1. Malana, et al., v. Tappa, et al., G.R. No.

181303, 17 September 2009;

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan as they inherited the subject property from late Anastacio
Danao. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and
occupy the southern portion of the subject property on agreement that the latter would
vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Averring that
they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same.
Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners’ demand. The petitioners referred their
land dispute with respondents to the Barangay. During the conciliation proceedings,
respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents
ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership, enough to create clouds on their title. Thus,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Tugegarao City Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting
of Title, and Damages.
The RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed two pleadings. A Motion for Reconsideration and another simply
designated as motion. They argued, among others, that their principal cause of action was
for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek
complete relief from respondents. Their complaint should not have been dismissed, since
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

Both Motions were denied by the RTC. The RTC differentiated between the first and the
second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers
to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second
paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet
title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No.
7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value
of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00
in all other places.
It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action under second paragraph of the
Sec.1, Rule 63 and since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration was
P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: NO. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. As the provision states, a petition
for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before
the appropriate RTC. And to determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said
provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Where the law or
contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has
no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion
reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real
property as owner.
Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria.
Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given
that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC,
has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ Complaint in Civil
Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction
A. Distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court (Declaratory Relief):
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may
be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1)
an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of
the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil
Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code
in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to
declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.
B. Jurisdiction of Section 1, par.2 of Rule 63:
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together
with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions
for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x
x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a
statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility,
an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title
to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MTC, not the RTC.
2. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004;

FACTS:
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment
on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
“x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a
Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike
Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a
Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly
prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the
common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable
controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was
closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the
denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file
memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his
Memorandum.
The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which
raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss.
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the
Petition, because “in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the
respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has
raised only a question of law.” It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised
in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the
historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at
some point that the “endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office
is a clear violation of the separation clause.”

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive
portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenged Decision comply
with the aforesaid form?

RULING: No. The challenged Decision did not comply with the proper form of a Decision.
In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of
the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in
which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as
well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because
it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even
just modify.
 Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless
disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as
void. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and
distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the
constitutional directive.

3. Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat, G.R. No. 144101, September 16, 2005;

FACTS: Facts: Spouses Sumabat and Baello were the registered land owners of a parcel
of land in Caloocan. In May 1973, and in order to obtain a P7,727.95 loan from petitioner
Tambunting, the spouses mortgaged said land to the former. Subsequently, Tambunting
assigned his rights to the mortgaged to Commercial House Finance (CHFI). And because
respondent spouses have not been paying their monthly amortizations, they were
informed that their indebtedness has ballooned to P15k.
And so, CHFI and Tambunting filed a case for foreclosure but was restrained by Branch
33 of the RTC of Caloocan. The reason for the restraint was because the respondents
were able to file an action for declaratory relief with said RTC. In their action, respondents
were praying that the court rule on the extent or amount of their actual indebtedness.
In said RTC case, which was filed March 1979, herein petitioners were declared in default.
Thus, even when the Tambunting, et al moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that “mortgaged deed/contract had already been breached prior to the action”, said motion
was denied for having been filed out of time.
On Jan. 1981, the RTC rendered a decision finding that respondents liability, by virtue of
their mortgage deed/contract, was P15,743.83. Pursuant to this decision, the respondents
made a consignation with the RTC in said amount.

After almost 14 years, or on Feb 1995, CHFI again foreclosed on the contested land. The
respondents came to know of this because they received a notice of foreclosure sale, to
be conducted by the sheriff, of the land in question
This time, the petitioners filed an action with Branch 120 of the RTC of Caloocan for
injunction against the foreclosure sale. But, the sale still pushed thru, with CHFI being
declared the highest bidder. A new TCT was then issued to CHFI. Thus, respondent
spouses amended their complaint to an action for nullification of the foreclosure/sheriff’s
sale, the new TCT of CHFI, as well as reconveyance.
On Feb 2000, Branch 120 of the RTC declared the foreclosure sale as void. It likewise
ruled that reconveyance of the property should be made to the respondents. This decision
was grounded on the fact that consignation of P15k has already been made by CHFI
pursuant to the earlier decision of the Branch 33 of the RTC.
After a denial of petitioner’s MR, they filed petition for review on certiorari with the SC. The
petitioners argued that RTC, Branch 33, erred when it ordered the consignation of P15k.
As earlier pointed out, the action in first case was for declaratory relief. But petitioner points
out the fact that respondents are not entitled anymore to file an action for declaratory relief
because there had already been a violation of the mortgaged contract when the spouses
defaulted on their amortizations. Furthermore the action for foreclosure by CHFI on 1995
has already prescribed

ISSUES:
1. Was the decision of Branch 120 of the RTC wrong when it ordered the nullification of
the foreclosure sale on the ground that consignation has already been made in a previous
case?
 2. Was the foreclosure action in 1995 and subsequent sale of the property already barred
by prescription?
3. Thus, should the action for nullification and reconveyance filed by the respondents be
dismissed?

HELD: The trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. The RTC
should have been barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since
petitioners, being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of
the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have
rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-7496, and the consignation made pursuant
to a void judgment was likewise void.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof. The purpose of the action
is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to
settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach
or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract
has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.
Nonetheless, the petition must fail.
Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
Here, petitioners’ right of action accrued in May 1977 when respondents defaulted in their
obligation to pay their loan amortizations. It was from that time that the ten-year period to
enforce the right under the mortgage started to run. The period was interrupted when
respondents filed Civil Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained
the intended foreclosure of the property. However, the period commenced to run again on
November 9, 1977 when the case was dismissed.
A. Nature of Declaratory Relief:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof.
B. Purpose of Declaratory Relief:
The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.2 It may
be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to
which it refers.

4. Mangahas, et al., v. Paredes, et al., G.R. No. 157866, 14 February 2007;

FACTS:
Private respondent Avelino Banaag alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed
property identified as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan
City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. He averred that petitioners Mangahas and Verdejo constructed
houses on the property without his knowledge and consent and that several demands
were made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate the premises.
This prompted private respondent to refer the matter to the Lupon Tagapayapa for
conciliation. The recourse proved futile since the parties were not able to settle amicably.
Banaag then filed an action for ejectment against Mangahas and Verdejo in MeTC
Caloocan City.

In their answer, Mangahas and Verdejo deny having unlawfully deprived private
respondent possession of the contested property. Petitioners claimed that they have
resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,
Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO’s president in their favor.

Mangahas and Verdejo also filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend Proceedings
on the ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan
City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They
posited that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City
because both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

The MeTC denied said manifestation and motion.1awphi1.net It ratiocinated that the
injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial
boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of
same, the injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

MeTC ruled in favor of Banaag, stating that Banaag's TCT affords a better right over the
property than Mangahas and Verdejo's Certificate of Occupancy. The Court ordered
Mangahas and Verdejo to : 1) Vacate the premises of the subject prop by removing the
houses they built; 2) pay rentals and; 3) pay for cost of suit.

RTC affirmed. CA affirmed. Judgment now final and executory after lapse of reglementary
period of appeal to SC (Dec 2002).

However, during the pendency of the appeal from RTC to CA (Sept 2001), Banaag filed a
motion to execute the (RTC) judgment pending appeal. RTC granted. Mangahas then filed
a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC. Said motion was denied in an order dated
Feb 2003. On Mar 2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho implemented and enforced the writ of
execution.

Hence this petition to the SC for for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer
For Provisional Remedy filed by petitioners Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks
to nullify and set aside the Feb 2003 Order of RTC Caloocan City, denying their Motion to
Suspend Execution.

Mangahas and Verdejo argue that RTC has no jurisdiction over the execution, reiterating
their arguments in the Manifestation and Motion To Suspend Proceedings which was
already denied by MeTC.

HELD:
Petition denied. RTC order for execution affirmed.

The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated November 10, 1997
which emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should have prompted the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then pending
 before it. It was the petitioners’ contention that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is
enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both cities are situated within the National
Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and
their judges is basically regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249),
but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges
sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995).
Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:
"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court
shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions,
whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. Xxx"

Taking our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the
petitioners’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of
an injunction writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region
where the magistrate presides.

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle,
whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which
the decision was predicated continue.

Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in
a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal.The reason lies in
the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time
and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Mangahas et al are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by
the Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue
had already been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point;
otherwise there would be no end to litigation.

5. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. No. 184203 and 187583,
26 November 2014

Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the
Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA).

In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of Appeals’
decision2 dated January 11, 2008 and resolution3 dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the
City’s appeal for being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 111, Pasay City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real
property taxes.

In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the Court of Appeals’
decision4dated August 27, 2008 and resolution5 dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
115, Pasay City gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property
taxes to the Province of Bataan.
Facts common to both cases:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring as
government policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in
the Philippines. To carry such policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority was created.
The said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit entity, and was also declared to
be exempt from taxes.
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded
from the PEZA PHP 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998
on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City pointed out that
no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA
from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that
explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the
PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA.

On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief25 with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of
real property taxes. Pursuant to Rule 63, Section 3 of Rules of Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a comment31 on the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief. It agreed
that the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes, citing Sections 24 and 51
of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the
National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA
under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. In the
resolution32 dated June 14, 2006, the trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for declaratory
relief and declared it exempt from payment of real property taxes.

Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the petition of declaratory
relief by PEZA against the city of Lapu-Lapu

Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu

We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the
City. The City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition
for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.

A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of any question
of construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights and duties, under any
of the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
 executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. However,
a declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been “no breach of the documents in
question.” If the contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been
breached, the appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is available
through another form of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an
action for declaratory relief. In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, specifically, over the remedy sought.

In sum, a petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six requisites:c[F]irst, the subject matter
of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been
no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the
City. The City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition
for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.

In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, specially, over the remedy. The trial court should have dismissed the PEZA’s
petition for declaratory relief for lack of jurisdiction.

6. CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., G.R. No.

172457, 24 December 2008

Facts: BOC demanded 12 of CJH the payment of P71,983,753.00 representing the duties
and taxes due on all the importations made by CJH from 1998 to 2004. For its part, the
BIR sent a letter to CJH wherein it treated CJH as an ordinary corporation subject to the
regular corporate income tax as well as to the Value Added Tax of 1997. CJH questioned
the retroactive application by the BOC of the Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 119775
(Section 3 of the Proclamation , which granted to the newly created SEZ the same
incentives then already enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, including tax exemptions, was declared
unconstitutional) It claimed that the assessment was null and void because it violated the
non-retroactive principle under the Tariff and Customs Code. held that the decision in G.R.
No. 119775 applies retroactively because the tax exemption granted by Proclamation No.
420 is null and void from the beginning. The RTC also ruled that the petition for declaratory
relief is not the appropriate remedy. A judgment of the court cannot be the proper subject
of a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration in Rule 64 is exclusive. Moreover, the
RTC held that Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA No. 55) which proscribes the use of
declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force and
effect.

Issues/ Held:
W/N the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case-NO
W/N the decision in G.R. No. 119775 be applied retroactively- NOT RESOLVED
 Ratio: Ultimately, the Court is asked to determine whether the decision of the Court en
banc in G.R. No. 119775 has a retroactive effect. This approach cannot be countenanced.
A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter.
The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) provides for the administrative and judicial remedies
available to a taxpayer who is minded to contest an assessment, subject of course to
certain reglementary periods. The TCC provides that a protest can be raised provided that
payment first be made of the amount due. The decision of the Collector can be reviewed
by the Commissioner of Customs who can approve, modify or reverse the decision or
action of the Collector. If the party is not satisfied with the ruling of the Commissioner, he
may file the necessary appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. Afterwards, the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals can be appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petition in G.R. No. 169234 was filed with the Supreme Court in September 2005, in
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition had attained finality. CJH therein raised the same
question of law, as in this case, whether the doctrine of operative fact applies to G.R. No.
119775. Clearly, the Court in G.R. No. 169234 is better positioned to resolve that question
of law, there being no antecedent jurisdictional defects that would preclude the Court from
squarely deciding that particular issue. CJH is free to reiterate this current point of
clarification as it litigates the petition in G.R. No. 169234.

7. Ollada v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-11357, 31 May 1962;

Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, accredited to practice accountancy

in the office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December 1955, by reason of a
requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an
accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients
applying for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was
nullified. Ollada thus filed a petition for declaratory relief before the trial court to nullify said
accreditation requirement. He alleges that because of these requirements he had suffered
serious injury, and that such enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the
practice of CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank.

Issue: Will the petition for declaratory relief prosper?

Held: The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute
or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation
arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by
petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him
injury — all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach
— which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory
Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing
forms of action or proceeding

8. Republic v. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, 24 September 2013;

FACTS:
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being
void for vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of communication and
due process and the privileged nature of priest- penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, contending that
private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they
averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the
Southern Hemisphere cases.

On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a declaratory relief, the subject matter of which is a new legislation,
may be given due course despite the fact that no controversy had arisen from the said
legislation.

HELD: Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief:
First , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms
of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
third , there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must
be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.

While the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth,
and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown
battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and
inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.

A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain
some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372.
Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
 the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended
towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of
RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to
any of them.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is
not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative
and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it This
private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.

9. Tanda v. Aldaya, 98 Phil 244 (1956);

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-9322-23. January 30, 1956.]

TEODORO TANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NARCISO N. ALDAYA, Defendant-Appellee.

Teodoro Tanda, in his own behalf.

San Juan, Africa, Yñiguez & Benedicto for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DECLARATORY RELIEF; COURT DECISION NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF
ACTIONS; REMEDY WHERE DECISION IS DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS. — A court decision cannot be the
subject of declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in
order that the defect may be corrected (section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a
party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54,
section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 53). A party may even seek relief from a judgment
or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he
avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the
fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the
principle of res judicata which stamps the ,ark of finality in a case which has been fully and definitely
litigated in court.

2. ID.; FINAL JUDGMENT; WITHDRAWAL OF EVIDENCE. — Where the judgment has become final and
executory and no further step need be taken affecting the equities of the parties, the evidence presented
therein may be withdrawn.
 DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

The present appeal concerns a review of an order entered by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on
June 12, 1953 which dismisses the complaint in Civil Case No. 5113 instituted to obtain from the court
a declaratory relief on certain matters pleaded therein while it grants the plea prayed for in Civil Case
No. 4606 of the same court for withdrawal of Original Certificate of Title No. 114 in order that the
Register of Deeds may effect the registration of the document of consolidation of ownership and issuance
of the necessary title in favor of the winning party. Another order appealed from is that of August 26,
1953, but, being merely corollary, discussion thereof is deemed unnecessary.

For a clear understanding of the issues raised herein, it is necessary to make a brief statement of the
factual background and the different steps taken by the parties leading to the issuance of the order
subject of the present review.

On April 10, 1948, appellant instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an action for the annulment
of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro (Civil Case No. 4606). On May 11, 1949, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring the contract valid and absolving appellee of the complaint. After a motion
to set aside judgment and a motion for new trial filed by appellant were denied by the trial court,
appellant brought the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 23, 1951, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision appealed from particularly with regard to the validity of the contract which is
disputed by appellant. After the two motions for reconsideration filed by appellant were denied, the
decision became final and executory and the record was returned to the court of origin; but, on
November 8, 1951, appellant initiated the present case for declaratory relief. Considering that this action
is purposeless because, while outwardly its aim is to seek a declaratory relief on certain matters but in
effect its purpose is to nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case (Civil Case No. 4606) which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-3278), * appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the case states no cause of action. In the meantime, appellee moved to withdraw the
original of Title No. 114 which was presented in the case as evidence in order that his ownership may
be consolidated and a new title issued in his name it appearing that case has been finally terminated
(Civil Case No. 4606). The trial court, acting on the two motions, entered an order on June 12, 1953
granting the motion to dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of the original title as already adverted to
in the early part of this decision.

The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals wherein appellant assigned nine errors as allegedly
committed by the trial court but, after a cursory reading of the errors assigned, that court certified the
case to us on the ground that the questions to be resolved are purely of law.

The purpose of the case which gave rise to the present appeal is avowedly for declaratory relief instituted
under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which provides that "Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may
bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." And, it is claimed, this case comes
under its purview because its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the decision of this Court in G. R. No.
L-3278 which in the opinion of appellant, is vague and susceptible of double interpretation. Appellant
contends that the words "other written instrument" should be interpreted as including a court decision
regardless of whether it is final in character or otherwise.

We do not subscribe to the foregoing view. Evidently, a court decision cannot be interpreted as included
within the purview of the words "other written instrument", as contended by appellant, for the simple
reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision
may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if
a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court
a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (Section 1, Rule
37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or
of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58). A
party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1,
Rule 38. Apparently, appellant has already availed of some of these legal remedies but that he was
denied relief because his claim was found unmeritorious.

But the fundamental reason why the decision of this Court in the original case (G. R. No. L-3278) cannot
be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the
mark of finality on a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court. This principle is sound.
It avoids multiplicity of actions. It commands that once a case is definitely litigated it should not be
reopened. Thus, it has been held that "The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata
rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate. It is considered
that a judgment presents evidence of the facts of so high a nature that nothing which could be proved
by evidence aliunde would be sufficient to overcome it; and therefore it would be useless for a party
against whom it can be properly applied to adduce any such evidence, and accordingly he is estopped
or precluded by law from doing so. Such is the character of an estoppel by matter of record, as in case
of an issue on a question of fact, judicially tried and decided." (Oberiano v. Sobremesana, G. R. No. L-
4622, May 30, 1952.)

We may mention in passing that the claim of appellant that the decision of this Court above referred to
suffers from contradiction or inconsistency is rather equivocal for he mistook a restatement made therein
of a portion of the argument of appellant as a finding of fact made by the Court which is not the case.
A more discerning appreciation of the decision would bear this out. The truth of the matter is that the
Court concluded that the contract in dispute was valid as may be inferred from the portion of the decision
which we quote:chanroblesv irt ual 1awlibra ry

"The second or supplemental motion for a new trial, the denial of which is the subject of the fourth
assignment of error, added a new ground to the first motion for new trial and assailed the validity of
the contract of sale for supposed lack of valuable consideration or because the consideration was’false
and illicit’ . Here is what we make out of the plaintiff’s line of reasoning, which is none too easy to
understand: chan roble svirtual 1awlibra ry

"At the start and through the greater part of the Japanese occupation, the Japanese war notes were at
par with the Commonwealth currency and were so understood and recognized both by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the ‘Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic.’ By the contract in question the
parties reduced the rate of exchange between the two currencies from par to one to ten. ‘This reduction
is contrary to the law or public policy promulgated by the Japanese Military authorities, or the Philippine
Executive Commission.’ Therefore the consideration was false and illicit and the contract was void ab
initio, according to Articles 1255, 1275, 1276, and 1278 of the Civil Code.

"What the plaintiff would want the court to do as a result of the contract’s alleged nullity is not stated
or made clear. However, that may be, the contract was not void. It was licit for the parties to agree that
the vendor should pay the purchaser only P2,000 instead of P20,000 as price of repurchase regardless
of the currency received by the vendor. In this case the plaintiff, who is a full-pledged lawyer and
appeared below in his own behalf and filed the brief in this instance, drew the deed of sale himself,
according to the lower court’s finding, and the fixing of the ratio of ten to one between the Japanese
war notes and the Commonwealth money must have been his own idea and certainly was for his own
benefit. If the devaluation of the Japanese money bothered the plaintiff’s conscience, there was no law
to prevent him from redeeming the land for P20,000, or P15,000 which he admitted having received."
(Italics supplied)

With regard to the portion of the order which allows the withdrawal of the original certificate of title in
order that the Register of Deeds may effect the consolidation of ownership and issuance of a new title
in favor of appellee as requested, we do not also find any justification for its reversal, as we are urged,
it appearing that the decision in the original case (Civil Case No. 466) has become final and executory
and no further step need be taken therein affecting the equities of the parties. The case is closed and
no reason is seen why the evidence that has been presented cannot be withdrawn.

Finding no merit in this appeal, we hereby affirm the order appealed from, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

10. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
126911, 30 April 2003;

FACTS:
Respondents had 71 Golden Time Deposits(GTDs) in Manila Banking Corporation(MBC).
HOWEVER, Bangko Sentral of the Philippines issued a memorandum prohibiting MBC to
do business in the Philippines and placed its assets under receivership. On the next
banking day, respondent Jose Abad pre-terminated his 71 GTDs and redposited the fund
into 28 GTDs in larger denominations. Thereafter, respondent filed their claims for the
payment of the insured GTDs.
Petitioner PDIC argued that the insured GTDs should not be recognized since they were
mere derivatives of respondents previous account balances pre-terminated at the time the
MBC was aslready in serious financial distress. Under its charter, they contend that they
are only liable for deposits received in the usual course of business.
Consequently, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondents for a
judicial determination of the insurability of respondents. In turn, Jose Abad SET UP A
COUNTER-CLAIM against PDIC whereby they asked for payment of the insured deposits.
The SC later on ruled in favor of the respondents due to petitioner having failed to
overcome the presumption that it was issued in the ordinary course of business. The trial
court then ordered petitioner to pay the balance of the deposit insurance to respondents.

MAIN ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in ordering the payment of the deposit insurance since a petition
for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process- the only relief being
granted is a declaration of the rights and duties.
HELD:
NO, the RTC’s action was proper. Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not
essentially entail an executory process. HOWEVER, there is nothing in its nature that
prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
A special civil action is not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is
generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals
with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the
identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary
civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may
serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Petitioner additionally submits that the issue of determining the amount of deposit
insurance due respondents was never tried on the merits since the trial dwelt only on the
determination of the viability or validity of the deposits and no evidence on record sustains
the holding that the amount of deposit due respondents had been finally determined. This
issue was not raised in the court a quo, however, hence, it cannot be raised for the first
time in the petition at bar.
11. Matalin Coconut Co., v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, et al., G.R.
No. L-28138, 13 August 1986;

FACTS: On 1966, the Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur enacted Municipal
Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION
FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons
"to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the
Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the)
ordinance." It shall be paid by the shipper before the same is transported or shipped
outside the municipality. Any person or company or group of individuals violating the
ordinance "is liable to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and
to pay Pl.00 for every sack of flour being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to
suffer imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the discretion of the court. A petition for
declaratory relief was filed by Matalin Coconut with the CFI of Lanao del Sur against the
Municipality, the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del
Sur. Alleging among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative of
Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner
prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the Municipal
Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner under the ordinance. The
petitioner also prayed that during the pendency of the action, a preliminary injunction
be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the ordinance. It was denied.
Because, it was also affected by the tax imposed, Purakan Plantation Company was
granted leave to intervene in the action. CFI declared that the ordinance was null and void
and ordered the Municipal Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments it made and
enjoining and prohibiting the respondents from collecting the tax. The TC issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, upon motion of petitioner, requiring the respondent
Municipal Treasurer to deposit with the PNB Iligan Branch, in the name of the Municipality
of Malabang, whatever amounts the petitioner had already paid or shall pay pursuant to
the ordinance in question up to and until final termination of the case; the deposit was not
to be withdrawn from the said bank without any order from the court. On MR by
respondents, the writ was subsequently modified, to require the deposit only of amounts
paid from the effectivity of the writ up to and until the final termination of the suit..A motion
to dismiss appeal filed by Matalin, was denied by this court. Respondents filed a motion
to dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the TC which was also
denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUES: (1) WON the action for declaratory relief was proper in adjudicating the money
claim of the petitioner
(2)WON the municipal ordinance is valid
HELD:
Respondents’ contention- In an action for declaratory relief, all the court can do is to
construe the validity of the ordinance in question and declare the rights of those affected
thereby. The court cannot declare the ordinance illegal and at the same time order the
refund to petitioner of the amounts paid under the ordinance, without requiring petitioner
to file an ordinary action to claim the refund after the declaratory relief judgment has
become final. Under Rule 64 of the RC, the court may advise the parties to file the proper
pleadings and convert the hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in this case.
 1. YES. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into
an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred.
The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such
payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because
the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved,
although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes
paid. In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the
enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest
the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed
for by the petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid
to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion of said
allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer.
During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced.
Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.

2. It is invalid. The Court finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed by the
ordinance in question to be excessive and confiscatory. It has been shown by the
petitioner, Matalin Coconut Company, Inc., that it is merely realizing a marginal average
profit of P0.40, per bag, of cassava flour starch shipped out from the Municipality of
Malabang because the average production is P15.60 per bag, including transportation
costs, while the prevailing market price is P16.00 per bag. The further imposition,
therefore, of the tax of P0.30 per bag, by the ordinance in question would force the
petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business considering that it is
maintaining a big labor force in its operation, including a force of security guards to guard
its properties. The ordinance, therefore, has an adverse effect on the economic growth of
the Municipality of Malabang, in particular, and of the nation, in general, and is contrary to
the economic policy of the government.

12. Department of Budget and Mangement, et al., v. Manila’s Finest Retirees

Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 169466, 9 May 2007;

FACTS:
With the issuance of PD 765 in 1975, the Integrated National Police (INP) was constituted
and to be composed of the Phil. Constabulary (PC), as the nucleus, and the integrated
police forces as components thereof. PD 1184 was then issued in 1977 to professionalize
the INP and promote career development. Then, in 1990, RA 6975 (PNP Law) was
enacted. Under Sec. 23 of this law, the PNP would initially consist of the members of the
INP, created under PD 765, as well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. About
8 years later, RA 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) was enacted,
amending the PNP Law and reengineered the retirement scheme in the police
organization. Under this new law, PNP personnel stood to collect more retirement benefits
that what the INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP Law. Thus,
all INP retirees, lead by the Manila‘s Finest Retirees Assoc., filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC of Manila, impleading DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM, CSC and
GSIS as respondents. Said petition alleged that INP retirees, although equally situated
with the PNP retirees with regard to retirement benefits prior to the enactment of the PNP
Law, were unconscionably and arbitrarily excluded from the higher and adjusted benefits
accorded to the PNP retirees.
The RTC rules in favor of the INP retirees. It held that the PNP Law, as amended, did not
abolish the INP but merely provided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP.
Thus, INP retirees are entitled to the same benefits as the PNP retirees. In the same
decision, the RTC ordered the proper adjustments of the INP retirees’ benefits and
its immediate implementation. Said decision was appealed by the DBM, etc. to the CA.
However, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the immediate adjustments of the INP retirees’
benefits when the basic petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.

HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC and CA decisions are affirmed.

Although herein petitioners DBM, etc. had a valid point, it must be remembered that the
execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible.
In PDIC v. CA, the SC categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract
subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an
ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court,
except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules
governing special civil actions.‖
Also, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, the
SC ruled:
x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an
ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an … ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred.
The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such
payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved, although
the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid ….
In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the
enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest
the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed
for by the petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid
to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion of said
allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer.
During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced.
Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
The SC sees no reason for treating this case differently from PDIC and Matalin. This
disposition becomes all the more appropriate considering that the retirees, as petitioners
in the RTC, pleaded for the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits to which the
herein petitioners, as respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware of said
prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical consequence if, as it turned out, a
declaratory judgment is rendered in the retirees‘ favor. At bottom then, the trial court‘s
judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which, needless to stress, would only entail a long
 and arduous process. Considering their obvious advanced years, the respondents can
hardly afford another protracted proceedings.

13. Crisologo v. Centeno, G.R. No. 20014, 27 November 1968;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20014 November 27, 1968

FRANCISCO CRISOLOGO and CONSOLACION FLORENTINO CRISOLOGO, petitioners-

appellants,
vs.
ISAAC CENTENO and ASUNCION AQUINO CENTENO, oppositors-appellees.

B. Martinez for petitioners-appellants.

Luis Bello, Jr. for oppositors-appellees.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

On January 18, 1955, the spouses Francisco Crisologo and Consolacion Florentino filed in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an ex parte petition for consolidation of ownership in them as vendees a
retro of two parcels of land situated at Barrio Lapting, Lapog, Ilocos Sur, on the ground that the
vendors, the spouses Isaac Centeno and Asuncion Aquino, have failed to exercise their right of
repurchase within the periods stipulated in the two contracts of sale with pacto de retro. On January
28, 1955, after hearing at which the petitioners presented evidence in support of the petition, the
court a quo, through Judge Francisco Geronimo, granted the petition. On July 19, 1956, the vendors
filed a motion to set aside the Order of January 28, 1955, and on July 27, 1956, the court a quo,
through Judge Felix Q. Antonio, granted the motion on the ground that the movants had not been duly
notified of the hearing. On motion by the petitioners to set aside the Order of July 27, 1956, on the
ground that the vendors had been notified by registered mail of the hearing, the lower court, by its
Order of February 27, 1957, granted the motion and set aside the Order of July 27, 1956. The vendors
appealed the Order of February 27, 1957, to the Court of Appeals. On June 27, 1958, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment in the appeal setting aside the lower court's Order of February 27, 1957,
after holding that the vendors had not been legally notified of the petition and the hearing, and that the
Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity. The Court of Appeals remanded the record to the
lower court for reopening and for further proceedings. Accordingly, after the vendors had been duly
summoned as respondents, they filed their answer alleging that the two contracts of sale with pacto
de retro were really intended as equitable mortgages as securities for usurious loans. After trial, the
lower court rendered its decision on October 26, 1960, holding that respondents' allegation was
substantiated by their evidence. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring that
Exhibits 2 and 3 are actually intended by the parties to be Deeds of Equitable Mortgage, and
as such respondents are entitled to redeem the lands described therein, by paying to the
petitioners whatever balance remains of the principal and interest thereon at 12%, after
deducting therefrom the excess interest paid on November 11, 1952 and September 10, 1953,
and the value of the produce taken from those properties by petitioners in accordance with the
above findings from 1955 until the possession of these properties are returned to respondents
 and upon such settlement, the petitioners are ordered to execute the corresponding release
of mortgage.

Petition for consolidation of title is therefore denied, with costs against petitioners.

The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of law.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the Order of January 28, 1955, was
valid, final and executory and that all proceedings thereafter taken, including the vendors' appeal to
the Court of Appeals and its decision rendered in said appeal setting aside the Order of February 27,
1957, and remanding the case reopening and further proceedings, as well as the proceedings
thereafter taken including the decision of October 26, 1960, are null and void. The contention is
untenable in view of the following considerations:

(1) Article 1607 of the Civil Code which provides that:

In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of
the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.

contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent in the
caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership and has been duly heard.

In the instant case, the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership named the
vendees as petitioners, but did not name the vendors as respondents, and said vendors were not duly
summoned and heard. In view thereof, the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity having
been issued contrary to the contentious proceeding contemplated in Article 1607 of the Civil Code,
and the lower court not having acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the vendors;

(2) The judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Order of February 27, 1957, and in
consequence thereof the Order of January 28, 1955, as a patent nullity on the ground that the lower
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the vendors because they had not been duly
summoned is res judicata on the question of nullity of said orders; and.

(3) After the remand to the court below, the proceedings further taken wherein the vendors were
named as respondents and duly summoned and heard, after which on October 26, 1960, the appealed
judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents, were valid, being in accordance with the
contentious proceeding provided for in Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower court of October 26,1960, is hereby
affirmed in all its parts, with costs against the petitioners-appellants..

Concepcion, C. J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

14. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-42108, 29 December 1989;

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42108 May 10, 1995

OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO MENESES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

The legal heirs of private respondents Adelaida Ramos and Lazaro Meneses filed the instant motion
for clarification of the decision of this Court promulgated on December 29, 1989 which sustained the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49345-R affirming in toto the judgment
rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 4168 in favor of private
respondents.

This supervening controversy had its roots in two deeds of conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 and
August 30, 1959 executed by the late private respondent Adelaida Ramos as collateral for loans
amounting to P14,000.00 in favor of her brother, Oscar D. Ramos, as creditor thereof. Said security
consisted of Adelaida Ramos' rights, interests and participation in and over Lot No. 4033, under
Original Certificate of Title No. 5125, and Lot No. 4221, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
10788. At that time, Lot No. 4033 was registered in the name of Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga,
the late parents of Adelaida and Oscar Ramos, while Lot No. 4221 was in the name of Adelaida
Ramos, Josefina Ramos, and Socorro Ramos.1

When Adelaida Ramos failed to exercise her right of repurchase as vendor a retro, Oscar Ramos and
his wife, Luz Agudo, proceeded to consolidate through legal suits their ownership over the two lots.
Eventually, the then Court of First instance of Tarlac acting as probate court in Special Proceedings
No. 5174, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Late Margarita Denoga," confirmed herein petitioners'
ownership over Lot No. 4033 in an order dated January 22, 1960. The same court, this time exercising
jurisdiction as a cadastral court in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 395, likewise affirmed the petition
for consolidation of ownership of said Ramos spouses over Lot No. 4221 in a similar order dated April
18, 1990.2

Despite these setbacks, private respondents remained in possession of said properties until 1964
when petitioners took possession of the lots. Sometime in 1968, however, private respondents
instituted Civil Case No. 4168 against petitioners in the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac for
declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument, and recovery of possession, with prayer for
preliminary injunction and damages. The complaint therein alleged in the main that the two deeds of
conditional sale were in fact equitable mortgages and were vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud and
undue influence.3 On May 17, 1971, the trial court rendered judgment with the following fallo:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Denying defendant's motion to dismiss of February 23, 1970;

2) Denying Exhibits "B", "B-1", and "G" as loan transaction secured by real estate
mortgages;

3) Annulling and setting aside Exhibits "D", "D-1", "I", "I-1" and "I-2";

4) Ordering plaintiffs, jointly and severally to pay (within ninety [90] days from receipt
of a copy of this judgment) defendant the sum of P5,000.00 specified in Exhibit "B",
with interest thereon at the legal rate from November 28, 1959 until full payment
together with the sum of P9,308.00 specified in Exhibit "G" with interest thereon at the
legal rate from December 1, 1959 until full payment, and in default of such payment,
let the properties mortgaged under Exhibit "B", "B-1" and "G" be sold to realize the
mortgage debt and costs; and

5) Dismissing defendant's counterclaim.

With costs against defendants.4

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment of the trial court was affirmed in all respects by the
appellate court in its decision of October 7, 1975. After the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners went for naught, petitioners sought this Court's favorable adjudication through a petition for
review on certiorari, with the principal argument that respondent appellate court erred in ruling that the
aforementioned deeds of conditional sale were actually equitable mortgages . This Court, however,
affirmed the questioned judgment of respondent court in its decision of December 29, 1989 which, as
earlier stated, is now the subject of this motion for clarification filed by the heirs of the late Adelaida
Ramos and Lazaro Meneses. The dispositive portion of this Court's aforesaid decision decreed:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.5

When private respondent Adelaida Ramos, who in the interim had taken up residence in the United
States and whose husband had passed away, was apprised of the long awaited legal victory, she
immediately came home to the Philippines for the enforcement of this Court's judgment which had
become final and executory on February 7, 1990. She was, however, grossly disappointed when she
learned that petitioners had subdivided and transferred the titles to the two lots in their respective
names and also in the names of third persons. Upon the advice of her lawyer, she complied with the
May 17, 1971 decision of the trial court by tendering payment, through a representative, amounting to
P40,432.11 pursuant to paragraph 4 of the trial court's aforequoted judgment. Said tender was,
however, refused by petitioner spouses resulting in the consignation of the money in court.6

In November, 1993, respondent Adelaida Ramos passed away. Due to inattention on the part of her
lawyer, the execution of this Court's judgment ground to a halt. On February 16, 1994, her heirs
Walfrido, Myrna, Zorayda, Vilma and Youlivia filed a "Motion for Substitution of Party-Plaintiffs" and a
"Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. These
motions were granted and on May 18, 1994, a deputy sheriff of Quezon City served the writ of
execution at the residence of petitioners and thereafter executed the sheriff's return thereon.7
It was at this point that the heirs of the private respondents came to perceive a seeming omission in
the basic judgment in this case as formulated by the trial court. Thus, in their own submission:

. . . the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and this Honorable Court, did not direct the Spouses Oscar Ramos and Luz Agudo to
restore possession of the properties to Adelaida Ramos; and/or failed to instruct the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac to cancel the titles issued to Oscar Amos and Luz Agudo,
to the extent of the shares of Adelaida Ramos in the properties originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 5125 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10788, Lots
No. 4033 and 4221 of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac, respectively.8

Hence, in this motion for clarification, they now pray that said judgment of the trial court, specifically
the third paragraph thereof, be accordingly amended.

The Court is willing to accommodate the motion although, as correctly pointed out by the movant heirs,
the declaration of nullity by the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its decision in Civil Case No.
4168 of the earlier orders of approval and consolidation of dominion9 marked as Exhibits "D", "D-1",
"I", "I-1" and "I-2" necessarily carries with it the restoration by petitioners of the physical possession of
the subject properties to Adelaida Ramos, now represented by her heirs. That is as it should be, for
those very same exhibits had been the bases for the transfer and registration by petitioners of the
subject lots in their names and in the names of third persons to the prejudice of private respondent
Adelaida Ramos. Moreover, private respondents had, as a matter of fact, expressly sought as a relief
such restoration of possession to them in the complaint that they filed in the court a quo.

It should, of course, be emphasized and noted that the amendment now being sought by the movants,
although coming long after the subject judgment had matured into finality, would not at all be
unauthorized or improper considering the peculiar but compelling circumstances under and by reason
of which such an amendment is necessitated. We need only to advert to what this Court emphatically
pronounced in Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., 10 on which the movant heirs also rely, in support of and to demonstrate the validity and regularity
of such amendment in the present situation. Thus:

In the exercise of the broad jurisdiction of this Court, we treat the "Very Urgent
Clarificatory Inquiry" of the respondent-spouses as a motion for clarification of the
resolutions of this Court dated 21 July 1985 and 4 September 1985 where we denied
the Petition for Review and affirmed the underlying decision of the Rizal Court of First
Instance. We clarify, in other words, what we did affirm. What is involved here is not
what is ordinarily regarded as a clerical error in the dispositive part of the decision of
the Court of First Instance, which type of error is perhaps best typified by an error in
arithmetical computation. At the same time, what is involved here is not an erroneous
judgement or dispositive portion of judgment. What we believe is involved here is in
the nature of an inadvertent omission on the part of the Court of First Instance (which
should have been noticed by private respondents' counsel who had prepared the
complaint), of what might be described as a logical follow-through, or translation into,
operation or behavioral terms, of the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage, from which petitioner's title or claim of title embodied in TCT 133153
flows. The dispositive portion of the decision itself declares the nullity ab initio of the
simulated Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and instructed the petitioners
and all persons claiming under them to vacate the subject premises and to turn over
possession thereof to the respondent-spouses. . . .
To repeat, ineluctably involved by necessary implication in the judgment in Civil Case No. 4168,
nullifying the orders of approval and consolidation of ownership in favor of petitioners in Special
Proceedings No. 5174 and G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 395, is the correlative vesting of
proportionate dominion over the lots in question in favor of private respondents, and this includes the
right to the possession thereof. Where title to real property is adjudicated in favor of a party, the
judgment must be enforced by giving the enjoyment thereof to that party, 11 as an inevitable
consequence of that judgment. 12

By the same token, the legal bases for the issuance of certificates of title to the lots in favor of
petitioners and third persons having been set aside by the judgment of the trial court in said Civil Case
No. 4168, with its recognition of corresponding rights thereover by private respondents, this again
ineluctably implies that the corresponding certificates of title thereover be issued in favor of private
respondents or their successors, and that the certificates of title of petitioners and their transferees be
consequently canceled.

Stated elsewise, the Court is now being asked to merely clarify via this nunc pro tunc amendment,
what in fact it did actually affirm and as a logical follow through of the express or intended operational
terms of said judgment in Civil Case No. 4168. In any event, just to write finis to what in actuality is an
unnecessary dispute between the parties and to forestall the possibility of another one, contrived or
otherwise, we accede to the supplication of movants for what amounts to a clarificatory adgment
explicitly articulating what was already implicitly assumed.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, and as prayed for, the dispositive portion of the decision dated
May 17, 1971, specifically paragraph 3 thereof, rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
now Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of said province, in Civil Case No. 4168 and as then affirmed
by respondent court and this Court, is hereby AMENDED to provide as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Annulling and setting aside exhibits "D", "D-1", "I", "I-1" and "I-2", and

3.1) Ordering the spouses Oscar and Luz Agudo-Ramos, their heirs and successors
or assigns, to restore actual physical possession of the subject properties to Adelaida
Ramos, her heirs, successors or assigns, consisting of said Adelaida Ramos'
undivided share of one-sixth (1/6) in Lot No. 4033, originally covered by OCT No. 5125,
and one-third (1/3) share in Lot No. 4221, covered by TCT No. 10788. both of the
Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac;

3.2) Ordering the Sheriff of Branch 63 of the now Regional Trial Court of Tarlac to
implement the corresponding and appropriate writ execution pursuant to the preceding
paragraph; and

3.3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Tarlac to cancel the titles issued in the names
of Oscar Ramos and Luz Agudo-Ramos or their transferees or assigns, where proper,
to the extent of the one-sixth (1/6) share of Adelaida Ramos in Lot No. 4033, originally
covered by OCT No. 5125, and her one-third (1/3) share in Lot No. 4221, originally
registered under TCT No. 10788, and to accordingly issue new titles therefor in the
name of Adelaida Ramos, married to Lazaro E. Meneses, or her legal heirs and
successors in interest.
 xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 139-140.

2 Ibid., 140-141.

3 Ibid., 141-142.

4 Ibid., 143.

5 Ibid., 154.

6 Ibid., 161-164; Motion for Clarification, 2-5.

7 Ibid., 164-166; id., 5-7.

8 Motion for Clarification, 7-8.

9 Orders of January 22, 1960 and April 18, 1960 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
acting alternately as a probate court and a cadastral court.

10 G.R. Nos. 71131-32 , July 27, 1987, 152 SCRA 309; cf. Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes,
et al. 63 Phil. (1936).

11 People of Paombong; Bulacan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 99845,
February 4, 1993, 218 SCRA 423.

12 See Heirs of Carlos Caballero vs. Solano, et al., G.R. No. 112518, April 21, 1995.

15. Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, 7 October 2013

FACTS: Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9of CA 473 had been complied
with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismisson the ground that
Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative
trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied
said Motion.Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucenas evidence was then set on
May 18, 2004.

Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the
hearing. Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the
RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive
Azucenas evidence. During the ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared
despite due notice.

The RTC found that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be
admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization
Law.

In its Omnibus Motion,the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the
Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473,as the law mandates public hearing in
naturalization cases.

The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,contending that Azucena failed to
comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not
allowed under the Retail Trade Law (RA No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
trade.

The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a
"public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the public in
attendance.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the OSGs appeal,the CA found that Azucenas financial condition permits her
and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. Petitioner-appellee, together with
her Filipino husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue a
lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions,
adopted a higher standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a
lucrative trade or profession that would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship
and to which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for
herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a financial burden to her community.

ISSUE: Whether or not Azucena failed to meet the income and public hearing requirements
of CA 473.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW naturalization

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of
CA 473, which provides that : "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines."

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Moy
Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient
evidence that Azucenas husband is a Filipino citizenas only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization based on CA 473. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant.

In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473.
The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was
denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law.

It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was found
to be disqualified, but because her husbands citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial
was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts
to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on
regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act. However, the case before us is a Petition
for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the
then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of
her qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has
granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA.

The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing.
However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing,
prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court
on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite
notice, again failed to appear.

On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has
an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutors office, the proceedings have complied with
the public hearing requirement under CA 473.

16. Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16108, 31 October 1961

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16108 October 31, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING CIVIL STATUS,
ELEUTERIA FELISETA TAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Valeriano S. Kaamino for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Hon. Patricio C. Ceniza,
presiding, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring said
Eleuteria Feliseta Tan a Filipino citizen; that her registration as an alien has been a clear
mistake on her part and on the part of the City Treasurer of Ozamis City and therefore, the
Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the Alien Certificate of Registration
of the herein petitioner as well as those of her children born out her relationship as husband
and wife without benefit of marriage with Tan King Pock, namely: Loreta Tan, Nenita Tan,
Lourdes Tan, Leonila Tan, Tan King Pock, Jr., and William Tan. (ROA, pp. 29-30).

The case originated with the presentation of a petition to the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, alleging that petitioner Eleuteria Feliseta Tan is the common-law wife of Tan King Pock, a
Chinaman, and that nine minor children were born to them out of wedlock; that she and her children
are registered as aliens; that she had asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her registration
and that of her children as aliens, but that the Commissioner refused to grant her petition. Therefore,
she prayed that the cancellation of the alien certificate of registration of herself and her children be
ordered.

The petition is dated September 8, 1958, and on September 17, 1958, the court issued an order
suggesting that the petitioner amend her petition into one for declaratory relief. The order reads thus:

After considering carefully the merits of the petition, the Court finds and so holds that the same
cannot be granted in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on February 5, 1954,
in G.R. No. L-5609, entitled Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic of the Philippines.

It is suggested, therefore, that the herein petitioner amends her petition into that of declaratory
relief within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt a copy of this order, otherwise this case
will be dismissed. (ROA, p. 5).

Pursuant to the suggestion, petitioner through counsel, amended her original petition converting it into
one for declaratory judgment, alleging that petitioner is a Filipino citizen being the illegitimate child of
a Chinaman by the name of Sy Siwa and Benita Feliseta, a Filipina, without benefit of marriage; that
the children mentioned in the petition are children of herself and Tan King Pock and their registration
as aliens has been a mistake; that she had asked the Commissioner of Immigration for the cancellation
of their alien certificate of registration but the Commissioner had denied her petition, so she prayed
that her alien certificate of registration be cancelled.

The Solicitor General presented an answer asking for the denial of the petition because the petition is
not based upon any of the grounds required by the rules as a ground for declaratory judgment; that
there is no need for the present action for the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration; and
that the petition is evidently one which seeks a judicial pronouncement as to petitioner's claim for
citizenship, which matter should be threshed out in a proper action. The provincial fiscal also prayed
that the petition be denied, alleging that the petition is not in order; that the children are not represented
by a guardian, and that the end sought in the petition should be threshed out in a proper action. After
hearing the petition and the arguments, the court below entered the order already quoted above.

The judgment or order appealed from must be set aside.

Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when "any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by
statute or ordinance," demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of
the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that
there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen
may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon,
and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is
beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a
declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single or a legitimate child,
although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief
available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given
status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing
the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.
(Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R. No. L-15775, April 29,
1961).

If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the facts do not warrant the filing of the
said special civil action. If the petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her
and her children's alien certificate of registration, this petition would not lie because such a remedy of
cancellation of alien certificate of registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent
court, in an action where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino
citizenship of the petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be obtained directly because
there is no proceeding at present provided by law or the rules for such purpose.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, set aside, and the petition
dismissed. With costs against petitioner-appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon,
JJ., concur.