Yap Tan vs. Sabandal
Yap Tan vs. Sabandal
Yap Tan vs. Sabandal
Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Admission to the Bar; Lawyer’s Oath;Since respondent Sabandal has
shown contrition and willingness to reform and has submitted proof of his good moral character and
civic consciousness, he may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.—In several cases wherein
reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria were considered: the
person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored
to the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time that
has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement, his good conduct and
honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and
religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the favorable indorsement of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of his
community (In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1);
the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-
585, February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802). The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to
respondent’s case. After the lapse of ten (10) years from the time respondent took and passed the
1978 Bar Examination, he has shown contrition and willingness to reform. He has also submitted
several testimonials, including one from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness. AC-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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CORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s oath,
with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the
language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Highest standards of the legal
profession.
PETITION to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of
pending administrative complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan,
Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D. Agnis, opposed the Petition on
several grounds.
In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983, respondent’s
petition was denied, the Court finding, inter alia, that:
“x x x the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent’s
infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326
where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his
position only after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically
manifested ‘Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor’ (Exhibit ‘A-1’). He
called himself ‘attorney’ knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors’
evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an ‘attorney’ in the agrarian,
civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent cannot shift the blame on the
stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification. x x x Oppositors had also presented
evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to respondent’s being
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their lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits ‘D-8’ and ‘D-9’). It may be that in
the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If
respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to
hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas, complaining of
harassment to ‘our clients’, when he could not but have known that he could not yet engage in the
practice of law. His argument that the term ‘client’ is a ‘dependent or person under the protection of
another and not a person who engages in the profession’ is puerile.” (126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)
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Note.—The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good to the extent of the
interest he has created. (Marcial A. Edillis, 84 SCRA 554).
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