Queensland Handbook For Practitioners On Legal Capacity
Queensland Handbook For Practitioners On Legal Capacity
Queensland Handbook For Practitioners On Legal Capacity
for Practitioners on
Legal Capacity
Acknowledgements
This Handbook for Practitioners on Legal Capacity (the Handbook) has been prepared by
Allens and Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, with the contribution of:
(a) University of Queensland law students via the UQ Pro Bono Centre;
(b) solicitors from the Queensland Law Society’s Ethics Centre;
(c) guidelines prepared by the Office of the Public Guardian;
(d) the Honourable Justice David Thomas and Senior Member Clare Endicott of the
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal; and
(e) solicitors from community legal centres and statutory and other bodies who
participated in the roundtable discussion regarding capacity issues held on 20
March 2014.
We thank all of these contributors for their efforts.
Queensland Advocacy Incorporated’s services are provided with funds invested by the
Queensland Government from the State Budget and Legal Practitioner Interest on Trust
Accounts Fund.
2
Contents
1 Executive Summary 6
1.1 What is the purpose of this Handbook? 6
1.2 Australian Law Reform Commission report on barriers
to legal capacity 6
1.3 Summary of steps for assessing capacity 7
1.4 Fundamentals of lawyers and capacity
(Chapters 3 and 4) 7
1.5 Practical process for assessing client capacity
(Chapter 5) 8
1.6 Where client has capacity
(the presumption of capacity is not rebutted) (Chapter 6) 10
1.7 Where capacity remains in doubt (Chapter 7) 11
2 Introduction 12
2.1 What is legal capacity? 12
2.2 Why is legal capacity important? 12
3
6 What do I do if I Determine My Client has Capacity? 37
7 What do I do if I Determine My Client does not have
Capacity or has Questionable Capacity? 39
7.1 Actions NOT open to lawyers 39
7.2 Has a substituted decision maker been formally
appointed by or for the client? 40
7.3 Will the client consent to a formal assessment
of capacity by a medical professional? 43
7.4 Can a substituted decision maker be appointed? 46
7.5 Ethical complexities for lawyers seeking to have
a substituted decision maker appointed to their client 48
7.6 Should I cease to act? 53
Schedule 2 59
Capacity Tests Applicable to Different Practice Areas 59
Schedule 3 76
Office of the Public Guardian Guidelines 76
Schedule 4 83
Referral Letter to Medical Professional 83
Schedule 5 85
Bibliography 85
4
Endorsement
The Queensland Law Society endorses this Handbook for use by Queensland
solicitors.
Disclaimer
This Handbook is provided for your information and interest only. It does not
constitute and must not be relied on as legal advice. You must seek specific
advice tailored to your circumstances.
5
1 Executive Summary
6
1.3 Summary of steps for assessing capacity
What follows is a summary of Chapters 3 to 7, which outline the steps a lawyer
should take to assess whether their client has capacity to make a particular
decision and provide competent instructions in relation to it. Lawyers may find it
useful to refer to Figure 1 (two pages below) which provides a flowchart of this
process.
(a) all adult persons are presumed to have capacity to make all decisions
unless there is evidence to rebut the presumption;
(b) capacity is time-specific, domain-specific and decision-specific, meaning
at a given time a client may have capacity for some decisions but not
others;
(c) the capacity to make a decision must be distinguished from the content
of the decision itself, meaning ‘bad’ decisions are not indicative of
impaired capacity;
(d) capacity should not be assessed solely on the basis of appearance, age,
behaviour (including communication style), disability or impairment;
(e) capacity may be increased with appropriate support; and
(f) substituted decision making is a last resort.
Finally, lawyers must remember that when assessing a client’s capacity they
are not making a determination of the client’s capacity that will be final and
binding on the client or any relevant third parties. Determining whether the
client has capacity to perform particular tasks is ultimately a matter for the
courts.
7
1.5 Practical process for assessing client capacity
(Chapter 5)
It is imperative that lawyers recognise that every client is unique. It follows that
the approach a lawyer takes in dealing with issues associated with a client’s
capacity may need to be tailored to the client’s individual circumstances.
Recognising this, what follows is a general conceptual framework on how to
assess capacity and deal with capacity issues in practice.
(a) Identify the client. In most cases, the client will be the person seeking
to make the decision. Where a substituted decision maker has been
appointed to or by the client, it may be the substituted decision maker
and not the client who has the exclusive ability to provide the lawyer with
instructions. In some cases, the substituted decision maker may be the
lawyer’s client. In all cases, the lawyer cannot accept instructions from
third parties such as family, friends and carers.
(b) Identify the particular decision the client is seeking to make and the
relevant legal test for capacity that applies to that decision. The specific
legal tests for different types of decisions are listed in Schedule 2.
(c) Consider whether there is any reason to question whether the client
has capacity. Various ‘red flag’ circumstances that could (but do not
necessarily) indicate that a client lacks capacity are listed in Schedule 1.
If there are no ‘red flags’ and the client displays no indicia of impaired
capacity, the lawyer can act on the client’s instructions.
(d) Determine whether a substituted decision maker has been formally
appointed for the client (such as a guardian or administrator, or litigation
guardian). Review the terms of the document effecting any such
appointment to ensure the appointment is still in force and the decision
to be made falls within its scope. If so, instructions must be taken from
the substituted decision maker.
(e) If ‘red flags’ or indicia of impaired capacity are present and no substituted
decision maker has been appointed, take steps to maximise the client’s
capacity. What steps are appropriate will invariably depend on the
particular client, but in general the following steps are recommended:
(i) meet with client in person and alone;
(ii) focus on the client as an individual and consciously put to one side
biases and assumptions based on age, mental health, intellectual
impairments, emotional distress or eccentricities;
8
Identify the client and the decision to be made
NO
Take steps to
maximise the client’s
capacity and then
conduct a preliminary
assessment of
capacity Lawyer can
act for client
Lawyer and take
can act on Does the preliminary Does the client have instructions
the client’s assessment indicate NO a validly executed YES from the
instructions the client has enduring power of substituted
capacity? attorney? decision
maker
NO
YES NO
9
(iii) establish the client’s trust and confidence by emphasising the
duties that the lawyer owes to the client, in particular the duties of
loyalty and confidence;
(iv) adapt your communication style to the client (deal with simple
issues first, take breaks, allow the client time to think, ask open-
ended questions, provide memory cues and explain matters
exhaustively);
(v) ensure any necessary interpreters, non-verbal communication
tools, visual and auditory aids are available for the client to use;
(vi) ensure the meeting environment is quiet, well-lit, comfortable and
familiar to the client (the lawyer may consider ‘dressing down’);
(vii) consider the timing of decision making (eg, a morning
appointment may better suit the client) and whether gradual
decision making (over a series of meetings) or delayed decision
making (to a time when the client is lucid) would increase
capacity; and
(viii) seek the assistance of third parties such as friends, family or
caregivers but only with the prior consent of the client.
(f) Once the client’s capacity has been maximised, conduct a preliminary
assessment of the client’s capacity having regard to the relevant legal test
to be applied (see Schedule 2). This will usually involve asking the client
questions (tailored to their circumstances) that seek to establish whether
the client:
(i) understands the facts and issues underlying the decision, the
different options available to them (including making no decision)
and the consequences and implications of those options for the
client and others;
(ii) has the ability to manipulate that information to make an
informed decision and can articulate a reasoning process behind
the conclusions and decisions they make;
(iii) expresses consistent and stable desired outcomes, conclusions
and decisions; and
(iv) is aware of their own abilities and limitations.
(g) In instances of doubt, it may be useful to have a second lawyer attend the
preliminary assessment. In all cases, lawyers should maintain thorough,
comprehensive and contemporaneous file notes of any consultation with
the client and relevant interactions with third parties (such as medical
professionals and information volunteered by third parties).
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1.7 Where capacity remains in doubt (Chapter 7)
(a) Consider whether there is an enduring power of attorney under which
the lawyer can take instructions from the attorney appointed. Errors on
the face of an enduring power of attorney or improper execution would
warrant further and more detailed investigations.
(b) If no substituted decision maker has been formally appointed, seek the
client’s consent to undergo a formal assessment of capacity by a medical
professional. There can be no assessment without the client’s consent;
lawyers do not have the power to force a client to undergo a formal
assessment. If the assessment, when considered along with all the other
available evidence, indicates the client has capacity, the lawyer may
proceed to act on the client’s instructions.
(c) If the client refuses to consent to a formal assessment, or the assessment
does not indicate that the client has capacity, consider whether
a substituted decision maker can be appointed to the client. It is
preferable if the client, a family member, friend, social worker or health
care professional makes the application to the Tribunal or court. In a
very narrow set of circumstances, it may be that lawyers can make the
application provided that they meet the relevant standing requirements
and take the steps required by the courts to ensure that they do not
breach their ethical obligations.
(d) Only if the client has impaired capacity for the matter and a substituted
decision maker cannot be appointed should the lawyer consider ceasing
to act. Lawyers should always remember that capacity is time-specific
so it may be likely that the client could recover capacity at some point in
the future. If the lawyer does decide to cease to act, they must give the
client reasonable notice and it is recommended that they provide the
client with a letter setting out their reasons for ceasing to act, the direct
and indirect consequences for the client and the options and support
available to the client (both legal and non-legal).
(e) In cases of doubt, solicitors can obtain guidance from the QLS Ethics
Centre.
11
2 Introduction
2 See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4 (Dictionary); Powers of
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3 (Dictionary).
3 See, eg, Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ss 280-83.
4 See, eg, Bergmann v Dengiz [2010] QDC 18 (10 February 2010) [15]-[16].
5 XYZ (Guardianship) [2007] VCAT 1196 (29 June 2007) [48]-[49] (Billings DP) (emphasis
12
added).
This necessarily means that whether a client has capacity can be a complex
issue. As Lord Cranworth LC famously put it in Boyse v Rossborough:
But between such an extreme case [of ‘a raving mad man’] and that of a man of perfectly
sound and vigorous understanding, there is every shade of intellect, every degree of
mental capacity. There is no possibility of mistaking midnight for noon; but at what
precise moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine.6
Given this complexity, it is imperative that lawyers have a strong framework for
assessing whether a client has capacity. Not only does the application of such a
framework fulfil the lawyer’s duties, but it also gives the client the best chance
of retaining control over decisions that affect them:
Capacity is a complex issue and requires careful consideration and balancing when
making decisions about how to proceed. There is a risk that a person’s right to make
their own decisions will be interfered with inappropriately or excessively. There is a
countervailing danger that failure to take action to protect a client might leave them
exposed to physical or financial harm or abuse. In addition, any course of action that
interferes with a person’s decision-making autonomy, whether for good or ill, risks
damaging the relationship between solicitor and client. It is important that solicitors
assisting these clients have the tools necessary to enable them do the job and are
not discouraged from assisting the most vulnerable of clients by the ethical and legal
framework in which they must operate.7
Unfortunately, the combination of the strict legal and ethical duties imposed
on lawyers and the inherently complex ‘medico-legal’8 nature of capacity
encourages lawyers to abdicate responsibility for assessing capacity and to
refuse to take instructions where any indicia of impaired capacity are present:
Lacking training in capacity assessment or other aspects of mental health, the average
practitioner may argue that, as lawyers, we do not and should not perform capacity
assessments. Instead, we should refer cases of questionable capacity to mental health
professionals. The assertion is true as far as it goes, but it only goes so far. To decide
whether a formal assessment is needed, the lawyer is already exercising judgment about
the client’s capacity on an informal or preliminary level. The exercise of judgment, even if
it is merely the incipient awareness that “something is not right,” is itself an assessment.
It is better to have a sound conceptual foundation and consistent procedure for making
this preliminary assessment than to rely solely on ad hoc conjecture or intuition.9
13
3 Ethical Duties and Guiding
Principles
(c) Duty to act in client’s best interests (including to respect client autonomy)
One of the fundamental ethical duties of lawyers is their duty to each of
their clients. Rule 4.1.1 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules provides
that ‘[a] solicitor must ... act in the best interests of a client’.16 Similarly, the
2011 Barristers’ Rules provide that ‘[a] barrister must promote and protect
fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the client’s best interests.’ 17
Senior Member Clare Endicott, who has oversight of the Human Rights
Division of the Tribunal, has made it clear that although it may be
tempting, it is inappropriate for a lawyer to assume responsibility for a
variety of smaller decisions which the client may take slightly longer to
complete:
Capacity should be assessed for the level of complexity of the matters about
which a decision has to be made always with the principle in mind that a person
who is capable of making simple decisions for themselves should not be denied the
right to make those decisions. 18
Therefore, while it may at times seem more efficient for the lawyer to
‘speed up’ the decision making process by prompting a particular decision
on the part of the client, this is in reality a highly inappropriate response.
This duty does not prevent lawyers from making generic health-related
enquiries of family, friends or carers (for example, enquiring about the
best time of day to seek instructions from a client if he or she is elderly
or questioning whether the client has recently changed medication)
provided the lawyer does not divulge confidential information not
already known by the third party (specifically, a discussion of the
lawyer’s concerns regarding the client’s capacity). More importantly, the
information obtained by such enquiries is pertinent to the lawyer-client
19 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 4.1.2; Legal Profession
(Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld).
20 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 42.1.1. Steps lawyers can
take to maximise a client’s capacity are discussed in further detail at Chapter 5.3 below.
21 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS
3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 3(a), 12(2). Article 3(a) provides that a general principle of the
Convention is ‘[r]espect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s
own choices, and independence of persons’, while article 12(2) obliges Australia to ‘recognize that
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’
22 Jonathan Wells, ‘Lawyers’ doubts about client capacity: an ethical framework’ (2014) 36(5) Law Society
Bulletin (South Australia) 38, 39.
23 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 9.1; Legal Profession
(Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld).
24 Cf Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 9.2.3, which provides
an exception allowing disclosure by a solicitor in a confidential setting for the sole purpose of obtaining
advice in connection with the solicitor’s legal or ethical obligations. In some circumstances, it may be
arguable that this exception would apply in relation to any enquiries relating to a client’s capacity made
of a doctor in his or her professional capacity, given that doctor also owes general duties of confidence.
16
relationship. However, lawyers should always be cognisant of the fact
that the third party’s interests and wishes may not be exactly the same as
those of the client, to whom the duty is always owed.
Ultimately, a lawyer will comply with their legal and ethical obligations provided
that they:
(a) direct their mind to the issue of whether their client has capacity to
instruct according to the relevant legal test;
(b) make a thorough and honest assessment of whether the client has
capacity to instruct;
(c) produce a detailed record of the assessment process, the lawyer’s
reasoning and their ultimate conclusions.
Whether or not a court reaches a contrary conclusion about the client’s capacity
in subsequent proceedings is irrelevant. It is the process, not the ultimate
conclusion, that is important. As Wells writes: ‘[t]here are few right answers;
there is only earnest endeavour and conscientious engagement.’31
18
4 Basic Principles of
Legal Capacity
32 See, eg, Borthwick v Carruthers (1787) 1 TR 648; R v McNaughten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200,
210 (Tindal CJ); Re Cumming (1852) 42 ER 660, 668 (Knight Bruce L J); Boughton v Knight
(1873) LR 3 P & D 64, 71 (Hannen J); Cosham v Cosham (1899) 25 VLR 418, 428-9 (Madden
C J, Holroyd and Hood JJ); Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698, 706; Re
Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574, 575-6 (Ambrose J); Dalle-Molle v Manos (2005) 88 SASR 193,
197 (Debelle J); Lawrence v Federal Magistrate Driver [2005] FCA 394 (15 April 2005) [12]
(Moore J); L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2006] FCAFC 114 (12 July
2006) [26]; SA v Manonai [2008] WASCA 168 (15 February 2008) [2], [23] (Pullen JA); Tobin
v Ezekiel [2011] NSWSC 81 (1 March 2011) [24] (overturned on appeal, but not on the point
regarding testamentary capacity); Frizzo v Frizzo [2011] QSC 107 (12 May 2011) [23]-[24],
affd [2011] QCA 308 (1 November 2011) [24]; Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC
87 (16 March 2012) [546]; Pistorino v Connell [2012] VSC 438 (25 September 2012) [14];
Anderson v Anderson [2013] QSC 8 (22 February 2013) [45], [52].
33 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 26.
34 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 9-9D.
35 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 8(1)(b)(third bullet point); Forensic Disability Act 2011 (Qld) s
7(1)(e)(third bullet point).
36 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), ss 7(a), 11, 34(1), sch 1 general principle 1.
37 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 76, sch 1 general principle 1.
38 See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 17A, 4-5.
39 See, eg, Jones v Jones [2012] QSC 113 (27 April 2012) [31]; Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995)
217 ALR 284, 295 (Kirby P). Kirby P was in dissent in the result, but not on this point. 19
to that decision (as a result of, for example, abatement of passing illness, taking
new medication, being assisted by new technology or acquiring new skills). This
means that capacity must be assessed every time a person is going to make a
decision.
This means that, at any given time, a client may not have capacity to make some
decisions within a domain, but may still have capacity to make others within the
same domain. For instance, a client may not have capacity to sell their house,
but may have capacity to manage their pension payments. In such a case, the
client would have capacity to make simple decisions within the domain of
managing their financial affairs, but would not have capacity to make more
complex decisions within that same domain.
40 Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 437-8; Dalle-Molle v Manos (2005) 88 SASR 193, 198 (Debelle J).
41 Jones v Jones [2012] QSC 113 (27 April 2012) [30].
42 See, eg, Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64, 71 (Hannen J).
43 See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 12, sch 2 (list of matters); Powers of Attorney
Act 1998 (Qld) s 32, sch 2 (list of matters).
44 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 5(c)(ii).
20
not mean the person lacks capacity to make those decisions. Capacity does not
require a person to always make decisions that are ‘objectively’ correct or in
their own ‘best interests’ or in the ‘best interests’ of certain others.45 Young J has
emphasised that:46
One cannot be too paternalistic. People have the right to manage their affairs, unless
they fall below the level that is prescribed by the Act…. There is no room in the legislation
for benign paternalism. A person is allowed to make whatever decision she likes about
her property, good or bad, with happy or disastrous effect, so long as she is capable.
Ignoring the content of decisions when determining capacity also follows from
the fact that every person has their own individual values, beliefs, interests and
relationships that provide a unique matrix within which they make decisions. All
people at times take risks when making decisions or make decisions which, with
the benefit of hindsight, are ‘bad’. To this end, Parliament has acknowledged
that ‘the right to make decisions includes the right to make decisions with
which others may not agree’.48
45 See, eg, L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2006] FCAFC 114 (12 July 2006) [34]: ‘we
would observe that the fact that a litigant has put forward a case that reveals no reasonable cause of
action may say nothing at all about the litigant’s capacity to present such a case. The presumption that
an adult person is capable of managing their own affairs is hardly likely to be displaced merely because a
case has been commenced that has no prospect of success.’
46 Re C (TH) and the Protected Estates Act [1999] NSWSC 456 (3 May 1999) [10], [17].
47 Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284, 291 (Gleeson CJ), 302 (Handley JA).
48 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 5(b).
49 Ibid s 5(c)(i).
50 Pates v Craig [1995] NSWSC 87 (19 October 1995) 6 (Santow J); Ruskey-Fleming v Cook [2013] QSC 142 (3
June 2013) [58].
51 Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284, 295; Frizzo v Frizzo [2011] QSC 107 (12 May 2011) [22];
affd [2011] QCA 308 (1 November 2011) [24].
21
4.7 Capacity may be increased with appropriate support
The support available to a person and the environment they are in are factors
that may influence their capacity from time to time.52 Furthermore, given that
capacity is time-specific and decision-specific, a person may have capacity to
make a particular decision at a particular time so long as they are provided
with sufficient support and an environment that assists them to make that
decision. For this reason, Parliament acknowledges that ‘an adult with impaired
capacity has a right to adequate and appropriate support for decision making.’53
The various steps that lawyers can take to maximise their clients’ capacity are
discussed in Chapter 5.3 below.
• Will is presumed to have capacity to manage his financial affairs. The fact that
Will has mental and physical illnesses does not displace the presumption,
although the existence of bi-polar affective disorder made the lawyer
cognisant of the issue of capacity and alert to any other ‘red flag’ indicia of
impaired capacity.
• The facts that Will is homeless and presents in a dishevelled state are
irrelevant to his capacity.
• Will’s previous ITOs relate to his capacity (in the past) to consent to treatment
for mental illness; they provide little to no guidance on his capacity to manage
his financial affairs at the present.
• While withdrawing his entire superannuation balance and spending it on a
rapidly depreciating asset (car) may not be an ‘objectively’ rational decision,
this is irrelevant to Will’s capacity.
• Will appears to understand the purpose and nature of a superannuation
account (ie, it cannot be accessed unless certain criteria are satisfied), and
gives the lawyer logical and coherent instructions.
23
5 Practical Matters to Consider
in Taking Instructions
The lawyer concludes that George is her client. George is the only person with
whom the lawyer has had contact for this matter. Further, he is not instructing
the lawyer to appear on Cathy’s behalf (this would mean that Cathy would be
the client).
The advice to George should emphasise the duties that he owes his mother, in
particular his duties to give her all necessary support, access to information and
opportunities to participate in decisions that affect her.
Before a lawyer can act on a client’s instructions, the lawyer must be satisfied that the
client has the requisite capacity to make the particular decision at that particular time.
Given the domain-specific and decision-specific nature of capacity, this requires the
lawyer to identify the particular decision the client is seeking to make and the relevant
legal test for capacity that applies to that decision. The specific legal tests for different
types of decisions are outlined in Schedule 2.
25
Case Study: Challenging a guardianship or
administration decision
Henry is an elderly man who seeks to remove the Public Guardian as his
guardian and the Public Trustee as his administrator. His recent application for a
declaration of capacity was dismissed by the Tribunal and he seeks advice on his
prospects of an appeal. Henry has obtained a medical report from his general
practitioner stating that he has capacity in relation to the matters for which the
guardian and administrator are appointed.
For the purposes of the appeal proceedings, Henry is presumed to have capacity
and has a right to be represented. The lawyer is able to obtain logical and
coherent instructions from Henry in relation to seeking reasons for the decision
and drafting submissions for the appeal. The lawyer concludes that Henry has
capacity to instruct and is thus able to act on his instructions. The fact that he
may previously have lacked capacity to make decisions in relation to certain
personal and financial matters is not relevant to Henry’s decision to appeal.
However, the contract to retain the lawyer’s services will need to be signed by
the Public Trustee as his administrator, unless the lawyer is acting on a pro bono
basis.
(a) have been diagnosed with a mental illness, intellectual disability, acquired
brain injury, learning disability or other cognitive impairment;
(b) experienced difficulties with learning or went to a special school or
received additional learning support;
(c) receive the disability support pension;
(d) receive support for day-to-day activities either from family, friends or
through paid support workers;
58 Susan Hayes, Hayes Ability Screening Index Record Booklet (University of Sydney, 2000); Legal Aid
Queensland, Legal Aid Queensland, Criminal Law Duty Lawyer Handbook (5th ed, 2012) 206-7 <http://
www.legalaid.qld.gov.au/publications/Practitioners-service-providers/Documents/duty-lawyer-
handbook/criminal-law-duty-lawyer-handbook.pdf>.
26
(e) have lived in institutions or disability-funded accommodation or have
been admitted to a mental health unit; or
(f) have ever been the subject of a guardianship or administration order, an
involuntary treatment order or a forensic order.
If the client is the subject of a current guardianship or administration order
that extends to ‘legal matters’, the lawyer must seek to obtain and act
on the guardian’s or administrator’s instructions. Refer to Chapter 7.2
for further details.
However, if the lawyer has no reason to question the client’s capacity, then
they should proceed to take and act on their client’s instructions. In the
absence of any indicia of impaired capacity, the lawyer is entitled to rely on
the presumption that the client has capacity.
27
(b) Focus on the client as an individual
At the outset, the lawyer should discard all personal biases and
prejudices that may have a subconscious effect on their assessment of
whether a client has capacity.63 Ethnic, cultural or religious barriers to
communication should be recognised and conscientiously put to one side
when assessing capacity.64 If the client has some form of disability or
impairment, the lawyer should ask the client if the client (or a third party)
can tell the lawyer how the lawyer can best accommodate the disability or
impairment and make the client as comfortable as possible.
Getting to know the client in more depth will help to reveal the client’s
true motives for seeking legal assistance. Without considering issues from
the client’s subjective personal frame of reference, there may be a greater
tendency for lawyers to see the client as lacking capacity.
Lawyers should be open to the fact that their perspective on the client’s
capacity may change once they get to know the client. Where appropriate,
lawyers may enquire about and seek to understand the client’s values,
historical behaviour and cultural factors that influence the client’s
decision making.70
63 Law Society of New South Wales, When a client’s capacity is in doubt: A Practical Guide for Solicitors (2009)
18 <http://www.lawsociety.com.au/cs/groups/public/documents/internetcontent/023880.pdf>.
64 Ibid.
65 James Gallagher and Cara Kearney, ‘Representing a Client with Diminished Capacity: Where the Law
Stands and Where It Needs to Go’ (2003) 16 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 597, 604.
66 O’Neill and Peisah, above n 8, 4. See also Re HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013) [27].
67 Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 14.
68 Sabatino, above n 9, 486; Wells, above n 22, 38.
69 Public Guardian, above n 61, 3. See further Chapter 5.4 below.
70 Sabatino, above n 9, 489.
28
helping the client achieve a positive outcome and, to this end, owes the
client duties of loyalty and confidentiality. Explaining in detail the nature
and extent of these duties will, in some cases, be imperative to gaining
the client’s trust and confidence.
Some clients may fear that their lawyer is acting for some ulterior
purpose (or generally that the lawyer is part of ‘the system’ working
against them). Any such fears should be immediately dispelled by frank
explanation of the lawyer’s duties to the client. In particular, the lawyer
should ensure that the client understands the relationship is confidential
and that the client may divulge information freely without fear of it being
shared with others without prior consent.71 The lawyer should emphasise
that, except in extremely rare circumstances, the lawyer cannot reveal
anything the client tells them to any third party (including mental health
and disability services).
Proceed slowly, take breaks (if necessary) and allow the client extra time
to formulate responses. Be willing to explain the nature and effects
of options exhaustively (repeating, paraphrasing and summarising
information where necessary) and allow the client plenty of time to
digest all the relevant information. Just because a client has difficulty
processing and comprehending information does not mean that they are
unable to do so.
As Wells notes, ‘[i]n all but a handful of rare cases, careful exploration and
communication will often allay any doubts about capacity to instruct.’76
(i) Consider the timing of decision making and facilitate gradual or delayed
decision making
Meeting the client regularly will help the client become more familiar with
their lawyer, enhancing the client’s comfort, confidence and trust in the
lawyer. Multiple meetings also allow lawyers to obtain a more long-term
understanding of the client’s capacity and any temporal variations in that
capacity.85 With such an understanding, a lawyer may better adapt to the
client and will be in the best position to act in the client’s best interests.
Fatigue may be avoided by scheduling multiple shorter meetings at times
when the client is most alert (this is commonly in the morning).86
At the first face-to-face appointment with the lawyer, Joan is affable and
compliant but is unable to recall basic advice the lawyer provides her with. In a
follow up telephone call, Joan is terse and terminates the call early.
In the next conversation, the lawyer leaves the client his phone number and
invites the client to contact him should she have any questions. The following
week, Joan contacts the lawyer for a further discussion. The lawyer is mindful to
keep the conversation to no longer than 5 minutes.
Over the course of 4 more conversations, the lawyer is able to establish
a rapport with Joan; Joan is able to remember the lawyer, recalls earlier
conversations they have had and is consistent in what she would like to happen.
On this basis, the lawyer is satisfied that she has capacity to give instructions in
relation to a Mental Health Review Tribunal review hearing.
Lawyers should be alive to any undue influence the third party exercises
over the client (or any advantages or benefits they seek to achieve) and
immediately ask the third party to leave the room where they consider
In order to conduct this preliminary assessment, the lawyer must ask the client
a series of questions and carefully observe the client’s responses. Given the
domain-specific and decision-specific nature of capacity, the questions will
depend on the particular person, the particular decision they seek to make and
the test for legal capacity to be applied (see Schedule 2). However, in general,
the lawyer should ask the client questions that will give an indication of the
following:97
(a) Does the client have a basic understanding of the relevant facts and
issues and sufficient knowledge of the world to make decisions such as
the one in question?
(b) Does the client have the cognitive ability to manipulate that information
so that they can make an informed decision?
(c) Is the client aware of their own abilities and limitations, any memory loss
and its impacts, and any (possibility of) exploitation?
(d) Does the client understand the different options available and can they
compare the likely consequences of each of those options?
92 Willmott and White, above n 62, 486; Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 22.
93 Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 21, 23.
94 However, practitioners should be alive to issues of conflicts of interests when speaking with paid support
workers.
95 Barbara Hamilton and Tina Cockburn, ‘Capacity to make a Will and Enduring Power of Attorney: Issues
new and old’ (2008) 38 QLS Journal 14, 18; Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 20.
96 Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, 4.
97 Sabatino, above n 9, 496; Endicott, above n 18, 4-5.
33
(e) Does the client understand the likely consequences (for them and for
others) of their decisions or failure to make decisions?
(f) Does the client have the ability to clearly articulate a reasoning process
behind their decisions?
(g) Are the client’s desired outcomes stable or do they vary over time or
depending on who is present? Can the client remember prior decisions?
(h) Are the client’s conclusions and decisions consistent with the client’s
previous decisions, prior behaviour, core beliefs and values and stated or
inferred goals?
(i) Is the decision substantively fair or will it lead to the injury or exploitation
of the client or a third party?
(j) Is the decision irreversible? If so, does the client attach appropriate
significance to the decision?
There are a number of standardised screening tests used by medical
professionals to assess cognitive ability (such as the Mini Mental State Exam).98
However, lawyers should exercise caution when relying on standardised
screening tests, particularly if they are not administered by an appropriately
qualified medical professional. In relation to the use of the MMSE to establish
testamentary capacity, Mullins J has commented:99
The result of the MMSE may be an indicator of cognitive impairment, but it is a blunt
instrument and must be considered in conjunction with other evidence of the testator’s
capacity at the time of making the will.
In cases where the lawyer has significant doubts about a client’s capacity, it may
be useful to have a second lawyer attend interviews and witness the client’s
capacity.101 The attendance of such a person is not a breach of the duty of
confidence, but good practice and common courtesy would favour obtaining the
client’s consent first.102
98 See, eg, William Molloy and Doug Drummond, Standardized Mini-Mental State Examination (SMMSE),
Ministry of Health, Province of British Columbia <http://www.health.gov.bc.ca/pharmacare/adti/
clinician/pdf/ADTI%20SMMSE-GDS%20Reference%20Card.pdf>.
99 Ruskey-Fleming v Cook [2013] QSC 142 (3 June 2013) [65] (emphasis added).
100 Sabatino, above n 9, 493.
101 See, eg, Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449 (28 April 2006).
102 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 9.1.1; Legal Profession
(Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld).
103 Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, 6; The Bar Council (UK), Client Incapacity (February 2014) 5
<http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/for-the-bar/professional-practice-and-ethics/client-incapacity/>.
34
powers of attorney; a note to section 41(2) of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998
(Qld) provides that ‘it is advisable for the witness to make a written record of
the evidence as a result of which the witness considered that the principal
understood [the matters listed in section 41].’104
(a) in any subsequent legal proceedings (which may occur many years after
having taken the instructions) where the issue of capacity is in dispute
and must be the subject of a final and binding determination by the
court;
(b) for refreshing the lawyer’s and client’s memory and preventing any
unnecessary hindrances in the client’s progress; and
(c) in assisting medical professionals who are subsequently consulted
regarding the client’s capacity in gaining a more longer-term view of the
client’s capacity.
At a minimum, a lawyer’s file notes should include the following details:105
(a) the date, time, length and location of all interviews with the client;
(b) the persons who were present for the interview (including the times at
which they entered and exited the interview room);
(c) the steps the lawyer took in assessing the client’s capacity (including all
questions and the client’s answers to those questions); and
(d) details of any information relevant to a client’s capacity that a lawyer
has gained from another source (for example, assessments of the client’s
capacity conducted by a medical professional at the request of the lawyer
or information about the client’s capacity volunteered to the lawyer by
any third party).
Finally, detailed file notes will also assist to show that the lawyer complied
with their legal and ethical obligations. For instance, in Ruskey-Fleming v
Cook, a lawyer engaged in extensive questioning of his elderly client, made
comprehensive diary notes of the questions and answers and subsequently
prepared a memorandum outlining the meeting.106 The lawyer genuinely
believed that his client had testamentary capacity and proceeded to allow the
client to execute an updated will.
In finding that the client did not have testamentary capacity, Mullins J
emphasised that it is the process the lawyer undertakes to assess capacity (not
the ultimate conclusion they reach) that determines whether they have fulfilled
their legal and ethical duties:107
104 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 41(2) (Editor’s Note). See also Form 3 – Enduring Power of Attorney
(Long Form), which contains the following direction to witnesses (lawyers) on page 12: ‘It is strongly
recommended that, if you are in any doubt, you make a written record of the proceedings and of any
questions you asked to determine the principal’s capacity.’
105 Public Guardian, above n 61, 6.
106 [2013] QSC 142 (3 June 2013) [25].
107 Ibid [64]. See also Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449 (28 April 2006) [27], where the Court of Appeal
upheld a decision of the trial judge that a testator did not have testamentary capacity at the time he
made his will but noted that the lawyer that prepared the will acted ‘in a quite exemplary fashion’ and
‘did everything conceivably possible’ to establish whether the testator had capacity (including involving
another lawyer from her firm, involving the testator’s general practitioner, extensively questioning the
testator and maintaining extensive notes of all dealings).
35
The greater the preparation and the care exercised by a solicitor when taking instructions
from a client about a will and attending on the client for the purpose of having the will
signed, the more likely there will be available to the court relevant evidence to determine
the issue of testamentary capacity. Whether or not the solicitor has complied with what
is reasonably required to carry out the solicitor’s professional duty in those circumstances
of a particular case does not dictate the conclusion as to testamentary capacity.
36
6 What do I do if I Determine
My Client has Capacity?
110 To the extent that the instructions do not require the lawyer to take steps on behalf of their
client, for instance, instructions to prepare an advice for the client, the lawyer can arguably
prepare the advice and furnish it to the client even if in the intervening period the client
has lost capacity. The lawyer cannot act on instructions to the extent that they would be
performing an act on the client’s behalf.
111 Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, item 3.
112 See, eg, Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) ss 109A, 110, 111, 116; Guardianship and
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 29, 31, 81, 146; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r
95(2); Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 11.11(1); Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.10(1);
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 21.08.6; Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.65.
37
Case Study: Ostensible capacity and substituted
decision makers
Beth seeks representation at a Mental Health Review Tribunal hearing. Her
lawyer assesses her as having capacity to instruct. He then finds out the day
before the hearing that the Public Guardian has been appointed as Beth’s
guardian.
The lawyer asks Beth for permission to talk with the Public Guardian officer
or the Tribunal to obtain a copy of the guardianship order. If Beth agrees, the
lawyer should obtain the order and determine whether it relates to ‘legal
matters’ and remains current. If it does not relate to legal matters or has
expired, the lawyer can take instructions from Beth provided that he remains
of the opinion that she has capacity to instruct.
If the order does relate to legal matters and is current, even though the
lawyer has assessed Beth as having capacity, he can only take instructions
from the guardian. However, the guardian must take into account Beth’s
wishes and maximise her involvement at the hearing.
If Beth forbids the lawyer from speaking with the guardian or Tribunal, then
his position is difficult. If the extent of the guardianship can be determined
at the hearing, the lawyer can seek an adjournment and obtain instructions
from the appropriate source. If not, he may have to seek leave to attend the
hearing as a support person to assist Beth to express her views, wishes and
interests.
38
7 What do I do if I Determine My
Client does not have Capacity
or has Questionable Capacity?
39
7.2 Has a substituted decision maker been formally
appointed by or for the client?
(a) Substituted decision makers
Lawyers should enquire whether a substituted decision maker has been
formally appointed by or for the client to make decisions on the client’s
behalf. A substituted decision maker can be formally appointed:
Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), a person under a legal
incapacity may only commence or defend proceedings only by way of a
litigation guardian. 120 A litigation guardian is primarily liable for the costs of
the lawyer they engage. They are also personally liable if costs are awarded
against a plaintiff they represent, but are not generally personally liable if
costs are awarded against a defendant they represent. All costs properly
incurred by a litigation guardian may be recovered from the estate of the
person who they represent.121
Having inspected the enduring power of attorney document and confirmed that it
has been validly executed, contains no errors on its face and gives Albert authority
to make decisions in relation to Liz’s housing and treatment and legal matters, the
lawyer decides he can act for Liz in the proceedings and take instructions from
Albert. The lawyer sends a copy of the enduring power of attorney document
to the guardian, administrator and Tribunal registry. Once the guardian and
administrator are aware of the enduring power of attorney, their powers are
suspended and the Tribunal initiates a review of their appointment. At the hearing,
the Tribunal revokes the interim appointments, as Albert has authority to make the
relevant decision and has been acting honestly and diligently.
For more information about the order of priority for substituted decision makers,
see Focus on page 43.
A personal matter is defined as relating to the adult’s care and can include
accommodation, employment, education, health care and legal matters, but
specifically excludes legal matters relating to the adult’s financial or property
matters.
For legal matters not involving finances or property, lawyers will obtain
their instructions from the appointed guardian. For all other legal matters,
instructions properly come from the administrator.
(i) give the person to whom they are appointed the necessary support,
access to information and opportunity to participate in decisions
affecting their life;
(ii) take the wishes of the person to whom they are appointed into
account to the maximum extent possible; and(iii) exercise their
powers in the way least restrictive of the rights of the person to
whom they are appointed.
123 See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 34(1), sch 1 general principle 7; Powers of
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 76, sch 1 general principle 7.
42
If the lawyer suspects that the substituted decision maker is breaching
their duties to the client, the lawyer may refuse to act on their
instructions. But the lawyer may also need to take action to protect
the client’s best interests. For example, by making an application to the
Tribunal or a relevant court or making a complaint to the Office of the
Public Guardian and requesting that it investigates. Ideally, such action
will only be taken with the permission and on behalf of the principal.
Intervention through application to the Tribunal or the courts can only
be initiated by the lawyer on their own behalf where the lawyer has
standing under the relevant legislation. (See Chapters 7.4 and 7.5 below
for further discussion.)
(c) Who should you obtain the medical assessment from, and what do you
need to tell the medical professional?
It is important to ensure that a formal assessment is obtained from a
professional specifically qualified to assess cognitive capacity.
The lawyer may form the opinion that the client requires non-legal
support and that with such support the client may have the capacity to
make the relevant decision and provide the lawyer with lawful, proper
and competent instructions. In such cases, the lawyer should consider
referring the client to an agency that will provide assistance. Examples
of non-legal support include local health area services, advocacy
services and government organisations. Lawyers should contact their
local community legal centre for an up-to-date list of non-legal support
agencies.137
On this basis, it has been held that the solicitor for one party to court
proceedings cannot bring an application for a guardian or administrator to be
appointed to the opposing party, because the solicitor is concerned not for the
welfare of the opposing party but to further the interests of their own client by
expediting the resolution of the litigation.144 Likewise, the director of a company
involved in proceedings against an individual cannot bring an application
against the individual because the director’s interest is not continuing (in that it
is limited to resolution of the proceedings) and ‘is tainted as he is in a position of
conflict.’145
Conversely, the Tribunal has held that step-children could bring an application
against their step-father in relation to their step-father’s capacity to continue
to conduct proceedings against them, because they had continuing familial
relations, common corporate business interests and genuine concern for the
step-father and his family.146
139 In Queensland courts and the High Court, the rules do not specify who may apply for a litigation guardian
to be appointed for a party: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 95; High Court Rules 2004 (Cth)
r 21.08. In the Federal Circuit Court, the rules state that only a party can request the appointment of a
litigation guardian: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 11.11(1). In the Family Court, the rules merely
state that ‘a person’ may apply for a case guardian to be appointed for a party: Family Law Rules 2004
(Cth) r 6.10(1). However, a note to that rule provides: ‘An application in relation to a case guardian may
be made by a party or a person seeking to be made the case guardian or by a person authorised to be a
case guardian.’ In the Federal Court, the rules state that only a party or an ‘interested person’ may apply
for an order appointing a litigation representative for a party: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.63(1). An
‘interested person’ of a ‘mentally disabled person’ is the person’s ‘guardian’, which is defined to mean a
person entrusted under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law with the care and management of the
person or their estate: see sch 1 (Dictionary).
140 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 12(3).
141 Ibid sch 4.
142 Re MAD [2007] QGAAT 56 (28 August 2007) [24].
143 Re EEP [2005] QGAAT 45 (24 August 2005) [15].
144 Re MAD [2007] QGAAT 56 (28 August 2007) [25].
145 Re EEP [2005] QGAAT 45 (24 August 2005) [15].
146 Re BRT [2012] QCAT 128 (20 March 2012) [26]-[28].
47
Case Study: Appointing a substituted decision maker
Charlie has an acquired brain injury and severe epilepsy. An administrator is
appointed to manage Charlie’s financial affairs. He clearly lacks capacity and
the administrator refuses to be involved in the matter.
As Charlie’s capacity is impaired, the lawyer must inform him that she cannot
accept his instructions unless he has a litigation guardian. As the administrator
refuses to act as litigation guardian, the lawyer informs Charlie someone
must agree to be his litigation guardian. Margaret states that she would be
willing to act as litigation guardian and Charlie agrees. Once Margaret files
her consent to act as litigation guardian with the Court, the lawyer can act on
her instructions, taking into account Charlie’s wishes to the maximum extent
possible. In some cases, the Court has been known to waive the requirement
for Margaret to act by a solicitor.
Where a client is not averse to their lawyer making such an application, then
there is no real legal or ethical issue for the lawyer. An issue only arises where
the client is hostile to the lawyer making such an application and instructs the
lawyer not to do so.148
147 Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87 (16 March 2012) [553] (Bell J).
148 Justice Paul Brereton, ‘Acting for the incapable – a delicate balance’ (2012) 35 Australian Bar Review 244,
247. For a detailed discussion of the ethical considerations involved, refer to Wells, above n 22, 39-40.
149 Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 26.
150 Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, item 9; cf Wells, above n 22, 39.
48
Focus: Applying for the appointment of a guardian
or administrator
An application for the appointment of a guardian or administrator is made to
the Tribunal by way of a Form 10 ‘Application for Administration/Guardianship
Appointment or Review’. Proposed guardians or administrators (except for the
Public Guardian or Public Trustee) will need to sign relevant pages of the form
witnessed by a justice of the peace, commissioner for declarations or solicitor.
Once the application is lodged, a hearing date will be set. The applicant is
expected to attend the hearing. The person the subject of the application and
any proposed guardians or administrators should also attend the hearing.
At the end of the hearing, an appointment may be made for all or specific
matters, and for a set period of time.
McD v McD was an application by a lawyer for the equivalent of a guardian and
administrator to be appointed to their client. Powell J granted the lawyer leave
to substitute the client’s brother as the applicant in the application. His Honour
noted that while the lawyer was clearly acting in what the lawyer considered
to be in the best interests of his client by commencing the proceedings, it was
inappropriate for the lawyer to continue as the applicant.151 His Honour stated
that the preferable course was for the lawyer to encourage the client’s family,
friends or a trustee company to commence such proceedings:152
[I]t was, in my view, undesirable that [the lawyer] should thus put himself in an adversary
position in relation to [his client] who, if her condition could be cured or controlled, might
wish to oppose the relief sought in the proceedings. While it may be that, on occasion,
situations may arise in which there is no person, other than the intended defendant’s own
solicitor, who is either able, or willing, to commence proceedings for the appointment of a
committee or a manager of the intended defendant’s property and affairs, I believe that, as
there is no limitation upon the persons who may bring such proceedings, such cases ought
to be very rare, indeed. Rather, so it seems to me, where a person’s own solicitor believes
that an application should be made for the appointment of a committee or manager of
his client’s property and affairs, and no member of the client’s family is available or willing
to make such an application, the preferred course for the solicitor to adopt is, as was done
in Re An Alleged Incapable Person (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 156, to invoke the good offices of a
friend of the client, or even of one of the trustee companies.153
(a) the solicitor making the application ex parte (provided there are no other
persons interested or affected by the application);
(b) the court hearing the matter in camera; and
In summary, the authorities on this issue are unsettled. On the basis of the
conservative approach adopted by the New South Wales courts, a lawyer should
not breach their legal and ethical duties if:
In either case, however, the lawyer may need to withdraw as legal representative
for the client in the substantive matter due to the arising conflict of interest.
168 Ibid [10], [13], [15]. Dixon J made such orders in the application before him.
52
7.6 Should I cease to act?
As already mentioned, determining the most appropriate option is akin to a
risk assessment process. The decision as to whether to terminate the client
retainer is a difficult one, and each case will need to be considered in light of
the particular context and circumstances. Where there is a very high risk that a
client will suffer serious detriment if the lawyer ceases to act, it is possible that
intervention (such as seeking appointment of a substituted decision maker)
may be warranted. However, if the risk to the client is very low, then ceasing to
act may be more appropriate than seeking an intrusive intervention against the
wishes of the client.
A lawyer may terminate a retainer for just cause and on reasonable notice.169
What constitutes just cause is not defined,170 but the inability of a client to
give lawful, competent and proper instructions would arguably constitute ‘just
cause’.171 The Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules do not specify what ‘reasonable
notice’ is; however, where the lawyer decides this option is the most appropriate
in the circumstances it is recommended that a letter be sent to the client
outlining:172
Alternatively, the lawyer may consider that although the client is not currently
able to give instructions, there is potential in the future for the client to either
have capacity to do so (for example, through improvement in mental state by
the client accepting medication or support), or to agree to accept intervention
such as the appointment of a substituted decision maker. Staying with the client
in these circumstances preserves the lawyer-client relationship, which may be
invaluable to a client where the lawyer has acted as a trusted advisor over a long
period of time. Considering the ethical duties imposed on lawyers, this may be
the only appropriate course of action as ‘the just lawyer does not abandon her
client, but stands with him unless or until the client says otherwise.’173
169 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 13.1.3; Legal Profession
(Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld).
170 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2011 and Consultation Draft Commentary
(19 October 2012) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/docs-2000-
2099/2012October19-ConsultationDraftCommentary.pdf> 22.
171 Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, item 8. In England and Wales, the common law and
professional conduct rules allow termination for ‘good reason’, which has been held to be ‘a fact-sensitive
question’: Richard Buxton (a firm) v Mills-Owen [2010] 4 All ER 405, 417. In that case, the Court of Appeal
also endorsed the guidance notes to the professional conduct rules which state that ‘good reason’ will
include ‘a solicitor being unable to obtain clear instructions from the client’: 418.
172 Law Society of South Australia, above n 60, 26.
173 Wells, above n 22, 40.
53
8 Who Pays the Costs
of Maximising and
Assessing Capacity?
Who should pay such costs? This issue remains largely unresolved. In
the absence of any specific government financial support for persons
with doubtful or impaired capacity, the costs are currently borne by
the client by default. As Bell J noted in Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch,
‘[t]here is no duty psychiatrist stationed at every court just in case
they are needed.’174 In rare cases, the courts or Tribunal might order
an opposing party to pay the costs of a formal assessment of capacity
by a medical professional, particularly where the opposing party
commenced the application and stands to gain from a declaration of
impaired capacity. For instance, in BRT, the Tribunal held:175
As these proceedings are not being brought by BRT it is unreasonable to
expect that he would meet the costs of the psychiatric examination. As a
result the Tribunal will order that the applicants pay the psychiatrist’s fees.
This case would suggest that to the extent steps taken in maximising and
assessing capacity do not involve the delivery of professional services, lawyers
should carefully consider how they charge for such activities.
178 Legal Aid Queensland, Grants Handbook (10 April 2013) <http://www.legalaid.qld.gov.au/about/Policies-
and-procedures/Grants-handbook/What-do-we-fund/Nature-and-extent-of-funding/Civil-law/Expert-
reports-in-civil-law-matters/Pages/default.aspx> see section entitled ‘Expert reports in civil law matters’.
179 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 420(1)(b).
180 See, eg, Law Society of NSW v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408, 435-6 (Mahoney JA).
181 [2006] LPT 3 (22 May 2006) 2-3.
182 Ibid 3.
183 Ibid.
55
9 Where Can I Obtain Further
Guidance?
184 Queensland Law Society, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at 1 June 2012) r 9.2.3; Legal
Profession (Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld).
56
Schedule 1
Indicia of Impaired Capacity
185 Endicott, above n 18, 1-2; O’Neill and Peisah, above n 8, 4-5; Hamilton Cockburn, above n
95, 17; Law Society of New South Wales, above n 63, 4; Legal Aid Queensland, above n 58,
206-7; Legal Services Commissioner v Ford [2008] LPT 12, 21-22 (Fryberg J).
57
(j) third parties accompany the client and do not give the client an
opportunity to speak for themselves;
(k) the person facilitating contact between the client and the lawyer stands
to benefit from any decision made by the client;
(l) the lawyer has a sense that ‘something is different’ because there has
been a change in the client’s presentation, mood or sociability; and
(m) the lawyer is on notice of issues regarding the client’s mental health or
cognitive function (particularly where information is volunteered by a
third party).
58
Schedule 2
Capacity Tests Applicable to
Different Practice Areas
2 Making a gift
Capacity to make a gift to another is governed by the same test as
the capacity to contract. In accordance with the High Court’s reasons
in Gibbons v Wright (discussed in relation to contracts above), the test
for capacity will depend on the nature and timing of the particular
gift. As Endicott explains, this means that in some cases the test for
making a gift may be the same as that required to make a will or
other testamentary disposition:187
59
Where the subject matter and value of the gift are trivial in relation to the donor’s other
assets, a low degree of understanding will suffice. Where the effect of the gift is to
dispose of the donor’s only asset of value and for all practical purposes to pre-empt the
terms of the donor’s will, then the degree of understanding required should be the same
as required to make a will. In addition when an elderly person makes a substantial gift,
there must be an understanding of both the immediate effect that the disposing of the
asset could have on the donor (Centrelink) and the longer term effect that reduction of
assets could have on the person for the rest of his or her life (accommodation options).
2. The testatrix must be aware, at least in general terms, of the nature, extent and value
of the estate over which she has a disposing power;
3. The testatrix must be aware of those who may reasonably be thought to have a claim
upon her testamentary bounty, and the basis for, and nature of, the claims of such
persons;
4. The testatrix must have the ability to evaluate, and discriminate between, the
respective strengths of the claims of such persons.
The modern adaption of the Banks v Goodfellow test has been accepted in
Queensland.191
(1) is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the
decision, in particular as to the consequences of the decision; or
(2) is unable to use and weigh the information as part of the process of making the
decision.195
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and
The requirements of this definition are discussed in more detail at Item 9.1
below in relation to the appointment of guardians and administrators.
5.3 Involuntary treatment (under the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld))
A person may be involuntarily treated for mental illness under the Mental Health
Act 2000 (Qld) provided that they, among other things, ‘lack the capacity to
consent to be treated for the illness.’204 Capacity in this context is defined to
mean:205
capacity, for a person, means the person is capable of—
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the person’s assessment,
treatment, care or choosing of an allied person; and
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the person’s assessment, treatment,
care or choosing of an allied person; and
5.4 Challenging involuntary treatment under the Mental Health Act 2000
(Qld)
The jurisdiction of the Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) includes periodic
review of involuntary treatment orders and approving the administration of
electroconvulsive therapy. The MHRT’s decision may be appealed to the Mental
Health Court.
Section 8(b) of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) creates a presumption of
capacity to make decisions about a person’s mental health treatment. It
provides, in particular, that ‘a person is presumed to have capacity to make
decisions about the person’s assessment, treatment and choosing of an allied
person’.
203 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4 (definitions of ‘capacity’ and ‘impaired capacity’).
204 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 14(1)(f).
205 Ibid sch (definition of ‘capacity’).
62
Provided the lawyer can obtain coherent instructions from the client in
relation to the conduct of proceedings before the MHRT or Mental Health
Court, evidence of the person’s impaired capacity to consent to mental health
treatment should be no barrier to legal representation. If it were, then the
presumption of capacity would be undermined, the doctor’s assessment of
capacity would take precedent over that of the MHRT’s and very
few people would be able to retain legal representation despite a legal right to
do so under the Act.206
For further discussion, see Item 9.2 below in relation to making and contesting
guardianship and administration applications below.
(a) the nature and the likely effects of each direction in the advance health
directive;
(b) a direction operates only while the principal has impaired capacity for the
matter covered by the direction;
(c) the principal may revoke a direction at any time the principal has capacity for
the matter covered by the direction;
(d) at any time the principal is not capable of revoking a direction, the principal is
unable to effectively oversee the implementation of the direction.
(2) A principal may make an advance health directive, to the extent it gives power to an
attorney, only if the principal also understands the matters necessary to make an
enduring power of attorney giving the same power.
Further, schedule 3 to the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) provides that:
capacity, for a person for a matter, means the person is capable of—
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and
206 See, eg, Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ss 328, 450.
207 Public Guardian, above n 61.
208 Legal Services Commissioner v Ford [2008] LPT 12 (22 August 2008) 22 (Fryberg J). 63
6 Making decisions about privacy
6.1 Commonwealth privacy legislation
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Australian Privacy Principles impose
requirements that individuals must consent to the collection, use and disclosure
of certain types of information in relation to them. Consent is defined to include
express or implied consent,209 but these terms are not further defined. The
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner has issued draft guidelines
that state that consent must be:
(a) voluntary;
(b) adequately informed;
(c) current and specific; and
(d) given by a person with capacity to understand and communicate their
consent. 210
The guidelines contain the following information about capacity to consent to
the collection, use and disclosure of information:211
An individual must have the capacity to consent. This means that the individual is
capable of understanding the nature of a consent decision, including the effect of giving
or withholding consent, forming a view based on reasoned judgement and how to
communicate a consent decision. An APP entity can ordinarily presume that an individual
has the capacity to consent, unless there is something to alert it otherwise…. If an entity
is uncertain as to whether an individual has capacity to consent at a particular time, it
should not rely on any statement of consent given by the individual at that time.
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capacity, the guidelines merely state that ‘[t]he individual must be capable
of understanding the issues relating to the decision, forming a view based on
reasoned judgement, and communicating their decision.’215
Mullane J in Babich v Sokur emphasised that the Australian test requires ‘that
for a valid consent a person must be mentally capable of understanding the
effect of the marriage ceremony as well as the nature of the ceremony.’220 His
Honour favoured the view that it is insufficient for a person to have ‘a general
understanding of marriage and its consequences’; rather, the person must
understand the ‘specific consequences of the marriage that the person is about
to enter into’:221
But it is in my view significant that the legislation not only requires a capacity to
understand “the effect” but also refers to “the marriage” rather than “a marriage”. In
my view taken together those matters require more than a general understanding of
what marriage involves. That is consistent with consent in contract being consent to the
specific contract with specific parties, consent in criminal law to sexual intercourse being
consent to intercourse with the specific person, and consent to marriage being consent
to marriage to the specific person. 222
The Australian Marriage Act test is ostensibly different to the English common
law test, which merely requires that a person understand the nature (but not
effect) of the marriage ceremony.223 Having said that, the Australian authorities
do refer with approval to English authorities,224 in particular the decision of
Singleton LJ in Re Estate of Park; Park v Park, where his Lordship held that the
relevant question to be posed in determining whether a person has capacity to
marry is whether the individual is:
215 Ibid.
216 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 23(1)(d)(iii), 23B(1)(d)(iii).
217 Ibid s 100.
218 (2004) FLC 93-178, 79,020-21. His Honour’s comments were referred to with approval by Mullane J in
Babich v Sokur [2007] FamCA 236 (9 March 2007) [249], [251].
219 (2005) 195 FLR 191, 196.
220 Babich v Sokur [2007] FamCA 236 (9 March 2007) [244].
221 Ibid [252].
222 Ibid [255] (original emphasis).
223 Ibid [244].
224 See, eg, Re Marriage of Brown; Dunne v Brown (1982) 60 FLR 212; Ranclaud v Cabban (1988) NSW ConvR
55-385; Beverley v Watson [1995] ANZ ConvR 369; Barrand v Coxall [1999] QSC 352 (30 November 1999);
Dalle-Molle v Manos (2004) 88 SASR 193; Privet v Vovk (2005) 195 FLR 191; Ghosn v Principle Focus Pty Ltd
(No 2) [2008] VSC 574 (19 December 2008).
65
capable of understanding the nature of the contract into which he [is] entering, or [is]
his mental condition such that he [is] incapable of understanding it? To ascertain the
nature of the contract of marriage a man must be mentally capable of appreciating that
it involves the responsibilities normally attached to marriage. Without that degree of
mentality, it cannot be said that he understands the nature of the contract.225
Editor’s note — However, under the general principles, a person is presumed to have
capacity—schedule 1, section 1.
(2) Understanding the nature and effect of the enduring power of attorney includes
understanding the following matters—
(a) the principal may, in the power of attorney, specify or limit the power to be
given to an attorney and instruct an attorney about the exercise of the power;
(c) once the power for a matter begins, the attorney has power to make, and
will have full control over, the matter subject to terms or information about
exercising the power included in the enduring power of attorney;
(d) the principal may revoke the enduring power of attorney at any time the
principal is capable of making an enduring power of attorney giving the same
power;
(e) the power the principal has given continues even if the principal becomes a
person who has impaired capacity;
(f) at any time the principal is not capable of revoking the enduring power of
attorney, the principal is unable to effectively oversee the use of the power.
66
Further, schedule 3 to the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) provides that:
capacity, for a person for a matter, means the person is capable of—
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and
The Supreme Court of Queensland has held that an enduring power of attorney
is more complex and more unfamiliar to most members of the community than
a will and thus requires a higher standard of capacity.228
For the purposes of that Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld),
‘capacity’ is defined such that a person will have capacity in relation to a matter
if they are capable of:
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter;
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and
(c) communicating the decisions in some way.233
Speaking of this definition in Re MC, the Tribunal made the following general
observations:234
228 Adult Guardian (Re Enduring Power of Attorney of Vera Hagger) v Hagger (Unreported, Supreme Court of
Queensland, Chesterman J, 16 April 2002, 1083 of 2001); Re CAC [2008] QGAAT 45 (5 June 2008) [63].
229 Public Guardian, above n 61.
230 Legal Services Commissioner v Ford [2008] LPT 12 (22 August 2008) 22 (Fryberg J).
231 Importantly, impaired capacity is only one limb of a three-limbed test that must be satisfied before a
substituted decision maker can be appointed. This means that an administrator or guardian may not
be appointed even if the Tribunal finds that the adult does lack capacity. See further Guardianship and
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 12(1).
232 Re FHW [2005] QGAAT 50 (2 September 2005) [46].
233 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4.
234 [2010] QCAT 677 (2 December 2010) [10].
67
Capacity is a functional concept, related to a person’s ability to identify, understand,
evaluate, retain and process relevant information in making a choice between options
for action and the ability to cause that decision to be put into effect. The existence or
absence of a diagnosis of a medical condition is not determinative of impaired capacity:
it is merely one factor taken into account when the tribunal considers how a person’s
functioning is impaired in the decision making process about a particular matter.
needs certain information about the matter explained to them in language and
concepts that they understand does not mean that he or she has failed the first
limb of the test.236
By contrast, the second limb ‘looks at volition and the susceptibility of an adult
to undue influence’.237 In particular, examines ‘volition and whether a person’s
free will has been so overborne that there is an inability of that person to make
up his or her own mind and to make his or her own decisions.’238
Finally, the third limb requires the person to be able to communicate in some
way. Age, limited education, limited fluency in English and cognitive impairment
may prevent a person from understanding complex and jargonistic language,
but this does not mean that the person cannot communicate their decisions;
rather, it means that their limitations should be taken into account when
communicating with them.239
Consequently, adults who are the subject of such applications must be deemed to
have capacity in order to instruct lawyers to either:
To adopt any other interpretation would produce an illogical and absurd result
that would undermine the presumption of capacity contained in the Guardianship
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) and the decision of Byrne SJA in Bucknall. If
lawyers were required to refuse to act for a person the subject of applications
before the Tribunal on the basis of impaired capacity, the person would be denied
representation despite being presumed to have capacity for the purposes of the
proceeding.
Such a denial of representation would also appear inconsistent with section 43(2)(b)(i)
of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), which provides
that a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal who is a person with impaired
capacity ‘may be represented by someone else’.242 Persons with impaired capacity
have been referred to as one of ‘the categories of parties for whom an as of right
entitlement to representation was given’.243 Writing extra-curially, Member Bridget
Mandikos of the Tribunal has stated that where ‘a party is … a person of impaired
capacity … that party is not required to apply to QCAT for permission to
be represented as representation is a right under the QCAT Act.’244
In the context of the Victorian rules of court, it has been held that for a person
to have the capacity to conduct civil proceedings ‘the person must be able to
understand the nature of the litigation, its purpose and its possible outcomes,
including the risks in costs.’248 The decision-specific nature of proceedings was
emphasised by Kyrou J in Slaveski v Victoria:249
The question of incapacity in relation to litigation must be examined against the facts
and subject matter of the particular litigation, the number and complexity of the issues
involved and the identity, number and interests of the other parties, particularly opposing
parties. A person can have the requisite capacity for one proceeding and lack it for
another. Where a person is a party to a proceeding and is legally represented, he or she
will be incapable of managing his or her affairs in relation to the proceeding if he or she
does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the acts or transactions in
respect of which he or she needs to give instructions to the lawyer.
(a) understand that they require advice in relation to their legal issue;
(b) communicate this requirement to someone who could arrange an
appointment with a lawyer or arrange such an appointment themselves;
257 Unreported, Court of Appeal (England and Wales), Boreham J, 12 November 1987); Owners of Strata
Plan No 23007 v Cross (2006) 153 FCR 398, 412-3. This passage was also cited with approval by Bell J in
Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87 (16 March 2012) [557].
258 Masterman-Lister v Brutton (Nos 1 and 2) (CA) [2003] 1 WLR 1511, 1539; Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v
Cross (2006) 153 FCR 398, 412.
259 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.08.
260 Ibid Dictionary (definition of ‘person with a disability’).
261 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 11.08.
262 [1958] VR 45, 48. His Honour’s judgement has subsequently been adopted by the High Court and
Queensland Court of Appeal: Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230, 243 (Mason CJ, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ); R v M [2002] QCA 464 (5 November 2002) [4].
72
He [the accused] needs, I think, to be able to understand what it is that he is charged
with. He needs to be able to plead to the charge and to exercise his right of challenge. He
needs to understand generally the nature of the proceeding, namely, that it is an inquiry
as to whether he did what he is charged with. He needs to be able to follow the course of
the proceedings so as to understand what is going on in court in a general sense, though
he need not, of course, understand the purpose of all the various court formalities. He
needs to be able to understand, I think, the substantial effect of any evidence that may be
given against him; and he needs to be able to make his defence or answer to the charge.
Where he has counsel he needs to be able to do this through his counsel by giving any
necessary instructions and by letting his counsel know what his version of the facts is
and, if necessary, telling the court what it is. He need not, of course, be conversant with
court procedure and he need not have the mental capacity to make an able defence; but
he must, I think, have sufficient capacity to be able to decide what defence he will rely
upon and to make his defence and his version of the facts known to the court and to his
counsel, if any.
Importantly, if an accused does not satisfy the last criterion, they will not be fit
to stand trial but will be fit to plead guilty.263 In R v M, de Jersey CJ (with whom
McPherson JA and Mullins J agreed) expanded on the Presser criteria and the
meaning of fitness for trial:264
Fitness for trial, in relation to the capacity to instruct counsel, posits a reasonable grasp
of the evidence given, capacity to indicate a response, ability to apprise counsel of the
accused’s own position in relation to the facts, and capacity to understand counsel’s
advice and make decision in relation to the course of the proceedings. It does not extend
to close comprehension of the forensic dynamics of the courtroom, whether as to the
factual or legal contest. For a person represented by counsel, fitness for trial of course
assumes that counsel will represent the client on the basis of the client’s instructions.
That the giving such instructions may take longer because of intellectual deficit is a
feature with which courts should and do bear.
A person whose fitness for trial is in question may be referred to the Mental
Health Court for determination of that question. Fitness for trial is defined in
the Schedule to the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) in the following manner:
fit for trial, for a person, means fit to plead at the person’s trial and to instruct counsel
and endure the person’s trial, with serious adverse consequences to the person’s mental
condition unlikely.
13 Voting
The test for capacity to vote is the same for elections to the Commonwealth
and Queensland Parliaments. Section 93(8) of the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 (Cth) provides that a person is not entitled to have their name
placed on the electoral roll or to vote at an election for the Senate or House of
Representatives if ‘by reason of being of unsound mind, [the person] is incapable
of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’. Section
64(1)(a)(i) of the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) provides that a person is entitled to
have their name placed on the electoral roll if they are entitled to be enrolled
under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
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14 Jury Service
In order to be eligible to serve on a jury, a person must not have ‘a physical or
mental disability that makes the person incapable of effectively performing
the functions of a juror’.265 The only two cases to have considered the meaning
of this requirement in Queensland have concerned deaf persons who can
communicate through an Auslan interpreter. Both indicate that the focus of the
test is whether the person’s disability will render them incapable of engaging
in jury deliberations. In Re the Jury Act 1995 and an application by the Sheriff of
Queensland, Douglas J held that a deaf person who could lip read well and who
could communicate through an Australian Sign Language (Auslan) interpreter
was ineligible for jury service.266 His Honour stated that:267
There seem to me to be considerable risks for the fairness of any trial if one relies simply
on the individual’s ability to lip read to qualify her as a juror, given her concession that she
may miss parts of some conversations and the likelihood that she may not be aware that
conversations are occurring which she cannot observe. There is a very real risk, absent the
use of an interpreter, that she will not be able to participate properly in communication
among jurors. In those circumstances, and in the absence of legislative provision to
facilitate the use of an interpreter to assist her to engage in the jury room discussions, my
ruling is that the individual is incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror
and therefore ineligible for jury service.
There is certainly room for doubt as to what the language of section 4(3)(l) is concerned
with. It does not seem to me to be open to conclude that its reference to persons with a
physical or mental disability means that every person with a disability who may require
assistance to perform their duty and cannot do so otherwise, is ipso facto incapable
of effectively performing the functions of a juror. It is highly questionable whether
incapacity can involve secondary considerations which are not caused by the physical or
mental disability itself, but caused by the necessity for example for something else to
occur which may or may not be permissible by statute, e.g. to allow for the presence of a
non-juror during jury deliberations. I have already rejected, for reasons set out elsewhere,
the proposition that jurors to perform their functions it is necessary that they be capable
of listening to the evidence given orally in open court.
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Schedule 3
Office of the Public
Guardian Guidelines
76
Guidelines for Witnessing Enduring
Documents
This supersedes the 2005 “Capacity
guidelines for witnesses of Enduring Powers
of Attorney”
Key Points
Witnesses must satisfy themselves that the principal understands the nature and effect of:
the document they are signing
the delegation of their decision making powers and
directions given about future health care.
When taking instructions, witnesses should:
ask open‐ended questions
take notes, detailing their interview with the principal
refer the principal to a health care professional if you have doubts about their
capacity to understand the document.
Do not witness an enduring document if you have concerns that:
the principal lacks capacity to understand what they are signing or
the principal is being unduly influenced by another person to sign the document.
Purpose of these guidelines
In an Enduring Power of Attorney, a person (‘the principal’) delegates to another person the power to make
personal and/or financial decisions on his/her behalf. By an Advanced Health Directive, the principal may give
directions about health matters and special health matters, for his or her future health care. Assessing the
principal’s capacity to understand the nature and likely effects of delegating powers and giving future
directions is one of the most important things that a lawyer, Justice of the Peace or Commissioner for
Declarations, as a witness to the document, can do.
However an assessment of capacity, by a witness, can be difficult. At times it may give rise to significant
personal and professional pressure because the choices made in these circumstances may have to be defended
in the future. A witness to the execution of an enduring document has a statutory duty to certify that the
principal appeared to have the capacity necessary to make the document (Section 44(4) Powers of Attorney Act
1998).
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Failing to perform this duty competently could have serious ramifications, not only for you, as the witness, but
for the principal. These guidelines will help you to carry out this important statutory duty by:
highlighting the indicators that may suggest you need to carefully consider a person’s capacity
providing a framework within which to consider the person’s capacity, and
assisting you to determine if you need to refer the person to more specialised assessment.
These guidelines are not meant to be a substitute for a proper or more rigorous assessment of a person’s
capacity (where that is justified).
Statutory definition
The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 [Schedule 3] defines ‘capacity’ for an adult for a matter, as meaning the
person is capable of ‐
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and
(c) communicating the decisions in some way
Section 41 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 addresses a principal’s capacity to make an Enduring Power of
Attorney. Section 41 states:
(1) A principal may make an enduring power of attorney only if the principal understands the nature and effect
of the Enduring Power of Attorney.
(2) Understanding the nature and effect of the Enduring Power of Attorney includes understanding the
following matters:
(a) the principal may, in the Power of Attorney, specify or limit the power to be given to an attorney and
instruct an attorney about the exercise of the power;
(b) when the power begins;
(c) once the power for a matter begins, the attorney has power to make, and will have full control over, the
matter subject to terms or information about exercising the power included in the Enduring Power of Attorney;
(d) the principal may revoke the Enduring Power of Attorney at any time the principal is capable of making an
enduring power of attorney giving the same power;
(e) the power the principal has given continues even if the principal becomes a person who has impaired
capacity;
(f) at any time the principal is not capable of revoking the Enduring Power of Attorney, the principal is unable
to effectively oversee the use of the power.
It should be noted by witnesses that section 47(1) requires the same requisite capacity to revoke an Enduring
Power of Attorney as is required to make an Enduring Power of Attorney.
Section 42 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 addresses a principal’s capacity to make an Advanced Health
Directive. Section 42 states:
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(1) A principal may make an advance health directive, to the extent it does not give power to an attorney, only
if the principal understands the following matters ‐
(a) the nature and the likely effects of each direction in the advance health directive;
(b) a direction operates only while the principal has impaired capacity for the matter covered by the direction;
(c) the principal may revoke a direction at any time the principal has capacity for the matter covered by the
direction;
(d) at any time the principal is not capable of revoking a direction, the principal is unable to effectively oversee
the implementation of the direction.
Suggested process to satisfy yourself of the principal’s capacity to
understand the document
Initial contact
As a witness of an enduring document, be aware that, from the first contact with the principal, you will be able
to gather information that is relevant to the principal’s capacity to understand the document.
Where you know or reasonably consider that the person has a diagnosed condition that may affect his/her
decision‐making capacity (such as an intellectual or psychiatric disability, acquired brain injury or dementia),
take extra care in witnessing the document, or seek a medical opinion verifying the person’s capacity.
It is recommended that you meet with the principal alone. This is an opportunity to develop rapport with the
principal and to establish the context within which the principal has decided to make the enduring document
(for instance, the death of a partner or a serious illness). It is also an opportunity to determine if the person is
being influenced into making the enduring document.
During this initial contact, it is reasonable to discuss background, family, health problems or related issues
(such as medication that may affect cognitive function, and, in the case of an EPA, the principal’s broad
financial circumstances including assets, source of income, payment of household and other accounts).
If you are concerned about the principal’s cognitive ability, refer the principal to a health care professional to
obtain an assessment of their capacity to understand the nature and effect of the enduring document they
wish to make. A witness should not rely solely on such a medical report, and must ask additional questions to
satisfy themselves of the principal’s capacity. You should never witness an enduring document if you doubt the
principal’s capacity to understand the document.
Indicators of impaired capacity
When you meet the principal, you may see a range of behaviours that indicate impaired capacity. Some early
symptoms, particularly in the area of dementia, may mean the person is:
more forgetful of recent events
more likely to repeat themselves
less able to grasp new ideas
more anxious about having to make decisions
more irritable or upset if they cannot manage a task
easily influenced by others about their decision making
less concerned with activities of other people
79
less able to adapt to change
often losing things or getting lost
undergoing change in behaviour, and/or
experiencing change in personality.
People with an intellectual or psychiatric disability may respond differently, and require further questioning to
assess their ability to understand an enduring document.
Interview process
Your role as witness in the making of an enduring document is an essential safeguard for people with impaired
capacity. An interview is your primary tool in assessing if the principal has the capacity to understand the
document.
Always seek an opportunity to meet with the principal alone. Record the questions you ask and the principal’s
responses.
Preferably, ask the principal to read the enduring document before you attempt to explain it. The document
contains a detailed introductory explanation. For vision‐impaired people, consider reading the explanatory part
of the document first.
When interviewing a principal intending to make an Enduring Power of Attorney, keep your questions ‘open
ended’, not closed. For example, this question requires a yes/no response, which may be inadequate in
determining capacity:
You understand what an Enduring Power of Attorney is, don’t you?
These questions allow more expansive responses:
What is an Enduring Power of Attorney?
Why do you want an Enduring Power of Attorney?
What sort of decisions will your attorney be making for you?
Can you limit the attorney’s powers if you want to?
Are you able to give specific instructions to your attorney about decisions to be made?
What is the extent of the assets over which the attorney will have control?
How many attorneys can you have?
Why have you selected this person to be your attorney?
If you have more than one attorney, who will make decisions concerning you or your finances?
When will the attorney’s power for financial matters begin?
When will the attorney’s power for personal matters begin?
How long does the attorney’s power last?
Can you change or revoke the Enduring Power of Attorney?
Is there anything else that will end the attorney’s power?
What would you do if you didn’t agree with the attorney’s decision?
If the principal cannot answer questions such as these, explain the correct responses, then ask the questions
again later in the conversation. For example:
Do you recall that I explained what an Enduring Power of Attorney is? Could you tell me what that explanation
was?
When you explain a financial Enduring Power of Attorney, cover the following:
that the principal is appointing someone to act on his/her behalf
80
that the attorney will be able to assume authority to the extent indicated over the principal’s financial
affairs (such as selling his/her house)
that the authority for the attorney begins once the document is completed (unless otherwise specified)
that the attorney will be able to do anything with the principal’s personal property (money etc.) and
real property (real estate) that the principal could do
that the authority will continue should the principal have impaired capacity, and
that if the principal should lose capacity, the power will be irrevocable.
When you explain a personal Enduring Power of Attorney, cover the following matters:
that the attorney’s power starts only after the principal has lost capacity for decision making
that the attorney will be able to assume authority to the extent indicated over the principal’s personal
affairs (such as health care, where the adult lives and with whom, and day‐to‐day issues)
that the attorney will be able to do anything that the principal can do, and
that if the principal loses decision‐making ability, the power to the attorney will be irrevocable.
When interviewing a principal intending to make an Advanced Health Directive, you should ask questions such
as:
has your doctor explained any medical terms or other words that you are
unclear about? (identify a medical term in the document and ask the principal what it means)
have you discussed your decisions with family members or close friends?, if yes, ask what did they say?
what you would want your medical treatment to achieve if you become ill?
If treatment could prolong your life, what level of quality of life would be acceptable to you?
how important is it to you to be able to communicate with family and friends?
When you explain an advanced health directive, cover the following matters:
that the principal may make an advance health directive, to the extent it does not give power to an
attorney
that a direction operates only while the principal has impaired capacity for the matter covered by the
direction
that the principal may revoke a direction at any time the principal has capacity for the matter covered
by the direction
that at any time the principal is not capable of revoking a direction, the principal is unable to effectively
oversee the implementation of the direction.
Where a principal is making an Advanced Health Directive, it is strongly recommended that they discuss it with
their general practitioner or a specialist medical practitioner who knows their medical history and views.
If the principal has problems answering the questions after you have explained, it is advisable that you suggest
that a professional opinion be sought about the principal’s capacity to make an enduring document. This could
be obtained from an appropriately qualified medical practitioner or another professional with expertise
in cognitive assessment, e.g. neuropsychologist.
A medical assessment gives you additional information about the principal’s capacity to understand the
document. However, the decision about whether the principal has capacity to execute the enduring document
remains with you, as the witness.
Be cautious if you observe behaviour or have interactions with the principal that are inconsistent with the
information contained in the medical assessment.
Note taking
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When assessing capacity to understand an enduring document, be prepared for any challenges to your
assessment of the principal. It is good practice to make a written record of all the steps you have taken in
assessing capacity (including all questions and answers).
Also record other witnesses’ opinions about the principal’s capacity or lack of capacity to understand an
enduring document. It is important to record basic information such as the date, time of the interview, who
was present, the length of the interview and the location.
Concerns
Making an enduring document is a significant matter. The principal should consider seeking professional advice
from his/her solicitor, the Public Trustee or a trustee company before signing this document.
If you suspect that a person is abusing or exploiting someone who is about to become the principal, or is
currently the principal, to an Enduring Power of Attorney, you can contact the Investigations Team at the Office
of the Public Guardian to discuss your concerns.
Contact Details
Office of the Public Guardian Head Office
Phone: 3234 0870 or 1300 653 187 Health Care Consent line: 1300 753 624
e‐mail: [email protected]
web: www.publicguardian.qld.gov.au
The Public Trustee
PO Box 1449
BRISBANE QLD 4001
Phone: 1300 651 591 or (07) 3213 9288
Website: www.pt.qld.gov.au
Endnote:
See Darzins, Dr P, Molloy, Dr W & Strang, Dr D (Eds) (2000) Who Can Decide: The six step capacity assessment
process. Memory Australia Press: Adelaide.
Obtainable from [email protected].
82
Schedule 4
Referral Letter to Medical Professional
83
7 Mr Smith has two children from a previous marriage: Mrs Sally Place and
Mr Brian Smith.
8 Mr Smith is estranged from his son but still maintains close contact with his
daughter.
9 Mrs Place and Ms Brown do not enjoy an amicable relationship.
10 Mr Smith is adamant that Mrs Sally Place should not be appointed as a co-
attorney under the power of attorney.
If you have any questions or require any further clarification of the relevant legal
test for capacity or any information in relation to Mr Smith, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Yours faithfully
84
Schedule 5
Bibliography
85
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2 Capacity Guidelines
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3 Cases
AK v NC (2004) FLC 93-178
Adult Guardian (Re Enduring Power of Attorney of Vera Hagger) v Hagger
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Chesterman J, 16 April 2002, 1083
of 2001)
Anderson v Anderson [2013] QSC 8 (22 February 2013)
Babich v Sokur [2007] FamCA 236 (9 March 2007)
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549
Barrand v Coxall [1999] QSC 352 (30 November 1999)
Bergmann v DAW [2010] QCA 143 (11 June 2010)
Bergmann v Dengiz [2010] QDC 18 (10 February 2010)
Beverley v Watson [1995] ANZ ConvR 369
Borchert v Terry [2009] WASC 322 (6 November 2009)
Borthwick v Carruthers (1787) 1 TR 648
Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P & D 64
Boyse v Rossborough (1857) 10 ER 1192
Bucknall v Guardianship and Administration Tribunal (No 1) [2009] 2 Qd R 204
Cosham v Cosham (1899) 25 VLR 418
Dalle-Molle v Manos (2005) 88 SASR 193
Fowkes v Lyons [2005] QSC 7 (20 January 2005)
87
Frizzo v Frizzo [2011] QCA 308 (1 November 2011)
Frizzo v Frizzo [2011] QSC 107 (12 May 2011)
Ghosn v Principle Focus Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] VSC 574 (19 December 2008)
Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423
Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87 (16 March 2012)
Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88
J (by her next friend) v J [1953] P 186
Jones v Jones [2012] QSC 113 (27 April 2012)
Kerr v Badran [2004] NSWSC 735 (17 August 2004)
Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230
L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2006] FCAFC 114
Law Society of NSW v Foreman (No 2) (1994) 34 NSWLR 408
Lawrence v Federal Magistrate Driver [2005] FCA 394 (15 April 2005)
Legal Services Commissioner v Ford [2008] LPT 12 (22 August 2008)
Legal Services Commissioner v Towers [2006] LPT 3 (22 May 2005)
Lyons v State of Queensland (No 2) [2013] QCAT 731 (11 December 2013)
Manches v Trimborn (1946) 174 LT 344
Masterman-Lister v Brutton (Nos 1 and 2) (CA) [2003] 1 WLR 1511
McD v McD [1983] 3 NSWLR 81
McKinnon v Queensland [2012] QCAT 169 (5 April 2012)
Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross (2006) 153 FCR 398
P v R [2003] NSWSC 819 (9 September 2003)
Pates v Craig [1995] NSWSC 87 (19 October 1995)
Pistorino v Connell [2012] VSC 438 (25 September 2012)
Privet v Vovk (2005) 195 FLR 191
R v M [2002] QCA 464 (5 November 2002)
R v McNaughten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200
R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664
R v Presser [1958] VR 45
Ranclaud v Cabban (1988) NSW ConvR 55-385
Re An Alleged Incapable Person (1959) 77 WN (NSW) 156
Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574
Re BRT [2012] QCAT 128 (20 March 2012)
Re BSA [2014] QCAT 206 (24 April 2014)
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290
Re C (TH) and the Protected Estates Act [1999] NSWSC 456 (3 May 1999)
Re CAC [2008] QGAAT 45 (5 June 2008)
88
Re Cumming (1852) 42 ER 660
Re EEP [2005] QGAAT 45 (24 August 2005)
Re Estate of Park; Park v Park [1954] P 112
Re FHW [2005] QGAAT 50 (2 September 2005)
Re Griffith; Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284
Re HE [2013] QCAT 488 (20 August 2013)
Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698
Re MAD [2007] QGAAT 56 (28 August 2007)
Re Marriage of Brown; Dunne v Brown (1982) 60 FLR 212
Re MB (Caesarean section) [1997] 2 FLR 426
Re MC [2010] QCAT 677 (2 December 2010)
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95
Re the Jury Act 1995 and an application by the Sheriff of Queensland [2014] QSC
113 (14 May 2014)
Read v Carmody [1998] NSWSC 182 (23 July 1998)
Richard Buxton (a firm) v Mills-Owen [2010] 4 All ER 405
Richmond v Branson [1914] 1 Ch 968
Ruskey-Fleming v Cook [2013] QSC 142 (3 June 2013)
SA v Manonai [2008] WASCA 168 (15 February 2008)
Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449 (28 April 2006)
Slaveski v Victoria (2009) 25 VR 160
Steindl Nominees Pty Ltd v Laghaifar [2003] QCA 49 (18 February 2003)
Thomson v Smith [2005] QCA 446 (2 December 2005)
Till v Nominal Defendant [2010] QSC 121 (22 April 2010)
Tobin v Ezekiel [2011] NSWSC 81 (1 March 2011)
Total Trading SRL v Nastri [2007] VSC 313 (31 August 2007)
White v Fell (Unreported, Court of Appeal (England and Wales), Boreham J, 12
November 1987)
XYZ (Guardianship) [2007] VCAT 1196 (29 June 2007)
Yonge v Toynbee [1910] 1 KB 215
4 Legislation
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth)
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)
Electoral Act 1992 (Qld)
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)
89
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Forensic Disability Act 2011 (Qld)
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld)
Health Services Act 1991 (Qld)
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth)
Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 (Qld)
Jury Act 1995 (Qld)
Legal Profession (Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules) Notice 2012 (Qld)
Legal Profession (Barristers Rules) Notice 2011 (Qld)
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld)
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth)
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld)
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld)
Public Guardian Act 2014 (Qld)
Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)
5 Treaties
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature
30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008)
6 Other
A list of community legal centres is available on the Queensland Association of
Independent Legal Services Inc website <http://www.qails.org.au/>.
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