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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:20-cv-20079-ASH

BRUCE MUNRO,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAIRCHILD TROPICAL BOTANIC

GARDEN, INC., NIGHT GARDEN, LLC,
KILBURN LIVE, LLC, ZHONGSHAN G-
LIGHTS LIGHTING CO., LTD., AND
NANETTE M. ZAPATA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS KILBURN, NIGHT GARDEN, FAIRCHILD, AND ZAPATA’S
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT [DE 35]

Dated: March 30, 2020

JOEL B. ROTHMAN
SRIPLAW
21301 Powerline Road, Suite 100
Boca Raton, FL 33433
561.404.4350 – Telephone
561.404.4353 – Facsimile

and

CARL F. SCHWENKER
LAW OFFICES OF CARL F. SCHWENKER
The Parsons House
3807 Duval Street, Suite E
Austin, TX 78751
512.480.8427 – Telephone
512.857.1294 – Facsimile

Counsel for Plaintiff Bruce Munro

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
II. Background .............................................................................................................................. 4
III. Legal Standards .................................................................................................................... 6
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)........................................................................................................ 6
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) ............................................................................................................ 7
IV. Argument ............................................................................................................................. 8
A. Both motions have threshold defects that compel their denial ............................................ 8
1. The Rule 12(e) motion lacks Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)’s mandated certification................... 9
2. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion rests on material outside the Complaint ................................. 9
B. The 12(b)(6) and 12(e) attacks on Munro’s infringement claims both fail ......................... 9
1. A copyright infringement claim has only two claim elements....................................... 10
1. The Complaint substantiates both infringement elements ............................................. 12
2. No grounds exist for a more definite statement on the infringement claim ................... 16
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
ADA v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................... 7
Agence Fr. Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ............................................ 18
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................... 6, 7
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ........................... 18
Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454 (11th Cir. 1994) ............................................... 10
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................... 6, 7
Boca Ciega Hotel v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................ 17
Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003) ................................................ 11, 13
Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ............... 12
Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) .......................................... 11, 12, 13
Corwin v. Walt Disney World Co., 475 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2007) ........................................... 11
Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ................ 8, 17
Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) ................ 12, 13
Euro RSCG Direct Response, L.L.C. v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) ............................................................................................................................. 2, 8, 17
Eye Care Int’l, Inc. v. Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ................................ 8, 17
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) ........................................ passim
Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) ........................................................ 6
Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................. 6
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) .................................................. 11
Home Legend, L.L.C. v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) ............... 10, 15
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) ............................................ 10, 14
Klein & Heuchan, Inc. v. Costar Realty Info., Inc. , No. 8:08-cv-1227, 2009 WL 963130 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 8, 2009) ......................................................................................................................... 12
Lassin v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., CASE NO.: 04-22320-CIV-HUCK/SIMONTON, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43862 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2005) ....................................................................... 11
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2010) ...................................... 10, 12, 14
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) ............................................................................................ 16
Munro v. Lucy Activewear, Inc., 899 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2018) ............................................... 2, 15
Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011) ..................................... 18
Oconnor & Oconnor, L.L.C. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , No. Case No: 6:13-cv-1389-Orl-31GJK,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142621 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2013) ............................................................. 8

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Olem Shoe Corp. v. Wash. Shoe Co., CASE NO. 09-23494-CIV-HUCK/BANDSTRA, 2011 WL
6202282 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2011) .......................................................................................... 11, 13
Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2015 WL 275806
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2015) ............................................................................................................. 17
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) .............. 10
Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008) ................................................................. 7
Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., 520 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) ............................................. 7
Robert Kubicek Architects & Assocs. v. Bosley , No. CV 09-00145-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL
3188391 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2009) ............................................................................................... 13
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) .................................... 3, 16
U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Jet One Express, Inc., No. 12-62357-Civ-SCOLA, 2013 WL 3451362
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2013) .................................................................................................................. 8

Statutes
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) ...................................................................................................... 10, 15
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018) ......................................................................................................... 2
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) ................................................................................................................ 11
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) ....................................................................................................................... 14
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2018) .............................................................................................................. 2
17 U.S.C. § 411 (2018) .................................................................................................................. 2
17 U.S.C. § 1202 ................................................................................................................ 3, 17, 18
17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2018) ...................................................................................................... passim
17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) ..................................................................................................................... 17
17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2018) .......................................................................................................... 17
17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), (2) (2018) .......................................................................................... 3, 17
17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), (a)(2) (2018) .................................................................................... 18, 19
17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2018) ............................................................................................................ 4
17 U.S.C. § 1202-03 (2018) ................................................................................................. 5, 6, 19
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 411 (2018) ........................................................................................................ 2
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2018) .................................................................................................. 6, 11
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, 602 (2018) ................................................................................................ 5

Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 ......................................................................................................................... 4, 9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ................................................................................................................. 7, 13, 19
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) .................................................................................................................... 7

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) .................................................................................................................... 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) ........................................................................................................ 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i), -12, 17, 18, 22-25 .......................................................................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................................ passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) .................................................................................................................. 6, 9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) ............................................................................................................ passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ................................................................................................................. 6, 9, 19

Other
1976 U.S.C.C.A ........................................................................................................................... 14
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) ........................................................................................ 17

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Plaintiff BRUCE MUNRO (“Munro”), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby

opposes the motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules

12(b)(6) and 12(e) of defendants KILBURN LIVE, LLC (“Kilburn”), NIGHT GARDEN, LLC

(“Night Garden”), FAIRCHILD TROPICAL BOTANIC GARDEN, INC. (“Fairchild”), and

NANETTE M. ZAPATA (“Zapata”) (collectively, “NightGarden Defendants” or “NGD”).

I. Introduction

NightGarden Defendants imported, installed, and publicly displayed visually

indistinguishable copies of Munro’s famous original sculptural artwork for a for-profit public

event called the NightGarden, which they publicized using images of those replicas. (Complaint

[DE 1].)1 NGDs’ present motions don’t dispute this because they can’t; comparative photos in the

Complaint (id. at pp. 7-12, 22-24) show this occurred despite warnings to NGD that their activities

violated Munro’s rights (id. at ¶39-41, 63-67).

As a result, Munro filed this copyright action on January 7, 2020, against NGD and their

supplier, co-defendant G-Lights.2 (Id. at p. 1 and ¶39-41.) Munro’s thirty-five-page, seventeen-

exhibit Complaint is filled with undisputed comparative images of Munro’s original artwork, of

defendants’ visually identical knock-offs, and of defendants’ offending promotional materials (id.

at pp. 7-12, 17, 18, 22-25, and Exs. B-G [DE 1-1 to 1-17]), and includes Munro’s copyright

registration certificate on the Munro U.S. sculptural work that defendants copied. (Id. at Ex. A

[DE1-1] (Forest of Light U.S. Reg. Cert. No. VA 2-176-825).)

1
Notably, NGD state their motions collectively, including as to their conduct as issue.
2
Co-defendant Zhongshan G-Lights Lighting Co., Ltd. (“G-Lights”)—which continues to illegally
copy most of Munro’s portfolio (id. at pp. 13-21 and Exs. C-G [DE 1-13 to 1-17])—was served
and notified of this action [DE 15, 21], has not appeared, and is in default. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i) & 55(a) (a party defaults if it fails to answer or defend within 21 days of service).
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Caught red-handed, NGD moved under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e) to dismiss the Complaint

or for a more definite statement (Motion [DE 35]), making two altogether implausible core

arguments. First, they assert that despite the Complaint’s straightforward charges and myriad

comparative photos it does not inform them of what they are accused of to sufficiently enable them

to respond. (Id. at pp. 10-11.) Legally this argument fails as this district limits Rule 12(e)’s use

to “unintelligible” pleadings. Euro RSCG Direct Resp., LLC v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., 872 F.

Supp. 2d 1353, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2012). In any event, the whole of NGDs’ motions overwhelmingly

reveal NGDs’ obvious grasp of this clear-cut case (which was summarized above in about a

sentence or so, supra).

Second, NGD dubiously posit that Munro’s world-renowned sculptural artwork isn’t

copyrightable and (in their view) isn’t truly art, dismissively writing off each of Munro’s sculptures

as utilitarian and nothing more than a light fixture. (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 3, 6-10; contra

Complaint [DE 1] at ¶1, 14-20, 28-35 and Exs. B-6, B-7 [DE 1-7, 1-8].) The U.S. Copyright

Office—which issued copyright registrations to Munro3—obviously disagrees, as does the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals, which stated, “Munro’s light-based artwork and installations are

sculptures and, as such, are copyrightable.”4 Buttressing copyrightability of Munro’s sculptural

works of art, which visibly aren’t “useful article[s],” are copyright principles established in the

3
E.g., Forest of Light U.S. Cert. Reg. No. VA 2-176-825 (Complaint at Ex. A [DE 1-1]). Munro’s
other non-U.S. works in suit are copyrighted per the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 as revised (“Berne Convention”) and United Kingdom law
(id. at ¶23-31, 34), which make copyright automatic as of a work’s creation and do not require
formal registration. See Berne Convention, Art. 5(2); Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[C][1][a][iv]
(registration of “foreign works” is not statutorily required); see also 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)
(“registration is not a condition of copyright protection”) and §§ 101, 411 (exempting from Section
411’s registration provisions works other than “United States works”).
4
Munro v. Lucy Activewear, Inc., 899 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(5)).
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Supreme Court’s landmark 2017 Star Athletica opinion5 that rebuff NGDs’ arguments and the

outdated set of lower court cases on which they rest. Plus, NGDs’ argument against

copyrightability—truly a red herring—confesses its own futility by begrudgingly conceding that

the Complaint makes out a prima facie case of copyright validity in view of Munro’s ownership

of the Forest of Light U.S. copyright registration. (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 2, 6 (citing, e.g., Kernal

Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2012).)

As to Munro’s Section 1202 claim, NGD flaunts basic tenets of statutory construction by

asking this Court to disbelieve that Congress meant what it said by Section 1202’s explicit statutory

text that broadly establishes liability for those like NGD who “provide . . . or distribute . . .

copyright management information that is false.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202(a)(1) & (2). Indifferent to

the Complaint’s facts on NGDs’ wrongful intent—i.e., that NGDs’ conduct occurred although

NGD received but did not heed a warning letter from Munro, knew of Munro and his works even

before the warning notice, and were supplied by China-based G-Lights, whose sales sites marketed

its offerings as imitative of Munro’s works and listed NGDs’ NightGarden as a reference project

(Complaint [DE 1] at ¶39-41, 54-56, 62-67)—NGD also feebly, but unsuccessfully, contest that

the Complaint shows appropriate scienter for their liability (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 17-18).

Bottom line, Munro’s detailed Complaint [DE 1] provides facts on which to infer NGDs’

wrongful intent, vividly substantiates NGDs’ knock-off copies’ striking similarity to Munro’s

original artwork, and alleges overwhelming grounds to plausibly hold NGD liable for direct and

contributory copyright infringement and copyright management information violations. NGD has

failed to show the Complaint or its claims to lack factual sufficiency, a legally necessary element,

5
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (“We hold that an
artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection . . ..”). NGD,
however, only cite old authorities that predate Star Athletica (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 5-10).
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or be “so vague or ambiguous that [NGD] cannot reasonably form a response,” and as a result

NGDs’ motions should be denied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) & 12(e).6

II. Background

Munro is a world-famous artist known for light-based sculptures. (Complaint [DE 1] at

¶1, 14-20.) Munro created and holds copyrights to multiple original sculptural works, including

those depicted in the Complaint. (Id. at ¶23-34 and Exs. A, B1-B11 [DE 1-1 to 1-12].) Munro

also includes author and title information alongside the displays and images of these sculptural

works.7 (Id. at ¶35 and Exs. B1-11 [DE 1-2 to 1-12].)

This action involves over a dozen copyrighted Munro sculptural works (id. at ¶23-35 and

Exs. A, B1-B11 [DE 1-1 to 1-12]) that NGD and their supplier G-Lights (id. at ¶54-56, 62, 63, and

Ex. C [DE 1-13]) copied and commercially exploited without authorization or proper attribution.

(Id. at ¶8, 36-91 and Exs. C-G [DE 1-13 to 1-17].) Each Munro work in this action is copyrighted

(id. at ¶23, 34), as reflected in the U.S. copyright registration for Munro’s U.S. work (id. at ¶32

and Ex. A [DE 1-1] (Forest of Light U.S. Reg. Cert. No. VA 2-176-825)) and the copyrights

bestowed automatically on his United Kingdom works per the Berne Convention and United

Kingdom law (id. at ¶24-31; see also supra at n. 3).

6
NGD seek a more definite statement but failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). See S.D.
Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) (requiring parties considering motions for a more definite statement to confer—
or at least make effort to confer—with the opponent “in a good-faith effort to resolve by agreement
the issues to be raised in the motion”). NGD did not contact Munro about their supposed need for
a more definite statement and their motion lacks the required L.R. Rule 7.1(a)(3) certification.
This defect alone warrants denial of NGDs’ motion for a more definite statement. See S.D. Fla.
L.R. 7.1(a)(3); Gov’t. Employees Ins. Co. v. Alternative Medical Center of Florida, Inc., No. 1:17-
cv-21375-RNS, at Docket No. 17, pp. 2-3 (S.D. Fla., June 30, 2017) (denying defendants’ motion
for a more definite statement where defendants “failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3),
requiring that parties confer before filing a motion . . . for a more definite statement”).
7
Author and title information is “copyright management information.” 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
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The Copyright Act grants copyright owners like Munro exclusive rights, including to copy,

make derivatives of, distribute, publicly display, and import their copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C.

§§ 106, 501, 602. Violating an exclusive right is actionable, id., as is providing false copyright

management information (“CMI”). Id. at §§ 1202-03. NGD, for their NightGarden event, violated

Munro’s exclusive rights when they imported, installed, and publicly displayed visually

indistinguishable replicas8 of Munro’s copyrighted Forest of Light, River of Light, Field of Light,

and Fireflies works.9 (Complaint [DE 1] at ¶8, 23, 28-29, 32-33, 39, 54-62, 69-71, 81-82.) To

promote the NightGarden, NGD photo’d these replicas, copied and distributed the photos over

online and traditional sites, outlets, and platforms, and encouraged others to do the same. (Id.)

NGD did not lack awareness of their violation of Munro’s rights. They instead had prior

familiarity with Munro and his works; had received letters from Munro warning them to not

include copies or derivatives of his copyrighted works in their NightGarden; and were supplied by

G-Lights, which advertised items it supplied for NGDs’ NightGarden as mimicking “Bruce

Munro[‘s] style” and listed the NightGarden as a reference account. (Id. at ¶38, 39, 41, 63-66, 75,

84, 88, 89 and Ex. C [DE 1-4] at p. 2.) They also took intentional effort to avoid scrutiny of their

copyright violations by doing things like self-attributing and re-titling the replicas—including on

accompanying signage, pamphlets, and online promotions—rather than revealing Munro as the

true author and originator of the works. (See id., at ¶59-66, 75, 84, 89 (including at ¶61-62, for

8
NGD act confused by the Complaint’s use of the term “replica” to identify NGDs’ visually
indistinguishable copies at issue in this suit (Motion [DE 35] at p. 10), but a common meaning for
that word is “a copy exact in all details,” which aptly describes NGDs’ copies. Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/replica.
9
I.e., one U.S.-registered Munro work (Forest of Light) and the three copyrighted U.K. Munro
works (River of Light, Field of Light, and Fireflies). Co-defendant G-Lights, NGD’s supplier (id.
at ¶39, 41, 54-56, 62, 63), accessed and copied a much broader array of Munro sculptural works
and images thereof (id. at ¶39-54, 67-70, 79-80, 88-89).
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example, a NightGarden pamphlet that lists a title of “Mystic Mushrooms” for the NightGarden

replica imitative of Munro’s Forest of Light, River of Light, and Field of Light.)

The Complaint also documents and in essence proves the striking similarity that NGDs’

replicas and NightGarden publicity photos have to copyrighted Munro sculptural works Forest of

Light, River of Light, and Field of Light (compare id. at ¶28, 32-33 with id. at ¶39, 54-58, 58-60)

and to copyrighted Munro sculptural work Fireflies (compare id. at ¶29 with id. at ¶41-42, 54-59).

Munro filed suit, asserting three claims against NGD and G-Lights: Counts I and II for

direct and contributory copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, and 602 of the

Copyright Act; and Count III for CMI violations under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act

(“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202-03. (Id. at ¶68-92.) NGDs’ current motions, which do not prevail,

seek a more definite statement on the infringement claim under Rule 12(e) and to dismiss the

infringement and CMI claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for purported failures to state a claim.

III. Legal Standards

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion under Rule12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the legal or

factual sufficiency of a complaint to support the asserted causes of action. Glover v. Liggett Group,

Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “When considering a motion to dismiss

. . . the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto,” Grossman v.

Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000),10 and must take all well-pleaded facts

in the plaintiff’s complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts as true, Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007),

10
“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (emphasis added).
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construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,

1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

Rule 8(a)(2) requires pleadings to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. “[T]he

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at

678 (emphasis added). A complaint suffices if its allegations “give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, by

articulating “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Am. Dental

Assoc. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288–90 (11th Cir. 2010).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.11 Where the allegations “possess enough heft” to suggest a plausible

entitlement to relief, the case may proceed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “[T]he standard ‘simply

calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the

required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). “And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)

11
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
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A motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), on the other hand, is appropriate

only if a complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the [defendant] cannot reasonably prepare a

response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).12 Its use is limited to “unintelligible pleading[s].” Euro RSCG

Direct Resp., LLC v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“A

motion for a more definite statement is intended to provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading,

rather than a vehicle for obtaining greater detail.”) (quotes omitted).

Rule 12(e) motions “are generally disfavored because too often defendants argue that a

more definite statement is needed simply to delay the progress of the plaintiff’s case.” U.S.

Specialty Ins. Co. v. Jet One Express, Inc., 2013 WL 3451362, *2 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2013).

Moreover, they “are not to be used as a substitute for discovery.” Eye Care Intern., Inc. v.

Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Oconnor & Oconnor, LLC v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142621 at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2013); see also Davison v. Santa

Barbara High School District, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225,1228 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“If the moving party

could obtain the missing detail through discovery, the [Rule 12(e)] motion should be denied.”).

IV. Argument

Munro’s Complaint describes clearly, in detail, and with substantiating photos the grounds

for his copyright claims whereas NightGarden Defendants’ motions distort and disregard the

Complaint’s allegations, rest on superseded authority, ignore compelling comparative photos of

the accused and the copyrighted original works, and meet none of Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e)’s

criteria. For all such reasons explained herein, the motions fail and should be denied.

A. Both motions have threshold defects that compel their denial

12
“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion . . . must point out
the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
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Fatal threshold defects doom both motions.

1. The Rule 12(e) motion lacks Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)’s mandated certification

By local rule, motions for a more definite statement fall within the group of motions subject

to pre-filing conference and certification requirements. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3). As noted, supra

at n. 6, NGD never took those steps, their Rule 12(e) motion doesn’t comply with Local Rule

7.1(a)(3), and that failure to meet the pre-filing conference and certification requirement—standing

alone—warrants denial of the motion for a more definite statement. See Gov’t. Employees Ins.

Co. v. Alternative Medical Center of Florida, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-21375-RNS, at Docket No. 17, pp.

2-3 (S.D. Fla., June 30, 2017) (denying motion for a more definite statement “on this basis alone”).

2. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion rests on material outside the Complaint

NGD deviate from Rule 12(b)(6)’s mandates, too. Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be based

on the contents of the challenged pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Submission of extraneous

material converts the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56, affording respondent

discovery before the court addresses the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) & 56.

NGDs’ motion, though, impermissibly went outside the Complaint to propose its own

alternate set of facts, which NGD rely on in an effort to recast Munro’s copyrighted sculptural

works as nothing but “light fixture[s]” (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 2, 7-9) and to reframe the scope,

scale, and content of their NightGarden event and its replicas of Munro’s works (id. at pp. 2-3).

This premature conflict between the motion and the Complaint over facts is reserved for the merits

phase, is beyond the Complaint’s boundaries, and compels that the motion either be treated as one

for summary judgment or denied outright. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

B. The 12(b)(6) and 12(e) attacks on Munro’s infringement claims both fail

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NGDs’ Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(e) motions dispute the sufficiency of the Complaint’s

copyright infringement claims, insisting that its allegations are vague and don’t show Munro’s

works to be copyrightable or to prohibit NGDs’ replicas. (Motion [DE 35] at pp. 5-10.) These

positions crumble under scrutiny.

1. A copyright infringement claim has only two claim elements

A plausible claim exists and may proceed where the complaint sufficiently pleads each

element of the claim. Just two elements are needed to state a claim for copyright infringement: (i)

ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are

original. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Beal v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994).

On the first prong, an “author has a valid copyright in an original work at the moment it is

created—or, more specifically, fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” Orig. Appalachian

Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 823 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).

A work is “original” if it exhibits a minimal degree of creativity. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.13

Alternatively, “[a] certificate of registration serves as prima facie evidence of copyright validity.”

Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).14

13
“Whether a work is sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection is a question of fact.”
Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404, 1409 (11th Cir. 2015). It is not
difficult to meet the lenient originality requirement for copyright protection. Feist, 499 U.S. at
345, 358. A work’s author need only independently create the work and imbue it with “some
minimal degree of creativity.” Id. at 345. “To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id. “The vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
14
“Once a plaintiff produces a certificate of registration, the burden shifts to the defendant to
establish that the work in which the copyright is claimed is unprotectable (for lack of originality).”
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
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Copying protected material is infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(“Anyone who violates

any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 . . . is

an infringer of the copyright”). To show the second prong, copying, the complaint ordinarily

should indicate that (1) defendants had access to the copyrighted work, and (2) the two works are

so “substantially similar” that “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having

been appropriated from the original work.” Calhoun v. Lilenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th

Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “Access” is present if the defendant had a “reasonable possibility

of viewing plaintiff’s work—not a bare possibility,” Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241,

1250 (11th Cir. 1999), and “may be inferred from wide dissemination” of plaintiff’s work. Olem

Shoe Corp. v. Washington Shoe Co., Case No. 09-23494-CIV-Huck/Bandstra, 2011 WL 6202282

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2011) (citing Lassin v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 04-22320-CIV-HUCK,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43862, at * 15-16 (S.D. Fla. August 8, 2005)).15

Determining whether two works are substantially similar usually warrants a side-by-side

comparison to identify whether the protected elements and elements in the allegedly infringing

work are so alike that a layperson would view the two works as substantially similar. See

Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2003); Olem Shoe, 2011 WL

6202282 at n. 24 (showing a district court in Florida conducting the substantial similarity analysis

by comparing photos of the accused’s and the plaintiff’s works). But such an element-by-element

comparison is unnecessary when the allegedly infringing work extensively copies the protected

material verbatim, such that protected elements of the original work are necessarily incorporated

15
If the plaintiff cannot show access, he may still prevail by demonstrating that the works are
“strikingly similar.” Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1232 n.6. Striking similarity exists where the items are
so similar in appearance that the possibility of independent creation, coincidence, and prior
common source are, as a practical matter, precluded. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239,
1253 (11th Cir. 2007).
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into the latter work. See Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1233 (“[Defendant] distributed and published digital

copies, which were indistinguishable from [plaintiff’s] original photographs. As such, substantial

similarity is not at issue.”); accord Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d

1335, 1348 (5th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases noting that works with thin copyright nevertheless are

infringed when copied verbatim).

1. The Complaint substantiates both infringement elements

a) Photos provided in the Complaint establish the copying element

Starting with the second element, the Complaint demonstrates “copying” in spades.

Included in the body of the Complaint and its attached exhibits is not only detailed factual

allegations but also photographic proof that the accused NightGarden replicas are visually

indistinguishable from Munro’s Forest of Light, River of Light, Field of Light, and Fireflies

works.16 (Complaint [DE 1] at ¶8, 23, 28, 29, 32, 33, 39, 54-62, 69-71, 81, 82.)

Ignoring these photographs completely, NGD calls for pleadings to tick off the protected

features of the original works and the copied analogue in their accused replicas (Motion [DE 35]

at pp. 5-6), but the aforementioned cases say no such listing is needed. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345;

Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1232; Eng’g Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1348.17 Rather, the preferred assessment

method applicable where an accused work slavishly copies an original work almost verbatim—as

16
Like any other materials that might be attached to or included in a complaint, the photos
contained in Munro’s Complaint are proper to consider in reference to the present motion, in
essence as visual allegations of fact in support of the claims. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c);
Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 491 F Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal 2007) (though
“[t]he scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is generally limited to the
content of the complaint[,] [t]he Court may [ ] consider exhibits submitted or referenced in the
complaint”). Put another way, in the Complaint a picture truly is worth a thousand words.
17
“Copyright infringement does not require a heightened standard of pleading.” Klein & Heuchan,
Inc. v. Costar Realty Info., Inc., No. 8:08-cv-1227, 2009 WL 963130, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8,
2009) (denying dismissal motion arguing plaintiff failed to allege when infringement occurred).
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in the situation here—is a simple side-by-side visual comparison. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Calhoun,

298 F.3d at 1232; Bridgmon, 325 F.3d at 576-77; Eng’g Dynamics, 26 F.3d at 1348 (collectively

holding that the “copying” claim element is demonstrated via either access plus substantial

similarity, “striking similarity,” or a simple side-by-side comparison where—like here—the

allegedly infringing work extensively copies the subject work almost verbatim). The Complaint

conducts and directly enables that assessment method via its inclusion of comparative photos of

Munro’s works and NGDs’ accused replicas.18

Here, simple visual reviews and side-by-side comparisons of the Complaint’s series of

photos of Munro’s works and of the accused NightGarden replica works readily confirm that the

accused NightGarden works are identical or virtually identical duplicates of the four Munro works,

thereby meeting any one of the three tests for copying. As such, the Complaint sufficiently alleges

the “copying” prong of the infringement claims.

b) The Complaint makes out a prima facie case of Munro’s

ownership of valid copyrights on the subject works

Turning to the first element, the Complaint alleges and demonstrates Munro’s ownership

of valid copyrights to the subject works that NGD stand accused of copying. NGDs’ attacks

against the copyrightability of Munro’s works fail and, nevertheless, are premature.

First, NGDs’ motion demands far more from a copyright pleading than needed to satisfy

Rules 8 and 12(b)(6). Compare Motion [DE 35] at pp. 6-10 (seeking detailed pleading of side

matters and sub-elements on copyrightability) with Robert Kubicek Architects Associates, Inc. v.

Bosley, No. CV 09 0145, 2009 WL 3188391, * 2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (finding Rule 8 met

18
NGDs’ motion does not dispute their access to Munro’s works, and the Complaint provides clear
allegations of fact showing and from which to infer that NGD had the requisite direct access,
including that the works are well known, plus indirect access through their supplier G-Lights.
(Complaint [DE 1] at ¶39-42, 49, 53-56, 63-66.) Olem Shoe, 2011 WL 6202282.
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where complaint “alleges present ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff,” “identifies the

copyright registrations that were obtained for some of the works at issue,” and “alleges

infringement of the copyright by Defendants”); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman Lundberg &

Woessner, P.A., Case No. 0:12-cv-00528-RHK-JJK (D. Minn. July 2, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have

alleged that Defendants copied their protected works; they need not suffuse their Complaint with

details regarding when, or the precise manner in which, such copying occurred.”).19

Second, Munro’s ownership of a registered U.S. copyright for Forest of Light (DE 1-1)

makes the Complaint essentially immune to NGDs’ attacks on copyrightability. Kernal Records,

694 F. 3d at 1302-03; Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1233 (burden to show work is unprotectable shifts to

defendant if plaintiff produces registration certificate). Notably, NGDs’ motion concedes that

Forest of Light is registered and nowhere in the motion does it dispute Forest of Light‘s prima

facie copyrightability. Motion [DE 35] at pp. 2, 6. Given NGD’s concessions, they cannot

successfully challenge copyrightability via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss;20 and thus the

Complaint meets the first claim element, states a plausible claim for infringement, and precludes

NGDs’ attempt to dismiss the infringement claim.21

Third, the Forest of Light copyright registration also shields from dismissal the

infringement contentions as to Munro’s similar Field of Light, River of Light, and Fireflies

19
Munro’s Complaint easily surpasses the pleading standards in Robert Kubicek Architect.
20
In view of the above, NGDs’ six-page deep dive into topics of “utility” and separability, see
Motion [DE 35] at pp. 5-10, is a red-herring and inconsequential to determining whether Munro’s
Complaint states a plausible claim for relief, which it clearly does.
21
Consequently, even under the motion’s proffered standards, a valid claim for infringement of
Munro’s registered Forest of Light work is stated whether the focus on the offending replicas
happens to be at the array level or at the up-close ornamental globe/stem/wrapped-filament level.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 (noting that
under section 106(1) “a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any
substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation” (emphasis added)).
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sculptural works. See Heritage Homes, LLC v. Benjamin Custom Homes, LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-

271 (D. N.D. Oct. 7, 2019) (deciding where a copyright complaint rested on a registered work and

other similar unregistered works, copyrightability becomes an issue of fact not suitable for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)). Reasonably inferable from the Copyright Office’s approval of

registration for Forest of Light is that the Field of Light, River of Light, and Fireflies works also

are copyrightable. Accord, Munro, 899 F.3d at 591 (“Munro’s light-based artwork and

installations are sculptures and, as such, are copyrightable.”). It would be counterintuitive to infer

that these three copyrighted but unregistered U.K. works wouldn’t receive similar copyright

protection to Munro’s Forest of Light work already approved registration by the Copyright Office.

(Compare Complaint [DE 1] at ¶32 with ¶28, 32 and 29.)

Regardless, photos of the Field of Light, River of Light, and Fireflies works (Complaint

[DE 1] at pp. 7-8, 10-12) visually substantiate these Munro works’ copyrightability since a valid

copyright subsists in a work if it exhibits a minimal degree of creativity.22 See Feist, 499 U.S. at

345. A quick scan of the photos of these three sculptural works readily confirms that each

possesses far more than the minimal degree of creativity needed to meet the discussed U.S. criteria

for copyright (and, as noted, each is already copyrighted per the Berne Convention).

Lastly, NGDs’ motion’s six-page foray into topics of functionality, “utility”, and

separability of an object’s creative and utilitarian aspects fails completely. See, e.g., Home Legend,

LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) (design of laminate wood-plank

flooring held to be original and copyrightable over defendant’s functionality arguments). As

discussed, supra at p. 2, NGD rest their discussions on outmoded authority supplanted by the

22
Copyright protection “subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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Supreme Court’s 2017 opinion, Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017),

which relaxed standards for copyrighting ornamental designs of items and things that might happen

to have useful or utilitarian functions, id. at 1007, 1016, holding that:

an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection
if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art
separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined
separately from the useful article.

Id. at 1016. As such, NGDs’ motion’s archaic stance that “lamps,” “light bulbs,” and “light

fixtures” are per se non-copyrightable doesn’t hold true.23 Moreover, NGD have not shown that

any of Munro’s sculptural works constitute a “useful article.” The Complaint’s photos, in contrast,

reveal that they plainly are not “light bulbs,” “lamps,” “light fixtures,” or “useful article[s],”24 but

rather are creative expressions which irrespective of any illuminability can readily be perceived as

standalone works of sculptural art.

2. No grounds exist for a more definite statement on the infringement claim

The Complaint, as discussed, states a clear and plausible claim for copyright infringement.

Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, a more definite statement is unwarranted. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e) (motion is appropriate only if a complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the

[defendant] cannot reasonably prepare a response”).

23
See, e.g., U.S. Copyright Office, REVIEW BOARD LETTER OPINION [CORRESPONDENCE ID: 1-
1QCBU38; SR 1-2926726521] IN RE BOCCI DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING INC.’S “ILLUMINATED
PENDANT 76” (April 4, 2018) (approving registration of a three-dimension sculpture claim for an
illuminated pendant lamp, and finding that the “glass sculpture and imbedded filaments meet the
test set forth in Star Athletica and therefore constitute artistic expression that is separable from the
Work’s utilitarian function of illumination”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (holding that a
ballet-dancer-shaped lamp base is copyrightable). Per In re Bocci‘s ruling, Munro’s works would
similarly be copyrightable irrespective of any contended utility.
24
To NGD anything capable of illumination is apparently simply a light.
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Notably, highly disfavored Rule 12(e) is reserved for “unintelligible pleading[s],” not as

an impermissible “substitute for discovery,” Eye Care Intern., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1316, or “a vehicle

for obtaining greater detail.” Euro RSCG Direct Resp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. Yet that is

precisely how opponents wield Rule 12(e) here. Munro’s 34-page Complaint is not

“unintelligible,”25 and NGDs’ brief reveals that they comprehend the Complaint and its

infringement charges quite well. Their motion nevertheless requests much more detail on matters

not elemental to infringement claims. (See Motion at pp. 10-11; compare supra at Sec. IV(B)(1)).

Because such topics are properly suited for discovery, the request for a more definite statement

should be denied on this secondary ground, too. Eye Care Intern., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1316; Davison,

48 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (“If the moving party could obtain the missing detail through discovery,

the [Rule 12(e)] motion should be denied.”).

A. The 12(b)(6) attacks on Munro’s DMCA Section 1202 claim fail

Section 1202 of the DMCA establishes liability for those who “provide . . . or distribute . .

. copyright management information that is false.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202(a)(1) & (2). 26 To be liable

on § 1202(a), a defendant must intend to “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement.” Id.

25
Rather, it identifies each party; details their respective roles in the infringements; identifies when and where
Munro created and first displayed each of the four Munro subject works; discusses and illustrates photographically
the four Munro subject works, defendants’ various infringing items, and the striking similarity between them;
identifies and discusses pertinent law and statutes; and describes the harm and damages suffered. See generally
Complaint [DE 1]; see also Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2015 WL
275806 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2015) (denying Rule 12(e) motion where plaintiff’s complaint “sets out in great detail
the factual basis for Plaintiffs' allegations, the parties involved, the Defendants' separate roles in the alleged scheme,
the Plaintiffs' individual harms, and the facts, parties, and law pertinent to each claim [as t]hose allegations more
than suffice to notify Defendants of Plaintiffs' claims and permit them to file a responsive pleading.”) (internal cites
omitted).
26
The DMCA does not define “distribute,” thus the term should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 237 (11th Cir.1995).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “distribute” as “[t]o deliver” or “[t]o spread out; to disperse.”
Black's Law Dictionary 543 (9th ed. 2009).
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The Complaint charges NGD with providing and distributing false CMI to conceal

infringing conduct, here NGDs’ use and display (on signage, pamphlets, etc.) of non-Munro title

and authors information that accompanied NGDs’ replicas of Munro’s works. (Complaint [DE1]

at ¶35, 37-41, 54, 59-67, 75,80-82, 84, 88-90). NGD do not dispute that CMI (i.e., author and title

information) accompanied Munro’s sculptural works when they were displayed and pictorially

depicted. (E.g., Exhibits B-1 to B-11 [DE 2-12].) Nor do NGD disagree that they publicly

displayed the visually indistinguishable replicas pictured in the Complaint, devoid of the CMI

associated with Munro.

NGL instead contest Munro’s CMI claims as deficient because the replicas accused of

lacking proper CMI are “NightGarden Defendants own works,”27 and urge that Section 1202 be

(mis)read to shield an infringer from liability whenever the infringing reproduction (or any

surrounding or associated labeling) accused of lacking proper CMI “is [d]efendants own work.”

(Motion [DE 35] at pp. 12-14). Section 1202 is not so limited. The statute as written applies

broadly,28 and its provisions at issue are simply stated and must be given their plain meaning. The

statutory text clearly states that it applies where a defendant (like NGD are alleged to have done,

see Complaint [DE1] at ¶56-67)) “provide[s] . . . or distribute[s]” CMI that is false, 17 U.S.C. §§

1202(a)(1) &(a)(2), no matter whether the false CMI happens to be on the item, on accompanying

27
That seemingly would be true in most every instance of infringement—generally speaking,
counterfeiters are largely accused of making their own unauthorized copies—and would limit
Section 1202’s application to situations where CMI was changed on or stripped from an original
or authorized copy of the subject work.
28
E.g., Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011)
(photographer’s name in the printed “gutter” credit qualified as CMI); Agence France Presse v.
Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss and declining to
hold that Section 1202 only applies to CMI on or applied to the body of a work as “the DMCA
defines CMI as information ‘conveyed in connection with copies’ of a work); Banxcorp v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same).
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labeling or signage, on packaging, or in or on related physical or digital advertising or promotional

materials. NGD’s request that this Court read out of the statute (and significantly and substantively

narrow) the protections and liability Congress explicitly provided for in the statute’s text when it

adopted the DMCA and Section 1202 should be rejected.

NGD also assert that the Complaint does not allege facts from which to infer or discern the

requisite intent on the part of NGD to support the CMI violation claims. But that is not so. It

contains numerous non-conclusory fact assertions on (1) NGDs’ preexisting knowledge of Munro

and his works; (2) NGD acquiring from China supplier G-Lights items advertised as being

imitative of Munro’s style; (3) G-Lights’ sales sites that list NGD’s NightGarden as a reference

project and tout picture of NGDs’ replicas in suit; (4) NGDs’ receipt of warning letters from Munro

on Munro’s works and copyright interests (which they chose to not heed); and (5) NGDs’ decision

to display and promote the infringing replicas anyway, using different title and author information.

(Complaint [DE 1] at ¶39-41, 54-56, 62-67). Each set of allegations gives more than a reasonable

basis to infer NGDs’ requisite intent to intentionally engage in the three alleged CMI violations

with knowledge that their provision and distribution of inaccurate CMI (see Complaint [DE1] at

¶56-67); 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202(a)(1) &(a)(2)) would aid and help conceal NGD’s and G-Lights’

infringing activities. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202-03.

V. Conclusion

Plaintiff Munro’s claims against NightGarden Defendants provide far more detail than is

required under Rule 8 and, if proven, state valid claims. NightGarden Defendants’ motions should

be denied or, alternatively, converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and deferred

pending discovery. To the extent, however, that any portion of NightGarden Defendants’ motions

is granted, Munro respectfully requests leave to amend to cure any pleading defect.

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Dated: March 30, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

Joel B. Rothman
JOEL B. ROTHMAN
Florida Bar No. 98220
[email protected]

SRIPLAW
21301 Powerline Road
Suite 100
Boca Raton, FL 33433
561.404.4350 – Telephone
561.404.4353 – Facsimile

and

CARL F. SCHWENKER
[email protected]
LAW OFFICES OF CARL F. SCHWENKER
The Parsons House
3807 Duval Street, Suite E
Austin, TX 78751
512.480.8427 – Telephone
512.857.1294 – Facsimile

Counsel for Plaintiff Bruce Munro

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned does hereby certify that on March 30, 2020, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by electronic mail by the Court’s CM/ECF System to all
parties listed below on the Service List.

Joel B. Rothman
JOEL B. ROTHMAN

SERVICE LIST

Deanna K. Shullman John K. Shubin, Esq.

Allison S. Lovelady SHUBIN & BASS, P.A.
Giselle M. Girones 46 S.W. First Street, Third Floor
SHULLMAN FUGATE PLLC Miami, Florida 33130
2101 Vista Parkway, Suite 4006 Telephone:(305) 381-6060
West Palm Beach, FL 33411 Facsimile: (305) 381-9457
Telephone: (561) 429-3619 [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected] Counsel for Defendant Fairchild
Tropical Botanic Garden, Inc.
Counsel for Defendants Kilburn Live,
LLC, Night Garden, LLC, Fairchild
Tropical Botanic Garden, Inc., and
Nanette Zapata

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