Morales' Concurring Opinion On Webb Et Al Re Vizconde Massacre
Morales' Concurring Opinion On Webb Et Al Re Vizconde Massacre
Morales' Concurring Opinion On Webb Et Al Re Vizconde Massacre
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Promulgated:
x--------------------------------------------------x
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
While it should be the common desire of bench and bar that crime is not
left unpunished, it is no less important, if not more so, that the innocent be
shielded from hasty prosecution and rash conviction. We have nothing but praise
for sincerity and zeal in the enforcement of the law. Nevertheless, the undeserved
penalties inflicted upon the blameless, and the indelible stain upon their name,
which is never quite washed away by time, should caution all concerned to a
more careful and conscientious scrutiny of all the facts before the finger is
pointed and the stone is cast.[1] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so, as in all criminal cases, the very voluminous records of the present
cases call for a “more careful and conscientious scrutiny” in order to determine
what the facts are before the accused’s conviction is affirmed.
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, then 19-year old
Carmela and then seven-year old Jennifer, were found dead in their home at No. 80
Vinzons Street, BF Homes Subdivision, Parañaque. They all bore multiple stab
wounds on different parts of their bodies. Some of their personal belongings
appeared to be missing.
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30,
1991, in the municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring and
confederating with accused Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura,
Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hiospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
“Ging” Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one another, while armed with
bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd design, with abuse
of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of Carmela Vizconde against her
will and consent.
The accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the
commission of the above-mentioned crime, and without having participated therein as
principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by assisting, with
abuse of authority as police officer, the above-named principal accused, to conceal or
destroy the effects or instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence and
allowing their destruction in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.
The case was, after the Presiding Judge of Branch 258 of the Parañaque
RTC inhibited, re-raffled to Branch 274 of the Parañaque RTC. The trial court,
then presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused,
Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart having remained at large.[4]
At the trial, the prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness. The other
witnesses were Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, the medico-legal officer who autopsied
the bodies of the victims; Lolita Carrera Birrer, an ex-lover of Gerardo
Biong; Mila Gaviola, former laundrywoman of the Webbs; Normal White and
Justo Cabanacan, security personnel of the Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes,
Parañaque, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
The defense presented testimonial evidence which tended to cast a bad light
on Alfaro’s reputation for truth, as well as on the implausibility of her account.
At all events, some of the accused invoked alibi, claiming to have been
somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. In Webb’s case, he
presented documentary and testimonial proof that he was in the United States of
America from March 1991 to October 1992.
On the other hand, it belittled the denial and alibi of accused Webb, Lejano,
Rodriguez, and Gatchalian in light of their positive identification by Alfaro.
And so after a protracted trial, the trial court rendered on January 4, 2000 a
172-page decision finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
with homicide.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which
specimen was believed to be still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court
granted the request pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence[8] to give
the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence which could affect
the result of the case.
On April 27, 2010, however, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
had custody of the specimen which it claimed had been turned over to the trial
court. Parenthetically, the trial court records do not show that the specimen was
among the object evidence that was offered in evidence in the case by any of the
parties. It was in light of this development that accused Webb filed an urgent
motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital
evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors,
gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings.[9] When the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court.[10]
The draft decision, which was later adopted by the dissenters, found “no
glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions” made by the lower courts. It readily credited the
testimony of prosecution “star” witness Jessica Alfaro (Alfaro) who, it
observed, “underwent exhaustive and intense cross-examination by eight . .
. defense lawyers . . . [and] revealed such details and observations which only a
person who was actually with the perpetrators could have known.”
Alfaro was found both by the trial and appellate courts to be a credible
witness. She impressed the trial court which found her to have “testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and [to] ha[ve]
remained consistent in her testimony.”[13]
By Alfaro’s own admission, she was a habitual drug addict who inhaled and
sniffed shabu “every other day”[14] since December 1990. It was about this time
that she met Artemio “Dong” Ventura who provided her with a regular supply of
shabu at the so-called “house of shabu” in Parañaque.[15] In March 1991, she
stopped getting her supply of shabu from Ventura as she instead got it from other
sources including Orly Bacquir and Cris Santos and places such as Quezon
City, Makati and Tondo.[16]
In the afternoon of June 29, 1991, the date of the commission of the crime,
before she and accused Peter Estrada, who she claimed was her boyfriend, went to
the Alabang Commercial Center, she had taken illegal drugs, and in the evening of
even date, she not only smoked shabu but sniffed cocaine as well at the “parking
lot.”[17] It was only in about October 1994 that she stopped taking illegal drugs.
. . . [W]here the prolonged use of drugs has impaired the witness’ ability to
perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is uniformly sustained by the
courts. Aside from organic deterioration, however, testimony may be
impugned if the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of
perceiving the event about which he is testifying or at the time he is on the
stand. This necessarily follows, for even the temporary presence of drugs
affects the functioning of the body’s organs, and thus bears directly on the
credibility of the witness’ testimony…[19] (underscoring supplied)
Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the
influence of drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is indeed very
unreliable.[20] So it has been held that “habitual users of narcotics become
notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby.”[21]
Defense witness Dr. Rey San Pedro, then Deputy Executive Director of the
Dangerous Drugs Board, opined that drug addicts or dependents are generally liars
who would lie for less than noble objectives, such as for money and/or to satisfy
their craving for attention, viz:
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Based on your experience, Doctor, will this dependency of shabu
affect the character of a person specifically, for example, the capacity
to tell the truth, would that affect?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Our general examination of patients showed that they become liars.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They become liars. Yes, what would be the usual motivation for a
shabu-dependent person to become liars. Why, why do they lie?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes. They could lie on the persons they go out with?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons they meet?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons from whom they allegedly get the
drugs?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Is it not correct, Doctor, that the tendency of a drug dependent is to
hide the identity of the drug suppliers. Is this correct?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Who would tell you the correct name of the drug supplier?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Their tendency is to give you misleading information, correct?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, would a drug dependent on shabu lie for money?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes. When I say lie for money so that she could get money?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: He will, from her relatives, from her friends, or even from third
persons?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They even sell their personal effects?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Would they sell their honor to get money, like a woman becoming a
prostitute?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes, because they want to be the center of attention to cover up for
their drug dependency, correct?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, Doctor, if a person were drug dependent on shabu since 1990,
1991, up to and including December, 1994. So, that is a long time,
isn’t it?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes, drug dependent. What would it take, Doctor, in order that we can
cure this patient of his or her dependency on shabu, what would it
take?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Treated and rehabilitated, where?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: In a hospital. Does the government provide for such facilities?
In their earlier mentioned paper, Burrus and Marks write on the “peculiar
effects upon veracity” of the principal types of drugs, like cocaine and
amphetamine which were used by Alfaro:
xxxx
xxxx
How Alfaro got to be a “star” witness in this case was narrated by then NBI
agent Artemio Sacaguing:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, Atty. Sacaguing, how did the NBI treat Ms. Alfaro considering
the assistance that he was giving your group?
Witness Sacaguing:
A We gave her very special treatment. So, we consider her already the
darling of the group because she was giving us good projects and she
loved it.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Witness Sacaguing:
A She liked being treated that way.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Now tell the Honorable Court, was there ever any time where the group
got tired of giving Ms. Alfaro the VIP treatment?
xxxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
All right, Atty. Sacaguing, how long did you give Ms. Alfaro this VIP
treatment?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Well, she was always there and we treated her very nicely, but later on,
about . . . after the lapse of about one or two weeks, the boys, I mean, my
associates in my team, began teasing her because she could not give us
any project anymore.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Witness Sacaguing:
Atty. Ongkiko:
xxxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Mr. Sacaguing, after your group teased her because, according to you, she
could not give you anymore projects, what was the reaction of Ms. Alfaro,
if any?
Atty. Ongkiko:
Witness Sacaguing:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q I see, piqued.
Witness Sacaguing:
A Piqued.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Court:
p i c q u e d. (underscoring in the original)
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And when she was piqued or “napikon”, what did she say or what did she
do?
xxxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
xxxx
Q Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde
murder case. Will you tell the Honorable Court?
Witness Sacaguing:
Witness Sacaguing:
A She told me, Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her
the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde
family. That’s what she told us, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Witness Sacaguing:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Did she ever bring to you or to your office this man that, according to her,
knew about the Vizconde murder case?
xxxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
Witness Sacaguing:
A No, sir.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Why not?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to
bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not, and the man
does not like to testify.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, and what happened after that?
Witness Sacaguing:
A She told me, “easy lang kayo, Sir”, if I may quote, “easy lang, Sir, huwag
kayong . . .”
Court:
Q How was that?
Witness Sacaguing:
A “Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko yan, papapelan ko na
lang yan.”
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And what did you understand by her statement as you quoted it?
Witness Sacaguing:
A I thought it . . .
Prosecutor Zuño:
Objection, Your Honor, that is asking for the opinion of this witness, Your
Honor.
Court:
Reform your question.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
“papapelan ko na lang yan”?
Witness Sacaguing:
A I said, “hindi pwede yan, kasi, hindi ka naman eye witness.”
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
Witness Sacaguing:
Witness Sacaguing:
A She went away, she went out of my office.
Court:
You speak clearly, Mr. Witness, I could hardly get you.
Witness Sacaguing:
A She did not answer anymore, Your Honor. She just went out of the office.
NBI agent Sacaguing was the special “handler” of Alfaro, an NBI “asset”
who regularly provided leads on projects or cases being investigated by the NBI,
on which account she received special treatment. From Sacaguing’s above-quoted
testimony, Alfaro came forward with her “knowledge” about the commission of
the crimes only afterbeing cajoled by the NBI agents about her lack of productivity
and her failure to make good her word that she knew and would bring someone
who could “shed light” on the crimes that occurred close to four years earlier. It is
thus hard to fathom how her motives for suddenly developing a first hand account
of the commission of the crimes could be treated as anything but suspect. Yet, the
lower courts, despite the peculiar circumstances related by Sacaguing, were not
put on guard from swallowing Alfaro’s testimony.
The trial court credited as satisfactory and plausible Alfaro’s explanation for
her silence from the time she allegedly witnessed the crimes in June 1991 up to
“about October 1994” when the numbing effects of drug abuse only began to wear
off and she had an earnest desire to reform her life.
Court:
Q After that incident, did it not occur to your mind to immediately report the
same to the police authorities?
Witness Alfaro:
A No, Your Honor, I did not.
Court:
Q Why?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Because at first, I was so scared. I just want to my Dad, but I didn’t have
a chance to tell him.
Court:
Q: No, after the lapse of a reasonable time, after witnessing that incident, did
it not also occur to your mind to finally report it to the proper authorities?
Witness Alfaro:
A: I did not first have that in mind, only recently when I was out on drugs.
Court:
Q: When?
Witness Alfaro:
A: When I got out on drugs.
Court:
Q When was that?
Witness Alfaro:
A: About October of 1994.
Court:
Q What prompted you to finally reveal what you have witnessed?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Well, when I started having these nightmares about my daughter instead of
that Jennifer that I see in my dreams. It’s my daughter whom I see crying,
and that triggered me, and then I got out from drugs, and then it came to
the point when I saw them accidentally, so, that’s the thing which
triggered me, Your Honor.
Court:
Q: Any other reason?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Those are my main reasons.
Court:
Q: Is that your principal reason?
Witness Alfaro:
A: I wanted to change my life already.[27] (underscoring supplied)
Given Alfaro’s confession of having for years, after the commission of the
crimes, been numbed by the effects of drug abuse, would the ponencia take as
gospel truth her what it termed “vivid” and “infallible” recollection of the minutiae
surrounding the commission of the crime in June 1991, and point to the accused as
the malefactors, particularly Webb, despite evidence, documentary and testimonial,
supporting his alibi?
It is not thus difficult to believe that Alfaro could have become familiar with
the evidentiary details of the crimes, given that she was practically a resident at the
offices of the NBI which was actively investigating the crimes, not to mention her
being an NBI “star” witness.
P140,000.00 in cash
Four (4) necklace
Five (5) rings
Two (2) bracelets
Two (2) pairs of earings
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Lauro Vizconde of the total value of
Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, Philippine currency
to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the said total sum,
and that on the occasion of the said Robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal, and carry away the articles above-
mentioned herein accused, in pursuant of their conspiracy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and
strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, stab
and use personal violence upon JENNIFER NICOLAS
VIZCONDE thereby inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds in
different parts of her body thus causing her instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
(2) Criminal case No. 91-7136 (for the rape with homicide of
Carmela Nicolas Vizconde filed by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe with the
same RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1919) also against the same
accused. It alleged:
P140,000.00 in cash
Four (4) necklace
Five (5) rings
Two (2) bracelets
Two (2) pairs of earings
Stock must be taken of the fact that the detailed extrajudicial confessions
or sinumpaang salaysay of the several accused (especially Villardo Barroso y
Datuin, Jr., Roberto Barroso y Datuin, his Rolando Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto
Cesar y Lizardo, Angelito Santos y Bisen) in the three criminal cases, were
acknowledged and ratified before Judge Roberto L. Makalintal, Atty. Luis Matro,
Atty. Francis Tolentino and Atty. Salvador B. Aguas, who affirmed that the said
extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay were freely and voluntarily
given by the affiants, and that no duress violence, intimidation or coercion of any
kind was employed against the affiants when the latter gave their statements if
they did not want to; and that indeed the affiants were made aware of their
constitutional right to have a lawyer of their choice to assist them during the
custodial investigation and to remain silent if they wished to. Nevertheless, as
seen in the consolidated decision rendered in the three criminal cases, these
extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay were declared inadmissible by
the Makati City RTC, for having been allegedly obtained through duress, threats,
or intimidation. The dismissal of these criminal cases nowithstanding, it does not
detract from the fact: (1) that said criminal case had indeed been filed in court,
(2) that the criminal indictments were erected on the strength of the extrajudicial
confessions or sinumpaang salaysay executed by the accused
therein, (3) that these extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay set
forth facts and events that are eerily similar to those which found their way
into the information was filed in the case under review; (4) that the victims in
the three criminal cases are also the victims in the case under review; and (5) that
since the accused therein had been duly arraigned, as indeed, criminal
proceedings had been commenced thereon before a competent court, the accused
therein were in real danger of being convicted of the felonies
charged.[28] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the questioned inconsistencies between Alfaro’s April 28, 1995 and May
22, 1995 Affidavits, the dissenters brush them aside as not necessarily affecting her
credibility, citing People v. Sanchez[29] which held:
And the dissenters forget that the first Affidavit, dated April 28, 1995, was
given about two months shy of four years from the occurrence of the crime in late
June 1991 and, therefore, her mental faculties could not have been in “such a state
as [not] to afford [her] a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident” subject of
her tale. The secondAffidavit, on the other hand, was executed 24 days after
the first Affidavit or on May 22, 1995. Does the ponencia find that Alfaro’s
mental faculties were more refreshed at a date more remote from the occurrence of
the crime she claims to have witnessed?
Again, as did the lower courts, the dissenters disregard the glaring
inconsistencies between Alfaro’s two affidavits vis-à-vis her testimony in open
court which undeniably detract from credibility ─ of witness and of
testimony. Consider these inconsistencies reflected in the tabulation below:
There was, however, no rational basis for Alfaro to mistrust her “handler”
Sacaguing who was present at the execution of the first Affidavit, or the NBI for
that matter, she, as stated earlier, having been accorded special treatment precisely
because she was one of the more valuable “assets” of the NBI. Sacaguing himself
testified that Alfaro was virtually dependent on them . . . “for protection, for
sympathy and even for her spiritual needs.”[30] Accused Gatchalian’s father, Atty.
Francisco Gatchalian, denied that his family was in any way related to
Alfaro. And the lawyer who is mentioned in the first Affidavit to have assisted
her, Atty. Arturo Mercader, Jr., took the witness stand and categorically stated that
he was present during the taking of such first Affidavit of Alfaro, he claiming
that, inter alia:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And after the typing of the statement was finished by Agent Tamayo, what
happened?
Witness Mercader:
A Well, I received the statement and showed it to Jessica and asked her to
read it also.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Did Jessica Alfaro read her statement?
Witness Mercader:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q How long did it take her to read the statement?
Witness Mercvader:
A Just for few minutes, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And after she read the statement, what happened next?
Witness Mercader:
A Well, she signed the statement and afterwards, I also affixed my signature
on it, Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Aguirre:
Q While assisting Jessica Alfaro, did you notice any action on the part of
anybody which pressured Jessica Alfaro to finish her statement?
Witness Mercader:
A No, Your Honor, none that I have noticed. If I did, I would have objected
[31]
to.
xxxx
Prosecutor Zuno:
Q And that, I believe, to your own perception, at that time she was giving the
facts, the answer, in accordance with her recollection?
xxxx
Witness Mercader:
A Your Honor, at that time what I noticed only was the spontaneity of the
answers of Jessica. Of course, I could not tell whether from where
Jessica was basing it. From the recollection or from a memorize
script, I do not know, Your Honor, about that. But definitely, whenever
she was asked a question, she answers them readily as if she knows the
answer personally.[32] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The trial court’s order preventing the defense from cross-examining Alfaro
on the inconsistencies between her two Affidavits was thus correctly SET
ASIDE by the Court of Appeals, to which this Court, by Resolution of January 22,
1996, referred for disposition G.R. Nos. 122466 and 122504, the accused’s
petitions assailing, among other orders, the trial court’s order denying their right to
cross examine Alfaro, for purposes of impeachment, on her conflicting
Affidavits. Thus, the appellate court, in its Decision[33] in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39839
and 39840 of June 21, 1996, held:
xxxx
Under Section 11, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, an adverse party’s
witness may be impeached (1) by contradictory evidence; (2) by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad; (3) by evidence that he
has made at other times statement inconsistent with his present testimony;
and (4) by producing the record of his conviction of an offense. Insofar as
impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent statements however, under
Section 13 of the same Rule 132, a proper foundation must first be laid, in that,
the attention of the witness should first be called to such statements, and he
should be asked whether or not he made them, and afforded an opportunity for
explanation, or affirmance, or denial of the authenticity of the
writing. (emphasis and underscoring in the original)
A testimony given four years after the occurrence of crime which gives
minute details that even contradict tales earlier given is too incredible as to draw
dubiety. The lucid observations of Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao in
his Dissent[34] for the acquittal of the accused, and the graphic analysis of Justice
Roberto Abad in his ponenciaon why Alfaro’s testimony can not be relied upon are
thus well taken.
It bears stressing that the defense’s earnest assertion that the prosecution
failed to rebut the pieces of evidence, highlighted by the defense, that seriously
dent its (the prosecution’s) case has not been controverted.
FINALLY, even assuming arguendo that the burden of evidence had shifted
to the defense, the testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense
indubitably establishes that, with respect to accused Webb, he was out of the
country when the crime occurred.
These dates [March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992] are so distant from the
time of the commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it
would not have been impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel back
to the country and again fly to the US several times considering that the travel
time on board an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from San
Francisco to the Philippines takes only about twelve (12) hours to fourteen (14)
hours. Given the financial resources and political influence of his family, it was
not unlikely that Webb could have traveled back to thePhilippines before June 29-
30, 1991 and then departed for the US again, and returning to the Philippines in
October 1992. There clearly exists, therefore, such possibility of Webb’s
presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and its excuse
cannot be deemed airtight. (underscoring and italics supplied)
Facts decide cases. Conjectures and suspicions are not facts, hence, they
have no evidentiary value. They cannot be the bases of conviction as they cannot
substitute for the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Suspicions, no matter how strong they are, must never sway judgment.[41]
While alibi is, indeed, a weak defense because the accused can easily
fabricate his story to escape criminal liability,[43] in the present case, Webb’s alibi
could not have been fabricated with ease. His travel and immigration documents
showing his departure from the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to
mention the testimonial and documentary evidence on his activities while in
the U.S.A. between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, deserve full credit. If
half the world away could not even be considered to be “so far removed from the
crime scene”[44] as to evince the physical impossibility of actual presence, then the
defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused lands in a different
planet.
[1]
Salvacion v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-68633, July 11 1986, 142 SCRA 707, 713.
[2]
The cases were (1) Criminal Case No. 91-7135 filed by then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe before the sala of Judge Julio R. Logarta of the Makati City RTC, Branch 63, on November 11,
1991 (for robbery with homicide) against Villardo Barroso y Datuin, Roberto Barroso y Datuin¸ Rolando
Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto Cesar, Bienvenido Baydo, Angelito Santos y Bisen, Rey Doe and several other
John Does still at large; (2) Criminal case No. 91-7136 (for the rape with homicide of Carmela Nicolas
Vizconde filed by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe with the same RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1919) also
against the same accused and (3) Criminal Case No. 91-7137 (for robbery, with homicide wherein the
victim was ESTRELLITA NICOLAS VISCONDE) likewise filed against the same accused by ACSP
Aurelio C. Trampe.
[3]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-3.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 393-399 and rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 80-104.
[5]
Decision dated January 4, 2000.
[6]
CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.
[7]
Resolution dated January 26, 2007, rollo (G.R. No. 176839), pp. 197-214. The resolution was penned by
Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with the concurrence of Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Normandie B.
Pizarro. Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucenito N. Tagle dissented.
[8]
A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007. Section 4 states:
Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b. The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subject to DNA testing , but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons;
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
[9]
People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
[10]
People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 207.
[11]
Siao Tick Chong v. Republic, No. L-22151, March 30,1970, 32 SCRA 253, 258.
[12]
37 N.J. Eq. 130, 132. Cited in SALONGA, Philippine Law on Evidence, 774 (1964) and
VIII FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, 458-459 (1997).
[13]
January 4, 2000 RTC Decision, p. 74.
[14]
Vide TSN, October 18, 1995, pp. 105-106.
[15]
TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 6-9.
[16]
Id. at 25-27.
[17]
Id. at 35-36; TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 80-96, 156-163.
[18]
35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 259 (1960)
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Vide 98 C.J.S. 348.
[21]
Vide People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 185 NE 2d 168 where the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled:
The question of whether a witness is a narcotics addict is an important consideration in
passing upon the credibility of a witness for, as we have stated, the testimony of a narcotics addict
is subject to suspicion due to the fact that habitual users of narcotics become notorious liars.
(citations omitted)
In People v. Perkins, 26 Ill 2d 2300, 186 NE 2d 330 (1962) , the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty on the basis of the
uncorroborated testimony of a drug addict who was the only witness to the alleged crime, and
further urges that the evidence as a whole does not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have repeatedly held that the fact that a witness is a narcotics addict and a police informer
has an important bearing upon his credibility and, while his position is not that of an
accomplice, the situation is sufficiently similar to that of an accomplice to warrant a close scrutiny
of the testimony of such a witness, recognizing the fact that habitual users of narcotics become
notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
[22]
State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236.
[23]
TSN, August 7, 1997, 35-45
[24]
TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 47-48.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: As an investigator, Governor, will you tell the Honorable Court how did you relate
or rather assess the reliability of any information furnished by a drug addict?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, I will consider it, Your Honor, not generally reliable.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Why do you say that?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, because, you know, if one is under the influence of drugs or one is considered
to be an addict, you could hardly believe his information.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Why, why so?
Witness Velasco:
A: Because he is not in his state of mind.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Well, what about the capacity to lie, Governor?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, the capacity to lie may be very great, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Well, because, you know, for maintaining or for in order to get money, they will
lie.”
(underscoring supplied)
[25]
BURRUS AND MARKS TESTIMONIAL RELIABILITY OF DRUG ADDICTS 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 259,
262-263, 269-270, 272-273 (1960).
[26]
TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 77-79.
[27]
TSN, July 29, 1996, pp. 77-78.
[28]
Justice Roberto Abad raised the same points, viz:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the
glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not
use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no
reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the
way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-
paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s
narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and
they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing
a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions
of the Barroso “akyat-bahay” gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this
physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at
another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-
door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical
evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with
him when they left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the
front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story
made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his
companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb
had been loosed to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of
them climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they
were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front
door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed
that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso “akyat-
bahay” gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense
for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going
straight into the house.
[29]
G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21.
[30]
TSN, October 6, 1997, p. 100.
[31]
Vide TSN, July 31, 1996, pp. 20-21, 44.
[32]
TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 10, 15.
[33]
CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 51173), pp. 209-225, penned by Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Hilarion L. Aquino.
[34]
Rollo, pp. 254-285, G.R. No. 176389.
[35]
People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 584, 586.
[36]
Records, Vol. 17, pp. 186-196. Webb argued that:
xxxx
7. Since the semen specimen is still in the custody and possession of the NBI, accused
Webb moves for the submission of the semen evidence to a DNA analysis by a US-government
or US government accredited forensic laboratory, preferably the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C. If granted, accused Webb reserves his right to be presented at all
stages of the DNA typing process and to have access to the results thereof.
xxxx
[37]
Id. at 502-529.
[38]
Records, Vol. 18, pp. 256-259.
[39]
G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, 270 SCRA 1, 3.
[41]
People v. Tajada, G.R. No. 147200, December 17, 2002, 394 SCRA 159, 166; Monteverde v.
People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 196, 215.
[42]
People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 121195, November 27, 1996, 264 SCRA 722, 746-747.
[43]
People v. Peruelo, No. L-50631, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 226-238;
[44]
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009.
[45]
G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.