VOL. 746, JANUARY 14, 2015 241: Briones vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 746, JANUARY 14, 2015 241: Briones vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 746, JANUARY 14, 2015 241: Briones vs. Court of Appeals
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VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASH ASIA CREDIT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; The Supreme Court (SC)
stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.”—At the
outset, the Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the
petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue
of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.—The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of
personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of thePhils., 559 SCRA 410 (2008),
instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions
arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the Decision2dated March 5, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated October 4,
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2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117474, which annulled the Orders
dated September 20, 20104 and October 22, 20105 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
173 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10-124040, denying private respondent Cash Asia Credit
Corporation’s (Cash Asia) motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint6 dated August 2, 2010 filed by Virgilio C. Briones
(Briones) for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of
Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290846, and Damages against
Cash Asia before the RTC.7 In his complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property
covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject property), and that, on July 15, 2010, his sister informed him
that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been issued in favor of
Cash Asia.8 Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly
executed a promissory note,9 loan agreement,10 and deed of real estate mortgage11 covering the
subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan in the amount
of P3,500,000.00 from the latter;12 and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia
proceeded to foreclose his property.13 In this relation, Briones claimed that he never contracted
any loans from Cash Asia as
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14 Id., at p. 52.
15 Id., at pp. 81-84.
16 Id., at p. 83.
17 Id., at p. 81.
18 Id., at pp. 82-83.
19 See Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Dismiss dated September 7, 2010; id., at pp. 169-171.
20 Id., at p. 169.
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The RTC’s Ruling
In an Order21 dated September 20, 2010, the RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. In denying the motion, the RTC opined that the parties must be afforded the right
to be heard in view of the substance of Briones’ cause of action against Cash Asia as stated in the
complaint.22
Cash Asia moved for reconsideration23 which was, however, denied in an Order24 dated
October 22, 2010. Aggrieved, it filed a petition for certiorari25 before the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision26 dated March 5, 2012, the CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly,
dismissed Briones’ complaint without prejudice to the filing of the same before the proper court in
Makati City.27 It held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Cash Asia’s motion
to dismiss, considering that the subject contracts clearly provide that actions arising therefrom
should be exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City only.28 As such, the CA concluded that
Briones’ complaint should have been dismissed outright on the ground of improper venue,29 this,
notwithstanding Briones’ claim of forgery.
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21 Id., at p. 86.
22 Id.
23 Not attached to the records of the case. Id., at p. 88.
24 Id., at p. 88.
25 Not attached to the records of the case. Id., at pp. 23-24.
26 Id., at pp. 23-30.
27 Id., at p. 30.
28 Id., at pp. 25-29.
29 Id., at pp. 29-30.
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Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated;
while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence
in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.,33instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either
introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the
filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by
Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the
suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file
their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
“exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to
the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Court of Appeals
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the
terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive
venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint
may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue.35 Conversely, therefore, a complaint
directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general
rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to
recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the
instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in
nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the
courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones’ complaint directly assails
the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance,
Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general
rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where
the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Briones’ complaint on the ground of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2012 and
the Resolution dated October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
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35 See Lantin v. Lantion, 531 Phil. 318, 323-324; 499 SCRA 718, 720 (2006).
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117474 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 20, 2010 and
October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173 in Civil Case No. 10-124040
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—The motu proprio dismissal of a complaint by the trial court on the ground of
improper venue is plain error. (Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., 542
SCRA 95 [2008])
Venue is only a matter of procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the
orderly administration of justice. (Lozada vs. Bracewell, 720 SCRA371 [2014])
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