Good Technology, Bad Management: A Case Study of The Satellite Phone Industry
Good Technology, Bad Management: A Case Study of The Satellite Phone Industry
JAEJOO LIM
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
[email protected]
RICHARD KLEIN
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
[email protected]
JASON THATCHER1
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Satellite phone services use advanced technology to deliver phone service around the world. Although
technologically advanced, satellite phone companies have not captured a substantial share of competitive mobile phone
markets nor returned large profits to investors. In this case study, we examine why Iridium, a major satellite phone service
provider, fell short of analyst’s expectations and failed to achieve profitability. We illustrate how high cost structures, lack of
critical mass, “threat of substitute services” and weak market positioning have limited satellite phone companies’ ability to
compete with conventional mobile phone companies. This case demonstrates that state of art technology may not lead to
market success, even with supportive investors, global cooperation and alliances with other firms.
Keyword: satellite phone, LEO, Iridium, five forces, critical mass, network effect, wireless, price war, positive feedback,
mobile phone.
1
Please address correspondence to Dr. Jason Thatcher, 101 Sirrine Hall, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, 29634.
Telephone: 864-656-3751, Fax: 864-656-2015
LEO and MEO satellites are used most switch users’ signals from one satellite to another. This is
frequently by satellite phone services. Because of signal because LEO and MEO satellites move more rapidly than
strength, LEO and MEO enabled systems require phones the Earth’s orbit and a handheld device Because of their
that use small omni-directional antenna. Despite this shorter distance from the earth, LEO and MEO satellites
advantage, low orbit satellite systems present firms with orbits degrade relatively quickly. Financially, this meant
technical and financial challenges. Technically, firms had that firms had to pay for launching new satellites more
to design LEO and MEO systems that could constantly frequently than if they had built GEO satellite networks.
Call routing
Satellite
Switch
Gateway
Gateway
Iridium
phone
Terrestrial Phone
LESSONS FROM IRIDIUM’S First, many consumers may not value quality as
FAILURE much as cost when purchasing communication services.
In order to win market share, Iridium focused advertising
Despite multi-billion dollar investments and high on differentiating satellite and conventional mobile phone
profile support, Iridium and its rivals’ failures illustrate services. Advertisements suggested that satellite phone
how offering technologically advanced services does not services quality and reach distinguished Iridium’s service
lead to success in the marketplace. We can draw several from less sophisticated mobile phone services. Even
lessons about how management and markets influenced though Iridium effectively differentiated its services,
Iridium’s failure. consumers were not willing to incur the high start-up and
ongoing costs of satellite phone service. Original US
retail prices were $3295 for a satellite phone, $695 for a strategy, it might have won customers as well as
pager, and airtime fees of up to $7 per minute. Given the generated good “word of mouth” advertising.
high price for Iridium’s service, consumers could not Fifth, Iridium failed to acquire the critical mass
justify the additional expense over using other phone needed to surpass entry barriers presented by existing
services. To address the service versus price dichotomy, services. The expected break-even point for Iridium was
Iridium could have considered using a price estimated to be 600,000 customers around the world. By
discrimination strategy that varied prices with level of the time it filed for bankruptcy, Iridium had acquired
service and type of customer. However, due to its billions 55,000 customers. Due to its pricing, changes in the
of dollars in debt, Iridium could not offer consumers mobile phone market, and focused marketing strategy,
lower rates for voice and data communication services. Iridium never gathered the critical mass to support basic
Second, network effects of existing technologies operating costs or to lower prices as a means to attract
placed Iridium at a disadvantage when compared to customers.
existing mobile phone services. Network effects refers to
a service or technology becoming more valuable as more CONCLUSION
people use it, which may allow firms to lower costs and
eventually acquire more customers. By the mid-1990s, Despite a history of bankruptcy and failures,
mobile phone companies had acquired a substantial satellite telephone companies continue to operate. To
customer base in many countries. In countries such as survive, companies have been reorganized or bought out
Hong Kong or the United States, mobile phones had by investors. For example, although Iridium’s satellite
become part of daily life for many citizens. Because system $5 billion to develop, Dan Colussy acquired
adding additional customers required relatively little Iridium assets for about $25 million at a liquidation sale.
additional investment, mobile phone companies had Freed of massive debt, satellite phone companies have
resources to invest in developing more reliable been able to lower costs. Rather than $7 dollars a minute,
technologies and expanding their infrastructure. During Iridium has slashed charges $1.50 per minute of airtime.
the 1990s, mobile phone service expanded the size of Despite lower costs, satellite phones may not appeal to
their calling areas through strategic alliances. By the time broader consumer markets. Satellite telephones cost from
Iridium initiated services, mobile cell phone companies $1995 to $9295. When compared to modern cell phones,
had achieved a critical mass of customers necessary to satellite telephones are bulky and posses fewer auxiliary
dominate the marketplace. functions. In lieu of broader consumer markets, satellite
Third, Iridium underestimated “the threat of phone companies continue to market their services to the
substitute services” By the time Iridium initiated services, industries such as oil exploration and have directed their
cell phone companies had addressed many of consumers’ attention to government agencies such as the U.S.
complaints linked to signal quality and roaming fees as Department of Defense. Iridium recently renewed a
well as lowered the costs of services. Consumers felt that contract with the Pentagon to serve 20,000 U.S. Defense
mobile phone services’ low airtime fees and start-up costs Department workers. The usefulness and ubiquitous
compensated for satellite phone services worldwide access of satellite phone services was demonstrated to TV
coverage and higher reliability. In essence, consumers viewers all over the world in the Iraqi war. Despite new
substituted technically inferior services for Iridium’s contract and increased public awareness of its services,
satellite phone service. Iridium has a long way to go to meet investors’
Fourth, Iridium’s management failed to target expectations. Will the future of Iridium Satellite be bright
many potential market niches. Iridium’s advertising as analysts predicted?
strategy focused on large, corporate customers such as oil
or aviation companies, however, it did not focus attention REFERENCES
on other niche markets such as small businesses or
residents of remote regions. A more effective marketing [1] Altinkemer, K., Yue, W. T. and Yu, L. “Adoption
strategy might have targeted small businesses such as of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Systems: A Diffusion
importers that require ubiquitous or high quality access to Model under Competition,” Information
maintain relationships with their global network of Technology and Management, Volume 4, 2003, pp.
suppliers and clients. Iridium also failed to market 33-54.
services to residents of lightly populated, inaccessible [2] BBC News, “Flaming end for satellites,”
areas that lack terrestrial phone service. If Iridium had http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/681646.stm,
engaged in a size or geographically based marketing March 18, 2000.
B. USEFUL TERMS
Airtime – The amount of time used by a transmission
over a wireless network. Airtime is typically calculated in
minutes.
Backbone – A large transmission medium that carries
data collected for multiple smaller sources.
Bandwidth – The amount of information that can be
transferred in a given time period over a wired or wireless
communications link.
Cell sites – The transmission and reception equipment,
including the base station antenna or tower, that connects
a cell phone to a mobile phone service provider.
Circuit Switching – A dedicated connection that lasts the
duration of a transmission.
Critical Mass – The number of users required to achieve
profitability or sustain the use of an innovation.
First Mover Advantage – Advantage gained by a
company for being the first entry in a new market.
Gateway – Points that a signal may enter or leave a
network.
GEO (Geosynchronous Earth Orbiting Satellite) –
Satellites that orbit about 22000 miles above the Earth’s
surface. Typically, a MEO orbits over one spot on the
Earth’s surface.
LEO (Low Earth Orbiting Satellite) – Satellites that
orbit about 1800 miles above the Earth’s surface.
Market Niche – a focused, targetable portion of a market.
Market Share – the percentage of total sales of a service
or product attributable to one company.