2/24/2020 G.R. No. L-23135 | Sumilang v.

Ramagosa

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23135. December 26, 1967.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO

SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA,
SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA
PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

Gatchalian & Sison and J.A. Bordelosa, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.

Jose L. Desvarro, Jr. for oppositors-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE OF WILLS. — In petitions for probate

the Court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, as the
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution
of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
thereof or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
L-23445, June 23, 1996).
2. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED REVOCATION DOES NOT WARRANT
DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR PROBATE. — An alleged disposal by testator
to prior to his death of the properties involved in his will is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution.
3. ID.; ID.; LACK OF INTEREST BARS OPPOSITION TO PROBATE.
— In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding,
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ñgo The Hua vs.
Chuang Kiat Hua, et al., L-17019, Sept 30, 1963) and an interested party is one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965).
Where oppositors do not take issue with the probate court's finding that they are
totally strangers to the deceased, or do not attempt to show that they have some
interest in the estate which must be protected, the order striking out their
opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto must be affirmed.
4. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ORDER STRIKING OUT OPPOSITION TO
PROBATE NOT INTERLOCUTORY. — An order striking out an opposition to the
probate of the will on the ground that the oppositors have no personality to
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intervene in the case is final, and therefore appealable insofar as they are
concerned.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J : p

On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of

Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and
testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said
document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner
as sole heir of the testator.
The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) sets of oppositors —
appellants herein — who questioned the due execution of the document,
claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the
deceased to be his last will and testament. Aside from merely opposing the
petition for probate, the first set of oppositors — Saturnino and Santiago
Ramagosa — also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit
the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors, representing themselves
simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will.
At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then
rested his case on February 16, 1961. Reception of oppositors' evidence was
set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the
dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the
decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of
law six years before his death." Oppositors alleged that after making the will
Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario
the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's death
the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.
Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961,
supplemented it by another opposition on August 14, 1961, and by a rejoinder
on August 21, 1961. Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out
the oppositors' pleadings on two grounds, namely:
"1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are
bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of
the testator; and
"2. That oppositors have no valid claims and interest in the
distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid
right whatsoever."
On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now subject of this
appeal, which read as follows:

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"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July

31, 1961, the same is hereby denied for the allegations contained therein
goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on
said motion to dismiss are without merit. With respect to the motion to
strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the
petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within
the fifth degree as pronded by law and therefore the oppositors are totally
strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the
motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is
hereby ordered stricken out of the record."
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the
legality of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-
23445, June 23, 1966).
"To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that
the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings .. for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more." (Alemany, et al., vs. CFI of
Manila, 3 Phil. 424).
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss the petition for probate
on the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to
his death, the lands disposed of therein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition
for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
"The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy." (Fernandez, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-
23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23662, October 12, 1967.)
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding
that they "have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by
law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is
under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the

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estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of

certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the
said court's findings in this respect.
"It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor." (Teotico vs. del Val, etc., G.R No.
L-18753, March 26, 1965.)
"The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will,
is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which
would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts
and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the
proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle
them to be heard with relation thereto." (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is interlocutory.
We deferred action on the motion until after the brief of both parties had been
filed. The motion, although now practically academic in view of our resolution of
the main issues involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court
striking out appellants' opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that
they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore
appealable order in so far as they were concerned.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
oppositors-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

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