FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371. January 22, 1999]

Baltazar D. Amion, complainant, vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Branch 50, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod
City, Respondent.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

A verified complaint dated August 29, 19961 was filed by Baltazar D. Amion with this Court on October 7, 1996
charging Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City with Ignorance of the
law and Oppression relative to Criminal Case No. 94-159772 pending in said trial court and in which complainant is
the accused.

The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for accused-
complainant despite the latters objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel in the person
of Atty. Reynaldo C. Depasucat.

Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Manuel Lao
Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case on
March 28, and 29 1996. He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on
March 27, 1996, the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was ill.

It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled
hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Manuel Lao Ong. Notwithstanding
complainant-accuseds vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the trial on March 28, 1996 with
Atty. Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have
sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held between said counsel de oficio and himself.

Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of his right to due process and
a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.

Consequently, complainant-accused filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion2 stating therein that he is not
accepting the legal services of counsel de oficio Atty. Ong since he can afford to hire a counsel de parte of his own
choice. He further states that respondent judge is not fair and just and does not have the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. He likewise asseverates that respondent judge is ignorant of the basic law which makes him unfit
to be a judge in any judicial tribunal.

Complainant-accused also alludes oppression to respondent judge when the latter was still a Municipal Trial Judge
of MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City. Complainant was then the offended party in a criminal case for Slander and it
took a year before respondent judge decided to dismiss the same. He complains that now that he is the accused in
Criminal Case No. 94-15772, respondent judge appears to be "very active" and wants the case to be terminated
immediately.

In addition, accused-complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law when the latter, as
then municipal trial judge of Bacolod City, heard Criminal Case No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-
complainant in the absence of his counsel.

In a resolution dated March 12, 1997,3 this Court required respondent judge to file his Comment on the
aforementioned charges.

Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, in his Comment dated April 21, 1997,4 explained that accused-complainant would not
have filed the administrative case had he acceded to the latters plea for his inhibition which he denied, there being
no ground therefor. He claimed that accused-complainant is a police officer charged in Criminal Case No. 94-15772
for having allegedly killed a fellow policeman on January 24, 1994. From the time he assumed office as Presiding
Judge of said court on November 27, 1995, other than the arraignment of accused- complainant on September 25,
1995 before Judge Emma Labayen (former judge of said court) in which accused-complainant pleaded not guilty,
the case has not moved.
When respondent judge set the case for hearing on January 9, 1996, trial was not held because accused-
complainants counsel Atty. Depasucat, was not feeling well. The hearing was reset to January 19, 1996 with a
warning that no further postponement would be entertained. On said date of hearing, Atty. Depasucat again failed
to appear in court. In order to avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Apollo Jacildo of the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) as counsel de oficio. Atty. Jacildo, however, filed a Manifestation explaining that it is the policy of their
office not to represent a party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice.

At the next scheduled hearing of February 21, 1996,5 accused-complainants counsel de parte still did not show up
in court, thus, prompting private complainant Mrs. Antonietta Vaflor (the victims wife) to speak in open court and
pour out all her frustration about the long delay in the resolution of the case.

In view of the fact that Mrs. Vaflor and another government witness, PO3 Richard Dejores, both reside at
Escalante, about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained
uncertain, Judge Chiongson appointed Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent accused-
complainant. The court, however, made it of record that the appointment of Atty. Ong was without prejudice to the
appearance of counsel de parte.6 Due to the continued absence of Atty. Depasucat, the counsel de parte, Atty.
Ong, represented the accused-complainant at the March 28, 1996 hearing which was opposed by the accused in a
Manifestation and Motion filed on March 29, seeking the nullification of the March 28, 1998 hearing and the
inhibition of Judge Chiongson. The hearings were then rescheduled on May 13 and 17, 1996.

On May 8, 1996, accused-complainants counsel, Atty. Depasucat, filed a motion for postponement alleging that the
motion for inhibition should be resolved and that he would not be available on the rescheduled dates for hearings
as he would be out of the country during those times.

An order denying the accused-complainants Motion for Inhibition and Motion to Set Aside the proceedings of March
28, 1996 was issued by the court on July 18, 1996 on the ground that the claim of bias and prejudice was without
legal basis.7cräläwvirtualibräry

At the scheduled hearing on August 1, 1996, Atty. Depasucat asked the court that he be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de parte of the accused-complainant causing further delay. The trial of the case was again reset to
September 2, 5, and 6, 1996 with a warning that the court will not grant any further postponement and that if the
accused-complainant was still without counsel, a counsel de oficio will be appointed.

Thereafter, the accused-complainant engaged the services of different counsels who continued to adopt the dilatory
tactics utilized by the previous counsel de parte.

Atty. Rosslyn Morana, who entered his appearance as counsel on September 2, 1996, filed on October 14, 1996 a
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent judge on account of a pending administrative case against the latter.
On October 24, 1996, Atty. Morana submitted an Explanation to the court stating that he could not represent the
accused-complainant as the latter failed to give him the records of the case.

On November 14, 1996, the prosecution filed a motion to cite the accused in contempt for filing a series of motions
for inhibition and for filing an administrative case against the presiding judge which are plain acts of harassment.

Atty. Salvador Sabio entered his appearance as counsel for the accused-complainant on December 2, 1996 and
asked for the cancellation of the scheduled hearings on December 5 and 6, 1996 as he had to study the case. The
court granted the request for postponement of Atty. Sabio and reset the case on January 24, 1997 with a strong
warning that it will not allow any further dilatory postponement. In the afternoon of January 23, 1997, the court
received another motion for postponement filed by Atty. Sabio requesting for the cancellation of the January 24
hearing. The court, considering the same as another delaying tactic, immediately issued an order denying the
motion. In spite of the denial of the motion for postponement, Atty. Sabio failed to appear.

On February 4, 1997, accused-complainant again asked for the voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge which
the court again denied for being merely a dilatory scheme.

On March 24, 1997, when the case was called for hearing, Atty. Sabio informed the court that he received a written
note from the accused-complainant discharging him as counsel, to which the court respondent by ruling that Atty.
Sabio would only be allowed to withdraw as accused-complainants lawyer upon the entry of appearance of a new
defense counsel.
In a Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 29, 1997, Judge Chiongson was required to submit a
COMMENT8 on a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by accused-complainant. Said document has also been
submitted to the Court as Supplemental Comment to this Administrative Case.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-
complainant is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the latters part who has been
represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that the records of
the case will show that the accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly foul,
to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 94-15772. He added that the Petition for Certiorari and the
Administrative Case were filed for the purpose of not only delaying the resolution of the case but also to pressure
him into inhibiting himself.

As to the allegation of oppression in connection with s criminal case for slander where accused-complainant was
the alleged offended party while respondent judge was then the Municipal Trial Judge of MTC, Branch 3, Bacolod
City to which the case was being tried, Judge Chiongson belies the same. He explains that the prosecution in the
said case had rested while the defense filed a demurrer which was granted.

He narrates that the case for slander was filed by herein accused-complainant against Mrs. Esparcia, a school
teacher and sister of a victim alleged to have been killed by the accused-complainant, when said Mrs. Esparcia told
the accused-complainant Murderer, why are you not in jail or words to that effect. This was made when accused-
complainant was seen roaming around the vicinity of the police station when he was supposed to be a detention
prisoner. Accordingly, respondent judge granted the Demurrer on the finding of the court that the utterance of Mrs.
Esparcia was not slanderous but was merely an expression of exasperation and disgust.

On the charge of Gross Ignorance of the law, for having tried Criminal Case No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22
against accused-complainant in the absence of counsel, respondent judge asserts that accused-complainant has
nothing to do with said criminal case as can be gleaned from the Order relied upon as basis for the aforementioned
charge.

Respondent judge concludes that the sequence of events hereinabove discussed, exposes clearly the false and
dissembled charges filed against him as well as the determined efforts of the accused-complainant and his counsel
to frustrate the ends of justice.

We find this administrative complaint devoid of merit.

Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the
proceedings undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would
want to impress upon this Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while respondent judge Roberto
Chiongson appears to be the oppressed. Through the course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case,
accused-complainant had filed several Motions for Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and this
administrative complaint with the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the case.

A Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 14, 199810 noted that Criminal Case
No. 94-15772 has been pending for almost four (4) years already and the prosecution has yet to rest its case.
Complainant has thrown every strategy in the book to delay the trial. x x x

The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judges appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a clear
violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his
own choice cannot be countenanced by this Court.

An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the
preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation 11 rather
than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of preference in the choice of counsel to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.

As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:13cräläwvirtualibräry

Withal, the word preferably under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede,
nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter

Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accuseds discretion in a criminal
prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would
preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a
criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he
was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he
forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled
hearings.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would
have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the
opportunity to present his side.15cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of
the accuseds counsel de parte pursuant to the courts desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the
continuous trial system.16cräläwvirtualibräry

Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos:17cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings of
the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of
the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victims family.

Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainants own strategic machinations which brought upon the need for the
appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course.

As to the charges of oppression and gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge relative to cases under
him while he was still in the Municipal Trial Court, the same have been sufficiently answered in the Comments
submitted in this case. The explanation by the respondent judge indicate that the aforesaid allegations have neither
legal nor factual basis and that the conclusions made therein are merely conjectural.

The actuation of respondent judge in this murder does not warrant reproach and reprimand, but in fact, merits the
acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judges ardent
determination to expedite the case and render justice.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.18 A
judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly administer justice.19cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to:

1. DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson of RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City for
lack of merit.
2. IMPOSE a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and ADMONISH accused-complainant Baltazar D. Amion
for filing a malicious and unmeritorious complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to delay and prolong the
prosecution of the case.
3. DIRECT Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to continue hearing the case and finally dispose of the same with utmost
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.