the competency of the widow of the deceased to prove his dying
whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence declarations. We see no possible reason for excluding her . . . after the husband's death
which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even though the she is no longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as between husbands and wives, are
other party be no longer living. no longer applicable.

This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. In the case of Arnett vs. Commonwealth (114 Ky., 593, 596), the testimony of the
The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the widow of the deceased as to his dying declarations made to her was objected to upon the
confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to express ground that under the terms of the Kentucky Code, "the wife was incompetent to
whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of testify even after the cessation of the marriage relation, to any communication made by
revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the her by her husband during the marriage."
point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the
manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense This contention was rejected, the court saying:
confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose
that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came
in inquiring into the cause of his death. to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does
not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the
The same theory as that upon which section 58 of General Orders No. 58 is based, one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a
underlies section 383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, which reads as follows: thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the
statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact
known to her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the

93
witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently G.R. No. 120769. February 12, 1997
made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in
the prosecution of the defendant. STANLEY J. FORTICH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIX T.
GALLERON, respondents.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony of
the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused was Criminal Law; Libel; The key elements of publicity found in the definition of libel in
deprived of one of his essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be granted. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are not present in this case.—Nothing in the
evidence on record would suggest that the key elements of publicity found in the
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and a new trial definition of libel in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are present in the case before
is granted at which the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, us.
together with any additional evidence which may be offered on the part of the
prosecution or the defense. At the new trial granted the accused, the testimony taken at Same; Same; While the imputation of a vice or defect on the petitioner’s character might
the former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this appeal shall be de officio. So have been apparent from the second to the last paragraph of the memorandum, the
ordered. imputation was never really made publicly.—Firstly, the assailed letter was obviously
part and parcel of the initial investigation surrounding the non-remittance of collections
by petitioner. The right hand caption of the memorandum clearly shows the phrase
“Inter-office Memorandum,” implying confidentiality. Secondly, petitioner was unable
to prove that the letter was circulated or publicized, much less read by officers of the
corporation other than those involved in the investigation or those directly supervising
the petitioner’s work. While imputation of a vice or defect on the petitioner’s character
might have been apparent from the second to the last paragraph of the memorandum, the
imputation was never really made publicly.

Same; Same; Petitioner was not able to establish satisfactorily that the issuance of the
letter and its offending paragraph was motivated by malice.—More importantly,
petitioner in the court below was not able to establish satisfactorily that the issuance of
the letter and its offending paragraph was motivated by malice. As respondent Court of
Appeals correctly held: Neither does this Court find positive proof that the appellant was
motivated by malice in the issuance of the memorandum claimed to be libelous,
addressed to the proper officials of San Miguel Corporation. In other words, the onus of
proving actual malice is placed on the plaintiff-appellee who must convince the Court
that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the
defense of privilege is unavailing. (Nanerico D. Santos vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.,
203 SCRA 110, 114). Our ruling is buttressed by the fact that no proof has been adduced
to show that the subject Memorandum was released to persons other than the officials
concerned.

Same; Same; The private respondent’s inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit
of privileged communication rule.—Malice exists when there is an intentional doing of
a wrongful act without just cause. An imputation is legally malicious if done without
any reason that would justify a normally conscientious man in so making the imputation.
While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are
exceptions to this rule. The record indicates that this case falls under the settled
exceptions to the rule: the private respondent’s inter-office memorandum falls within the
ambit of privileged communication rule.

94
Same; Same; A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga Del Norte. In his complaint, he
matter in which party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a alleged that:
duty.—A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. xxx xxx xxx
Discussing the scope of this rule, former Chief Justice Fernando, in Mercado v. CFI of
Rizal, explained that: x x x. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is [T]he defendant has pictured the plaintiff in his report (Annex "B") as a thief, corrupt or
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the dishonest man and even going to the extent of exposing in public the alleged vices of the
mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements plaintiff such as mahjong and cockfighting.
must be made under an honest sense of duty. Fortich vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
152, G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997 [T]he defendant is guilty of gross bad faith and malice in the highest degree for making
and publishing a false, and libelous report for the purpose of putting down the good
For over five years since August 1973, petitioner Stanley J. Fortich was employed as an name and reputation of the plaintiff and his family.
area salesman of the soft drinks division of the San Miguel Corporation in Dipolog City,
a job which required him to collect various sums of money from the retailers and buyers xxx xxx xxx 6
of the company along his designated route.
Petitioner then prayed that the trial court grant the total amount of P171,000.00 to him
On June 5, 1979, petitioner received a Memorandum ordering him to stop plying his as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
route and collecting the sums owed by customers to the company for the stated reason of
his alleged "NONISSUANCE (SIC) OF EITHER CHANGE REFUND NOR On November 5, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision 7 in favor of
OFFICIAL RECEIPT FOR EMPTIES RETRIEVED FROM OUTLETS WITH herein petitioner, the dispositive portion of which states the following:
TEMPORARY CREDIT SALES." 1 The order grounding petitioner, signed by herein
respondent Felipe T. Carreon in his capacity as District Sales Supervisor, likewise PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby renders judgment —
directed petitioner to instead report directly "to the sales office every working day at the
prescribed company time." 2 1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following sums: (a) P150,000.00 for
moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P20.000.00 for attorney's
Following up on his first memorandum and alleging that petitioner misappropriated the fees and (d) P1,000.00 for litigation expenses;
amount of P1,605.00 from his collections (through non-issuance of invoices to several
customers) private respondent, on June 11, 1975, submitted a second inter-office 2. Dismissing the defendant's counterclaim for lack of merit; and
memorandum addressed to the Regional Sales Manager summarizing the findings of an
initial investigation he conducted on the matter, which he concluded with the following 3. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs. 8
paragraph: Principally contending in his assignment of errors that no actual malice existed or had
been shown in respect to the questioned (second) memorandum and that in any case, the
In addition, I would like to further inform management that S/M Stanley Fortich is an assailed letter was protected by the privileged communication rule, the private
avid mahjong player and a cockfighting enthusiast. Inspite of several advices, there respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals.
seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a similar case last
September 11, 1978. 3 On February 21, 1995, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision on the ground
that the memorandum was not libelous being "within the ambit of privileged
After further investigation by the company which found petitioner guilty of communications." Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on
misappropriating company funds, petitioner was preventively suspended from his job. May 31, 1995, hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The order suspending petitioner also decreed his dismissal "upon receipt of clearance
from the Ministry of Labor." 4 The appeal is not impressed with merit.

Claiming that the above-quoted second memorandum issued by the private respondent The provisions of law applicable to the case at bar are embodied in Articles 353 and 354
was "wilfull, malicious and done in gross bad faith," 5 petitioner, on September 28, of the Revised Penal Code which state the following:
1979 filed a complaint for "Damages Arising from Libel" with the Court of First

95
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, conscientious man in so making the imputation. 11 While the law presumes every
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this rule. The record
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or indicates that this case falls under the settled exceptions to the rule: the private
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. respondent's inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of privileged
communication rule.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
shown, except in the following cases: party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. 12
Discussing the scope of this rule, former Chief Justice Fernando, in Mercado v. CFI of
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any Rizal, 13 explained that:
legal, moral or social duty; and
. . . . Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act honest sense of duty;
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. ....

Nothing in the evidence on record would suggest that the key elements of publicity In the instant case, it is well-worth stressing that the private respondent was, as the
found in the definition of libel in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are present in District Sales Supervisor of the corporation's Dipolog office, the immediate supervisor
the case before us. of petitioner. In this capacity, respondent was charged with the duty to carry out and
enforce company rules and policies, including the duty to undertake initial investigation
Firstly, the assailed letter was obviously part and parcel of the initial investigation of possible irregularities in customer accounts in order to suggest further action which
surrounding the non-remittance of collections by petitioner. The right hand caption of could be taken by the company. In fact, the communications initially submitted by the
the memorandum clearly shows the phrase "Inter-office Memorandum," 9 implying private respondent to his superiors prompted the investigation which eventually led to
confidentiality. Secondly, petitioner was unable to prove that the letter was circulated or petitioner's preventive suspension and to the decision by the company's proper officers
publicized, much less read by officers of the corporation other than those involved in the to terminate the latter's employment. In making his earlier recommendation, the private
investigation or those directly supervising the petitioner's work. While imputation of a respondent relied on the affidavits submitted by at least three of the company's clients
vice or defect on the petitioner's character might have been apparent from the second to (all attesting to irregularities) 14 and his initial though yet-unsubstantiated findings that
the last paragraph of the memorandum, the imputation was never really made publicly. respondent was an "avid mahjong player and a cockfight enthusiast." That the affidavits
were subsequently found to have been gathered by the private respondent himself did
More importantly, petitioner in the court below was not able to establish satisfactorily not diminish their quality. Investigation necessarily includes the gathering and
that the issuance of the letter and its offending paragraph was motivated by malice. As solicitation of information.
respondent Court of Appeals correctly held:
Even granting that the questioned memorandum — particularly the above quoted
Neither does this Court find positive proof that the appellant was motivated by malice in paragraph — contains statements which could be slanderous and therefore actionable
the issuance of the memorandum claimed to be libelous, addressed to the proper were they not protected by the rule on privileged communications, still as no malice was
officials of San Miguel Corporation. In other words, the onus of proving actual malice is shown, we agree with the respondent court's conclusion that the assailed memorandum
placed on the plaintiff-appellee who must convince the Court that the offender was report was an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a
prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the defense of privilege is moral and legal obligation which the private respondent certainly owed to the company
unavailing. (Nanerico D. Santos vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., 203 SCRA 110, 114.) in the performance of his duties. The opinion which the private respondent expressed in
Our ruling is buttressed by the fact that no proof has been adduced to show that the the discharge of his duty might have skirted the boundary which usually separates
subject Memorandum was released to persons other than the officials concerned. . . . 10 innocent opinion from actionable defamation. Paradoxically, however, if he did not
hazard the warning, though it might have subsequently turned out to be a reckless one,
Malice exists when there is an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause. An he would have been remiss in his responsibilities to the company. The rule on privileged
imputation is legally malicious if done without any reason that would justify a normally

96
communications allows the latitude of expression embodied in the private respondent's On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand
second memorandum. as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
objection.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed,
the petition is hereby DENIED. Esperanza testified as follows:

SO ORDERED. "ATTY. ALCANTARA:

Note.—There is a right to publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood to the We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
injury of others with impunity. (People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 [1995]) Fortich vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997 COURT:

Swear in the witness.

G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005 xxx

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, respondent. ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; Marital Disqualification; Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house
direct descendants or ascendants.—Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring
provides: “Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.—During their marriage, the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew
of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in
ascendants.” The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was
husband and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and
danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of others.
private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is COURT:
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. Alvarez vs.
Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 You may proceed.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of xxx
Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez,
petitioner, versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, DIRECT EXAMINATION
and Maximo Alvarez, respondents."
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon xxx
City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza
G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that
scent?

97
 Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of
my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room). "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know? affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez. ascendants."

Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him? The reasons given for the rule are:

A: Yes, sir. 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him? 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at
his name as Maximo Alvarez."4 the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
"uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings. 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.11
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion5 to disqualify Esperanza
from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
marital disqualification. both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed
by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance,
trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony
witnesses. to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.7 such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void
Order dated October 19, 1999.8 in the unhappy home.12

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.10 "We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid
down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside
the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. ‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly
attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"

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Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal Adm. Case No. 4078. July 14, 2003.*
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information
for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and respondent.
flourishes.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyer-client Relationship; An attorney is not
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a
client, unless the latter consents.—Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not
of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets
complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client
underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a Same; Same; Same; The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly
longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule." within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer; It does not extend to those made
in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.—It must be stressed, however,
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of
they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a
and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the
communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he
the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege
right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who
gave rise to its necessity." Same; Same; Same; A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his
clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach.—Be that as it may,
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, respondent’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his
RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights
petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner. as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to
use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of
SO ORDERED. litigation therein and respondent’s professional competence and legal advice were not
being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings
Note.—For marital disqualification to apply, it is necessary that the marriage is valid with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with
and subsisting at the time the testimony is offered. (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil. 493 his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
[1946]). Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 20059 Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75, Adm. Case No. 4078 July 14, 2003

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty.
Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could

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rent a small office space in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant denied respondent's charges and claimed that respondent's allegation is
Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, libelous and not privilege as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant
complainant's retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondent's Answer, thus:
him handle some of complainant's cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship
between complainant and respondent. 12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on
January 30, 1993, defendant Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said that he will only do so
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of
downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his
a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review
on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of
did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in the event that the said
before the Quezon City Register of Deeds. petition for review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the
prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. his eventual acquittal, which defendant Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not only
However, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name and because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the complainant confided to
financed through City Trust Company. him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in
the above-mentioned case. (emphasis supplied)
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero.
Romero likewise wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure
the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount of case and maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such
P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondent's arrears with the car allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship
financing firm. and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this
complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent's
postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained1 that it was complainant
therein was already closed. who offered him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter
was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case2 filed against complainant.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest
then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe
and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made
these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer: complainant's credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell
lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-
xxx xxx xxx client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor
and reputation.
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading
and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of
and has many cases pending in court; complainant without consideration and only as a "formal requirement" so he could
obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the
xxx xxx xxx mortgaged property to complainant.

Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for
value, but only: (a) to serve as "some kind of acknowledgment" that he already received

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in advance a portion of his attorney's fees from the complainant for the legal services he
rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
handling for complainant. communications or information is limited only to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero's not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.5 If the
loan which he allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to him by unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's alleged intention to bribe
Romero as attorney's fees, the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay his government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the
amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is
ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no
ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent professional employment in the strict sense.
was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the
amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him. disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to
protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional competence and legal
recommendation. advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith
investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending and fairness.
his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent's
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP. allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of respondent from the practice of law
civil cases pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to seems to be disproportionate to his breach of duty considering that a review of the
ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not for records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against him.
us to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be
determined by the trial court where his case is pending. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of
complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a suspension to all courts in the country.
pending case.
SO ORDERED.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the
inception of their relationship.3 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does
not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client.4

101
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992 well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."
NELLY LIM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D.
VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS
JUAN SIM, respondents. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES THEREOF. —
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; requisites.
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule
on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES,
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure NOT PRIVILEGED. — There is authority to the effect that information elicited during
and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such information
opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the casual presence of a
policy and is for the general interest of the community. third person destroys the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and
patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Since the object of the privilege may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result."
is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the
physician’s testimony. 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. — while it may
be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — In order that the privilege may be subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal
successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is claimed of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the
the patient." testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in
the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. — These requisites conform with the four (4) interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be
fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver
disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1. The communications must originate in thereof.
a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the
fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the
of litigation." National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. — The physician
may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which
would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only
of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that

102
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
"before, during and after the marriage and until the present." After the issues were communication rule.
joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent
presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as
own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would an expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness
present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic)
Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she
Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness she examined and treated
requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines
motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is she prescribed.
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
was issued on 12 January 1989.
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition
On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the 2 for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul
subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion. the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual
urgent motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a law library
professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and course to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she
professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse
allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court discussed the conditions which
by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a physician and his patient
questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the
and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the following findings:
medicines she had prescribed.
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose
Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced testimony is sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who
to writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date: was summoned by the patient in her professional capacity for curative remedy or
treatment. The divergence in views is whether the information given by the physician in
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged communication. We
seeks to prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication
respondent Nelly Lim in her professional capacity perforce her testimony is covered by because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in
the privileged (sic) communication rule. her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the
physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or
she will not testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-
her professional capacity. charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of
the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending
respondent’s motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the physician of petitioner.
Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes

103
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no . . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no declaration that touched (sic) or
declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during
her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a professional the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity.’
capacity. Although she testified that she examined and interviewed the patient, she did
not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and IV.
treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr.
Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious . . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the
character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5
hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.
related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court
of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no
(sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided reversible error in its challenged resolution.
the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information
related to him in his professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which
of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.). reads:

The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient "SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
protection must be confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly cases:
implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be implied according to
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
nature of the information given." 4 professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient."
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules
"seriously erred" : of Court with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or
"I. treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word
character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the
privileged communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar. changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was
sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the
II. 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the
information would blacken such character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as an Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the word
attending physician of petitioner.’ character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts."
‘Character’ is what a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what
III. people say he is.’Character’ depends on attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on
attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter
merely what is accepted to be reality at present." 10

104
 that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of
and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure communicated is not stated." 17
and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
policy and is for the general interest of the community. 12 requisites. 18

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action
objection is made to the physician’s testimony. 13 but to agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to
discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose
concur: anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As
professional capacity; an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule
on this point is summarized as follows:
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a
(formerly character) of the patient." 14 physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question
in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have
concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the
facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or
maintenance of the relation between the parties. does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the
patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications party, thus:
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when
he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and interviewed the patient, Nelly.
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be emphasized

105
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office? question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate
the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be
month of April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the
since July of 1987, it was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition
until November of 1987. 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, 25 do not at all
show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician? Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.
A Yes, I understand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
Costs against petitioner.
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not
get anything from Dr. Lim. SO ORDERED.

Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who
was also present during that interview?

A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20

There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of
the privilege:

"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys
the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts
have reached a contrary result." 21

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by
Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 — which
is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former’s
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained
from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.

Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion
for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the
petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any

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G.R. No. 108854. June 14, 1994 from disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and
the appellate court, she is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari.
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents. On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint
Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children,
Evidence; Privileged Communication; Physician-Patient Relationship; Requisites in Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the
order that the privilege may be successfully invoked.—Requisites in order that the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz
privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma.
enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.” November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying
Same; Same; Same; The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the patient’s husband who conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. His testimony cannot thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and Definite." 2
executed the report.—In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
simply the patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. partnership.

Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma.
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who Paz before the trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric
examined the patient and executed the report. Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." 4
Same; Same; Same; In failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
evidence offered may be admitted.—Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the
objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and
his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing
privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-
mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the
counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for
may be admitted. petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such
ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her
The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment absence.
proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma.
privileged communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband Paz' Statement for the Record. 8

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On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that — evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets
circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what cannot be done
respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
respondent had been suffering from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the
said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not object Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what
thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient and she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain
physician. What was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was when her Answer was filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain
irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose of and simple pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the place of her
determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from
psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material and may be the records.
testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the
respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and later Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit:
the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be presented. 9 the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not
applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner." 16 In
4, 1991, and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may
the record. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
denied.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her
Decision promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was likewise presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account
denied. Hence, the instant petition for review. among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely
psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to
part of the records of the case. She argues that since interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional
capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits
this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with
a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for
prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is
— The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication
between physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed,
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are intended
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician
that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or
treat his patient. 13 disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that
the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility
of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure.

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19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as
humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably delaying
types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after
fall within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in
in keeping his mental health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the the company of each other. 23
psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of
antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist. assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is
AFFIRMED.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals
22 clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully SO ORDERED.
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; Note.—Failure to object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the right to cross-
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his examine the actual witness to the occurrence thereby rendering the evidence admissible
professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that (People vs. Competente, 207 SCRA 591).
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband
who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private

respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to
the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such
objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.

The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court.
The allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private
respondent's declarations which may be denied or disproved during the trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have
already lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet
to conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties'
respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and avoid
any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to
appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their
appeals depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate
courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should

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 RULE 130, Sec. 36 Same; Same; Acquittal; Witnesses; Credibility; Testimony of an eleventh-hour witness
not credible; Self-contradictions on material points of prosecution witness; Sign
HEARSAY RULE language of deaf mute as a witness not clear and was not cross-examined to determine
ability to communicate.—The tragic poisoning of the three children is unfortunate. The
No. L-45283-84. March 19, 1982.* tragedy was compounded when the trial Court imposed the death penalty on the accused
although the evidence against her does not justify a conviction. Inspite of the self-
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCILA VALERO contradictions of Rodolfo Quilang on very material points noticed by the trial Judge,
y VARILLA, defendant-appellant. himself, Quilang’s obvious tendency to prevaricate, and the fact that he is what the
appellant’s counsel calls an “eleventh-hour witness”, which is true, and inspite of the
Criminal Law; Double murder and frustrated murder; Evidence; Hearsay evidence or incompetence of the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco whose
incompetent evidence; Res inter alios acta; Rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an testimonies are hearsay evidence, and the practical impossibility of interpreting correctly
act, declaration or omission of another.—Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital the sign language of Pipe, the trial Judge readily accepted their testimonies as basis for
information for the prosecution was never presented as a witness either for the imposing the death penalty in gross violation of the hearsay rule and the constitutional
prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as prosecution right of the accused to meet the witness face to face (in the instant case, the deaf-mute,
witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned from Pipe by sign language. The Pipe), and to cross-examine Pipe in order to determine his ability to communicate with
evidence is purely hearsay. The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the the outside world.
principle of res inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Lucila Valero alias Rosing and Alfonsito Valero alias "Pipe" were accused in the
Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan in two separate complaints, one of double
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to object to presentation of hearsay or murder and the other of frustrated murder.
incompetent evidence does not give probative value to the evidence; Admissibility of
evidence not equated with weight of evidence.—The failure of the defense counsel to After the preliminary investigations, the complaints against Alfonsito Valero were
object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence dismissed "on the ground that he is a deaf-mute and, therefore, all the proceedings
that violates the rules of res inter alios acto, or his failure to ask for the striking out of against him were beyond his comprehension". Lucila Valero remained as the sole
the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may defendant. After the trial in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan where the records
make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be were later forwarded for appropriate proceedings, the trial Court convicted Lucila
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no Valero of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder and imposed upon
probative value. her the extreme penalty of death.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right of the defendant to meet Hence, this automatic review.
witnesses face to face; Imposition of death penalty based on hearsay evidence or as part
of res gestae violates constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to The following facts are not disputed. In the morning of February 22, 1969 between 7:00
face and subject the witness to rigid test of cross-examination; Substantive rights of and 9:00 o'clock of Saturday, Michael, aged 9 months, and Annabel, aged 1 year and 9
defendant under the Constitution prevail over mere technical rules of evidence.—To months, both of whom are the children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning after
give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. Likewise, Imelda, another
considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis for minor child of Ceferino, tasted the poisoned bread and would have died as a
the imposition of the death penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the consequence were it not for the timely medical assistance given her. All these three
defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross- minor children were in the balcony of their house at San Rafael, Bulacan, when they
examination, the only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and partook of the poisoned bread.
in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In a conflict between a provision of the On the same morning at about the same time that the three minor children partook of the
constitution giving the defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of poisoned bread, three (3) puppies of Ceferino Velasco under the balcony also died of
evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to the constitution. poisoning.

110
Earlier that same morning at about 6:00 o'clock, Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, Only Rodolfo Quilang, among the nine prosecution witnesses testified that he saw the
was seen throwing poisoned rats into a river near his house. Investigations were defendant Lucila Valero deliver "something wrapped in a piece of paper" 2 to her deaf-
conducted by Cpl. Bucot and Pat. Arturo Ventuso both of the Police Department of San mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction by sign language to deliver the same to
Rafael, Bulacan. Upon their arrival, they saw the dead bodies of Michael and Annabel in the Velasco children. Quilang never saw what was inside the piece of paper. At the time
the house of Ceferino Velasco and the dead puppies under the balcony. They also saw Quilang saw the delivery to Pipe of the wrapped object, the defendant and her brother
several pieces of sliced pan scattered in the sala of the house, near the balcony, and were in the balcony of their house, which was just near the gate of Ceferino Velasco's
under the balcony. They picked up some pieces of sliced bread under the balcony, house where he (Quilang) was standing. Upon receipt of the wrapped object, Pipe
wrapped them in a piece of paper and submitted them to a chemist for examination. It allegedly proceeded towards Velasco's house.
was found that the bread contained endrin, a poisonous insecticide. The two minor
children, Michael and Annabel, were also autopsied and the necropsy reports showed According to Quilang, he was "in the act of leaving Velasco's gate when Pipe "was
that both children died of poisoning by endrin. Samples of the blood and internal organs entering the gate of Ceferino Velasco". 3
of both Michael and Annabel were also examined by a chemist and it was found that
they contained endrin. Whether or not Quilang saw the delivery to the Velasco children of the "something
wrapped in a piece of paper" is a question that involved this star prosecution witness
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense conflict as to the source of the poisoned into a series of self-contradictions, aptly called by the appellant's counsel as a "series of
bread. The evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the basic somersaults" which earned for Quilang a reprimand from the trial Judge, who,
children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, a deaf-mute brother of the defendant Lucila surprisingly later, based the conviction mainly on the testimony of this flip-flopping
Valero, and that it was Lucila Valero who gave the bread to Pipe for delivery to the witness.
minor children. On the other hand, the defendant Lucila Valero denies that she ever gave
bread to her deaf-mute brother, Pipe, for delivery to the minor children. The evidence In his affidavit, dated March 8, 1972 (Exhibit "4", p. 437, Record of murder case) or
for the defense tends to show that the Velasco children might have eaten one of the three (3) years after the poisoning of the Velasco children, Quilang stated that he
sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning rats in his garden. actually saw Pipe deliver the wrapped object to the children. The statement reads as
follows:
It is not denied that Ceferino Velasco has a vegetable garden in his yard. He uses an
insecticide called Polidol to spray the vegetable and uses the same insecticide to kill 3. Na nakita kong si Pipe ay nagpunta sa bahay nina Ceferino Velasco at dala-dala ang
rats. According to the testimony of the defendant, which was never rebutted by Ceferino inabot ni Lucilang nakabalot sa papel, at noong dumating sa may hagdanan ni Ceferino,
Velasco, Ceferino also planted vegetables in the yard of the defendant whose house is ay nakita kong iniabot ang nakabalot sa mga bata na anak ni Ceferino Velasco.
just across the street from the house of Ceferino Velasco. She further testified that
Ceferino dipped sliced bread into an insecticide called endrin, dried them up and later Three years later during the trial on September 15, 1975, he declared on cross-
used the poisoned bread as a bait to kill rats in the yard located by the side of his house. examination, as follows:
1
Q. When you left the residence of Demetria and Severino (sic) Velasco, Pipe was just
More of the controversial facts will be presented in the following discussion. entering the gate of that house, is it not?

We first discuss and assess the evidence for the prosecution. Out of the nine witnesses A. Yes.
for the prosecution three witnesses, namely Rodolfo Quilang, Federico Jaime, and
Ceferino Velasco were presented to prove that the defendant Lucila Valero gave the Q. In other words, you did not see Pipe give that something wrapped in a piece of paper
poisoned bread to her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction to deliver the to anybody in the premises because you have already left?
bread to the Velasco children.
A. Really not.
We now analyze the testimonies of these three witnesses:
Q. Are you sure of that?
1. Rodolfo Quilang
A. I did not really see. 4

111
When confronted with the contradiction, Quilang reiterated that he did not see Pipe you did not see, and now you say you saw, can you explain these inconsistent
deliver the bread, in the following testimony: statements?

Q. You did not answer the question, you stated in open court that you did not see Pipe A. The truth of the matter was that he handed over. 9
give the bread to the children of Ceferino and Demetria Velasco is that correct?
Convinced that Quilang was a lying witness, the trial Judge could not help but explode
A. I really said that. 5 an expletive in Tagalog during the cross-examination, as follows:

On being pressed further to explain the contradiction, Quilang made the absurd Atty. Rodrigo:
explanation that the self-contradictory statements were both correct. Thus:
Q. Did you see that wrapped thing being given or you were just guessing?
Q. And you, of course, realized that you said that under oath?
A. I saw that he handed over.
A. Yes.
Q. But I thought, Mr. Quilang, that when Pipe was just entering the gate of Ceferino
Q. Now, in your statement, dated March 8, 1969 (should be March 8, 1972) which was Velasco, and Demetria Velasco, you were already departing from the place and that you
also under oath, you stated that you saw Pipe give that thing wrapped in a piece of paper have already left, and this is the reason why you did not see Pipe handed over that
to the children of Severino (sic) and Demetria Velasco, are you telling that is also true? something wrapped on a piece of paper?

A. Yes. 6 A. I was not able to say that.

Court:
The judge must have been so flabbergasted with the inconsistencies that he, himself,
propounded the following question: Ano ka ba? Narinig kong sinabi mo iyon ah! 10
Court:
The tendency of Quilang to prevaricate is shown not only in his self-contradictory
Q. The Court will ask you, did you see Pipe hand over to the deceased children that statements on the witness stand but also in the other portions of the record. The first
something which was wrapped in a piece of paper? statement of Quilang (Exhibit "4", p. 437, Record of the Murder case) is dated March 8,
1972. This date appears twice in the affidavit, first at the end of the affidavit and second,
A. Yes, sir. 7 in the jurat. In both places of the affidavit, the words "March" and "1972" are
typewritten by the same typewriter used in typing the entire affidavit. The date,
The confusing inconsistencies prompted the Court to proceed further as follows: however, was left blank so that originally what appeared at the end of the affidavit and
in the jurat was practically "March — 1972 ". Apparently, the affidavit must have been
Q. A while ago, you were asked by Atty. Rodrigo. You clearly state that you did not see prepared in March of 1972. The date "8", presumably the date of the swearing before the
Pipe hand over this wrapped thing in the paper, do you remember that? Fiscal, was typewritten with a different typewriter on the blank space.

A. Yes, sir. On the witness stand, Quilang stated that he made an affidavit on February 23, 1969. 11
He must have made this statement to make it appear that he was not an "eleventh-hour
Q. The Court is now confused, which of these statements it will believe, do you realize witness" as alleged by the defense. When confronted with the discrepancies in the date
that these two statements are contradictory to each other? 8 appearing in his affidavit, to wit, March 8, 1972, and his testimony on the witness stand,
he insisted that the correct date was February 23, 1969 and that either the Fiscal or the
After some evasive answers in this attempt to extricate himself from this web of self- one acting in his behalf committed the error in indicating the date in his affidavit. 12 It is
contradictions, the Court insisted as follows: incredible that a Fiscal administering the oathtaking on February 23, 1969 and signs the
jurat postdates the oath-taking to March 8, 1972, three years later.
Q. You are not answering the question, in fact, I remember having asked you whether or
not you saw Pipe hand over this something wrapped to the children and you said that

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There are other equally strong considerations indicating the lack of credibility of A. When I went down, I made this sign to him. (Witness was waiving his two hands
Quilang. He is what the appellant's counsel calls an "eleventh-hour witness". When the with his palms down and both hands horrizontal along the waist.)
complaint for frustrated murder and the complaint for murder, both dated March 11,
1969, were filed with the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan, Rodolfo Quilang was Q. When you made that sign, what was the meaning or Idea that you wanted to convey ?
not listed as one of the several witnesses. Quilang never made any statement to the
police who initially investigated the case nor to the Philippine Constabulary which made A. I was asking him as to what happened to the children and the sign made by him was
its own investigation. When the Municipal Court asked searching questions from several like this. (Witness demonstrated by one of his hands demonstrating some kind of height
witnesses during the first stage of the preliminary investigation on March 12, 1969, only and at the same time the left hand pointing upwards where the children were.)
Ceferino Velasco, Concepcion Velasco, Delfin Senorosa, Federico Jaime and Demetria
Manalastas were investigated. Rodolfo Quilang was not one of them. 13 xxx xxx xxx

Again, when the information for frustrated murder (pp. 87 to 88, Record of Frustrated Q. What do you mean by the sign when your right hand indicating some height and your
Murder case) and the information for murder (p. 76, Records of Murder case) were filed left hand pointing towards upward?
in February 1971, the star witness, Rodolfo Quilang, was not listed among the nine (9)
prosecution witnesses. Then on September 15, 1975 or six (6) years after the tragedy, A. What I wanted to imply is, I was asking Pipe as to who gave food to them, your
Quilang was suddenly sprung as the star witness, the only witness who allegedly saw the Honor.
delivery by the defendant to Pipe of "something wrapped in a piece of paper" with the
alleged instruction by sign language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. Without Q. Why did it occur to you to go down and try to communicate with Pipe?
the testimony of Quilang, there would be no evidence to show that the poisoned bread
which was allegedly delivered by Pipe to the Velasco children came from the defendant. A. I saw him down below and he was making signs and I asked the children as to what
Realizing that there was a missing link, the prosecution thought of presenting Quilang to happened and he told me that the children were given bread.
provide the missing link six years after the occurrence of the tragedy.
Q. What came into your mind when you saw Pipe demonstrating in the manner that you
This witness, Aniceto Decalos, a neighbor and old friend of Ciriaco Jimenez, like the described ?
alleged eyewitness Candido Autor did not figure in the list of witnesses for the
prosecution, either in the criminal complaint filed by PC Capt. Golez or in the Fiscal's A. I just wanted to know as to who gave food to the children, your Honor.
indictment. His name was not amongst those who gave affidavits to back up the criminal
charge. This gives the impression that Aniceto Decalos, the neighbor of the deceased, Q. Did you catch any significance in those signs that you saw to Pipe?
was but an eleventh-hour witness. To take his testimony on its face value, we fear, is to
rate truth so lightly. 14 A. Yes, your Honor.

2. Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco Q. What significance that you had in mind?

On the other hand, both Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime did not see the delivery by A. Because the children said that it was Pipe who gave bread, your Honor.
the defendant to her deaf-mute brother "something wrapped in a piece of paper". They
never saw or heard her giving any instruction to Pipe to deliver the wrapped object to Court:
the children. Both claimed that they learned or obtained the information from Pipe after
interviewing him by means of sign language. Which the trial Court accepted as Proceed.
competent, trustworthy and credible
Fiscal Calderon, Jr.
The following testimony of Federico Jaime speaks for itself:
Q. When you made that sign pointing one hand upward, what was the answer of
Q. Will you please stand up and demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you talked to Panchito?
him (Pipe) through signs?

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A. I inquired from him through signs as to who gave bread to the children by A. After having given the bread, I asked him who gave the bread, and he said that the
demonstrating like this (witness demonstrated by seemingly eating something inside the bread came from her (witness demonstrated by swaying his right arm and pointing his
house with his right hand and his left hand index finger towards the front and then forefinger sidewise.)
pointed towards his left index finger).
Q. Where was Lucila Valero at the time that Alfonsito was demonstrating to you his
Q. Towards what direction was Panchito pointing his index finger ? answer?

A. To the sister, sir. A. She was there on the side of the street, sir. 16

Q. And who is that sister? There is nothing in the aforequoted testimony indicating that the deaf-mute, Pipe,
pointed to her sister Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread. We have
A. Precila (sic), sir. Precila (sic) Valero. 15 examined the entire transcript of the stenographic notes, and, except the aforequoted
portions of the testimony of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, there is nothing in
There is nothing in the foregoing testimony pointing to the defendant Lucila Valero as the record showing that Pipe communicated to the prosecution witnesses by
the source of the poisoned bread. What is evident is nothing but confusion. What Jaime comprehensible sign language that his sister was the source of the poisoned bread.
asked from Pipe was "Who gave the bread to the children?" The evidence of the
prosecution already shows that Pipe gave the bread to the children. In reply, it seems Aside from the foregoing observation, there are several compelling reasons that should
that Pipe pointed to the defendant who was standing nearby. have made the trial Court reject the testimony of both Jaime and Velasco.

Here, the confusion is clear. Pipe could not have said that his sister handed over the Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never
poisoned bread to the children because the evidence of the prosecution shows that Pipe presented as a witness either for the prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco
himself, gave the bread to the children. It is clear that Pipe did not understand the sign were presented as prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned from
language of Jaime and vice-versa. Pipe by sign language.

The testimony of Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, did not help the prosecution The evidence is purely hearsay. 17 The presentation of such evidence likewise violates
much either. The following is Ceferino's testimony: the principle of res inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. 18
Witness:
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be
Upon seeing Ponsito I asked him what was that and he answered me that it was a piece justified by claiming that it is a part of the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to
of bread and he told me that she was the one who caused the giving of the bread, sir. Ceferino Velasco that the source of the poisoned bread was the defendant, the children
(witness pointing to the accused Lucila Valero) had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no
startling Occurrence yet. 19
Atty. Rodrigo, Jr.
With reference to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe made the
I would like to make of record that during the narration as to how he asked Alfonsito, extrajudicial revelation spontaneously when he was still under the influence of a
the witness was only demonstrating by using his index finger moving up and down, your startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not spontaneously but after
Honor. an interview through the complicated process of sign language.

Fiscal Calderon, Jr. The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence,
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his
Q. When you first asked that question who gave the bread to you, how did Alfonsito failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
answer? value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. 20 But
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. 21

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To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether Fiscal Calderon:
considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis for
the imposition of the death penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the I object, your Honor.
defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-
examination, the only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and Court:
in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In conflict between a provision of the constitution May answer.
giving the defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have
no choice but to give effect to the constitution. A. Like that also, sir. (witness demonstrated to be putting something in his mouth.)

The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital information for the prosecution, Q. In other words, anything which will be taken by mouth, you just use the same sign
would have shown clearly his incompetence as a witness. During the preliminary language?
investigation in the Municipal Court, experts on deaf-mutes like Belen Herreros who is
the official interpreter of the only school for the deaf and the blind in the Philippines, A. Yes, the same sign, sir.
assisted by Mrs. Felicidad Vinluan who is the principal of the school of the deaf and the
blind, Mesdames Gilda Tatum and Salud Natividad, examined Alfonsito Valero alias Q. So that it would be safe to conclude that Pipe might have misunderstood your signs.
Pipe and reported to the Municipal Court that "questions addressed to him (Alfonso He could have misunderstood it for rice, bibingka, star-apple or for anything else?
Valero) and answers given by him cannot be accurately interpreted". 22
A. witness gave no answer. 25
As a result of the testimonies and the report made by the aforementioned experts, the
Municipal Court dismissed the murder and frustrated murder cases against Alfonsito Obviously the trial Court committed the grave error of accepting, and worse still, of
Valero, alias Pipe, who was then the co-accused of Lucila Valero, "on the ground that he giving weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco interpreting the
(Pipe) is a deaf-mute and, therefore, all the proceedings against him were beyond his alleged extrajudicial information to them by sign language of Pipe, when the source of
comprehension". 23 the information himself, Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe, would have been an incompetent
witness had he taken the witness stand.
Even prosecution witnesses Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime admitted on cross-
examination that their interpretations of the sign language of Pipe were only guess work. When Jaime allegedly learned from Pipe that the latter's sister was the source of the
poisoned bread, the defendant was only at the gate of the Velascos near Jaime but he did
Thus, Ceferino admitted on cross-examination: not confront her.

Q. As a matter of fact, most of your interpretation would be only guess work on your Q. When Pipe pointed to Lucila and when you gave the meaning to that sign that it was
part, is it not? Lucila who offered Pipe to give the bread to the children, did you (Federico Jaime
confront Lucila immediately?
A. Yes, sir. 24
A. No, sir.
Jaime practically made a similar admission, as follows:
Q. Did it not occur to you (Federico Jaime to confront, Lucila considering that you
Q. When you were requested to demonstrate how you conveyed the Idea to Pipe about already suspected that it was her (sic) who caused the poisoning of the children ?
the giving of the bread to the children, you pointed to a height, is it not?
A. No, sir. I did not. 26
A. Yes, sir.
The natural reaction of Jaime who is the uncle of the mother of the victims 27, upon
Q. How do you demonstrate to Pipe if you wanted to convey that what is to be taken is learning the killer of his relatives would have been a violent action or at least an angry
star-apple?

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confrontation. Neither did Ceferino Valero confront Lucila Valero upon allegedly S — Ang nalalaman ko lamang po ay sa kanila siya galing. Hindi ko po alam kung sino
learning that the latter poisoned his children. ang nagbigay sa kanya". Do you remember having given that answer?

Q. After allegedly knowing from Alfonsito that the bread was allegedly given to him by A. Yes, sir.
Lucila, did you (Ceferino Velasco) confront her?
Q. You affirm that answer under your present oath?
A. No, sir.
A. Yes, sir. 31
Q. As a matter of fact, you never confronted her until you filed this case about the
poisoning of your children? This answer prompted the Court to remark: "There seems to be inconsistency". 32 We
may add that the inconsistency is on the very fact in issue, namely, the guilty
A. No, sir. I have been very patient with her since the beginning. 28 participation of Lucila Valero.

Moreover, when Ceferino Velasco made a sworn statement on February 25, 1969 or When further repeatedly asked by the defense counsel why Ceferino did not state in his
three (3) days after the poisoning of his children, he declared that he did not know who affidavit (Exh. 1-d) that he learned that Lucila was the source of the poisoned bread, he
gave the poisoned bread to his children, thus: gave irresponsive and evasive answers. 33

T — Nalalaman ba ninyo kung mayroong nagbigay kay Pipe ng tinapay na ibinigay sa When a witness makes two sworn statements and these two statements incur in the
inyong anak? gravest contradictions, the Court cannot accept either statements as proof. 34

S — Ang nalalaman ko lamang po ay sa kanila siya galing hindi ko po alam kung sino A witness who changes his name and statements, like a Chameleon changes color, does
ang nagbigay sa kanya. 29 not inspire confidence. 35

But when he took the witness stand on July 23, 1975 or six years later, he declared that Obviously, Ceferino Velasco is a lying witness. If Ceferino Velasco really learned from
on that very morning of February 22, 1969, he learned from Pipe, when the latter was in Pipe that Lucila Valero poisoned his three children, he might have become violent.
the act of delivering the bread to the children, that the source of the bread was the Surprisingly, he kept quiet. He did not confront Lucila Valero. 36
defendant Lucila Valero. 30
The reason is that the first suspicion of Ceferino Velasco when his three children were
When confronted during the cross-examination with the previous affidavit (Exhibit "1- still suffering from the effects of the poison was that his children were "nausog" (victim
d"), Ceferino Velasco admitted that he made the answers in the affidavit. of witchcraft). Thus, testified Onofre Adriano, a 73-year old relative of Ceferino
Velasco:
Q. You also stated that Alfonsito, by means of sign, told you that the bread came from
his sister, Lucila, the accused in this case? Q. On February 22, 1969 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, do you remember
having seen Mr. Ceferino Velasco?
A. Yes, sir.
A. I was fetched at home, sir.
Q. You are sure of that?
Q. Who fetched you in your house?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Ceferino Velasco, sir.
Q. Let me now read to you portion of Exh. "1"
Q. Why did he fetch you in your house?
T — Nalalaman ba ninyo kung mayroong nagbigay kay Pipe ng tinapay na ibinigay sa
inyong anak? A. Because according to him one of his children is sick and might have been "nausog".

116
Q. Why did he fetch you for that purpose? testimony on July 23, 1975 when he described what Pipe allegedly brought as "just one
piece of wrapped bread". 43
A. I have a knowledge in the curing of "nausog", sir. 37
But when the police investigated the premises of the house of Ceferino Velasco in the
Demetria Manalastas, mother of the victims, also testified: morning of February 22, 1969, they found not only one pandesal but "several sliced
pan" scatterred in the sala, near the balcony, and under the balcony. 44 According to the
Q. While you were at the market place of Baliuag, what happened? defendant, in her testimony not rebutted by the prosecution, Ceferino Velasco, who was
her tenant, dipped sliced pieces of bread in endrin dried them up and used them as bait
A. A son of mine came to call me, sir. in his barn. As a matter of fact, at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of February 22, 1969,
Ceferino Velasco threw into a nearby river a long string of poisoned rats. Three puppies
Q. What is the name of your son? died of poisoning under the balcony. The rats, the dogs, or maybe even his minor
children must have found the poisoned slices of bread somewhere in the barn or in the
A. Francisco Velasco, sir. house, scattered them, and the children, not knowing the danger of the poison, ate them.

Q. Why did Francisco fetch you? The thought that he might have poisoned his own children must have caused Ceferino
Velasco some kind of trauma. So galling to a father is the thought that he, himself,
A. He said that the children were "nausog", sir. 38 might have caused the death of his two children and the near death of a third child, albeit
unintentionally, that his natural reaction is to escape from it by throwing the blame to
Aside from the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, there are other someone else not only to appease his own conscience but also to avoid embarassment
considerations which negate the guilt of the defendant. before his relatives, friends and neighbors.

There was no motive for Pipe and Lucila Valero to poison the three children. Both Pipe The tragic poisoning of the three children is unfortunate. The tragedy was compounded
and Lucila Valero loved the children. Ceferino Velasco admitted that even when Pipe when the trial Court imposed the death penalty on the accused although the evidence
was only a small boy, the latter frequented his house to visit his children. 39 When the against her does not justify a conviction. Inspite of the self-contradictions of Rodolfo
children were dying because of the poison, Pipe alternately fanned Michael and Quilang on very material points noticed by the trial Judge, himself, Quilang's obvious
Annabel. tendency to prevaricate and the fact that he is what the appellant's counsel calls an
"eleventh-hour witness", which is true, and inspite of the incompetence of the
The prosecution, however, claims that the motive of the poisoning was the quarrel in the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco whose testimonies are hearsay
morning of February 21, 1969 between Demetria Manalastas, mother of the victims, and evidence, and the practical impossibility of interpreting correctly the sign language of
the defendant Lucila Valero. The cause of the quarrel was the interference of the Pipe, the trial Judge readily accepted their testimonies as basis for imposing the death
defendant to protect the children from the scolding and maltreatment to their own penalty in gross violation of the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused
mother. The interference was resented by Manalastas prompting her to say to the to meet the witness face to face (in the instant case, the deaf-mute, Pipe), and to cross-
defendant "Don't interfere in the matter because I am scolding these children of mine." examine Pipe in order to determine his ability to communicate with the outside world.
40 The defendant is not a relative of the Velasco children. Her intervention in their
behalf only shows her affectionate concern for them. The defendant quarrelled with Realizing that there is completely no motive for the defendant to commit the heinous
Demetria Manalastas, not with the Velasco children. There is no motive whatsoever for crime, the trial Judge conjured up something as the probable cause that might have
the defendant to poison the children. Even Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, stated impelled the defendant to commit the crime. The conjecture of the Judge is stated, thus:
that the cause of the quarrel was "Wala pong kabagay-bagay" meaning, "very trivial". 41
The quarrel was not a sufficient cause to commit a heinous crime. There is something disquieting about those seemingly unfading smiles on the face of the
accused; with her sharp, penetrating look, her unsolicited smiles are clues to her real
This leaves Us speculating as to the source of the poisoned bread. Rodolfo Quilang personality; they forebode some out-of-the ordinary dispositions in the inner recesses of
stated that he saw the defendant give Pipe "something wrapped in a piece of paper." her mind; perhaps, only a trained psychiatrist or an experienced psychologist could
According to Ceferino Velasco in his Affidavit of February 25, 1969, Pipe gave to his fathom or decipher the meaning of this characteristic of the accused; it is unfortunate
children "isa pong pandesal". 42 He practically reiterated this statement during his that the prosecution and the defense have chosen not to delve into the personality of the
accused; however, because of these queer manifestations on the facial expressions of the

117
accused, could she have intended to produce the gravity of her felonious act; had she a
fore-knowledge that the poisons used to kill rats or insects would also cause death to the
children. Was her intention merely to cause some malady or discomfort to the children
to shout and vent her hatred on the mother of the children. These are some questions that
find no definite answer from the records of these cases; these questions notwithstanding,
the court strongly feels that it is not entirely improbable for the accused to possess a
violent or cruel disposition ... 45

In effect, motive was not necessary to compel the defendant to commit the crime
because according to the observation of the Judge, she was suffering from some kind of
psychiatric abnormality or mental disorder that can make her violent.

It is most unfair for the trial Judge to unexpectedly spring the aforementioned
observation in his decision without having mentioned it in the course of the trial. Such a
procedure is unfair to the accused, for she is thereby deprived of her chance to either
deny or affirm the truth of such a very material finding which has important bearing in
the judgment. This procedure of the trial Judge practically denies the accused the right
to due process.

The surprising finding of the trial Judge goes far beyond mere observation on the
manner a witness testified, which admittedly may be considered subjectively by the
Judge in evaluating the credibility of the witness. The surprising finding of the Judge
relates not only to the credibility of a witness but to the sanity of the defendant. Its aim
is not only to weigh the testimony of the witness but to establish a motive for the crime
charged.

WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution has not established the guilt of the
defendant, We hereby reverse the decision of the trial Court and instead render judgment
of acquittal without cost.

SO ORDERED.

Notes.—An accused can understandably try to exculpate a co-accused who provided

him with a defense counsel for free. (People vs. Aposaga, 108 SCRA 574.)

Statement made almost immediately after the startling occurrence may be considered res
gestae. (People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303.)

Motive is relevant where the identity of the persons accused of having committed the
crime is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall
upon a member of persons. In the case at bar, the identity of the accused was positively
proved by the eyewitnesses, so motive is irrelevant. (People vs. Bueno, 90 SCRA 23.)

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G.R. No. 93516. August 12, 1992 its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to
the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASILIO DAMASO immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he,
@ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant. thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN,
December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered decision, the
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence; Whether objected to or not cannot be dispositive portion of which states:
given credence.—It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its
being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie
testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential
whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. Decree Number 1866, and considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of
Same; Same; Same; To give probative value to hearsay statements and convict the Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
without meaning.—It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses
the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles
way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and
and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any submitted in court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at
the owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements Lingayen, Pangasinan.
and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights
useless and without meaning. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)

The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
@ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO,
Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE
(Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the above- WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The
amended information reads: B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and THE PROSECUTION.
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody and control one (1) FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY
M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH
ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of OF THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN
subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of ILLEGAL SEARCH.
Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20) BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR
SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN
(Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)

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 We reverse.
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the
to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the
Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The
Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a
radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989). Fiscal

After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba
whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned the
Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same time
appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items. (TSN of October 31,
house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since 1989, p. 40)
Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for
the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented xxx xxx xxx
by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached
the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K-2,"
that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw tell us if it has any connection to the house?
Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the
group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," A The same house, sir.
xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions
of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you
allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw find out the identity?
books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true identity of
to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee Bernie Mendoza?
of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6,
8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo) A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.

While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against Q Can you name these officers?
lawless elements in our society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this
end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining
evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez
him is weak to justify conviction.
Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that house?

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 However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and
xxx xxx xxx seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving
vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-
A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is 58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this
the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso. case.

. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128) The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered
the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados,
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a
matters not on their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more
that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the subversive items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was
failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto. voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly
conducted without search warrant with the consent of the person searched in this case,
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities,
admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether the same may be seized without a warrant.
objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that: We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied) house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has
such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is
the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
have exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is
them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted
subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here
appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search
without meaning. warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the
appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to
comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
(Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
against such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646).

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arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its
military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286) correction or lack of it could spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of
the accused-appellant.
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant
is in the identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden
the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with to prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the
serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number thus: firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the
trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the
FISCAL substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been
fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house? connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the
prosecution's case.
Lt. Quijardo:
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately saw raised by the defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession
different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive orientation and of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion.
the M-14 rifle. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion. The
defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned? of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in
no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same? essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag
(G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically
A Yes, sir. distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:

Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes of Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a
identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit "D." crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by
rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes
COURT: specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act
(Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive
Mark it. organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking
of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a
FISCAL: subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a member of a
subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis supplied)
firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza? Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289
(1981]), this Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security,
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house. (TSN, while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against
October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied). the Government is the very element of the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A.
1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error. similar associations and its successors because their existence and activities constitute a
clear, present and grave danger to national security.

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The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to A.M. No. MTJ-94-979. October 25, 1995.*
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion, and other illegal means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, RTC-BRANCH 10, APARRI, CAGAYAN,
only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private respondents), complainant, vs. JUDGE ADOLFO B. MOLINA, MCTC, GONZAGA-STA.
but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by TERESITA, CAGAYAN, respondent.
authoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or
indispensable. Judges; Warrants of Arrest; Preliminary Investigation; A warrant of arrest shall be
issued only when the “municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if satisfied, after an examination in writing in the form of searching questions and answers,
an accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
doctrine of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.”—Section 6(b), Rule 112
application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court when it said: of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued
only when the “municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching questions and answers,
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.” This is in conformity
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED with the constitutional mandate that no “warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; “Probable Cause,”
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the Defined.—In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that the prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of arrested.
firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking
up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical result of this may be Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of
harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that probable cause.—Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide
obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its latitude and unbridled discretion in determining probable cause, an elementary legal
power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. principle must not be compromised—hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable
83837-42, April 22, 1992). cause. The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever. Yet, in the case at
charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection bench, respondent judge found probable cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the
with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the basis of the testimonies of Mencelacion Padamada and Rosita Castillo which were
accused on reasonable doubt. obviously hearsay.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The determination of probable cause is a function of
is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio. the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain.—Respondent
cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The determination of
SO ORDERED. probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor
to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination.

The members of the bench are, undoubtedly, expected to be knowledgeable in the law,
its basic tenets and principles.

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 On 17 November 1993, Judge Antonino A. Aquilizan, Acting Presiding Judge of the
Unfortunately, respondent judge fell short of the norm. Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch 10 denied with finality the motion filed by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melencio Unciano for reconsideration of the 9 August
The instant case was brought to this Court in connection with the order1 of complainant 1993 order of then Presiding Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili and dismissed the aforestated
Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili dated 9 August 1993 charging Judge Adolfo B. Molina with criminal case provisionally on grounds of absence of probable cause against the
grave ignorance of the law in relation to Criminal Case No. 10-435, entitled "People of accused.6
the Philippines v. Rolando Anama," for homicide. A directive was contained in said
order to furnish this Court with a copy thereof "for its information and appropriate In its report and evaluation dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
action." recommended that respondent be admonished to be more careful in the determination of
the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Thus, opined the
In the aforecited order, complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the Office of the Court Administrator:
preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned criminal case, failed to exercise
utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, Close perusal of the records disclosed that the complaining witnesses do not have
based as it was, merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal personal knowledge of the facts which became the basis of the filing of the crime
knowledge of the commission of the offense charged. charged and of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. From the affidavits of the affiants
alone (Rollo, pp. 6-7), it is very clear that they learned the killing of victim Virgilio
Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of Capa from a certain Wilma Anama. Respondent Judge, however, on the basis of the said
the 1987 Constitution which requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge affidavits, issued an Order dated October 8, 1992 directing the issuance of a warrant of
must personally determine the existence of probable cause from an examination under arrest for the temporary confinement of the accused. Thereafter, the warrant of arrest
oath of the complainant and his witnesses."2 was issued on the same day.

Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated Respondent Judge in issuing the warrant of arrest failed to observe the elementary
complainant judge. There must be something more concrete. requirement that the complainant and his witnesses should have personal knowledge of
the commission of the offense charged. Just like in the issuance of search warrants, mere
Consequently, in the same order, complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest and hearsay evidence, cannot, standing alone, justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (See
the order directing its issuance and directed the National Bureau of Investigation, Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, G.R. 35149, June 23, 1988, Padilla J).
through Regional Office No. 2, Ilagan, Isabela, to conduct an investigation in order to Respondent Judge should be reminded that under Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules
avoid a possible miscarriage of justice. on Evidence, "A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, . . . (309)".
In his Comment, respondent admitted that he was the inquest judge in the preliminary
investigation of the above entitled case and finding the existence of probable cause, he We concur with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.
ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as the case was
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant
Office in Aparri, Cagayan.3 of arrest shall be issued only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching
Respondent explained that since the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which has the final say and disposition on the placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, should justice." This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest
carry the brunt of the responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause.4 shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
Respondent judge argued that the findings of complainant judge in his 9 August 1993 produce.7
order is his opinion-argument and contended that "the proper remedy for a seemingly
weak probable cause finding is a reinvestigation."5 In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.8

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 A: Yes, sir, they killed him.
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled
discretion in determining probable cause, an elementary legal principle must not be Q: You said that they killed him do you know the person who killed him?
compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause. The rules on
evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his A: I do not know his name but his sister came to me and reported the incident.
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.9 Hearsay
evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever. 10 Yet, in the case at bench, Q: Will you please tell the name of the person who killed your son Virgilio Capa?
respondent judge found probable cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the basis of
the testimonies of Mencelacion Padamada and Rosita Castillo which were obviously A: Rolando Anama.
hearsay. Consider the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge:
Q: How did Rolando Anama, killed your son, if you know?
xxx xxx xxx
A: They stabbed him to death.
Q: You said that you are Mencelacion Padamada, is this Mencelacion Padamada the
same as Mencelacion Castillo Capa? Q: What kind of weapon did he use in killing your son?

A: Yes, sir. A: I do not know sir, all I know he was killed by Rolando Anama.

Q: Do you know Virgilio Capa? Q: So is the court made to understand that you were not present during the killing of
your son, isn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir, I was not present because I was at home.
Q: Why do you know him?
Q: So it is understood that you were only informed about the death of your son?
A: He is my son.
A: Yes, sir, because his sister Wilma Anama, came to me and reported the incident
Q: You said you are Mrs. Padamada, how come that the family name of your son is regarding the death of my son Virgilio Capa.
Capa?
Q: What is the name of his sister?
A: He is my child in my first nuptial.
A: Wilma Anama.
Q: Was your first husband still alive?
Q: What did you do when Wilma Anama came to your house and reported the killing
A: He died already. incident of your son Virgilio Capa?

Q: Are you legally married with your husband. A: We went to see.

A: No, sir, he is only common law husband. Q: What did you do at that time when you were informed about the killing of your son?

Q: You said that Virgilio Capa is your son, do you know where is your son now? A: I went to see and verify it.

A: He was already dead and buried at the cemetery of Sta. Ana, Cagayan. Q: Where?

Q: Do you know the cause of his death? A: At San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to the house of Rolando Anama.

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Q: What did you find out when you reach the house of Rolando Anama? Q: When you informed the mother of Virgilio Capa was killed by Rolando Anama, what
did you do?
A: I found out that my son, is already buried.
A: I informed the mother of Virgilio Capa.
Q: How did you come to know that your son was buried?
Q: Who is the mother of Virgilio Capa?
A: Wilma Anama reported to me sir.
A: Mencelacion Capa.
COURT: That is all. (Emphasis ours)
A: When you informed the mother of Virgilio Capa about the killing incident of her son
xxx xxx xxx what did you do if there be any?

Q: Please state your name and other personal circumstances? A: I informed Mencelacion Padamada, about the killing of her son and further instructed
her to go and see her son.
A: Rosita Castillo, 52 years old, married, housekeeper and resident of Parada-Batu, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan. Q: Is the court made to understand that you were not present during the killing incident
happened?
COURT:
A: No, sir.
Q: On June 15, 1992 in the morning, can you still recall where were you?
Q: And you do not know the day when Rogelio Anama killed Virgilio Capa isn't it?
A: I was in your house sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While you were inside your house can you recall some (newbits) that reached you?
Q: You were only informed by Wilma Anama the sister of the herein accused about the
A: Yes, sir. killing of Virgilio Capa isn't it?

Q: What was that news items that reached you? A: Yes, sir.

A: Wilma Anama told me that Virgilio Capa was killed by Rogelio Anama. Q: Aside from that report made by Wilma Anama what else did Wilma Anama tell you
if there be any?
Q: Who is this Wilma Anama how is she related to the accused?
A: No more sir, those were only the things told to me by Wilma Anama, but she even
A: They are brother and sister. revealed that Virgilio Capa, was buried by her brother Rogelio Anama after killing him.

Q: When Wilma Anama related to you that Virgilio Capa was killed by Rolando Q: Did he tell the place where he was buried?
Anama, what did you do?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I informed the mother of Virgilio Capa.
Q: To whom did Wilma Anama reveal that Virgilio Capa was buried after he was killed
Q: Who is the mother of Virgilio Capa? by Rolando Anama?

A: Mencelacion Capa. A: I, sir.

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Q: How about the mother of Virgilio Capa was she present at that time when Wilma G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000.
Anama reported the incident to you?
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
A: The mother was not present. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA,
METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA
Q: So it was you to whom Wilma Anama related the killing of Virgilio Capa by Rolando CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL
Anama? COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA,
respondents
A: Yes, sir. 11 (Emphasis ours)
Evidence; Admissions; The rule that a party’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be
xxx xxx xxx given in evidence against him is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration were true.—Petitioner’s declarations as
We are as perplexed as complainant judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of
witnessed the alleged crime or has personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
respondent for investigation. She could have been the key to determining whether or not anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, particularly with respect to
Rolando Anama was the probable perpetrator of the grisly killing. such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, “[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this such admission was made.” Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny
determination. 12 making such admissions.

Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of Same; Entry in Official Records; A court’s Monthly Report constitutes an entry in
which must be in strict conformity with the procedure laid down by law. It is, therefore, official records, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.—The records also
this constant reminder which compels us to remain ever vigilant. contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge
Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry
with the pertinent rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, with a warning that in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.
resolution be entered in his record.
Same; Double Hearsay Rule; Newspaper Articles; Newspaper articles amount to
SO ORDERED. “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without
any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other
than proving the truth of the matter asserted.—Public respondents likewise presented a
certified true copy of People’s Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the
National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to “life imprisonment.” However,
newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not,
unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this
case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist
with the tenor of the news therein stated.

Actions; Habeas Corpus; Evidence; If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of

lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of

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the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
illegal.—As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests Corpus 5 with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued
ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to
new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention due process.
of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, 6 the Second Division of this Court resolved
show that the restraint is illegal. —

". . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the
he mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case among
the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is
release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try
reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his
defense.chanrobles.com : decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the
close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, and PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and
1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General,
the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE the
Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically,
hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court. his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the
person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time of hearing."
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the
present petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on
November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order 7 dismissing the case on the ground
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
to present 1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy
Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court
jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene which rendered the decision.
Carmona.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995,
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred rendered the assailed Decision 8 affirming the decision of the trial court with the
from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, 2 but the Jail modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. 3 Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.
It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial merit, 9 petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:
Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 10
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire
records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second I WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. 4 CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE

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PETITIONER’S CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of
LAW. conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.

COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS’ Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANT’S PETITION evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the
FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION. and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay" .

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that
LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS —16
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE
LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED. "During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned
counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid appears clear and indubitable that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 11 and that
the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus (A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No.
proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further contends 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band
that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that in Criminal Case No. 60867. . . . In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide)
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been the accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a
modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life
SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that" [i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that Imprisonment (Habang buhay) . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the
prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records." Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above
Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993, 17 petitioner himself stated that —
In its Comment, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in
this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. "COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto
The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the this Honorable Court most respectfully move:
existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction
by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge 1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioner’s
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the 2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life
reconstitution of judicial records. Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (Emphasis supplied)

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was 3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic)
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. 13 It secures
to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a 4. That whether the de officio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused
court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the decision was
authority. 14 Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a promulgated.
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) 5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made
an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 15 to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of
Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"

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Petitioner’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioner’
under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such Court which provides that —
declaration were true, 18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction
for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129," [a]n "SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions. make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
19 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."
constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), Accused was convicted
by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People’s Journal dated Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons
January 18, 1985, page 2, 20 issued by the National Library, containing a short news undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the issuance
article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition,
sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay ruling thus:
evidence, twice removed" 21 and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected to or not, 22 unless offered for a purpose other "The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner
than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting
only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or
stated. destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the
commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s release."
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. 23 If the detention of jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. 24 Put another way,
evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be
show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court void for lack of jurisdiction. 25 Thus, petitioner’s invocation of our ruling in Reyes v.
provides: Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and
ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that" [i]t does not appear that the
"SECTION 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision and
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner does not
of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a raise any jurisdictional issue.
plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts." The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate
the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, 26 the general
law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to
reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5

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(h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. 27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution
without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases. 28 There is no RULE 130, SECTION 36 – HEARSAY RULE
sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. 29
31. G.R. No. L-28482 January 30, 1971
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense." 30 Petit ioner’s PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since vs.
the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants.
prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore" [t]he government
has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by Remedial law; Criminal procedure; Findings of fact of the trial judge not to be
the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this disturbed.—The general rule, based on logic and experience, is that the findings of the
case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not disturbed on appeal, unless
by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if
the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case properly considered, might affect the result of the case.
for Illegal Possession of Firearm, 31 the records of which could be of assistance in the
reconstitution of the present case. Same; Evidence; Ante-mortem declaration; When statements satisfy the requirements of
ante-mortem statement.— The testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante-mortem
statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have
SO ORDERED. realized seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same
under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour
after being shot.

Same; Same; Affidavits; When affidavits are rejected as hearsay; Affiants should be
placed on witness stand.—Affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants
themselves but by another who uses Ms own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial
proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.

Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi a weak defense.—It has been repeatedly held that in the face
of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if
uncorroborated. It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons
mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.

Same; Same; Same; Alibi to be believed must be supported by physical impossibility for
the accused to have been at the scene of the crime.—The defense of alibi is so weak that
in order to be believed there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Same;

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Same; Same; Defense of alibi must be established by full, clear and satisfactory clear-ly and sufficiently proved that the killing of Silvino Daria was qualified by
evidence.—In case of positive iden- Remedial law; Criminal procedure; Findings of fact treachery (alevosia). The victim was quietly making rope in his own house. He was
of the trial judge not to be disturbed.—The general rule, based on logic and experience, caught off-guard and defenseless when suddenly and unexpectedly the two accused fired
is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not at him. He had no chance either to evade or repel the aggression. The trial court
disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have correctly held that treachery absorbs nocturnity and abuse of superior strength. But
been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. while these aggravating circumstances are always included in the qualifying
Same; Evidence; Ante-mortem declaration; When statements satisfy the requirements of circumstance of treachery, the commission of the crime in the victim’s dwelling is not,
ante-mortem statement.— The testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the hence the crime is murder attended by one aggravating circumstance, which has been
declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza held to be present where the victim was shot inside his house although the triggerman
who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante-mortem was outside.
statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have
realized seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same REYES, J.B.L., J.:
under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour
after being shot. Same; Same; Affidavits; When affidavits are rejected as hearsay;
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra, in its Criminal Case No.
Affiants should be placed on witness stand.—Affidavits are generally not prepared by
626, finding the two appellants Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza guilty of murder, and
the affiants themselves but by another who uses Ms own language in writing the sentencing each to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one heirs of Silvino Daria in the sum of P6,000.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in
writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally
rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon. Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi a weak defense.—It has An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated 16 January 1967 charged the two
been repeatedly held that in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak accused, Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza, with the crime of murder under Article 248 of
defense and becomes more so if uncorroborated. It is worse if the alibi could have been the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
corroborated by other persons mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi to be believed must be supported by physical impossibility for That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1966, in the Municipality of Tayum,
the accused to have been at the scene of the crime.—The defense of alibi is so weak that Province of Abra, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
in order to be believed there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for the above-named accused, armed with firearms of different calibers, by confederating and
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Same; mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable
Same; Same; Defense of alibi must be established by full, clear and satisfactory motive, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
evidence.—In case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, it has unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and shot one, Silvino Daria, inflicting upon
been held that the defense of alibi must be established by “full, clear and satisfactory him multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds caused
evidence.” It is obvious that the witness, who is a close relative of the accused, was his death thereafter.
merely presented in court in an attempt to save Juan Brioso from punishment for the
crime committed. The witness has an interest in the fate of the accused Juan Brioso, and, CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
therefore, his testimony should not be given credence. crime, to wit: (a) treachery and evident premeditation; (b) advantage was taken of
superior strength; and (c) with the use of firearm.
Same; Same; Locus criminis; When there is possibility to be present at the scene of the
crime.—Evidence shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers The records of the case show that on 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the
and only a two-hour walk. The place is also accessible by motor transportation, although evening, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio
motor vehicles are allegedly rare in the said place. As in the case of Mariano Taeza, it Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making rope in the annex of their house, while
was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at the locus criminis at the time the the wife, four meters away, was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria was
crime was committed. using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the night was bright because of the moon
overhead.
Criminal law; Aggravating circumstances; Alevosia absorbs abuse of superior strength
and nocturnity; Dwelling aggravating although triggerman was outside.—It has been

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Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and each subsequently
She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon (t.s.n. Millare, page 17) that could have
southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away. been carried concealed in his person.
Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and,
shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's. The
Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for
his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no
found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.
that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was
shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the
of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the
above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a
widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why
(Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively). she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell
the truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and
The cause of the death of Silvino Daria was "Shock due to severe hemorrhage secondary could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her
to gunshot wounds at the abdomen and leg," as found by Dr. Isabelo B. Lucas, testimony do not detract from the "positive and straightforward" 1 identification of the
Municipal Health Officer of Tayum, Abra, contained in his Medico-Legal Necropsy accused as the ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot
Report, Exhibit "A". Silvino Daria.

The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino It is noteworthy that the trial judge observed witness Bernal closely, warning her several
and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was times not to exaggerate, yet in the decision gave her full credence, being obviously
even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted by satisfied of her truthfulness.lâwphî1.ñèt The general rule, based on logic and experience,
Mariano Taeza. is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not
disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have
The two accused appealed the conviction and assigned the following errors as been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
committed by the court a quo: case,2 which in this case have not been shown to exist.

1. The lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the
and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This
accused; statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the
nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his
2. The lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of
of the deceased, clearing the accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified impending death,3 considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
in court by the fiscal before whom the same was executed; and
The defense of both the accused is alibi. Mariano Taeza's own account was that in the
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder. evening of 23 December 1966 he was at the barrio clinic of Tiker playing the guitar with
Antonio Daria (son of the deceased), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais. While in the said
The assigned errors are discussed together, being closely inter-related. place, they heard two gun explosions. Soon afterwards, Macrino Arzadon and Taurino
Flores came running towards them, informing Antonio Daria that his father was already
dead.
We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. She
stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by.
But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate
carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved when both the said Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said affidavit was identified by the Provincial
Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he did not

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know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. He denied being a close friend of Mariano Taeza (thereby contradicting Mariano Taeza's
Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said exhibit was testimony)8; denied that he had gone to the house of Angelita Daria, and his having
never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the knowledge of the courtship of Angelita by Mariano Taeza; or that both of them used to
prosecution to cross-examine him. As stated in People vs. Mariquina4, affidavits are drink and go out together. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he went
generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own with Mariano Taeza when they attended dances. One such occasion was during the
language in writing the affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or birthday of his first degree cousin in Addamay way back in 1965.
misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits Nestorio Flores was presented to corroborate the alibi of the accused. But while both
are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves exhibited wonderful memory as to what happened between sunset and midnight of 23
are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, We find Exhibit "2" of December 1966, they contradict each other as to what happened in the earlier hours or
no probative value, and that the lower court did not err when it rejected the same. In this events. As already stated, Juan Brioso testified that he left his place in Addamay at 8 in
connection, it is markworthy that the prosecuting attorney stated in open court that the morning and arrived at his cousin's house before the noon meal of 23 December
Antonio Daria had also executed another affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the Fiscal's office "to 1966; but Nestorio Flores asserted that it was 8 in the morning when Juan Brioso
the effect that he went to the office of defense counsel, ...... and there affixed his arrived. Brioso claimed that they cut sugar cane from 4 to 5 in the afternoon of the said
thumbmark on a statement that was never read to him." Be that as it may, not one of the day. His cousin testified that they cut sugar cane in the morning after Brioso's arrival
other persons who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso until lunchtime. Brioso stated that they milled sugar cane for the third time in that place
Valera and Jose Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano Taeza's in 1966, the first occasion being on 29 November, and the second on 8 December.
testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has been repeatedly held that in the face Flores denied this, saying that they did not cut sugar cane in November, 1966, although
of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if in other years they did. He further stated that it was already in December of that year
uncorroborated. 5 It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons that Brioso came. In fact, the same witness showed uncertainty as to the exact date,
mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.6 when he answered even on direct examination that "may be that was the time when he
came."9 In cases of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, it has been
By Mariano Taeza's own admission, he and the other accused, Juan Brioso, are close held that the defense of alibi must be established by "full, clear and satisfactory
friends. It was shown that Mariano Taeza's house is only about two hundred meters from evidence." 10 It is obvious that this witness, who is a close relative of the accused, was
that of Silvino Daria's and that the barrio clinic is only about eighty to one hundred merely presented in court in an attempt to save Juan Brioso from punishment for the
meters from the said victim's place. Mariano Taeza himself stated that Silvino Daria crime committed. We believe the trial court when it found that the witness has an
died "may be less than thirty minutes, may be five minutes" after his arrival at the interest in the fate of the accused Juan Brioso, and, therefore, his testimony should not
victim's house with the latter's son and other persons. As held in another case 7 the be given credence.
defense of alibi is so weak that in order to be believed there should be a demonstration
of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the Evidence also shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers and
time of its commission. Mariano Taeza was so near the victim's house that it was easy only a two-hour walk. The place is also accessible by motor transportation, although
for him to be there when the shooting occurred. motor vehicles are allegedly rare in the said place. As in the case of Mariano Taeza, it
was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at the locus criminis at the time the
The other accused, Juan Brioso, stated that he was in sitio Catungawan, barrio Basbasa, crime was committed.
Tayum, on 23 December 1966. He was there upon invitation of his first cousin, Nestorio
Flores, to cut and mill sugar cane. He left his house in Addamay at 8 in the morning of It has been clearly and sufficiently proved that the killing of Silvino Daria was qualified
the said day, arriving in Catungawan before the noon meal. They cut sugar cane from 4 by treachery (alevosia)." 11 The victim was quietly making rope in his own house. He
to 5 in the afternoon. At 6:30, after supper, he, his cousin, and the latter's son, Felix was caught off-guard and defenseless when suddenly and unexpectedly the two accused
Flores, started milling the sugar cane which they had cut. The milling lasted up to 2 in fired at him. He had no chance either to evade or repel the aggression. The trial court
the early morning of the following day. He never left the place where they were milling. correctly held that treachery absorbs nocturnity and abuse of superior strength. 12 But
He learned of the death of Silvino Daria only when he returned to Addamay because his while these aggravating circumstances are always included in the qualifying
parents informed him of the news. He admitted knowing Cecilia Bernal and that she circumstance of treachery, the commission of the crime in the victim's dwelling is
likewise knows him. not, 13 hence the crime is murder attended by one aggravating circumstance, which has
been held to be present where the victim was shot inside his house although the

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triggerman was outside. 14 There being no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the of the aggression introduces a material change in the conditions of the homicide; and in
apposite penalty is death. However, for lack of sufficient votes, the penalty imposable is slaying a person so circumstanced, the author of the crime obviously avails himself of a
reduced to life imprisonment. form or means directly tending to insure the execution of the deed without risk to
himself from any defense on the part of the person slain.
WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, with the sole modification that
the amount of the indemnity is increased to P12,000.00. 15 Same; Ignominy; Where commission of rape did not add ignominy to the crime.—
Where the rape of the wife was not perpetrated by the satyr in the presence or with the
knowledge of her husband or where the rape was done after the husband was killed, the
rape committed could not have added ignominy to the crime. Same; Complaint charging
robbery with homicide and rape; Legal definition of the crime.—it is the uniform
32. G.R. No. L-24877 June 30, 1969
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that where the crime charged is robbery with
homicide and rape, the legal def inition of the crime is robbery with homicide
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, punishable under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Penal Code; and the rape committed on
vs. the occasion of that crime is considered an aggravating circumstance (People v. Ganal,
GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, and BELESANDE 85 Phil. 743; People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136; People v. Tarrayo, supra.)
SALAR, accused.
Same; Dwelling; When considered aggravating in robbery.—The settled rule is that
SYLLABUS dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of person (U.S. v.
Leyba, 8 Phil. 671, etc., cited in People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798). The rationale
Evidence; Affidavits; Admissibility as evidence; When courts may consider contents of behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the
affidavits.—Affidavits are generally classed as hearsay evidence; they are objectionable necessity of transgressing the sanctity the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes
on hearsay grounds; they are not admissible evidence of the facts they narrate. which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as
Affidavits must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence before the court may trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. Cuello Calon opines that the commission of
consider their contents (see People v. Parayno, 24 SCRA 3, [1968]; and People v. the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces
Tarrayo, L-26489, April 21, 1969). This is based on Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of greater alarm.
Court, which provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered." It is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of facts and his Same; Mitigating circumstance; Lack of instruction; Should be proved, not inferred.—
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence adduced (U.S. v. Solaña, 33 Phil. 582). Lack of instruction should be proved; it cannot be inferred People vs. Mongado, 28
SCRA 642, No.. L-24877 June 30, 1969
Criminal procedure; Unqualified plea of guilty; Its effect upon material facts alleged in
the information.—There is the firmly settled jurisprudential principle that an unqualified PER CURIAM:, F
plea of guilty constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information
including the aggravating circumstances therein stated. Excepted thereform are
conclusions of fact and mere conjectures. Thus, it is, that a plea of guilty is sufficient to Up for automatic review, in this case of robbery with double homicide and rape, is the
sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, trial court's decision imposing the capital penalty upon the accused Gaudencio
Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar, on a plea of guilty 1 entered into by each of
without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the
them with the assistance of counsel de officio to the second amended information of
necessary proof.
June 16, 1965, which reads:
Criminal law; Aggravating circumstance; Treachery; Treachery should normally attend
the inception of the attack; Exception; Reason.—True, the general rule is that treachery SECOND AMENDED INFORMATION
should normally attend the inception of the attack. But if a person is f irst seized and
bound, with a view to rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then slain either by The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accuses GAUDENCIO
the person who reduced him to this helpless state or by another, alevosia is present. MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, BELESANDE SALAR, ANASTACIO CADENAS
Reason for this is that in the case of that kind, it is obvious that the binding of the victim and ANDRES CAGADAS of the crime of ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE HOMICIDE
AND RAPE, committed as follows:

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That on or about the 17th day of March, 1965, in the municipality of Mainit, province of Contusion: 1. Frontal region left;
Surigao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the 2. Orbital region, left;
said accused, Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador, Belesande Salar, Anastacio Cadenas 3. Maxillary region, left;
and Andres Cagadas with evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and 4. Nasal region.
mutually helping one another, and armed with an unlicensed .22 cal. revolver, a small
Incised
sharp-pointed bolo, a toy revoler marked `Kit gun' and a wooden club, with intent to
wounds:
gain, after having gained entrance to the residence of Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit,
husband and wife respectively, by abusing the goodwill of the said spouses, the latter 1. Earlobe, left;
being the uncle and aunt respectively of the accused Gaudencio Mongado, did then and 2. Hemathorax, (a) 4 inches below midelivicular
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force upon things thru violence anteriorly, left (4) bone; 3 inches deep
as alleged in the third paragraph of this information that is by breaking the aparadors (b) Upper-lateral to nipple
and a trunk where valuables and personal effects were then kept, take, steal and carry (c) Below nipple
away the following articles, to wit: (d) Lateral to nipple

1. One (1) shotgun, 12 gauge ......................... P250.00 more or less EMILIA DALIT
2. One (1) radio Kharman .............................. 250.00 " " ".
3. One (1) radiophono ................................... 450.00 " " ". 1. Contusions buccal region with fracture right mandible;
2. Incised wounds
4. One (1) ring ............................................... 75.00 " " ".
5. One (1) ring ............................................... 40.00 " " ". 1. Infraclavicular region, left;
6. One (1) necklace (chinese gold) ............. 180.00 " " ". 2. Mammary region, laterally left;
7. One (1) necklace (chinese gold) ................. 75.00 " " ". 3. 4 inches below axilla, mid-axillary line, right;
8. One (1) microphone .................................. 90.00 " " ". 4. Humeral region (2) right:
Cash money ............................................... 300.00
a. Lateral aspect
b. Medical aspect
P1,710.00
5. Mammary region, upper right;
having a total value of P1,710.00, more or less, belonging to the said Silvino Lincuna 6. Numural region, left;
and Emilia Dalit, as owners, to their ultimate damage and prejudice in the 7. Infrascapular region, left (3);
aforementioned amount. 8. Back right.

That on the same occasion, in the foregoing manner as charged and pursuant to their which injuries directly caused the death of the said Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit.
conspiracy, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack and assault in a treacherous manner the said spouses, Silvino That on the occasion of the said Robbery, with Double Homicide, in the manner as
Lincuna and Emilia Dalit; that is, the accused Belesande Salar clubbing Silvino Lincuna charged in this information and pursuant to their conspiracy, the accused Belesande
on the head; Gaudencio Mongado tying him helplessly to a chair with the use of radio Salar after having fatally assaulted the wife, Emilia Dalit, and while she was alive and
antennae and stuffing his mouth with rolls of gauze, and Jilly Segador attacking him helpless, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with fatal thrusts by means of a sharp-pointed bolo, and finally with Belesande Salar, with the said Emilia Dalit at the residence referred to where the aforementioned crime
also with the use of the same sharp-pointed bolo, stabbing Emilia Dalit with several fatal was committed.
thrusts; who as a result thereof suffered the following injuries, to wit:
Contrary to Article 294, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code with the
SILVINO LINCUNA aggravating circumstances of treachery, ignominy evident premeditation and abuse of

136
confidence, and with an additional aggravating circumstance of recidivism against shall be turned over to the heirs of the victims. The home-made revolver, cal. 22, the
Gaudencio Mongado for having been previously convicted of the crime for Robbery in rounds of ammunitions thereof, the toy gun revolver, the small sharp-pointed bolo, and
Case No. 2470 before this Honorable Court of December 8, 1960 and made to suffer the the wooden club used as instruments of the crime, were ordered forfeited in favor of the
penalty of not less than 2 years, 4 months and one day of prision correccional, as government.
minimum, to not more than 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
On July 15, 1965, the trial court came out with an order directing that the decision
Surigao, Surigao del Norte, June 16, 1965 disposing of the things recovered and forfeiting to the government all the articles used in
the commission of the crime, shall not be implemented until after the case of the
(SGD.) ILDEFONSO G. MANTILLA remaining two defendants, Andres Cagadas and Anastacio Cadenas, "will have been
Assistant Provincial Fiscal. tried and decided."

It was on June 28, 1965 when the three accused, together with two others, were 1. It is clear error on the part of the trial court to consider the affidavits of admission of
arraigned before His Honor, Judge Teofilo B. Buslon of the Court of First Instance of the three accused attached to the record in appreciating aggravating circumstances
Surigao del Norte. 2 According to the decision below, during the arraignment, the against them. Affidavits are generally classed as hearsay evidence; they are
information was translated to the accused "into the Visayan dialect, the dialect which objectionable on hearsay grounds; 4 they are not admissible evidence of the facts they
each of the five accused speaks and understands." The accused Gaudencio Mongado, narrate. 5 These affidavits must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence before
Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar pleaded guilty. The two others, Anastacio Cadenas the court may consider their contents. Thus, in People vs. Parayno (1968), 24 SCRA 3,
and Andres Cagadas, pleaded not guilty. Those who admitted guilt were asked by the 17, affidavits of prosecution witnesses and the record of the preliminary investigation
court, in the words of the trial judge, "if they understood the consequence of their plea "were offered as exhibits" and "legally before the Court" and were thus properly
of guilty which is that they would be punished according to law which might be death in considered. And again, in People vs. Tarrayo, L-26489, April 21, 1969, a capital case,
the Electric Chair, to which question each of the three accused answered in the the transcript of stenographic notes taken at the preliminary investigation was received
affirmative." Thus did the trial court state in its decision that it "is satisfied that when in evidence after the accused pleaded guilty. It was thus also appropriately utilized by
each of the above-named accused, GAUDENCIO MONGADO, BELESANDE SALAR the court.
and JILLY SEGADOR, entered the plea of guilty, each of them was well aware of its
consequences and that each of them did so freely and voluntarily." The fundamental rule on this point is found in Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court,
which provides that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
On July 8, 1965, without taking any evidence, but taking stock of the affidavits of offered." It is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only
admission of the three accused, as attached to the record, the trial court found that the and strictly upon the evidence adduced. 6 Here, the affidavits of admission have not been
Commission of the crime charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of formally offered, much less admitted, in evidence. They cannot be taken into account.
treachery, ignomity, evident premeditation, dwelling and abuse of confidence for all the
three accused, and recidivism as regards the accused Gaudencio Mongado (who was a The result is that solely the factual averments in the second amended information — to
parolee at the time of the commission of this crime), all offset only by the mitigating which the three accused have pleaded guilty — may be made the basis of any court
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. The court, accordingly, sentenced the three, finding as to the aggravating circumstances.
Gaudencio Mongado, Belesande Salar and Jilly Segador (Anastacio Cadenas and
Andres Cagadas were to be tried separately) to suffer the penalty of death for the crime 2. Of importance here is the existence of circumstances in aggravation or in mitigation
of robbery with double homicide and rape defined and penalized under Article 294, of the penalty for the crime committed. For, at stake are the lives of the three accused.
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code, to indemnify jointly and severally the Deep-rooted in criminal law is the precept that the existence of aggravating
hearirg of the victims Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit in the amount of P6,000 each, circumstances must be based on positive and conclusive proof, not merely on
plus P596.15, 3 the value of the things taken by the accused but not recovered, with 3/5 hypothetical facts, no matter how truthful suppositions and presumptions may seem. 7
of the costs. The trial court also directed the return to the heirs of the victims, of a radio
receiving set, a radiophono, cash money of P163.85, six pieces of assorted clothes of the There is, of course, the firmly settled jurisprudential principle that an unqualified plea of
victims and other things taken by the accused but recovered; and likewise ordered the
guilty constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information
deposit with the Philippine Constabulary Provincial Command of Surigao del Norte of
including the aggravating circumstances therein stated. 8 Excepted therefrom are
the 12 ga. shotgun until it can be bought by any qualified person, the proceeds of which conclusions of fact, 9 and mere conjectures. 10 Thus it is, that a plea of guilty is sufficient

137
to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, We do not believe that the rape here committed added ignominy to the crime. Nothing in
without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the the information suggests that the rape of Emilia Dalit was perpetrated by the satyr in the
necessary proof. 11 presence or with the knowledge of her husband Silvino Lincuna. This act was done after
the fatal thrusts were inflicted on Lincuna. Thereafter, the wife was first fatally assaulted
Parting from the foregoing premises, we take a look at the aggravating circumstances and, while still alive and helpless, was ravished. This last averment by itself and without
found by the trial court. more leaves us under serious doubt as to whether rape did really "add ignominy" to the
killing.
3. Counsel de officio contends that alevosia may not be considered in aggravation
because here it did not exist at the inception of the attack. The foregoing notwithstanding, it is the uniform jurisprudence of this Court that where
the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape, the legal definition of the crime is
robbery with homicide punishable under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Penal Code;
True, the general rule is that treachery should normally attend the inception of the
and the rape committed on the occasion of that crime is considered an aggravating
attack. 12 But "if a person is first seized and bound, with a view to rendering him
incapable of defense, and he is then slain either by the person who reduced him to his circumstance. 15 Instead of ignominy, therefore, it is the rape itself that aggravates.
helpless state or by another," alevosia is present. 13 Reason for this is that "[i]n a case of
that kind it is obvious that the binding of the victim of the aggression introduces a 5. Dwelling was properly included as an aggravating circumstance, although not
material change in the conditions of the homicide; and in slaying a person so specifically alleged in the information as such an aggravating circumstance. 16 And this,
circumstance, the author of the crime obviously avails himself of a form or means because from the factual narration in the second amended information, the robbery, the
directly tending to insure the execution of the deed without risk to himself from any killing and the rape were all perpetrated in the "residence" of the offended parties. We
defense on the part of the person slain." 14 have said in the recent case of People vs. Apduhan (August 30, 1968), supra, at p. 815,
that —
In this case, the second amended information specifically charged that defendants killed
Silvino Lincuna "in a treacherous manner ... that is, the accused Belesande Salar The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation
clubbing Silvino Lincuna on the head, Gaudencio Mongado tying him helplessly to a of persons, 17 like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this
chair with the use of radio antennae and stuffing his mouth with rolls of gauze, and Jilly class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity
Segador attacking him with fatal thrusts by means of a sharp-pointed bolo." No doubt, of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other
the principles heretofore stated fit into the foregoing facts. Treachery has been properly place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house.
appreciated. This Court in People vs. Pinca, citing People vs. Valdez, ruled that the "circumstances
(of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because,
the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically,
4. Ignominy was deemed an aggravating circumstance because of the rape committed on
robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without the
the occasion of the robbery with double homicide.
necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that
the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the
The second amended information charges: "That on the occasion of the said Robbery, accused and produces greater alarm."
with Double Homicide, in the manner as charged in this information and pursuant to
their conspiracy, the accused Belesande Salar after having fatally assaulted the wife,
No reason exists why we should depart from the pronouncement just quoted. 18
Emilia Dalit, and while she was still alive and helpless, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the said Emilia Dalit at the
residence referred to where the aforementioned crime was committed." 6. Counsel de officio invokes in mitigation lack of instruction. But lack of instruction
should be proved; it cannot be inferred. 19 There is no such proof here. It was not
invoked below.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, in enumerating aggravating circumstances, states
in its paragraph 17: "That means be employed or circumstances brought about which
add ignominy to the natural effects of the act." The result, therefore, of our review of the record is that the crime here under
consideration is attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) treachery, (2)
dwelling, and (3) rape against all the three accused, with the added aggravating
circumstance of (4) recidivism against Gaudencio Mongado. And only one mitigating

138
circumstance — that of voluntary plea of guilty — can be considered in favor of the Criminal Law; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Witnesses; Hearsay Rule;
three accused. By the law, the three accused merit the penalty of death. We do not thus Affidavits; It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
find it necessary to pass upon the lower court's pronouncement that the aggravating stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of confidence also attended the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.—In indicting accused-appellant, the
commission of the crime. The result is the same. The penalty is death.1awphil.nêt prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two
brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the decision under review is hereby affirmed; the three judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of
defendants Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar are hereby hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
sentenced to DEATH, and are ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the
each of the deceased, Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit, in the sum of P12,000.00, and to judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused
pay the said heirs, jointly and severally, the sum of P596.15, the value of the things made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the
taken but not recovered, and to pay the costs. So ordered. latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Right to Counsel; The
settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the
right to counsel—that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel—is inadmissible in
evidence.—Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police
render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The
settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the
right to counsel—that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel—is inadmissible in
evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman
Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of
counsel the next day. As ruled in People vs. Compil: [T]he belated arrival of a CLAO
(now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack of counsel) for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-
appellant . . . Thus, in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed
under the Constitution.

Same; Same; Witnesses; Marital Disqualification Rule; Murder; Under the marital
disqualification rule, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused.—With
regard to Gina Quidato’s testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-
appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As
correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife,
33. G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998 the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused.
Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie,
which was jointly tried with accused-appellant’s case. This testimony cannot, however,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice
vs. of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule.
BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant. “What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly” is a rule familiar even to law
students.

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Same; Same; Same; Suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it plea during the trial and were accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's
being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense case was tried on the merits.
to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance
essential to the guilt of the accused.—Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-
Quidato’s testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie’s extrajudicial confessions, appellant's brother Leo Quidato, appellant's wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman
nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused- Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the prosecution offered in evidence affidavits containing the
appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellant’s defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His extra-judicial confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers were,
alleged acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. Instead, it presented
father’s house on the strength of the latter’s verbal threats, his incredulous escape from Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when they made
the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure their confessions. Similarly, the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who
to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita
after the incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the brothers.
Malita brothers as the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling
participant. Yet, suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an
Based on the foregoing pieces of evidence, the prosecution's version of the facts is as
accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a
follows:
conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to
the guilt of the accused. This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and
Leo Quidato. Being a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy.
ROMERO, J.:
Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in the area.

Before us is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch
On September 16, 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused-appellant,
4, dated March 2, 1994, finding accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. guilty of the and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41
crime of parricide. sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor,
who thereafter left. Bernardo and accused-appellant went back to Sitio Libod that same
On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide before day.2
the Regional Trial Court of Davao. The information reads as follows:
According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, September 17, 1988,
The undersigned accuses BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR. of the crime of Parricide under accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get money from the
latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen
That on or about September 17, 1988, in the Municipality of Kaputian, Province of asleep before 10:00 p.m.3 Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- the ground that the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with Reynaldo Malita Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 4 The judge, acknowledging the
and Eddie Malita, who are charged for (sic) Murder in a separate information, did then applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony only against accused-
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with the use of a bolo and an iron bar, appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.
assault, hack and stab his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him wounds which caused his death, and further causing As adverted to earlier, the Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime,
actual, moral and compensatory damage to the heirs of the victim. executing affidavits detailing how Bernardo was killed. Their version shows that Eddie
had been living with accused-appellant for the past four years. At around 6:00 p.m. of
Contrary to law. 1 September 17, 1988, accused-appellant asked Reynaldo to come to the former's house to
discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at accused-appellant's house, he
Accused-appellant's case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his co- saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. The Malita
accused Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their "not guilty" brothers alleged that it was at this juncture that accused-appellant proposed that they rob
and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had

140
stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, accused-appellant After due trial, the court a quo rendered the following judgment:
knocked on the door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door,
Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused,
nape and neck. Accused-appellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of
money but they found none; so, the three of them left. Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for the death of his
father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, is hereby sentenced by this court to
The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory
gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardo's penalties provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the
death certificate was "hypovolemic shock secondary to fatal hacking wound on the amount of P50,000.00, in accordance with current case doctrines of the Supreme Court,
posterior neck area." 5 and to pay the costs.

On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and SO ORDERED.9
learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death.
The two were promptly arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, appellant interposed the present appeal,
however, the police also arrested accused-appellant. assigning the following errors:

On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO MALITA (EXH. C) AND
rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES.
counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter
to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING (THE) EXISTENCE OF
presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
Jonathan Jocom.6
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED BY
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again
THE ACCUSED AND DISREGARDING (ANY) ILL-MOTIVE OF REYNALDO
advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents
AND EDDIE MALITA IN KILLING THE VICTIM.
of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and
voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their
signatures on the affidavits.7 Accused-appellant must be acquitted.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers. He In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed
claimed that the Malita brothers were not at his house on the evening of September 17, by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness
1988. They, however, passed by his house at around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to come stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives
with them to his father's house, threatening him with harm if he refused. Out of fear, he these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
led the way to Bernardo's house and even knocked on the latter's door until Bernardo themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the
opened the same. In the ensuing commotion, he scampered away, but in his confusion, affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
reached his house only at around 11:00 p.m., although the same was only about one hearsay. 10 The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
hundred fifty meters away from Bernardo's house. He did not call for help. Eddie arrived admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an
a while later. Accused-appellant claimed not to have seen the actual killing, having run opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.11
away earlier. He, however, admitted finding a bolo, encrusted with blood, at his house.
He turned the same over to his brother, who, in turn, surrendered the same to the police. The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the
Accused-appellant did not feel uneasy having Eddie around even if he knew of the Malita brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that
latter's participation in the crime.8 "[t]he act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its

141
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." The inapplicability of this must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the
provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended accused. 15 This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of
the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2, 1994, is REVERSED
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on
same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from
that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for any other legal
counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in or valid cause. With costs de oficio.
evidence. 12 It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman
Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of SO ORDERED.
counsel the next day. As ruled in People vs. Compil: 13

[T]he belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day even if prior to
the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect (of lack of
counsel) for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from 34. G.R. No. 119359 December 10, 1996
accused-appellant . . . Thus, in People vs. De Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed vs.
under the Constitution. ROBERT CLOUD, accused-appellant.

With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused- SYLLABUS
appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As
correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, Criminal Law; Parricide; Courts; Prosecutors; Speedy Disposition of Cases; That it took
the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child's death is a distressing indictment of
accused. 14 Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and the criminal justice system, particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars.—That
Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, it took more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child's death is a distressing
however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly its investigative and prosecutory
judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital pillars. How the case managed to reach its logical denouement, however, is a tribute and
disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule does honor to the other component of the system 7. the community participation 7.
familiar even to law students. which is the redeeming feature in this bizarre and repulsive case of barbarity to an
innocent, helpless victim who was just a stage out of infancy.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of
Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Res Gestae; Doctrine of Independently Relevant
to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellant's Statements; A witness' account of statements made by another which were caused by
defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the demand of the and resulting from a startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that the latter witnessed, is
Malita brothers to accompany them to his father's house on the strength of the admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the
latter's verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they
inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.—The trial court was of
authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the incident, and the the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not merely constitute an
nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as the independently relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay
culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of its contents." We will
suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom clarify this. Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are

142
admissible as part of the res gestae, they having been caused by and did result from the supplied by the People. Having painstakingly reviewed and analyzed the evidence of
startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly record, we find that such findings merit reproduction hereunder:
thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the
same. The report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning on August 2, 1988 while a certain Mrs.
actually there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she recounted in Josephine Aguilar was at the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital, Quezon City to
court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the doctrine of have some stitches removed from her daughter's head her attention was called by a
independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, limpid boy being carried by a man followed by an old woman who was shouting
since independent of truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the hysterically. The boy is John Albert Cloud. She noticed that the face of the boy was
cause of the death of the victim. swollen and bruised and his body covered with dry blood. A nurse commented that the
little
Same; Same; Same; Irrefutable physical evidence, medico-legal experts say, belies the boy — not more than three years old — must have been hit by a truck (tsn, J. Aguilar,
adage that dead men tell no tales.—And this brings us to the irrefutable physical June 21, 1993, pp. 7-10, 14-15, 33).
evidence which, as medico-legal experts say, belies the adage that dead men tell no
tales. Indeed, to the trained eye, the inanimate remains of the dead give testimony of But the words of the old woman — the lola — of the little boy, showed the cause of the
their own and, in the present case, that is true even of the young victim who in life could injury to be otherwise for she was repeatedly saying in a potpourri of cries and tears:
not have been as articulate. We refer to the report of the NBI after the exhumation and "Pinatay siya ng sariling ama!" The old woman told the people inside the Emergency
autopsy which we have taken pains to completely set out here. Room that the boy's
father — Robert Cloud — wouldn't allow John Albert to come with her and when the
Same; Same; Same; The normal action of any person bringing a patient to a hospital, boy started to cry and wouldn't stop crying his father began to beat the boy hard, tied his
especially a medico-legal case, is to give information even tentatively as to how the hands, and made "tusok, tusok" in his body. The father continued beating the boy even
injuries were sustained.—That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, when excrements were already coming out from the boy's anus (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21,
Acosta never even mentioned at all that the boy merely fell down the stairs. The normal 1993, pp. 12-13, 22).
action of any person bringing a patient to a hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to
give information even tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet, although The male companion of the boy said to the old woman: "Hoy, tigil ka na!" "Wag kang
the grandmother was announcing to everybody that the boy was killed through violent maingay." and told the people at E.R.: "Sira ang ulo ng matanda, eh!" (tsn, J. Aguilar,
maltreatment by his own father, Acosta says he merely told her to keep quiet, and he July 12, 1993, pp. 8-9) But the old woman wouldn't stop and continued to say: "Putang-
forthwith left the hospital. He never dared to tell his present cock-and-bull story or ina ang ama niya . . . Hayop siya!"
mention the conjured accident on the stairs, especially to the medical staff whom he
knew he could not delude, and yet he has the effrontery to do so before this Court
When the doctor pronounced the boy dead the old woman knelt before him and cried
People vs. Cloud, 265 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 119359 December 10, 1996 like (Ix)ion (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, p. 10). His baptismal certificate says that
John Albert was born on October 2, 1987 to Janet Villagracia and John Robert Cloud
(Exh. "3").

The ear-piercing would probably have ended there but for the fact that Mrs. Aguilar's
REGALADO, J.:p conscience was bothered by what she saw and heard as narrated above and decided to do
something about it. She approached Atty. Remedios Balbin, Chairman in Quezon City
The universal outcry and multinational campaign against child abuse can draw added of a civil liberties organization. Atty. Balbin, after a few weeks of research found out
impetus from this extreme case of a little boy, just barely two and a half years old, who that Robert Cloud and family left his house at No. 69 San Isidro Street, Barangay Sto.
was beaten to death by his own father. So it was alleged in an information for parricide Niño, Quezon City[;] the boy's body was brought to Rey Funeral Homes[;] Dr. E. Cacas
filed against accused-appellant Robert Cloud in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, certified that the cause of death of John Albert Cloud is broncho pneumonia with heart
Quezon City. 1 complications (Exh. D-48) [;] and that the autopsy on the cadaver was waived by
Natividad Calpito Cloud who claimed to be the boy's mother per her "Affidavit" dated
The case for the prosecution is presented by the Solicitor General 2 by adopting the August 3, 1988 (Exh. "D-47"). Atty. Balbin thereafter contacted the NBI and requested
factual findings of the trial court, with the pages of the stenographic notes being

143
for the exhumation of the boy's cadaver (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1994, pp. 17-21, 32, That it took more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child's death is a distressing
35-37, 42; R. Balbin, March 8, 1994, pp. 6, 17-21, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 36, 50, 54-55). indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly its investigative and prosecutory
pillars. How the case managed to reach its logical denouement, however, is a tribute and
The exhumation was done on November 8, 1988 by the NBI at the Manila South does honor to the other component of the system — the community participation —
Cemetery. The exhumation report stated the following findings: which is the redeeming feature in this bizarre and repulsive case of barbarity to an
innocent, helpless victim who was just a stage out of infancy.
Upper incisor, right, missing.
Contusions; face, right side, 9.0 x 6.0 cm; buttocks, right and left sides, 20.0 x 12.0 cm; As stated earlier, the events that later became the subject of testimonial evidence for the
knees, anterior aspect, right, 6.0 x 4.5 cm; prosecution unfolded before the eyes of prosecution witness Josephine Aguilar who was
and left 8.0 x 5.0 cm.; then inside the emergency room of the hospital having stitches removed from her
daughter's head. Although she was a perfect stranger to the family involved, but haunted
by the sight and memory of the lifeless and battered child, she sought the help of Atty.
Contused-abrasion: face, left side, 14.0 x 6.0 cm;
arm, left, postero-lateral aspect, Remedios Balbin, chairperson of a civil liberties organization in Quezon City. It was
6.0 x 4.0 cm; through their joint, unrelenting and selfless efforts that this case eventually wound up in
the court a quo for judicial action.
hand, right, dorsal aspect, 7.0 x 5.0 cm;
thigh, right posterior aspect, extending to the lateral and anterior aspects 15.0 x 7.0 cm.
Atty. Balbin conducted an investigative research which enabled her to coordinate with
Hematoma — frontto-temporal region, left side 13.0 x 6.0 cm. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Her efforts led to the discovery of the
following facts:(1) Robert Cloud and his family left their house at No. 69 San Isidro
Street, Barangay Sto. Niño, Quezon City immediately after the death of John
Hemorrhages, subdural and subarachnoidal, left cerebral hemisphere. Albert; 4 (2) John Albert's body was brought from the hospital to the Rey Funeral
Homes; 5 (3) a certain Dr. E. Gacas certified that the cause of the death of John Albert
Heart chambers contain a small amount of embalmed blood. was broncho pneumonia with heart complications; 6 and (4) the autopsy of the cadaver
was waived by a certain Natividad Calpito Cloud who falsely claimed to be the mother
Brain markedly congested and edematous. of John Albert. 7 Incidentally, despite her active participation in various aspects of this
case, she was never called upon by appellant to testify and corroborate his assertions
Other visceral organs, congested. therein.

Stomach, empty (Exhibits "E" and "E-l") Atty. Balbin thereafter requested for the exhumation of the body of the little boy for
purposes of autopsy. The exhumation was made on November 8, 1988, almost three
months after the burial of John Albert. The exhumation report, which has been quoted
Although the crime was supposedly committed on August 2, 1988, for reasons
by the People in its brief and is set out in full at the start of this opinion, revealed the
hereinafter explained the information dated May 10, 1990 was filed on June 5, 1990.
grave and fatal injuries, internal and external, which caused the boy's death and could
The decision of the trial court states that the accused was arrested only on April 15,
have resulted only from violence or strong physical force. On the strength of that report
1993. That is why, with the proceedings that then had to be undertaken and the trial
of the NBI, the sworn statement of Josephine Aguilar and the evidence gathered by Atty.
which had to be conducted, it was only in a decision dated November 11, 1994 that
Balbin, an information for parricide was eventually filed against herein appellant.
judgment was ultimately handed down, decreeing as follows:
A warrant for the arrest of Robert Cloud was issued on June 11, 1990 which was
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused ROBERT
returned unserved. Alias warrants were issued on June 29, 1992 and September 22, 1992
CLOUD GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of PARRICIDE
and finally on April 15, 1993. Appellant was arrested by the police at No. 22 Lourdes
for the violent death of his son JOHN ALBERT CLOUD and he is hereby sentenced to
Castillo Street, Galas, Quezon City and was thereafter committed to jail. On April 26,
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and ordered to pay the heirs of the
1993, duly assisted by counsel, he was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
victim the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. Costs vs. the accused. 3

144
The prosecution built up its case on the basis of a sworn affidavit and testimony in open A The lola started shouting telling everybody there how it happened, to the nurses and to
court of its principal witness, Josephine Aguilar. For a clearer appreciation of what she the doctors.
actually witnessed and overheard inside the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital, we
quote her testimony: Q You said the lola started telling the doctor what actually happened, did you hear these
what the lola tell (sic) madam witness?
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
A Yes, sir.
Q Madam witness, do you recall where were you on August 2, 1988 at around 11:00 in
the morning, madam witness? Q Please narrate before this Honorable Court what you hear(d) as narrated by the lola,
madam witness?
A I was in the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City, sir.
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q While you were there after a couple of minutes, what happened? Do you recall any
unusual incident, madam witness? Q What did you hear when she tells (sic) everybody?

A An old woman came with a boy full of dried blood, sir. A The father of the boy who died has burned in the skin, he was tie(d) and thrown
against the wall, punch(ed) the boy, sir.
Q You said old lady with a little boy, what happened after that, madam witness?
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
A Well she came in and she was crying, I heard the old woman, I heard the doctor as(k)
the old lady what happened and the old lady told the doctor that it's the father who bit Q Did you have any occasion to see whether there are marks in the hands or the body of
(sic) him up again and the old lady put the kid on the table and I saw the kid died, sir. the boy, madam witness?

Q What happened next, what else did the old lady say, madam witness? A At that time the boy was full of dried blood, sir.

A The doctor told the old lady "wala na" then the old lady sitdown (sic) on the floor Q After that?
crying and crying h(y)sterically, sir.
A I see (interrupted)
Q Did you come to know the old woman, madam witness?
Q What did you see, madam witness?
A No, sir.
A He had dried blood here. The boy had dried blood in the forehead, sir.
Q How about the boy, did you come to know the name of the boy who died, madam
witness?
COURT:

A Albert Cloud, sir. Q What else did you see?

Q What happened after the boy died, madam witness? A He has bruises, blood inside the skin, "mga pasa".

145
Q At that time? A He was upstairs, sir.

A I only saw full of dried blood, sir. Q Do you know what he was doing at the time you left, Mr. Witness?

Q Did you see the condition of the body of the boy? A He was sleeping, sir.

A No, I only saw dried blood from head to foot, sir. Q Also, evidence already adduced in this case indicates that your son was brought to the
St. Lukes Hospital, Quezon City by an old woman with a male companion on or about
FISCAL PONFERRADA: 12:00 o'clock noon on August 1, 1988 and by there (sic) your son died. Did you know
that Mr. Witness?
Q So at that time in the hospital you did not see the boy, madam witness?
A No, sir.
8
A Only dried blood, sir.
Q Why not, Mr. Witness?
The defense, on the other hand, argues that at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, appellant was not in his house and that the boy, John Albert, must have fallen A I was not at home that night, sir.
from the stairs leading to the second floor of the house. The defense presented appellant
and he testified that he left the house on the day in question and only learned upon his xxx xxx xxx
return that his son was already dead, thus:
Q Did you ever come to know on that very day that your son, John Albert Cloud, died,
Q Do you know how your son died, Mr. Witness? Mr. Witness?

A I don't know, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q By the way where were you on August 2, 1988 in the morning, Mr. Witness. Q How did you come to know that your son died Mr. Witness?

A I was at home, sir. A My "tiyahin" told me "nadisgrasya raw po ang anak ko".

Q Did you leave that house on that day, August 2, 1988, Mr. Witness? Q Who is this auntie, what is her name, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir. A Teresita Alconyes.

Q What time did you leave the house, Mr. Witness? Q Was that the old woman together with the male person (who) brought your son to the
hospital, Mr. Witness?
A Around 10:30, sir.
A No, sir.
Q In the morning?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Where did this aunt of yours Ms. Alconyes tell you that your son died, Mr. Witness?
Q Now, your son, where was he at the time you left the house, Mr. Witness?

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A I was at Paco at that time, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q Is that the place where you were when you left your house at 10:00 o'clock in the Q Who were those persons whom you waited for, Mr. Witness?
morning?
A My Lola and our houseboy, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What did your Lola tell you upon their return, about your son, Mr. Witness?
Q By the way, what is the address of your house on August 2, 1988?
A My Lola told me that my son is dead.
A In Quezon City, sir.
Q Did she tell you where your son was at that time?
Q What specific address?
A That he was at the hospital, sir.
A No. 69 San Isidro St., Barangay Sto. Niño, Santol, Quezon City.
Q Did you ask her whether she was the one who brought the child to the hospital?
Q Did your aunt tell you how she came to know that your son died, Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.
A No, sir.
Q Was she the one or was she not the one who brought (him) to the hospital?
Q When you learned that your son died from your aunt, what did you do?
A "Sila ho."
A I went home immediately, sir.
Q Your Lola, is she your grandmother or your grandaunt?
Q Did you see any person in your house or did you reach your house?
A Grandmother, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Mother of your mother?
Q Whom did you meet in your house upon your return?
A Yes, sir.
A None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So what did you do, Mr. Witness?
Q Did you go to the hospital, Mr. Witness, to verify?
A I waited there, sir.
A No, sir.
Q For whom did you wait, Mr. Witness?
Q Why not, Mr. Witness?
A The one who brought my son to the hospital.
A "Masama ang loob ko" that is why I did not go anymore to the hospital, sir. 9
Q Were you able to wait for them, Mr. Witness?

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The defense also alleged that John Albert was a sickly child from birth and was often FISCAL RAMOS:
hospitalized due to difficulty in breathing, as shown by some medical records. 10 Further
presented was the death certificate of John Albert Cloud issued by one Dr. Gacas and Q So as far as the probabilit(ies) are concerned, are you looking for a possibility that he
dated August 6, 1988, stating that the cause of death was broncho pneumonia with heart fell on (sic) a high place?
complications, 11 and the report made by Patrolman Ulep showing that he investigated
the death of the child, John Albert Cloud. 12
A All in all the fall of (sic) a high place is very remot(e). 15

On this aspect, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, the medical specialist at the NBI who examined
To recall, the court a quo rendered its decision on November 11, 1994 or six years after
the exhumed body of the little boy, was presented as a prosecution witness. His the death of John Albert Cloud, and we find its observations therein to be very
report 13 indicated "hemorrhage, intracranial, severe, traumatic" as the cause of death. perceptive and significant, to wit:
He testified that "the upper incisor, right, was missing, contusions on the face, right side,
buttocks, knees and on the head. And the said injuries could have been caused by a hard
blunt object, hitting by a fist or a piece of wood." He did give a hypothetical concession The court also considers as inculpatory, corroborative circumstances, the following
"that it was also possible that it was the result of a fall from a building and as result of which the prosecutor elicited from the accused himself and which, in the court's opinion,
said injuries the boy suffered internal hemorrhage which was the immediate cause of his do not constitute normal, reasonable or compatible with innocent behavior of a father
death." 14 with respect to the horrifying death of his son;

However, as to what would be the more credible cause of death, this is what he had to (a) the accused was told that his son died from a fall and he did not even bother to go to
say: the hospital where his son lay dead;

Q In your best judgment as a physician, (h)is injury, could have been caused by any (b) he did not bother to see the medical records or the medical certificate when he knew
force applied, what about the handle of a gun? already that his son did not die of an ordinary, natural cause. And corollarily, said
certificate is false and even the alleged doctor who made (it) is a false or non-existent
doctor;
A We do not rule out that possibility.
(c) the accused took his entire household to Paco, Manila away from Quezon City for
Q Could this finding also with (sic) the result of the excessive of physical hitting (sic)? years. There must have been some other reason than his alleged sorrow over John
Albert's death. For, if it were just his sadness over it, then the Quezon City house could
A Yes, ma'am. have been rented out or a caretaker left thereat. As it is, even Herminio Acosta left and
did not return there anymore to date. Was there cause to shudder about in the death of a
COURT: 2-1/2 year old boy that the Quezon City house of accused had to be abandoned thus like
a haunted castle? Under the circumstances, the court believes that it could only be the
Q Both buttocks sustained injuries according to your findings? hounding darts and howls of the memory of what the accused did there rather than what
he told the court supposedly happened there, that can furnish such a strong reason for
the sudden abandonment of the house at 69 San Isidro St., Sto. Niño (quite an irony),
A Yes, right and left side.
Quezon City; and
Q If baby boy like this boy fall on the high building would sustain injury on the
buttocks, the injury on the buttocks as well as the knees? (d) despite the alleged unusual cause of death of his son, he allowed his wife Natividad
who is not the real mother of John Albert, to be the one to waive the autopsy on his son.
We thus find a father very much afraid to face his own baby son freshly lying cold and
A The contusion on the buttocks are very extensive. They are 20 by 20 centimeters. So dead. This is another eerie but nonetheless clear sign of circumstantial guilt. 16
if the buttocks first (sic) is very different, if he falls it is very difficult for him and also
on his knees. And the knees are anterior portion it is highly improbable.
The prosecution's primary evidence that it was appellant who beat up and killed the boy
was the testimony of its principal witness Josephine Aguilar who declared that she heard

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appellant's grandmother herself shouting that it was appellant who killed his own son by Q Do you know whose house was that?
beating him to death. The said grandmother, Rufina Alconyes, was not presented in
court, since at the time of the trial she was already dead. A Mr. Robert Cloud the accused.

The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that grandmother constituted Q How long have you been staying there at that time?
exceptions to the hearsay rule since they were part of the res gestae. Those inculpatory
and spontaneous statements were: (1) "Pinatay siya ng kanyang ama" (he was killed by
A About three years.
his own father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walang awa sa anak niya . . . hayop
siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . . without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and
(3) Appellant did not allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and when the boy Q What was your function in that house as a member of the family?
started to cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son very hard, tied his hands, and
continued beating him until excreta came out of his anus. 17 A I know a lot of things, cooking, taken child in the school, driving.

The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not merely Q In other words you were utility man in that house?
constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to
the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of its A Yes, sir.
contents."18 We will clarify this. Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are
concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae, they having been caused by and xxx xxx xxx
did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these
were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to
Q Let us go back to August 2, 1988, who were member(s) of the household present, in
contrive the same. The report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since
the morning and afternoon?
she was actually there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she
recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the
doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth xxx xxx xxx
thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the
issue on the cause of the death of the victim. A Myself, Natividad and Abet and Lola the old woman.

Against the foregoing facts which came from the lips of these two women who had no Q What is the full name of Naty?
ill motives whatsoever against appellant and the circumstantial evidence arising from his
abnormal and inexplicable post-incident behavior, as well as the physical evidence A Natividad, the wife of Robert Cloud.
which will hereafter be discussed, we have merely the bare denial of appellant and the
testimony of his faithful houseboy cum driver, Herminio Acosta. Since the latter is the COURT:
star witness of the defense, we will consider his testimony in extenso.
Q Who is this Abet?
These are the pertinent parts of his representations in the trial court:
A The one who fell in the stairs.
Q Mr. Acosta, where were you on August 2, 1988?
xxx xxx xxx
A I was at home, sir.
Q Who were inside that house, by the way what time of that day when the boy fell from
Q Where was your home then? the stairs?

A At Santol but don't know specific address. A It was still early maybe 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning.

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Q Now let us see, you said that there were six members of the household? Q What was he doing there?

A Yes, sir. A I don't know because I was in the groundfloor.

Q Where was Naty, was Naty still there when the boy fell in the stairs? xxx xxx xxx

A She was there at that time. Q What time were you at the groundfloor?

Q Why? A Morning when I heard something "kalabog" that I went there.

A I did not notice that she left. Q What were doing there?

Q What about Mr. Cloud the accused here Robert Cloud, was he there when the child A I was preparing food and water for Jonald, the old brother.
fell from the stairs?
xxx xxx xxx
A He was not there also.
Q While you were doing this work, do you know what happened.
Q What about the Lola? Was she there when the boy fell?
A As I said I heard "kalabog" as if something fell.
A Yes, sir.
Q But before that you did not know that Mr. Cloud left?
Q What do you mean there, when the boy fell the Lola was already there?
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
Q What about Mr. Cloud, what time did he leave?
Q Where was she?
A I don't remember.
A She left perhaps she buy (sic) something, sir.
Q What about the old woman what time did she leave?
Q Who were there in that house
A I could not remember the time.
A I was there, Jonald also.
Q Who left ahead Mr. Cloud or the old woman?
Q What about the boy?
xxx xxx xxx
A He was upstairs in the room.
A The Lola first the one who left then Naty then Robert Cloud.
Q Now let us see at what time was that boy John Robert Cloud was upstairs?
Q Now when you said that (they) left and you heard the "Kalabog" did you know what
A In the morning. kalabog is that?

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A Yes, sir, I went to the stairway. Q After that what happened?

Q And what did you find out? A The baby was brought to the hospital.

A I saw Abet. xxx xxx xxx

Q So what did you do? COURT:

A I held him, I don't know how he fell and I don't expect that he fall in the stairway. Q Who brought the boy to the hospital?

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the appearance of the boy if you can still A The two of us, lola and I.
remember?
ATTY. MADAMBA:
A He had blood.
Q What time?
Q Where?
A Pas(t) ten o'clock in the morning.
A On the arms in the face I cannot remember the other.
Q Do you know what happened in the hospital?
Q While you were holding that boy what transpired next?
A I don't know I just left there.
A Lola arrived.
Q I am calling your attention to the testimony of one Ms. Aguilar, according to her
Q Did the lola see what happened to the boy while you were holding the boy, did the while she was attending to her child for treatment inside the hospital she saw John
lola see the boy in your arm? Albert Cloud and the old woman and according to her the old woman (was) hysterical
and she was stating aloud the following words or expression "Pinatay siya ng sariling
A Yes, sir. ama, pinatay siya ng sariling ama," did you hear that?

Q Was there any remark made by an old woman while you were holding the boy? xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir. A I did not hear that because I left already.

Q Please tell us as far as you can remember? Q There is also here a statement by, I think this is alluded to you, you said while the old
woman (was) shouting you said "Hoy tumigil ka na at huwag kang maingay?"
A She was angry with the father because according to her "pinabayaan daw ang bata."
A Yes, your Honor because she was saying a lot of thing that is why I left already.
Q Can you represent all as you can the statement of the lola?
Q When you said he was telling a lot of thing, what do you mean?
A She was already angry and she was telling a lot of things that is all, I don't know what
she said. A "Parang ano ho iyung matanda, kasi may pagkaulyanin iyun."

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Q Now after that you left, where did you go? been greatly reduced. That would be true even if that person did not merely slip or fall,
but was pushed or thrown, down the stairs.
A I went home to Santol.
And this brings us to the irrefutable physical evidence which, as medico-legal experts
Q Whom did you see there? say, belies the adage that dead men tell no tales. Indeed, to the trained eye, the inanimate
remains of the dead give testimony of their own and, in the present case, that is true
even of the young victim who in life could not have been as articulate. We refer to the
A Mr. Robert Cloud.
report of the NBI after the exhumation and autopsy which we have taken pains to
completely set out here.
Q Did you notice what he was doing at that time?
It would be the nadir of gullibility to believe that a small boy with his nominal weight
A He was already crying. could fall down the stairs above described with such velocity as to result in the injuries
which even the experienced hospital staff initially believed were caused by his being run
Q Did you ask him why he was crying? over by a truck. One needs to merely look at the description of the contusions on his
face, buttocks and knees; the contused abrasions on his face, hand and thigh; the
A No, sir. hematoma on the temporal region of his head; the severe hemorrhages on the cerebral
hemisphere of his skull; and the congestion in his brain and visceral organs, to see that
Q Did he talk to you? appellant and his star witness are gravely imposing upon the patience and credulity of
this Court.
A He just asked me what happened to the child.
That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, Acosta never even mentioned
at all that the boy merely fell down the stairs. The normal action of any person bringing
Q What did you tell him?
a patient to a hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to give information even
tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet, although the grandmother was
A I told him that the child was dead. 19 announcing to everybody that the boy was killed through violent maltreatment by his
own father, Acosta says he merely told her to keep quiet, and he forthwith left the
Standing out in bold relief from this orchestrated story narrated by Acosta for the first hospital. He never dared to tell his present cock-and-bull story or mention the conjured
time after six years of silence is his clearly deliberate effort to make it appear that accident on the stairs, especially to the medical staff whom he knew he could not
appellant, his wife and grandmother were not in the house at the time of the incident, delude, and yet he has the effrontery to do so before this Court.
thus paving the way for him to claim that he alone saw and could testify to what
happened to the victim. Yet, comparing his declarations thereon and those of appellant, The circumstances which the court below considered as reactions betraying a sense and
they could not even agree or be specific as to when appellant supposedly left the house knowledge of guilt on the part of appellant and his cohorts have already been
and stayed away in Paco, Manila. There was not even an attempt on their part to explain catalogued. One of them is the fact that immediately after the death of the victim in the
why it took more than two hours from the alleged accidental fall from the stairs to take hospital, appellant took his entire household to Paco, Manila, abandoned their house in
the boy to the hospital which was not a considerable distance away. Quezon City and never came back until several years later. This is admitted by
appellant 21 and Acosta. 22 In fact, appellant admitted that, while investigations into the
The second floor could not be more than four meters from the ground floor, not so death of his son were going on, he left for Japan in 1990 and returned in 1993, 23 only to
highly elevated even for a straight fall therefrom. In fact, as the trial court elicited from be arrested since the investigation had by then zeroed in on his culpability. This
appellant, the stairs from which the boy allegedly fell had only nine steps. It did not circumstance was even sought by the trial court to be clarified by Acosta, but this is
even go straight down but went four steps to the first landing then turned right where what transpired:
another five steps led to the ground floor. 20 Evidently, if one merely fell down such
stairs, that fall would be broken at the landing where the stairs turned at a right angle, Q Do you know or did you come to know why after the death of this boy in the house at
and even if he still continued rolling in that new direction, the momentum would have Santol everybody left the house and did not return anymore for a long time?

152
A I don't know. 24 Actions; Habeas Corpus; Words and Phrases; The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and
The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstantial evidence is effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal prosecution. That is why it has sufficient defense of personal freedom.—The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus,
spent unusual time and effort to reflect upon all facets of the circumstances which the whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
lower court accepted as an unbroken chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
yielding a conclusion of guilt, all consonant with the requisites therefor. 25 But, from defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
whatever angle we take the view, the catena of facts cannot but produce an inference detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
consistent with guilt and not with innocence. All these, even aside from the tenet that ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may
flight bespeaks guilt, a further strike against appellant in addition to the cover-up also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
running the gamut from falsification to false testimony. deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been
From such ruminations, we are fully convinced that the conscience of the Court can rest imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on
the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding
easy only by doing justice to an innocent child whose parents had heartlessly failed him.
the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional
Somehow, a mystical cause may have called upon two good Samaritans — mother with
a sense of humanity and a lady lawyer with a passion for justice — to seek redress for right to due process.
his untimely death. On this consoling thought, we write finis to this case.
Evidence; Admissions; The rule that a party’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. Q- anything against himself unless such declaration were true.—Petitioner’s declarations as
90-12660 convicting accused-appellant Robert Cloud of parricide is hereby to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs in both instances. the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, particularly with respect to
SO ORDERED. such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, “[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.” Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny
making such admissions.
Same; Entry in Official Records; A court’s Monthly Report constitutes an entry in
official records, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.—The records also
contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge
Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry
35. [G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000.] in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, Same; Hearsay Rule; Newspaper Articles; Newspaper articles amount to “hearsay
METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than
COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF proving the truth of the matter asserted.—Public respondents likewise presented a
MANILA, Respondents. certified true copy of People’s Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the
SYLLABUS National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to “life imprisonment.” However,
newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not

153
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, Same; Same; Same; Same; Reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of
unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this the defense.—Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government
case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist to reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
with the tenor of the news therein stated. “reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense.” Petitioner’s
invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since
Actions; Habeas Corpus; Evidence; If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records
lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore “[t]he government
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by
illegal.—As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever.” In this
on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to
ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case
new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention for Illegal Possession of Firearm, the records of which could be of assistance in the
of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima reconstitution of the present case. Feria vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 525, G.R. No.
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to 122954 February 15, 2000
show that the restraint is illegal.

Same; Same; When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who DECISION
is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus.—Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all QUISUMBING, J.:
intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a
court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who. is so charged, its
judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction
another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the
corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioner’s invocation of our release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the
ruling in Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the
the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that “[i]t does not appear defense.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent
authority during the enemy occupation” and not because there were no copies of the Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28,
decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And, indeed, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of
petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue. the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As
Same; Courts; Judgments; Reconstitution of Records; There is no sense in limiting hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate court.
reconstitution to pending cases—finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as
evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.—The proper remedy in this case Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the
is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment present petition are as follows:
of the case under either Act No. 3110, the general law governing reconstitution of
judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up
records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules to present 1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
of Court. Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the
refer to pending cases or finished cases. There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene
pending cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights Carmona.
and obligations finally adjudicated.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred

154
from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, 2 but the Jail rendered the assailed Decision 8 affirming the decision of the trial court with the
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the
Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. 3 Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and
It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.
judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of
Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. merit, 9 petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire 10
records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second
and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. 4 I WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas PETITIONER’S CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
Corpus 5 with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the LAW.
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of
Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS’
detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANT’S PETITION
due process. FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, 6 the Second Division of this Court resolved BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
—
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
". . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case among ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE
the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try
and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid
decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 11 and that
close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus
and PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further contends
time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that
Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE the "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been
Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235
his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that" [i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that
person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time of the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the
hearing." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."

The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on In its Comment, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in
November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order 7 dismissing the case on the ground this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner.
that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction
would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge
which rendered the decision. of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioner’s
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, reconstitution of judicial records.

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 3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic)
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. 13 It secures 4. That whether the de officio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused
to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the decision was
court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful promulgated.
authority. 14 Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in 5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made
the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of
an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"
Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of Petitioner’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him
conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process. under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient declaration were true, 18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction
evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129," [a]n
legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay" . showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that
—16 The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985
19 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted
"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report
counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised
appears clear and indubitable that: Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No.
60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People’s Journal dated
in Criminal Case No. 60867. . . . In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) January 18, 1985, page 2, 20 issued by the National Library, containing a short news
the accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was
personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay
Imprisonment (Habang buhay) . . ." (Emphasis supplied) evidence, twice removed" 21 and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected to or not, 22 unless offered for a purpose other
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible
Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993, 17 petitioner himself stated that — only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein
stated.
"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto
this Honorable Court most respectfully move:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide; exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. 23 If the detention of
Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (Emphasis supplied) the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie
evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to

156
show that the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
provides: during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies of the decision and
information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner does not
"SECTION 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that the raise any jurisdictional issue.
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate
of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, 26 the general
plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to
facts." reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5
(h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. 27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioner’ without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases. 28 There is no
s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
Court which provides that — pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. 29

"SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense." 30 Petitioner’s
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of records
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore" [t]he government
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted
by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave rise to
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), Accused was convicted the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case
by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. for Illegal Possession of Firearm, 31 the records of which could be of assistance in the
Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons reconstitution of the present case.
undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court
ruling thus: of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner SO ORDERED.
under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting
judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or
destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the
commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s release."
RULE 130, SECTION 37 – DYING
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly DECLARATION
appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents
and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. 24 Put another way,
in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
void for lack of jurisdiction. 25 Thus, petitioner’s invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. vs.
Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that" [i]t does not appear that the

157
SYLLABUS and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing
and hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument
Evidence; Dying Declaration.—It has been held that a dying declaration to be causing injuries which directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de
admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the Salac.
declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were
he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. x x x The reason present (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended
upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of confidence.
little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been Contrary to law. 1
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes
the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a
Criminal Procedure; Acquittal on reasonable doubt.—The totality of the case made out quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged.
against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a
compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We
consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case
is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the
considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the
judgment of conviction. The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
appellant’s guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as
reasonable doubt. People vs. De Joya, 203 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 75028 November 8, provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
1991
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of
FELICIANO, J.:
P550.00.
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined
before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with immediately in the National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the Supreme
the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows: Court.

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the
of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Supreme Court for review.
accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the SO ORDERED. 2
owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2)
In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one
rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y
basic assertion: that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond
Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery, evident The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following
premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack, assault manner:

158
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body
year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack
Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. Both spouses are teachers by which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were
profession. punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate,
but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately left.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag,
Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The
Bulacan. right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00

In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The
Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box
was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found
the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and things
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto
neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the
former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death
direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and certificate so that her mother could be embalmed.
holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the
prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran victim was lying prostrate.
towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?".
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro
words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old
and wornout pair of slippers of the latter.
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was
drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the
Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened. four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and
peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house.
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own
blood." On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo
Madrid, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination,
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock, secondary to punctured wound
Alvin followed, riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear
found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side
Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing of the neck to the opposite side. (Exhibit "D-2").
out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She
asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the
judgment of conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the
trial court, were the following:

159
In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the 5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day
death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the wake.
dying statement of the deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before the
incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin
from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk Valencia asked his grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched
type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After
identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of
she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house; the appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words
testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January 31, "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could
1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a
accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of Herminia he never verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate
visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state without any justifiable was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we
reason and contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui"
dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his
testimony never denied that he is called Paki.

The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To
deceased leads only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author
be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
of the crime. constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any
given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed
court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
follows:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it
10-year old boy: "Si Paqui"; must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the
death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a
took place two weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to
deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not
house without the consent of the victim; there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if
the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of
the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season; accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes
nothing; the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5

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It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her
incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been
uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted,
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had
Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt.
the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the
bloody deed. ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of
the Filipinos.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in
nature. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence
lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the against appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya
deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to through his counsel to settle the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony that
have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal
adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent charge amicably. That testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased
and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as follows:
at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.
Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or had a conversation with him, is that right?
under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be
regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair A Yes, air.
of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's
husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple
Q What was this conversation about?
manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same
color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if
conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if
appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still only Atty. Aguilar can talk with me, everything will be settled.
the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to
the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of that slipper Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar?
in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the
Valencias and there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir.
himself had testified that he did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon,
but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had found many Q When was this?
persons in the house viewing the body.
A The time he was fetched out of jail.
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31
January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a
Q You are referring to the municipal jail?
bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would
show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the
appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for supposing that A Yes, sir.
appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering
her through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house. Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty.
Aguilar?

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A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of
what I liked to happen. the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made
no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably
Q What did you say? through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not believe
that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant
could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and
A I said if it will be settled, well and good.
killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is
necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a
Q Anything else that transpired? crime as serious as robbery with homicide.

A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters. The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an
incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or
Q Did he tell you he can settle this? collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had
indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the
A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty
was very certain as to what happened. of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court
remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of
Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.
lawyer?
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of
A Yes, sir robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Q He heard what his, lawyer was telling you? ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby
REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.
It is so ordered.
Q Did the accused say anything?

A None, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

37. G.R. No. 101799.November 6, 1992.*
We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed
attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACIFICO DUNIG y
is concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellant.
Court which provides that
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; A person’s conviction must rest not on the weakness of
Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an his defense but on the strength of the prosecution.—However, we have repeatedly
admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person
making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be stressed that a person’s conviction must rest not on the weakness of his defense but on
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an the strength of the prosecution. The accused can rely on the constitutional presumption
implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied) of his innocence. It is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption with convincing
proof that the accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be absolved. In the case at bar we
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a find that the prosecution has not proved its case.
member of the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise"

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Same; Same; Dying declaration; A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence “Nanay, nanay, sinaksak ako ni Pico.”3 “Pico” is Dunig’s nickname.Teresita Montes,
on the theory that a person who knows he is on the verge of death is not likely to make a the girls’ mother, declared on the stand that at about 9 o’clock in the morning of April 4,
false accusation.—A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence on the theory 1990, she saw Pico and her niece Marilyn quarreling. At about 3 o’clock the following
that a person who knows he is on the verge of death is not likely to make a false morning, she was awakened when Marilyn knocked at her door. Marilyn’s neck was
accusation. However, the declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be based bleeding, and she cried to her: “Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil
on an erroneous identification of the declarant’s killer. sinaksak ako ni Pico.” A minute later, she died. Behind Marilyn were Maylin, Katherine
and Flory.4

Dr. Nicanor Cruz informed the court that Marilyn died of hemorrhage due to multiple
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 11.The stab and incised wounds in the neck. He opined uncertainly that the victim might or
facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff- might not have been able to speak or run to the house after the stabbing.5
appellee. Public Attorney’s Office for defendant-appellant
Dunig’s defense was alibi. He said that on the night in question, he was alone in a nipa
CRUZ,J.: hut in Matinbubong, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, where he went to sleep at 9 p.m. and
awoke the following morning at 6 o’clock. He swore he was not in the resthouse where,
There were two witnesses who allegedly saw the killing, not to mention the victim
and at the time, Marilyn was killed.6
herself, who identified her assailant shortly before she died. Yet the Solicitor General,
who is usually for sustaining the conviction by the trial court, is unconvinced and has Judge Amado M. Calderon, disbelieving him, found him guilty as charged.7
asked for its reversal.
This Court, after considering the evidence, holds that the conviction cannot stand.Alibi
Pacifico Dunig was formally charged with the murder of Marilyn Canatoy, then 14 years is unquestionably a weak defense, and it is clearly so in the case at bar. Dunig has not
old, in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The allegation was presented a single witness to corroborate him. There is also the admitted fact that the
that on April 5, 1990, in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, he repeated stabbed and thus killed the nipa hut where he supposedly slept was only a kilometer away from the scene of the
said girl, the attack being accompanied with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse crime.However, we have repeatedly stressed that a person’s conviction must rest not on
of superior strength.1 the weakness of his defense but on the strength of the prosecution. The accused can rely
on the constitutional presumption of his innocence. It is for the prosecution to overcome
To prove its case, the prosecution presented three witnesses, besides the doctor who
that presumption with convincing proof that the accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be
testified on the cause of the victim’s death. These were Maylin Montes, her sister,
absolved. In the case at bar we find that the prosecution has not proved its case.The
Katherine Montes, and their mother, Teresita Montes.
testimonies of the two alleged eyewitnesses to the killing are not believable. While
Maylin Montes, who was then ten years old at the time of the trial, said that at about 7 insisting that she saw Dunig stab Marilyn, Maylin also admitted that it was pitch dark
o’clock in the evening of April 4, 1990, she, Katherine, a certain Flory, and her Ate when they awoke and there was not a single light in the resthouse or nearby. (Or from
Marilyn went to sleep at the resthouse belonging to one Atty. Andrade. Marilyn slept in the moon either, for that matter.) Katherine said she only saw “what looked like a
a bamboo bed, and the rest of them slept under the bed. Maylin said that at about 3 shadow” and concluded it was Dunig. Assuming the sisters did wake up when Marilyn
o’clock in the morning, she saw Dunig stab Marilyn in the neck three times. The three screamed, it would have taken some time before their eyes could get accustomed to the
girls ran to Andrade’s house about 8 meters away where her father and mother were darkness. Yet both said they immediately recognized the accused-appellant.If there was
staying. Marilyn did, too, and collapsed at the door.2 anything certain about their testimonies, it was their certainty that the resthouse was
dark when they allegedly saw Dunig stabbing their cousin.Maylin agreed it was “so
Katherine Montes, thirteen years old at that time, corroborated her sister’s testimony. dark.”
She said she also saw Dunig running away after she heard her Ate Marilyn screaming.
She said she ran to the house ahead of Marilyn and she heard the stricken girl say, Atty. Ramirez:

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Q This resthouse where you and Marilyn, Flory and Katherine were sleeping, there was Q In what particular place did you see Dunig immediately before your Ate Marilyn was
no inside light in that early morning of April 5, 1990? stabbed?

A None, sir. A In the resthouse, sir.

Q There was no outside light in that resthouse? Q Outside or inside the resthouse?

A None, sir.8 A Inside, sir.

xxx Q The resthouse was unlighted at that time, was it not?

Atty. Ramirez: A No, sir.

Q It was dark inside that resthouse? Q It was pitch dark because you could not see anyone or recognize anyone?

A Yes, sir. A It was not too dark and a shadow passed by me, sir.

Q It was so dark inside that resthouse that early morning that you could not see anyone Q You mean to tell us that you actually saw a shadow that passed?
who would enter the resthouse itself?
Fiscal: The witness said “parang shadow.”
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Ramirez: What I saw something passed looked like a shadow.
Q It was so dark that you could not even see or you could not recognize anyone who
could enter the resthouse? Witness: A It was really a person, sir.10

A Yes, sir. So much for the sisters for the nonco. Now for their mother.

COURT: How could you see if it was dark? There is some confusion as to who arrived first in the house, Katherine saying it was
she, Maylin and Flory who did while Teresita Montes, her mother, said it was Marilyn.
Atty. Ramirez: But that is not really important. What is is Teresita’s testimony that Marilyn said to her a
minute before the girl died: “Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil
No more question, Your Honor.9 sinaksak ako ni Pico.”

Katherine demurred, saying “it was not too dark.” If it is true that the victim did make that statement before she died, it should qualify as a
dying declaration and so can be considered an exception to the hearsay rule.
Q You want to impress upon us that immediately before your Ate Marilyn was stabbed,
Nonetheless, it cannot be automatically accepted as a truthful accusation and is still
you had seen Dunig?
subject to the test of credibility.
A Yes, sir.
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence on the theory that a person who
Q Are you sure of that? knows he is on the verge of death is not likely to make a false accusation. However, the
declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be based on an erroneous
A Yes, sir. identification of the declarant’s killer.

164
In the case at bar, it has been established by the testimonies of the Montes sisters that the A This is a bamboo and it was encircled with cemented seat, Your Honor.
resthouse was dark, if not, indeed, completely dark. Like the other three girls who were
sleeping there with her, Marilyn could not possibly have seen the person who was Q Is that the only basis in saying that it was Pacifico Dunig who stabbed Marilyn?
attacking her. At best, she could probably only surmise it was Dunig, but that was a
A Yes, Your Honor.12
most uncertain identification. A surmise is not evidence. A man’s honor and liberty
cannot be forfeited because the victim supposedly pointed to him as her killer although The evidence of the prosecution is a slender reed. It cannot sustain a conviction. The
she could not possibly have seen the person who was stabbing her in the dark. defense is weak, but the prosecution is even weaker, based as it is mainly on the
narration of the alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the killing, one in total
At that, we cannot even be certain that the dying Marilyn really made that declaration
darkness and another in near total darkness that enabled her to see a shadow that passed
against Dunig. By corroborating their mother’s testimony, Maylin and Katherine may
by her. The tales are implausible. We cannot accept them. The Court has no choice but
have instead enfeebled it because their own credibility regarding what they said they
to exonerate the accused-appellant because his guilt has not been proved beyond
saw in the dark resthouse is also suspect. It must also be noted that the doctor who
reasonable doubt.
autopsied the victim’s body was not sure if Marilyn would have been able to speak at all
after she was stabbed because of the severity and location of her wounds.11 The following observations in People v. Pecardal 13 are appropriate:
Significantly, the statement she supposedly made to Teresita was strenuously long for a
person who died a minute later. A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But the same
justice that calls for retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt has not
It would seem that the mother and her daughters have put two and two together and been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe puniens et vere praeveniens. Even as this
come out with a sum of five. Teresita makes much of the quarrels of Marilyn and Pico to Court must punish, so too must it protect. Conceivably, the conviction of the accused-
bolster her belief that Dunig is the girl’s killer. Such quarrels, if true, may be evidence appellant could add another victim in this case.Accordingly, the appealed decision is
of motive but not necessarily of murder. In fact, Katherine said that the day before REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and must be
Marilyn was killed, Dunig was in the resthouse and apparently in good spirits, as he was released immediately. It is so ordered.
strumming his guitar and singing.
Note.—To be considered as a dying declaration, it must have been made under the
It is noteworthy that Katherine, seeing what looked like a shadow (“parang shadow”) consciousness of an impending death (People vs. Padrones, 189 SCRA 496). People vs.
pass by her in the dark that morning, immediately concluded it was Dunig who had Dunig, 215 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 101799 November 6, 1992
stabbed Marilyn. As for Maylin, she was sure Dunig was the killer for the preposterous
reason that he was in the resthouse in the afternoon of April 4, 1990.

Thus –
38. 42. 56. G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997
COURT:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
Q You stated, Maylin, that it was Pacifico Dunig who stabbed Marilyn. And you also s.
said that there was no light whatsoever that time. How did you know that it was Pacifico EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE" and "JOHN DOE" @ "OGANG," accused,
Dunig who stabbed Marilyn?
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE," accused-appellant.
A Because in the afternoon, he was already there, Your Honor. Q Where was he? A
He was seated in the pavement, Your Honor. SYLLABUS

Q Pavement of what?

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Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Dying Declaration; When a person is at the point of evidence when considered as part of the res gestae, another recognized exception to the
death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most hearsay rule provided specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The
powerful consideration to speak the truth; Elements of Dying Declaration.—A dying requisites for the admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the
declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling
his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.
for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, “when a person is at the point of death, every motive
for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to Same; Same; Same; Same; An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a
speak the truth.” This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.—An ante mortem statement may be
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. This dual
made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the state-ment’s
been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (4) the declaration is offered in a the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the identification of the
criminal case where the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the culprit is assured.
declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.
Same; Same; Evidence; Alibi; Alibi is inherently weak and the facts in the case at hand
Same; Same; Same; Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to show that it was not at all impossible, considering the circumstances of time and place,
observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty to tell the for the accused-appellant to have been present at the crime scene at the time of its
truth.—True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But as the commission.—It must be remembered that alibi is inherently weak and the facts in the
prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon case at hand show that it was not at all impossible, considering the circumstances of
being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to see time and place, for the accused-appellant to have been present at the crime scene at the
and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the time of its commission. The military detachment at Barangay Lumapao, where appellant
competency, of the victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum allegedly slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty
ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, the able-bodied appellant was
to tell the truth. Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing and only an hour’s walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle ride from the locus criminis. As
recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, correctly argued by the trial court, “(i)t would not have been impossible for the accused
under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, and come back to his detachment in a
challenges merely the credibility of the victim’s ante mortem statement. matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified by the defense witness Gabutero as to
going to and coming back from these two places. (TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)” The alibi
Same; Same; Same; An ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the very persuasive declaration of the victim.
declarant’s thumbmark imprinted with his own blood, and serve as evidence in the form
of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death.—Moreover, that the Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Court cannot appreciate treachery to qualify the crime to
declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his thumbmark in his own blood murder for the simple reason that this was not alleged in the Information.—The
is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity thereof. This manner of Information readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation.
authentication is understandable in view of the necessity and urgency required by the The trial court however found that the killing was qualified by treachery. Even assuming
attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any ulterior motive on the that this conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, we cannot appreciate
part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement treachery to qualify the crime to murder for the simple reason that this was not alleged
may be authenticated through the declarant’s thumbmark imprinted with his own blood, in the Information. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that
and serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his the accused must be informed of the “nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
death. Verily, such declaration need not even be in writing and may be proven by Obviously, this failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the
testimony of witnesses who heard it. Same; prosecution. Since every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, we cannot
convict him of murder through treachery under an Information that charged him with
Same; Same; Res Gestae; The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence murder qualified by evident premeditation.
when considered as part of the res gestae; Requisites for the Admissibility of Statements
as Part of the Res Gestae.—The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in

166
Same; Same; Same; Desistance; Well-settled it is that the desistance of the victim’s this Honorable Court, the above-named accused mutually helping one another and with
complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it evident premeditation and at nighttime did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity.—The facts of this case feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who,
show that the victim’s mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the as a result thereof, suffered fatal gunshot wound as reflected in the medical certificate
“financial help” extended to her family by the accused-appellant. Such “financial help” issued on October 2, 1990 by the Guihulngan District Hospital which was the immediate
when viewed as an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to cause of his immediate death.
demonstrate appellant’s criminal liability. Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her
son’s death was an accident attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
that the victim’s two gunshot wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is
that the desistance of the victim’s complaining mother does not bar the People from
A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16,
prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue
1991. 4 However, this was returned unserved on two different occasions for the reason
civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce that the subject had already changed address and "his whereabouts [were]
the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil unknown." 5 A motion for reinvestigation filed by appellant's Counsel de Oficio Marcelo
indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
Ondoy was denied in an Order dated April 15, 1991 on the ground that the trial court
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court’s refusal to
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the accused who was then still at
include a finding of civil liability. People vs. Amaca, 277 SCRA 215, G.R. No. 110129 large. 6 Jurisdiction over the person of appellant was acquired by the said court only on
August 12, 1997 July 1, 1991 when he was arrested by police authorities. 7 Thereafter, reinvestigation
was conducted but the prosecutor, reiterating his prima facie findings, resolved to
PANGANIBAN, J.: continue the prosecution of the accused.

The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy,
at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by treachery, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 8 Trial ensued in due course. Thereafter, the trial court
because the Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
premeditation. This legal lapse of the prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution
lapse — should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused may be WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused EDELCIANO
held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the crime necessarily included AMACA alias "EDDIE" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
therein), and every doubt must be resolved in his favor. Thus, we hold him guilty only penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said
of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim waived their claim through an accused to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, without pronouncement as to civil
affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity should be included in this Decision liability, and damages, and to pay costs.
finding the accused guilty of the homicide.
SO ORDERED. 9
Statement of the Case
The Facts
These postulate are explained in the Court's adjudication of this appeal from the
Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Branch
The trial court synthesized the facts based on the testimonies of witnesses for the
45, 2 in Criminal Case No. 550-C convicting Accused Edelciano Amaca of murder and
prosecution and the defense, as follows:
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and his cause of death,
On December 17, 1990, an Information 3 was filed by Bais City Prosecutor Epifanio E. the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar P. Pialago, a resident physician of the Guihulngan
Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one known only by his alias "Ogang,"
District Hospital, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, who testified that on October 2, 1990,
charging them as follows:
he was on duty at the aforesaid hospital, and was able to attend to victim Wilson
Vergara who had just undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor, Dr.
That on October 1, 1990 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Purok Gonzaga. The major organs of the victim, namely, the heart, lungs and kidney, were no
Liberty Hills, Barangay Mabigo, Canlaon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of

167
longer functioning normally, and thus, he was suffering from multiple organ system defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from
failure. Furthermore, there was injury in the pancreas, causing a leak of the pancreatic further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil
juice. Victim suffered two gunshot wounds at the back, and x-ray revealed two (2) liability of the appellant.
bullets inside the body, and there was no exit wound. The patient was admitted at 10:45
in the evening of October 1, 1990, and died at 7:00 in the evening of the following day. The Issue
He identified the death certificate (Exh. "A"), and the data sheet of the victim and the
final diagnosis. (Exh. "B") Even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not
In his brief, the appellant filed a lone assignment of error, to wit:
have survived with the wounds he sustained.
The trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond reasonable
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified doubt of the crime of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of the
that as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him from his
victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat. 12
residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed him of a
shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near
his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on The Court's Ruling
board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the
victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder,
Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he and civil indemnity shall not be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.
(TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified himself as Nelson Dying Declaration
(sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and Sufficient to Identify Assailant
have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in the presence
of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. (Exh. "C") A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is
aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death,
Felix Ponting, and Alfredo Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
and Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces consideration to speak the
Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37,
(CVO) with station at Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased
accused together with his companion Felix Ponting were on duty at the said station from made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have
6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock that same evening. After their duty at 8:00 been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
o'clock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo Gabutero, surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a
whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening. 10 criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the
declaration is complete in itself. 14 All these concur in the present case.
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law
Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case; the former because of the Declarant a Competent Witness
"financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina
had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." This notwithstanding, The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a
the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the competent witness to identify his assailant. He emphasizes that
victim's ante mortem statement. 11 the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that ". . . the witness/victim based
on the foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are
The Trial Court's Ruling not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But
as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness
The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to
identifying Appellant Amaca, a dying declaration sufficient to overcome the latter's see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not

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the competency, of the victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another," 20 Police Officer Mangubat had
ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty enough motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The defense
to tell the truth. 16 Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing also asks: "Why was the alleged dying declaration of the victim merely thumbmark (sic)
and recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and very capable of writing his name at
victim, under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, that time?" 21 Additionally, the defense questions why Wagner Cardenas who signed
appellant challenges merely the credibility of the victim's ante mortem statement. We the ante mortem statement as witness was not presented as such by the prosecution. 22
hold that the serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a
witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not
his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion in the past to destroy the genuineness of the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is
rule on a similar issue as follows: presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the
circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of
. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by
given wound,(') according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. the trial court, even appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with
212), "is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a particular case." They Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against
cited a case from Vibert's Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being him. 23 This dismal failure of the defense to show any ill motive on the part of said
shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish police officer adds credence to Mangubat's testimony. 24
the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of water from the courtyard. When the fire was
extinguished, the man lay down in bed and died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his
found that the left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by the revolver's bullet. It is thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity
evident from the foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion that the victim of a gunshot thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity and
wound would immediately lose consciousness, after infliction of the wound, may not be urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any
true in all cases. . . . 17 ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that
an ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the declarant's thumbmark
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because "the imprinted which his own blood, and serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration
actual shooting occurred at 7:00 o'clock in the evening." 18 This statement is bereft of in a criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily, such declaration need not even be in
factual basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat was fetched from his writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses who heard it.
house at 7:00 p.m. to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the victim had
already been brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus be inferred that the Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not fatal,
shooting occurred sometime before the victim was found, brought to the clinic, and as his testimony would have been merely corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the
before Mangubat was fetched from his house. Thus, a considerable period of time must presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if presented does not
have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until the policeman was fetched from obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have been called
his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to the to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the prosecutor's prerogative to
inference that it was pitch-black at the time of the shooting. Indeed, from the foregoing, choose his own witnesses to prove the People's cause. 26
it is reasonable to assume that the crime was committed before nightfall and that there
was sufficient daylight to enable the victim to identify his assailant. At any rate, there Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
are no indicia in the record that lighting conditions made it impossible for declarant to
identify his assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he did
recognize his shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as part of
of the defense that he did not. the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically
under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the admissibility of
statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration
immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence; and (c) it relates to the
circumstances of such occurrence. 27 These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by present case where the statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after
suggesting that since "the relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by the shooting incident and, more important, the victim had no time to fabricate.

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An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as Information. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the
part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against
ensuring the statement's appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or him." 38 Obviously, this failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of
more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the the prosecution. Since every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, we cannot
identification of the culprit is assured. 28 convict him of murder through treachery under an Information that charged him with
murder qualified by evident premeditation.
Alibi Debunked
Moreover, in this case, treachery and nighttime may not be considered even as generic
The defense also contests the trial court's finding that the aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution
"alibi interposed by the accused miserably fall short of exculpation. (Decision, p. witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely
7)" 29 Appellant insists that, since the dying declaration was unreliable and since there adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of
was no positive identification aside from this declaration, the defense of alibi gained night to facilitate the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade
strength. 30 There is no basis for this contention for, as previously discussed, the ante capture. This conclusion is further bolstered by the simple fact that not one of the
mortem statement met all requirements for its admissibility either as a dying declaration prosecution witnesses saw the commencement of the assault or even the actual assault
or as part of the res gestae or both. 31 It must be remembered that alibi is inherently itself. Hence, they are not competent to testify on whether the aggravating circumstances
weak and the facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all impossible, considering of treachery and nighttime attended the commission thereof. These circumstances
the circumstances of time and place, for the accused-appellant to have been present at cannot be appreciated on the basis of mere presumptions or suppositions; they must be
the crime scene at the time of its commission. 32 The military detachment at Barangay proven as clearly as the crime itself. 39
Lumapao, where appellant allegedly slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from
Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, Appellant may therefore be held liable only for the crime of homicide defined under
the able-bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Since there are no mitigating or aggravating
ride from the locus criminis. 33 As correctly argued by the trial court, "(i)t would not circumstances, the penalty of reclusion temporal provided under said article shall be
have been impossible for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, imposed in its medium period . Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant
and come back to his detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified by should suffer imprisonment of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
the defense witness Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two places. temporal, also in its medium period.
(TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)" 34 The alibi of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the
very persuasive declaration of the victim. 35 Non-Award of Indemnity

Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience rests easy with the moral The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of accused-appellant,
certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense at reasoning that it was prevented from doing so by the "unwillingness" of the victim's
innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against him. Even mother, Segundina Vergara, to further prosecute the case against the accused. 40 The
his flight — eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the warrant for trial court cited the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denying the motion
his arrest — clearly bespeaks his for reinvestigation. The DOJ held that the ante mortem statement of the victim testified
guilt. 36 to by Pfc. Mangubat accorded prima facie validity to the case against the accused, but it
noted and confirmed the desistance of the victim's mother and her son-in-law from
Murder or Homicide? further prosecuting the case. The salient portions of Segundina Vergara's affidavit of
desistance quoted in said resolution reads:
Finally, the defense posits that the appellant may be held liable only for homicide since
treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation and nighttime, That I am the complainant in a case which I filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor,
although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. 37 We agree. The Information Canlaon City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 550-C of Regional Trial Court, Bais
readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. The trial City for Murder against Eddie Amaca as the alleged accused;
court however found that the killing was qualified by treachery. Even assuming that this
conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, we cannot appreciate treachery to That in the evaluation of our case against him, I have found out that the death of my son
qualify the crime to murder for the simple reason that this was not alleged in the Wilson Vergara was purely accidental that could be attributed to his fault;

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That due to my compassion to the poor accused who is a family man, I have decided to
drop the case against Eddie Amaca for the reason that his family financially help (sic) us
in our family problems due to the death of my late son;

That with our desire to have a mutual understanding and goodwill among ourselves,
since we are neighbors and our respective families are good friends, I have decided to
drop the case against Eddie Amaca;

That when the said case was scheduled for hearing, I will not testify anymore as the
complaining witness; 41

The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial court's reasoning and
recommends that its decision be affirmed. 42 We agree. The facts of this case show that
the victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial
help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when
viewed as an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to
demonstrate appellant's criminal
liability. 43 Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death was an accident
attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot
wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the
victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal
action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in
effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of
accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising
from the criminal prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor 39. [G.R. No. 109617. August 11, 1997.]
any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding
of civil PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE SION @
liability. 45 "JUNIOR," JOHNNY JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX SION @ "ELLET,"
and FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL," accused, FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR" and
The records, however, do not show whether the deceased had other compulsory heirs. FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL," Accused-Appellants.
Such heirs, if there are any, may file an independent civil action to recover damages for
the death of Wilson Vergara.
SYNOPSIS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Edelciano Amaca is found GUILTY of homicide and SENTENCED At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag, while inside
to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen his house lying down on his bed, heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No civil indemnity of his brother, Fernando Abaoag. When he went out to see who were throwing stones,
is awarded. No costs. Cesar saw his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juquilon
hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned
SO ORDERED. his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing
stones towards his direction. Appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, stabbed
Fernando with a very sharp double bladed dagger, hitting him first on the left side just
below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck
below the jaw. Cesar tried to help his brother, but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him.

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When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions to kill Cesar, he fled and ran to Edong Sion and Johnny Juquilon constitutes a mere denial of Cesar Abaoag’s positive
his brother’s house and informed Fernando’s wife, Felicitas Abaoag, about the helpless testimony that it was appellant Sion who stabbed the victim. The claim was made rather
condition of Fernando Felicitas and Cesar went to the place of the incident and saw her late in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity.
husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired
what happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit." In light of the positive identification of the appellants appellant Disu’s alibi must fail.
Fernando also told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong
Sion, Johnny Juquilon and Felix Sion. The victim was rushed to the hospital but he was Conspiracy is present, The confluence of the acts of the appellants and their co-accused
pronounced dead on arrival. manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take the victim’s
life. There was no "free-for-all rumble." The aggravating circumstances of treachery and
An information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City cruelty are not present. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
against Felipe Sion, Johnny Juquilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion, and Federico Disu alias appreciated in favor of appellant Sion. As modified, the appellants are declared guilty of
Miguel, and fair unidentified Dersons. Since only appellants Felipe Sion and Federico homicide and sentencing each of them to indeterminate prison terms.
Disu were arrested, he case proceeded against them only. Upon arraignment, both
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Decision modified.

The trial court rendered a decision finding both accused Sion and Disu guilty of the
crime of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. SYLLABUS

On appeal, appellants attacked the identification made of them by the prosecution

witnesses, the court’ s taking into account of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, in 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED
ruling that conspiracy was established, in not appreciating the presence of voluntary BY DELAY IN DIVULGING THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME; DELAY
surrender, and in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED. — That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag
Johnny Juquilon who were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag. that it was appellant Sion who stabbed her husband, was not proof that Cesar was absent
from the crime when it was committed. Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to
Appellant Sion admitted that he participated in the stone-throwing incident, but forthwith inform Felicitas of this fact. At that time, Cesar himself was running away
professed his innocence climbing that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny from the accused who had hit him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get
Juquilon who stabbed the victim. Appellant Disu offered denial and alibi, declaring that someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was scared of accused Felix Sion who
during the whole night of October 16, 1991, he was resting and sleeping in the house of was a "notorious" character in their neighborhood. It is settled that delay in divulging the
his employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving the latter’s jeepney the entire day. He name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the
only learned of the killing the following morning when told that he was one of the credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative value. In any event, in his sworn
suspects. statement, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion and Disu as
among the perpetrators of the crime.
The Supreme Court held that appellants were positively identified by prosecution
witness Cesar Abaoag. He saw appellant Sion stab the victim thrice and the rest of the 2. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE;
accused, including appellant Disu, throwing stones at the victim. He was definite, EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE; DYING DECLARATION; REQUISITES;
however, that it was only accused Johnny Juquilon who was able to hit the victim at the ALL PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The declaration made by the victim to his wife
left eyebrow. The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at the left is a "dying declaration," having been made under the consciousness of impending death.
eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juquilon jibed with the post mortem findings of The victim was already weak when his wife saw him and he knew that he would not
the doctor who examined the body of the victim. survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to
the hospital. When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened to him,
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live. The statements given by the
dying declaration of the victim. When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had victim to his wife have met the requisites of a dying declaration under Section 37 of
happened to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was
conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its
Appellant Sion’ s defense that it was not he who stabbed the victim but his brother scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances

172
pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent an accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt-is simply inaction which may be due
to testify had he survived. Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an indication of innocence.
to the hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the
declarant’s death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens 7. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. — In
that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu’s alibi must fail. Alibi is
"made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot prevail over and is
is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that an accused
most powerful consideration to speak the truth. We find no ulterior motive on the part of perpetrated the crime.
Felicitas to fabricate the declarations of her husband.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; PRESENT. — There is conspiracy when two or
3. ID., ID.; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY RELATION TO THE more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
VICTIM. — The relationship of prosecution witnesses to the victim does not disqualify to commit it. Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it
them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not to be lightly may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or
supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and
avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be design, concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is established, the
innocent thereof. A witness’ relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony act of one is the act of all. Here, the confluence of the acts of the appellants and other
biased, would even render the same more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative accused indubitably manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design
who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. to take Fernando Abaoag’s life.

4. ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES; DISCRETIONARY 9. ID.; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT
TO THE PROSECUTOR. — Failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses is not PREMEDITATION; NOT PRESENT. — The prosecution failed to prove the essential
fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that the decision as whom to present as elements of evident premeditation. viz: (a) the time when appellants determined to
witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination;
handling the case and the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow
a plausible defense. The prosecution is not obliged to present all possible witnesses, them to reflect upon the consequences of their act.
especially if their testimony will only serve to corroborate that of another eyewitness’
testimony, in which case the former may very well be dispensed with considering that 10. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; NOT PRESENT. — There is treachery when the offender
the testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive to prove the guilt of the commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in
accused beyond reasonable doubt, would suffice. the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically to ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. We find
5. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE TESTIMONY. — no clear and convincing evidence of treachery. Cesar Abaoag’ s testimony as to how his
Appellant Sion’s defense that it was not he who stabbed, but his brother Edong and brother was attacked lacks sufficient detail showing conclusively that the mode and
Johnny, both of whom fled after the incident, was mere denial of Cesar Abaoag’s manner of the assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless. In light of the absence of
positive testimony. It must fail in light of the settled rule of evidence that positive clear details showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the
testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Moreover, the claim was made rather late ‘victim was entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when
in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity. He raised this claim for the first time the victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal,
only during his testimony in court almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident and his or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased completely unaware.
initial surrender, and notably, only after the hope of apprehending Idong and Johnny Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means of execution were
already seemed remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the information as soon as deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.
he was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a vital matter hardly inspire
belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of men and common 11. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CRUELTY; NOT APPRECIATED.
experience. — Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any showing that appellants, for their
pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted
6. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT; NOT AN INDICATION OF INNOCENCE. — That on him unnecessary physical and moral pain; and, the mere fact that wounds in excess of
appellant Sion did not flee neither proves his innocence. Non-flight — unlike flight of what was indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body of the victim

173
does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and with the WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu
intention of deliberately intensifying the victim’s suffering. In the instant case, the alias Miguel Disu guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Murder
evidence only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were delivered in succession, pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the attendance of the
nothing more. aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance,
the two accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to
12. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; indemnify jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of
APPRECIATED. — Appellant Sion is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of the proceedings.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered himself to
a person in authority." Its requisites are: (a) the offender had net been actually arrested; Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu are ordered to
(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and pay jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P11,910.00 as actual damages.
(c) the surrender was voluntary. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous
and show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, SO ORDERED.
either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture. Appellant Sion ‘presented" Felipe Sion alias "Junior," whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. 2 (hereafter
himself to Kagawad Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered" him to the police appellant Sion), and Federico Disu alias "Miguel" (hereafter appellant Disu), seasonably
in the poblacion. His admission that he surrendered because he was already suspected as appealed therefrom to this Court 3 in view of the penalty imposed. 4
one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his surrender "forced by
circumstances." His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor inevitable. Whatever The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint for
the accused’s reason for surrendering — either she fear of reprisal from victim’s Murder 5 on 19 November 1991 in Criminal Case No. 2141 (SF-91) before the Fourth
relatives or, in this case, his knowledge that he was already a suspect — "does not Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto in the Province of Pangasinan.
gainsay the spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he Charged with appellants therein were Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias
saved the State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested."cralaw "Ellet," and "four (4) other John Does." After appropriate preliminary examination,
virtua1aw library Judge Sergio Garcia of said court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused with no
bail fixed for their temporary liberty. 6 However, the warrant was served only on
13. ID.; PERSONS IN AUTHORITY; BARANGAY OFFICIALS; EXPANDED appellant Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu’s motion for
UNDER SECTION 388 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. — Sec. bail, to which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr., recommended that bail
388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides, in part, that" [f]or be fixed at P40,000.00 for said accused only, the court fixed said accused’s bail at such
purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay amount; and upon filing and approval of the bail bond, appellant Disu was ordered
members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed released. 7 Subsequently, one Atty. Fernando Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused, a
as persons in authority in their Jurisdictions. . ." This law expands the definition of a motion to reduce the bail from P40,000.00 to P20,000.00. 8 As Provincial Prosecutor
person in authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay Dumlao agreed to a reduction of P10,000.00, the court granted the motion and fixed bail
officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is at P30,000.00. None of them, however, filed a bail bond.
expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in
addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the Municipal
Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as Circuit Trial Court, finding probable cause against all the accused for the crime of
agents of, but as persons, in authority. murder on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, ordered the transmittal of the
record of the case, including the bail bond of accused Federico Disu, to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan for appropriate action. 9
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu
In its decision 1 in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but promulgated and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4) unidentified
on 8 February 1993, Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First persons (designated as John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime
Judicial Region decreed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library of murder committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

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That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of San when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west complaining that he
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon (p. 7, TSN, id.). On that same
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with you are making trouble again." The latter answered, "I am not making trouble uncle
treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and because while I was inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny
feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando Abaoag inflicting upon him the Juguilon were trying to stab me. (p. 8, TSN, id.). Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny
following injuries:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Juguilon appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop
throwing stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even you
— stab wound 1½ inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid axillary Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of your mother, you
area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando
Abaoag whose nickname is Andong.
— stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1½, inch in depth
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o’clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag
— stab wound 1½ inches in width, 1½ in depth mid scapular area, left while inside his house lying down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the
nearby house of his brother Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones (p.
— contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow 14, TSN, id.). When already near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his
brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the
which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being
hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code. Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his direction. On the other hand,
appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger,
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned to Branch stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left waistline
44 thereof. and finally on the right side of the neck below the jaw (pp. 18-19, TSN, id.).

On 2 June 1992, Accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the RTC Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which
annulled and voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by MCTC Judge Sergio landed on his right side below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his
Garcia for lack of proper hearing, denied the motion for bail filed by appellant Sion, and companions saying, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping his brother (pp.
ordered their detention in jail. 12 22-23, TSN, id.). Instead, he ran to his brother’s house and informed Felicitas, the wife,
about the helpless condition of Fernando (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.). Upon being informed,
Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded against them Felicitas, accompanied by Carlos Abaoag, went to the place of the incident. The
only. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial. 13 assailants were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the ground
very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered
The prosecution’s witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the wife "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992). Fernando
of the victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health Officer; told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny
Rosendo Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.).
the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses appellant Disu; appellant Sion;
Corazon Sion, wife of appellant Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo. The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead
on arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN, August 20, 1992).
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its witnesses is
partly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee, as Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian, Pangasinan conducted
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library post mortem examination (Exh. A) on the body of the victim. The result of his findings
showed that Fernando Abaoag sustained the following injuries, to
On or about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
barangay road in front of his house situated in Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was
with his elder brother Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel (p. 6, TSN, August 20, 1992) "1) stab wound 1½ inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11, ICS, mid axillary

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area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung stoned him (Fernando Abaoag). It was Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed
Fernando Abaoag. After Fernando Abaoag was stabbed, they ran away. His group also
2) stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1½ inches in width, 1½ inch in depth ran away. He went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon because he was stabbed.
He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and Hospital. He did not report the incident
3) stab wound 1½ inches in width, 1½ in depth mid scapular area, left to Barangay Captain Rosendo Imuslan. On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he presented himself
to Kagawad Lagman who brought him to the Police Station. . . . 21
4) contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow." 14
In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no
Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-pointed participation in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16
instrument, possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the lower lobe of the left lung October 1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in question were taking
causing severe bleeding and its eventual collapse. He determined the cause of death to place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his employer, Felicidad Gatchalian,
be hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds. 15 after driving the latter’s jeepney the entire day. However, before proceeding home from
work that afternoon, he went to the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and
Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando Gatchalian, on the dropped by the house of appellant Sion where he stayed for about five minutes. He only
night of the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied double-bladed weapon (dagger) learned about the killing the following morning when he was told that he was one of the
near the scene of the crime. 16 Cesar Abaoag recognized this weapon as the one used by suspects. He was arrested about a month after the incident. 22chanrobles virtual
appellant Sion in stabbing the victim. 17 On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she lawlibrary
spent more than P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of her husband whose death
saddened her, she being left alone to take care of their children. 18 On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar asserted that
neither his brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at Sion’s house; there was no
In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong 19 Sion and Felix free-for-all fight between the Sions and the Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion
Sion alias "Ellet," respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in merely threw stones at, but did not stab, Fernando Abaoag; and it was only appellant
a stone-throwing incident and "free-for-all rumble" between his group (the Sions and Sion who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. 23
Johnny Juguilon) on one hand, and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he
professed his innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny After the conclusion of trial, the court granted appellants’ motion to file a memorandum
Juguilon who stabbed the victim. 20 His version of the incident was summarized by the within fifteen days. Despite the extension given, appellants’ counsel did not file the
trial court, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library memorandum. Thus, in its order of 11 December 1992, the trial court declared the case
submitted for decision. 24
On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny Juguilon went to the
house of Eling Alcantara as he wanted to talk with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision, 25 the dispositive portion
was already there when they arrived. While at the place, Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie quoted in the introductory paragraph of this ponencia.
Manuel came out and started fighting with each other. Ronnie Manuel ran and
proceeded to the place of his cousin. He was pacifying Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:chanrob1es
Manuel but Johnny Juguilon threw stones at Ronnie Manuel. At this point, Fernando virtual 1aw library
Abaoag intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your mother Johnny, you are too
much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon answered "vulva of your mother The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr.
Andoy, do not interfere because you are not our enemy." After the verbal exchange, he deserve scant consideration. Cesar Abaoag narrated in detail how his brother Fernando
took Johnny Juguilon to their (Sion’s) house. . . . At about 9:00 p.m., that same evening, Abaoag was stoned by accused Johnny Juguilon, Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how
they stoned their house, its sides and the stairs. He and Idong and Johnny Juguilon accused Felipe Sion stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar Abaoag saw Johnny
looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two (2) Juguilon throw stone hitting the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother
other companions. They were at the place of Marta Soriano. After that, they still threw (Fernando Abaoag) turned left, Accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion
stones towards them. There was a free for all rumble between Ronnie Manuel, Ricky and Felix Sion simultaneously threw stones toward him (Fernando Abaoag). Then, at a
Manuel, the Abaoags and Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw accused Felipe Sion stab Fernando
of the house of Loly Galdones. He denied the testimony of Cesar Abaoag that he Abaoag three times, hitting the left side below the armpit, then on the left waistline and
stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times and before he was stabbed Johnny Juguilon the right side of the neck below the jaw of the deceased with the use of a sharp double

176
bladed dagger. cruelty; (3) in ruling that conspiracy was established; (4) in not appreciating the
presence of voluntary surrender; and (5) in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of
away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a Fernando Abaoag.
light illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and
Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D). In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification made of them
by prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar Abaoag actually saw
The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, appellant Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have immediately informed Felicitas
the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag, the victim’s wife, of this fact. Cesar’s failure was then unusual and unnatural.
Abaoag. Dr. Manalo stated that "stab wound 1½ inches in width, 9 inches in depth Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag’s testimony on her husband’s alleged dying declaration was
between 10-11 ICS, mid-axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung" "not specific" as far as the assailants’ identities were concerned because the victim
is located below the left armpit. The second stab wound, "stab wound right lateral side merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying appellant Sion as the one who
of the neck 1½ inches in width, 1½ in depth", is located at the right side of the nec[k] at stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five (5) accused as the
the back. The doctor stated that the wounds were caused possibly by a dagger. ones who "stabbed" him and was "an impossibility." Moreover, the prosecution
witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital witnesses" — such as
Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag in the presence of Marta Soriano, Lolly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara — should have been presented to
Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which means, I was hit, take note of this because I corroborate the "biased" testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.
cannot survive these injuries of mine." Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe
Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-12 tsn Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the stabbing of the
July 27, 1992). This is a dying declaration because it was made under a consciousness of victim was not "sudden" ; (2) cruelty was not proven because "there is no clear
impending death (Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court). 26 testimony" that the first stab wound was fatal and the second and third wounds were
"unnecessary" ; (3) conspiracy cannot be deduced from the mere fact that all the accused
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the prosecution, threw stones at the victim before the stabbing; (4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library even before the police started investigating the case when he was not yet a suspect; and
As stated in the decision, Accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone, hitting the left eyebrow (5) appellant Sion could not have testified that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon
of Fernando Abaoag, and Edong Sion, Felix Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu who stabbed the victim if such were not true, considering that the former is his brother
simultaneously threw stones upon the deceased, while accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant Sion bore no grudge against the victim
stabbed him (victim) three times, resulting in the latter’s death. 27 and did not escape.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of treachery On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the Appellee,
because the "attack was so sudden that the victim had no time to defend himself" and (b) supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions, except as to the appreciation of
the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty because "there were three stab wounds" cruelty, which it concedes to be erroneous.
and the first wound — which "caused severe bleeding and collapse of the lung" and the
death of Fernando Abaoag — "was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties convinces us
wounds which are unnecessary for its commission." 28 It did not, however, appreciate that prosecution witness Cesar Abaoag positively identified appellants as being present
evident premeditation for lack of "substantial" evidence; 29 nor give the benefit of during the incident in question and saw appellant Sion stab the victim thrice. As
voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion since his surrender was merely "forced by correctly found by the trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
circumstances," as he "presented himself to Kagawad Lagman because he was suspected
as one of the persons who stabbed the victim." 30 Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters
away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. 31 light illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and
Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
In their eight-page Appellants’ Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
32 appellants plead for their acquittal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing
convicting them of murder; (2) in taking into account the aggravating circumstance of stones at the victim. He was definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny Juguilon

177
who was able to hit the victim at the left eyebrow. The three stab wounds inflicted by
appellant Sion and the injury at the left eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
jibed with the post mortem findings of Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left
eyebrow as "contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow." 33 If Cesar had any Q Did you ask him why he said "naalaak" ?
ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he could have declared that it was Disu,
and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then honestly narrated what he A He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
observed.
Q What do you mean by word "naalaak" ?
That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion who
stabbed her husband, was not proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar was absent from A I was hit.
the crime when it was committed. Cesar’s presence was admitted by appellant Sion
himself on direct examination, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when Proceed.
you said he was stabbed by Johnny Juguilon and Idong Sion?
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, sir. 34
Q Do you know the reason why he was hit?
Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform Felicitas of
this fact. At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the accused who had hit A What I understand is that in the course of his pacifying the trouble between his
him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get someone to help his wounded nephew and the rest, he was stabbed, sir.
brother; besides, he was scared of accused Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who was
a "notorious" character in their neighborhood. 35 It is settled that delay in divulging the Q Aside from the statement of your husband Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else
name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the did he say, if you know?
credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative value. 36 In any event, his sworn
statement 37 which was submitted on 22 October 1991 before Judge Sergio Garcia, he A He said, take note of this because I know I cannot survive with these injuries of mine.
narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion and Disu as among the
perpetrators of the crime. COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the Q What else did he tell you aside from that?
declaration made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly
characterized this as a "dying declaration," 38 having been made under the A He said, remember that in case I cannot survive with the injuries that I sustained, the
consciousness of impending death. The victim was already weak when his wife saw him men who stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and
and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few Felix Sion, sir. 40 (Emphasis supplied)
minutes later while on the way to the hospital. 39 When Felicitas saw her husband, he
told her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a
live, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is
imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which
Q What happened next after that when you met your husband? bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates
to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant
A I immediately asked him what happened to him. would have been competent to testify had he survived. 41 Dying declarations are
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and
Q And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag? trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant’s death renders impossible his taking
the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of
A He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit. the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point

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of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is vital matter hardly inspire belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits
silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the of men and common experience.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
truth." 42 We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
of her husband.
That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny Juguilon, neither
We likewise find to be without basis appellants’ claim that all the prosecution witnesses proved his innocence. Non-flight — unlike flight of an accused which validly serves as
were biased due to their relation to the victim’s family. Plainly, witnesses Imuslan (the a badge of guilt — is simply inaction which may be due to several factors; hence, it
barangay captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related to the victim, while the relationship should not be construed as an indication of innocence. 50
of witnesses Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas Abaoag to the victim, as brother and wife,
respectively, neither disqualified them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony Appellant Sion’s claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando Abaoag was
unworthy of belief. It is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would belied and contradicted by his admission in court that just before the stabbing of the
callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on victim, he and his co-accused hurled stones at and fought with the Abaoags, including
persons whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A witness’ relationship to a Fernando, whom he blamed for allegedly stoning his house. 51 It is also belied by his
victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the same more actuation and utterance made earlier in the evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando
credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime Abaoag interfered in the quarrel between appellant Sion and Fernando’s nephew,
to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 44 Ronnie Manuel, which prompted appellant Sion and Johnny Juguilon to curse and warn
Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you are interfering, you are
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as those siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have also your day . . . you Abaoags." 52
mentioned by the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that the Appellant Sion also admitted that he "had an ill-feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel, the
decision as whom to present as witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound victim’s nephew, because "he was making trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the
discretion of the prosecutor handling the case and the non-presentation of certain incident." 53
witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense. 45 The prosecution is not
obliged to present all possible witnesses, especially if their testimony will only serve to In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu’s alibi must fail.
corroborate that of another eyewitness’ testimony, in which case the former may very
well be dispensed with considering that the testimony of a single witness, if credible and It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot
positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, would suffice. 46 prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible
witnesses that an accused perpetrated the crime. 54 We are unable to discern any
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion’s defense that it was not he who stabbed plausible reason, and appellant Disu does not offer any, why he should be falsely
the victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, both of whom fled after the implicated by Cesar Abaoag and mentioned in the victim’s dying declaration as one of
incident. Constituting a mere denial of Cesar Abaoag’s positive testimony that it was the victim’s assailants, if appellant Disu was not actually present during the incident and
appellant Sion who stabbed the victim, such must fail in light of the settled rule of had no participation in the commission of the crime. As to his motive or lack thereof,
evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. 47 Moreover, the appellant Disu claims that he had no misunderstanding with Fernando Abaoag or his
claim was made rather late in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity. From the family. 55 However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu was close to the Sion
time that appellant Sion presented himself to Kagawad Lagman and the police clan, which explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and joined the Sions and
authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent incarceration, he never told Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico Disu was Sion Jr.’s jeepney conductor for
anyone nor made any statement that he was not the one who stabbed the victim; he did five (5) months, the latter teaching the former how to drive for three (3) months; and
not even so inform his close relatives, not even his wife who visited him in jail. 48 Also, when Disu became a driver himself, they had the same route and saw each other every
during the preliminary investigation, when he had the opportunity to submit counter- day at the poblacion. 56 Disu even admitted that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he
affidavits and other evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to dispute the "dropped by" the house of Felipe Sion, which he often did before. 57
statements of Felicitas and Cesar Abaoag identifying him and detailing participation in
the crime. 49 He raised this claim for the first time only during his testimony in court We now rule on the-presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or
almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident and his initial surrender, and notably, more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
only after the hope of apprehending Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, together with the to commit it. 58 Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not
other accused, already seemed remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the necessary; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
information as soon as he was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint

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purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 59 Once conspiracy is Juguilon stone his brother and hit him on the left eyebrow. Fernando Abaoag then
established, the act of one is the act of all. 60 turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion, Miguel Disu and the
four (4) other unidentified companions, who then "simultaneously" threw stones at
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay road of Fernando. "Seconds later," Cesar saw appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed
Binday, near the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when Fernando Abaoag, dagger and stab his brother three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just
who was looking for the persons who just stoned his house several times, and Cesar standing and said ‘I will not fight.’" 64 They were six (6) meters away from Johnny
Abaoag, arrived. Immediately, Johnny Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting him Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at Fernando which signaled the other
on the left eyebrow; then, Edong and Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" accused to do the same. 65
threw stones, also at Fernando. As Fernando turned away from his assailants, appellant
Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3) times, even as the latter raised his arms Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim when the attack
saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag tried to help his brother Fernando, commenced, and the fact that there were two (2) waves of stoning which preceded the
appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone. Appellant Sion then commanded his stabbing of the victim, these should have sufficiently forewarned him of the greater
companions to also kill Cesar, prompting the latter to run away. Then the assailants fled, danger which loomed and prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence of
leaving behind a small bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably clear details showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the
manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando victim was entirely helpless when stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that the
Abaoag’s life. attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the victim entirely defenseless.
Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim was forewarned of the
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellants’ claim, through the testimony of attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as
appellant Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was a result of a "free-for-all to have caught the deceased completely unaware. 66 Furthermore, the evidence does not
rumble," thereby possibly tempering their liability to that of causing death in a disclose that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by
tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, which carries a penalty appellants.
lower than that for homicide. 61 In this case, it was ascertained beyond doubt that
appellant Sion inflicted the fatal stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected. Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having resolved appellants’ liability for Fernando Abaoag’s death, we now rule on the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime. The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, 67 based solely on the fact that the victim was stabbed thrice,
In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying with the first stab wound hitting the lower left causing severe bleeding and its collapse.
circumstance of treachery, and disregarded the qualifying circumstance of evident In fact, appellee concedes this error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in
premeditation, which was likewise alleged in the information. We agree as to the latter absence of any showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the
as the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of evident premeditation, viz: victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and
(a) the time when appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly moral pain; and, the mere fact that wounds in excess of what was indispensably
indicating that they clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time necessary to cause death were found on the body of the victim does not necessarily
between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and with the intention of deliberately
consequences of their act. 62 intensifying the victim’s suffering. 68 In the instant case, the evidence only shows that
the three (3) stab wounds were delivered in succession, nothing more.
We disagree, however, with the trial court’s finding as regards the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the offender commits We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily
execution thereof which tend directly or specifically to ensure its execution, without risk surrendered himself to a person in authority." 69 Its requisites are: (a) the offender had
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 63 We find no not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
clear and convincing evidence of treachery. Cesar Abaoag’s testimony as to how his or to the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. 70 For a surrender to be
brother was attacked lacks sufficient detail showing conclusively that the mode and voluntary, it must be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself
manner of the assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless. He merely testified that unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2)
when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay road of Binday, he saw Johnny because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and

180
capture. 71 maximum, with all the accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provisions of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged
As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion judgment stands.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
"presented" himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and
surrendered" him to the police in the poblacion. 72 His admission that he surrendered Costs against Accused-Appellants.
because he was already suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make
his surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. His arrest at that time SO ORDERED.
was neither imminent nor inevitable. At the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest
against him had yet been issued, the same having been issued only on 19 November
1991. 73 In fact, he was released from custody after a few days, and was ordered
committed to jail only sometime in June 1992, after his motion for bail was denied by
the trial court on 10 June 1992 and was thus taken into custody. 74 This subsequent fact
should not diminish nor erase the favorable effect of Felipe Sion Jr.’s voluntary
surrender on 17 October 1991. As has been held, whatever the accused’s reason for
surrendering — either the fear of reprisal from victim’s relatives or, in this case, his
knowledge that he was already a suspect — "does not gainsay the spontaneity of the
surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he saved the State the time and
trouble of searching for him until arrested." 75

We disagree with Appellee’s submission that there was no voluntary surrender because
appellant Sion surrendered to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay
member, and not to the police authorities, implying that the former is not a person in
authority. 76 This ignores Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
expressly provides, in part, that" [f]or purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in
each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions . . . ." 77
RULE 130, SECTION 38 – DECLARATION
This law expands the definition of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code, AGAINST INTEREST
wherein among the barangay official, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called
Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article
[G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997.]
152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang
Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are now considered
not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority. 78 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THEODORE
BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, Accused-Appellants.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional
SYLLABUS
Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. D-10796 is MODIFIED.
As modified, appellants FELIPE SION, alias "JUNIOR" or FELIPE RODRIGUEZ, JR., Criminal Law; Kidnapping; Evidence; In kidnapping, what is important is to determine
and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are hereby declared GUILTY beyond and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not
reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor.—The Court notes that up to this day,
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the former entitled to the mitigating neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does not preclude the
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to
are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim
years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and an indeterminate penalty ranging from easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victims’ bodies.
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as

181
Same; Same; Same; For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10
victim’s liberty, which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved.— under an information 1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads as
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim’s liberty, which is follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal
indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals “as shown by "That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose.” Proof jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with hand
of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together and helping one another, and
only. The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation of by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and
Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr. feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was
drinking liquor with his friends at Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed
Same; Same; Same; Motive; Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in and carried away using a PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby
establishing the identity of the perpetrator.—Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.
utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the CONTRARY TO LAW."
accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda,
Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued.
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on The prosecution presented four witnesses. 2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal
Evidence. testified for his defense.

Same; Same; Same; Declaration Against Interest; Requisites before a statement may be The material facts and events as found by the court a quo are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
admissible.—A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following library
requisites, to wit: “(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to
a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing
the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.” by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the
entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since latter if he was "Payat." 3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun
it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.—The court a while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen"
quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him
sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarino’s forthright answers to the away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter’s
questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation of mother of the abduction.
Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. This The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez,
Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal’s wife Naty and this
of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong was the motive behind the former’s kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question of
credibility of witnesses. On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the
police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped. 4

On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 finding Bernal "guilty
ROMERO, J.:
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and
disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities
Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering. 6
and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping in

182
 Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him
witnesses’ allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not dispatching one of them to "Tarsing’s Store" to check if a certain person was still there.
proved beyond reasonable doubt. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter’s presence
was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal’s
companions.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This,
however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City
kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing’s Store" on that fateful day
therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided
disposing of their victims’ bodies. to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked for "Payat." When Openda,
Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," he was handcuffed and taken away by the
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph unidentified men.

"ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal’s wife Naty
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married
death:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library woman. 9 Undoubtedly, his wife’s infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to
contemplate revenge.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made. support a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit
relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer. 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the "Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense."cralaw declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a
virtua1aw library reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim’s liberty, which is against third persons."cralaw virtua1aw library
the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal
indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals "as shown by With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision,
their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose." 7 it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. 11
circumstances only. 8 The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the
participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr. A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:"
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the
The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was
with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had

183
no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. 12 have requested his companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with
Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his
affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no sane "Q. After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. 14 that correct?

In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino’s testimony. He A. Yes, sir, because I was still in the store." 17
alleges that the latter could not have seen the actual handcuffing because "Tarsing’s
Store" could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino’s testimony shows that after On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr.,
already handcuffed. "Q. When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him
again?
"Q. The three of them together?
A. Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and
A. Yes, sir. proceeded to Tarcing Store and arrested Junjun Openda. When these two men brought
out Junjun Openda, fifteen minutes later, Bernal came.
Q. And what about you, where did you stay?
Q. Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)
A. I just stayed in the billiard hall.
A. He was coming from outside.
Q. While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?
Q. He has with him his son?
A. The two came back.
A. He was with nobody, sir.
Q. Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. The companions of Bernal.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did these two men do?
Q. He was alone?
A. They apprehended Junjun Openda." 15
A. Yes, sir." 18
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr.
arrested. The lower court correctly rejected this argument by holding The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph as to be irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall,
there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter
"But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the could have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the billiard hall
Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary, he says that he had not known who the person where he was seen by Sagarino. 19
was that Bernal referred to when he requested one of this two companions to go see if
that person was still there at the store, and that he came to know that he was Openda, Jr. Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino’s testimony by imputing revenge as his
only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two motive for testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged
unidentified companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main road." 16 kidnapping, five policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking for
Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied
If one had a direct view of "Tarsing’s Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would not that they were residents of the place and staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house.

184
The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned. dead.

"Q. Minutes later do you know what happened? Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
recommended to this Court the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
"A. They came back. minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty must be
determined in accordance with rules and provisions of the Revised Penal Code. With
"Q. What did you do after they came back? respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it is left entirely within the discretion of the
court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to
"A. I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking the periods into which it may be subdivided." 23 Consistent with this ruling, this Court
(for)? imposes reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, as the minimum penalty,
to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
"Q. What was their answer?
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
"A. They answered in the negative. appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.

"Q. Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do? Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

"A. I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?) SO ORDERED.

"Q. What was the answer of the policemen?

"A. The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly
(sic) they were marijuana pushers." 20

Bernal’s position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest
was made by pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly 41. G.R. No. L-21724 April 27, 1967
preposterous.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GERTRUDES LUCAS VDA. DE
ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter’s allegations were true, then Sagarino should have RAYMUNDO, Respondents.
been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest
was, however, made. Government Corporate Counsel Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for petitioner.
J. R. Romero for respondents.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and
Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarino’s forthright answers
to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation SYLLABUS
of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. 21 Evidence; Self-serving evidence; Workmen’s compensation; Claimant may testify in
This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of workmen’s compensation case.—The right of a claimant to be present at the hearing of
fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any his claim for workmen’s compensation includes the right to testify in his own behalf.
strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the
While a party’s interest may to some extent affect his credibility, his interest alone is not
question of credibility of witnesses. 22
a ground for disregarding his testimony. Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to party out of court at one time; it does not include a party’s testimony as a witness in
resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of

185
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its averred that her husband was employed at the National Development Co., petitioner in
admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication of evidence. On the other hand, this case, for more than 12 years, his last designation being machine tender in the
a party’s testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party -the opportunity for Finishing Department; that as machine tender, Luis Raymundo's work consisted of
lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed and wet cloth and mixing
cross-examination.
chemicals for use in dyeing and printing textiles and that because of strenuous work
done mostly at night and because of exposure to sudden changes in temperature, her
Same; Hearsay evidence in workmen’s compensation cases.—The Workmen’s
husband began to lose weight, complained of headaches and chest pains and later spat
Compensation Law allows the admission of certain kinds of hearsay evidence (Sec. 49). blood. On account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from the service of petitioner
on May 6, 1953; eight months after (on January 23, 1954), he died of pulmonary
Same; Presumption as to aggravation of illness.—There is a presumption that the tuberculosis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
claimant’s illness was aggravated by the nature of his employment and that the doctor’s
affidavit, that he treated the claimant for tuberculosis, is correct. This presumption is In due time, petitioner filed its answer denying liability. It alleged that Luis Raymundo
intended to reverse the burden of proof and make it the duty of the employer to never contracted tuberculosis while in its employ and that at any rate "tuberculosis is not
establish, by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated by the an occupational disease incident and/or peculiar to the work of the claimant (sic)." It
nature of the job, further averred that the claim was barred by prescription, the complaint having been
filed beyond the three-month period provided in section 24 of the Workmen's
Same; Section 8 of law construed.—Section 8 of the law provides for -compensation for Compensation Act, Act No. 3428.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
illness contracted or injury received by the employees as provided in Section two
thereof. The phrase “illness aggravated the nature of such employment 33 a ground for Hearings were held after which a decision was rendered ordering petitioner to pay to
compensation, was inserted in Section 2 by Republic Act No. 772. While a respondent the sums of P4,000 as death compensation and P200 as reimbursement for
corresponding change should have been made in Section 8, it is, nevertheless, clear that burial expenses. In addition, a fee of P41 was assessed against
the omission was a mere oversight. Section 8 governs only the amount of compensation petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
while section 2 provides the grounds for compensation. Section 8 therefore must be
On review, this decision was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.1
deemed to cover also cases in which the illness was not contracted but merely
Subsequent attempt to have the award reconsidered proved unsuccessful as the
aggravated by the nature of employee’s job. Commission en banc found nothing to warrant a modification, much less a reversal, of
its decision.2 Petitioner appealed to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
Same; When delay in filing claim is excused.—The employer cannot contest a claim for virtual law library
workmen’s compensation on the ground, that it was filed beyond the three-month
period, (1) where the employer failed to controvert the claim;(2) it paid gratuity to the The issues in this case are: (1) whether the evidence presented by respondent is
employee under a policy of retiring employees suffering from tuberculosis, and (3) it has admissible to support an award in her favor; (2) whether death benefits could be
shown no damage as a result of the delay in the filing of the claim. National recovered where as here the illness which caused the death of an employee was not
Development Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861, No. L- contracted while on the employment of petitioner but was merely aggravated by the
nature of such employment, and (3) whether respondent's claim could still be prescribed
21724 April 27, 1967
despite the lapse of more than three months from the date of the death of
Raymundo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

REGALA, J.
In affirming the award made in favor of respondent, the Commission said:
On April 27, 1960, respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda. de Raymundo filed a claim for That the deceased contracted pulmonary tuberculosis while in the employ of the
workmen's compensation for the death of her husband, Luis Raymundo, on January 23, respondent (now petitioner) can fairly be inferred from the evidence. Furthermore, the
1954. In a complaint before Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, she work that he performed, which involved heavy lifting cannot be considered light by any

186
standard. As a matter of fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that such kind of
work may be considered as strenuous and taxing for a man of his advanced age and In addition, section 44 establishes certain presumptions:
weak physical condition. Inasmuch as he died of pulmonary tuberculosis, barely eight
months after he was retired from the service, the inescapable conclusion is that the In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it
nature of his work must have had an adverse effect on his illness which shortly led to his shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary -
death.
1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act;
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission relied partly on the testimony of
respondent and on the following: 2. That sufficient notice thereof was given;

Exhibit "E" - Death certificate which states that Luis Raymundo died on January 23, 3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to
1954 of pulmonary tuberculosis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law bring about the injury or death of himself or another;
library
4. That the injury did not result solely from intoxication of the injured employee while
Exhibit "F" - Affidavit of Dr. Crisanto S. Vito Cruz in which he states that he treated on duty; and
Luis Raymundo for pulmonary tuberculosis from December, 1952 to January 22, 1954.
5. That the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by
Exhibit "G" - Petitioner's letter, dated May 6, 1953, advising Luis Raymundo of the claimants for compensation are correct. (As added by sec. 24, Republic Act No. 772).
termination of his employment.
It would be easy to dismiss petitioner's contention by citing these provisions of the Act,
Petitioner contends, however, that both respondent's testimony as well as Exhibits "E", for after all there are precedents for doing so,3 but we believe that it is here necessary to
"F" and "G" should have been excluded, because the first is self-serving while the set forth the reasons and the policy considerations which underlie these statutory
second are hearsays. Petitioner adds that while the death certificate (Exh. "E") is enactments in order to explain their meaning.
admissible to prove the fact and date of death, it is not competent to prove the cause The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided in section 49 would be
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library meaningless if it did not include the right to testify in his own behalf. Indeed, the Rules
of Court enjoins that "neither parties nor other, persons interested in the outcome of a
Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides in part: case shall be excluded."4 For while a party's interest may to some extent affect his
credibility,5 his interest alone is not a ground for disregarding his testimony.6 The
x x x all parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person or argument that the testimony of an interested party is self-serving and therefore is
by counsel or by any other agent or representative, to present such testimony as may be inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of self-serving evidence and the
pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to cross-examine the ground for its exclusion. Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court
witnesses against them. The Commissioner may receive as evidence and use as proof of at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded
any fact in dispute the following matters, in addition to the sworn testimony at open on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-
hearing:chanrobles virtual law library examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would
open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony.7 On the other hand, a party's
1. Reports of attending examining physician.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-
virtual law library examination.

2. Reports of investigators appointed by the Nor is there merit in the claim that Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" were erroneously admitted
Commissioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library in evidence. While they may be hearsay by common law rules of evidence, they are
nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Act. Section 49 is patterned after similar
3. Reports of the employer, including copies of time sheets, book of accounts or other legislation in the United States, especially New York, where the widespread adoption of
records.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Workmen's Compensation statutes was accompanied by a demand for a more simple and
summary method of procedure and proof than those given by the common law. As noted
4. Hospital records in relation to the case. in a leading article.8

187
 compensation. Section 8 therefore must be deemed to cover also cases in which the
Legislatures needed the deep sense of injustice felt by workers that the burden of proof illness was not contracted but merely aggravated by the nature of employee's job.
rested always on them and that probative evidence was often kept out because it was
hearsay. A growing distrust of our court system had thus grown up among working men Finally, it is argued that respondent's claim is barred because more than three months
and it was essential to the successful operation of the acts that workmen feel they were had elapsed from the date (January 23, 1954) Raymundo died to the date (April 27,
treated fairly while at the same time duly protecting the interests of industry and the 1960) the claim was filed.
community's interest in economy.
There are several reasons why petitioner cannot set up this defense. First, petitioner
Indeed, enactments of the type of section 49 were precisely aimed at the hearsay rule, failed to controvert the claim,14 which means that it cannot now be heard to say that the
for the rejection of hearsay evidence, often of strong probative value, was one of the claim was not filed on time.15 Second, it paid gratuity to Raymundo under a policy of
grievances of working people against the procedure of the old employer's liability law.9 retiring employees suffering from tuberculosis. Under this circumstance the delay in the
Not that hearsay evidence is adequate to support an award for compensation,10 but that filing of the claim is excused.16 Third, petitioner has shown no damage as a result of the
as aptly observed: delay in the filing of this case, another circumstance which, under section 27, excuses
delay in filing claims.
[A] compensation board which wants to avoid reversal on admissibility-of-evidence
grounds can beat do so by admitting everything and excluding nothing. It can be Wherefore, the decision of May 29, 1963 and the resolution of August 5, 1963 of the
presumed to apply the appropriate discount to various kinds of hearsay, but it cannot be Workmen's Compensation Commission are hereby affirmed without costs.
presumed to have reached a right result if some important piece of evidence which have
swayed the result has been erroneously excluded on technical grounds.

Here, aside from the evidence objected to, there is some other substantial evidence
supporting the award. Aside from respondent's testimony, there is in the record the
testimony of Bienvenido Dizon, a former co-employee of Luis Raymundo. There is RULE 130, SECTION 42 – PART OF RES GESTAE
likewise evidence of the payment of gratuity to Raymundo on account of his illness.
G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991
In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo's illness was
aggravated by the nature of his employment and that Dr. Vito Cruz' affidavit that he PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct. This presumption is intended to reverse vs.
the burden of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to establish by EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated by the nature of the job.
12 Petitioner has failed to overcome the evidence and presumptions in favor of
SYLLABUS
respondent. It has chosen merely to rest its case on the statement of its medical officer
that the deceased employee never met an accident while in its employment.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Double Jeopardy; The killing of a person with the use of an
Still it is claimed that the award of death benefits in this case is erroneous because unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecution for violation of Section 1 of
section 8 of the Act allows such benefits only "If the disease contracted or injury P.D. No. 1866 and violation of either Article 248 (murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of
received by the employees as provided in section two hereof causes his death within two the Revised Penal Code; Rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked.––In fine then,
years from the date of such injury or sickness" and the point is made that here the illness the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
was not contracted but was merely aggravated by the nature of Raymundo's work. The prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either
phrase "illness ... aggravated by ... the nature of such employment" as ground for Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
compensation was inserted in section 2 of the Act by Republic Act No. 772 on June 20, cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double
1952. While a corresponding change should have been made in section 8, it is jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the
nevertheless clear that the omission was a mere oversight. After all, section 8 governs second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
only the amount of compensation while section 2 provides the grounds for

188
Same; Same; Same; It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may disclose that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant
be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.––“It is a cardinal rule that was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information.
the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and Same; Same; Same; Same; The lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or the offense which the prosecution must allege and prove.––Undoubtedly, there is
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one does not have the license to
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where possess the firearm. Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his
two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to residence without legal authority therefor. It follows then that the lack or absence of a
one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must allege and
from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
element of the other.”
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstance; Treachery; When is treachery present.––There
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites in order that circumstantial evidence is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
may be the basis for conviction.––For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
an accused, it is necessary that the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
be more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are party might make, which means that no opportunity was given to the latter to do so. It
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. conclusively as the killing itself.

Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Court does not agree with the observation that the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Treachery cannot be considered where the lone
statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the witness did not see the commencement of the assault.––For, as held in U.S. vs. Perdon
shooting that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae.––We where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or
do not, however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect to the how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no
sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the way be established from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the very
victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.
covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the
commencement of the assault. People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, G.R. No. 89823 June
Same; Same; Same; Same; A testimony of a witness as to what he heard other persons 19, 1991
say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence;
Statements as part of the res gestae is one of the exceptions.––Accordingly, a testimony
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
of a witness as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be
admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One
of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February
Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National
hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements Capital Judicial Region, accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential
may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling Decree 1866, as amended, committed as follows:
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and
and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of the res gestae. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
lawful motive or purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearm; Prosecution failed to present any evidence in his possession, custody and control one .38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham
to prove that the accused-appellant was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without authority of law, which firearm
the information.––Our pains-taking review of the records and the evidence fails to was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y
Mesia, which caused death.1

189
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989.2 Pre-trial was neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and
conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. so she caused the arrest of the accused; she spent about P100,000.00 in connection with
burial and wake of her husband.
In a decision promulgated on 30 June 1989,3 the court a quo found accused-appellant
guilty and sentenced him as follows: Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Kalookan Police Force on the witness stand testified that
on February 24, 1989 in line with his duty as policemen, a shooting incident was
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused EUTROPIO reported to him; he responded to the said report by proceeding to the crime scene,
TIOZON y ACID guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder thereat, he saw the lifeless body of the victim as well as the accused whose clothing was
qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to full of bloodstains; the cadaver of the victim was referred to the Philippine Constabulary
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to Crime Laboratory (PCCL) while the person of the accused was turned over to the
reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the Homicide Section of the Kalookan City Police Station; the day after, at around 10:00
wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs. o'clock in the evening and upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam he together with some
Kalookan policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm (Exh. "F")
According to the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence whom the accused threw at the grassy area particularly at the back of the latter's house;
aside from the firearm they also recovered two (2) spent bullets (Exh. G-6 and G-7) and
imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended", should have been
three live ammunitions (Exh. G-12, G-13 and G-14).
imposed.

On 5 July 1989 Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision 4 which, NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay testified that he has been a ballistician of the NBI since
however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. 5 On 17 August 1984; that pertinent to this case, he happened to examine a caliber .38 Squires Bingham
with serial number 180169 (Exh. "F"); that as per his findings the evidence shells (Exhs.
accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.6 Hence, the case is now before Us.
G-6 and G-7) were fired from the gun, subject matter of this case.
The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows:
Forensic chemist from the NBI Edwin Purificando testified that the paraffin test he
conducted on the dorsal aspect of the left and light hands, that is, from the wristbones to
That at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 24, 1989, while she and her the fingertips, of the deceased, gave negative result on the presence of nitrates (Exh.
husband were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the loud knocks on "I"). Likewise, the paraffin test he conducted on the dorsal aspects of the left hand and
their door; Her husband opened the door and they saw that the person who was right hand of the accused yielded negative results on the presence of nitrates (Exh. "J").
knocking was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused,
who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house,
accused sat down and the two (accused and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even On the other hand, the version of the defense as testified to by the accused is as follows:
saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got
irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the That at about 11:30 in the evening of February 24, 1989 accused on his way home, after
two, however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the accused coming from his work, passed by the house of his Pareng Nardo, the victim herein;
was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she had while passing infront of the said house, his Pareng Nardo called him up; when he was
heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same about to enter the door of the house of the victim, the latter, from the back of the door,
time informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko poked a gun at him; he grabbed the gun from his Pareng Nardo and at that instance,
si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya" she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room, saw him holding the gun; he returned the gun
full of bloodstains so she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister- to his Pareng Nardo and the latter tucked it in his waistline; he was served with a beer
in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, and after he and the victim consumed about two bottles of beer, they went out to buy
they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when she some more; after they were able to buy some more bottles of beer, victim carried the
still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that her husband be brought to the same and left ahead of the accused; accused was left behind to answer the call of nature;
hospital; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the victim towards the while in the act of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots; he followed the victim
main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim; and he saw the latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from his Pareng Nardo
accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even as to what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the
without the latter's help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some of her victim's replied (sic) was "Pare, binaril ako", he further inquired as to who shot him but

190
the victim who was gasping for breath could no longer talk; thereafter, he saw a gun the identity of the assailant of the victim, why then he threw it at the grassy area when
near the body of his Pareng Nardo; moved by his desire to bring the said gun to the wife he could easily leave the same to the place where he picked it up.
of the victim, he picked the same, but after he got hold of the gun, he suddenly realized
that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw the very same gun to the grassy 5) The testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive gunshots, accused went
area; he then ran towards the house of the victim and he informed the wife of the latter back to her house and informed there (sic) that he accidentally shot her husband
that his Pareng Nardo was shot to death; he returned to the place where he left the body deserves merit, Besides, the Court sees no reason for the wife to concoct such story that
of the victim but the body of the latter was no longer there; he later found out that would point to the accused as the culprit specially so that had not the accused became
townspeople carried the body of the victim towards the main road; when the policemen (sic) the prime suspect in this case, he would be the best person to be used as a
arrived he was ordered to go with them at the Kalookan Police Headquarters; when he prosecution witness, with more reason that from the evidence presented, it appears that
was asked by the policemen as to who shoot (sic) the victim, his answer was, he did not the widow of the victim harbours no ill-feeling towards the accused otherwise, she
see the actual shooting incident; never did he declare nor utter before her Mareng Lina would have prevented accused accused's entry in her house on that fatal evening.
or before any police authorities that he accidentally shoot (sic) the victim. However, he
admitted that it was him who accompanied the policemen in retrieving the fatal gun at 6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took
the grassy area at the back of his house.
place admitted to her having accidentally shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence
against the accused declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on exception to the hearsay rule.
circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who
could give an account as to the actual shooting incident. It considered the following Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is
circumstances which it deemed sufficient to convict the accused-appellant pursuant to
taking place or immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto with respect to the
Rule 133, Section 5, of the Revised Rules of Court:
circumstance thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
The following are among the circumstances which points to the culpability of the
accused. 7) The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but (sic) the
accused (sic) who owns the same and in fact the latter even tucked it in his waistline
1) That the widow of the victim saw the accused holding a gun immediately before immediately before the shooting incident happened is improbable, for, how come then
shooting incident happened; that the assailant was able to drew (sic) the gun from the waistline of the victim and
fired (sic) the same towards the back portion of the victim's body. Is it not that the
2) That accused was the last person seen in the company of the victim immediately natural reaction of a person was to face the person who suddenly and without permission
before the latter was shot to death; drew something from one's waistline. (sic)

3) That it was the accused who purposely went to the house of the victim on that fatal While there is no eyewitness who testified to having seen accused shoot (sic) the victim,
evening; The testimony of the accused that he was merely passing in front of the house yet all the foregoing circumstances meet the criteria set by Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the
of the victim when the latter who was standing at the window of his house called him up Revised Rules of Court, as amended, and therefore points (sic) to the accused as the
is less credible than the testimony of the widow of the victim, that they were already person who unlawfully owns the fatal gun as well as the same person who shoot (sic) to
aslept (sic) inside their house when or the aforesaid time accused knocked at their door. death the victim. "Circumstantial (sic) evidence is admissible in the absence of an
eyewitness to the commission of the crime" (People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 125
4) That it was the accused who guided the policemen as to the place where the fatal gun [1983]).
was recovered. Here the Court believes that the gun was purposely hid at the grassy area
at the back portion of accused's house. The story of the accused that he picked the gun The Court does not give credence to the denial of the accused that he was not the one
for the purpose of bringing it to the widow of the victim but for fear that the policemen who shoot (sic) the victim as he was some distance away from the victim answering the
might see him holding the gun, he then decided to throw it to the place where it was call of nature when the victim was killed. Instead, the Court gives credence to the
recovered, was too flimsy to merit belief. Firstly, what is his reason for bringing it to the testimony of the widow that it was the accused whom he saw in possession of the gun,
widow of the victim when he surely knew fully well that it will be the policemen who that it was the accused who was the last person seen in the company of the victim
will investigate the case. Secondly, he knew for a fact, that the said gun could lead as to

191
shortly before the latter died and it was the same accused who lead (sic) the policemen (a) Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, he was not the one holding the gun
in retrieving the fatal gun. immediately before the shooting incident, for as admitted by the victim's wife, her
husband also "toyed or played with the gun;9
Admittedly, as per findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist, the accused's right and left
hand yielded negative result to the test of nitrates. However, the same witness testified (b) The testimony of the victim's wife that he was the last person seen in the company of
that even when a person fired gun, it does not necessarily follows (sic) that his hand the victim is unrealiable because she was left in the house when the victim and accused-
would be positive to the test of nitrates, as there are still several factors which affects the appellant went out to the store which is about 145 to 150 meters away;
presence or absence of nitrates in the hands of a person.
(c) That the accused-appellant pointed the place where the gun allegedly used in the
xxx xxx xxx killing was recovered, should not create the unfavorable inference that he purposely hid
the gun and should not be taken against him, for knowing the reputation of police
Although the fact of death of the victim (Exh. "E") is undisputed, still the presence of authorities, what he did was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation rather than guilt;
the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation being alleged in the
Information, must be proven like the crime itself. (d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive gunshots
accused-appellant went back to her house and informed her that he accidentally shot her
To properly appreciate evident premeditation it is necessary to establish with proof, as husband, should not have been considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae; and
clear as the evidence of the crime itself (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his (e) The "raciocination" of the trial court regarding the improbability of the testimony of
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time to reflect upon the consequence of his accused-appellant that he does not own the gun but that it was the deceased who owned
act (People vs. Lorenzo, 132 SCRA 17 (1984); People vs. Obengue, 147 SCRA 1987). it which the latter tucked in his waistline before the shooting incident is baseless as the
Although alleged in the Information, the record of this case is bereft of any indication records show that the deceased was walking ahead of the accused-appellant who was
that evident premeditation attended the killing of the victim. left behind to answer a call of nature; therefore, it is not highly improbable that some
other person whom the deceased might have met in the street could have taken the gun
However, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is appreciated in this case since its from the waistline and shot him with it. It would not also be highly improbable that a
presence could be established by the position/location of the wound of the victim, that is person from whose waistline a gun was grabbed could not face his assailant especially
at the back portion of his torso which necessarily imply that he was treacherously shot when he is carrying something with his both hands, like the deceased who was carrying
by his assailant.7 one case of Gold Eagle beer when he was shot at. Moreover, accused-appellant was
found negative for nitrates when a paraffin test was conducted on him by a forensic
Accused-appellant assigns only one error in this appeal: chemist of the NBI.10

The People, in its Brief filed by the Solicitor General on 18 April 1990, disagrees with
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
the accused-appellant, maintains that the prosecution was able to establish his guilt
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION WITH MURDER AS
DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. 1866. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL beyond reasonable doubt, and prays that subject decision be affirmed in toto. It stresses
EVIDENCES RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF that accused-appellant himself admitted and confirmed that he and the victim went out
together to buy some more bottles of beer; he was with the victim after they bought the
CONVICTION ARE INSUFFICIENT
beer, and they separated only when he had the urge to urinate seconds before the
TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.8 incident. The widow did not testify that she saw what happened in the street; what she
testified was that the accused and the victim went out together and five minutes later she
heard two shots. There was, therefore, nothing improbable about her testimony.
and prays that the decision appealed from be reversed and another be entered acquitting
him.
Appellee likewise contends that the conclusion of the trial court on the hiding of the gun
was based on the evidence on record; the accused himself testified that he threw the gun
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits that: on a grassy area. It further argues that the conclusion of the court on the improbability of
appellant's testimony concerning the ownership of the gun is not baseless; on the

192
contrary, it is the theory of the appellant that it is probable that another person may have prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
grabbed the gun from the victim that is highly improbable. Since appellant was behind both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
the victim he could have seen a third person grabbing the gun. He did not testify that he which is not an essential element of the other.13
saw one. The negative result of the paraffin test cannot be singled out to absolve the
accused-appellant from liability.11 In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun
which caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one,
No Reply-Brief was filed. informations for physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public
disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he
We are now called upon to determine whether, on the basis of the evidence adduced, the sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
judgment appealed from should be affirmed or the accused-appellant be acquitted.
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may
We shall first focus our attention on the law under which accused-appellant is indicted. be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum not bar prosecution under the other.
period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, Since the informations were for separate offense –– the first against a person and the
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other
ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with under the rule on double jeopardy.
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under Section 1 of P.D. No.
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said 1866 because of the resulting crime of homicide or murder, the prosecution must allege
Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, in the information and prove by the quantum of evidence required for conviction
follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous violation of said section and, more specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the
absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised commission of homicide or murder. In this regard, the information in this case is
Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The sufficient in form and substance. It alleges illegal possession of a firearm and of murder,
rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to The latter is covered by the clause "which firearm was used with treachery and evident
effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused his death.
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed
and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an We agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than one
unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 circumstantial evidence were duly proved and that these circumstances point, beyond
of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed the deceased
(Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict an
other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because accused, it is necessary that the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must be
the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
by the Revised Penal Code. proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment
In People vs. Domiguez,12 We held: of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, 15 i.e.,
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more)
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a hypothesis except that of guilty.16
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes,

193
The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established A And that was when they left it was 11:30 and when he came back 11:35 he was
and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that already knocking (referring to the person of the accused) telling me while he was
the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, knocking: "Mare, mare nabaril ko si pare, hindi ko sinasadya."
agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth
circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim Q By the way Mrs. Witness, who is that "pare" you are telling us?
immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by
the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements
A Troping, sir (as the witness pointed to).
as part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a
witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as Q The same Troping here, is your "kumpare"?
to what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because
it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is A Yes, sir.
statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to (TSN, April 18,1989, p. 13).
be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as
part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking The seventh circumstance mentioned by the court below is haphazardly formulated.
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances Something is wrong with the opening clause reading:
thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a
legal significance may also be received as part of the res gestae.
The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but the
accused who owns the same and in fact the latter even tucked it.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not
hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party,
The words but the accused should have been the deceased.
who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral
confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which
he did in this case. Two more basic issues are left for determination, to wit: whether the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is liable for illegal possession of
firearms and whether the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement allegedly
treachery and evident premeditation as alleged in the information.
made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to
himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court
was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae. Our painstaking review of the records and the evidence fails to disclose that the
prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant was not
authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And, contrary to the finding
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged
of the trial court, there was no sufficient evidence to prove the presence of treachery.
statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its
admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given. The
transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima, It must be stated, however, that had illegal possession of firearms been duly proven as
wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an objection, thus: alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was simple homicide or murder
since Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 expressly provides that:
Atty. Villano:
xxx xxx xxx
You said when you turned your back after taking a few steps and when you turned your
back, they were no longer there, will you please tell what happened after that? If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.

194
which penalty, however, had been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view xxx xxx xxx
of the abolition of the death penalty.18
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
The issue concerning the failure of the prosecution to prove that he had no authority to licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
possess the firearm has not been raised in this appeal. Interestingly, accused-appellant
raised it in his motion to reconsider the decision of the trial court. 19 In its resolution Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one does not
denying the motion, the trial court admitted, in effect, that the prosecution did not offer have the license to possess the firearm. Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the
any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. It follows then that the
firearm in question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the
he has that authority. Thus, it ruled: prosecution must allege and prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved.21
Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in
the enacting clause by which the offense is described and forbidden, he has the burden In People vs. Pajenado, L-27680-81, 27 February 1970,22 We said:
of proving that he is within the exception.
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could
Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact relied upon be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal
by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lie possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm,
peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof of such but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of
averment or fact is on him (16 C.J. sec. 998, p. 530). An illustrative case of this rule may the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the
be found in prosecution for exercising a trade or profession, or doing other acts, without offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
a license. In such cases, it would greatly inconvenience the prosecution to prove that the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the
defendant had no license, whereas the defendant could easily prove that he did have one. burden of proof was with the prosecution in to case to prove that the firearm used by
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative
averments in the information to the effect that the accused possesses the firearms It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in
to prove that he possesses the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged
as a justification or excuse being one that is related to him personally or otherwise that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein.
within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
averment or fact is on the accused" (Francisco, Handbook on Evidence, pp. 379-380, fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria,
1984 Ed., citing cases).20 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a
voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 reads: held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element
of the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of
proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us,
death shall be imposed.

195
both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons
upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
Justice Moran upholds this view as follows: specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make, which means that no opportunity was given to the latter
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the to do so.26 It cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or
fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving as conclusively as the killing itself.27 For, as held in U.S. vs. Perdon 28 where no
it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act
knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be
the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the established from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the very moment
sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. 29 Accordingly,
it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the commencement of
or non-existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it the assault.30
is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the
allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly In People vs. Manalo, supra, We ruled:
within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part
of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him. (6 Moran, Comments on the The fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself,
Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8). compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must be based on some positive proof and
not merely an inference drawn more or less logically from hypothetical facts. This Court
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in has ruled that the suddenness of an attack is not, of itself, enough to constitute treachery
question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court when the method of the killing does not positively show that the assailant thereby
then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof. However, as knowingly intended to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself
above-stated, the accused-appellant did not touch this issue in his Brief. Be that as it from any defense which the victim might put up. In other words, to sustain a finding of
may, the rule is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for treachery, the means, method or form of attack must be shown to have been deliberately
review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and the damages adopted by the appellant. (citing People vs. Carsano, 95 SCRA 146; People vs. Cabiling,
involved.23 74 SCRA 185; People vs. Satone, 74 SCRA 106; People vs. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547).

In People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708, We ruled: In People vs. Ablao, 183 SCRA 65, 669, We said:

. . . In a criminal case, an appeal to the Supreme Court throws the whole case open for There being no direct evidence on how the shooting was committed, treachery cannot be
review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in appreciated.
the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subjects of assignments of error
or not. (People vs. Ofindo, 47 Phil. 1). In the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was
presented.1âwphi1 Absent the quantum of evidence required to prove it, treachery
Accordingly, it is proper for this Court to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
absence of proof of illegal possession of a firearm. But, may accused-appellant be
convicted for murder under the information for which he was tried? The answer is in the Accordingly, accused-appellant could only be liable for HOMICIDE, which is punished
affirmative since, as We stated earlier, the information sufficiently alleges the by RECLUSION TEMPORAL. It shall be imposed in its medium period, whose duration
commission of murder; hence, a conviction for murder, if warranted by the facts, can be is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, since neither
had under the information.24 If murder is not proved by reason of the absence of any aggravating nor mitigating circumstances had been proved.31
qualifying circumstance, conviction for the lesser crime of homicide is also proper.25
The Indeterminate Sentence Law benefits the accused-appellant. Applying it in this
We are also unable to agree with the trial court that the qualifying circumstance of case, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day
treachery was duly established. of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

196
The civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to 1. EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; WHEN TESTIMONY NOT
P50,000.00 conformably with our ruling in People vs. Sison, G.R. No. 86455, 14 DEEMED SELF-SERVING. — The widow of the deceased displayed courage in
September 1990 and in People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1990. admitting having had illicit relations with the accused and thereby dishonoring and
humiliating herself, to bring out the truth that the accused confessed to her his plan to
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the kill her husband, and, after the latter’s death, the fact that he killed him. Her testimony
trial court, and as Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y is, therefore, credible, and cannot be said to be self-serving, because she gained no
ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as defined and beneficial interest by it.
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Leonardo
Bolima, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby SENTENCED to 2. ID.; RULE OF RES GESTAE. — There are other declarations which are admitted as
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND original evidence, being distinguished from hearsay by their connection with the
ONE DAY of prision mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist of a complication of
AND ONE DAY of reclusion temporal as Maximum, with the accessory penalties circumstances so intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each other. Each
therefor, to INDEMNIFY the heirs of Leonardo Bolima in the sum of FIFTY owes its birth to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of parent of others, and each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its
insolvency, and to REIMBURSE said heirs in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS kindred facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known for a right
(P50,000.00) as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial of Leonardo Bolima. understanding of its nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting part of the
res gestae, may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their
admissibility is determined by the judge according to the degree of their relation to the
Accused-appellant shall be given full credit for the period of his preventive
fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion; it being extremely difficult, if not
imprisonment.
impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more particular description.
(Comments on the Rules of Court, Moran, 1957 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 348-349)
Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:
44.

SECOND DIVISION The accused was charged with and convicted of murder under the following information
filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
[G.R. No. L-13288. June 30, 1960.]
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1956, at night, in barrio Caraol-Malimpin,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, v. JOSE municipality of Dasol, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
NARANJA, defendant and Appellant. of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with a blunt instrument, did, then and there,
José Vid. F. Espinosa for Appellant. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, and beat to death one MAMERTO
SIGNEY, alias Berto, with the use of the said blunt instrument."cralaw virtua1aw library
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva
for Appellee. The accused has appealed, contending that the alleged crime has not been established,
particularly because there is no evidence (1) as to the kind of blunt instrument that killed
the deceased; (2) as to the position of the assailant when he allegedly killed the
SYLLABUS deceased; (3) as to the possession of a blunt instrument by the accused on the night of
the crime, and (4) as to the cause of the death of the victim. The accused considers the

197
testimony of Maria Diaz, wife of the deceased mainly relied upon by the trial court, as investigation. The affairs of men consist of a complication of circumstances so
weak, uncorroborated, self-serving, unnatural and not direct. intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth to
some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific parent of others, and
According to Maria Diaz, it appears that in the afternoon of December 28, 1956, while each, during the existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred facts, materially
she was pounding rice in her yard, the accused arrived and was thereupon told by her to affecting its character, and essential to be known for a right understanding of its nature.
stop coming to her house because her husband (the deceased) knew that she and the These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of the res gestae, may always be
accused had been carrying on illicit relations; that the accused had asked her to leave her shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their admissibility is determined by
husband and, as she refused, he indicated that he would seek means to separate her from the judge according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his
her husband; that before leaving in that afternoon of December 28, 1956, the accused sound discretion: it being extremely difficult, if not impossible to bring this class of
told her to wait for him in the evening; that, when she inquired about his purpose, the cases within the limits of a more particular description."cralaw virtua1aw library
accused answered that he would kill his compadre (the deceased) who was then
harvesting palay in the farm; that in the evening of December 28, 1956, as the dogs were Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased; and
barking, her husband went out of the house and proceeded to the place where there were the implementation of his evil design is borne out by the actual and physical facts of the
stocks of palay; that, becoming impatient for her husband’s return, she went to the case. The testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect that, when Maria Diaz came to
kitchen where she saw the accused at the stairs; that the accused confessed to her that he his house for help, she told him that her husband was dead and could be found at a
had killed her husband whose dead body she ought to take and bury; that cautioning her certain place, amply proves the fact of the crime as confessed by the accused. The
not to tip anyone, the accused informed that her husband lay dead at the creek east of the presence of the bluish black spot at the nape of the deceased, Mamerto Signey, and the
house; that she awakened her mother and children and told them about the occurrence; opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the medulla oblongata could have
that, upon advice of her mother, she requested her neighbors, Santiago Balderas and one caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of the accused to Maria Diaz.
surname Baraan, to help her bring her husband’s body to the house.
The defense of alibi is miserably weak. The testimony of defense witness Bisquera is
Maria Diaz displayed courage in admitting having had illicit relations with the accused incredible. While she could recall the events of December 28, 1956, the date of the
and thereby dishonoring and humiliating herself, obviously to bring out the truth and let crime, she could remember nothing about other days, not even Christmas. Moreover it is
justice prevail. Her testimony is not self-serving because she has not gained any not impossible, much less improbable, that even if the accused was with his common-
beneficial interest. There is no point in the allegation that she was jealous as the accused law wife and others harvesting at the ricefield of Regino Naranja, he still could have
had taken for himself another woman. The accused already had a common-law wife gone in the afternoon to the house of Maria Diaz and killed the latter’s husband in the
before the crime was committed; and if Maria Diaz was in fact jealous, she would have evening, considering that Maria’s place was only about one kilometer away.
wanted to eliminate the other woman, not the accused.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the accused. So
As regards the contention that the elements of the crime have not been shown, suffice it ordered.
to say that the confession of the accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence falling under
the res gestae rule.

"SEC. 33, Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling 45. [G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000.]
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. So, also, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES, Accused-
significance may be received as a part of the res gestae." (Rule 123, Rules of Court.) Appellants.

Quoting Professor Greenleaf, Chief Justice Moran, in his Comments on the Rules of SYLLABUS
Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. III, pp. 348-349, explains the res gestae rule as Remedial Law; Hearsay Evidence; As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph inadmissible as evidence; Exception.—As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is
inadmissible as evidence. There are several exceptions however to the rule of
"There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one of which is the admissibility of dying
distinguished from hearsay by their connection with the principal fact under

198
declarations given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, the reason being that in a criminal prosecution,
Rules of Court. the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. People vs. Palmones, 336 SCRA 80, G.R. No. 136303 July 18, 2000
Same; Same; Requisites for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement.—The DECISION
requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern
the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time it
was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal
case for murder, murder or parricide in which the decedent was the victim.
This is an appeal by accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony
Same; Same; The circumstances surrounding the declaration must justify the conclusion Baltazar Palmones from the decision 1 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of
that the declarant was conscious of his impending death.—While it is true that the law Kidapawan, Cotabato, 12th Judicial Region, convicting them of the crime of murder.
does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given up the 2chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
hope of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion
that he was conscious of his impending death. In the instant case it was not proven that The information 3 dated June 4, 1997 charging accused-appellants of the crime of
the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition. murder reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Same; Same; What may be considered as part of res gestae.—Neither may the alleged "That in the evening of April 27, 1997 at Barangay Magsaysay, Municipality of
statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to
refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or kill, armed with a gun, did then and there, wilfully, conspiring, confederating and
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission mutually helping one another, unlawfully, feloniously and with treachery, attack,
of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a assault, and shot the person of SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL, thereby hitting and inflicting
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which is the cause of the
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. death thereafter.

Same; Same; Factors generally considered in determining whether statements offered in CONTRARY TO LAW." Both accused were arraigned on July 15, 1997 and both
evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously.—In order to admit pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced.
statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements The prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer who was the
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time nephew of the victim. He testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of April 27, 1997,
that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the his mother and elder brother informed him that something had happened to his uncle
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant SPO2 Asim Mamansal. They then rushed to the Kidapawan Doctor’s Hospital and
when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between proceeded to the emergency room. Upon seeing his uncle, the witness went near him
the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances and asked him what had happened to him. His uncle answered that he had been waylaid.
of the statement itself. The witness then asked the victim who the perpetrators were and the victim answered
that it was "Juany and Tony Palmones" which were the nicknames of the two Accused-
Criminal Law; Evidence; Alibi; The weakness of the alibi of the two accused-appellants Appellants. 4 He claimed that while he was talking with his uncle, there were attendants,
cannot be held against them in view of the absence of a clear and positive identification nurses, and other bystanders whom he did not know present inside the emergency room.
of them as the perpetrators of the crime.—The trial court based its judgment of A few minutes after he talked with the victim, a certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and
conviction on the alleged ante mortem statements of the victim and the apparent examined the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw Police Inspector
weakness of the defense put up by the two accused-appellants. As it now stands Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot him. The witness
however, the weakness of the alibi of the two accused-appellants cannot be held against then heard his uncle positively answer the policeman that his assailants were Juany and
them in view of the absence of a clear and positive identification of them as the Tony Palmones. 5
perpetrators of the crime. And while their alibi may not have been proven so
satisfactorily as to leave no room for doubt, such an infirmity can not strengthen the On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to talk with his uncle for about one

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hour and that the most important part of their conversation was the identification of his Aguayo and two other medical ladies were inside the room.
uncle’s assailants. 6 He stated that it did not occur to his mind to immediately report to
the police what his uncle had told him as his mind was troubled at that time. It was only On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to speak with Alice Villamor about
after the burial of his uncle on April 28, 1997 that he told Insp. Tagum that it was Tony the incident but that she told him that she was not able to identify the assailant even
and Juany Palmores who had shot his uncle. 7 though she was right beside the victim because of darkness. 18 He admitted that when
he went to the hospital, he was already entertaining the idea that the suspects were Juany
The prosecution next presented Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo who testified that he was the and Tony Palmones because of the radio call he received earlier. He likewise admitted
surgeon-on-duty on the day that SPO2 Mamansal was shot. He stated that before he that the only question which he asked the victim was "who shot you?" and that he was
operated on the victim, he interviewed Mamansal and one of the questions he asked is not able to reduce his findings to writing. 19
whether the victim had known who had shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him
that he did not know who had shot him. 8 He did not pursue this line of questioning The next witness for the prosecution was Mila Arimao Mamansal, the wife of the
further as he was told by a companion of the victim that the area where the victim was victim, who testified mainly on the expenses she incurred because of the death of her
shot was dark. 9 He testified that he operated on the victim at around 12:00 in the husband. She also stated that she was able to talk with witness Sonny Boy Redovan at
evening. He operated for around four (4) hours but the victim developed cardio the hospital but the latter did not tell her anything about the alleged assailants of her
respiratory arrest at around 8:30 the following morning and thereafter, the victim died in husband. It was only on April 29, 1997 that she heard Redovan tell the Chief of Police
the ward. 10 of Kidapawan that Juany and Tony Palmones were the ones who had shot her husband.
20
On cross-examination, he stated that it was Sonny Boy Redovan who was with SPO2
Mamansal at the time that he was interviewing the victim and that it was Redovan who The prosecution next presented Asmyra Mamansal, the daughter of the victim. She
told him that the assailant could not be identified because the area where the shooting testified that on the night of the incident, she was at her aunt’s house where she was
happened was dark. 11 He likewise claimed that before he arrived at the hospital, a informed about the shooting of her father. She immediately proceeded to the hospital
certain Dr. Caridad Jalipa was already attending to the victim and that she told him that where she saw her father lying on a bed calling her name. Her father then told her to
the victim remained silent when she asked him about the person who shot him. 12 take down the name Alice Villamor whom she knew as the name of her father’s
mistress. 21 She was able to talk with her father for about thirty minutes.
The third witness for the prosecution was Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum.
He testified that on the night of April 27, 1997, he was at the Kidapawan, Cotabato On cross-examination, she testified that in the course of her conversation with her
Police Outpost. After receiving a radio report, he proceeded to Brgy. Magsaysay, father, her father did not tell her the reason why he mentioned the name of Alice
Kidapawan where he discovered that one of his men, SPO2 Mamansal, was shot. 13 Villamor nor did he tell her about the persons who had shot him. 22
After conducting an initial investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men towards
different directions to look for suspects. He then proceeded to the hospital together with The other two witnesses of the prosecution identified the death certificate 23 of SPO2
another witness, Alice Villamor. On the way to the hospital, Alice Villamor pointed to a Mamansal and the extract of the police blotter 24 where the shooting incident was
passing motorcycle and told him that it was the motorcycle the assailants were riding. recorded.
He chased the motorcycle but he was not able to catch up with them as his car ran out of
gas. 14 He was able to borrow a motorcycle and he proceeded to chase the other For their part; accused-appellants presented ten (10) witnesses to support their case.
motorcycle again. While riding on the borrowed motorcycle, a certain PO3 Aniceta
called him on the radio and told him that the assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones. The first witness, Alex Siago, a barangay kagawad, testified that he was one of the first
15 He and his men proceeded to the residence of the suspects where the brother of the persons to go to the victim after the latter was shot. 25 He stated that a certain Patricio
accused-appellants, Triny Palmones, met them. He asked Triny Palmones where his Fuertes and Samuel Angelio then brought the victim to the Kidapawan Doctor’s
brothers were and the latter responded that he didn’t know. He then asked Triny Hospital. Thereafter, another kagawad, a certain Gregorio Lonzaga called up the police
Palmones whether his brothers owned a motorcycle and the latter admitted that they to report the incident. 26 A few minutes later, Inspector Tagum arrived and proceeded to
owned a Kawasaki motorcycle which matched the description of the motorcycle he had make an investigation of the incident. He also claimed that he was the one who lent
been chasing. 16 He then told his men to continue pursuing the assailants and after Insp. Tagum his motorcycle when the latter gave chase to another motorcycle bearing
exhausting all efforts, he proceeded to the Kidapawan Doctor’s Hospital. He confronted two passengers. 27 Considering that he was only five (5) meters away from the
the victim in the emergency room and asked him about his assailants. The victim motorcycle when it passed by, he was able to see the faces of the passengers and he was
answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones. 17 At that time, he claimed that Dr. certain that they were not the two Accused-Appellants. 28

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 the shooting of Mamansal, he was at his house in Datu Piang St., Kidapawan, Cotabato,
The next witness, Patricio Fuertes, testified that he was person who brought the victim having a drink with a few friends. He stated that on the day of the incident, at around
to the hospital. 29 At the hospital, he saw three policemen, whom he did not recognize, 5:00 p.m. of April 27, 1997, he was resting inside his home as he had just come from
talking with the victim. He was about a meter away from the bed of the victim when he work. While in his house, Rodolfo Barrientos arrived to borrow some money from him.
heard a policeman, ask Mamansal whether he had recognized who had shot him. He 40 After giving him the money, the accused asked Rodolfo Barrientos to stay for dinner
then heard the victim reply that he did not recognize his assailants. 30 He likewise told and to have some drinks. While they were drinking "tuba," Jerry Barrientos arrived and
the court that while he was bringing the victim to the hospital, he was not able to talk joined them. They only stopped drinking at around 11:00 p.m. 41 The accused likewise
with Mamansal and neither did the victim identify his assailants. 31 testified that he only knew the victim’s surname and that he did not have any quarrel
with or grudge against the victim in the past. 42
The next witness for the defense was Alicia Villamor, the alleged girlfriend of the
victim and his companion at the time he was shot. She testified that in the evening of On cross-examination, he denied that he drove a motorcycle to work. He admitted
April 27, 1997, she was in her store together with the victim. At around 10.00 p.m., she however, that during the drinking spree, he went out of his house to buy "tuba" from a
closed shop and went home together with Mamansal and her two helpers. 32 While they nearby store. 43 On re-direct, he stated that the store was only 10 to 15 meters away
were already near her house in Magsaysay, someone suddenly shot Mamansal. She was from his home and that he was only gone for 2 to 5 minutes. 44
just at the side of Mamansal when the shooting happened but she claimed that she was Accused-appellant Anthony Baltazar Palmones’s testimony was corroborated by
not able to identify the assailants as it was dark. 33 Patricio Fuertes then brought the Rodolfo Barrientos and Jerry Barrientos who both claimed that they were drinking with
victim to the hospital but she did not accompany him as her clothes were stained with accused-appellant at the latter’s home at the time of the incident.
blood. After changing her clothes, a group of policemen arrived at the crime scene.
After conferring with the policemen, she then rode with Insp. Tagum in going to the On May 8, 1998, the trial court rendered its questioned decision finding accused-
hospital. 34 On the way, Insp. Tagum tried to halt a passing motorcycle. When the appellants guilty of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as
passengers of the motorcycle kept on going, Insp. Tagum fired warning shots and gave follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
chase but the car they were riding in ran out of gas. He then saw Alex Siago provide
Tagum with a motorcycle and again the latter gave chase. 35 She claimed that she was "WHEREFORE, prescinding (sic) from the foregoing facts and considerations, the
not able to see the persons riding the motorcycle as it was moving quite fast. When she Court finds both accused Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones
finally arrived at the hospital, she saw that Insp. Tagum was already there. She was then guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Murder, hereby sentenced
able to talk with the victim who told her that he did not see the person who had shot (sic) both accused each to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the
him. 36 heirs of Asim Mamansal, the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The next witness, Rommel Arambala, a 27 year old neighbor of Alice Villamor,
corroborated the testimonies the three previous witnesses. Accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration 45 of this decision but the trial
court, in an Order dated 26 October 1998 46 , denied the same for lack of merit. Hence,
The defense also called the two accused-appellants to support their defense of alibi. this appeal where accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

Accused-appellant Anthony Melchor Palmones testified that at the time of the incident, I.
he was in his house in Kisulan, Sultan Kudarat, having a drinking session with friends. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
He estimated that Kisulan, Sultan Kudarat was at least two hours away from the scene of NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
the crime. 37 Their group started drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and they only THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
finished drinking at around 11:00 p.m. By 11:30, their group had already dispersed. 38
He admitted knowing the victim as a policeman in Kidapawan but he denied having a II.
quarrel or a grudge against him. 39 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THEIR DEFENSE.
The testimony of accused-appellant Anthony Melchor Palmones was corroborated by
witnesses SPO1 Ramil Bahian and Jolito Silva. III.
THE FACTS, AS ESTABLISHED BY ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DO NOT
For his part, Accused-appellant Anthony Baltazar Palmones claimed that at the time of SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT’S FINDING OF GUILT.

201
 rules.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR AND HAD There are several exceptions however to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence,
DEMONSTRATED CLEAR BIAS AND PREJUDICE IN FAVOR OF THE the first one of which is the admissibility of dying declarations given under the
PROSECUTION AND AGAINST THE ACCUSED. circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
V.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO SECTION 31. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under a
THE TESTIMONY OF SONNY BOY REDOVAN AND INSPECTOR ALEXANDER consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his
TAGUM. death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
VI.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VICTIM, ASIM As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it
MAMANSAL WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY HIS ASSAILANTS BEFORE HE DIED. must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c)
VII. the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED DYING criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim. 49
DECLARATION OF ASIM MAMANSAL AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE. As testified to by prosecution witness Sonny Boy Redovan, the supposed dying
declaration of the victim was made as follows:
VIII.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED DYING PROS. DE GUZMAN:
DECLARATION OF ASIM MAMANSAL AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE RULE.
Q: Did you reach the Kidapawan Doctor’s Hospital, Inc.?
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), for its part, filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Brief 47 where it recommended that the accused-appellants be acquitted of the crime A: Yes, sir.
charged against them. In this Manifestation, the OSG reasoned that the identity of the
assailants was not sufficiently established by the evidence of the prosecution and that Q: What did you discover?
the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an
exception to the hearsay rule. A: Upon arrival, I immediately proceeded to the emergency room.

From the records of the case, the conviction of the two accused-appellants was based Q: What did you do in the emergency room?
largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to two witnesses of the
prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense of alibi. It behooves us therefore A: I saw my uncle there lying.
to determine the admissibility of the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased Asim
Mamanal as testified to by prosecution witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan and Police Q: Are you referring to SPO2 Asim Mamansal?
Investigator Alexander Tagum.
A: Yes, sir.
As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence. 48 This is
pursuant to Rule 130, section 30 of the Rules of Court which states:chanrob1es virtual Q: What did you do after that?
1aw library
A: Upon seeing his condition I went near him and whispered "Ano ba ang nangyari sa
SECTION 30. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. yo?" meaning "What happened to you?"
— A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these Q: What was the answer, if any?

202
 declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made
A: His answer (sic) that he was waylaid. under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was ever presented
by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector
Q: What else did he tell you? Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim whether he believed that he was going to die
out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he
A: I was worried after saying those words, I asked him who are the perpetrators. was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he revealed of
their conversation was the alleged identification of the victim of his two assailants. 53
Q: What was the answer? For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of the victim was
if the victim knew who had shot him. 54
A: And he said "It’s Juany and Tony Palmones."cralaw virtua1aw library
While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his
Q: When those words uttered to you (sic) where there other persons inside the room? perception that he has given up the hope of life 55 , the circumstances surrounding his
declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death. 56
A: Attendants, nurses, "ususero," I do not know the others. 50 In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of
his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the victim, prior to
In a similar vein, Police Investigator Alexander Tagum likewise testified that the victim his operation, were quite stable. 57 Moreover, from the time the victim was brought to
named the two accused as his assailants prior to the victim’s death. Thus: the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk
intelligently with at least four (4) other persons on various matters. The fact that his vital
Q: What did you do at the Kidapawan Doctor’s Hospital? signs were strong and that he still had strength to converse with these four (4) witnesses
belie the conclusion that the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of
A: I immediately went to the room wherein SPO1 Mamansal was lying. the gravity of his wounds.

Q. What did you do while you were inside the room where SPO1 Mamansal was lying? Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the
res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
A: I immediately confronted him sir and immediately asked the question: Who shot participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
you? immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
Q: What was the answer?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. 58
A: SPO1 Mamansal answered sir, it is Juany and Tony Palmones.
x x x In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of
spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been
Q: Can you remember who were your companions (sic) inside the room where SPO2 made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
Mamansal was lying? transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was
made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or
A: I noticed two (2) ladies medical orderly (sic) and Dr. Aguayo. 51 absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto;
and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. 59
In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven
that that the declaration was made "under a consciousness of impending death" which Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the
means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When
wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of
at hand, or there must be "a settled hopeless expectation." 52 time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around
10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an
In the instant case. it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime

203
but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of
of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET
victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar
show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are
order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae. being held for some other legal grounds.

Finally, after a thorough reading of the testimonies presented by both sides, it is even SO ORDERED.
doubtful that the victim ever uttered these alleged ante mortem statements in the first
place. We note that the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and Investigator Alexander
Tagum are contradicted not only by the witnesses for the defense but also by the
prosecution’s own witnesses.

Dr. Mark Aguayo the doctor who performed the operation on the victim and who is an
impartial and disinterested witness, categorically stated that the victim told him that he
did not recognize those who had shot him. 60 He likewise testified that witness Sonny
Boy Redovan told him in the emergency room that the victim was not able to recognize 46. People vs. Raquel
his assailants because of darkness. 61 Similarly, the wife and the daughter of Asim G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
Mamansal, who were also able to talk with the victim prior to his death, likewise denied appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE,
that the victim ever told them the identity of his assailants. We fail to see why the victim accused. SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
should choose to tell some people the identity of his assailants and deny his knowledge
of the same to others. Criminal Law; Evidence; Hearsay; Res Inter Alios Rule; The extrajudicial statements of
an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these
With respect to the witnesses for the defense Alex Siago and Patricio Fuertes, who were are repeated in open court.—The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a
both present at the site of the shooting immediately after the incident, testified that they coaccused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court.
did not hear the victim identify his assailants. Patricio Fuertes even stated that at the If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's
hospital, he heard Mamansal tell the police officers present that he did not recognize extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
those who had shot him. Most importantly, Alice Villamor, who was the lover of the accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the
victim and who was with him during the shooting, categorically stated that it was not case at bar.
possible to recognize the assailants as the area where the shooting happened was dark.
Moreover, she was able to talk with Mamansal at the hospital where he told her that he Same; Same; Same; Same; Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing
did not see the persons who had shot him. This testimony of Villamor is quite significant with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused.—Extreme caution
and we fail to see why the trial court failed to consider the same in its decision. Alice should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
Villamor, as the lover of the victim, had no motive to lie for the defense and had all the implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between
reason to speak the truth in order to seek justice for the death of her lover. extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown
As previously stated, the trial court based its judgment of conviction on the alleged ante wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
mortem statements of the victim and the apparent weakness of the defense put up by the
two Accused-Appellants. As it now stands however, the weakness of the alibi of the two Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The res inter alios rule ordains that the
accused-appellants cannot be held against them in view of the absence of a clear and rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.—
positive identification of them as the perpetrators of the crime. And while their alibi may The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
not have been proven so satisfactorily as to leave no room for doubt, such an infirmity declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
can not strengthen the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, the reason being that in a confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that,
criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
the weakness of the defense. 62 himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound

204
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. While admittedly the alibi of
appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Rule.—The writer of this substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of
opinion has elsewhere compiled these exceptions as follows: (a) If the co-accused the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact,
impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said confession by not questioning its truthfulness alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak.
(People vs. Orenciada, et a/., 47 Phil. 970 [1924]), as where it was made in his presence
and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein (People vs. Amajul, et al, APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Br. 16.
L-14626-27, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 612); (b) If the accused persons voluntarily The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
and independently executed identical confessions without collusion, commonly known
as interlocking confessions (People vs. Encipido, et al., G.R. No. 70091, December 29,
1986, 146 SCRA 478) which confessions are corroborated by other evidence (People vs.
Argana, et a/., L-19448, February 28, 1964,10 SCRA 311; People vs. Provo, et al,
L28347, January 20, 1971, 37 SCRA 19; People vs. Mateo, et al, G.R. No. 65165, June
29, 1984, 130 SCRA 282); and without contradiction by the other co-accused who was
present (People vs. Molleda, et al., L-34248, November 21, 1978, 86 SCRA 667); (c) REGALADO, J.:
Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant after being apprised of
such confession (People vs. Narciso, L-24484, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 844); (d) If they The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as
are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed by one of the accused well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
and said confession is used only as a corroborating evidence (People vs. Linde, et al., sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito
L10358, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 38; People vs. Simbajon, L-1807375, September 30, Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the amount of
1965, 15 SCRA 83; People vs. Sta. Maria, L-19929, October 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 222; P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen revolver.1 The Raquel brothers now plead
People vs. Cortez, et al., L-31106, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 309); (e) Where the for their absolution in this appellate review.
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by
the co-conspirator (People vs. Condemena, et al., L-22526, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for
910; People vs. Pareja, et al, L-21937, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693; People vs. robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch
Vasquez, G.R. No. 54117, April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA 772); (f) Where the confessant 16,2 allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of
testified for his codefendant (People vs. Villanueva, et al, L-12687, July 31, 1962, 5 Kabacan.
SCRA 672); or (g) Where the co-conspirator's extrajudicial confession is corroborated Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in
by other evidence of record (People vs. Paz, et al., L1505-53, August 31, 1964, 11 progress, however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce
SCRA 667; People vs. Agdeppa, et a/., L-17489, December 24, 1969, 30 SCRA 782). escaped from jail.3

Same; Constitutional Law; Extrajudicial Confessions; Extrajudicial statements made The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of
during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and record and with page references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized
cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case.—Extrajudicial statements made by the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief:
during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and "At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and
cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men
constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed. emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN,
January 25, 1988)
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; Alibi; A conviction in a
criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt—the prosecution Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic)
cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; Alibi need not be inquired while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
into where the prosecution's evidence is weak.—A conviction in a criminal case must
rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of

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She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged,
two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the
help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the crime.We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond
He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of
March 21, 1988)Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the herein appellants in, the crime charged.The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not
police station. (p. 27, ibid able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her testimony on direct examination in
court she declared as follows:
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano
Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. "Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you
However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the see any when you pip (sic) at the window?
shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)Appellants were later on apprehended on different A: Yes, sir.
occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991)"4 Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pumpand "I saw again two (2)
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts persons who were running away,sir.
which are presented in their brief in this wise: Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) downnear the jetmatic pump and
"Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his two (2) persons runningaway?
parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan,
Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased xxx
brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3
and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied by his Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmaticpump, who is this person?
father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He A: I do not know sir. "I have known that he was AmadoPonce when the Police arrived,"
already heard the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in
Paatan.On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are On cross-examination she further testified:
located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim
Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20)Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, "Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?
testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him A: I was at the Veranda sir and "I started shouting whilegoing to our room.
that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one personwho was mask(ed) and got
date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a the gun of your husband be-cause he was mask(ed), is that not right?
soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several A: Yes, sir.
policemen came over to his house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to yourhouse and got this gun?
of his sons and even accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son A: Yes, sir.
Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26)T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who havegot this gun inside?
Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry FISCAL DIZON: Already answered. She was not able to identify, your Honor.
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas________________ Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presentedto you by the police, is
4 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, 2-3; Rollo, 199-200. that right?
253 VOL. 265, DECEMBER 2, 1996 253 People vs. Raquel Raquel was under his A: Yes, sir.
division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20)."5On
August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of xxx
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them
accordingly. Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousieafter you shouted for help
they manifested that they were appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals.7 The and you saw two (2) person(s)running, is that right?
lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.8 A: Yes, sir
In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
us.9Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court A: I saw them running sir going around.

206
Q: These two (2) persons were running going around? Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions,17 those
A: They were running towards the road. exceptions do not however apply to the present case.
ATTY. DIVINO: Going to the road. The writer of this opinion has elsewhere compiled these exceptions as follows: (a) If the
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road? co-accused impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said confession by not questioning its
A: No, sir. truthfulness (People vs. Orenciada, et al., 47 Phil. 970 [1924]), as where it was made in
his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein (People vs.
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of Amajul, et al, L-14626-27, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 612);(b) If the accused persons
who shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the voluntarily and independently executed identical confessions without collusion,
Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that: commonly known as interlocking confessions (People vs. Encipido, et al., G.R. No.
70091, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478) which confessions are corroborated by
Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where other evidence (People vs. Argana, et al., L-19448, February 28, 1964, 10 SCRA 311;
you were then drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any? People vs. Provo, et al., L-28347, January 20, 1971, 37 SCRA 19; People vs. Mateo, et
A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a al., G.R. No. 65165, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 282); and without contradiction by the
maong jacket. The other one wore a hat locally known as 'kipis' meaning a hat made of other coaccused who was present (People vs. Molleda, et al., L-34248, November 21,
cloth with leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding something 1978, 86 SCRA 667);(c) Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant
which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white T- after being apprised of such confession (People vs. Narciso, L-24484, May 28, 1968, 23
shirt with markings and there was a white Tshirt covering his head and a part of his face SCRA 844);(d) If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed
as he was head-down during that time. by one of the accused and said confession is used only as a corroborating evidence
Q: Did you recognize any of these men? (People vs. Linde, et al., L-10358, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 38; People vs. Simbajon,
A: No. Because they walked fast" L-18073-75, September 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 83; People vs. Sta. Maria, L-19929,
October 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 222; People vs. Cortez, et al., L-31106, May 31, 1974, 57
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of SCRA 309);(e) Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of probability of participation by the co-conspirator (People vs. Condemena, et al., L-
accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier 22526, May 29, 1968; 23 SCRA 910; People vs. Pareja, et al., L-21937, November 29,
stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has 1969, 30 SCRA 693; People vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 54117, April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA
been at large since then.The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co- 772);(f) Where the confessant testified for his co-defendant (People vs. Villanueva, et
accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If al., L-12687, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 672); or(g) Where the co-conspirator's extrajudicial
the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's confession is corroborated by other evidence of record (People vs. Paz, et al., L-1505
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no
case at bar.Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt.
confession of an accused which implicates his coaccused. A distinction, obviously, Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr.
should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente,18 was negated by Dr. Anulao
other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his himself who testified that he treated no person by the name of Danny
confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.15The res inter alios Clemente.19Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution
rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce.
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who
and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station:
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would "Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound the process of investigation?
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the informat ion from him . . . And after
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. that I checked the information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?

207
A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to
investigate as to against (sic) him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if
the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the identity of
the other accused we do not need to inform him.
Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit, the accused should be
(re)presented by counsel that is the ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.
Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, sir."

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of

counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While
the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of
counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were
never observed.A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the
prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights to them3 While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable,
the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred
in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it
must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into RULE 130, SECTION 26 – ADMISSIONS OF A PARTY
where the prosecution's evidence is weak.24It would not even have been necessary to
stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of 47. G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the
standards therefor fulfilled. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL
accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME
offense charged, with costs de oficio.SO ORDERED. Romero, Puno, Mendoza and "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Judgment reversed, accused-appellants acquitted. Notes.—The
confession of a suspect may be admissible only as against him but not against nor in Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions;
favor of others. (People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 [1996]) An extrajudicial confession Evidence; Words and Phrases; “Confession” and “Admission,” Distinguished.—Before
is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the
(People vs. Camat, 256 SCRA 52 [1996]) trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial
admission. We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one from the other.
Sections 26 and 33, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court clearly show such a distinction. In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged,

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—Wharton defines a confession as effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
follows: “A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; The counsel must be a lawyer.—In
is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such
fact of guilt.” right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he
can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he
decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When what is involved is the issue of must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.
admissibility in evidence under Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution, the distinction
between confession and admission is irrelevant because Par. 3 thereof expressly refers to Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the confession of an accused speaks the
both.—We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
are satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.—The
merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibility in evidence under without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus: “(3) Any confession
or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Stenographic Notes; It should be the transcript of
evidence against him.” stenographic notes containing the alleged admissions of a suspect that should be
subscribed and sworn to, not the stenographic notes since the suspect cannot be expected
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution compared to read or decipher their contents.—The extrajudicial admission of the appellant,
with Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.—The first two paragraphs of Section 12, contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him
Article III of the present Constitution have broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. What we find in these yellow pads are stenographic notes.
respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a “competent and These were transcribed by the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes, but
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice”; (2) the right to remain silent and to for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit “C”), which
counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on consists of twelve pages, was not signed by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Assuming
inadmissibility expressly includes admissions, not just confessions. that the transcript of the notes is a faithful and accurate account, it is obvious that this
was not subscribed and sworn to by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to be Informed; The right to be informed carries Since we cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we
with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and cannot expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what read or decipher its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its
is conveyed.—The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair
contemplates “the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.” It is not Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights.
enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Where the fiscal immediately
the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in suggested the availability of a particular counsel without first distinctly asking the
practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do? and in a suspect if he had a counsel of his own choice, and if he had one, whether he could hire
language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a such counsel, or whether he would agree to have one provided for him, then such
correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates counsel provided was foisted upon the suspect and not one who was voluntarily and

209
intelligently “accepted” by the suspect.—Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to the certification. The conclusion then is inevitable that he did not conduct the
have been voluntarily and intelligently “accepted” by the appellant as his counsel to preliminary investigation.
assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom’s presence in the Office of the City Fiscal
at the time the appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; A counsel appointed to assist a
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to suspect must be an independent counsel, and he could not be one where he is an
be attending to some professional matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for associate of the private prosecutor in the same case.—Even assuming for the sake of
the purpose of giving free legal aid to the appellant, These possibilities are not remote argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be assisted by Atty. Cajucom, we
but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that Atty. Cajucom was in fact doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel. While we wish to give him the
foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted portion of Exhibit “C,” the benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the court upon whose shoulders lies the
City Fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first responsibility to see to it that protection be accorded the appellant and that no injustice
distinctly asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he had one, be committed to him, and. moreover, he generally has in his favor the presumption of
whether he could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he would agree to have regularity in the performance of his duties, there are special circumstances in these cases
one provided for him; or whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and which convince us that he was unable to assist the appellant in a satisfactory manner.
to counsel. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at that time, and even until the time he
City Fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom took the witness stand, he was an associate of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
was ready to assist him. While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be Galace, in these and the companion cases.
investigated has the final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him
by the investigator and ask for another one, the circumstances obtaining in the custodial
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to be Informed; It is doubtful for a
interrogation of the appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For
suspect to have understood his constitutional rights if he was informed of the same in
as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and English and Tagalog when he could only understand Ilocano.—Then we have
whether he could afford to hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the City Fiscal clearly misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the appellant when the
suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom.
former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English and Tagalog
considering that the appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only understand
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence during the custodial investigation before Ilocano.
the fiscal of military officers who had earlier threatened the suspect with death vitiated
the latter’s free will.—Then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is error for the counsel to impress
Roberto Rambac, military officers of RUCI, who brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office
upon the suspect that he was only a witness, not an accused.—lt appears to us that Atty.
for investigation in the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto.
Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he was one of the accused;
Tomas, Pangasinan. Along Kennon Road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was only a witness.
and threatened with death if he would not admit knowing “Jun” and “Sonny” and his
participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the prosecution. The
presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Arrests and Seizures; No arrest
something would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will. without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected five months after the
commission of the crime, and the counsel should have forthwith taken the appropriate
measures for the immediate release of the suspect instead of allowing the City Fiscal to
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; It is not for a City Fiscal to investigate him.—Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-
conduct custodial investigations.—Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the
examination, that the appellant was picked up on 10 February 1987 by military men in
custodial investigation is beyond us. Nothing in the records shows that at that time the
Pangasinan without a warrant for his arrest. Since the crimes with which the appellant
criminal cases against the culprits had already been filed with the City Fiscal’s Office was charged were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five months
for preliminary investigation and had, therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had earlier, no arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected. A
been so filed, then the City Fiscal should have followed the usual course of procedure in
warrantless arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, Rule 113
preliminary investigations. It appears, however, from the informations in Criminal Cases
of the Rules of Court. Atty. Cajucom knew or ought to have known that the arrest was
Nos. 4647R and 4648-R that it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his duty to fully assist the appellant, he should
conducted the preliminary investigation and who prepared, signed, and certified the have forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the immediate release of the appellant
informations. City Fiscal Balajadia merely approved them and administered the jurat in
instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him. Needless to say, the conduct of

210
Atty. Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen our belief that the appellant had Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs
all the cards stacked against him. People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 110290 against the accused, Jaime Agustin.
January 25, 1995
SO ORDERED.5

The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay, a
DAVIDE, JR., J.: member of the Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit "A");
(2) Christie Napeñas, a stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio
City, who took down the stenographic notes of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia's
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases investigations of accused Wilfredo Quiaño (Exhibit "D") on 30 January 1987 and of the
Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with appellant on 10 February 1987, and who identified her stenographic notes containing the
statement of the appellant (Exhibit "B") and the transcript of said stenographic notes
attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were
(Exhibit "C"); (3) Dominic Bayquen, the victim in Criminal Case No. 4650-R, who
allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of
Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony testified on how they were shot; (5) Eulogio Francisco, the father of Anna Theresa
Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta. Francisco, who identified her death certificate (Exhibit "I") and testified on the list of
expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio Mumar, a supervising ballistics expert, who
declared that the fourteen shell recovered from the scene of the crime were not fired
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and from any of the three armalite rifles submitted to him; (7) Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, who
alleged the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary testified that he was the lawyer who assisted the appellant and accused Wilfredo Quiaño
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price.1 while they were being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San Luis
Bayquen, wife of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and mother of Dominic Bayquen, who testified
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could on what she did after Dominic informed her by telephone about the shooting incident.
be arraigned, he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. 2 The The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of 6
cases, which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only against the appellant. September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son,
Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and
After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial on Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's
the merits was held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990. residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car.
While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man
On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision 3 in the consolidated cases came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man
acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and Criminal approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the
Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R (attempted murder) for insufficiency of evidence but passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to
convicting him in the two murder cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with the parked car which then sped away.
treachery as the qualifying circumstance.4 It also ruled that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and price had been duly established. It then All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr.
sentenced the appellant as follows: Bayquen's head was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the
Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later,
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. 6 Danny Ancheta
murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of the went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. 7 Anna
criminal cases aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death, Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor.8 The police later arrived at the
there being two aggravating circumstances. However, since the death penalty is not crime scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an
imposable at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further armalite rifle.9
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa Francisco the sum of sixty
Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and

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On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then later, at Camp Dangwa
agent or "asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, to where he was taken, he told his wife to get in touch and talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally,
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in he asserted that he was promised by his captors that he would be discharged as a state
his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push through because his co-accused,
Theresa Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military Quiaño, escaped. 12
agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy"
Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the
Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the morning of 10 February 1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her
Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie Napeñas, a stenographic notes of efforts to locate him proved futile until days later when she finally learned that he was
the proceedings during the investigation. 10 Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the detained at Camp Dangwa. 13
transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he signed, with the
assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. 11 The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant
consideration to his claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of the
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime following reasons: (a) the presence of material improbabilities in his tale of when and
Agustin, was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to how he was allegedly taken at gunpoint from his hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it was
Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo improbable that he was made to kneel thrice at gunpoint along Kennon Road
Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo considering the vehicles which were passing along that road; (c) it was unbelievable that
Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took when he was in the Fiscal's Office he asked for his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could not go
down stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic home for a period of one month; (d) no less than the city Fiscal of Baguio City
notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the interrogated him and yet he did not tell the fiscal that he was being forced to give a
appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently transcribed these notes which statement; (e) the fiscal even provided him with a lawyer who conferred with him and
the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of apprised him of his rights; (f) he signed each and every page of the stenographic notes of
the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a his statement and this was witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of Baguio and the
confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman. lawyer who assisted him; and (g) he disclosed in his statement that he voluntarily gave it
because of his ill feeling against his co-accused who did not give him any money.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant, who
is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct
validity of his extrajudicial statement. he alleged that in the morning of 10 February participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his
1987, he went to Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy some fertilizer and upon his return he was "extrajudicial confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be
met by two armed men who took him to their car where two other companions, armed paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when he
with armalites, were waiting. They then brought him out of Pangasinan. He later learned was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule
that they were on their way to Baguio City. 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his
conviction for murder inevitable.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did not.
Along Kennon Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court the
reach a toll booth, and then brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at commission of this lone error:
gunpoint in order to force him to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he finally
did out of fear. Then he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AS ADMISSIBLE
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 14
and their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being
threatened. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo
The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights
Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty.
under Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted
Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by

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the city Fiscal. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to
Arthur Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
only Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and when the Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under
city Fiscal interrogated him, his military escorts were present. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph
3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should
be of the latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
parties," 15 and that where there are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the be inadmissible in evidence against him.
extrajudicial confession, the doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. 16 He then
concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his conviction cannot The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
stand, there being no other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
In its brief, 17 the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
validity of the confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision. independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a in writing and in the presence of counsel.
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the
appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights)
of the 1973 Constitution which read:
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement
of the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one from the
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
other. Sections 26 and 33, rule 30 of the Rules of any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
Court 18 clearly show such a distinction. obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal

The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a
broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not
confession as follows: just any counsel, but a "competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in writing and
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly
his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct includes admissions, not just confessions.
or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself Constitution, laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and
is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate
ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel would not be valid unless made with the
fact of guilt.
assistance of counsel:

We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are
satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he

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At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of yellow
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any find in these yellow pads are stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained in the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of twelve pages, 33 was
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the not signed by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand, the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial same stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic notes when accused
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the Wilfredo Quiaño was being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes,
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition and the transcription 34 was subscribed and sworn to by the accused before City Fiscal
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom, who represented the accused in the
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any investigation.
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
of inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we
cannot expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 22 People vs. Lumayok, 23 People vs. read or decipher its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its
Albofera, 24 People vs. Marquez, 25 People vs. Penillos, 26 and People vs. accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair
27
Basay, among other cases. deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The transcript (Exhibit "C")
The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the shows the following preliminary questions of the City Fiscal and the answers of the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory appellant:
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for the investigator
to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article 01. QUESTION — Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that you are under
IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the investigation in connection with the death of Dr. Nap Bayquen of which you are one of
former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the the principal suspects. I am informing you of your constitutional rights before you give
person under investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly any statement. First, you have the right to remain silent meaning, you may give a
understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part statement or you may not give any statement. If you will not give a statement, you will
of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results not be forced to do so, do you understand this right?
in the subject understanding what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought
to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on ANSWER — I understand, sir.
the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing the investigation. 02. Q — If you will give a statement, you have the right to be assisted by a lawyer of
your own choice, if you cannot afford to secure the services of a lawyer the government
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of will provide a lawyer for you, do you understand this right?
such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told
that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his A — I understand, sir.
request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided
for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid
and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a 03. Q — Now, do you want to be assisted by a lawyer?
lawyer. 29
A — Yes, sir.
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. 30 Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it 04. Q — I am now informing you that a lawyer in the person of Atty. Reynaldo
was made without the assistance off counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of Cajucom is now present in this investigation room, do you wish to avail of his assistance
the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 31 in connection with this investigation?

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A — I want, sir. there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two possibilities may explain it: it was a
mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to be attending to some professional
05. Q — I am also informing you that whatever you say in this investigation can be used matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal aid
as evidence in your favor and it can also be used as evidence against you in any criminal to the appellant. These possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it
or civil case, do you understand that? is clear to us that Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in
the above-quoted portion of Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the
availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a
A — Yes, sir, I understand.
counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if
he could not, whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel.
06. Q — After informing you of your constitutional rights, are you now willing to give a In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal,
statement? through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready
to assist him.
A — Yes, sir, I agree.
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the final
Investigator — Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, the witness or respondent Jaime Agustin has choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask
chosen you to give him assistance in this investigation, are you willing to assist him? for another one, 35 the circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the
appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For as earlier stated, he
Answer — I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness. was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and whether he could afford to
hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly suggested the availability of
Investigator — Have you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional rights? Atty. Cajucom. then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Roberto
Rambac, military officers of RUC I, who brought him to the City Fiscal's Office for
investigation in the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas,
Answer — Yes, fiscal.
Pangasinan. Along Kennon road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced and
threatened with death if he would not admit knowing "Jun" and "Sonny" and hi
Investigator — Do you know after examining him whether or not he is giving a free and participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the prosecution. The
voluntary statement of his own volition without any intimidation or force exerted on presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate,
him? something would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will.

A — As stated by him, fiscal, he is willing to give a free and voluntary statement in Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond us.
relation to what really happened. Nothing in the records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the culprits had
already been filed with the City Fiscal's Office for preliminary investigation and had,
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had been so filed, then the City Fiscal
a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind should have followed the usual course of procedure in preliminary investigations. It
any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could appears, however, from the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 46648-R
not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not that it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who conducted the preliminary
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and investigation and who prepared, signed, and certified the informations. city Fiscal
that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, Balajadia merely approved them and administered the jurat in the certification. the
waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver conclusion then is inevitable that he did not conduct the preliminary investigation.
of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to
prove its existence. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be
assisted by Atty. Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel.
Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently While we wish to give him the benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the court
"accepted" by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. upon whose shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection be accorded the
Cajucom's presence in the Office of the City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought appellant and that no injustice be committed to him, 36 and, moreover, he generally has

215
in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties, 37 there are A — I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to confront in person the
special circumstances in these cases which convince us that he was unable to assist the witnesses against him and that he has the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the
appellant in a satisfactory manner. For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at hearing of the case which was being investigated then.
that time, and even until the time he took the witness stand, he was an associate of the
private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, in these and the companion cases. Thus: Q — And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this statement?

Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the office of Atty. A — He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and in order to shed
Galace, you were an associate at the time when you assisted the accused? light. 41

A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid. It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he
was one of the accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was
Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an associate of only a witness. Thus:
Atty. Galace up to the present?

A Yes. 38
Q [by the prosecutor]
Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the
appellant when the former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English — But, nevertheless, you gave the precautionary measureentitled to any witness?
and Tagalog considering that the appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only
understand Ilocano. Thus:
A — Yes, sir.

ATTY. TABIN: Q — Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?

So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional rights using A — Before presenting him to the investigation we were given time to talk personally
English Language and Tagalog Dialect you did not have any Ilocano dialect Interpreter.
without any other people and that was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
...
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case. 42

xxx xxx xxx On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:

WITNESS: ATTY. TABIN:

As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English. And when asked
That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language, Your Honor.
whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom merely answered:
WITNESS:
A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic] him of his
constitutional rights. 40
I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some narrations as a
witness and his involvement would mean the most grievous offense and if found guilty
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that his
will bring him for some years in jail and I told him that I could help him if he will be
explanations were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following answers:
presenting the truth and narrate is the truth. This is in combination, English and Tagalog,
and most of the time, I made it in Tagalog. 43
Q — Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to caution him of the
consequences of his statement?

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Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved
serious doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his and the triggerman and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the failure
constitutional rights since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog. of the Government to exert the necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to the bar of
justice. Until now, the accused, who were implicated by the triggerman as having
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the ordered for a price the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large and the records do not
appellant was picked up on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without a show any diligent effort to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped while in the
warrant for his arrest. 44 Since the crimes with which the appellant was charged were custody of the PC/INP at Camp Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of Baguio City
allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five months earlier, no arrest should then use all the resources at its command, in coordination with the law-
without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless arrest enforcement agencies of the Government, such as the National Bureau of Investigation
should comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of and the Philippine National Police, to immediately arrest the other accused.
Court. Said section provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, the Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and
without a warrant, arrest a person: Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN.
His immediate release from confinement is hereby ORDERED unless for some other
lawful cause his continued detention is warranted. Costs de oficio.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
SO ORDERED.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal 48. G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,
another. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was
arrested on 10 February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Witnesses; Evidence to be believed, must proceed not
were committed in the presence of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself.—Time
arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or that the appellant was a prisoner who and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from
had escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes had just been committed for the mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court
they were in fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness
ought to have known that the arrest was unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw
duty to fully assist the appellant, he should have forthwith taken the appropriate how petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the
measures for the immediate release of the appellant instead of allowing the City Fiscal evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is
to investigate him. Needless to say, the conduct of Atty. Cajucom under the open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner.
circumstances only strengthen our belief that the appellant had all the cards stacked
against him. Same; Same; Trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction that is
irrational because it is not derived from an established fact.—The trial court cannot
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible in convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction that is irrational because it is not derived
evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the from an established fact. The records do not show any fact from which the trial court
Constitution. since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered up his scar with a black
convicted, he must then be acquitted.

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coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute MADARAOG TORRES, alone in her house at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro Subdivision,
evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Novaliches, Quezon City. Her husband is in Australia while her children go to school.

Same; Same; Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody
one's selfish interest.—Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving knocked at the gate of the Torres residence pretending to buy ice. As the maid Madaraog
evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves one's handed the ice to the buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the fence, poked a gun at
selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party her, covered her mouth, and opened the gate of their house.4 The ice buyer and his
out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is companions barged in. Numbering four (4), they pushed her inside Torres' house and
excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for demanded the keys to the car and the safety vault.5 She told them she did not know
cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission where the keys were hidden.6 They tied up her hands and dragged her to the second
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. floor of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left downstairs as their lookout. 7

Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi should be considered in the light of all the evidence on record On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom
for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused.—Judges should not at once door with her back on the vault. They also gagged her mouth and ransacked Torres'
look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be considered in the light of all room. One of the accused stumbled upon a box containing keys. They used the keys to
the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused. In open drawers and in the process found the car key. Petitioner was then summoned
People vs. Omega, we held: "Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses upstairs and given the car key. He tried it on the car and succeeded in starting its engine.
for it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for
the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the question of whether or In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to loot the vault and other valuable items in
not the accused committed the crime charged, the defense of alibi assumes importance." the house. They then tied Madaraog's hands and feet to the bed's headboard and escaped
Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 695, G.R. Nos. 113779-80 February 23, 1995 using Torres' car.

PUNO, J.: Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her ties with her fingers, hopped to the stairs
and cried for help.8 Her neighbor Semia Quintal responded and untied her. They also
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the sought the help of Angelina Garcia, another neighbor. It was Garcia who informed
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without proof of Torres that her house was burglarized.
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction. In the case
at bench, the identification of the petitioner cannot rest on an assured conscience. We Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the
rule that petitioner is entitled to a mandatory acquittal. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal
described the physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged of those drawn by the artist was a person with a large mole between his eyebrows.9 On
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 1 with Robbery2 (Article 294, paragraph August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI
5 of the Revised penal Code) and Carnapping3 (republic Act No. 6539). headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one
of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench.
Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other three (3) are still at-
large. SEMIA QUINTAL 10 averred that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men
whiling away their time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried. committed. Quintal is a neighboring maid.

We come to the facts. MARY BARBIETO 11 likewise declared that she saw petitioner allegedly with several
companions standing-by at Torres' house that morning of July 19, 1988. She is a teacher
and lives within the block where the crimes were committed.
Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public school teacher of Kaligayahan
Elementary School, Novaliches. Her work requires her to leave her maid, JOVINA

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Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and corresponding values thereon or a total of P280,550.00 which the court finds to be the
insufficient identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the neighborhood of reasonable values.
the Torres family since 1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough
and rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the The civil liability is joint and solidary with the co-conspirators of accused Alvin Tuason.
afternoon at his sisters' TipTop bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him
two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.
In case of appeal, the bail bonds are fixed at TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396 and ONE HUNDRED
He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at about THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for criminal case No. Q-88-397.
8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was in their house watching a basketball game on T.V.
and went out to buy a cigarette. On his way back, a person accosted him and asked his Costs against the accused.
name. After he identified himself, 13 a gun was poked at his right side, a shot was fired
upward, and five (5) men swooped on him without any warrant of arrest. He asked them
if he could wear t-shirt as he was naked from waist up. They refused. They turned out to SO ORDERED.16
be NBI agents of one of whom a certain Atty. Harwin who lived in Lagro, Novaliches.
He was shoved into the car and brought to the NBI headquarters. 14 He was surprised Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1993, the
when an NBI agent, whose identity was unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the Eleventh Division of the appellate court gave no credence to
suspects in the robbery in the presence of Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses. the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and affirmed in toto the assailed
Decisions.17 On February 4, 1994, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, 15 part-owner of TipTop Bakeshop corroborated for lack of merit.18
his story. She testified that on July 17, 1988 she asked her sister Mary Ann to remind
petitioner to work early on July 19, 1988 since Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays In this petition for certiorari, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred:
are busy days as she caters to schools.
A.
The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged and
sentenced him as follows: [I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE THAT
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURTS ARE GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON
xxx xxx xxx APPEAL, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE ARE BASED ON CERTAIN REFUTABLE
In Q-88-396 (carnapping) or an indeterminate term of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and REASONS EXPRESSLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
FOUR (4) MONTHS as minimum and TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum; and in Q-
88-397 (robbery) for a term of ONE (1) YEAR, SEVEN (7) MONTHS and ELEVEN B.
(11) DAYS as minimum and TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS as maximum. [I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER
THE CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "SELF-SERVING
On the civil aspect, the court hereby orders Alvin Tuason y Ochoa as follows: EVIDENCE."

1. In Q-88-396 (carnapping) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the C.
carnapped Toyota Corona Sedan, Model 1980 with Plate No. NPZ 159 or to pay its
value of P180,000.00 which the court finds to be the reasonable value of the said car; [I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER
and THE CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF "NEGATIVE EVIDENCE."

2. In Q-88-397 (robbery) to return to Mrs. Cipriana Torres and her husband the stolen D.
items mentioned in the information filed in said case and hereinabove stated or pay the

219
[F]OR IGNORING OR DISREGARDING THE GLARING AND FATAL bilog na nunal sa pagitan ng kilay sa noo. Mahaba at malantik ang pilikmata," who is
INFIRMITIES OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, that?
SPECIALLY AS IDENTIFICATION, AS WELL AS TO THE PALPABLE
IMPROBABILITY OF HEREIN PETITIONER HAVING BEEN A SUPPOSED Interpreter: Witness referring to Exhibit "J-3."
PARTICIPANT IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED, THE ERROR BEING
TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF THE RECORD.
Q Madam witness where is that round mole that appears in the two eyebrows of the
person?
E.
A It is probably the cartographer that made a mistake.
[I]N AFFIRMING THE CLEARLY REVERSIBLE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT. Q I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call your attention to that black rounded
figure at the middle of the bridge of the nose between the two eyebrows, what was that
We reverse. represent?

Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only A A mole, sir. 25
from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must be credible in itself. 19 The trial
court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution xxx xxx xxx
witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she
clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review
of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Q Among the four drawings prepared by the cartographer section of the NBI, you will
Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner. agree ith me Madam Witness that it is only on Exhibit "J" when that rounded mole
appear?
Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid
Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. A No sir, it is the third one.26
Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of the
crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether Madaraog and xxx xxx xxx
Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog
described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his eyebrows. 20 While Q You did not call the attention of the NBI that the third one whom you just identified
Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between his as Exhibit "J-3" did not bear that rounded mole as mentioned by you, did you?
eyebrows. 21 On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a drawing of
petitioner showing a dominant mole between his eyes. 22 As it turned out, petitioner has A I did not remember.
no mole but only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall.
There is a big difference between a mole and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a
Q Why did you not remember having called the attention of the NBI to that deficiency
new connective tissue that replaces tissue injured. 23 On the other hand, a mole is a small
in the drawing?
often pigmented spot or protuberance on the skin. 24 If indeed Madaraog and Quintal had
a good look at petitioner during the robbery, they could not have erroneously described
petitioner. Worthy to note, petitioner was not wearing any mask in the occasion. A I was not able to call the attention of the NBI (sic) because there were four of us who
Madaraog's attempt to explain her erroneous description does not at all convince, viz.: made the description.27

xxx xxx xxx Secondly, the trial court and the respondent appellate court unduly minimized the
importance of this glaring discrepancy in the identification of the petitioner. The trial
court resorted to wild guesswork. It ruled:
Q We come now to the third person "iyong namang isa ay mga 28 o 29 ang edad, mga
5'2" o 5'3" ang taas, payat, medyo kulot ang buhok at maiksi at mayroong malaking
xxx xxx xxx

220
[T]he court has observed that Alvin has a prominent scar in between his two (2) A No, I did not because he did not ask me.
eyebrows. It is not within the realm of improbability that Alvin covered up that scar with
a black coloring to make it appear that he has a "nunal" which was therefore the one Q [Y]ou did not come forward to volunteer that some portions of your narration were
described by Jovina and, which reinforces her testimony that she had a good eye view of not incorporated therein?
Alvin from the start of the robbery to its conclusion.28
A [T]he investigator knew it.
This is a grave error. The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction
that is irrational because it is not derived from an established fact. The records do not
Q You mean to tell the Honorable Court that after reading Exhibit "M", the NBI
show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that investigator knew that there were some lapses or omissions in your statement?
petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an
illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This
palpable error was perpetrated by respondent appellate court when it relied on the theory A It's up to the investigator. 30
that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial court had a better
opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. Barbieto is a school teacher and the kind of excuses she proffered does not enhance her
This is a misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The credibility. However, she and Quintal merely testified they saw petitioner within the
subject finding of the trial court was not based on the demeanor of any witnesses which vicinity where the crimes were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to
it had a better opportunity to observe. Rather, it was a mere surmise, an illogical one at the conclusion that petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner, we note,
that. By no means can it be categorized as a fact properly established by evidence. lives in the same vicinity as the victim. To use his words, he lives some six (6) posts
from the house of Torres. His presence in the said vicinity is thus not unnatural.
And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her testimony that
diluted her credibility, thus: The doubtful identification of petitioner was not at all cured by the process followed by
the NBI agents when petitioner was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution
xxx xxx xxx witnesses in their headquarters. Madaraog's identification of petitioner from a line-up at
the NBI was not spontaneous and independent. An NBI agent improperly suggested to
them petitioner's person. Petitioner thus testified:
Q I am showing to you Exhibit "M" and please point to this Honorable Court that
portion where the accused (Alvin Tuason) allegedly asked from you the price of that
plastic pack of ice. xxx xxx xxx

A I did not state it in my statement. Q Mr. Witness (Alvin Tuason) do you know of any reason why these two witnesses in
the persons of Jovina Madaraog Torres and Mary Barbieto would be testifying in the
manner that they did against you?
Q Why did you say a moment ago that you place it there (Sinumpaang Salaysay)?
A At the NBI, I saw them with the NBI agent. After the agent pointed at me, later on
A But that is the truth, sir.
they also pointed at me.31

Q I am not asking you the truth or falsehood . . . I am only asking you why you said a
On cross-examination, he declared:
moment ago that the portion of your testimony now is incorporated in Exhibit "M".
xxx xxx xxx
A [B]ecause they asked the price of the ice. 29
Q Do you know the reason why they testified and pointed to you as one of the robbers of
xxx xxx xxx
July 19, 1988?

Q After reading Exhibit "M", did you or did you not call the attention of the investigator
A Because when I was at the NBI, the NBI agent pointed at me.
that some of your narrations were not incorporated therein?

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Q Did you see them at the NBI when they pointed at you? He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after the crimes were
perpetrated.
A They were outside a room where there was a glass window.
Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother had an eye
Q So you can see those persons outside the room? examination on July 17, 1988 35 and she reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988
which he did.
A Yes, sir.
Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be
considered in light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in
Q When they pointed you and identified you where there other person with you when
you were lined up during that time? favor of the accused. 36 In People vs. Omega,37 we held:

A In the second line I was in the line-up. Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and
betrays lack of concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed
Q When was the first time they pointed you as one of the suspects? the crime charged, the defense of alibi assumes importance.

A In the Office of the Chief Unit there, to the third floor of the NBI building. 32 The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem disposed more readily to
credit the veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence
This damaging testimony of the petitioner was not rebutted by the prosecution. The NBI by or on behalf of the accused , whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or
agent present during the identification of petitioner was not presented to belie other testimony. 38 They are unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the
petitioner's testimony. Consequently, the identification of the petitioner in the NBI eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her powers of perception becomes
headquarters is seriously flawed. According to writer Wall, the mode of identification distorted and her identification is frequently more untrustworthy. Into the identification,
other than an identification parade is a show-up, the presentation of a single suspect to a enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the accused
witness for purposes of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it constitutes personally — the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support,
the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police. 33 consciously or unconsciously, an identification already made by another. 39

The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self- IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December 16, 1993 is REVERSED and SET
serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self- ASIDE and petitioner Alvin Tuason is ACQUITTED.
serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest.
Under our law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at SO ORDERED.
one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on
the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would
open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's
testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-
examination.34 Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the
prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-serving.

Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing
dough at TipTop Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. With the usual traffic jam, it takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro
to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. He said
he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3) days thereafter. He did not flee.

222
 otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (3), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The investigation was merely an administrative investigation
conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation.—In the case at bar, the
admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted by
49. G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997 private respondents’ counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate
their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not
EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA, yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an
Petitioners, v. N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), The questions were propounded by the employer’s lawyer, not by police officers. The
Respondents. fact that the investigation was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put
Labor Law; Dismissal; An employer has a right to terminate the services of an employee petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely
subject to both substantive and procedural limitations.—An employer has a right to incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may be
terminate the services of an employee subject to both substantive and procedural used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
limitations. This means that (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause
provided in the Labor Code, and (2) the employee must be accorded due process before Same; Same; Due Process; Private respondents failed to observe due process in
his employment is terminated. The validity of the dismissal hinges on the employer’s terminating the employment of petitioners.—Private respondents, however, failed to
compliance with these two requirements. observe due process in terminating the employment of petitioners. Due process demands
that the employer should furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
Same; Same; Article 282 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate the terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) for termination and
services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence, provided that the loss of afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a
confidence arises from particular proven facts; Meaning of substantial evidence.—In the representative if he so desires. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with
case at bar, petitioners who were employed as drivers at respondent company were two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice
found guilty of stealing company property consisting of electrical wire, welding rod, which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
G.I. sheet, steel bar and plywood. Article 282 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s
to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence, provided that decision to dismiss him. There is no showing in this case that private respondents
the loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts. The law does not require furnished petitioners with such notices. Manuel vs. N.C. Construction Supply, 282
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct. Substantial evidence is SCRA 326, G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
sufficient. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
PUNO, J.:
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; The exclusionary rule under paragraph
(3), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal This special civil action for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the National Labor
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.—We also reject Relations Commission (NLRC) dated June 27, 1996 in NLRC-NCR-00-07-04925-95
petitioners’ argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under entitled Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea v. N.C.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of Construction Supply, Johnny Lim and Anita Sy. 1
the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular employed as drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by private respondents Johnny
suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of Lim (a.k.a. Lao Ching Eng) and Anita Sy.
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or

223
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, a nakikisama lang ako sa mga dati ninyong tauhan dahil kailangan ko talaga ng trabaho
company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper ("pahinante"), taking out from the company kahit labag man sa aking kalooban ang gumawa ng hindi maganda.
premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was
brought to the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso Boss, kahit paano sana maintindihan mo ako, tatanggalin nyo na ho ako sana bigyan nyo
named seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts at na lang ako ng kahit pamasahe namin pauwing probinsya para makapagbagong buhay
respondent company, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea. 2 na ako.

On June 5, 1995, petitioners received separate notices from respondent company Salamat po.
informing them that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as Sumasainyo,
perpetrators of the series of thefts committed at respondent company. They were thus Joel Rea
invited to the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their alleged involvement
in the offense. Atty. Reyes accepted petitioners' resignation effective June 5, 1995.

Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal
investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor
petitioners on their alleged participation in the series of thefts committed at respondent were they given an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their
company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being positively admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the theft as
identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private respondents'
for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against them. 3 Petitioners Bana and Rea filed lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
separate resignation letters while petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their
resignations orally. Petitioner Bana's resignation letter 4 reads: Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to
be illegal. He held that private respondents failed to show a just cause for the
Hunyo 6, 1995 termination of petitioners' services. He declared that petitioners' admission regarding
their involvement in the theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken without the
Dear Bong, assistance of counsel, in violation of Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 6
He also held that petitioners were not afforded due process before their services were
Sa ganitong sitwasyon nagpapasalamat rin ako na humantong sa ganito para hindi na terminated. Hence, Labor Arbiter Caday ordered private respondents to reinstate
tumagal ang masama naming gawain. Piro lubos rin ako nagpapasalamat sa iyong petitioners to their former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay them full
pagpapatawad sa akin, at ang masasabi ko lang na I'm very, very sorry na lang. Kasi backwages. He also ordered private respondents to pay petitioners their service incentive
alam mo naman na kapos na kapos talaga ako. Kaya alam mo halos hindi na nga ako leave benefits plus attorney's fees. 7
nag-a-absent dahil sa sahod ko lang kapos pa sa pamilya ko. Kaya sana sa pag-resign ko
sana mabigyan mo man lang ako nang kaunti para makapamasahi man lang pau-wi sa On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners
Mindanao kasama ang mga anak ko. Yon lang. . . were dismissed for a just cause. It held that petitioners failed to adduce competent
evidence to show a vitiation of their admission regarding their participation in the theft.
Gumagalang, It further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence because Section 12
Boy Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings but not to
administrative proceedings. The NLRC, however, agreed with the Labor Arbiter that
Petitioner Rea's resignation letter, 5 on the other hand, states: petitioners were denied due process. Hence, it ordered private respondents to pay
petitioners the amount of P1,000.00 as indemnity. The dispositive portion of the
Hunyo 6, 1995 decision reads:
Boss,
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
Dahil sa hindi maganda ang aking naging performance sa inyo sa loob ng NC reversed and set aside. A new one is hereby entered ordering respondents to pay to the
Construction Supply sa nakakahiya na aking nasangkutan magreresign na ho ako, complainants the amount of P1,000.00 each as and for indemnity for failure of the
magsisimula Hunyo 6, 1995. Siguro naman Boss alam naman ninyo ang totoo respondents to observe due process.

224
SO ORDERED. 8 We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence
against them under Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds: under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
1. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
declaring the dismissal legal; focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
2. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
declaring that the admission of petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right
it was obtained in a hostile environment and without the presence or assistance of to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. 14 Therefore, the
counsel; exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admission made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
3. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in investigation.
finding that respondents N.C. Construction Supply et al. are right in withdrawing their
trust and confidence with petitioners without any valid and legal basis. 9 In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the
investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is
We affirm the decision of the NLRC. sufficient ground to terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under custodial
investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
An employer has a right to terminate the services of an employee subject to both investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not
substantive and procedural limitations. This means that (1) the dismissal must be for a a criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not
just or authorized cause provided in the Labor Code, 10 and (2) the employee must be by police officers. The fact that the investigation was conducted at the police station did
accorded due process before his employment is terminated. The validity of the dismissal not necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue of the
hinges on the employer's compliance with these two requirements. 11 investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during
such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
In the case at bar, petitioners who were employed as drivers at respondent company
were found guilty of stealing company property consisting of electrical wire, welding Private respondents, however, failed to observe due process in terminating the
rod, G.I. sheet, steel bar and plywood. Article 282 of the Labor Code authorizes an employment of petitioners. Due process demands that the employer should furnish the
employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence, worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
provided that the loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts. The law does statement of the cause(s) for termination and afford him ample opportunity to be heard
not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. Substantial and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires.
evidence is sufficient. 12 Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 13 termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2)
Petitioners' culpability in the instant case was sufficiently proved by private the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
respondents. Jay Calso, an employee of respondent company who has personal him. 15 There is no showing in this case that private respondents furnished petitioners
knowledge about the series of thefts that has been going on at respondent company, which such notices. Private respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Reyes,
positively identified petitioners as among the perpetrators of the theft. Petitioners have immediately terminated petitioners' services upon conclusion of the investigation.
not shown any ill motive on the part of Calso to implicate them in the offense, unless it Private respondents must therefore indemnify petitioners for failure to observe due
was true. In addition, petitioners admitted their participation in the theft during an process before dismissing them from work.
investigation conducted by private respondents' lawyer.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision is hereby
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that such admission was obtained by AFFIRMED. No costs.
means of threat or intimidation as such allegation is couched in general terms and is
unsupported by evidence. SO ORDERED.

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 pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to
prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction.” From the above
principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to
50. G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996 prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged. People vs.
Solayao, 262 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMERO, J.:
NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearm; Evidence; Essential elements to prove the Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
crime of illegal possession of firearm.—This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati ammunition 1 defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio
license or permit to possess the same. Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an
intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on
Same; Same; Same; Search Warrant; The case at bar constitutes an instance where a the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. 2
search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest.—As with Posadas,
the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to “stop and frisk” accused- Onion where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The
appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-
first. appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. 3

Same; Same; Same; Same; There was no violation of the constitutional guarantee Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as
against unreasonable searches and seizures.—Thus, there was no violation of the "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When
on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence. he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he
was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he
Same; Same; Same; The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient or and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently
essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. 4
reasonable doubt.—Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes
every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not
proof beyond reasonable doubt. aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were
using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch
Same; Same; Same; An admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond handed to him after the others had been used up. 5 Accused-appellant's claim was
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.—By its very nature, an corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes
“admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves. 6
may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt.” In other words, it is a “statement by defendant of fact or facts

226
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et
of firearm under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the al. 12 where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law
penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may
perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. 7 It found that accused-appellant an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest
did not contest the fact that SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm from him and that he had would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's
submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments
reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, are hardy tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of
Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage
not know his companions. 8 uniform or a jungle suit 13 and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled.
It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors: verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. 14

I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm. The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in the themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know
imposition of the maximum penalty against the accused-appellant. 9 that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. They just suspended that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify
This court, in the case of People v. Lualhati 10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements an arrest without a warrant."
thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who
owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought
same. about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in made.
admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful
warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated his In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former
constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches identified himself as a government agents. 16 The peace officers did not know that he
and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays
Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia: surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may
be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk"
accused-appellant when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents. Under
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is
the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search
inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous
tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant warrant first.
acquitted.

227
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of
the homemade firearm as evidence. proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only
establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us,
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case
element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the Justice Moral upholds this view as follows:
prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license
to possess the subject firearm. 17 The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the
fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired some
upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the
or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if
reasonable doubt. 18 it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence
or non-existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it
In People v. Tiozon, 19 this Court said: is nevertheless, encumber upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the
allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly
within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him." (6 Moran, Comments on the
be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).
possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm,
but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case
law on this question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling: 20
offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged," the
burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed. prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in
an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided
by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense charged,
offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in
Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus
that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. alleged.
Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that
17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time that he was accosted
voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was
held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element asked if he had one. 21 In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's
of the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People admission to prove the second element.
vs. Quebral. 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of
medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having illegal possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical corresponding license? Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the
Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that accused-appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing beyond
if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the

228
reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms an WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET
essential ingredient of the crime charged. ASIDE. Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is continued detention, with cost de oficio.
the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt may be
inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his SO ORDERED.
guilt." 22 In other words, it is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt,
but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." 23 From the above principles, 51. G.R. No. 128046. March 7, 2000
this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMON CHUA UY,
Accused-Appellant.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-Bust Operations; Words and Phrases; A buy-
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states: bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the
purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.—
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. the purpose of trapping and capturing law-breakers in the execution of their criminal
plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by
even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the
not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license. operation deserved full faith and credit. As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be
given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, especially when they
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to
was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the
falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in
possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated
claim of having been framed.
prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm
by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned." 24 Same; Same; Same; Frame-Up; Presumption of Regularity; Although there are instances
when the law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information
or even to harass civilians, still the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies
depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are acted in the regular performance of their official duties.—We, of course, are aware that
equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
averring the negative." 25 information or even to harass civilians. But the defense of frame-up in drug cases
requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties.
National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court
caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.

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Same; Same; Same; The price of P1,000 per gram of shabu paid by the “poseur-buyer” Criminal Procedure; Pre-Trial Orders; In order to bind the accused, the pre-trial order
cannot be considered “so exorbitant” as to render the account of the buy-bust must be signed not only by him but his counsel as well.—Even granting for the sake of
improbable.—The price of P1,000 per gram of shabu paid by the “poseur-buyer” argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits “D” to “D-4,”
Nepomuceno to RAMON cannot be considered “so exorbitant” as to render the account inclusive, and Exhibit “E” contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission
of the buy-bust improbable. In fact, in a buy-bust operation conducted by the policemen cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by
in Sampaloc, Manila on 5 July 1995, or more than a month earlier, P500 only fetched RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly
0.395 gram of shabu, which meant that the selling price then was already more than provides: SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No ‘agreement or admission
P1,000 for a full gram of shabu. made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. Put in
Same; Same; Witnesses; Informers are almost always never presented in court because another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but
of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.—The failure to present the his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of
informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his
prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his
preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be presence at the pre-trial conference; and eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the
dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case, accused to the facts agreed upon.
when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.
Appeals; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Objection to evidence cannot be raised for
Same; Same; Same; An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, the first time on appeal; When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.—As against the positive must so state in the form of objection.—In addition to the foregoing admission by
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust RAMON of the prosecution’s exhibits, he likewise never raised in issue before the trial
operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for
from him, RAMON’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in
mouth of credible witness. the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain
Same; Warrantless Arrests; Where the accused was caught in flagrante selling shabu, his documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for
warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also the first time, be raised on appeal. In U.S. v. Choa Tong where the defense counsel did
valid and lawful.—Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimen submitted
correctly ruled that his warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing was opium, the Court ruled that “[t]he objection should have been made at the time the
more shabu was also valid and lawful. Besides, RAMON never raised, on constitutional said analysis was presented.”
grounds, the issue of inadmissibility of the evidence thus obtained.
Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Presumption of Regularity; An NBI Forensic
Same; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Where the accused and his counsel merely Chemist is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the
agreed to the marking of the exhibits, thereby dispensing with the testimony of the performance of his function and duty.—As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it
Forensic Chemist, the same may not be considered an admission of the findings of said must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his
witness on the contents of the plastic bag.—It may at once be noted that neither report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duty.
RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in the
“be marked” as Exhibits “D,” “D-l,” “D-2,” “D-3,” “D-4,” and “E” contain performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie
methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with the testimony evidence of the facts therein stated. We are also aware that “the test conducted for the
of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo presence of ‘shabu’ (infrared test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by
on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion of an average or regular chemistry graduate” and where “there is no evidence. . . to show
the Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his counsel merely agreed to the marking of that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (‘shabu’)
the exhibits, and the clause “thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist are erroneous . . . coupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has been
Loreto E. Bravo” must be understood in that context. regularly performed, said results” may “adequately establish” that the specimens
submitted were indeed shabu.

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 The accusatory portion of the Information5 in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN charges:
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale
of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled That on or about the 11th day of September 1995 in the Municipality of Malabon,
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.—In sum, in Criminal Case No. Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
16199-MN we are convinced that the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond above-named accused being a private person and without authority of law, did then and
reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
shabu, to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and white crystalline substance separately contained in five (5) sealed plastic bags all with
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the markings with total net weight 401 grams which substance when subjected to chemistry
contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money successfully examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise
consummated the “buy-bust” transaction between the entrapping officers and the known as shabu which is a regulated drug.
accused. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in CONTRARY TO LAW.
court of the corpus delicti. People vs. Uy, 327 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 128046 March 7,
2000 In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, RAMON was charged with the illegal possession of
"traces" of shabu found on three (3) plastic scoops and other drug paraphernalia which
DECISION were seized from his supposed residence in a follow-up search.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: No bail was recommended. When arraigned, RAMON pleaded not guilty in each case.6
During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the testimony
Ramon Chua Uy (hereafter RAMON ) appeals from the decision1 of the Regional Trial of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.7 They also agreed on the marking of the exhibits
Court of Malabon, Branch 170, Metro Manila, in Criminal Cases No. 16199-MN and for the prosecution.
No. 16200-MN, which decreed him guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Article III,
R.A. No. 6425,2 as amended, for the illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," and possession of 401 grams of the same drug, respectively.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr.,
RAMON was arrested in the evening of 11 September 1995 by the elements of the Anti- who acted as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-
Narcotics Unit of the Philippine National Police in Malabon, Metro-Manila, in the bust team, as rebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno.
course of a buy-bust operation3 and a follow-up search of his residence, and was
subsequently charged in three cases, namely, Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, Criminal The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence, thus:
Case No. 16200-MN and Criminal Case No. 16201-MN.
The evidence on record shows that at around 5:00 o clock in the afternoon of September
The accusatory portion of the Information4 in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN alleges: 11, 1995, a female confidential informant personally informed the members of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which was then holding office at
That on or about the 11th day of September 1995 in the Municipality of Malabon, Barangay Concepcion, Malabon, Metro-Manila, that accused Ramon Chua Uy "alias
Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Chekwa" had asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram.
above-named accused being a private person and without authority of law, did then and Acting on the given information, the members of the unit subsequently planned a buy-
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver for and in consideration of bust operation against the accused.
the amount of P5,000.00 to SPO1 Alberto Nepomuceno, Jr. who acted as poseur buyer
white crystalline substance contained in a sealed plastic bag with markings with net SPO4 Eddie Regalado instructed the confidential informant to consum[m]ate a deal with
weight of 5.8564 grams which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave the accused by telling him that a prospective buyer is willing to purchase five (5) grams
positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as "Shabu" of the illicit drug to be delivered in front of the Justice Hall of Malabon located along
which is a regulated drug. Sanciangco Street, Barangay Catmon. At 6:30 p.m., the confidential informant called up
and informed the police officers that accused Chua Uy already agreed on the transaction
CONTRARY TO LAW. as well as to the place of delivery. P/Insp. Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Narcotics Unit,
at once formed the buy-bust team composed of SPO4 Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel

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Borda. After securing five (5) P1,000.00-peso bills to be used in the operation from scoop; one (1) Selecta ice cream cup; and one (1) white plastic container (Exhs. "G,"
P/Inp. Aquino, SPO4 Regalado have (sic) them photocopied, after which, [he] affixed "G-1," "G-2," "H and "H-1"). All the items were marked by SPO1 Nepomuceno with his
his signatures (sic) on each of the xerox copies although the serial number of the bills initials "AGN." Along with the aforesaid articles were three (3) pieces of plastic scoops
were previously recorded. and two (2) plastic glasses (sic) with traces of "shabu." Laboratory examination made on
them gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
The group then proceeded to Barangay Catmon at about 7:00 p.m., with SPO1 regulated drug (Exhibit "F"- Crim. Case No. 16200-MN). These antecedent facts which
Nepomuceno designated to act as the poseur buyer. When they reached the place, SPO1 lead to the filing of the present cases against accused Chua Uy are embodied in the
Nepomuceno first went to a store near the tennis court while the rest of the team sworn affidavit of SPO1 Nepomuceno marked and offered in evidence as Exh. "J."
positioned themselves in strategic locations. At 8:20 of the same evening, SPO1
Nepomuceno saw a white Toyota car came to a stop. Their confidential informant SPO4 Eddie Regalado corroborated the testimony of SPO Nepomuceno, claiming that
immediately stepped out of the car and approached SPO1 Nepomuceno and ordered him he was positioned fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away when he saw SPO1
to board the vehicle. Once inside, SPO1 Nepomuceno caught sight of the driver and the Nepomuceno entered the white Toyota car at the time of the operation. He further went
other male companion of accused Chua Uy through the back seat where he and the to say that a caliber 9mm pistol was also recovered from accused Chua Uy but
accused together with the confidential informant were seated. After a few minutes considering that up to now they have not received any certification from the Firearms
conversation, accused Chua Uy opened up his brown attach case and ensuingly handed and Explosives Unit, showing whether accused is authorized to carry firearm, no case
over to SPO1 Nepomuceno five (5) grams of shabu placed in a transparent plastic has yet been filed against the latter. Further, SPO4 Regalado said that accused Chua Uy
packet. In exchange for the substance, SPO1 Nepomuceno delivered the five (5) P1,000- has admitted to him that he is just a neophyte in the illegal trade.
peso bills which accused Chua Uy put in his right front pocket. SPO1 Nepomuceno then
simply opened the rear right door of the car and lighted a cigarette as pre-arranged RAMONs version of the incident is also faithfully summarized by the trial court, thus:
signal. SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz consequently closed in on the vehicle.
Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the accused of his Accused Chua Uy claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit drug
constitutional rights before placing him under arrest. He later turned over to SPO1 allegedly seized from him were merely "planted" by the police officers.
Regalado the five (5) grams of shabu (Exh. "E"- Crim. Case No. 16199-MN).
Thereafter, SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz seized the brown attach case from accused He stated that he has been in the business of manufacturing t-shirts and selling them in
Chua Uy which yielded five (5) more plastic packets of "shabu," (Exhs. "D" to "D-4" -- different places for almost fifteen (15) years already. That on the date of the incident at
Crim. Case No. 16200-MN), along with several drug paraphernalia. SPO4 Regalado issue, it took him up to 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening to return home because he had made
likewise recovered the buy-bust money from the accused after the consumated (sic) deliveries and had collected bigger amount of money. On board his L300 delivery van
transaction, (Exhs. "K" to "K-4"). The one packet of suspected "shabu" which was the together with his driver and while they were about to enter the house, he saw a white
subject of the sale including the five (5) packets of the same substance, taken from the Toyota Corolla car parked in front of the gate. A man, whom he identified as a certain
brown attach case, bearing the respective initials of SPO4 Regalado and SPO1 Arnold, alighted from the car and approached them. Arnold was offering the said car for
Nepomuceno were brought to the NBI Forensic Division. Laboratory examination of the sale to him at a cheaper price but he declined the offer inasmuch as he already owns a
pieces of evidence shows positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a van. Due to the persistence of Arnold, he agreed to test drive the vehicle bringing along
regulated drug (Exh. "C"). with him his attache case containing the days collection. With Arnold on the wheel, they
traversed the interior alley of Dela Cruz then came out at M.H. del Pilar and proceeded
The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 to J. Alex Compound before turning to Gov. Pascual Ave., on their way back to his
Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that there house. At the junction of Justice Hall Street and Gov. Pascual Ave., somebody blocked
were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused at No. 402 their car. Arnold lowered his side window and inquired what was it all about. Although
Gen. Vicente St., San Rafael Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. Forthwith, SPO4 he did not quite understand the conversation, he overheard that it was a "police bakal."
Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court to lawfully When Arnold informed him that they will have to go along with the man to the police
search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. "I"). headquarters, two other men boarded their car while an owner jeep followed them from
During the search and in the presence of Bgy. Kagawad George So and Rodolfo behind.
Salvador including Maritess Puno, the alleged owner of the house and live-in partner of
accused Chua Uy, the team was able to confiscate assorted articles intended for the Reaching the headquarters, Arnold and the two men went inside while he was left
repacking of the regulated drug (Exh. "I-1"). SPO1 Nepomuceno identified them as behind inside the car. Soon after, one of the two returned to him and insisted in getting
follows: one (1) white plastic scoop; one (1) blue plastic scoop; one (1) tangerine plastic his attache case. He refused at first to surrender the same but had to give up on account

232
of the persistence exerted on him. Ten minutes later, a man ordered him to go inside the 3. In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, accused RAMON CHUA UY is hereby
headquarters and likewise asked him why there was "shabu" in his attache case. He ACQUITTED for lack of sufficient evidence.
denied owning the "shabu" and tried to look for Arnold who was no longer around. He
even inquired how his attache case was opened considering that the key was still with The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions story of a legitimate buy-bust
him. Finally, he was dragged inside the headquarters where he saw his attache case operation; declared that poseur-buyer SPO1 Nepomuceno creditably testified as to how
already thrown wide. He again reiterated his earlier query and tried to look for his the sale took place inside the white Toyota car of RAMON and that his testimony "was
money but instead he was informed about the "shabu" found inside his attache case amply corroborated" by SPO4 Regalado. It held that RAMONs entrapment and arrest
which he, nonetheless, denied ownership. The man who earlier stopped them and those were not effected in a haphazard way with the police undertaking "the rigors of
inside the headquarters, who were forcing him to admit ownership of the "shabu" told planning" the buy-bust operation. The presumption that they regularly performed their
him that they were policemen. Furthermore, he recalls that aside from some documents, duty was not rebutted by proof of any ulterior motive. It concluded that the prosecution
list of collections, checks, check booklets and 9 mm pistol, his attache case contained has proved with certainty all the elements necessary for the crime of illegal sale of
P132,000.00 which he was able to collect from different persons. Only a bundle methamphetamine hydrochloride, and since RAMON was caught in flagrante delicto
consisting of P20.00 peso bills was left while the rest of his money comprising of selling a regulated drug, his warrantless arrest was valid and the seizure of five (5) more
bundles of P10, P20, P100, P500 and P1,000 peso bills were already missing. packets of shabu weighing 401 grams (Exhibits "D" to "D-4") from the confiscated
attache case of RAMON was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an
Maritess Puno, the other defense witness, testified on the events which transpired during officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his
the follow-up search by the police of RAMONs suspected house at No. 402 Gen. person in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. The trial court also
Vicente Street, San Rafael Village, Navotas, and on the fact that she knew RAMON. cited the confirmation by the NBIs Forensic Division Chemist, Loreto F. Bravo, that the
packets of shabu bought and seized from RAMON, was tested positive for
On rebuttal, SPO4 Regalado reiterated that the five (5) transparent plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibit "C").
"shabu" were indeed found inside RAMONs confiscated attache case and that they
recovered therefrom only P20-peso bills amounting to P2,200 and not P1,000-peso bills The trial court was not convinced of RAMONs claim of innocence and frame up. It
as RAMON claims. doubted his tale that when arrested, he was just test-driving the car of a certain Arnold,
and that he was carrying P132,000 in various denominations inside his attache case
In its decision,12 dated 10 December 1996, the trial court found credible the testimonies which the police did not account for. It also dismissed as trivialities RAMONs attack on
of the witnesses for the prosecution and its evidence to have established beyond the existence and preparation of the buy-bust money and lack of prior surveillance, since
reasonable doubt the culpability of RAMON in Criminal Cases Nos. 16199-MN and a police report listing the names of the donors of the money used by the police to
16200-MN. It acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 16201-MN. It then decreed: finance its anti-drug operation, the marking of the buy-bust money itself, and prior
surveillance are not indispensable to the conduct of a buy-bust operation, as long as the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven.

1. In Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, the Court finds accused RAMON CHUA UY guilty Unsatisfied, RAMON appealed from the decision. In view of the penalty of reclusion
beyond reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. perpetua imposed in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, the appeal is now before us.
6425, amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years In his Appellants Brief, RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in giving credence
and two (2) months of prision correctional as maximum plus the cost of the suit; to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the
defense; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of drug
2. In Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, [t]he Court finds accused RAMON CHUA UY pushing and drug possession. He assails the credibility of the testimony of the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, contending that the price of P1,000 for
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and considering that the quantity of a gram of shabu is "so exorbitant"13 as to be in credible and claims that the police
methamphetamine hydrochloride is more than 200 grams, there being no mitigating or officers only made it to appear that the price was exactly P1,000 per gram because there
aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion were P1,000-peso bills among the P132,000 which they got from his attache case. He
perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus the cost insists that he is a legitimate garments businessman who need not resort to selling illicit
of the suit; and drugs to make money; in fact, he was carrying his days collection amounting to
P132,000 when accosted by the police in the evening of 11 September 1995. Thus, the

233
female confidential agent/police informer should have testified in court to prove her
claims against him. We find no merit in this appeal.

Finally RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist, the A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for
prosecutions case "falls to pieces." Bravos testimony cannot be waived since only he the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
could say whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and also determine its plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved
actual weight upon which depends the penalty to be imposed. Thus, whatever he said in itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a
his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by
value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the
only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions evidence." operation deserved full faith and credit.18 As has been repeatedly held, credence shall
be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges us to affirm they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
RAMONs conviction. It agrees with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of
witnesses for the prosecution. The price of shabu at P1,000 per gram is not incredible. It motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of
was the price quoted by the informant, prompting the buy-bust team to prepare five (5) regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on
P1,000-peso bills which they actually paid to RAMON but later recovered. The Tranca the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated
and Ong cases14 cited by RAMON cannot be relied upon because the price of shabu or claim of having been framed.
any illegal drugs for that matter is determined by the law of supply and demand, not by
law or jurisprudence. Besides, the amount of shabu sold to the poseur buyer in Tranca We, of course, are aware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of
for P100 was only 0.06 gram; while in Ong, the price of P650 per kilo of shabu involved planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians.20 But the defense of
transactions done way back in March, 1993. It is then neither impossible nor improbable frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
for the street price of shabu to reach P1,000 per gram in 1995 when the illegal sale was presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
committed in this case since the price of illegal drugs are not fixed, but determined by official duties.21 Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
its availability on the street and the demand of users. Secondly, RAMONs avowal that viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common
he is a legitimate garments businessman who need not earn money the illegal way is and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
purely self-serving, since the members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit Act.
caught him in the act of selling shabu to a member of the buy-bust team and further
carried 401 grams more of shabu inside his attache case. Finally, the police informer In the cases at bar, our review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses yields no
need not be presented to establish the buy-bust since it was not she but the police who basis to overturn the trial courts findings on their credibility. As correctly noted by the
caught RAMON in the act of selling and possession of shabu. Her presentation is neither trial court, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers
essential nor indispensable for RAMONs conviction, since her testimony would be who conducted the buy-bust operation. RAMON has not even tried to suggest any
merely corroborative and cumulative. ulterior motive.

On the non-presentation of Loreto Bravo, the NBI forensic chemist, the OSG argues that We are convinced that in the evening of 11 September 1995, an honest- to- goodness
Bravos finding that the drugs seized from RAMON were indeed the regulated entrapment operation against RAMON was conducted by the team composed of the
methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu, is not hearsay. Bravo did not testify anymore local Anti-Narcotics Units Chief himself, Police Inspector Ricardo Aquino, OIC, SPO4
because the parties agreed during the pre-trial to dispense with his testimony. RAMON Eddie Regalado, PO Alberto G. Nepomuceno, PO3 Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel
never objected to the order. Neither did he move to reconsider it. The facts thus Borda.23 Nepomuceno, the poseur-buyer had not seen RAMON before, although he had
stipulated and incorporated in the pre-trial order bound him.16 Moreover, at the trial previous background information about RAMON. Nepomuceno conducted surveillance
RAMON never raised the question of the non-presentation of the forensic chemist; what on RAMON.
his counsel objected to was with respect to the presentation and identification of the
shabu wherein defense objected to the irregular act of showing the confiscated drug to The price of P1,000 per gram of shabu paid by the "poseur-buyer" Nepomuceno to
SPO1 Nepomuceno without laying the basis therefor.17 The defense counsel did not RAMON cannot be considered "so exhorbitant" as to render the account of the buy-bust
also object to the direct examination of SPO4 Regalado concerning the whereabouts and improbable. In fact, in a buy-bust operation conducted by the policemen in Sampaloc,
identification of the subject shabu. Manila on 5 July 1995, or more than a month earlier, P500 only fetched 0.395 gram of

234
shabu,25 which meant that the selling price then was already more than P1,000 for a full the withdrawal of the motion for reinvestigation by RAMONs counsel; RAMONs plea
gram of shabu. of not guilty in each case; and the proceedings at the pre-trial. As to the latter, the Joint
Order states:
As to the buy-bust money, Nepomuceno categorically stated that after receiving the
information from their informant, Police Inspector Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Anti- During the pre-trial, prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on the markings of the
Narcotic Unit, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation "and prepared marked following prosecutions exhibits, thereby dispensing will the testimony of Forensic
money worth P5,000 in P1,000 denomination and instructed [him] to act as poseur buyer chemist Loreto E. Bravo, to wit:
in the operation." They photocopied (xeroxed) them and "got the serial numbers." After
the operation, they submitted them to the prosecutors office.26 Nepomuceno underwent Exhibit "A" - Letter request;
grueling cross-examination by defense counsel27 but he never wavered on his testimony
on the conduct of the buy-bust operation. On cross-examination, Nepomuceno revealed Exhibit "B" - Preliminary report;
that the source of their buy-bust money is Mayor Amado S. Vicencio.
Exhibit "B-1" - Signature of forensic Chemist;
The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court Exhibit "C" - Final Report for Chemical cases Nos. 16199 and 16200;
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.29 Their testimony
or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely Exhibit "C-1" - Signature of Forensic Chemist in said Report;
corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the sale of the
illegal drug. The five (5) plastic bags with markings containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
with a total weight of 401 grams will be marked as follows:
On the other hand, RAMON only offered an unsubstantiated tale of frame-up. He did
not even present his own driver named "Lolong" to corroborate his tale. Exhibit "D" - Plastic bag with letter A;

As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught Exhibit "D-1" - Plastic bag with letter B;
RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of
shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMONs negative testimony must necessarily fail. Exhibit "D-2" - Plastic bag with letter C;
An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it
comes from the mouth of credible witness. Exhibit "D-3" - Plastic bag with letter D;

Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court correctly ruled that Exhibit "D-4" - Plastic bag with letter E;
his warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also
valid and lawful.32 Besides, RAMON never raised, on constitutional grounds, the issue Exhibit "E" - One (1) plastic sachet with methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total
of inadmissibility of the evidence thus obtained. weight of 5.8564 grams;

We now address RAMONs contention that since the NBI Forensic Chemist did not Exhibit "F" - Another Final report for Criminal Case No. 16201;
testify, his findings that the specimens submitted to him were indeed shabu and weighed
so much, are hearsay and leave the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to convict. Exhibit "F-1" - Signature of Chemist in said report;
RAMONs premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemists
testimony but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions evidence." Indeed, The three (3) pieces of plastic scoop and two (2) plastic containers with markings
the records disclose that during the pre-trial, conducted immediately after the containing residue of methamphetamine hydrochloride will be marked as follows:
arraignment on 21 November 1995, RAMON, duly represented by counsel de parte
Atty. Gerardo Alberto,33 and the prosecution stipulated on the markings of the Exhibit "G" - Plastic scoop color white;
prosecutions exhibits, and agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist
Loreto F. Bravo. Thereafter the trial court issued a Joint Order, which embodies its Exhibit "G-1" - Plastic scoop color blue;
ruling granting the motion of the trial prosecutor for the joint trial of the two cases and

235
Exhibit "G-2" - Plastic scoop color tangerine;
Exhibit "H" - Selecta ice cream plastic cup; ATTY. DOMINGO:

Exhibit "H-1" - White plastic container; No objection to these exhibits Your Honor only insofar as to form part of the testimony
of the witness/ es who testified and identified said exhibits and only insofar or in
By agreement of the prosecution and defense, set the presentation of evidence for the accordance with the stipulations the prosecution and the defense had entered into during
prosecution on January 8, 9, 11 and 15, 1996; whereas evidence for the defense will be the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.38cräläwvirtualibräry
on January 18, 22 and 25, 1996, all at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon.34cräläwvirtualibräry
In its offer of the exhibits, the prosecution explicitly described what the foregoing
It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express admission exhibits was and the purposes for which they were offered, thus:
that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-
3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to FISCAL ALIPOSA:
dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an
admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the We are now offering in evidence the following:
tenor of the aforequoted portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his
counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing Exhibit "A", is the letter-request;
with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that
context. Exhibit "B", the preliminary report;

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibit "B-1", signature of the forensic chemist;
Exhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Exhibit "C", final report of Crim. Case Nos. 16199-MN and 16200-MN;
Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides: Exhibit "C-1", the signature of forensic chemist;

SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or These exhibits are being offered to establish the fact that after the apprehension of the
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused accused, the necessary request was prepared and findings in the preliminary and final
unless reduced to writing and signed and his counsel.35cräläwvirtualibräry reports are both positive for shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2", "D-3", and "D-4", are plastic packs of shabu found inside
him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the the attache case opened while inside the vehicle of the accused together with the
rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions prosecution witness in the course of the buy-bust operation;
which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived
his presence at the pre-trial conference;36 eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the Exhibit "E" is the 5.84 grams of shabu which was the subject of the buy-bust operation;
accused to the facts agreed upon.
Exhibit "F" and "F-1", final report and signature of the forensic chemist in Crim. Case
Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels No. 16201-MN, showing the specimen examined to be positive for shabu;
signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence
what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, RAMON did not object to the xxx
admission of Bravos Preliminary Report (Exh. "B"), Final Report (Exh. "C"), another
Final Report (Exh. "F"), and of the plastic bags (Exhibits "D" to "D-4" inclusive, and We likewise offered these exhibits as part of the testimony of the witness or witnesses
"E"). who testified thereon Your Honor.

When asked to comment on the exhibits formally offered, RAMONs counsel merely In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecutions exhibits, he
stated: likewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic

236
Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to caught during the buy-bust operation. The penalty imposed, namely, reclusion perpetua
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to and fine of P500,000 is in order pursuant to People v. Simon.[48]
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such WHEREFORE , the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.40 The familiar rule in 170, in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN and Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, is hereby
this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of affirmed in toto.
hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the first time, be raised on
appeal.41 In U.S. v. Choa Tong[42] where the defense counsel did not object to the Costs de oficio.
form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimen submitted was opium, the
Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at the time the said analysis was SO ORDERED.
presented."

In People v. Dela Cruz,43 the Court rejected the appellants contention that the biology
report of the NBI forensic chemist was inadmissible for being hearsay because the
forensic chemist was not presented in court, and held, noting that the report was not 52. G.R. No. 124832. February 1, 2000
objected to as such in his comments or objections to the prosecutions formal Offer of
Evidence, that "[e]very objections to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANTE CEPEDA y
time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall SAPOTALO, Accused-Appellant. YNARES-SANTIAGOJ
have become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived.
Criminal Law; Rape; Sweetheart Theory; As an affirmative defense, an alleged “love
Finally, as to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI affair” needs convincing proof, for, after having admitted to having had carnal
Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of knowledge of the complainant several times, the accused bears the burden of proving his
regularity in the performance of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of Section 44, defense by substantial evidence.—Accused-appellant’s allegation of an illicit amorous
Rule 130, entries in official records made in the performance of office duty, as in the relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of
case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We are credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the ‘illicit love affair’
also aware that "the test conducted for the presence of shabu (infrared test) is a relatively angle appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative defense, the
simple test which can be performed by an average or regular chemistry graduate" and alleged ‘love affair’ needs convincing proof. Having admitted to having had carnal
where "there is no evidence... to show that the positive results for the presence of knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) are erroneous... coupled with the undisputed proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that other than his self-
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, said results" may serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and
"adequately establish" that the specimens submitted were indeed shabu. private complainant were in love.

In sum, in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN we are convinced that the prosecutions Same; Same; Same; If the accused was really the paramour of private complainant, the
evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every latter would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably
prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood.—It
the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married and are
therefor.45 The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the living together with their respective spouses. In this case, other than accused-appellant’s
marked money successfully consummated the "buy-bust" transaction between the self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or pictures were
entrapping officers and the accused.46 What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private complainant. Neither
of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused-
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not have gone to
the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to humiliation
There is also no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have
No. 16200-MN was proven beyond reasonable doubt since RAMON knowingly carried implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable
with him more than 400 grams of shabu without legal authority at the time he was crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to

237
mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected
it not the truth. the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact examine their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who
that in rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition act with testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
remains untainted.—Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source
but must also be credible in itself such as one that the common experience and Same; Same; Same; A complainant’s act in immediately reporting the commission of
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has rape has been considered as a factor strengthening her credibility.—To restate what had
taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable vis-à-vis the prevailing facts of the case for
and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so the victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the process, subject herself and her
that their reputation remains untainted. Such circumspection must have prompted the family to the disgrace, social humiliation and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape
victim to request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused- as well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame incident thereto. Furthermore, the conduct of
appellant’s house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by accused-appellant on the the victim immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance so as to
pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their establish the truth or falsity of the charges of rape. In this case, we find the private
house. complainant’s prompt report of her defilement to her husband as well as the authorities
as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant’s act in
Same; Same; Same; The mere assertion of a “love relationship” would not necessarily immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a
rule out the use of force to consummate the crime—a sweetheart cannot be forced to factor strengthening her credibility. People vs. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290, G.R. No.
have sex against her will.—Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused-appellant 124832 February 1, 2000
and private complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not
extricate him from his predicament. The mere assertion of a love relationship’ would not
necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in DECISION
rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent. Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the victim YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
were really lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that “[A] sweetheart cannot
be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual For acceding to a request to massage the stomach of a neighbor's wife who was
gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. purportedly suffering abdominal pains, Conchita Mahomoc got raped instead. Charged
Love is not a license for lust.” for the crime was the neighbor, Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo in an Information alleging -

Same; Same; It defies reason why a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of That on or about the 2nd day of April 1994 in Barangay Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
been sexually abused if her motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to armed with a knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
justice the person who defiled her.—As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Conchita Mahomoc, against her
married woman with a husband and three (3) daughters would not publicly admit that will.
she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in
this case why a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of defloration, allow the CONTRARY TO LAW.1cräläwvirtualibräry
examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused
if her motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who Upon arraignment, accused assisted by counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.2
defiled her. The case then proceeded to trial after which the court a quo rendered judgment,3 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Same; Same; Witnesses; Doctrinal Guidelines in Scrutinizing Credibility of
Witnesses.—In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby finds accused
following doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
of the lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or rape and accordingly sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

238
He shall serve his sentence entirely at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo, Davao been a masseuse since 1979. On complainant's request, she accompanied her to Cepeda's
del Norte. In addition, the accused is ordered to pay the offended party moral damages house. Upon arrival, the accused told her to leave as his Muslim wife gets angry when
in the sum of P50,000.00.4 The accused is entitled to the full benefits of his preventive there are plenty of people in their house. Both she and Conchita protested but Cepeda
imprisonment if he agrees to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon insisted on it several times forcing her to leave the house of the accused.
convicted prisoners, conformably with Article 29 (as amended) of the Revised Penal
Code. Accused is also ordered to pay the costs. Veronica Delmiguiz declared that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2,
1994, she heard a shout for help from the house of Cepeda. She looked and saw that the
IT IS SO ORDERED.5cräläwvirtualibräry windows were closed. She did not give it a second thought thinking that it was a family
trouble as she has heard Cepeda and his wife quarrel on previous occasions. Helen
Dissatisfied, accused interposed this appeal ascribing a lone assignment of error which Antolijao co-executed an affidavit with Veronica Delminguiz on April 5, 1994 but was
asserts that - not anymore presented by the prosecution as her testimony would only corroborate that
of Delminguiz.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
-APPELLANT GULTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. .......x x x.......x x x.......x x x

The trial court summed the versions of both prosecution and defense thus: This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are lovers. He came
to know her as he passes by her house in going to his place of work. He began working
with EMCO in the month of February 1994. The complainant has gone to their house
four times in February 1994, first to sell Herway cosmetics, the second time to sell
On April 4, 1994, Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station of Magallanes to "chorizo", the third time to sell fish and the fourth time to sell clothing materials. He
complain that she was raped by Dante Cepeda. On April 5, 1994, she signed her was present in their house only on the first occasion that complainant had gone there. He
Complaint and swore to it before MCTC Clerk of Court Gad B. Curaza. She claims that knew of the other occasions because his wife told him. The fifth time the complainant
at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house went to their house on March 6, he courted her by saying: "Sing, I knew that you like
at Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to massage me and I like you." Then they had sexual intercourse. The next time Conchita came to
(hilot) his wife who was suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was see him and had sexual intercourse with Him was on March 13, then March 17, March
in her house and she asked her to go with her. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they 29 and March 27 when on this date, she asked him to leave his wife to elope with her as
reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry she would also leave her husband. He rejected this proposal because he loved his wife
if there were many people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according to him, was displeased because
had to leave. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped he would not elope with her. On April 2, 1994, Conchita again came to his house and
inside and saw a figure covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At while they were petting, somebody outside his house said: "You there, what are you
that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her shoulders and pointed doing? At this Conchita left his house and went home. At about 10:00 o'clock that
a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not make any noise, evening, he was arrested.
otherwise I will kill you." She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three times
but Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her to the room by her armpits. Shaking The accused's wife, Dory Cepeda, testified that indeed the complainant has gone to their
herself free from his grasp, she hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom. house four times in the month of February and on these occasions, her husband was at
Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to remove her panty and home. Her husband started working with EMCO in the month of March while she began
lie on the bed. Afraid, she did as ordered and the accused also removed his pants and working as a baby sitter also in the month of March, 1994."
brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs, inserted his penis
inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at the same time embracing and On the basis of the foregoing factual summation, the trial court rendered judgment
kissing her. After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her. against accused Dante Cepeda as stated at the outset.

Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the complainant on the aspect that at [a]bout Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant claims in his defense that he and private
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, she was at Conchita's house to discuss the complainant were carrying on an adulterous love affair. According to him, his request to
gift they would give their neighbor who was getting married. Cepeda arrived and asked private complainant that the latter massage his allegedly ill wife "is a pre-arranged lie
Conchita to give his wife a massage as she was having stomach pains. Conchita had between the accused-appellant and private complainant in order to mislead Regina

239
Carba" the truth being that accused-appellant "purposely went to the house of private
complainant to invite her to his house, their place of rendezvous for their passionate Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be
affair."6 He asserts that the charge of rape was "a contrivance or an afterthought rather credible in itself such as one that the common experience and observation of mankind
than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong"7 because private complainant can approve as probable under the circumstances.15 The Court has taken judicial
"feeling guilty of such an adulterous affair and out of fear that Regina might have cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition
suspected something between her and the accused-appellant, thought of accusing her act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their
paramour of rape in anticipation of the possible retribution by her husband should he reputation remains untainted.16 Such circumspection must have prompted the victim to
later on discover their relationships." request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused- appellant's
house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by accused-appellant on the pretext that
Guided by the three (3) principles in the review of rape cases, namely, that - his wife who was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their house.

1.] An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused- appellant and private complainant
difficult for the person accused, though innocent to disprove; were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not extricate him from his
predicament. The mere assertion of a 'love relationship' would not necessarily rule out
2.] In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are the use of force to consummate the crime.17 It must be stressed that in rape cases, the
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without
and her consent.18 Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the victim were really
lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that "[A] sweetheart cannot be forced to
3.] The evidence of the prosecution stands or fall on its own merits and can not be have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a
allowed to draw strength from weakness of the defense. fiancee, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license
for lust."
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Succinctly stated, in rape the prosecution must rule out the victim's consent to the sexual
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to act.20 In the case at bar, the testimony of private complainant was clear: she did not
deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect consent to penile invasion.21 Assuming for argument's sake that accused-appellant and
scrutiny of the record discloses that the 'illicit love affair' angle appears as a fabrication private complainant were sweethearts, rape was nevertheless committed because
by accused- appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged 'love affair' needs accused-appellant had sex with the victim by force and against her will.
convincing proof.10 Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the
complainant several times,11 accused-appellant bears the burden of proving his defense Indeed, unless deeply wronged and aggrieved, private complainant would not have
by substantial evidence.12 The record shows that other than his self-serving assertions, instituted this case at all. That the victim had been married to her husband for seventeen
there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and private complainant (17) years and is a mother of four (4) children whose ages at the time ranged from
were in love. seventeen (17), sixteen (16), fourteen (14) and ten (10),23 rendered her exposure to
public trial of rape all the more embarrassing and painful.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married and
are living together with their respective spouses.13 In this case, other than accused- As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza,[24] a married woman with a husband and
appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or three (3) daughters would not , publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why a mother of four (4)
complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts25 and
illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other than to fight
would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her.26 Thus not surprisingly
exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. when she was queried as to how much would she claim for her defilement in terms of
Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the moral damages, she emphatically declared as follows:
perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to
public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the Q.......If you were to ask for moral damages from the court, how much would you claim
withering contempt of her children were it not the truth. for moral damages?

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 that a mother of four would demand from a man who became her neighbor for only
A.......I do not need payment it is Justice that I ask.[27] about one and a half months to elope with her. There is no evidence that her relationship
with her husband was on the rocks. Rather, as soon as her husband arrived from work,
She, likewise, flatly denied the existence of an illicit affair with the accused-appellant in she reported to him the abuse she suffered from the hands of the accused and a
face of the not too subtle insinuations of defense counsel to this effect on cross- commotion ensued because of the husband's anger. From the accused's own mouth, he
examination, viz: had been convicted once for possession of "indian pana" and had been transferring from
one place to another, without a permanent home, while the complainant has established
Q.......I will ask you a candid question, Mrs. Marohomoc. Is it not a fact that at one time her home in Magallanes and is secure therein together with her family. A Filipina
you gifted Dante Cepeda with a Herway lotion? woman, especially a mother of three daughters, would not bring herself, her family and
her husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny and being the talk of the community
A.......No, sir. unless what she had testified that she was raped is true.32 If, in the remote possibility,
complainant had voluntarily consented to have sex with him, her most natural reaction
Q.......So you will also deny that you gifted him with Mark cigarettes. would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor
and reputation, as well as to her family.
A.......Oh no!
The conscience of the Court will be very much at ease with a finding that the accused is
In a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of the evidence presented during trial ultimately guilty. It could not decree an acquittal based on lies for falsehood is the anathema of
revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness.29 When a woman says she justice. There can be no justice based on lies.
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped
and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility To restate what had been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable vis-a-vis the prevailing
needed to convict the accused. facts of the case for the victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the process,
subject herself and her family to the disgrace, social humiliation and trauma attendant to
In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following a prosecution for rape as well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame incident thereto.34
doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower Furthermore, the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged assault is of
court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied utmost important so as to establish the truth or falsity of the charges of rape.35 In this
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of case, we find the private complainant's prompt report of her defilement to her husband
the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses as well as the authorities as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A
are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to examine complainant's act in immediately reporting the commission, of rape has been considered
their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who testified by this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility.
in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent
on cross-examination is a credible witness. With regard to the civil liability, however, the trial court's award of damages should be
modified. Under controlling case law, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the following findings and as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.37 This is exclusive
conclusions of the trial court: of the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without need of
further proof.38 The victims' injury is now recognized as inherently concomitant with
From the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, the Court could make out and necessarily proceeds from the appalling crime of rape which per se, warrants an
this deduction: from the accused's heart sprang this evil desire and he contrived a plan to award for moral damages.
rape the complainant. He made up a story about his wife being in pain and shaped a mat
covered with a blanket thus making it appear that his wife as in bed. He closed all the WHEREFORE, with the sole MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Dante Cepeda y
windows of his house so no one could see what happened inside. What he did not expect Sapotalo pay complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
though was the presence of Regina Carba in the house of the complainant so that he indemnity consistent with controlling case law, aside from the award of Fifty Thousand
again had to make up another tale about his wife being a Muslim to get rid of Carba. Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case
Without any "illicit relationship" having been established between the accused and the No. 6246 finding accused Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
complainant before April 2, 1994, what is the basis for the sexual intercourse on that the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
day? The complainant says "rape" and the Court agrees. The Court just cannot believe

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SO ORDERED.
RULE 130, SECTION 27 – OFFER OF COMPROMISE 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE TO
FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST THE ACCUSED. — The trial court, after
NOT ADMISSIBLE observing the demeanor and deportment of said witness, together with the
variations in his expressions while on the witness stand — which are badges of
53. [G.R. No. 97957. March 5, 1993.] truthfulness — concluded that both he and his testimony are credible. Accused-
appellant presents no factual bases or strong arguments to convince Us that the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERTO LASE, alias trial court erred in that regard. Nor has he shown any improper motive which
"BERT", Accused-Appellant. could have impelled Dominico to testify against him or implicate him in the
commission of the crime. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive
strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed, and that the
SYLLABUS testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. For indeed, if an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and
of human nature and against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; witness falsely testify against the accused.
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The
issue of the credibility of witnesses, is a matter appropriately addressed to the 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — The
trial court because it is in a better position to decide the matter, having heard alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl. Mitra relate to
the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is settled that minor
the trial. Thus, the said court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal may even heighten their credibility.
absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the 5. ID.; ID.; OFFER TO COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES; RULE. —
result of the case. Accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum of P10,000.00.
The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY expressly provides that: "In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
REPORT THE CRIME TO THE AUTHORITIES; CASE AT BAR. — The offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
failure of prosecution witness Dominico Pangantihon to immediately report the offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
incident certainly did not detract from his credibility. While it was his duty as a admission of guilt." Murder is not among those criminal cases which may be
barangay official to have assumed the responsibility of reporting the incident, compromised.
come to the succor of the victim or even run after and arrest the assailant, it is a
sad reality that not all in our society, including many of our public officials, are 6. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY,
imbued with the highest sense of civic duty which is necessarily expected of PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — We agree with the trial court that the crime
leaders in the community. Such indifference or apathy should not, however, was committed with treachery because of the sudden and unexpected attack on
cast any shadow of doubt on or impair the credibility of a person who fails to the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch
report a crime or immediately come forward to testify. The initial reluctance of Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case or their facilitate or insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim.
common. Delay in itself is, therefore, not enough. It would, of course, be
entirely different if it clearly appears to the trial court that the witness himself 7. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — The penalty prescribed for
is not credible for the rule is settled that evidence, to be believed, must not only murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its
proceed from a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. Respect maximum period to death, a penalty which consists of three (3) periods. There
should not likewise be accorded to such testimony if there is proof that the said being neither generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the
witness is influenced by improper or ulterior motives in so volunteering to imposable penalty is the medium period of the prescribed penalty — reclusion
testify for the victim sometime after the occurrence of the incident. perpetua.

242
 contrary, they may even heighten their credibility. People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA 584, G.R.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Credibility of witnesses; The court's findings on the No. 97957 March 5, 1993
credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal \absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case.—At the bottom of the first and second assigned errors is DAVIDE, JR., J.:
the issue of the credibility of witnesses, a matter appropriately addressed to the trial
court because it is in a better position to decide the matter, having heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Thus, the said Accused-appellant appeals from the decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court
court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of (RTC) of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 1 convicting him of the crime of murder
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, for the death of Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong, Dimasalang,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which Masbate, and sentencing him:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
could have affected the result of the case.
". . . to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in the absence of any mitigating
Same; Same; Same; Same; The initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to circumstance and to indemnify the parent of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00." 2
volunteer information about a criminal case or their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common.—The failure of prosecution witness The decision was promulgated on 18 February 1991.
Dominico Pangantihon to immediately report the incident certainly did not detract from
his credibility. While it was his duty as a barangay official to have assumed the The records disclose that two (2) days after the killing of Dante Huelva, a criminal
responsibility of reporting the incident, come to the succor of the victim or even run complaint for murder was filed by the Acting Station Commander of the Integrated
after and arrest the assailant, it is a sad reality that not all in our society, including many National Police (INP) of Dimasalang, Masbate with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial
of our public officials, are imbued with the highest sense of civic duty which is Court (MCTC) of Dimasalang-Palanas-Uson (5th Judicial Region) at Dimasalang,
necessarily expected of leaders in the community. Such indifference or apathy should Masbate. 3 The Judge presiding over the said court asked both Ramon Sayson, 4 who
not, however, cast any shadow of doubt on or impair the credibility of a person who fails was Dante’s companion when the incident occurred, and Godofreda Huelva, 5 Dante’s
to report a crime or immediately come forward to testify. The initial reluctance of mother, searching questions. The court then issued a warrant for the arrest of the
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case or their accused-appellant and fixed the bail bond for his temporary liberty at P30,000.00. 6
unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common.
Delay in itself is, therefore, not enough. Accused-appellant was arrested on 20 May 1987 and was released the following day
after posting the required bond. 7
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motive; The absence of evidence as to an improper motive
strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is Having failed to submit his counter-affidavit for purposes of the preliminary
worthy of full faith and credit—Accused-appellant presents no factual bases or strong investigation, the MCTC considered him as having waived the second stage of the
arguments to convince Us that the trial court erred in that regard. Nor has he shown any preliminary investigation and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Office of
improper motive which could have impelled Dominico to testify against him or the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate. 8
implicate him in the commission of the crime. The absence of evidence as to an
improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed, and that the Accused-appellant then sought a reinvestigation of the case; this request was
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. For indeed, if an accused had nothing to do consequently granted. On 7 September 1987, 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jesus C.
with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and Castillo issued a resolution, duly approved by Provincial Fiscal Hermenegildo Betonio,
against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against Jr., dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence and directing the police authorities
the accused. to investigate further and gather more evidence to ferret out the real perpetrator. 9
During the said reinvestigation, Ramon Sayson testified for the prosecution.chanrobles
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is settled that minor incondistencies do not affect virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
the credibility of witnesses.—The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the
testimony of Cpl. Mitra relate to minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is On appeal to the Department of Justice by the offended party, however, the abovecited
settled that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the resolution was reversed by the then Secretary of Justice, Honorable Sedfrey A. Ordoñez,

243
in Resolution No. 856, series of 1988, dated 15 September 1988. 10 Pursuant thereto, home to Piaong, Dimasalang, Masbate, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of May 18,
the Provincial Fiscal was directed to file an information for murder against Accused- 1987, coming from her daughter’s house in Canomay, Dimasalang, Masbate, when she
Appellant. met Eliza Cortes who informed her that her son Dante was stabbed. She proceeded to
the Dr. Alino’s Hospital and found out that Dante was already dead. The following
On 9 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed with the Regional Trial morning, Ramon Sayson told her that it was appellant Alberto Lase who stabbed Dante.
Court (RTC) of Masbate an Information 11 charging the accused-appellant with the (tsn, October 17, 1989, pp. 17-25).
crime of murder committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The stabbing of Dante Huelva was reported to the Integrated National Police (INP) of
"That on or about May 18, 1987, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Pia-ong, Dimasalang, Masbate, on the same night of the incident. The following morning, Police
Municipality of Dimasalang, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of Cpl. Carlos Mitra of the Dimasalang INP conducted an investigation of said stabbing
this Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and incident. He investigated Ramon Sayson who disclosed that appellant was the assailant
taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, of Dante Huelva and readily identified and pointed to appellant among the persons
attack, assault and stab one Dante Huelva, hitting the latter on the different parts of the presented in a police line-up. Ramon Sayson executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F").
body, thereby inflicting wounds which caused his instantaneous death."cralaw virtua1aw The blood-stained pants of Dante Huelva and the hole thereon (Exhibit "G") were
library likewise identified (tsn, January 12, 1990, pp. 2-8).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5557 and was assigned to Branch 45 of the The autopsy conducted on the body of Dante Huelva by Dr. Ernesto Tamayo, Municipal
court. Health Officer of Dimasalang, Masbate, on May 21, 1987, disclosed the following
injuries sustained by the victim, to wit: (a) perforating stab wound, hand, right; (b) stab
Upon being arraigned on 1 September 1989, Accused-appellant entered a plea of not wound, 2 inches below the umbilicus, point of entrance measured 1 inch in diameter, 3
guilty. 12 and 1/2 inches deep, penetrating the intestines; and (c) severe internal hemorrhage
(Exhibit "A"), which injuries directly caused his death (Exhibit "B"). Dr. Tamayo
The prosecution presented Dr. Ernesto Tamayo, the Municipal Health Officer of further testified that the wounds sustained by the victim were caused by a sharp pointed
Dimasalang, Masbate who identified the postmortem examination report (Exhibit "A") instrument (tsn, October 17, 1987, pp. 2-5)." 13
and the death certificate of Dante Huelva (Exhibit "B"), Dominico Pangantihon,
Godofreda Huelva and Cpl. Carlos Mitra as witnesses for its evidence in chief; In her rebuttal testimony, Godofreda Huelva testified that accused-appellant offered to
Godofreda Huelva was recalled as a rebuttal witness. Ramon Sayson could no longer settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
testify as he had left Dimasalang and his whereabouts remain undetermined. The
defense, on the other hand, presented as witnesses for its evidence in chief Paquito "FERNANDEZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Banda, George Combati, Salvacion Andueza, Miguel Andueza and the accused-
appellant, who was also recalled as a surrebuttal witness. Q Now the accused also testified that you filed this case against him because you
wanted him to be paid about (sic) the death of the victim?
The prosecution’s evidence is succinctly summarized in the Brief for the Appellee,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph A He wanted to pay me but I did not agree.

"On May 18, 1987, at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening, Domingo (sic) Pangantihon Q You mean that he wanted to settle this case but you refused?
was on his way home from Piaong, Dimasalang, Masbate, when appellant Alberto Lase
and Ramon Sayson passed him by. At that moment, Dante Huelva was about six meters A Yes, sir.
ahead of them and was urinating by the roadside. Appellant proceeded directly to the
back of Dante Huelva and without any warning stabbed him once with a 7-inch long Q How much were they offering you for this case to be settled?
Batangas knife in the stomach. Afterwards, appellant ran away. Dante Huelva shouted
for help. Ramon Sayson came to his rescue and brought him towards the Poblacion. (tsn, A About ten thousand." 14
October 17, 1989, pp. 6-17).
On the other hand, Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi; he relied on the
Meanwhile, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim Dante Huelva, was on her way testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else

244
and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing. innocence and maintains that the trial court committed the following errors:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
His version is summarized in his Brief as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I
"Accused-appellant Alberto Lase testified that on May 18, 1987, at around 5:30 in the
afternoon, he was with Miguel Andueza at the house of Kagawad Marcelo Tamayo.
They waited for Artemio Andueza who was then drunk. At around 7:00 in the evening, . . . IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE
they were fetched by Mrs. Andueza who informed them that something happened in TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING
Piaong. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

On their way home, they passed by the clinic to visit Dante Huelva. He saw Juan Huelva II
and the policeman at the clinic. The barangay captain talked to the policeman. Dante
Huelva was already dead when they arrived.
. . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
The charges levelled against him is (sic) not true. In fact, after preliminary investigation FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
by the fiscal, the case against him was dismissed. The reason why he was implicated in REASONABLE DOUBT.
this case was because Ramon Sayson told the policeman that Dante Huelva’s assailant
was tall and that victim’s (sic) parents wanted to be paid for the death of the victim." 15 III

In his surrebuttal testimony, Accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise.

He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph . . . IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED IS
MURDER QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY, ALTHOUGH TREACHERY WAS NOT
"MEDINA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, AND IN HOLDING THAT NOCTURNITY IS
DEEMED ABSORBED BY TREACHERY."cralaw virtua1aw library
Q Mrs. Huelva testified here that you are offering in this case for P10,000, is that true.
(sic).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary Being interrelated, Accused-appellant discusses the first and second assigned errors
jointly, unleashing the force of his arguments against the credibility of prosecution
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library witnesses Dominico Pangantihon, who belatedly came out in the open as a witness to
the incident, and Police Corporal Carlos Mitra. As to the first, Accused-appellant argues
A I did not say that. If that is true even P50,000 I am going to pay them." 16 that while it may be true that in a long line of cases this Court "had enunciated the (sic)
credibility of the testimony of a witness who had incurred delay (sic) in reporting the
The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of Dominico Pangantihon because it crime he witnessed, it had also nevertheless ruled that:
was months after the incident, and only after Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he
decided to come out and testify as an alleged eyewitness to the killing. "‘ . . . the silence of an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility
doubtful . . . The long delay in reporting the crime or its author to the authorities not
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and disregarded the caused by threat, intimidation or coercion, renders the testimony untruthful. (People v.
defense of alibi in view of the positive identification of the accused-appellant and the Besa, 183 SCRA 533).’" 20
possibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Thus, in a
Decision promulgated on 18 February 1991, 17 the trial court held him liable for the He then avers that in the instant case, the testimony of Dominico Pangantihon could not
killing of Dante Huelva which, in view of the attendance of treachery, was qualified to be believed because the delay of the latter in reporting the incident was not caused by
murder. As earlier adverted to, the accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty threat, intimidation or coercion, but by his own fear of being implicated. Such reasoning
of reclusion perpetua and was ordered to indemnify the parent of the victim in the is alleged to be unacceptable because being a barangay official (councilman) at that
amount of P30,000.00. On 21 February 1991, he filed his Notice of Appeal. 18 time, it was his duty and responsibility to report the crime. As a matter of fact, he should
have apprehended the assailant who was alone at the time of the attack.
In his main Brief filed on 15 September 1991, 19 accused-appellant insists on his

245
As to P/Cpl. Mitra, Accused-appellant claims that said witness "incurred various glaring position to decide the matter, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
material inconsistencies which render his testimony doubtful and unreliable." 21 Such and manner of testifying during the trial. 25 Thus, the said court’s findings on the
inconsistencies relate to the following matters: (a) whether it was accused-appellant or credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
Ramon Sayson who was summoned to the police station for questioning, (b) whether disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
Ramon Sayson told him that he (Sayson) could recognize the accused-appellant’s face misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
but does not know his name or did in fact mention the name of the said accused- affected the result of the case. 26
appellant, (c) whether the holding of a police line-up was indeed reduced to writing in
Sayson’s sworn statement, (d) whether the murder weapon recovered from the accused- We have painstakingly examined the records of the instant case and scrutinized the
appellant and placed inside his (Mitra’s) drawer was thereafter lost or was given to Pat. transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses and are fully
Tamayo who is already deceased and (e) whether the entry in the police blotter convinced that the exception to the foregoing settled doctrine has not been shown to
concerning a claim of identification of the accused-appellant, in relation to the exist in this case.
investigation of Sayson, is true.
The failure of prosecution witness Dominico Pangantihon to immediately report the
Additionally, Accused-appellant suggests that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses incident certainly did not detract from his credibility. While it was his duty as a
Dr. Tamayo and Godofreda Huelva are likewise unreliable. barangay official to have assumed the responsibility of reporting the incident, come to
the succor of the victim or even run after and arrest the assailant, it is a sad reality that
In his third assigned error, Accused-appellant insists that the qualifying circumstance of not all in our society, including many of our public officials, are imbued with the highest
treachery is not alleged in the information filed by the prosecution. Moreover, sense of civic duty which is necessarily expected of leaders in the community. Such
nocturnity, even if considered as absorbed in treachery, was not present in this case indifference or apathy should not, however, cast any shadow of doubt on or impair the
because although the stabbing occurred at 6:30 o’clock in the evening — considered in credibility of a person who fails to report a crime or immediately come forward to
law to be nighttime — there is no proof that such circumstance was especially sought or testify. The initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about
taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime or ensure the assailant’s a criminal case or their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal
escape. investigations is common. 27 Delay in itself is, therefore, not enough. It would, of
course, be entirely different if it clearly appears to the trial court that the witness himself
The People, in its Brief 22 submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, refutes the is not credible for the rule is settled that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed
arguments of the accused-appellant and maintains that the latter’s guilt has been proven from a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 28 Respect should not
beyond reasonable doubt; however, it agrees with the accused-appellant’s observation likewise be accorded to such testimony if there is proof that the said witness is
that treachery was not alleged in the information and that nighttime was not purposely influenced by improper or ulterior motives in so volunteering to testify for the victim
and deliberately sought. It is further alleged that indeed, "6:30 o’clock in the evening of sometime after the occurrence of the incident.
May 18, 1987 could not be totally dark as it was summertime, when days were longer
than nights, and at such time darkness could not yet have surrounded the area." 23 Thus, The trial court, after observing the demeanor and deportment of said witness, together
the Office of the Solicitor General recommends that accused-appellant should only be with the variations in his expressions while on the witness stand — which are badges of
found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. truthfulness 29 — concluded that both he and his testimony are credible. Accused-
Since the aggravating circumstance of treachery, though not alleged in the information, appellant presents no factual bases or strong arguments to convince Us that the trial
was duly proved, and the same is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the court erred in that regard. Nor has he shown any improper motive which could have
imposable penalty should be the maximum of the prescribed penalty — reclusion impelled Dominico to testify against him or implicate him in the commission of the
temporal — pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to the crime. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is averred that accused-appellant may then be sentenced conclusion that none existed, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 30
to an indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to For indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal as natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith
maximum. It is finally recommended that the amount of indemnity be increased from for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused. 31
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl. Mitra relate to
At the bottom of the first and second assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is settled that minor inconsistencies do
witnesses, a matter appropriately addressed to the trial court 24 because it is in a better not affect the credibility of witnesses; 32 on the contrary, they may even heighten their

246
credibility. 33
WHEREFORE, except for the above observations with respect to the aggravating
Then too, Accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum of P10,000.00. circumstance of nighttime, and the modification of the indemnity which is hereby
The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, the challenged Decision of Branch 45 of the
provides that: Regional Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 finding the accused-
appellant ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the crime charged, is hereby
"In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those AFFIRMED.cralawnad
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt." 34 Costs against the Accused-Appellant.

Murder is not among those criminal cases which may be compromised. SO ORDERED.

As regards the third assigned error, it is clear that both the accused-appellant and the
OSG may not have carefully read the Information filed in this case. Contrary to their
claims, the Information does allege treachery. More specifically, it states: ". . . the said
accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of 54. [G.R. No. 109172. August 19, 1994.]
nighttime, did then and there . . . ." 35 The trial court likewise missed the word treachery
when it quoted the Information in its decision. 36 Interestingly, the criminal complaint TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE COURT
filed on 20 May 1987 by the INP Acting Station Commander of Dimasalang with the OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, Respondents.
MCTC mentions only treachery as a qualifying circumstance. In all likelihood, either
both the accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General merely relied on the
Information as quoted in the decision and in the Appellant’s Brief, 37 or that the latter SYLLABUS
merely relied on its representation in the Appellee’s Brief to the effect that the
Information does not allege the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In this regard, the
Office of the Solicitor General failed to exercise due care in the preparation of the 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; ADMISSIBILITY IN
Appellee’s Brief, while the counsel for accused-appellant unjustly took advantage of the EVIDENCE OF DUPLICATE COPY OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. — It is
inadvertence committed by the trial court. undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore
admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not
We agree with the trial court that the crime was committed with treachery because of the bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In
sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the People v. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said: "When carbon sheets are inserted
road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the
mode of attack to facilitate or insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a
arising from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim. 38 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same
stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written
We likewise agree with the conclusion of both the accused-appellant and the Office of on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence
the Solicitor General that evident premeditation was not duly established by the as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others." A duplicate copy of the
prosecution. original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
The penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank.
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty which consists of three (3)
periods. 39 There being neither generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances 2. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS; ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE
present, the imposable penalty is the medium period of the prescribed penalty — OF OFFER OF COMPROMISE. — To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility
reclusion perpetua. 40 The trial court is therefore correct. However, conformably with of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity should be increased from P30,000.00 to making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
P50,000.00. offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer

247
of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits
the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, 5. ID; DAMAGES; ATTORNEY’S FEES; AWARD THEREOF PROPER IN CASE
then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the AT BAR. — Respondent court is faulted in awarding attorney’s fees in favor of
Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 Associated Bank. True, attorney’s fees may be awarded in a case of clearly unfounded
[1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer civil action (Art. 2208 [4], CC). However, petitioner claims that it was compelled to file
of settlement is an effective admission of a borrower’s loan balance (L.M. Handicraft the suit for damages in the honest belief that it has fully discharged its obligations in
Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what favor of respondent bank and therefore not unfounded. We believe otherwise. As
petitioner did in the case before us for review. petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the fact of its admission
regarding the unpaid balance of P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot also be
3. ID.; APPEAL; WHEN FINDINGS OF FACTS REVIEWABLE BY SUPREME denied that petitioner opted to sue for specific performance and damages after
COURT; CASE AT BAR. — While it has been consistently held that findings of facts consultation with a lawyer who advised that not even the claim for interests could be
are not reviewable by this Court, this rule does not find application where both the trial recovered; hence, petitioner’s attempt to seek refuge under Art. 1271 (CC). As
and the appellate courts differ thereon (Asia Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437 previously discussed, the presumption generated by Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was
[1993]). Petitioner maintains that the findings of the trial court should be sustained successfully rebutted by private Respondent. Under the circumstances, i.e., outright and
because of its advantage in observing the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying honest letters of admission vis-a-vis counsel-induced recalcitrance, there could hardly be
(citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 833) more so where it is supported honest belief.
by the records (Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA
169). This case, however, does not concern itself with the demeanor of witnesses. As for
the records, there is actually none submitted by petitioner to prove that the contested
amount, i.e., the interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact DECISION
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA
178 [1991]). Petitioner could have easily adduced the receipts corresponding to the
amounts paid inclusive of the interest to prove that it has fully discharged its obligation BIDIN, J.:
but it did not. There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial court to
support its claim, by empirical evidence, that the amount corresponding to the interest
has indeed been paid. The trial court totally relied on a disputable presumption that the In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc.
obligation of petitioner as regards interest has been fully liquidated by the respondent’s seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent court, the decretal portion of which
act of delivering the instrument evidencing the principal obligation. reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

4. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; EXTINGUISHMENT OF "WHEREFORE, the decision of June 11, 1991 is SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED; the
OBLIGATIONS; ARTICLE 1271 OF THE CIVIL CODE; CONSTRUED. — The complaint is dismissed, and on the counterclaim, Transpacific is ordered to pay
presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely Associated attorney’s fees of P15,000.00.
prima facie. If there be no evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely,
the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary. "Costs against Transpacific.
In the case before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of
payment generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners "SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 47)
indebtedness. It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a
presumption, not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit where more Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial
convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be called for to prove accommodations amounting to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The
payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a loans were evidence and secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage
private instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy covering three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over petitioner’s stock and
of the evidence of credit. Where several originals are made out of a private document, inventories.
the intendment of the law would thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original
original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by
copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be applied differently. respondent bank, a restructuring of the remaining indebtedness which then amounted to

248
P1,057,500.00, as all the previous payments made were applied to penalties and
interests. "Defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed for lack of merit.

To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were "With costs against defendant.
executed by Trans-Pacific as follows: (1) Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for the
amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated as working capital; (2) Promissory Note No. TL- "SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 101)
9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00 denominated as restructured interest; (3)
Promissory Note No. TL-9079-82 for the amount of P42,234.00 denominated similarly Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed
as restructed interest (Rollo. pp. 113-115). the decision of the trial court. In this appeal, petitioner raises four errors allegedly
committed by the respondent court, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other
parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner’s stock inventory. The released I
parcels of land were then sold and the proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according
to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific’s restructured
loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate original copies of the three "RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon. ACCRUED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT OF P492,100.00 HAS NOT BEEN PAID
WHEN ARTICLE 1176 OF THE CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THAT SUCH CLAIM
Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded FOR INTEREST UPON RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL MUST BE
from Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest RESERVED OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED PAID.
on PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously
released. II

Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by

respondent bank. Later, it had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before the "RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITH THE
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 146, for specific performance and damages. There it DELIVERY OF THE DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING THE PRINCIPAL
prayed that the mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory OBLIGATION, THE ANCILLARY OBLIGATION OF PAYING INTEREST WAS
be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid. NOT RENOUNCED CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 1273 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AND THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific, to wit:
III
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and upon a clear preponderance of evidence in
support of the stated causes of action, the Court finds for the plaintiffs and against
defendant, and "RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS FULLY PAID ITS OBLIGATION CONFORMABLY WITH
"(a) declares plaintiff’s obligations to defendant to have been already fully paid; ARTICLE 1234 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

"(b) orders defendant to execute and deliver to plaintiffs a release on the i September 11, IV
1981 mortgage over TCT (50858) S-10086 and TCT (50859) S-109087, and ii
December 20, 1983 chattel mortgage, within fifteen (15) days from the finality thereof;
"RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S
"(c) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs Romeo Javier and Romana Bataclan-Javier the FEES IN FAVOR OF ASSOCIATED BANK" (Rollo, p. 15).
sum of P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
The first three assigned errors will be treated jointly since their resolution border on the
"(d) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus common issue, i.e., whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to
expenses of the suit. respondent bank.

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 consolidated obligation as restructured, produces a legal presumption that Associated
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court had thereby renounced its actionable claim against plaintiffs (Art. 1271, NCC). The
ruled that petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the presumption is fortified by a showing that said promissory notes all bear the stamp
documents (stamped "PAID") evidencing its indebtedness. Respondent court disagreed "PAID", and has not been otherwise overcome. Upon a clear perception that
and held, among others, that the documents found in possession of Trans-Pacific are Associated’s record keeping has been less than exemplary . . ., a proffer of bank copies
mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner’s claim that its obligation has been of the promissory notes without the "PAID" stamps thereon does not impress the Court
fully paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes submitted by petitioner were as sufficient to overcome presumed remission of the obligation vis-a-vis the return of
duplicates and not the originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to the petitioner said promissory notes. Indeed, applicable law is supportive of a finding that in interest
does not merit the application of Article 1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code which reads: bearing obligations-as is the case here, payment of principal (sic) shall not be deemed to
have been made until the interests have been covered (Art. 1253, NCC). Conversely,
"Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by competent showing that the principal has been paid, militates against postured
the creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had entitlement to unpaid interests.
against the latter."
"In fine, the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs must be found to have settled their
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the obligations in full.
original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
"As corollary, a finding is accordingly compelled that plaintiffs (sic) accessory
". . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, obligations under the real estate mortgage over two (2) substituted lots as well as the
it must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) chattel mortgage, have been extinguished by the renunciation of the principal debt (Art.
presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the tree promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 1273, NCC), following the time-honored axiom that the accessory follows the principal.
42) There is, therefore, compelling warrant (sic) to find in favor of plaintiffs insofar as
specific performance for the release of the mortgages on the substituted lots and chattel
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed is concerned." (Rollo, p. 100)
that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as
evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to premised by:
challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In People v.
Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said: "Records show that Associated’s Salvador M. Mesina is on record as having testified
that all three (3) December 8, 1990 promissory notes for the consolidated principal
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that obligation, interest and penalties had been fully paid (TSN, July 18, 1990, p. 18). It is,
the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be moreover, admitted that said promissory notes were accordingly returned to Romeo
charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus Javier." (Ibid.)
reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all
of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be The above disquisition finds no factual support, however, per review of the records. The
introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others." presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely
prima facie. If there be no evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely,
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary.
possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to In the case before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of
produce it after reasonable notice (Sec. 2 [b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent payment generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners
bank. indebtedness.

This notwithstanding, we find no reversible error committed by the respondent court in It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not
disposing of the appealed decision. As gleaned from the decision of the court a quo, of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would
judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner on the basis of presumptions, to wit: be required than what normally would be called for to prove payment. The rationale for
allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument is that,
"The surrender and return to plaintiffs of the promissory notes evidencing the unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just on copy of the evidence of credit.

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Where several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law
would thus be to refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the "Q Not fully settled?
original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a copy. It would thus be
absorb if Article 1271 were to be applied differently. "A The interest was not paid, but the principal obligation was removed from our books,
Your Honor.
While it has been consistently held that findings of facts are not reviewable by this
Court, this rule does not find application where both the trial and the appellate courts "Q And you returned the promissory note?
differ thereon (Asia Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437 [1993]).
"A We returned the promissory note."
Petitioner maintains that the findings of the trial court should be sustained because of its
advantage in observing the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (citing That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the Associated Bank
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 833) more so where it is supported by the finds more than ample confirmation and self-defeating posture in its letter dated
records (Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 169). December 16, 1985, addressed to respondent bank, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

This case, however, does not concern itself with the demeanor of witnesses. As for the ". . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy economic conditions, the business is
records, there is actually none submitted by petitioner to prove that the contested unable to generate sufficient resources for debt servicing.
amount, i.e., the interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shopping Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA "Fundamentally on account of this, we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate the
178 [1991]). Petitioner could have easily adduced the receipts corresponding to the remaining obligations to you of P492,000 through a payment in kind (dacion en pago)
amounts paid inclusive of the interest to prove that it has fully discharged its obligation arrangement by way of the equipments (sic) and spare parts under chattel mortgage to
but it did not. you to the extent of their latest appraised values." (Rollo, pp. 153-154; Emphasis
supplied)
There is likewise nothing on the records relied upon by the trial court to support its
claim, by empirical evidence, that the amount corresponding to the interest has indeed Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:j
been paid. The trial court totally relied on a disputable presumption that the obligation "We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our proposal for the
of petitioner as regards interest has been fully liquidated by the respondent’s act of eventual settlement of our remaining obligations . . . .
delivering the instrument evidencing the principal obligation. Rebuttable as they are, the
court a quo chose to ignore an earlier testimony of Mr. Mesina anent the outstanding "As you may be able to glean from these letters and from your credit files, we have
balance pertaining to interest, as follows: always been conscious of our obligation to you which had not been faithfully serviced
on account of unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding these however, total
"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph payments thus far remitted to you already exceed (sic) the original principal amount of
our obligation. But because of interest and other charges, we find ourselves still
"Q Notwithstanding, let us go now specifically to promissory note No. 9077-82 in the obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . . .
amount of consolidated principal of P1,050,000.00. Does the Court get it correctly that
this consolidated balance has been fully paid? ". . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation in as much as the
overall outlook of the industry has not substantially improved. Principally for this
"A Yes, the principal, yes, sir. reason, we had proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you by way of dacion en
pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts mortgaged to you to (the) extent of their
"Q Fully settled? applicable loan values." (Rollo, p. 155; Emphasis supplied).

"A Fully settled, but the interest of that promissory note has not been paid, Your Honor. Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission
that anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule
"Q In other words, you are saying, fully settled but not truly fully settled? 130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an ironclad rule.

"A The interest was not paid. To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the

251
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for 55. [G.R. Nos. 114011-22. December 16, 1996.]
the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VEVINA
an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the BUEMIO, Accused-Appellant.
admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.]
citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of SYLLABUS
settlement is an effective admission of a borrower’s loan balance (L.M. Handicraft
Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what
petitioner did in the case before us for review. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
REQUIREMENTS; SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — There is due process if the
Finally, respondent court is faulted in awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Associated following conditions are present: (1) a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
Bank. True, attorney’s fees may be awarded in a case of clearly unfounded civil action hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction lawfully acquired by the court
(Art. 2208 [4], CC). However, petitioner claims that it was compelled to file the suit for over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings; (3) the
damages in the honest belief that it has fully discharged its obligations in favor of defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard, and (4) judgment must be rendered
respondent bank and therefore not unfounded. upon lawful hearing. All these conditions have been satisfied in the case at bar. What is
repugnant to due process is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Appellant’s
We believe otherwise. As petitioner would rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the failure to present additional witnesses was within her power and that of her counsel to
fact of its admission regarding the unpaid balance of P492,100.00 representing interests. avert. Verily, her failure to act with prudence and diligence cannot elicit approval or
It cannot also be denied that petitioner opted to sue for specific performance and sympathy from the Court.
damages after consultation with a lawyer (Rollo, p. 99) who advised that not even the
claim for interests could be recovered; hence, petitioner’s attempt to seek refuge under 2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
Art. 1271 (CC). As previously discussed, the presumption generated by Art. 1271 is not CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; RULE; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — As a
conclusive and was successfully rebutted by private Respondent. Under the rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court on said issue unless
circumstances, i.e., outright and honest letters of admission vis-a-vis counsel-induced certain facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or
recalcitrance, there could hardly be honest belief. In this regard, we quote with approval misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is because the
respondent court’s observation: trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their deportment and
"The countervailing evidence against the claim of full payment emanated from manner of testifying during the trial. No negative circumstances attend this case as to
Transpacific itself. It cannot profess ignorance of the existence of the two letters, Exhs. warrant departure from the general rule.
3 & 4, or of the import of what they contain. Notwithstanding the letters, Transpacific
opted to file suit and insist(ed) that its liabilities had already been paid. There was thus 3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES; POSITIVE
an ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific to capitalize on the delivery of the DECLARATIONS GENERALLY PREVAIL OVER BARE DENIALS. — A review of
duplicates of the promissory notes, in complete disregard of what its own records show. the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the testimonies of the
In the circumstances, Art. 2208 (4) and (11) justify the award of attorney’s fees. The prosecution witnesses are credible. Taken as a whole and even under the crucible test of
sum of P15,000.00 is fair and equitable." (Rollo, pp. 46-47) examination by the defense, said testimonies are not only consistent on all material
respects but also replete with minutiae of the questioned transactions with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. Inasmuch as the trial court found the positive declarations of the complainants more
credible than the sole testimony of the appellant denying said transactions, there must be
SO ORDERED. a well-founded reason in order to deny great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies. The defense has failed to provide that reason as it
has failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the complainant-witnesses in so
imputing to appellant such a serious crime as illegal recruitment.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE;

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ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Recruitment for overseas employment is not in
itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of the necessary license or permit KAPUNAN, J.:
that renders such recruitment activities unlawful or criminal. When three or more
persons are victimized, the offense becomes illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense
constitutive of economic sabotage. In other words, the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale is committed when a person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined Vevina Buemio, a field officer of a travel agency, appeals from the decision of the
under Art. 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; Regional Trial Court in Pasay City, Branch 117, rendered on January 26, 1994, the
(b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
placement. of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons,
individually or as a group. The last two requisites are present in this case. By appellant’s WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Vevina Buemio GUILTY beyond
own admission, she was a field officer of a travel agency who merely assisted reasonable doubt for illegal recruitment on a large scale under Article 39, of Presidential
prospective travellers procure the necessary travel papers. Her admission is proof that Decree (P.D.) 2018, and sentences her to a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
she was not a licensed recruiter per the records of the POEA, although some of the P100,000 00 to indemnity Eliseo Principe, Eduardo Gutierrez and Ramon Villanueva
complainants desisted from pursuing their cases against appellant, it is undeniable that the amount of P150,000 00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
more than three persons raised claims that they had been victimized by appellant’s to pay the costs.
recruitment activities.
SO ORDERED. 1
5. ID.; ID.; THE TERM "PLACEMENT" IS DEFINED IN THE SAME WAY AS
"RECRUITMENT" UNDER ART. 13(b) OF THE LABOR CODE. — The The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
prosecution’s theory that appellant promised employment abroad to the complainants
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt not only by the testimonies of prosecution Sometime in September, 1991, Cecilia Baas, a clerical employee at the Villamor Air
witnesses but also by the aforequoted receipts signed by appellant indicating that she Base in Pasay City, learned from Catalina Asis that Vevina Buemio could send job
received "placement fees." The term "placement" is defined in the same way as applicants abroad for employment. Catalina, an officemate of Vevina’s husband at the
"recruitment" under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code. Obviously, to deflect the import of same air base, arranged a meeting between Cecilia and Vevina at the office of the
the use of the phrase "placement fees" in the receipts she signed, appellant claimed that latter’s husband. When the two met for the second time at the residence of Vevina in 9
she did not read the receipts when she signed them feigning tiredness and pointing to the Second St., Villamor Air Base, Vevina promised to provide Cecilia with a job as a
late hour of the night when she signed one of them. But her claim crumbles in the face factory worker in Japan with a minimum salary of 10,000 yen a day. Vevina also
of her own admissions that as a field officer of a travel agency, she was well aware of promised to provide Cecilia with all the necessary travel documents. For her part,
the importance of documents and that it was not her practice to sign papers without Cecilia would give Vevina P60,000.00 as placement fee and for the expenses in the
reading them. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that she had read them before processing of travel documents. Cecilia believed Vevina because the latter was the wife
affixing her signature, but she did not object to the use of "placement fees" in the of an official at the Villamor Air Base.
receipts.
On September 11, 1991, Cecilia, together with her husband and one Rafael Andres,
6. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVITS OF DESISTANCE MAY NOT EXONERATE AN went to the office of Vevina’s husband and paid P30,000.00 representing half of the fees
ACCUSED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY, WHEN THE EVIDENCE ALREADY agreed upon. Cecilia paid the second half of the fees on September 28, 1991 at Vevina’s
ADDUCED SUFFICES TO CONVICT. — The trial court stated that the "complainants residence. In both instances, Vevina issued receipts acknowledging Cecilia’s payments.
executed affidavits of desistance except Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez." This,
perhaps, explains why the trial court did not even mention the testimony of Cecilia Baas At the airport on the day when Cecilia, Marilou Gonzales, Rafael Andres and Armando
in its decision. However, the records show that only the following executed affidavits of Garcia were supposed to leave for Japan, Vevina handed them their passports and
desistance: Lito B. Camora (Exh. 8), Roel B. Perez (Exh. 9), Magdalena P. Arizala and tickets. To their surprise, they found out that they were bound for Korea, not Japan.
Fe P. Domagtoy (Exh. 10), and Eduardo P. Prudenciado, Leonilo D. Arganda and Rose Vevina explained to them that she would be following them in Korea where they would
V. Flores (Exh. 11). Of these seven persons, Camora, Arizala. Prudenciado, Arganda be getting their plane tickets for Japan. When Cecilia noticed that the name appearing on
and Flores filed complaints for estafa against appellant while Perez and Domagtoy did the passport given her was that of "Pacita Garcia," Vevina told her that she could use
not. Affidavits of desistance, however, may not exonerate an accused from criminal other names in her passport like other people do. Convinced by Vevina’s explanations,
liability, especially when the evidence already adduced suffices to convict. the group took off for Korea.

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 receipt which was prepared by Gutierrez’s wife:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In Korea, they checked in at the Naiagara Hotel but they just stayed inside their hotel
rooms. They only left their rooms twice after Vevina’s arrival when she took them on a 10/24/91
tour. Vevina also got their pocket money purportedly to buy their food.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
Vevina informed them later that the plane tickets to Japan were expensive in Korea. She
proposed that she herself would proceed to Japan where she would buy their tickets. She This is to acknowledge receipt of PESOS: Ninety Thousand & 00/100 (P90,000.00)
left for Japan with Lito Camora and Sergio Andres who had "complete tickets." from the following persons, representing 50% partial payment for their placement
However, Vevina came back to Korea without the group’s tickets. Instead, she advised fees:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
them to go back to the Philippines using their round-trip tickets Believing Vevina’s
promise that she could still send them to Japan without any expense on their part, the 1. Eliseo Principe P30,000.00
group left for the Philippines on October 16, 1991 with Vevina staying behind in Korea.
2. Ramon Villanueva 30,000.00
Since Vevina’s arrival in the Philippines on October 22, 1991, the group frequented
Vevina’s residence, inquiring about their trip to Japan. As Vevina’s promises remained 3. Eduardo Gutierrez 30,00.0.00
unfulfilled, the group, showing their displeasure, demanded that their money be given
back to them. Vevina promised to return their money but when she failed to do so, they -----------
filed their respective complaints before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 2
P90,000.00
It was sometime in October, 1991 that, through one Elsa Sta. Ana, Vevina met Eliseo
Principe, Ramon Villanueva and Eduardo Gutierrez at Villanueva’s residence in Bunlo, Received by:
Bocaue, Bulacan. Elsa knew that the three were looking for jobs and that Vevina was (Signature over printed name)
also looking for people interested in working abroad. Vevina explained that she could
send them to Japan where they could be factory workers with a minimum salary of VEVINA N. BUEMIO
"isang lapad" or 10,000.00 yen a day. Having manifested their interest in getting the job,
the three were advised by Vevina to raise right away the placement fee of P60,000.00 Date Rec’d/ 10/24/91 3
each in order that they could leave for Japan in a week’s time. Vevina told them to bring
to her residence the placement fee and a prepared receipt. After a week had gone by without a word from Vevina, Principe, Villanueva and
Gutierrez went to her residence to inquire. Vevina told them that the money they had
Because Vevina was leaving for Korea, she instructed each of the three to give given her was insufficient and that she needed P50,000.00 more. Since they did not have
P1,500.00 to one Jenny who would secure their passports. The three obliged but only that amount with them, the three agreed to deliver it to Vevina at Villanueva’s residence
Principe and Gutierrez were given their passports. When Vevina arrived from Korea, that evening. As agreed, they met at Villanueva’s residence that same evening and, after
she advised Villanueva to secure his passport himself as there were "some problems." receiving the amount, Vevina signed the receipt handwritten by Gutierrez’s wife which
Villanueva did as instructed and personally secured his passport. states:

The three were then made to sign application forms for Korean visas upon Vevina’ s 10-31-91
guarantee that the "onward visa" from Korea was necessary for them to reach Japan.
Unfortunately, the Korean Embassy denied their visa applications. This is to acknowledge receipt the amount of PESOS: Fifty Thousand and 00/100
(P50,000.-) only, representing 2nd partial payment for placement fee and other expenses
Nevertheless, to raise the placement fee, Principe borrowed the title to the property of of the following:
her sister-in-law and mortgaged the property for P200,000.00 with P70,000.00 interest.
On October 24, 1991, Principe, together with Gutierrez and Villanueva, their respective 1. Eliseo Principe
wives and Elsa Sta. Ana, went to Vevina’s house and handed her P90,000.00
representing half of the placement fee agreed upon. The balance would be given to 2. Ramon Villanueva
Vevina before their departure for Japan. Vevina then signed the following typewritten 3. Eduardo Gutierrez

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Received by: Arganda, Eliseo Principe, Eduardo Gutierrez, Sergio Andres, Magdalena Arizala and
Lito Camora" and for having wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruited them and
(Signature over printed name) collected from them "the amounts ranging from P20,700.00 to P82,000.00 each," but
which amount she appropriated to herself after failing to deploy the complainants
VEVINA N. BUEMIO abroad. 7

Date Rec’d/ 10/31/91 4 On the same day, eleven (11) informations for estafa, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
92-0130 to 92-0140 were likewise filed in the same court against Vevina for having
Vevina then assured them that they would be leaving for Japan within a few days. allegedly defrauded the following of the corresponding amounts: Cecilia Baas,
P60,000.00; Rose Flores, P20,700.00; Marilou Gonzales, P60,000.00; Eduardo
The three repaired once more to Vevina’s residence after several days. Vevina informed Prudenciado, P55,000.00; Ramon Villanueva, P50,000.00; Leonilo Arganda,
them that they would be leaving for abroad if not for the problem with the travel tax P30,000.00; Eliseo Principe, P50,000.00; Eduardo Gutierrez, P50,000.00; Sergio
amounting to P10,000.00. Exhilarated by the prospect of soon leaving for work abroad, Andres, P60,000.00; Magdalena Arizala, P82,000.00, and Lito Camora, P28,600.00 or
the three gave Vevina the amount on November 12, 1991 at Principe’s residence in $1,100.00. A typical information for estafa filed against Vevina reads as follows:
Marilao, Bulacan. Vevina issued them a handwritten receipt which reads:
That on or about the 11th and 28th of September 1991, in Pasay, Metro Manila,
Nov. 12, 1991 Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Vevina Buemio, defrauded Cecilia Baas, in the following manner, to wit: that
Received the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos only (P10,000.00) part of their partial said accused, by means of false representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect
payment for plane tickets & hotel accommodation." that she could secure employment as factory worker abroad for said complainant, and
that she could facilitate her working and travel papers, did then and there wilfully,
Received by unlawfully and feloniously ask and demand the amount of P60,000.00 from the
complainant allegedly to be used for the facilitation of the latter’s working and travel
(Signature) papers, that complainant carried away by said misrepresentations, in fact, she gave and
delivered to said accused, the amount of P60,000.00 which amount, Accused misapplied,
VEVINA BUEMIO 5 misappropriated and converted to her own personal use and benefit, and failed to deploy
complainant for employment abroad, and despite repeated demands, Accused failed and
The three thereafter went to Vevina’s office to inquire why they still could not leave for refused to do so, or account for the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said
Japan. Again, Vevina told them that she still had some documents to take care of but she complainant, in the said amount of P60.000.00.
assured them that they were scheduled to depart on November 18 and some other dates.
However, Vevina’s promises remained unfulfilled even after those dates had passed. Contrary to law. 8
Thus, the three demanded their money back and Vevina promised to return it to them.
On February 11, 1992, the following amended information for illegal recruitment was
Having failed to get their money back, the three reported the matter to the NBI where filed in Crim. Case No. 92-0129:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
they were instructed to verify from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) whether Vevina was authorized to recruit job applicants for abroad. The POEA That on or about and during the period comprising from April 1991 to October 1991, in
accordingly issued a certification dated June 11, 1992 stating that ‘VEVINA BUEMIO, Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of false
in her personal capacity" was "neither licensed nor authorized . . . to recruit workers for representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure
overseas employment from Jan., 1991 to the present." 6 employments as Factory Workers abroad for Cecilia Baas, Rose Flores, Marilou
Gonzales, Eduardo Prudenciado, Ramon Villanueva, Leonila Arganda, Elicio Principe,
Vevina was apprehended by NBI agents on January 27, 1992. Two days later, an Eduardo Gutierrez, Sergio Andres, Magdalena Arizala and Lito Camora, did then and
information for illegal recruitment, docketed as Crim. Case No. 92-0129, was filed there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee aforesaid persons without the
against her in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City for falsely representing and corresponding license from the Department of Labor and Employment.
alleging that "she could secure employments as factory workers abroad for Cecilia Baas,
Rose Flores, Marilou Gonzales, Eduardo Prudenciado, Ramon Villanueva, Leonilo Contrary to law. 9

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The defense forthwith filed a motion for reinvestigation in view of the amendment of the return the money "as soon as some of the groups gave back the money that they used." ‘
information and, allegedly, the denial of her right to a preliminary investigation. It 16 She had received P50,000.00 for Principe’s ticket at Villanueva’s residence, and
prayed further for the court to fix the bailbond for the liberty of the accused. 10 The P10,000.00 for their hotel accommodations. 17
court accordingly held the arraignment of the accused in abeyance pending the result of
the reinvestigation. 11 At her arraignment on April 22, 1992, Vevina pleaded not guilty On January 26, 1994, the trial court rendered the aforementioned decision convicting
to the charges against her in Crim. Cases Nos. 92-0129 to 92-0140. 12 The number of appellant of illegal recruitment. Vevina filed a motion for its reconsideration but this
complainants, however, diminished when some of them executed affidavits of was denied by the court on February 3, 1994. 18 Hence, this appeal questioning the trial
desistance upon the common allegation that Vevina did not promise them employment court’s giving weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and
abroad but merely assisted in the processing of their travel papers. 13 alleging denial of due process to the Appellant.

Testifying in her own defense at the trial, Vevina swore that during the first week of On the issue of denial of due process, appellant contends that she was not given the
October, 1991 when she was in Korea, Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez went to her opportunity to present additional witnesses. The records belie such claim. There were
residence in Villamor Air Base requesting for assistance in going to Japan. Jennilyn, her three resettings 19 of the hearings of the case where the defense was given an
friend who ran errands for her, accompanied the three who had learned from a certain opportunity to present additional witnesses before the trial court finally ordered the case
Baltazar, Vevina’s former client, that Vevina could help them because of her job as the submitted for decision. 20 The defense filed a motion for the reconsideration of said
field officer of the Continental Tour and Travel Agency. From the telephone order 21 which the trial court granted 22 but still, the defense failed to present its
conversation with her husband and Jennilyn, she learned that the three had relatives in promised additional witnesses. Hence, on November 30, 1993, the trial court issued an
Japan who could provide them employment in that country. order decreeing that the defense had waived presentation of further evidence and
directing it to make a formal offer of the evidence already presented within ten days. 23
The day after Vevina arrived from Korea on October 23, 1991, Principe told her by On January 19, 1994, the defense submitted a motion to defer the promulgation of
phone that he and his companions would be arriving at her residence at 6:00 p.m. Since judgment and to reopen the case 24 but the following day, it nevertheless formally
she told them that she had an appointment at 10:30 p.m., that day being her husband’s offered its exhibits.
birthday, Principe told her that they would be coming to her place instead at 12:00
midnight. From the foregoing, it is very clear that appellant was given more than enough
opportunity to fully ventilate her defense and therefore she was accorded due process of
The three arrived at the appointed time. It was the first time for her to meet them. law. There is due process if the following conditions are present: (1) a court or tribunal
Principe, who would be shouldering the expenses of Villanueva and Gutierrez, was the clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction
spokesman of the group. As the three handed her P90,000.00, she emphasized to them lawfully acquired by the court over the person of the defendant or over the property
that part of the amount would defray the expenses for her own ticket and hotel subject of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard,
accommodations as she would be travelling with them. 14 She signed a receipt prepared and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. 26 All these conditions have
by the group but she did not read its contents anymore nor did she count the money been satisfied in the case at bar. What is repugnant to due process is an absolute lack of
which she placed inside a drawer, as she was busy attending to her husband’s guests. opportunity to be heard. 27 Appellant’s failure to present additional witnesses was
within her power and that of her counsel to avert. Verily, her failure to act with prudence
The three having given her their business registration papers, income tax returns and and diligence cannot elicit approval or sympathy from the Court. 28
calling cards, Vevina immediately processed their travel documents and passports. She
first proposed that the three go to Thailand but the Thai airline did not issue tickets for On the merits of the appeal, appellant contends in the main that the testimonies of
them because they had not secured an "onward visa." ‘ 15 Thus, she next proposed that Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez are contrary to ordinary human experience. Thus,
since entry to Hongkong would not entail securing a visa thereto, the three should take a they could not have been enticed to work in factories in Japan as there was no mention
Hongkong-Japan-Korea route. The three, together with other clients of Vevina, applied of any contacts of appellant in that country who could provide them employment, nor
for a Korean visa but only Principe was granted said visa. Vevina then gave Principe were their specific work and workplaces as well as the peso equivalent of their supposed
tickets for the Manila-Hongkong, Hongkong-Japan, Japan-Korea and Korea-Manila trip. salary ever pointed out by the appellant. Neither was it proven that appellant enticed
Upon her advice, Principe also applied for a visa at the Japanese embassy. Because them with convincing benefits in working in Japan which would be enough for them to
Villanueva and Gutierrez wanted to be sure first that Principe would be granted a part with their money just so they could be "TNTs" 29 in Japan.
Japanese visa, no tickets were issued to them. However, all three later decided to give up
their travel plans and demanded that she gave them back their money. She agreed to Appellant’s contentions boil down to the issue of credibility. As a rule, appellate courts

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will not disturb the findings of the trial court on said issue unless certain facts or Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if sabotage as defined herein:
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the
testimony of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying x x x
during the trial. 30 No negative circumstances attend this case as to warrant departure
from the general rule.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In fact, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible. Taken as a whole and even under Recruitment for overseas employment is not in itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It
the crucible test of examination by the defense, said testimonies are not only consistent is the lack of the necessary license or permit that renders such recruitment activities
on all material respects but also replete with minutae of the questioned transactions with unlawful or criminal. When three or more persons are victimized, the offense becomes
the appellant. 31 Inasmuch as the trial court found the positive declarations of the illegal recruitment in large scale, 33 an offense constitutive of economic sabotage. In
complainants more credible than the sole testimony of the appellant denying said other words, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person
transactions, there must be a well-founded reason in order to deny great weight to the (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13(b) or any prohibited
trial court’s evaluation of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies. 32 The defense has practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or
failed to provide that reason as it has failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c)
complainant-witnesses in so imputing to appellant such a serious crime as illegal commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 34
recruitment.
The last two requisites are present in this case. By appellant’s own admission, she was a
We find the instant appeal to be without merit. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines field officer of a travel agency who merely assisted prospective travellers procure the
recruitment as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, necessary travel papers. Her admission is proof that she was not a licensed recruiter per
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or the records of the POEA. Although some of the complainants desisted from pursuing
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." The pertinent their cases against appellant, it is undeniable that more than three persons raised claims
provisions of the Labor Code on illegal recruitment are as follows: that they had been victimized by appellant’s recruitment activities. What remains to be
determined thereof is whether or not the acts committed by appellant constituted illegal
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited recruitment as defined by the Labor Code.
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees
or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of The prosecution’s theory that appellant promised employment abroad to the
this Code. The Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment or any law complainants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt not only by the testimonies of
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. prosecution witnesses but also by the aforequoted receipts signed by appellant indicating
that she received "placement fees." The term "placement" is defined in the same way as
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be "recruitment" under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code. Obviously, to deflect the import of
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in the use of the phrase "placement fees" in the receipts she signed, appellant claimed that
accordance with Article 39 hereof. she did not read the receipts when she signed them feigning tiredness and pointing to the
late hour of the night when she signed one of them. But her claim crumbles in the face
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three of her own admissions that as a field officer of a travel agency, she was well aware of
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out the importance of documents and that it was not her practice to sign papers without
any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first reading them. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that she had read them before
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed affixing her signature, but she did not object to the use of "placement fees" in the
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. receipts.

x x x That appellant was prevaricating as regards the nature of the amounts she received from
the complainants is manifested by the fact that while she testified that she demanded and
accepted the amount of P10,000 to solve the "travel tax problems" of some of the
ART. 39. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred complainants, the aforequoted handwritten receipt she signed shows that the same

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amount was for "plane tickets & hotel accommodation." Moreover, if indeed it is true seven persons, Camora, Arizala, Prudenciado, Arganda and Flores filed complaints for
that the amounts she demanded and collected from the complainants were mere estafa against appellant while Perez and Domagtoy did not. Affidavits of desistance,
processing fees needed to secure travel papers, then she would have received them upon however, may not exonerate an accused from criminal liability, especially when the
official receipts of the travel agency, in its office and at the appropriate office hours. The evidence already adduced suffices to convict. In People v. Romero, 38 the Court
evidence proven, however, shows that two of the receipts were prepared by a holds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
complainant’s wife while another appears to be in appellant’s own handwriting on a
yellow ruled pad paper, and that she received various amounts in places other than her The fact that complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope executed a Joint
office including her own residence, and after office hours. In one instance, a transaction Affidavit of Desistance does not serve to exculpate accused-appellant from criminal
even occurred at midnight in her own home. liability insofar as the case for illegal recruitment is concerned since the Court looks
with disfavor the dropping of criminal complaints upon mere affidavit of desistance of
Appellant also claims that the visa applications of the complainants she had presented in the complainant, particularly where the commission of the offense, as is in this case, is
evidence prove that they were not as seekers for jobs overseas. This stretches judicial duly supported by documentary evidence.
credulity to the limits. The four complainants who testified for the prosecution could not
have afforded travel abroad, much more as tourists. Cecilia Bass and the three, Principe, Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially
Villanueva and Gutierrez, were all unemployed. Neither was there proof that when it is executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
complainants had sources of income which they could rely on even if unemployed or testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses
low-salaried. Furthermore, as regards Cecilia Baas, the use of the name "Pacita Garcia" who had given them, later on, changed their mind for one reason or another, for such
in the passport given her was not even satisfactorily explained by the appellant. It is of rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy
judicial notice, however, that fake passports are the usual tools of illegal recruiters. of unscrupulous witness(es).

That appellant even accompanied some complainants abroad on the pretext that she Complainants Bernardo Salazar and Richard Quillope may have a change of heart
would secure their plane tickets there does not help her case any. Instead of bolstering insofar as the offense wrought on their person is concerned when they executed their
her claim that she was merely helping the complainants secure travel papers, that story joint affidavit of desistance but this will not affect the public prosecution of the offense
instead undermines the alleged legality of her activities. She did not actually have to go itself It is relevant to note that "the right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is
abroad to secure tickets and travel documents since these may be obtained just as easily one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctly
within this country. The rule, therefore, that for evidence to be believed, it must not only charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every
common experience and observation of mankind can prove as probable under the citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights." The cardinal principle which
circumstances, finds meaning in this case. states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes should not be
overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State. As provided by
Upon the evidence presented a nd on record, there is therefore no reason to disturb the the Civil Code of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
trial court’s conclusion that appellant violated the law against illegal recruitment in large
scale. Art. 2034. There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense;
but such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the
We note, however, that the trial court omitted Cecilia Baas in its decision. Since Cecilia legal penalty.
Baas is named one of the complainants in the amended information for illegal
recruitment and who testified in court to prove her charges, her case should have been While the trial court included the eleven estafa cases in the docket numbers appearing
duly considered. on the face of the decision to identify the cases under consideration, it omitted any
mention about them. A thorough search on the records for a reason for such omission
The trial court stated that the "complainants executed affidavits of desistance except yielded a negative result. Notably, the Solicitor General failed to notice the same
Principe, Villanueva and Gutierrez." 36 This, perhaps, explains why the trial court did omission in his brief The settled rule is that where other crimes or felonies are found to
not even mention the testimony of Cecilia Baas in its decision. However, the records have been committed by an accused charged with violation of another law, conviction
show that only the following executed affidavits of desistance: Lito B. Camora (Exh. 8), under the latter law does not preclude punishment under the other statutes. 39
Roel B. Perez (Exh. 9), Magdalena P. Arizala and Fe P. Domagtoy (Exh. 10), and
Eduardo P. Prudenciado, Leonilo D. Arganda and Rose V. Flores (Exh. 11). 37 Of these WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Vevina Buemio guilty

258
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Arts. 38 That on October 1, 1990 at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Purok
and 39 of the Labor Code and imposing on her the penalty of life imprisonment and the Liberty Hills, Barangay Mabigo, Canlaon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
payment of a fine of P100,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that this Honorable Court, the above-named accused mutually helping one another and with
she shall refund the amounts she had unlawfully collected while committing the acts evident premeditation and at nighttime did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
constituting illegal recruitment to Cecilia Baas, Eliseo Principe, Ramon Villanueva and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who,
Eduardo Gutierrez. as a result thereof, suffered fatal gunshot wound as reflected in the medical certificate
issued on October 2, 1990 by the Guihulngan District Hospital which was the immediate
Costs against the Appellant. cause of his immediate death.

SO ORDERED. Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16, 1991. 4
56. G.R. No. 110129 August 12, 1997 However, this was returned unserved on two different occasions for the reason that the
subject had already changed address and "his whereabouts [were] unknown." 5 A
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, motion for reinvestigation filed by appellant's Counsel de Oficio Marcelo Ondoy was
vs. denied in an Order dated April 15, 1991 on the ground that the trial court had not yet
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE" and "JOHN DOE" @ "OGANG," accused, acquired jurisdiction over the accused who was then still at large. 6 Jurisdiction over the
person of appellant was acquired by the said court only on July 1, 1991 when he was
EDELCIANO AMACA @ "EDDIE," accused-appellant. arrested by police authorities. 7 Thereafter, reinvestigation was conducted but the
prosecutor, reiterating his prima facie findings, resolved to continue the prosecution of
the accused.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy,
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case pleaded not guilty to the charge. 8 Trial ensued in due course. Thereafter, the trial court
at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by treachery, rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
because the Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident
premeditation. This legal lapse of the prosecution — for that matter, any prosecution WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused EDELCIANO AMACA
lapse — should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused may be alias "EDDIE" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as penalized
held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the crime necessarily included under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused to a
therein), and every doubt must be resolved in his favor. Thus, we hold him guilty only penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, without pronouncement as to civil liability, and
of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim waived their claim through an damages, and to pay costs.
affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity should be included in this Decision
finding the accused guilty of the homicide. SO ORDERED. 9

Statement of the Case The Facts

These postulate are explained in the Court's adjudication of this appeal from the The trial court synthesized the facts based on the testimonies of witnesses for the
Decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Branch prosecution and the defense, as follows:
45, 2 in Criminal Case No. 550-C convicting Accused Edelciano Amaca of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and his cause of death,
the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar P. Pialago, a resident physician of the Guihulngan
On December 17, 1990, an Information 3 was filed by Bais City Prosecutor Epifanio E. District Hospital, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, who testified that on October 2, 1990,
Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one known only by his alias "Ogang," he was on duty at the aforesaid hospital, and was able to attend to victim Wilson
charging them as follows: Vergara who had just undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor, Dr.
Gonzaga. The major organs of the victim, namely, the heart, lungs and kidney, were no

259
longer functioning normally, and thus, he was suffering from multiple organ system further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil
failure. Furthermore, there was injury in the pancreas, causing a leak of the pancreatic liability of the appellant.
juice. Victim suffered two gunshot wounds at the back, and x-ray revealed two (2)
bullets inside the body, and there was no exit wound. The patient was admitted at 10:45 The Issue
in the evening of October 1, 1990, and died at 7:00 in the evening of the following day.
He identified the death certificate (Exh. "A"), and the data sheet of the victim and the In his brief, the appellant filed a lone assignment of error, to wit:
final diagnosis. (Exh. "B") Even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not
have survived with the wounds he sustained. The trial court erred in finding accused Edelciano Amaca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder on the sole basis of the alleged dying declaration of the
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City, testified victim to Police Officer Bernardo Mangubat. 12
that as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him from his
residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed him of a The Court's Ruling
shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which was near
his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide, not murder,
board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the and civil indemnity shall not be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and
Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he Dying Declaration
was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die. Sufficient to Identify Assailant
(TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified himself as Nelson
(sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is
have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in the presence aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being
of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. (Exh. "C") responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death,
every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
Interposing the defense of alibi, the accused corroborated (by) his witnesses, namely, consideration to speak the
Felix Ponting, and Alfredo Gabucero, portrayed the following scenario: Felix Ponting truth." 13 This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37,
and Alfredo Gabucero were members of the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased
Geographical Unit) and accused as member of the Civilian Volunteer Organization made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have
(CVO) with station at Barangay Lumapao, Canlaon City. On October 1, 1990, the been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
accused together with his companion Felix Ponting were on duty at the said station from surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a
6:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:00 o'clock that same evening. After their duty at 8:00 criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the
o'clock, they went to sleep at the detachment, and were relieved by Alfredo Gabutero, declaration is complete in itself. 14 All these concur in the present case.
whose duty covered from 8:00 to 9:00 that same evening. 10
Declarant a Competent Witness
Prosecution Witnesses Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law
Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case; the former because of the The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a
"financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina competent witness to identify his assailant. He emphasizes that
had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." This notwithstanding, the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that ". . . the witness/victim based
the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's on the foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants . . . 15 We are
ante mortem statement. 11 not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets. But
as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness
The Trial Court's Ruling upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to
see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not
The trial court deemed the victim's statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively the competency, of the victim. Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum
identifying Appellant Amaca, a dying declaration sufficient to overcome the latter's ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty
defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from to tell the truth. 16 Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing

260
and recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the writing his name at that time?" 21 Additionally, the defense questions why Wagner
victim, under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not presented as such by
appellant challenges merely the credibility of the victim's ante mortem statement. We the prosecution. 22
hold that the serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a
witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does not
his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. The Court had occasion in the past to destroy the genuineness of the ante mortem statement. Police Officer Mangubat is
rule on a similar issue as follows: presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the
circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of
. . . (') The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by
given wound,(') according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. the trial court, even appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with
212), "is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a particular case." They Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against
cited a case from Vibert's Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being him. 23 This dismal failure of the defense to show any ill motive on the part of said
shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish police officer adds credence to Mangubat's testimony. 24
the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of water from the courtyard. When the fire was
extinguished, the man lay down in bed and died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his
found that the left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by the revolver's bullet. It is thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity
evident from the foregoing that Dr. Acosta's assertion that the victim of a gunshot thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity and
wound would immediately lose consciousness, after infliction of the wound, may not be urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any
true in all cases. . . . 17 ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have clearly ruled that an
ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the declarant's thumbmark
Appellant also argues that the declarant could not have seen who shot him because "the imprinted which his own blood, and serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration
actual shooting occurred at 7:00 o'clock in the evening." 18 This statement is bereft of in a criminal case involving his death. 25 Verily, such declaration need not even be in
factual basis. The record shows that Police Officer Mangubat was fetched from his writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses who heard it.
house at 7:00 p.m. to investigate the shooting. He was informed that the victim had
already been brought to the clinic of Dr. Cardenas. 19 It may thus be inferred that the Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not fatal,
shooting occurred sometime before the victim was found, brought to the clinic, and as his testimony would have been merely corroborative of Mangubat's. In addition, the
before Mangubat was fetched from his house. Thus, a considerable period of time must presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if presented does not
have elapsed from the time of the actual shooting until the policeman was fetched from obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and could have been called
his house around 7:00 p.m. That he was shot way before 7:00 p.m. does not lead to the to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the prosecutor's prerogative to
inference that it was pitch-black at the time of the shooting. Indeed, from the foregoing, choose his own witnesses to prove the People's cause. 26
it is reasonable to assume that the crime was committed before nightfall and that there
was sufficient daylight to enable the victim to identify his assailant. At any rate, there Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
are no indicia in the record that lighting conditions made it impossible for declarant to
identify his assailant. Ineluctably, the positive assertion of the declarant that he did The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered as part of
recognize his shooter has greater persuasive value than the baseless negative speculation the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically
of the defense that he did not. under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the admissibility of
statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is spontaneous; (b) it is made
Genuineness of the Dying Declaration immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence; and (c) it relates to the
circumstances of such occurrence. 27 These requirements are obviously fulfilled in the
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by present case where the statement, subject of this discussion, was made immediately after
suggesting that since "the relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by the shooting incident and, more important, the victim had no time to fabricate.
jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another," 20 Police Officer Mangubat
had enough motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU member. The An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as
defense also asks: "Why was the alleged dying declaration of the victim merely part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of
thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and very capable of ensuring the statement's appreciation by courts, particularly where the absence of one or

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more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner, the convict him of murder through treachery under an Information that charged him with
identification of the culprit is assured. 28 murder qualified by evident premeditation.

Alibi Debunked Moreover, in this case, treachery and nighttime may not be considered even as generic
aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution
The defense also contests the trial court's finding that the witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely
"alibi interposed by the accused miserably fall short of exculpation. (Decision, p. 7)" 29 adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of
Appellant insists that, since the dying declaration was unreliable and since there was no night to facilitate the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade
positive identification aside from this declaration, the defense of alibi gained strength. capture. This conclusion is further bolstered by the simple fact that not one of the
30 There is no basis for this contention for, as previously discussed, the ante mortem prosecution witnesses saw the commencement of the assault or even the actual assault
statement met all requirements for its admissibility either as a dying declaration or as itself. Hence, they are not competent to testify on whether the aggravating circumstances
part of the res gestae or both. 31 It must be remembered that alibi is inherently weak and of treachery and nighttime attended the commission thereof. These circumstances
the facts in the case at hand show that it was not at all impossible, considering the cannot be appreciated on the basis of mere presumptions or suppositions; they must be
circumstances of time and place, for the accused-appellant to have been present at the proven as clearly as the crime itself. 39
crime scene at the time of its commission. 32 The military detachment at Barangay
Lumapao, where appellant allegedly slept, is a mere seven kilometers away from Appellant may therefore be held liable only for the crime of homicide defined under
Barangay Mabigo, Purok Liberty Hills where the crime was committed. In other words, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Since there are no mitigating or aggravating
the able-bodied appellant was only an hour's walk and a short fifteen-minute tricycle circumstances, the penalty of reclusion temporal provided under said article shall be
ride from the locus criminis. 33 As correctly argued by the trial court, "(i)t would not imposed in its medium period . Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant
have been impossible for the accused to be at Purok Liberty Hills, and shoot the victim, should suffer imprisonment of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal,
and come back to his detachment in a matter of thirty (30) minutes, the time testified by also in its medium period.
the defense witness Gabutero as to going to and coming back from these two places.
(TSN, p. 17, July 15, 1992)" 34 The alibi of appellant cannot overcome, therefore, the Non-Award of Indemnity
very persuasive declaration of the victim. 35
The trial court did not make a finding on the civil liability of accused-appellant,
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court's conscience rests easy with the moral reasoning that it was prevented from doing so by the "unwillingness" of the victim's
certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense at mother, Segundina Vergara, to further prosecute the case against the accused. 40 The
innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against him. Even trial court cited the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denying the motion
his flight — eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the warrant for for reinvestigation. The DOJ held that the ante mortem statement of the victim testified
his arrest — clearly bespeaks his to by Pfc. Mangubat accorded prima facie validity to the case against the accused, but it
guilt. 36 noted and confirmed the desistance of the victim's mother and her son-in-law from
further prosecuting the case. The salient portions of Segundina Vergara's affidavit of
Murder or Homicide? desistance quoted in said resolution reads:

Finally, the defense posits that the appellant may be held liable only for homicide since That I am the complainant in a case which I filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor,
treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation and nighttime, Canlaon City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 550-C of Regional Trial Court, Bais
although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. 37 We agree. The Information City for Murder against Eddie Amaca as the alleged accused;
readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. The trial
court however found that the killing was qualified by treachery. Even assuming that this That in the evaluation of our case against him, I have found out that the death of my son
conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, we cannot appreciate treachery to Wilson Vergara was purely accidental that could be attributed to his fault;
qualify the crime to murder for the simple reason that this was not alleged in the
Information. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the That due to my compassion to the poor accused who is a family man, I have decided to
accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him." 38 drop the case against Eddie Amaca for the reason that his family financially help (sic) us
Obviously, this failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the in our family problems due to the death of my late son;
prosecution. Since every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, we cannot

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That with our desire to have a mutual understanding and goodwill among ourselves, RULE 130, SECTION 30 – ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR
since we are neighbors and our respective families are good friends, I have decided to
drop the case against Eddie Amaca; 57. G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941

That when the said case was scheduled for hearing, I will not testify anymore as the FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, Petitioner,
complaining witness; 41 vs. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, ET
AL., Respondents.
The Solicitor General finds nothing wrong with the trial court's reasoning and
recommends that its decision be affirmed. 42 We agree. The facts of this case show that Criminal Law; Rape; Sweetheart Theory; As an affirmative defense, an alleged “love
the victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial affair” needs convincing proof, for, after having admitted to having had carnal
help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. Such "financial help" when knowledge of the complainant several times, the accused bears the burden of proving his
viewed as an offer of compromise may also be deemed as additional proof to defense by substantial evidence.—Accused-appellant’s allegation of an illicit amorous
demonstrate appellant's criminal relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of
liability. 43 Parenthetically, her claim that the cause of her son's death was an accident credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the ‘illicit love affair’
attributable to the latter, has no basis. It is inconceivable that the victim's two gunshot angle appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative defense, the
wounds at the back were self-inflicted. Well-settled it is that the desistance of the alleged ‘love affair’ needs convincing proof. Having admitted to having had carnal
victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of
action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that other than his self-
effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and
accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising private complainant were in love.
from the criminal prosecution. 44 This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she
nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a Same; Same; Same; If the accused was really the paramour of private complainant, the
finding of civil latter would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably
liability. 45 exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood.—It
must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married and are
The records, however, do not show whether the deceased had other compulsory heirs. living together with their respective spouses. In this case, other than accused-appellant’s
Such heirs, if there are any, may file an independent civil action to recover damages for self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters, mementos or pictures were
the death of Wilson Vergara. presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private complainant. Neither
was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If accused-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision is hereby MODIFIED. appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not have gone to
Accused-appellant Edelciano Amaca is found GUILTY of homicide and SENTENCED the extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to humiliation
to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No civil indemnity implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable
is awarded. No costs. crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to
mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were
SO ORDERED. it not the truth.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact
that in rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition act with
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation
remains untainted.—Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source
but must also be credible in itself such as one that the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has
taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom
and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so

263
that their reputation remains untainted. Such circumspection must have prompted the family to the disgrace, social humiliation and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape
victim to request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused- as well as the stigma of a lifetime of shame incident thereto. Furthermore, the conduct of
appellant’s house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by accused-appellant on the the victim immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance so as to
pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in their establish the truth or falsity of the charges of rape. In this case, we find the private
house. complainant’s prompt report of her defilement to her husband as well as the authorities
as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant’s act in
Same; Same; Same; The mere assertion of a “love relationship” would not necessarily immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a
rule out the use of force to consummate the crime—a sweetheart cannot be forced to factor strengthening her credibility. People vs. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290, G.R. No.
have sex against her will.—Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused-appellant 124832 February 1, 2000
and private complainant were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not
extricate him from his predicament. The mere assertion of a love relationship’ would not
necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in
rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her OZAETA, J.:
will or without her consent. Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the victim
were really lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that “[A] sweetheart cannot This is an original petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to
be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused in criminal case No.
gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. 6598, to prove the alleged conspiracy between him and his five coaccused, respondents
Love is not a license for lust.” herein.

Same; Same; It defies reason why a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has Pampanga, filed an information against the said Catalino Fernandez and the herein
been sexually abused if her motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
justice the person who defiled her.—As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to kill, and that they did
married woman with a husband and three (3) daughters would not publicly admit that kill, one Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premiditation.
she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in
this case why a mother of four (4) would concoct a story of defloration, allow the Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty.
examination of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused At the trial of the latter, the former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify
if her motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who to the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent
defiled her. judge did no permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on
the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his
Same; Same; Witnesses; Doctrinal Guidelines in Scrutinizing Credibility of coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
Witnesses.—In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court. A written motion for
following doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings reconsideration, supported with lenthy argument, was filed by the fiscal to no avail.
of the lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or Hence the present petition for mandamus.
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected
the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility The only question raised here is the interpretation of section 12 of rule 123, which reads
of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the opportunity to as follows:
examine their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who
testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
Same; Same; Same; A complainant’s act in immediately reporting the commission of declaration.
rape has been considered as a factor strengthening her credibility.—To restate what had
been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable vis-à-vis the prevailing facts of the case for That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the
the victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the process, subject herself and her old Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or

264
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PELAGIO
rule has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents CONDEMENA, CASAMERO PETIÑO, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, RICARIDO
completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to CAUSING @ GARIDO, Defendants, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.
an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator - not to his testimony by way of direct
evidence. For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five SYLLABUS
coaccused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his coaccused
were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez's friend to
the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told him that he (Fernandez) and his 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY;
coaccused were going to kill Gaudencion Viviar would be admissible against Fernandez, PRESUMPTION. — When an accused pleads guilty to the charge against him, it is
but not against his coaccused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first. It is understood that he does so fully cognizant that he has carefully read beforehand the
admissible against Fernandez because the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a charge against him; and when he pleads guilty thereto, he signifies his admission of all
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him (section 7, rule 123). But, without the material facts alleged therein, including the allegation of the aggravating
proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible against Fernandez's coaccused because the act circumstance of evident premeditation.
and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios as to his coaccused and, therefore,
cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each conspirator is privy to the acts of the 2. CRIMINAL LAW; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; NOT CONSIDERED AFTER
others; the act of one conspirator is the act of all the coconspirators. WARRANT OF ARREST HAS BEEN ISSUED. — Where the accused surrendered
only after the warrant of arrest was served upon him, there is no voluntary surrender that
To further explain the rule in the language of the jurisprudence on the subject, we add: may be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance.

... The evidence adduced in court by the coconspirators as witnesses are not declarations
of conspirators, but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the
discredit which attaches to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to ANGELES, J.:
establish the facts to which they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is
applicable only when it sought to introduce extrajudicial declarations and statements of
coconspirators (People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 P. 78, 84.) Pelagio Condemena, Casamero Patiño, Ricarido Causing and Simplicio Aniel were
charged with the crime of robbery in band with homicide in the Court of First Instance
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a of Leyte, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and aggravating circumstances
witness to testify what one or all of several accused persons did; and evidence adduced of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and dwelling.
by coconspirators as witnesses, which is direct evidence of the facts to which they
testify, is not within the rule requiring a conspiracy to be shown as a prerequisite to its After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
admissibility. ... (22 C. J. S. 1293; see also 2 Whartoon's Criminal Evidence, 1189; cox of robbery in band with homicide without, however, making a finding on any of the
and others v. State, 8 Tex Cr. App. 254, 303, 34 Am. Rep. 746; White v. State, 60 Tex. aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, instead it took into consideration
Cr. R. 559, 132, S. W. [2d] 518; Bannister v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 158, 15 S. W. [2d] the lack of instruction and education in mitigation of their criminal liability, and
629; Bland v. State, 89 S. W. [2d] 996, 998.) sentenced each to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay P6,000.00 to the heirs of the
victim, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
Let the writ of mandate be issued as prayed for by the petitioner, with costs. So ordered. proportionate costs.

Pending their appeal in this Court, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero
Patiño withdrew their appeal which was granted in a resolution of the Court of June 5,
1964. As the record now stands, only Simplicio Aniel remained as the Appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution has established that on October 6, 1962, at about 6
58. [G.R. No. L-22426. May 29, 1968.] o’clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa Lamoste was sitting by the side of the cradle of her
child facing her husband Fermin Lamoste who was on the yard of the house. Their

265
eldest daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, 14 years old at that time, was at the door of their Crispin Bactol testified that at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon on October 6, 1962, he
house together with her younger brothers and sisters. saw four men going to the house of Fermin Lamoste. He recognized Pelagio Condemena
to be one of the group. Later on, he heard a woman’s voice from the house of Fermin
Suddenly, four men arrived at their house. Of these four, Barcelisa Lamoste recognized Lamoste calling for help. On his arrival at the house of Fermin Lamoste in answer to the
Pelagio Condemena who had been living in Mambajao, Villaba, Leyte, for quite a long call for help, he saw Fermin Lamoste dead. He asked Barcelisa Lamoste who were the
time as their neighbor. Barcelisa Lamoste did not know the names of the companions of persons who killed her husband. Barcelisa Lamoste answered that of the four men, she
Pelagio Condemena, but she recognized them by their faces. On the witness stand, only knew Pelagio Condemena.
Barcelisa Lamoste pointed and identified Pelagio Condemena to be one of the four men
who were in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, the date Jose P. Burgos, municipal judge of Villaba, Leyte, testified that on December 3, 1962,
and approximate time of the commission of the crime. In the words of the trial Judge, Pelagio Condemena, accompanied by a certain P. C. soldier, appeared before him and
"Barcelisa Lamoste also unhesitantly and unmistakenly, in open court, pointed to the sworn to the truth and veracity of his confession, Exhibit "B", the pertinent portions of
three companions of Pelagio Condemena on that fateful day and time above-mentioned which are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
who turned out to bear the names of Ricarido Causing @ Garido, Casamero Patiño and
Simplicio Aniel." (p. 2, Rec.) "9. Q What are the names of your four (4) companions in going to the house of Fermin
Lamoste?
She further testified that Simplicio Aniel and Casamero Patiño were armed with guns,
and Pelagio Condemena and Ricarido Causing were armed with bolos when these four A I know their names but I do not know their surnames.
men arrived in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon. That
upon their arrival, Simplicio Aniel rushed towards her and pointed the gun, about one 10. Q Who are they and where are they residing at present?
foot long, at her face, telling her the following words "Do not shout. If you shout, I will
kill you." Barcelisa Lamoste, out of fear, did not in fact shout. While Simplicio Aniel A . . . @ Simplicio Aniel, from bo. Oson, . . .
was thus pointing the gun at her, the three other men went directly towards where her
husband was. Two of them, Casamero Patiño and Ricarido Causing, each held the hands 11. Q What arms are you carrying and your companions in going to the house of Fermin
of her husband and when resistance from Fermin Lamoste was already impossible, Lamoste?
Pelagio Condemena, with the use of his bolo, stabbed her husband on the right side of
the breast. Upon being hit with the bolo-stab, she heard her husband said: "Dong, why A . . . @ Simplicio Aniel is carrying shorten Japanese Rifle,. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
did you stab me when I did not commit any wrong?" After Fermin Lamoste was
stabbed, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patiño dragged her Judge Burgos further testified that on December 11, 1962, in the presence of Felix
husband towards the kitchen of the house. Pelagio Condemena stayed outside while Arañez, Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, Accused Casamero Patiño appeared before
Casamero Patiño and Ricarido Causing went up the house through the kitchen. him and sworn to the truth and veracity of his statement. Exhibit "C", its translation is
Exhibit "C- 1", with the following pertinent portions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Esmeralda Lamoste, who was at the door of the house together with her young brothers
and sisters, saw Ricarido Causing stab her father with a bolo on the right breast below "5. Q Why are you detained here, what crime are you charged?
the nipple. Then Casamero Patiño and Ricarido Causing approached Simplicio Aniel, at
the time still pointing his gun towards her mother, and demanded from Barcelisa their A Because I was with the robbery and to the murder of Fermin Lamoste.
money. Her mother, out of fear, pointed to Ricarido Causing their trunk. Ricarido
Causing opened the trunk and took the amount of P200.00 from it. "6. Q Do you know the robbers and those who murdered Fermin Lamoste?

Barcelisa Lamoste explained that the money was the proceeds of the sale of their A Yes, sir. They . . . and Simplicio Aniel."cralaw virtua1aw library
carabao on October 5, 1962, the day previous to the incident. After taking the money,
the four men, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing, Simplicio Aniel and Casamero As evidenced by the medical certificate, Exhibit A and A-1, the victim suffered the
Patiño fled towards the same direction where they had come from. After they were gone, following injuries:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Barcelisa Lamoste shouted for help. Crispin Bactol was the first person who responded
to the call for help. 1. Incised wound on right hypochondrium 3/6" x 1/2 cm. x 1 cm. obliquely directed.

266
2. Incised wound in the anterior axillary line on the right hypochondrium 1-1/2" from contradicted, rebutted and destroyed by the testimony of Felix Arañaz, the Chief of
the first wound directed 3/4" x 1/2 cm. up to the abdominal cavity. Police of Villaba, Leyte, who investigated the crime the day following the commission
of the offense; that the court should have given credence to the testimony of Benjamin
Appellant Simplicio Aniel, in exculpation, interposed the defense of alibi. He presented Corpin with whom Simplicio Aniel was together on October 6, 1962, from 7:00 o’clock
Benjamin (Benigno) Corpin, a 73-year old man, who testified that on October 6, 1962, in the morning up to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, selling salted fish in the market fair
he was in the market fair of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, selling salted fish. His of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, at the time the robbery and killing of Fermin
companion on that date was Simplicio Aniel whom he hired to help him. The two of Lamoste took place; that while it may be true that this witness was not able to recall the
them left Considra (or Consuegra), Leyte, at 7:00 o’clock in the morning and returned other dates when he hired Simplicio Aniel to carry salted fish to Wague, Leyte, aside
home to Considra from the market fair at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. from October 6, 1962, Benjamin Corpin had given the reason why he particularly
They arrived together in his house at Considra where the two of them took their meals. remember the hiring of Simplicio Aniel on that day, because on that same day, he was
Then after that, Simplicio Aniel went to his house. Aniel’s house was only about 10 to reminded by his son-in-law who for the first time went fishing in Gotosan, and this
15 meters away from his home. being the first time his son-in-law fished in Gotosan, it is not strange that that date made
a deep impression in his memory.
Felix Arañez, Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, also testified for the defense. He
testified that on October 7, 1962, a day after the robbery and the killing occurred, he The lower court, however, did not believe the testimony of Benjamin Corpin because he
went to the house of Fermin Lamoste in Sitio Mambajao, Villaba, Leyte. His purpose was not able to account the whereabout of Simplicio Aniel after 5:00 o’clock in the
was to investigate the incident which was reported to him by the Barrio Lieutenant of afternoon of October 6, 1962, the time they returned home to Considra from Wague,
Cagnocot. During his investigation, Barcelisa Lamoste, wife of the deceased, informed Leyte. According to the trial court, Corpin was sure that they arrived in Consuegra (or
him that at about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, there were Considra), Leyte, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, because Juan
unidentified persons who went up their house while she was holding her baby in the Delanta told them that it was exactly 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon when asked by
cradle; that Fermin Lamoste was outside the house and when he was brought up the Benjamin Corpin. On cross-examination, however, Corpin admitted that he treated
house, he was already stabbed; that one of them pointed his gun at her; that she was not Simplicio Aniel as his son, because Simplicio Aniel is the nephew of Corpin’s son-in-
able to identify the robbers, not even one, because it was already dark; that Barcelisa law. He also admitted that he did not remember the other dates, not even the last time,
Lamoste pointed to the two sons of Segundo Mesa as the persons she suspected to be when he hired Simplicio Aniel to carry his salted fish to Wague, Leyte. Thus, the court
responsible for the robbery because on the day of the incident, these two went to their who had personally seen and observed the behavior and manner of the witness while
house to buy corn and they promised to come back the following afternoon; that he testifying, concluded that his testimony is not worthy of belief because it is tainted with
investigated the two sons of Segundo Mesa but he had to release them for lack of bias and interest of the witness to obtain a judgment of acquittal. His memory is also
evidence; that when he further asked Barcelisa Lamoste whether there were other faulty. The fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his age" is not always a
persons who were responsible for the commission of the crime aside from the two sons guaranty that he would tell the truth, the trial court further added.
of Mesa, she said that she and Pelagio Condemena had a misunderstanding a week
before the crime was committed; that when he found out later on that this Pelagio With respect to the testimony of the chief of police Arañaz, We are more impressed into
Condemena did not go inside the house, he abandoned the investigation of Pelagio believing that he had attempted to tailor his testimony in an effort to bolster the validity
Condemena because he had received information that before the commission of the of the defense of alibi. We are not persuaded to accord credence to the testimony of the
crime, Pelagio Condemena had already abandoned his house in Mambajao. chief of police that Barcelisa Lamoste told him that she was not able to identify the
robbers, because he himself swore to the truth of the information after he had gathered
On the basis of these facts, the question before the Court hinges on whether or not evidence pointing to Simplicio Aniel and his companions as the perpetrators of the
appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently identified as one of the four men who crime.
participated in the commission of the crime charged.
He declared thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The defense argued that the identification in open court made by Barcelisa Lamoste and
her daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, should not have been considered by the trial court as "Q Is it your purpose or intention to impress the Court that you do not believe that
a "positive identification" which could sustain the conviction of Simplicio Aniel for the Pelagio Condemena, Et Al., have been charged falsely?
crime charged. It is contended that the testimony of Barcelisa Lamoste that Simplicio
Aniel was the person who pointed the gun at her, while his three other companions A No, sir.
killed her husband and, thereafter, robbed their house, was more than sufficiently

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Q What do you mean by that? the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime. As this
Court has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A I mean that these persons now who are accused are the ones responsible of the crime
committed. "While confession of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily admissible as evidence against
another co-conspirator, the fact that they implicate the latter and were made soon after
Q That is why you were the one who actually signed the criminal complaint in this case, the commission of the crime, is circumstantial evidence to show the probability of their
is that right? co-conspirator having actually participated therein." (People v. Lumahang, Et Al., L-
6357, May 7, 1954.)
A Yes, sir, when the complaint was amended.
The commission of the crime was attended by treachery. The act of the accused in
Q The incident took place on October 6, 1962 and the filing of the complaint took place suddenly rushing towards the victim, then two of them, each holding the hands of the
on October 24, 1962, can you explain why the filing of the complaint was delayed? victim, and the third of them stabbed the victim, is characterized by treachery insuring
the accomplishment of their purpose without risk to themselves from any defense or
A Because we were searching for more evidence, and when we were able to gather retaliation the victim might offer.
sufficient evidence, we filed this case. (tsn pp. 56- 57, Pareja.)
The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven. Their acts collectively
Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the prosecution witnesses and individually executed have clearly demonstrated the existence of a common design
positively identified the accused. To prosper such a defense, it must be established by towards the accomplishments of the same unlawful purpose and objective - to rob the
clear and convincing evidence and not merely supported by witnesses who bear close house of Lamoste. Altho the killing of Fermin Lamoste was accomplished by only three
ties of relationship to the accused. The degree of the evidence must be such as to of the intruders without any physical participation thereof by the appellant Simplicio
preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place Aniel, however, as conspiracy has been established, the crime committed is robbery in
of the crime or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission. band, and the homicide was committed on the occasion thereof, all the members of the
band are liable for robbery with homicide (People v. Evangelista, Et Al., L-2489, April
Barcelisa Lamoste, in the words of the trial judge who had personally seen and observed 12, 1950). And
her behavior and manner of testifying on the witness stand, "unhesitantly and
unmistakenly" pointed to Simplicio Aniel as the person who rushed towards her and ". . . any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band,
pointed his gun, about one foot long, at her face, warning her at the same time not to shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be
shout or else she will be killed. Esmeralda Lamoste substantially corroborated the shown that he attempted to prevent the same." (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code.)
testimony of her mother. And Crispin Bactol’s testimony has demonstrated a
circumstance of strong persuasion when he recognized Condemena and his companions the appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the evidence does not show
when they were passing in front of his house. The credibility of their testimony was that he had attempted to prevent the assault and the killing of Fermin Lamoste. (People
never successfully impugned by the defense when they were cross- examined on the v. Garduque, Et Al., L- 10133, July 31, 1958.).
witness stand. No motive was shown by the defense why these witnesses should impute
so grave a crime to Simplicio Aniel who they did not even know before the crime was The information charging appellant Simplicio Aniel, and the three other accused, of the
committed. crime of robbery in band with homicide alleged three aggravating circumstances,
namely, nocturnity, use of superior strength, and commission of the crime in the
The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further bolstered when dwelling of the offended party. The lower court, however, after finding all the four
Pelagio Condemena and Casamero Patiño, in their sworn statements Exhibits "B" and accused guilty of the crime charged, did not consider the above aggravating
"C", named Simplicio Aniel as one of them in the group when they killed Fermin circumstances when it imposed the penalty, instead took into account lack of instruction
Lamoste and robbed the house of P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00 o’clock in and education in mitigation of their liability. In this respect, the trial court was in error.
the afternoon. Existing jurisprudence has settled that lack of instruction and education as mitigating
circumstance in the crime of theft or robbery is not recognized, 1 although it might be
Extra-judicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical under certain situations in cases of homicide. 2 As to the aggravating circumstances of
with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on dwelling and superior strength, the evidence has clearly established the presence thereof
record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show in the commission of the crime. Two of the four accused each held the hands of Fermin

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Lamoste, who was at the time unarmed, before he was stabbed, while Simplicio Aniel, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the appellant herein, guarded the wife, Barcelisa Lamoste, with the gun pointed at her vs.
face, and the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The trial court, PAN PROVO, ET AL., defendants, JOSE MESINA, defendant-appellant.
therefore, should have considered dwelling and superior strength as aggravating
circumstances. (People v. Sina-on, L-15631, May 27, 1966.) Remedial Law; Evidence; Inconsistencies and contradictions in testimony.—Well
settled is the rule that inconsistencies and contradictions incurred by an illiterate witness
The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, however, cannot be appreciated. The record in the course of a lengthy examination will not affect the credibility of her testimony.
does not show that the peculiar advantages of nighttime was purposely sought by the
accused in the commission of the deed. Same; Same; Admissibility of extra-judicial confessions.—Although extra-judicial
confessions are in general admissible only against those who made the same, this rule is
As this Court has pointed out:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
subject to an exception. As pointed out and applied in People vs. Condemena, L-22426,
May 29, 1968: Extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion, which
". . . in default of any showing or evidence that the peculiar advantages of nighttime was are identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other
purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact that the offense was
evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person
committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. It must concur with the intent
implicated to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission
or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by darkness of
of the crime. People vs. Provo, 37 SCRA 19, No. L-28347 January 20, 1971
night." (People v. Boyles, Et Al., L-15308, May 29, 1964.)

The penalty imposable on persons found guilty of the crime of robbery in band with CONCEPCION, J.:
homicide, under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering that appellant Simplicio Aniel acted in conspiracy with his co- Defendant Jose Mesina seeks the reversal of a decision of the Court of First Instance of
accused, and there is no evidence that said appellant attempted to prevent the Tarlac, the dispositive part of which reads:
commission of the offense charged, and taking into account the two aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the accused PAN PROVO and LEONARDO
offset the same, in the opinion of the writer, the appellant Simplicio Aniel should be DAVID are ACQUITTED of the crime charged, with costs de officio. However, PAN
made to suffer the extreme penalty of death. However, in view of the lack of the PROVO should be released from detention because of the pendency of Criminal Case
requisite vote, the sentence imposed on him by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs No. 2190 of this Court wherein the said accused is one of those charged for Murder.
against said Appellant. With reference to LEONARDO DAVID, his immediate release is ordered unless his
confinement is warranted by some other legal cause.

As for the accused JOSE MESINA, the Court finds him GUILTY of the crime of
Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heir of the victim
Matignas Serrano in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00); and to pay
the costs. The Court has imposed the penalty in its medium period, instead of the
maximum penalty of death because the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and use
of superior strength alleged in the information have already been absorbed in the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.

On October 9, 1958, shortly after dusk, Matignas Serrano, a security guard of the Clark
Field Air Base, was forcibly taken away by five men from his guard post at Fish Hawk
No. 1, locally known as "Pisok," at Bamban, Tarlac, where there is a cement vault, about
59. G.R. No. L-28347 January 20, 1971 1-1/2 meters by 2 meters at its base and about 2-1/2 meters in height, with an iron door
which is padlocked. There are electric wires, on top of the vault, connected with the

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wirings running southward from wooden -transmission n posts on both sides of said Anastacio answered that he could not grant Mesina's request because the "pipes"
vault.1 His dead body was found, on October 11, 1958, in a sugarcane plantation near a (cables) belonged to the Americans; that, thereupon, Mesina remarked: "If you do not
wooded area, known as Sapang Bituka, not far away from said post, with fractured know how to get along with people, you win not live long"; that, later, at about 3:00
"cervical vertebrae, right mandible, and right basofrontal bones." On December 2, 1958, p.m., Mesina and the unknown man, who came with him, departed stating that they were
a complaint was filed accusing herein appellant Jose Mesina, together with John Doe, in a hurry because they had companions waiting for them at Pisok; that, just after sunset
Peter Doe, Richard Doe and William Doe, of kidnapping with murder. Soon thereafter, that evening, Benita Mayuyu went to the post of her husband at Pisok and gave him a
the corresponding information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac flashlight he had bade her to bring that, soon after, five (5) men, four (4) of them
charging Jose Mesina and Leonardo David, alias Benaring with the aforesaid crime. masked, came; that the unmasked man was Mesina, whom she knew long before, and
Still later, the information was amended to include Pan Provo as one of the accused. who asked a cigarette from Matignas; that, as the latter extended his hand holding the
cigarette, Mesina grabbed the rifle slang on his (Matignas') shoulder, whereas the four
The main evidence for the prosecution against Mesina consisted of the testimonies of (4) masked men held him, and, with the help of Mesina, dragged him down the hill, and
Benita Mayuyu, Anastacio Serrano, Apolonio Gilbert, Kudiaru Laxamana and Emilio disappeared in the darkness at the foot thereof; that she, thereupon, screamed for help;
Provo, and Exhibits C and E. The prosecution, likewise, introduced the testimony, that as her nephew Berting Sibal, whose house was not far away, came, she bade him to
among others, of Robert Armstrong, superintendent of the police at the Air Base, which inform her brother-in-law, Anastacio Serrano, that Matignas had been kidnapped; that
is partly in Camp O'Donnell, province of Pampanga, and partly in Bamban, Tarlac. when Anastacio Serrano came, later that evening, he found Benita crying miserably; that
he gathered from her that Matignas had been taked away by several men, and since, in
Armstrong testified that, in addition to a private road therein, the Air Base used to view of her condition, he could not get from her the detail's of the occurrence, he
proceeded to the Air Base and reported the matter; that the officer then on duty therein
maintain its communications with Camp O'Donnell by radio, as well as thru
told him (Anastacio) to go home and come back the next day with a search team, which
underground cables, about two (2) inches in diameter, containing around 900 wires, for
the protection of which and other property within the base the U.S. Government had he did; that upon learning of the disappearance of Matignas, on October 10, 1958,
engaged as sentries the services of former members of the Philippine Scouts and Kudiaru Laxamana, another security guard of the Air Base, went, with several persons,
to Pisok where Benita Mayuyu confirmed the news that Matignas had been kidnapped
members of the Non-Christian tribe known as "Baluga," among whom was the deceased
by several persons and told him that one of them was Jose Mesina; that, as Laxamana
Matignas Serrano, whose guard post wag on a small plateau, on top of a hill, about 600
feet high. Early in 1958, the communication officer of the Air Base had reported and 4 others proceeded down the hill to search for Matignas, following the footprints
difficulty in communication, which was found to be due to the disappearance of a visible on the ground, Mesina came and joined the search; that the aforementioned
footprints led to a sugarcane field, at a given point of which the footprints were divided
portion of said cables, about 3 miles in length- apart from the disappearance of bridges
into two (2) sets, one leading to the left and another to the right; that when the search
and culverts-owing, presumably, to pilferage. In the evening of October 9, 1958,
Anastacio Serrano, another Baluga sentry, reported that his brother Matignas Serrano team was, about to take the latter direction, Mesina persuaded the members of the Team
had been missing from this post at "Pisok," with his carbine, since 6:00 o'clock that to follow the footprints leading to the left; that, heeding Mesina's advice, the search team
followed this lead but failed to locate Matignas; that when the team, together with
evening. The next day, a posse searched in vain the vicinity of "Pisok." On October 11,
Mesina, returned to Pisok. Anastacio Serrano was there; that Benita Mayuyu then said
1958, the body of Matignas was found in a state of decay at Sapang Bituka, not far away
from Pisok.lâwphî1.ñèt The carbine and ammunition issued to him were missing. that Mesina should not be allowed to go free "because he was the one who kidnapped
Armstrong further said that Pan Provo is another Baluga chief in the region; that he my husband"; that, thereafter, Anastacio brought Mesina and the others to the office of
the Provost Marshal; and that, one Lt. Ocampo, an officer therein, referred them to
(Armstrong) had seen Pan Provo and Mesina together on several occasions; that Pan
Camp Olivas, upon the ground that the event had taken place beyond his territorial
Provo and Mesina are related to each other; and that once Pan Provo asked him
(Armstrong) to engage the services of Mesina as security guard. jurisdiction.

It appears from the testimonies of Anastacio Serrano, Benita Mayuyu, Apolonio Gilbert In an affidavit, Exhibit C, subscribed and sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of
Angeles, Pampanga, Leonardo David stated that, when he was about to fetch his carabao
and Kudiaru, Laxamana that, on October 9, 1958, at about 9:00 a.m., Mesina went to the
in the vicinity of Pisok, early in the evening of October 9, 1958, he met his brother,
house of Anastacio Serrano, at Baluga Village, accompanied by a man whose face was
partly covered; that, presently, Apolonio Gilbert arrived, also, at said house of Anastacio Federico David alias "Pedring," who was accompanied by Jose Mesina and Manuel
Serrano, to ask for some rice; that the three (3) visitors took their lunch in that house; Zamora, alias "Maning"; that "Pedring" bade him to join the group, which he did, in
going Pisok; that as Matignas Serrano refused to allow them passage therein, "Pedring"
that, soon thereafter, Mesina urged Anastacio to let him get some "pipes," referring to
held Matignas snatched his carbine, and, with the assistance of his companions, dragged
the electric cable lines, guarded by Matignas Serrano near Pisok, within the Air Base
him away from his guard post; that Matignas was brought to a place in Sapang Bituka,

270
under a big tree, where "Pedring" gave him fist blows and then hit him on the head with credence to the testimony of Anastacio Serrano, Apolonio Gilbert and Kudiaru
the butt of the carbine taken away from him; and that Matignas then fell down Laxamana; (3) in admitting Exhibits C and E as evidence; and (4) in not believing the
unconscious. evidence for the defense.

Exhibit E is the transcript of the testimony given by Emilio Provo before Fiscal Under the first assignment of error, the defense assails the credibility of Benita
Fernando M. Bartolome of Tarlac, at the preliminary investigation conducted by the Mayuyu's testimony, upon the ground that she had given conflicting versions, in that at
latter, on July 16, 1959. Emilio Provo then testified, among other things, that Mesina is one time she said it was dark, between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., when her husband was taken
well known to him, Mesina having visited frequently Emilio's father, Pan Provo; that in away by several men, one of whom was Mesina, and, at another time, stated that the
1958, his father was engaged in supervising the digging of cable lines and culverts and occurrence took place just after that in a seeming effort to explain how she could
the dismantling of bridges in the Clark Air Force Base — with the assistance of many recognize said appellant; that in the evening of October 9, 1958, she did not tell either
persons, among them Emilio Provo and Jose Mesina; that the cables, culverts and I- her nephew Berting Sibal or her brother-in-law Anastacio Serrano, that she had
Beams thus contained were sold to Domingo de Vera and a Chinaman in Mabalacat, recognized appellant among the kidnappers of Matignas; that she, likewise, failed to
Pampanga; that on October 9, 1958, just after twilight, Emilio and Pan Provo went to the convey such information to Anastacio Serrano, as soon as he arrived at Pisok the next
house of Jose Mesina, whom the latter invited to go to Pisok; that on the way thereto, morning, not even when Mesina then showed up in that place; and that neither had she
Federico David, alias "Pedring," and Leonardo David, alias "Benaring," joined them; revealed his participation in the commission of the crime charged, while they were
that before reaching Pisok, Emilio's companion said that they would get Matignas going to the office of the Provost Marshal on October 10, 1958:
Serrano, the guard in that place, "because of the tubes" they were taking "and that one
that was enclosed in a tank which were being guarded by Matignas Serrano that as they At the outset, it should be noted that Benita Mayuyu is a member of the Non-Christian
reached Pisok, Pan Provo called Matignas Serrano that as Matignas stepped out of his tribe known as Baluga. As such, she had grown up and lived in a primitive condition,
guard post, Mesina wrested the carbine slung on the former's shoulder; that Pan Provo devoid of any education whatsoever. She is illiterate and cannot read, not even a time-
and Federico and Leonardo David helped Mesina drag Matignas down the hill; that, as piece. Although Matignas had been snatched by his kidnappers at 8:00 or 8:30 p.m., she
Matignas offered resistance Mesina, Pan Provo and Federico David boloed him at explained that this was a mere estimate of the time, which may be mistaken, and that the
Sapang Bituka, where Matignas was left, already dead; and that when they learned that evening had happened "just after twilight." It is well to remember, in this connection,
the body of Matignas Serrano was found subsequently, Emilio Provo and Pan Provo fled that, in response to her screams for help, her nephew Berting Sibal came; that she bade
to Pulong Calara, in the mountains. Berting Sibal to forthwith inform her brother-in-law, Anastacio Serrano, of the
kidnapping of Matignas; and that, after verifying this fact, Anastacio Serrano
Although Emilio Provo admitted having given this testimony, he denied, before the immediately reported to the authorities that Matignas "had been missing with his carbine
lower court, any knowledge about the truth thereof and affirmed that he gave said since 1800 house ... 9 Oct. '58," as recorded in the "Daily Journal SPL Police Operation"
testimony upon instructions of Angel Manipon and one Panolapi, who had assured him of the Air Base. In other words, Anastacio Serrano had estimated the time of the
that he would, thereafter, be free. disappearance of Matignas to be about 6 p.m. Considering that Anastacio is more
enlightened than Benita Mayuyu and that Matignas had been snatched from his post
Appellant denied having performed any of the acts imputed to him by the prosecution. "just after twilight," there is every reason to believe that Anastacio's estimate of the time
The defense would, also, have the Court believe that on October 9, 1958, Mesina was in of the occurrence is more accurate than that of his sister-in-law. In fact, Benita testified
his house at Barrio San Nicolas, Bamban, Tarlac, up to 5:00 o'clock p.m.; that, after that, at 5 p.m., she brought the dinner of Matignas, who, after taking the same, bade her
taking an early dinner he attended the religious service, which lasted up to 8:00 p.m., at to bring his flashlight, whereupon she picked it up at their hut, barely 70 meters away
the Iglesia ni Cristo, to which he is affiliated, in that barrio; that, at about 8:30 p.m. he from Pisok, and then brought the flashlight thereto, at about 6 p.m. The occurrence took
and Ruben Villas attended a barrio meeting called by barrio lieutenant Remigio part shortly thereafter.2
Ocampo; that, upon adjournment of the meeting, around 10:00 p.m., they returned to the
house of Mesina and then went to bed. Then, too, "Pisok" is in a small plateau, then cleared of grass, on a hill about 600 feet in
height. Although, for lack of electric lights in the vicinity, it was already dark,
As indicated above, the trial court acquitted Pan Provo and Leonardo David, upon the particularly at the foot of the hill, it is a fact that Pisok was at the top thereof; that
ground of reasonable doubt, but convicted Mesina of the crime of murder, and sentenced twilight had been over only shortly before; that the hut of Matignas and Benita was
him accordingly, whereupon Mesina interposed the present appeal contending that the barely 70 meters away from Pisok,3 that Benita's eyesight had already been adjusted to
trial court erred: (1) in relying upon the testimony of Benita Mayuyu; (2) in giving the existing conditions when she went to Pisok bringing a flashlight to Matignas; that

271
her ability to see and recognize persons and objects was enhanced by the circumstance Appellant assails the testimony of Anastacio Serrano and Apolonio Gilbert upon the
that she had been with Matignas several minutes before the arrival of his kidnappers; ground that neither had inquired about the identity of the companion of Mesina, or
that the glow of the light at the Air Base proper, although 5 to 6 kilometers or miles conversed with him (Mesina's companion) when they (Mesina and his companion)
away, rendered the top of the hill, where Pisok was, less dark than the area at the foot allegedly went to the house of Anastacio Serrano in the morning of October 9, 1958, and
thereof; and that she was beside her husband when the malefactors snatched him. We stayed there up to 3:00 p.m., and that the remark of Mesina, about the short life of them
are satisfied that the surrounding circumstances were not such as to render it impossible, who do not know how to get along with others, does not have the import the prosecution
or even improbable, for Benita to identify a person whom she knew well, like Mesina, attaches thereto.
had he been with the kidnappers, unmasked. Indeed, Kudiaru Laxamana learned from
Benita, on October 10, 1958, that she had recognized Mesina among the offenders, the The significance of said remark is, however, irrelevant to the veracity of said witnesses
night before. What is more, Mesina testified that, in a conversation he had with her on for the prosecution, who corroborated each other in connection therewith. Moreover, in
October 10, 1958, Benita said she had recognized one of the kidnappers. Benita had no the light of the fact that Mesina and the unknown person, who came with him, left the
possible reason to inculpate house of Anastacio Serrano, at 3:00 p.m., stating that their companions were waiting for
him — if he were not really the unmasked kidnapper — and thereby exculpate the true them at Pisok; that, at about 6:00 p.m., that same day, Mesina and four (4) masked men
culprit. went to Pisok, snatched the carbine of Matignas and dragged took away; and that,
thereafter, Matignas was found dead, it is clear that the remark in question, made after
Let us now consider appellant's argument based upon Benita's failure to forthwith reveal the refusal of Anastacio Serrano to allow further pilferage of electric cables within the
the participation of Mesina in the commission of the crime. It will be recalled that, as Air Base, was meant to be a threat to those who might obstruct said pilferage. Upon the
soon as Matignas and his kidnappers had disappeared in the darkness at the foot of the other hand, since the man who accompanied Mesina to the house of Anastacio Serrano
hill, Benita hurried down another part of the hill, screaming for help. When, soon had his face covered with a towel, it was obvious that Mesina and he did not want his
thereafter, her nephew Berting Sibal appeared, she bade him to inform Anastacio identity to be known. It was, therefore, indiscreet and useless to converse with him or to
Serrano that Matignas had been kidnapped. She did not tell Berting Sibal the details of otherwise ask who he was or where he came from.
the occurrence, for there was vital urgency of rescuing Matignas and, hence, she did not
wait for Berting to approach her, but conveyed her message to him as soon as he was It is argued that the act of Mesina of dissuading the posse headed by Kudiaru Laxamana
within shouting distance. from following the set of footprints going to the right of the sugarcane plantation near
Pisok, and of persuading the posse to track the footprints leading to the left of said
When Anastacio Serrano came, it was sometime later. Meanwhile, there was nothing plantation is "too insignificant" to implicate said appellant. This argument is manifestly
she could do to save Matignas. It is not unusual for female members of our masses, devoid of merit, aside from being immaterial to the issue of credibility of Laxamana's
particularly those least enlightened, to express their sorrow or desperation by crying testimony. Indeed, considering that the posse had thereby failed to locate the body of
loudly and otherwise acting in a frenzied or hysterical manner. An intense lamentation Matignas, which it would have found had it (the posse) turned right, which was the
and expression of grief for a misfortune, when unchecked soon enough, is bound to logical course to take — as Laxamana wanted — to for there were small footprints in
result in a condition of numbness, under which the mind becomes somewhat dull. Under that direction and Matignas is small, the aforementioned act of Mesina tends to show
these circumstances, it is not difficult to picture Benita's plight on October 10, 1958. that he knew where the body was and corroborates the testimony of Benita Mayuyu to
When Anastacio Serrano eventually arrived, she was in no condition to explain the the effect that he was one of those who snatched Matignas in the evening of October 9,
occurrence or to do anything except lament the loss of her husband. She was in a daze, 1958.
and did not clearly perceive or remember what she did, or what transpired about her.
She did not converse with Anastacio Serrano when he arrived, or notice the presence of It is next urged that Kudiaru Laxamana, Anastacio Serrano and Benita Mayuyu had
Jose Mesina, either when he first showed up that morning, or when she went to Clark contradicted each other, in that — according to the defense — the first said that Benita
Field and later to Camp Olivas. When Kudiaru Laxamana arrived later in the morning of "told the search party not to allow Mesina to go free because he was the one who
October 10, 1958, she, however, confided to him that Jose Mesina was one of the kidnapped her husband," whereas Anastacio Serrano affirmed that Benita "told him
culprits. And still later, when the search team headed by Laxamana came back empty about Jose Mesina only the day after they came from the Office of the Provost Marshal
handed, she said: "do not let thus man (referring to Mesina) go free, for he was the one and when they were already at Camp Olivas," and Benita declared that "it was only
who kidnapped" her husband. when they were at Clark Field when she told Anastacio Serrano about Jose Mesina and
she did not tell the same to other members of the search party."4
The first assignment of error is, therefore, untenable.

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The statement of Benita Mayuyu, testified to by Laxamana, was made to him, not to the effect, exculpating himself therein, Leonardo David points in Exhibit C to his brother —
search party or to Anastacio Serrano, so that no inconsistency exists between the latters Federico David, alias "Pedring" — as the sole killer of Matignas
testimony and that of Laxamana. Besides, Benita did not testify that the participation of Serrano.lâwphî1.ñèt The participation of Jose Mesina, as one of those who helped
Mesina in the commission of the offense had been revealed by her to no other person "Pedring" drag Matignas away from his guard post, was merely an incident in the
than Anastacio Serrano. What she said is that no other person heard her or was description of the crime, as committed principally by "Pedring." Likewise significant is
present when she conveyed the aforementioned information to Anastacio Serrano. Then, the fact that the latter - Federico David, alias
too, after the ordeal of the night before, Benita did not feel well on October 10, 1958. "Pedring" — had already been killed, in an encounter with peace officers, shortly after
The apprehension and the tension resulting from the failure to locate the body of October 9, 1958 .7 In short, there was no reason why the agents of the law Who
Matignas on that date did not certainly help improve the situation. Hence, when she was, investigated Leonardo David would resort to duress in order to secure a statement
thereafter, brought, first to Clark Field and, then — after the usual period of waiting substantially favorable to him.
during the preliminary inquiries therein made — referred to Camp Olivas, she was
literally and understandably groggy. When we add to this the fact that she was kept on Exhibit E is the transcript of the questions propounded by Fiscal Bartolome of Tarlac
the witness stand for five (5) days, and that she was so extensively cross-examined by and of the answers given by Emilio Provo at the preliminary investigation conducted by
several lawyers for the defense that the transcript of her testimony covered one hundred said official. Angel Manipon and Panolapi — who, according to Emilio Provo, induced
and five (105) pages, some of which are single space, it is not in the least strange that him to give said answers — did not take part in said investigation. It does not even
this simple, illiterate member of one of our tribes of aborigines, found herself uncertain appear that they were present when it was held. There is, likewise, nothing in the record
or confused on whether her conversation with Anastacio Serrano took place at Clark to indicate the interest, if any, of Manipon and Panolapi in the case at bar, or that Emilio
Field or at Camp Olivas. Well settled 19 the rule that inconsistencies and contradictions Provo had reasonable grounds to believe that they could order his release or cause to
incurred by an illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy examination will not affect the take place.
credibility of the testimony.5
Again, unlike Exhibit C, which depicts Federico David — alias "Pedring" — as the
One fact stands in bold relief and that is that Benita Mayuyu had positively recognized main culprit, the testimony of Emilio Provo in Exhibit E tends to show that his father,
one of the culprits and that she had so stated, from the very first moment she explained Pan Provo, was the mastermind, for it was he (Pan Provo) who invited Mesina to go to
the circumstances under which her husband had been "kidnapped." This was established, Pisok, and it was he (Pan Provo) who called Matignas and persuaded him to step out of
not only by the testimony and that of Kudiaru Laxamana and Anastacio Serrano, but, his guard post. Moreover, Pan Provo took part in the act of hacking Matignas to death.
also by the appellant himself.6 In the light of the foregoing, and considering that neither As in Exhibit C, the reference to Mesina in Exhibit E was merely incidental to the main
Laxamana, nor Anastacio Serrano, nor Benita Mayuyu had possible motive to falsely role played by Pan Provo. Had A been concocted by the prosecution in this case, the
incriminate appellant Jose Mesina. We do not find sufficient grounds to doubt the story given by Emilio Provo in Exhibit E would have, in all probability, followed a
veracity of said witnesses for the prosecution. pattern identical to that of Exhibit C, made prior thereto, or to that resulting from the
testimony of Benita Mayuyu, Anastacio Serrano and Kudiaru Laxamana. Although all
Referring now to Exhibits C and E, Leonardo David testified that he had acted under are unanimous on :the participation of Mesina, and Exhibits C and E are in accord that
duress in subscribing to the first and swearing to the truth of its contents, whereas Pan Provo and Federico David had taken part, also, in the commission of the crime,
Emilio Provo affirmed that he knew nothing about the truth of his statements in Exhibit these two (2) documents do not agree as regards the details of their participation therein.
E, he having made the same upon instructions of Angel Manipon and one Panolapi, who In short, the explanation given by Emilio Provo, for his statements contained in Exhibit
assured him that he would thereby be set free. Furthermore, appellant maintains that, E, is manifestly unworthy of credence.
being in the nature of extrajudicial admissions or confessions, the same are admissible in
evidence against its makers only, not against him. As regards the admissibility of Exhibits C and E as evidence against Mesina, it should
be noted that, although extrajudicial confessions are in general admissible only against
The testimony of Leonardo David about his alleged maltreatment bythe police has all those who made the same, this rule is subject to an exception. As pointed out and
the earmarks of artificiality, for he did not reveal said maltreatment, either to his own applied in People v. Condemena:8
father, when the latter visited him at Camp Olivas, or to the Justice of the Peace of
Angeles City, before whom he subscribed and swore to the truth of the contents of Extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion, which are identical
Exhibit C. Besides, his signatures on each and everyone of the three (3) pages thereof with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on
appear to have been written with a firm hand. More important still, -apart from, in

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record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to chow the latter being less than 1/2 kilometer from the barrio of Camatsili, which, in turn, is
the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. 9 about one-hour's walk from San Nicolas. 13

Indeed, as early as November 5, 1915, this Court had occasion to state: 10 The acts proven constitute the crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength,
with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and evident premeditation, in which
... The truth of the incriminating statements of Miguela Sibug, Damaso Valencia's would warrant the imposition of the extreme penalty, were it not for the lack of the
widow, in connection with each one of the said three defendants, is proved by those number of votes necessary therefor. Except as to the indemnity, which should lie
made by the other witness for the prosecution, Lorenzo Reyes, and by the increased from P10,000 to P12,000, 14 We find, therefore, no reason to disturb the
confession, although extra-judicial, made by Faustino Mañago himself in the decision appealed from, which. as thus modified as to the indemnity, is hereby affirmed
municipality of Hagonoy to the lieutenant of the Constabulary, Cristobal Cerquella and in all other respects, with the costs of this instance against appellant Jose Mesina. It is so
to the municipal president and a policeman of the said pueblo and this confession is ordered.
worthy of credence and is admissible against him, as it is likewise credible and
admissible against his co-defendants, Abdon de Leon and Severino Perez, his
accusation of their participation in the crime, inasmuch as the confession is
corroborated both by the testimony of Miguela Sibug herself and by that of Lorenzo 60. [G.R. No. L-27909. December 5, 1978.]
Reyes and confirmed by the other evidence related thereto and found in the record. 11.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARCADIO PUESCA
The applicability of the foregoing exception — which has been repeatedly alias "Big Boy", WALTER APA, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias "White",
acknowledged and applied by this Court 12 — to the case at bar becomes apparent when MAGNO MONTAÑO alias "Edol", JOSE GUSTILO alias "Peping" and
we bear in mind that the statements contained in Exhibits C and E were made — RICARDO DAIRO alias "Carding", Defendants-Appellants.
obviously without collusion and independently of each other — for the purpose of
establishing the guilt of Federico David and Pan Provo, respectively, and that they
corroborate one another and the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, Anastacio Serrano and SYNOPSIS
Kudiaru Laxamana with respect to the fact that Matignas Serrano was dragged away Six appellants were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide, attended
from his guard post in the evening of October 9, 1958, by Mesina and several other by the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. Three of the appellants executed
persons — apparently for not allowing them to steal and take away electric cables from extrajudicial confession wherein they implicated their co-accused. They were positively
Clark Field Air Base — and then killed. Hence, said Exhibits C and E were properly identified by the prosecution witnesses as participants in the crime. Two of them were
admitted as circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the participation identified on the basis of distinct physical characteristics, such as the fact that one was
of appellant in the commission of said offense, as testified to by said witnesses for the taller and stoop-shouldered, while the other was the shorter one. During the custodial
prosecution. investigation the witnesses pointed to the appellants as the culprits.

Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court sentenced them to
Needless to say, as one of the weakest defenses available in criminal cases, the alibi set
death.
up by appellant herein cannot offset the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, who positively
identified him as one of those who seized Matignas Serrano, at Pisok, in the evening of
October 9, 1958, corroborated by the testimony of the aforementioned witnesses for the On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment with the modification
that the indemnity of P6,000.00 due the heirs be increased to P12,000.00.
prosecution and by the aforementioned Exhibits C and E. It may not be amiss to add that
Lazaro David, whose testimony was introduced by Mesina to corroborate his alibi, could
not explain why he allegedly remembered distinctly the presence of Mesina at the
religious service in the Iglesia ni Cristo and the barrio meeting held subsequently SYLLABUS
thereto, in the evening of October 9, 1958, but could not remember other events of
similar nature, at about that period of time. Upon the other hand, Remigio Ocampo
,would have Us believe that Mesina arrived at said meeting in the barrio of San Nicolas 1. APPEAL; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; RES JUDICATA. — Appellants can longer
around 9:00 p.m., which does not negate Mesina's presence at Pisok, at about 6: 00 p.m., raise in issue the denial of their motion for new trial where they had previously
challenged before the Supreme Court the correctness of the order of the court a quo
denying their motion for new trial, and the Supreme Court had found the petition devoid

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or merit. declared that the affiants read the contents thereof, after which they freely affixed their
signatures on the document. And where a confession was first orally given and tape
2. EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; FEAR DOES NOT DETRACT FROM PERSON’S recorded, after which it was put down in writing, but the affiant refused to sign his
ABILITY TO OBSERVE. — Fear does not necessarily detract from a person’s physical confession before the justice of the peace, the circumstance that he was able to refuse,
ability to observe. A person will easily remember another who does him harm, because without having been punished or maltreated for such refusal, is a strong indication that
consciously or unconsciously, he turns his attention to the offender. his confession was not extracted from him by force or intimidation.

3. ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP TO VICTIM. — That the prosecution witnesses are 8. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. — In order to determine the existence of
related to the victim is no reason to disbelieve their testimony. Relationship to the robbery with homicide, the rule is that it is enough that a homicide resulted by reason or
victim, standing by itself, does not prove that the witnesses are prejudiced and biased, on the occasion of the robbery, and it is immaterial that the death supervened by mere
considering that their testimonies are clear and convincing and corroborated by other accident. It is sufficient that the homicide was produced by reason or on occasion of the
facts and circumstances. robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to
the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime,
4. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF ILL-FEELING AGAINST APPELLANTS. — The that has to be taken into consideration. There is homicide by reason of robbery when
testimonies of prosecution witnesses will be given weight if it does not appear that they there is direct relation, an intimate connection, between the robbery and the killing,
had some grievances or ill-feelings against any of the appellants and the record does not whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes be
disclose any untoward or wicked motive which could have induced them to twist the committed.
truth or perjure themselves. And where they were subjected to extreme cross-
examination by defense counsel, any falsity in their declaration could have been ferreted 9. ID.; ID., BAND IS A GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN
and exposed. ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. — The term "band" is defined both in paragraph 6,
Article 14 and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code. "Band" is a generic aggravating
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY DISTINGUISHED FROM EVIDENT circumstance in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, international mutilation or
PREMEDITATION. — Since conspiracy by its very nature is formed in utmost secrecy, with physical injuries, resulting in insanity, impotency and blindness (subdivision 2,
it can seldom be proven by direct evidence. It is "generally proved by a number of Article 263, Revised Penal Code), which means that it can be offset by a generic
indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be mitigating circumstance. But if "band" is present in the other kinds of robbery with
accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, violence mentioned in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 294, then it is a qualifying or
one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect inherent circumstances which raises the penalty to the maximum period and cannot be
the object." In contrast with evident premeditation and reflection on the possible offset by any generic mitigating circumstances. This qualifying circumstance should be
consequences of the intended criminal act, conspiracy arises on the very moment the expressly alleged in the information.
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
accomplish it. Once this is established, each and every one of the conspirators is made 10. ID.; ID.; NOCTURNITY AND BAND. — The aggravating circumstances of "band"
criminally liable for the crime committed by any member of the conspiracy. and "nocturnity" when occurring jointly in the commission of a crime, are generally
treated only as one aggravating circumstance. Nevertheless, they may be considered
6. ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; ADMISSIBILITY. — It is true that an separately when their elements are distinctly perceived, and can subsist independently,
extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the person who made it, but it is also revealing a greater degree of perversity. It is not necessary, however, to decide whether
settled that such confession is admissible as corroborative evidence of such other facts or not the two should be treated distinctly from each other where the existence of the
that tend to establish the guilt of his co-defendants. It is also admissible against a co- maximum penalty and the concurrence of an additional circumstance will not alter same.
accused as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator having
actually participated in the commission of the crime.

7. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES SHOWING VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION.

— The voluntariness of confession may be shown by the fact that no motive on the part PER CURIAM:
of the investigating officials or officers has been proven that could have impelled them
to concoct facts narrated in the extrajudicial confession; which only the affiants could
supply; that the judge before whom the confessions had been signed and sworn to

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 When Francisco Macias, another son of Candido Macias, heard the gun reports he
Automatic review of the judgment of the Davao Court of First Instance in Criminal Case rushed to his father’s house which was about eighty (80) meters away from his home.
No. 6813, finding appellants Arcadio Puesca alias "Big Boy", Jose Gustilo alias As he approached the house, two persons with carbines who were in the kitchen fired
"Peping", Magno Montaño alias "Edol", Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. alias "White", Walter upon him. He was ordered to crawl to the sala and to lie flat on his stomach on the floor.
Apa and Ricardo Dairo alias "Carding" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of He observed that the house was being ransacked. When Francisco Macias tried to look
Robbery in Band with Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of around, two men kicked him on the head. Later, Francisco was told to go downstairs and
nocturnity, and imposing upon them the penalty of DEATH, ordering them to indemnify to get the key of one of the jeeps from his house. As he went down, he was followed by
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Candido Macias in the amount of two other armed men.
P6,000.00 and P20,000.00, the latter sum representing the money robbed, and to pay the
costs. The gun reports in the house of Candido Macias were also heard by the spouses Marietta
Macias-Olarte and Epifanio Olarte, daughter and son-in-law, respectively, of Candido
The following facts were the basis of the trial court’s judgment: On the early evening of Macias. They immediately left their house to find out what was happening in Candido
November 27, 1960, Candido Macias and his wife, Marcela Macias, were taking supper Macias’ house. On their way thereto, they heard bullets whistling over their heads. They
in their house located in Barrio Sinayawan. Sinayawan is a barrio of Hagonoy, Davao sought shelter in the house of Anacleto Delfino, whose wife, Antonia Macias, was the
del Sur and lies near the road to Digos. Under the house were their son, Fortunato sister of Marietta Macias-Olarte. Francisco Urbano, a tenant of Candido Macias,
Macias, and son-in-law, Anacleto Delfino. Fortunato Macias was repairing a jeep, happened to reside at that time in said house. When the firing subsided, Marietta
assisted by Anacleto Delfino who was holding a lighted "Petromax" lamp. Macias-Olarte, Epifanio Olarte, Antonia Macias and Francisco Urbano went to the
backyard of Delfino’s house. The distance from the house of Anacleto Delfino to the
Suddenly, strangers with firearms unceremoniously entered the house. Three of them house of Candido Macias was some forty (40) meters. The group of Marietta Macias-
went upstairs. Marcela Macias and Candido Macias heard the voice of one of them Olarte then saw three men coming from the house of Candido Macias. As the three men
emanating from the sala, ordering the occupants of the house to lie down on the floor. neared their place, Epifanio Olarte tried to talk to Francisco Macias, but he was
Candido Macias left the table and went out to the sala. Two gun reports were heard and immediately pushed back and one of the escorts of Macias fired at him. Marietta
Candido Macias instantly slumped to the floor. Marcela Macias stood up and walked Macias-Olarte and Francisco Urbano testified that they recognized the tall, stoop-
towards her husband but before she could reach him, she was met by one of the shouldered gunwielder as Walter Apa because of the light of the moon and his proximity
intruders who ordered her to lie flat on the floor, otherwise all of them would die. to them. They also recognized the shorter fellow as appellant Ricardo Dairo, when they
saw was carrying a gun. Appellant Ricardo Dairo remained with the group of Marietta,
Someone under the house also directed Fortunato Macias and Anacleto Delfino not to while Francisco Macias and appellant Walter Apa continued on their way. Francisco
move. Turning to his left, Fortunato Macias saw two armed men. He immediately ran Macias was not allowed by appellant Apa to turn his face sideways. After they secured
towards the coconut plantation near the house where he took refuge. Anacleto Delfino the key from his house, Francisco Macias and appellant Walter Apa returned to the
also turned around to see who those persons were. When he held his lamp up, he saw house of Candido Macias, passing through the backyard of the house of Delfino where
two gunmen, one tall and the other short. He identified one of them as appellant Arcadio they were joined by appellant Ricardo Dairo.
Puesca and the other as appellant Magno Montaño. According to Delfino, appellant
Puesca fired at him and he was hit between the elbow and the armpit. Delfino brought Under the house of Candido Macias, Francisco Macias started the motor of one of the
down the lamp and lay flat on his belly. When he was brought to the sala which was jeeps, and thereafter, eight of the men boarded the jeep. Apparently to prevent pursuit,
then lighted by a "Petromax" lamp, Delfino saw his father-in-law, Candido Macias, the tires of the other jeep were fired upon. The jeep which was driven by Francisco
lying on the floor near the door. He was already dead. He also noticed two persons with proceeded towards Barrio Liling on the way to Davao City. After a while Francisco
firearms whom he identified as appellants Jose Gustilo and Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. At Macias was ordered to stop the vehicle and someone alighted from the rear, and
that time, Marcela Macias noticed that the intruders were ransacking the house. The Francisco Macias was ordered to move over to the center of the front seat. According to
trunk in the master’s bedroom was forcibly opened, and the sum of P20,000.00 was Francisco Macias, he was able to recognize fully the man who took over the steering
taken. This sum represented the proceeds from the sale of a parcel of land for wheel. He identified him as appellant Jose Gustilo. When Francisco tried to look
P17,000.00 together with their income from a twenty-four-hectare riceland and their sideways, one of them hit him on the head with a pistol. After the jeep had run for more
three jeeps for hire. They also took the gun of Candido Macias which was lying on the than one hour, it was stopped. Francisco Macias went down the jeep and one of the men
bed, as well as his new pair of pants and other clothes. The aparador in the sala was said that he should be shot. Francisco Macias pleaded for his life. Appellant Jose Gustilo
toppled down by appellants Gustilo and Macalinao. intervened and suggested to his companions that they spare Francisco’s life. Francisco
Macias was then hogtied and stripped of his clothes. The men then fled away in the jeep.

276
After their departure, Francisco was able to untie his feet, and he walked about two The questioning of appellant Gustilo was tape recorded by Lei Hong, and was taken
kilometers to a friend’s house, where he borrowed a pair of pants and shirts. Later, he down in writing (Exhibits "R", "R-1", "R-2" ; "U", "U-1" ; "V", "V-1", "V-2" ; "W",
boarded a passenger bus for Digos, a municipality adjacent to Hagonoy. "W-1" and "W-2").

The robbery and killing in the house of Candido Macias were reported that same night, Following the confession of appellants Puesca and Gustilo, appellant Magno Montaño
November 27, 1960, by Francisco Macias to Antonio Viran, Chief of Police of alias "Edol" was arrested by Chief Viran. In his own handwriting (Exhibits "Q", "Q-1"
Hagonoy, Davao. Accompanied by police officers, Chief Viran went to the house off to "Q-3"), appellant Montaño confessed his guilt and names as his confederates in the
Candido Macias in Barrio Sinayawan and found Candido Macias dead. The furniture in crime Arcadio Puesca alias "Big Boy", Jose Gustilo alias "Peping" and Felimon
the house were in topsy-turvy condition. The officer interviewed persons in the house Macalinao. Appellant Montaño’ confession was tape recorded by Lei Hong in the
and the latter assured him that they could recognize the culprits. The get-away jeep was presence of Mayor Llanos and the police officers.
recovered near a bridge on the road to Davao City. The following morning, Chief Viran
returned to the house of Candido Macias, accompanied by Mayor Llanos of Digos, The confessions of appellants Puesca and Montaño (Exhibits "L" and "Q") were
Zosimo Melendez, Chief of Police of Digos, Sgt. Baño and Lt. Javier of the Digos subsequently subscribed and sworn to by the declarants before Augusto H. Fernandez,
Police Force. Chief Viran found P17.00 in one-peso bills, while Chief Melendez found Justice of the Peace of Digos. Appellant Gustilo, on the other hand, refused to sign his
empty shells in the sleeping room of Candido Macias, and a bullet slug on the floor of confession (Exhibit "R") and did not give any reason for his refusal.
the sala. They also saw downstairs a jeep with flat tires and a "Petromax" lamp
destroyed by bullets. On December 15, 1960, appellant Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. was arrested at the Sasa
Airport, Davao City, as he was about to board a plane for Cebu. In a confrontation with
Chief Viran reported the incident to the Provincial Governor of Davao. Col. Jacinto appellant Puesca and later with appellant Gustilo, he was identified by the two as the
Romero, Chief of Police Affairs Unit in the Office of the Provincial Governor, then person they had mentioned in their confessions as their companion in the commission of
joined hands with the police to solve the robbery-killing incident. the crime.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On December 1, 1960, Sgt. Lucio Baño met one Roger Cahilog who informed him that In order to identify all the culprits, Chief Viran showed to Francisco Urbano and
appellants Arcadio Puesca alias "Big Boy" and Jose Gustilo alias "Peping", slept in his Marietta Macias-Olarte the pictures of some police characters, from which the two
house on the night of November 26, 1960 and that he overheard the two talking about picked out the pictures of appellant Walter Apa (Exhibit "S") and Ricardo Dairo
robbery. He thus became suspicious of the two. (Exhibit "T"). They told the officer that Apa and Dairo were among those whom they
saw on the night of the incident. Appellants Apa and Dairo were picked up by the police
On December 2, 1960, appellants Puesca and Jose Gustilo were apprehended by Sgt. and confined in jail.
Baño and Lt. Javier in Davao City. On December 10, 1960, appellant Puesca, who was
detained in the municipal jail of Digos, told Sgt. Baño and Chief Melendez that he Sometime in December 1960, Marietta Macias-Olarte, Anacleto Delfino, Francisco
would like to see Mayor Llanos in order to confess his participation in the crime. In the Macias and Francisco Urbano were invited to the municipal jail of Digos, where, from a
evening of that date, Mayor Llanos met appellant Puesca in his office on the second group of detained prisoners, they pointed to appellants Arcadio Puesca, Jose Gustilo and
floor of the municipal building. Appellant Puesca was questioned by the Mayor on his Magno Montaño as three of the men who had participated in the robbery and killing of
participation. Present were Chief Melendez, Chief Viran, Lt. Javier and Lei Hong, Candido Macias. Subsequently, in January 1961, Francisco Urbano was called to the
owner of a tape recording machine. Appellant Puesca’s investigation was tape recorded municipal building of Hagonoy, and from among a group of persons he pointed to
by Lei Hong. Puesca confessed that he was one of the gang who entered the house of appellant Ricardo Dairo as one of the culprits he recognized.
Macias and committed the robbery and killing therein. He mentioned as his companions
Jose Gustilo alias "Peping", Magno Montaño alias "Edol", Felimon, Carding and The Cadaver of Candido Macias was autopsied by Dr. Julio M. Layug, Municipal
Mariano. He said that there were others who were with them whose names he did not Health Officer of Digos, Davao, as the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy was away.
know but whom he could identify if he saw again. The confession of appellant Puesca The result of his autopsy examination is found in the report, Exhibit "A", and read as
was taken down in writing (Exhibit "L"). follows:

Appellant Jose Gustilo, like Puesca, admitted to Mayor Llanos his participation in the "1. Gunshot wound 3 inches above the left mammary gland more on the left side of the
commission of the crime and mentioned as his companions Arcadio Puesca alias "Big manubrium measuring 1 cm. in diameter, penetrating the skin, muscle, aorta of the heart,
Boy", Magno Montaño alias "Edol", Filomeno Macalinao, Carding, Mariano and others. lung and the slug was lodged between the right 8th and 9th ribs at the back and between

277
the muscle and the skin between the spinal column and the right scapula. The slug found the house and that after he heard those shots he asked Jose Gustilo why he shot the
was caliber 38. victim, and Gustilo replied that he "wanted to challenge me" (Exhibit "Q-2")

"2. Gunshot wound 3 inches below the left mammary gland externally at the left axillary Marietta Macias-Olarte and Francisco Urbano testified that appellants Walter Apa and
line measuring 1 cm. in diameter, penetrating the skin, muscle, lung, liver, and the right Ricardo Dairo were the ones who escorted Francisco Macias when they came from the
lumbar region. The gunshot wound at this place of exit measures 1-1/2 cms. in diameter house of Candido Macias, passing through the backyard; that when they talked with
and in overted position." Francisco Macias and Olarte tried to place his hands on the shoulders of Francisco,
Dr. Layug testified that the second shot was fired while the victim was falling down, and Walter Apa pushed him; that Apa fired at Olarte who fell to the ground. Marietta and
that death supervened in only three or four minutes. The cause of death was due to Francisco testified that they recognized Walter Apa as the tall stoop-shouldered person
"shock with internal hemorrhage caused by the gunshot wounds" holding a gun and that the shorter fellow, also armed with a carbine, was Ricardo Dairo.
After Francisco Macias and Walter Apa had proceeded to the former’s house, it was
Counsel de oficio for all of the appellants maintains that the court a quo erred: (1) in Ricardo Dairo who guarded Olarte, Antonio Macias, Delfino and Francisco Urbano.
giving more weight and credence to the "biased and unbelievable declarations of After a few minutes, Francisco Macias returned to the house of Candido Macias.
relatives of the deceased" ; (2) in admitting and believing the confessions of some of the
appellants which "were extracted through third degree" ; and (3) in denying the motion Francisco Macias declared that two persons armed with carbines fired at him; that while
of appellants for new trial. In a supplemental brief, counsel for appellant Filomeno lying face downwards on the floor, he heard "sounds as if something have (sic) been
Macalinao, Jr. argues that the evidence on record, outside of the confessions, is ransacked . . . persons going down . . .. The aparador was (sic) tumbled down . . .." He
inadequate to prove conspiracy; that there is no evidence that appellants took and carried further testified that when he drove the jeep of the deceased with the appellants aboard,
away the money, pistol and clothes of Candido Macias; that none of the witnesses saw it was appellant Jose Gustilo who took over the wheel from him. In their attempt to
the slaying of Candido Macias; that the identification of Macalinao by Anacleto Delfino impugn the credibility of the testimony of Anacleto Delfino, appellants contended that
is "shaky and indecisive" ; and that nocturnity should not have been considered as an this witness could not have recognized appellants Arcadio Puesca and Magno Montaño,
aggravating circumstance. much less Jose Gustilo and Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. It is claimed that it would have
To begin with, appellants can no longer raise in issue the denial of their motion for new been difficult for Anacleto Delfino to recognize Arcadio Puesca and Magno Montaño
trial. They have previously challenged before this Court by certiorari the correctness of because when Delfino turned around and put up the lamp, the lamp blocked Delfino’s
the order of the court a quo denying their motion for new trial. 1 This Court found that face, preventing him from getting a clear view of the two. This contention, however, is
the petition devoid of merit, hence, the same was dismissed on July 28, 1967. Entry of not borne by the facts. When the witness, Anacleto Delfino, held the lighted lamp, he
judgment was made on September 20, 1967. did not hold it directly in front of his face. He held the lamp at the right side of his face
in such a manner that his view of the appellants who were just three meters away should
On the question of sufficiency of the evidence as basis for the conviction of appellants, not in the least be impeded. Moreover, because of the bright light of the "Petromax"
the Court finds that the evidence clearly shows that appellants were positively identified lamp, identification of the culprits was not an improbability.
by the prosecution witnesses as participants in the crime. Thus, Anacleto Delfino
declared that appellants Arcadio Puesca and Magno Montaño were the persons he saw Appellants further argued that it was improbable for Delfino to have recognized Jose
under the house of Candido Macias, his father-in-law; that he recognized them because Gustilo and Filomeno Macalinao, Jr., since he saw them for the first time under the light
he raised the lamp higher to find out who they were; and that it was appellant Arcadio of a kerosene lamp, and he was gripped by fear and lying on the floor with his face
Puesca who fired at him, hitting him between the elbow and the armpit. He further downward. Contrary to appellants’ contentions, fear does not necessarily detract from a
stated that when he placed the lamp down on the ground, Puesca shot the lamp and person’s physical ability to observe. It should be borne in mind that a person will easily
ordered Anacleto to go upstairs. Puesca admitted in his confession that he fired at a man remember another who does him harm, because consciously or unconsciously he turns
holding a "Petromax" "with the intention of hitting the light and to scare the man . . ." his attention to the offender. 2
(Exhibit "L"). Anacleto Delfino also testified that upon reaching the second floor of the
house, he saw two armed men whom he identified as appellants Jose Gustilo and At any rate, according to Delfino, he was looking straight at the appellants whose faces
Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. After he was made to lie on the floor, he heard sounds in the were clearly visible to him under the bright light of the kerosene lamp in the sala.
room of something being broken. According to Puesca, a certain Felimon and Jose
Gustilo were the first to go up the house followed by Magno Montaño, then he heard "Q. Those persons looked at you squarely and plainly, without any attempt of hiding
two shots fired inside the second floor of the house. This was confirmed by Magno their identities, is that not correct?
Montaño (Exhibit "Q-1") who stated that Jose Gustilo and Felimon Macalinao went up

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A. I do not know whether they were looking at me, but I was looking at them. Maybe hogtied and left on the road. He remembered that Gustilo had a moustache and had a
they were looking at me also. light complexion.

Q. The robbers did not shoot at this small lamp or put out its light? Nor are We persuaded that the prosecution eyewitnesses should be disbelieved because
they are related to the victim. It is true that except for Francisco Urbano, who was a
A. No, this lamp was placed at the center of the sala. tenant of the deceased, the rest are related to the victim, either by affinity or
consanguinity. But relationship to the victim, standing by itself, does not prove that they
Q. The two men nonchalantly were carrying their arms under the brightness of the light are prejudiced and biased, considering that their testimonies are clear and convincing
of this lamp, this kerosene lamp, correct? and corroborated by other facts and circumstances. 3

A. Yes, they were lighted by that lamp." (pp. 364-365, t.s.n., Emphasis supplied). As the then Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar (now Associate Justice of this Court)
aptly observed: ". . . it does not appear that the prosecution eyewitnesses had some
Appellants further argued that it is doubtful for Marietta Macias-Olarte to have grievances or ill-feelings against any of the appellants; the record does not disclose any
recognized appellants Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo because she only saw the untoward or wicked motive which could have induced them to twist the truth or perjure
illumination of the moon but did not see the moon itself. This argument ignores the themselves in a prosecution for a heinous crime as the present case. The prosecution
possibility that a person may be aware of the presence of the moon in the sky not witnesses were subjected to extreme cross-examination by defense counsel, and the
necessarily because he looks at it directly but because of its manifestations, such as its falsity of their declaration, if indeed there were, could have been ferreted and exposed."
effulgence on the structures on the ground. Moreover, Olarte recognized Walter Apa and
Ricardo Dairo because of their proximity to her. The contention that there could not be robbery with homicide in this case, because there
is "no evidence that appellants took and carried away the money" and the personal
Neither can Francisco Urbano’s identification of Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo be properties of Candido Macias, overlooks the fact that the taking and carrying away of
successfully impugned. Urbano identified the two on the basis of distinct physical the money and the personal properties of the deceased has been sufficiently established
characteristics which have not been denied, such as the fact that Walter Apa was the by testimony of the witnesses, confirmed and corroborated by the admissions of
taller one and stoop-shouldered, while Ricardo Dairo was the shorter one. Urbano appellants Puesca, Gustilo and Montaño. Francisco Macias distinctly heard "sounds as if
clearly saw the two when they were only a meter from him, under bright moonlight. To something have (sic) been ransacked" and that "the aparador which was in the sala, fell
find out the identities of the perpetrators of the offense, Chief of Police Viran took to with a loud thud on the floor." Marcela Macias also declared that the intruders were
Sinayawan pictures which were provided by Col. Romero. These pictures were shown to ransacking the things inside their room. After the departure of the perpetrators of the
the witnesses. The witnesses Francisco Urbano and Marietta Macias-Olarte, picked out offense, she saw that things were scattered in their room, the trunk containing their
the pictures of Walter Apa (Exhibit "S") and Ricardo Dairo (Exhibit "T") and told Chief money appeared to have been forcibly opened and the P20,000 kept there, which was
Viran that the two were among those who had robbed and killed Candido Macias. On part of the proceeds of the sale of their land, was gone. So were the deceased’s pistol
this basis, Apa and Dairo were arrested. and a pair of new pants. When the Chief of Police went to the crime scene, he found
many things in disarray in the sala. The aparador was-lying on the floor broken, and
Nor can the circumstance that Francisco Macias could only identify Jose Gustilo, papers and other things were scattered. This robbery was further confirmed by the
although he was with the other perpetrators of the crime, render the identification of recitals contained in the confessions of Puesca, Gustilo and Montaño (Exhibits "L", "R"
appellants made by the other witnesses incredible. It should be recalled that there were and "Q"), wherein they stated that when they met in the Holiday Canteen at Sta. Ana,
circumstances which could have prevented Francisco Macias from recognizing the Davao City on November 25, 1960 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, they planned
others. Thus, the moment Francisco Macias set foot on the house of the deceased he was originally to raid and rob the Christensen Plantation, but upon seeing the plantation well
fired upon, then ordered to lie flat, face downwards, on the floor. When he tried to move guarded, they changed their plans and decided to rob the Macias family in Sinayawan;
his head, he was immediately kicked by two of the assailants. When he was ordered to that they proceeded to Sinayawan in a jeep, alighting from the jeep at a distance of about
get the key, he was not even allowed to turn his head to look at the men behind him. 200 meters; that they walked to the house of Candido Macias; and that therein they
When he got the key from his house, he noticed that his escort concealed himself behind committed the crime in a manner confirmatory to that testified to by the prosecution
the coconut trees. It was only appellant Jose Gustilo whom he had the best opportunity witnesses. According to Puesca, Felimon and Carding were the ones who took the cash
to recognize because Gustilo sat by his side in the jeep and took over the steering wheel from the Macias’ house. Regarding the killing of Candido Macias, his wife testified that
from him. Even while he was in the jeep, whenever he attempted to look at the other when the robbers came up the sala, she and her husband and two grandchildren were
people in the back of the jeep, he was immediately hit with the butt of a pistol. He was sitting by the dining table; that she was ordered to lie flat on the floor; that she saw her

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husband stand up then walk around the table: and that suddenly she heard two gun boarded the jeep, and with Francisco Macias driving it, the appellants left the scene of
reports and saw her husband fall down. the crime (pp. 421-423, t.s.n.).

The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellants were engaged in Second, the confessions of appellant Arcadio Puesca (Exhibit "L"), appellant Magno
a conspiracy to effect the object of their criminal purpose. Since conspiracy by its very Montaño (Exhibit "Q") and appellant Jose Gustilo (Exhibit "R") admit their participation
nature is formed in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. 4 in the commission of the crime at the house of Macias (pp. 924-992, 988-1133, t.s.n.).
Conspiracy is "generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and The confession of Jose Gustilo, however, was the only one which was unsigned as he
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved afterwards refused to affix his signature thereto; but his confession was tape recorded
that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and and from the replay of the recording made during the trial, it may be seen that his
another a part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the confession was freely and voluntarily given (pp. 732, 748-749, 782, 791, 816-817, 828-
same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a 836, 924-992, t.s.n.). Towards the end of his tape recorded confession, the following
conspiracy to effect the object . . .." 5 In contrast with evidence premeditation, which questions and answers were given:
requires as an essential condition that a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford
full opportunity for premeditation and reflection on the possible consequences of the "In your confession now given to me, Peng, the incident of the hold-up in Makilala, the
intended criminal act, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly hold-up in Sinayawan, Hagonoy, Davao, in the house of the late Candido Macias, were
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to accomplish it. Once this is you able to relate everything which you think you would tell me before you offered to
established, each and everyone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the make that confession?
crime committed by any member of the conspiracy. 6
"Yes, sir, because I narrated all the things what I have already in mind.
The Solicitor General cites the following facts to show the existence of conspiracy;
First, upon breaking into the premises of the house of the victim, Candido Macias, three "You would like to tell me now that all the things which you just narrated are the truth
men went upstairs into the house, two of them being appellants Jose Gustilo and and nothing but the truth?
Filomeno Macalinao, Jr., both with drawn guns, surprising the inmates Candido Macias
and his wife Marcela Macias, who were then having supper (pp. 489, 330, 321-322, "Yes, sir.
t.s.n.). Candido Macias was ordered to lie down on the floor but he did not obey and
walked towards the sala instead (p. 490, t.s.n.), whereupon he was shot. Thereafter, "Are you going to confirm the truth of the statement, which you told me now?
appellants ransacked the room of the victim, forced open the trunk and got therefrom
P20,000.00 in cash (pp. 492, 502, t.s.n,). They also took the victim’s new pants and "Yes, sir.
clothes and his gun from his bed (p. 501, t.s.n.).
"Are you going to affirm your confession even though these statements which you have
Two others, appellants Arcadio Puesca and Magno Montaño, went under the house and narrated to me will be used against you?
immobilized Anacleto Delfino and Fortunato Macias who were then repairing a jeep
(pp. 315-317, t.s.n.). They pointed their guns at them and ordered them not to move (pp. "Yes sir." (pp. 990-991, t.s.n.).
314-315, t.s.n.). Fortunato, however, succeeded in running away towards the coconut
plantation (p. 362, t.s.n.). Anacleto Delfino was told to go upstairs where he was made The confessions of Arcadio Puesca, Magno Montaño and Jose Gustilo are admissible
to lie flat on the floor (p. 320, t.s.n.). against them. Their confessions could be considered as corroborative evidence of the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses pointing to them as the culprits who
While all this was going on in the house, appellants Walter Apa and Ricardo Dairo, who participated in the commission of the crime.
were armed with carbines, were standing outside apparently on guard (pp. 417, 418,
131-134, t.s.n.). When Francisco Macias came to the house, he was ordered to get the Third, the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses find corroboration in the extrajudicial
key to the jeep from his house, and appellants Apa and Dairo followed Francisco from confessions of appellants Puesca alias "Big Boy", Gustilo alias "Peping", and Montaño
behind (pp. 419, 421, t.s.n.), passing through the backyard of the house of Anacleto alias "Edol", insofar as said confessions tell about the participation of their other
Delfino, on their return to the place where the jeep was parked (pp. 135-137, t.s.n.). companions in the commission of the crime. Thus, Arcadio Puesca, in his extrajudicial
confession, named Jose Gustilo alias "Peping", Magno Montaño alias "Edol", Felimon,
Francisco Macias having gotten the ignition key of the jeep, all of the appellants Carding, Mariano and two others whose names he did not know, as his companions in

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the perpetration of the crime (Exhibit "L", folder of exhibits; pp. 774-775, t.s.n.). He robbery." 9 The original design of the perpetrators of the offense comprehended robbery
narrated how the plan to rob the Macias family was conceived, as well as the manner in in the dwelling of the victim. There is robbery with homicide if the homicide resulted by
which they implemented the plan. The person referred to as "Felimon", he said, was reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, in Mangulabnan, 10 this Court stated
appellant Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. (p. 731, t.s.n.). Thus, in the tape recorded confession that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide, the rule
of appellant Jose Gustilo, he declared that his confederates in the crime were Arcadio is that it is enough that a homicide resulted by reason or on the occasion of the robbery,
Puesca alias "Big Boy", Magno Montaño alias "Edol", Filomeno Macalinao, Mariano, and it is immaterial that the death supervened by mere accident. It is sufficient that the
Carding and others (Exhibits "R", folder of exhibits; pp. 927-928, 930-931, 935, 940, homicide was produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only
942-945, 946-952, 958-960, 963-965, 966, 968-969, 970-981, t.s.n.). And thus, in the the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
confession of Magno Montaño alias "Edol", which was in his own handwriting and modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
which was also tape recorded, he mentioned Arcadio Puesca alias "Big Boy", Jose consideration.
Gustilo alias "Peping" and Felimon Macalinao as his confederates in staging the hold up
(pp. 999-1005, 1119-1120, 1122, t.s.n.; Exhibit "Q", folder of exhibits). According to There is homicide by reason of the robbery when there is a direct relation, an intimate
his confession, it was Gustilo who shot to death the late Candido Macias (pp. 1002, connection, between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing be prior or
1122-1123, t.s.n.), and that it was Macalinao who got the 38 caliber pistol of the subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes be committed.
deceased (p. 1128, t.s.n.). Both declarants corroborated the narration given by Puesca.
Finally, counsel for appellant Filomeno Macalinao, Jr. poses the query--if by the ruling
It is true that an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the person who made in People v. Apduhan 11 robbery with homicide (subdivision 1, Article 294, Revised
it, but it is also settled that such confession is admissible as corroborative evidence of Penal Code) is not comprehended in Article 295, how would the circumstance of "band"
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-defendants. 7 This Court has also be appreciated? The term "band" is defined both in paragraph 6, Article 14 and Article
allowed its admission against a co-accused as circumstantial evidence to show the 296 of the Revised Penal Code. "Band" is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery
probability of the co-conspirator having actually participated in the commission of the with homicide or robbery with rape, intentional mutilation or with physical injuries,
crime. 8 resulting in insanity, impotency and blindness (subdivision 2, Article 263, Revised Penal
Code), which means that it can be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance. But if
Fourth, the claim of the defense that the confessions of appellants Puesca, Gustilo and "band" is present in the other kinds of robbery with violence mentioned in paragraphs 3,
Montaño were extracted from them through force and violence is not supported by the 4 and 5 of Article 294, then it is a qualifying or inherent circumstance which raises the
evidence. No motive on the part of the investigating officials or officers has been proven penalty to the maximum period and cannot be offset by any generic mitigating
that could have impelled them to concoct the facts narrated in the extrajudicial circumstance. This qualifying circumstance should be expressly alleged in the
confessions. Judging from the details of the narration given therein, only the appellants information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
could have supplied the facts. With respect to the extrajudicial confessions of appellants
Puesca and Montaño, Judge Augusto Fernandez, before whom the confessions had been In the case at bar, the crime committed is robbery with homicide. Considering that the
signed and sworn to, declared that the affiants read the contents thereof, and confirmed crime was committed by six armed men, the circumstance of "band" should be
the said contents as true and correct, after which they freely affixed their signatures on considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is also obvious that the
the documents (pp. 828-831, t.s.n.) With respect to the extrajudicial confession of perpetrators of the offense waited for the night before committing the robbery to better
appellant Gustilo, it was first orally given and tape recorded after which it was put down accomplish their purpose. The trial court, therefore, correctly found the existence of
in writing (pp. 782, 791, 815, t.s.n.) However, appellant Gustilo refused to sign his "band" and "nocturnity." These two aggravating circumstances, when occurring jointly
confession before the justice of the peace without giving any reason for such refusal (p. in the commission of a crime, are generally treated only as one aggravating
834, t.s.n.). The circumstance that he was able to refuse, without having been punished circumstance. Nevertheless, they may be considered separately when their elements are
or maltreated for such refusal, is a strong indication that his confession was not distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of
extracted from him by force or intimidation. As a matter of fact, the tape recording of perversity. 12 In the instant case, it is not necessary to decide whether or not the two
his confession shows that it was voluntarily given. The trial judge who heard the replay should be treated distinctly from each other, since the existence of one is sufficient for
of Gustilo’s confession could have surely noted from the manner in which appellant the imposition of the maximum penalty, and the concurrence of an additional
gave his answers if he had been maltreated (pp. 924-992, t.s.n.) The trial judge was circumstance will not alter the same. 13 However, the indemnity of P6,000.00 due the
positive that the verbal confession had all the indicia of voluntariness. heirs of the deceased should be increased to P12,000.00.

The killing of Candido Macias was committed "by reason or on occasion of the On July 13, 1977, during the pendency of this appeal, appellant Jose Gustilo alias

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"Peping" died at the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital. In view thereof, on September 8, RASONABLE, FELIPE ANTIPOLO Y MISA, and JURITO AMARGA Y BAHI-
1977, this Court issued a Resolution, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph AN, Accused-Appellants.

". . . Considering the letter dated August 2, 1977 of Gerardo N. San Pedro,
Administrative Officer IV, Bureau of Prisons, informing the Court of the death of SYLLABUS
appellant Jose Gustilo alias "Peping" last July 13, 1977, as well as the comment of the
Solicitor General thereon, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the case as to appellant Jose
Gustilo." (p. 580, rollo). 1. CRIMINAL LAW; ARSON; RULE WHERE DEATH RESULTS BY REASON OR
ON OCCASION OF ARSON. — It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson
WHEREFORE, except for the dismissal of the case as against Jose Gustilo alias with homicide. . . . Except for the imposable penalty, the rule has not changed.
"Peping" and with the foregoing modification as to the amount of indemnity, the Accordingly, if death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. arson although the imposable penalty as provided in Sec. 5 of P. D. No. 1613, which
expressly repealed Arts. 320 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code, is now reclusion
SO ORDERED. perpetua to death. If the objective of the offender is to kill and arson is resorted to as the
means to accomplish the crime, the offender can be charged with murder only. But if the
objective is to kill — and in fact the offender has already done so — and arson is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two
separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH;

MULTIPLICITY OF CHARGES; EFFECT OF WAIVER THEREOF; CASE AT BAR.
— The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the crime of
"Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly charges appellants with six (6) distinct criminal
acts. It accuses of them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack(ing), assault(ing)
and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G. Tabanao, Maria T. Dorio, Dioscora T.
Dorio and Flora T. Dorio, inflicting on their persons multiple mortal wounds . . . (and)
set(ting) on fire and burn(ing) the house of the victims. . . ." Since appellants failed to
move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges or object thereto
at any other time, the defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may validly render
judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF PROVING AS MANY OFFENSES AS ARE
ALLEGED; CASE AT BAR. — In order to sustain a conviction for as many offenses as
are alleged, it is elementary that all the allegations must be proven with moral certainty.
Hence, considering that the Information alleges that appellants burned the house of the
victims and killed them with treachery and (evident) premeditation, both the arson and
the multiple murder must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. . . . The death certificates
of victims Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao state as cause
of death "incised wounds" which could definitely be caused by a bolo, while the infant’s
death was due to "burns." Hence, appellants should be held responsible only for the
murder of the four (4) victims who sustained fatal hack and stab wounds. They cannot
be convicted of homicide for the death of the infant who died presumably of suffocation
61. [G.R. No. 93485. June 27, 1994.] or incineration but of arson resulting in death, as defined in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
Considering that the prosecution was able to show with moral certainty that the killing
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO CEDENIO Y of the four (4) victims was attended with evident premeditation and the burning was

282
done to disguise the murder, appellants are guilty of arson and four (4) counts of Conspiracy, as we said, may be inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts
murder, each count aggravated by dwelling which, while not alleged in the Information, point to a joint purpose of design.
was sufficiently proven during the trial.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — From the evidence adduced, it is
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF TESTIMONY; ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the house
AND CREDENCE ABSENT ANY EVIL MOTIVE; CASE AT BAR. — Palomas, afire to hide their gruesome act. This is the only logical conclusion for the burning of the
Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is not a shiver of house. For, appellants and some six (6) others, all bolo-wielding, have already inflicted
evidence to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. In fact, the records show that fatal wounds on the victims, save for the 22-day old infant. If their objective was merely
witness Antifuesto even lent his bolo to appellant Cedenio so that the former could not to kill the victims then there would be no reason for them to burn the victims’ abode. On
have had a grudge against the latter, otherwise, he would not have lent his bolo. Absent the other hand, if their objective was merely arson, they would not have attacked the
the most compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable why the prosecution witnesses victims with their bolos.
would openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which would send three innocent men
to jail. Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of 9. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; NOT APPRECIATED
prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled WHEN THE MANNER OF ATTACK IS NOT PROVEN; CASE AT BAR. — We
to full faith and credence. however cannot consider the qualifying circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be
appreciated, there must be proof that at the time of the attack, the victims were not in a
5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL; REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION ON THE BASIS position to defend themselves and that the offenders consciously and deliberately
THEREOF. — While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the adopted particular means, method or form of attack which they employed to ensure the
victims and the burning of the house, we have repeatedly ruled that guilt may be accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. There is no proof of such fact in the
established through circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one instant case; neither is there any testimony on how the attack was actually carried out.
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond how the act which resulted in the death of the victims began and developed, it can in no
reasonable doubt. Thus in People v. Adriano and People v. Galendez we ruled that there way be established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.
can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven For, the rule is settled that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. Hence, when the manner of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. attack is not proven, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and the crime
should be considered homicide only, absent any other circumstance which would qualify
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — This is another lucid illustration of a case the killing.
where a conviction can be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence. First,
appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto at around seven o’clock in 10. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; REQUISITES THEREOF. — For evident
the evening. Second, Cedenio together with appellants Antipolo and Amarga were premeditation to be considered, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the
positively identified as brandishing their bloodstained bolos while rushing out of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the offense; that they coolly and
victims’ burning house around ten-thirty that same evening. Third, Antifuesto’s bolo dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on
was returned to him at around three o’clock the following morning after appellants were the consequences of their criminal design; and, that an appreciable length of time
seen outside the victim’s burning house. Fourth, the bolo had bloodstains when it was elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the
returned. Fifth, Cedenio called on Antifuesto at three-thirty that same morning to accomplishment of the intended crime.
appease the latter and assure him not to worry because." . . if this incident reaches the
court, I will answer (for) everything." Sixth, when retrieved from the burned house, the 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — We qualify the killing to
bodies of the victims bore stab and hack wounds. For sure, these circumstances "form an murder on account of evident premeditation. The fact alone that appellants burned the
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused victims’ house after inflicting fatal wounds on them already suggests that they clung to
as the perpetrators of the crime."cralaw virtua1aw library their determination to commit the crime. The circumstance that appellant Cedenio
borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto and later placated the latter when his bolo was
7. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE ACTS OF returned to him already bloodstained strongly indicates that appellants pondered on the
THE ACCUSED. — Appellants conspired to inflict fatal blows on the victims which means of executing the crime and on the consequences of their criminal design. Since
cost their lives and thereafter set their house on fire to conceal the dastardly deed. appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo at around seven o’clock in the evening and the

283
crime was committed around ten o’clock that same evening, certainly, there was death. He thus proceeded to the scene and found the house razed to the ground. The five
sufficient interval of time within which to reflect upon the consequences of the crime (5) bodies retrieved from the site were those of Hilario Dorio with wounds on the head
they planned to commit. and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed; Maria Dorio
with wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in the
stomach; and, infant Dioscora Dorio with no wounds at all but charred to the bone. 4

BELLOSILLO, J.: Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Pedro Cedenio to the heinous crime. Antifuesto said that
on 26 November 1986, at around seven o’clock in the evening, he was awakened by
Cedenio who borrowed his bolo. At around three o’clock the following morning, Pito
The silence of the slumbering night was suddenly shattered by wailing cries for help. A Panla-an woke him up to return the bolo earlier borrowed by Cedenio. It was placed in
sheet of fire raged, its crimson brightness overwhelming the velvet darkness its scabbard and left leaning against the wall below the window. When Panla-an left,
enshrouding the sleepy barangay as it enveloped the lair of a mandadaut, 1 the flames Antifuesto got his bolo and found bloodstains on its handle. Upon unsheathing it, he
only fading away with the first blush of dawn. As the smoke thinned and the ashes discovered fresh blood on its blade. Thirty (30) minutes later, Cedenio arrived and
settled, the debris yielded five (5) fatalities among them a 22-day old female infant. appeased him,." . . do not worry, if this incident reaches the court I will answer (for)
Unlike the other victims, she did not sustain any stab or hack wound. She could have everything." 5
died of suffocation if not of burning.
Although it appears that around nine (9) persons were involved in the commission of the
Bonifacio Palomas recounts that on 26 November 1986, at about ten-thirty in the felony, 6 only three (3) were convicted by the trial court. 7 Thus on 16 March 1990, it
evening, he was roused from his sleep by bangs and slams and what sounded like found Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo and Jurito Amarga guilty of "Arson with Multiple
women’s desperate cries for help coming from the direction of a neighbor’s house some Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613
thirty (30) meters away. It was Hilario Dorio’s house on fire. Peeping through his (amending the law on Arson)" 8 and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On 4 April
window, Palomas saw around seven (7) persons, among them appellants Pedro Cedenio, 1990, they filed their notice of appeal.
Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo, emerge from the house of Dorio that was afire. The
blaze was so bright he was able to recognize them. They were wielding unsheathed Appellants now argue that there is no direct and positive evidence showing that they
bolos. Afraid, Palomas remained home. The following morning, he narrated to Romeo, killed the victims and burned their house. The fact that prosecution witnesses saw them
son of Hilario Dorio, what he witnessed the night before. Then he went with the younger coming out of the burning house cannot by itself sustain the conviction as this lone
Dorio to the rubble and saw the charred bodies of his father, Hilario Dorio, his mother circumstance is capable of several interpretations. If witnesses indeed saw them there,
Flora, his sister Maria, his niece Dioscora, and his maternal grandmother Nicanora that must be the time when they (appellants) were trying to save the burning house and
Tabanao, said to be a family of sorcerers in the village. 2 its occupants. They likewise contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are contrary to human experience and should not inspire credence. Thus the claim of
Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that fateful evening when he witness Antifuesto that his bolo was borrowed and later returned with bloodstains is
heard dogs barking. Thinking that a carabao may have gone astray, he went out of his highly improbable for it is unnatural for criminals to openly bare the instruments used in
house and headed for the cornfield. On his way, he noticed some thirty (30) meters away perpetrating a crime.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
that the house of Hilario Dorio was on fire. From where he stood, he also saw people
running out of the burning house. As the fierce fire illumed the surroundings, he Finally, appellants maintain that their denial and alibi should prevail over the
recognized three (3) of them as his neighbors Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe insufficient evidence of the prosecution. In asserting their innocence, they allege that
Antipolo. When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with blood so he they were in the area because of their moral obligation to save life and property. Hence,
retreated home. The next morning, he went to the burned house, joined the people appellant Cedenio claimed that he cut up banana trunks and hurled them into the fire
already milling around, and saw the seared bodies of the five (5) members of the Dorio while appellant Antipolo gathered soil and threw it into the blaze. While witnesses
household. 3 might have indeed seen them (appellants) coming out of the burning house, that was
probably after they (appellants) checked on and tried to save the occupants of the house.
Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, also
narrated that on 27 November 1986, at around seven o’clock in the morning, he was We are far from persuaded. While we cannot affirm the findings of the trial court that
informed by Cristituto Gajo that the Dorio residence was gutted by fire the night before accused-appellants are guilty of "Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized
and that five (5) members of the Dorio family then occupying the house were burned to under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613" as there is no such offense, we

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nevertheless find them guilty of as many crimes as are alleged in the Information and move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges or object thereto
proven by the evidence. at any other time, the defect has been waived, and thus the trial court may validly render
judgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged. 14 In order to sustain a
It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide. The late Mr. Chief conviction for as many offenses as are alleged, it is elementary that all the allegations
Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard — must be proven with moral certainty. Hence, considering that the Information alleges
that appellants burned the house of the victims and killed them with treachery and
. . . when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house (evident) premeditation, both the arson and the multiple murder must be proven beyond
and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the reasonable doubt.
Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that
fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without We accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We see no reason to
a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means depart from the conclusion of the trial court that it was "morally convinced that the three
of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the accused are all guilty. . . . 15 The court a quo had the opportunity to observe the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. 9 witnesses thus its findings are given great weight and respect.

. . . in the classification of crimes committed by fire, attention must be given to the Palomas, Apostadero and Antifuesto are disinterested witnesses and there is not a shiver
intention of the author. When fire is used with intent to kill a . . . person who may be in of evidence to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. In fact, the records show that
shelter, and that objective is secured, the crime is . . . murder. Murder or homicide in a witness Antifuesto even lent his bolo to appellant Cedenio so that the former could not
juridical sense would exist if the killing were the objective of the malefactor and the have had a grudge against the latter, otherwise, he would not have lent his bolo. 16
burning of the building was resorted only as the means of accomplishing his purpose. Absent the most compelling reason or motive, it is inconceivable why the prosecution
The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere consequence. The witnesses would openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which would send three
crime in such a case would be arson only, absorbing the homicide. 10 innocent men to jail. 17 Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive
on the part of prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true
Except for the imposable penalty, the rule has not changed. Accordingly, if death results and thus entitled to full faith and credence. 18
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson although the imposable
penalty as provided in Sec. 5 of P. D. No. 1613, which expressly repealed Arts. 320 to While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the victims and the
326-B of The Revised Penal Code, is now reclusion perpetua to death. If the objective burning of the house, we have repeatedly ruled that guilt may be established through
of the offender is to kill and arson is resorted to as the means to accomplish the crime, circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
the offender can be charged with murder only. But if the objective is to kill — and in facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all
fact the offender has already done so — and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 19 Thus in
the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or People v. Adriano 20 and People v. Galendez 21 we ruled that there can be a conviction
murder, and arson.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the
Consequently, in People v. Paterno 11 where the defendants killed a Japanese spy and perpetrator of the crime.
his wife, and thereafter set the victims’ house afire with their lifeless bodies inside and
their three-day old infant who perished in the fire, we found the accused guilty of This is another lucid illustration of a case where a conviction can be sustained on the
murder for the killing and of arson for burning the house with the resulting death to the basis of circumstantial evidence. First, appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness
infant. In People v. Basay 12 we said that where the house was burned to conceal the Antifuesto at around seven o’clock in the evening. Second, Cedenio together with
stabbing and hacking, separate crimes of murder and arson were committed. appellants Antipolo and Amarga were positively identified as brandishing their
bloodstained bolos while rushing out of the victims’ burning house around ten-thirty that
The Information in this case however, although erroneously charging the crime of same evening. Third, Antifuesto’s bolo was returned to him at around three o’clock the
"Arson with Multiple Murder," clearly charges appellants with six (6) distinct criminal following morning after appellants were seen outside the victim’s burning house.
acts. It accuses of them of "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack(ing), assault(ing) Fourth, the bolo had bloodstains when it was returned. Fifth, Cedenio called on
and stab(bing) Hilario G. Dorio, Nicanora G. Tabanao, Maria T. Dorio, Dioscora T. Antifuesto at three-thirty that same morning to appease the latter and assure him not to
Dorio and Flora T. Dorio, inflicting on their persons multiple mortal wounds . . . (and) worry because." . . if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for) everything." 22
set(ting) on fire and burn(ing) the house of the victims. . . ." 13 Since appellants failed to Sixth, when retrieved from the burned house, the bodies of the victims bore stab and

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hack wounds. For sure, these circumstances "form an unbroken chain which leads to a dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on
fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." the consequences of their criminal design; and, that an appreciable length of time
23 elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the
accomplishment of the intended crime. 30 These, the prosecution established.
We disagree with appellants’ submission that the testimony of prosecution witness
Antifuesto is not in accord with human nature. On the contrary, his testimony that the The fact alone that appellants burned the victims’ house after inflicting fatal wounds on
bolo was returned to him with bloodstains is worthy of belief. Appellants never thought them already suggests that they clung to their determination to commit the crime. The
that Antifuesto would testify against them. Thus, appellant Cedenio borrowed circumstance that appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo of witness Antifuesto and later
Antifuesto’s bolo and after its return even mollified him. placated the latter when his bolo was returned to him already bloodstained strongly
indicates that appellants pondered on the means of executing the crime and on the
In fine, we believe that when appellants were seen in the vicinity of the burning house, consequences of their criminal design. Since appellant Cedenio borrowed the bolo at
they were not there to save lives and property but rather to escape from the locus around seven o’clock in the evening and the crime was committed around ten o’clock
criminis and avoid being made to answer for the consequences of their wicked act. In that same evening, certainly, there was sufficient interval of time within which to reflect
other words, they were not there to save the lives and valuables of the victims but to upon the consequences of the crime they planned to commit.
save their own. We are convinced that appellants conspired to inflict fatal blows on the
victims which cost their lives and thereafter set their house on fire to conceal the The death certificates of victims Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora
dastardly deed. 24 Conspiracy, as we said, may be inferred from the acts of the accused Tabanao state as cause of death "incised wounds" which could definitely be caused by a
when such acts point to a joint purpose of design. bolo, while the infant’s death was due to "burns." Hence, appellants should be held
responsible only for the murder of the four (4) victims who sustained fatal hack and stab
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed wounds. They cannot be convicted of homicide for the death of the infant who died
to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. This is the only logical presumably of suffocation or incineration but of arson resulting in death, as defined in
conclusion for the burning of the house. For, appellants and some six (6) others, all Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
bolo-wielding, have already inflicted fatal wounds on the victims, save for the 22-day
old infant. If their objective was merely to kill the victims then there would be no reason Considering that the prosecution was able to show with moral certainty that the killing
for them to burn the victims’ abode. On the other hand, if their objective was merely of the four (4) victims was attended with evident premeditation and the burning was
arson, they would not have attacked the victims with their bolos. done to disguise the murder, appellants are guilty of arson and four (4) counts of
murder, each count aggravated by dwelling which, while not alleged in the Information,
We however cannot consider the qualifying circumstance of treachery. For treachery to was sufficiently proven during the trial.
be appreciated, there must be proof that at the time of the attack, the victims were not in
a position to defend themselves and that the offenders consciously and deliberately The penalty prescribed by law for murder if committed with evident premeditation is
adopted particular means, method or form of attack which they employed to ensure the reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, 31 while for arson where death
accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. 26 There is no proof of such fact in the results, it is reclusion perpetua to death. 32 Since the murder was attended by the
instant case; neither is there any testimony on how the attack was actually carried out. aggravating circumstance of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance, the imposable
Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or penalty against appellants is death for each of the four (4) counts of murder they
how the act which resulted in the death of the victims began and developed, it can in no committed. However, considering that the death penalty was proscribed at the time
way be established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery. appellants committed the crime, their sentence should be reduced to four (4) terms
27 For, the rule is settled that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear of reclusion perpetua. For the arson where death resulted, appellants should be
and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. 28 Hence, when the sentenced to a separate term of reclusion perpetua.
manner of the attack is not proven, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt
and the crime should be considered homicide only, 29 absent any other circumstance Furthermore, it appearing from the records that the heirs of the deceased did not waive
which would qualify the killing. nor reserve their right to institute a civil action, nor did they institute a civil action prior
to the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly
Nevertheless, we qualify the killing to murder on account of evident premeditation. For instituted with the instant criminal action. 33 Consistently therefore with prevailing
evident premeditation to be considered, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts jurisprudence, appellants are jointly and severally liable to the heirs of the victims in the
of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the offense; that they coolly and amount of P50,000.00 for every death even without proof of pecuniary loss.

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WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. Appellants PEDRO
CEDENIO, FELIPE ANTIPOLO and JURITO AMARGA are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of murder and another crime of arson. Consequently,
appellants are sentenced each to four (4) terms of reclusion perpetua for the murder of
Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao, and another reclusion
perpetua for arson for the burning of the house which resulted in the death of infant
Dioscora Dorio, to be served successively in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised
Penal Code. In addition, appellants are jointly and severally held liable to the heirs in the
amount of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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