A.C. No.

8761               February 12, 2014

WILBERTO C. TALISIC, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Wilberto C. Talisic (Wilberto) against Atty. Primo R. Rinen1 (Atty. Rinen),
charging the latter with falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale 2 which allowed the transfer to spouses Benjamin Durante
and Eleonor Lavifia (Spouses Durante) of a parcel of land formerly owned by Wilberto's mother, Aurora Corpuz (Aurora). The
property, measuring 3,817 square meters and situated in Barangay Langgas, Infanta, Quezon, was formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4875 under Aurora's name.3 After Atty. Rinen filed his comment on the complaint, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report and recommendation.4

Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three
children, namely: Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his father’s death on November 2,
2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that his
father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were merely forged. Wilberto also pointed
out that even his name was erroneously indicated in the deed as "Wilfredo".5

For his defense, Atty. Rinen denied the charge against him and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of
the transaction between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge
of the Municipal

Trial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its
completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration of oath. 6 The deed contained his certification that at the time of
the document’s execution, "no notary public was available to expedite the transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid by the
parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the Municipality of Real, Quezon.7

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and
Recommendation8 dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from
notarial practice for a period of one year.9 The report indicated that per Atty. Rinen’s admission, the subject deed was prepared in
his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring
from the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinen’s failure to properly satisfy his duties as
a notary public was also shown by the inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the execution; 1995
when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book x x x."10

In the meantime, Atty. Rinen filed a motion for reconsideration 11 of Commissioner Abelita’s recommendation. The IBP Board of
Governors, nonetheless, adopted and approved on March 20, 2013, via Resolution No. XX-2013-247, the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.12

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

"[F]aithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct." 13 "The
notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.1âwphi1 Thus, notarization is not an empty
routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree x x x."14

It must then be stressed that, "a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity."15 Towards this end, the Court emphasized in Bautista v.
Atty. Bernabe16 that "[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant."17

In the present case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the
subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that
the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in
the subject deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that
was required of him as a notary public ex-officio. The lapses he committed in relation to such function then justified the
recommendations presented by the IBP.

The fact that Atty. Rinen was a trial court judge during the time that he administered the oath for the subject deed did not relieve
him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon other commissioned notaries public. He also could not
have simply relied on his clerk of court to perform the responsibilities attached to his function, especially as it pertained to ensuring
that the parties to the document were then present, performing an act that was of their own free will and deed. "Notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public."18 It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, "notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties."19 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined.20

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court REVOKES the notarial commission which Atty.
Primo R. Rinen may presently have, and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public for one year, effective
immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction. He is
DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable it to determine when the revocation of his
notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Primo R. Rinen's personal record.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
A.C. No. 4545               February 5, 2014

CARLITO ANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139-B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of Court assailing Resolution Nos. XVII-2005-
1411 and XVIII-2008-6982 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors
found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana administratively liable and imposed on him the penalty of suspension for one year
from the practice of law and the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for
two years.

The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31,
1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of 6,258 square meters and was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as
Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon. 5 However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found
out that said TCT No. (T-22409)-6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of
William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.

Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the commission of forgeries and
falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to the
transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by
Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the
Certification9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of
page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the
Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit.10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria
Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she Died11 three years prior to the execution of the said
affidavit of loss.

Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact of William Magpayo, Antonio
Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power of
Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale12 selling Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995.
Ang complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Cebu.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the present administrative complaint as
a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes. Respondent
averred that Ang had filed Civil Case No. Man-2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his claim on the
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject
parcel of land. During the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. Man-2202, Ang admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria
Magpayo but insisted on his claim for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common-law
husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of the
land in question were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition. Ang sought reconsideration of
the order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT (TCT No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens.
Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to
the filing of the present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any
factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of Civil Case No.
Man-2202 allegedly because the issues in the present administrative case are similar to the issues or subject matters involved in
said civil case.

Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom the case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation15 finding respondent administratively liable.
She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent committed
an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale
executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is
the subject of a pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that
respondent "delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their office before being brought to him for his signature." This,
according to the commissioner, "must have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the questioned document…
as well as the erroneous entry in his notarial register…." 16 Nonetheless, the Investigating Commissioner merely reminded
respondent to be more cautious in the performance of his duties as regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held,
Respondent should have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which requires that the party subscribing to the
authenticity of the document should personally appear and sign the same before respondent’s actual presence. As such notary
public respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.18
On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-141, 19 adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the Board
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s notarial commission
and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 20 arguing that it was neither illegal nor unethical for a lawyer to accept appointment
as attorney-in-fact of a client to sell a property involved in a pending litigation and to act as such. He further contended that granting
that his act was unethical, the modified penalty was evidently too harsh and extremely excessive considering that the act
complained of was not unlawful and done without malice.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2008-69821 denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2005-141. Hence, this petition for review.

Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a portion of a parcel of land, part of which is involved in
litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical. According to him, his clients got his help to sell part of the land and because they were
residing in different provinces, they executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor.22

We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively liable.

After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act unethically when he sold the property in dispute
as the sellers’ attorney-in-fact because there was no more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. Likewise, the
Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989 was
antedated.

However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal
presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:

Sec. 1. x x x

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria
subscribed to the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since
March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. Indeed, respondent averred in his position
paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization 24 thus admitting
that Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. 25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty.
Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of the act of notarization, to wit:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who xecuted and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
act and deed.

A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.27 It devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on
the questioned documents. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining the integrity of a
notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his infraction, not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office,
such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.1âwphi1 Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.28 As the
Court has held in Flores v. Chua,29

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in
good standing." Respondent averred in his position paper that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff
documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents are complete as to the
fundamental requirements and inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If everything is in order, they ask the
parties to sign the documents and forward them to him and he again inquires about the identities of the parties before affixing his
notarial signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his notarial report. As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that the persons who
signed the documents are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. In merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of documents brought to him
for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring about the identities of the persons appearing
before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order.31

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years, with a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of respondent.
A.C. No. 10185               March 12, 2014

LICERIO DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition against Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana),
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public document.

In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late
Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 filed
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that on November 6, 2003, a compromise agreement
was executed by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the MTCC;
that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the due execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement,
the signatories therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty.
Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue
delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. Cabucana
violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be
sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said case in MTCC.

In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to harass him because he was the private prosecutor in a
criminal case filed against complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of action as his right was not violated
because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the compromise agreement; and that complainant would not suffer any
damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects obtaining in the notarization of the compromise agreement.

In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the compromise agreement without the presence
of all the parties, and recommended that he be suspended as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years and from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six (6) months for violation of his
obligation as Notary Public.

On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution, 3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty.
Cabucana from the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from re-appointment as notary public for one (1) year.

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty.

Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:

The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it,
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial
Practice of 2004 which provides that:

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document –

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.

As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it
and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months,
REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is throughout
the country.
A.C. No. 9514               April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.

The Facts of the case are not disputed.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado.
Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal 4 within the fourth
civil degree.

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid
identification cards.

In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The
issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he
should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the
affiants to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are
sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.

Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation.

Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We
agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he
notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two
of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification
rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his
proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the
complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a
notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.

He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.

On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat"
under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of
the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline
Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring
them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the
complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be impressed that Atty.
Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While
he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.
As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or
gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, 8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We recall the
case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six
months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for
Cortez’s violation. In Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person
shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence
personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of attorney without having the alleged
signatories appear before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from the Bar should not
really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end
desired.1âwphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a
punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3)
months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has
lapsed.
Adm. Case No. 9612               March 13, 2013

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant,
vs.
MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding the matter subject
of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to
serve his client with competence and diligence.

Antecedents

In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct unbecoming
an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the performance of
his duty as a lawyer.

Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of title
over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;1 that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the
amounts of ₱14,000.00 for the transfer of title2 and ₱10,000.00 for the adoption case;3 that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave
them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made
them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the
country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already
paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the
amount of ₱14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millo’s office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty. Millo
then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties.4

Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo made him and his wife
believe that an interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14, 1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac
DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been scheduled; that adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not
be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home in Quezon City when he received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had
again been scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be found; and
that they learned after an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested the hearing to be moved to the
afternoon without their knowledge.5

Exasperated by Atty. Millo’s neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of
₱15,643.75 representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the ₱10,000.00 given for the adoption
case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wife’s
absence from the country.

On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer. 6 Although an extension of the period to file was granted at his
instance,7 he filed no answer in the end.8 He did not also appear at the hearings despite due notice.9

In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were held in abeyance to await
the appropriate motion from Johnny’s counsel.10

The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the President of the IBP on
October 28, 1998.11 It was only on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another
hearing on June 29, 2001.12 At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a representative, and presented a
manifestation/motion,13 whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella would be withdrawing the complaint
against him.

On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed the case submitted for
resolution.14

On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile transferred,
submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months.15
In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011, 16 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating
Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to return the amount of ₱16,000.00,
to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount of ₱16,000.00 to complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed that Abella had already caused
the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death; that he had already caused the preparation of the documents necessary for
the transfer of the certificate of title, and had also returned the ₱14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the adoption case had been finally
granted by the trial court; that he had lost contact with Johnny and Abella who resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella’s
brother, could have confirmed that the charge had arisen from a simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the
withdrawal of the complaint, except that Daquis had meanwhile died in November 2011.17

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millo’s motion for reconsideration.18

Ruling

We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients.1âwphi1 He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients’ interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until
his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his
clients’ interests may require.19

Atty. Millo’s acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to
complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the
duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his
inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did
not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent attorney. Yet, Atty.
Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long period of time. Despite being given
several opportunities to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby forfeited his right and chance to reasonably
explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had the complaint been untrue and unfair, it would have been quite
easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably. Indeed, a refutation was the requisite response from any worthy and blameless
respondent lawyer. His belated and terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a mere
"misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the charge against him, which omission indicated that the
complaint had substance. It mattered little now that he had in the meantime returned the amount of ₱14,000.00 to the clients, and
that the application for adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court. Such events, being not only post facto, but also
inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not obliterate his liability based on the neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his
clients. The severe lesson that he must now learn is that he could not ignore without consequences the liberal opportunity the Court
and the IBP allowed him to justify his neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients’ concerns. Towards him the Court now stays its
hand of leniency, lest the Court be unfairly seen as too willing to forego the exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful
and inept as he had been towards his clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges granted to him out of a desire
to delay the investigation of the complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being residents in Canada, would have already lost interest
in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed this world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations
he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the Court is not about to condone such selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized
to him and to others similarly disposed that an attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an
explanation, and should meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 20 The obvious reason for the requirement is that
an attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all
times.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled hearings the IBP had set for his
benefit. His disregard of the IBP’s orders requiring his attendance in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but also constituted
utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers
are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from
the duly constituted authorities.21 Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,22 the Court saw the respondent attorney’s odious practice of
repeatedly and apparently deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of wiggling out from the duty to
explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millo’s disregard is justified. Indeed, he thereby manifested evasion, a bad trait that no
worthy member of the Legal profession should nurture in himself.

Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the assurances of Abella that she would be
withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save the
day for himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension or disbarment based on an
attorney’s professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment
proceedings that are warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court
may even entirely ignore the withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine whether the
charge of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record. 23 This approach bespeaks the Court’s consistent
view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.

Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants are the plaintiffs and the respondent
attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private grievances. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called to answer for every misconduct he commits as an officer of the
Court. The complainant or any other person who has brought the attorney’s misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.24

The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months as the penalty to be imposed. The
recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and
could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law because
he had caused material prejudice to the clients’ interest.25 He should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in
dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and Abella, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a
lawyer and in his trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the heart and mind
of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the
condign and commensurate penalty for him.

The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the ₱14,000.00 received for the transfer of title. Although he ought also to refund
the amount of ₱15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late payment of the capital gains tax, the Court cannot order him to
refund that amount because it is not a collection agency.26 The Court may only direct the repayment of attorneys fees received on
the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient service to the client. Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund the
₱10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption case, plus interest of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS him to
return to the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the sum of ₱10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof
of his compliance within thirty days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marcelito M. Millo's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 9310               February 27, 2013

VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA, CELEDONIO ALOJADO,
ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a consolidated administrative complaint against herein respondent, Angelita Villarin, for allegedly harassing
complainants through the demand letters he sent to them.

The facts are as follows:

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and developer- Purence Realty
Corporation and Roberto Bassig.

In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the respondents therein to accept the payments of
the buyers under the old purchase price. These buyers included some of the complainants in the instant case, to wit: Florentina
Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin.

The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning
litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the property.

Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued
a Writ of Execution.1 It was at this point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence
Realty.2 Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution3 for being null and
void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his client. This motion was not acted upon by
the HLURB.4

On 4 December 2003, respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.5 In all of these letters, he demanded that they
immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the
necessary action against them.

True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) against Trinidad,6 Lander,7 Casubuan8 and Mendoza.9 Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against
respondent.10 A month after, Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent.11

As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)12 and affirmed by its Board of Governors,13 complainants asserted in their
respective verified Complaints that the demand letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They
insisted that the letters also contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subdivision lots.

Considering that these two actions were related, Villarin moved for the consolidation of the administrative cases, and his motion
was granted by the IBP commissioner.14

In his Position Paper,15 Villarin denied the allegations of harassment and claimed that no malice attended the sending of the
demand letters. He narrated that when he inquired at the HLURB, he was informed that his client did not receive a summons
pertinent to the Complaint for specific damages. With this information, he formed the conclusion that the HLURB Decision was void
and not binding on Purence Realty. Since his client was the lawful owner of the property, respondent issued the ejectment letters,
which were indispensable in an action for unlawful detainer. Moreover, he insisted that the addressees of the letters were different
from the complainants who had filed the case with the HLURB.

Hence, the pertinent issue in this consolidated case is whether respondent should be administratively sanctioned for sending the
demand letters despite a final and executory HLURB Decision directing, not the ejectment of complainants, but the payment of the
purchase price of the lots by the subdivision buyers.

Prefatorily, this Court affirms the factual finding of the IBP 16 that of complainants herein, only Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado,
Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin were listed as the subdivision lot buyers who were parties to the HLURB case; and that
Verleen Trinidad, Wally Casubuan and Minerva Mendoza were non-parties who could not claim any right pursuant to the Decision
in that case.
Proceeding to the contested demand letters, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP board of governors that the issuance thereof
was not malicious.17 According to its Report,18 respondent counsel merely acted on his legal theory that the HLURB Decision was
not binding on his client, since it had not received the summons. Espousing the belief that the proceedings in the HLURB were
void, Villarin pursued the issuance of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment case he would later on file to protect the
property rights of his client.

As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.19 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense 20 – including the
institution of an ejectment case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, we held that in the full
discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease the general public.21

Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within
the bounds of law.22 They should only make such defense only when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. 23 In this
case, respondent’s act of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If
his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. 24 Hence, he did not resort to
any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code,25 just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.

Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error.1âwphi1 The factual findings of the IBP board of governors reveal that in
his demand letter, he brazenly typified one of the complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal occupant. However, this description
is the exact opposite of the truth, since the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot
buyer who had a right to complete her payments in order to occupy her property. Respondent is very much aware of this ruling
when he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the HLURB Decision and the appurtenant Writ of Execution.

Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the HLURB Decision, he thus advances the interest
of his client through means that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. What he does is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false.26

Considering the present circumstances, we agree with the 14 May 2011 Resolution of the IBP board of governors that the penalty
of reprimand with a stern warning is appropriate. Notably, no motion for reconsideration 27 was filed by either of the parties. Thus, by
virtue of the rules for disbarment of attorneys, the case is deemed terminated.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin is REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Adm. Case No. 6148               January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having
contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his
first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court
that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.

Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.2

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in
the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy)5 seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion for
reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012. 6 On December 18, 2012, the
same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the
substantive merits of the case.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, 8 the Court
laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to
good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.9 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character.10

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life.
He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the
herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan
and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. 12 In 2009, he was appointed as
Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/
Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. 13 Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. 14 Respondent likewise took an active
part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; 15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P.
Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office;18 (5) Certification by the
Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer
of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager,
Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile
Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his
office26 while the Office of the Human Resource Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case. 27 He is
not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that
he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter 29 and
by his former and present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to
actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. 31 He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. 32 Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by
complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the Decision dated
February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement
as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986
to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil
Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.36 From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years
of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is
its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1âwphi1 He is, however, reminded that such privilege
is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the
rules and the law are continuing requirements.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 9387               June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of
Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed
of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorney’s fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file
their Appellants’ Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal
instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a
Resolution2 dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that
because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law." 3 Complainant
and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the Resolution sometime in July
2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint5 with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct.
Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of ₱ 350,000.

Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an
answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP
on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him.
According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to
him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."8 Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was required."9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant’s husband to settle the case. The latter allegedly "gestured
approval of the advice."10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus
assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him
to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available
means of communication, but to no avail."11 Thus, when complainant’s husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that
the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA’s Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The
lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12

In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5,
17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing
law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14
January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty
imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter16 addressed to
then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the
penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010
Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the disbarment Complaint she
filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as
counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband. 17 The pleading starts with the following
sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that:
x x x."18 Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainant’s husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant’s husband cannot be treated as a "client-
lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and
circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that complainant’s husband
never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he
really believed that he engaged" the former’s services.20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in
the amount of ₱ 7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant’s claim that he charged ₱ 7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was
only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence.24 Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant’s husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that
he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what
complainant’s husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the
particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in
appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the
Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the
rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after
the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of
the Code reads:

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts
to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,26 to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file the proper pleading
was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and
thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that
respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to
diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he
was approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come
up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals."27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of
explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he
was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latter’s Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent’s actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment he received the Notice
from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit
on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a
violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing
a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant
and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. 28 His failure to take this measure proves
his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his
part.1âwphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them
liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical
and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.
A.C. No. 5098               April 11, 2012

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the lawyer’s duty to
preserve confidential information received from his client;1 and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.2

In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the
preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of
using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied
having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one
Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had
instigated the complaint for this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated
November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing
conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up
inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Cañete, respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn
about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by complainant to
respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current
employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent
before accepting employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x

xxx

Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously
present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which
his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what
he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)3

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.4

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and
rules.5 The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated
July 30, 2004.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
The Court’s Ruling

After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility quoted below:

Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.

"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients
in the same action or in an unrelated action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend
for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable
under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients."9

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case.

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for
one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still another test is whether the lawyer would
be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.10 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn [emphasis ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule,
as established by the following circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The
records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and
executed in the complainant’s favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of
Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s
interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement
from Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own
actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant
as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously
prepared and executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also accepted a
new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services
had been previously retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition.
However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth under
the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the
new engagement with Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant
informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse
claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida
Cañete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting
interests.12

We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint was only
for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him
liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are
not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition
against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Cañete, to recover lands from
Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.13 He also averred in his Answer that:

6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete
was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would
first write a letter (Annex "4") to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it.
Neither did she object to respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant
complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against her.14 1âwphi1

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against oneself
and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the
above circumstances.

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.16 In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.17 This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this
Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning
point when his suspension shall take effect.
A.C. No. 6116               August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent
Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the
attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their
agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed
through a letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his profession for having
abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has
four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business 5 without the required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the
expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's
commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation 8 dated October 10, 2008, the
Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-453 9 dated
August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his
July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to
Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at
bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he
begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has
been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently established.1âwphi1 A "business"
requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis.15 The lending of money to a single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a
consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should
be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and as member of the bar, 16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice
of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
A.C. No. 6368               June 13, 2012

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against
respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of
his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance
and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants
Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of
the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced
herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite
the titling of the subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William
Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and he is the one handling William Gatchalian’s business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the
complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount ([₱]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with
his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and
refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and
Oath as a lawyer.2

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 19983 and June 22, 19994 of the
Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal information 5 against both
Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48,
charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated Comment,7 wherein
he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting
from them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal
services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for titling of the
land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondent’s undated comment filed with the Court was not verified.9

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1,
2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement.10

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion 11 for extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22,
2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. 12 The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the
respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted
for report and recommendation.13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in connivance and collusion with a
certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to
the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the
acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance
money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian,
the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land
once it has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and
deliver to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said
amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for Estafa against the former before the
Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted
by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the
case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00 because
according to him the amount of [₱]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was turned
over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat
requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time
granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the
offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no
reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8
July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a crime that import deceit and violation of
his attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land.’
The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath,
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule
VIII).14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. 15

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning
that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The
respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two
(2) years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through
Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement 18 signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due
process when the Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during
the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of ₱225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on
his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita’s declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third
quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she
received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.

In her Comment,20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case because they took into
consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondent’s
reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from
Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondent’s whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be heard;
and finally, that no restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation 21 stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the
accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum."22

In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present action as she was already 86
years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another
Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardo’s restitution of the amount of ₱200,000.00 so
she can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases
against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for.25

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as
an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the court’s authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing,
the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in
their private capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.26

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal
services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he
begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to
deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not
benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite
having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively."28

In Yu v. Palaña,29 the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court
will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.30 (Citations omitted)

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondent’s moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –  A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority
to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to all his acts and to accord the
complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of ₱200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita
Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit
him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232               April 10, 2012

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Presiding Judge and Acting, and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge
Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.

This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly
issued by Judge Indar.

To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit
Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of
cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the
records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local
Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-
Cotabato.

At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indar’s compliance with Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin A.
Villasor’s 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to the letter1 of Ms. Miren Galloway, Manager-Permanent Entry Unit,
Australian Embassy, Manila (Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on the authenticity of Judge Indar’s decision, dated 23
May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled "Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling," for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
As regards this case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions:

1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based in Cotabato City, nor in the records of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City;

2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular process such as
filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now circulating and being registered in Local Civil Registrars throughout
the country, the extent of which is any body’s guess;

3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by handwriting experts of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained except probably through a more
thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and]

5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the Court’s Integrity.2

Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasor’s Indorsement and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indar
explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that "this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases
involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and
she is free to marry."3

In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular administrative matter;
(2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be
preventively suspended, pending investigation.
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, 4 and (2)
preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case.

The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation. The case was re-raffled
to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due to its proximity to the Regional Trial
Courts involved.

Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to Judge Indar at his
known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTC-Shariff Aguak and residence address.

The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC, scheduled the hearings
on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his explanation. The LBC records show that this
notice, which was delivered to Judge Indar’s official stations, was received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010.

The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was sent to Judge
Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and was received again by Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010.

Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an Order of 23 July 2010,
Justice Gacutan directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order
was sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report
indicated that the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok.

Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting Clerk of Court
of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the
steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge
Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown.

In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further investigation to determine the
authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain marriages. The Court required Justice
Gacutan to ascertain whether the cases were properly filed in court, and who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the
questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon within 60 days from receipt of the Resolution.

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City and Atty.
Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to testify thereon.

Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies are summarized as
follows:

"Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila

TSN, November 4, 2010

As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status of the person like the birth,
death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment, adoption, legitimization, the affidavit using the surname of the
father, naturalization, the selection of citizenship, etc. The documents are forwarded to their office after they are being registered by
the concerned parties.

In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the one who had his marriage
annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish them a copy of the Decision. After the copies of
decisions are submitted to them, they are mandated to verify the authenticity of the decision by writing a verification letter to the
Clerk of Court before making the annotation or changing the parties’ status.

She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions changing status of persons (annexes "A-1" and "A-2") which
all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have already been confirmed or annotated in the records of the Manila
Civil Registry. She affirmed that the said cases in the list were certified true by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said
decrees to their records are merely ministerial, they do not question the decrees however peculiar they may seem.

The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato City for their annotation.
Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their annotation and confirmation were held in abeyance due
to the on-going investigation of Judge Indar."

"Testimony of Salvador Cariño,

Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City

TSN, November 4, 2010

He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs certified true copies of birth,
marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Court’s decisions furnished to them by different courts.

With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision regarding the annulment, the
parties concern should first register the decision to the Local Civil Registrar where the court is situated. After they receive the
decision from the Administrative Division, they would call or write the concerned Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the
records. He identified the cases coming from a Cotabato court that were submitted to them for annotation.

The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were already annotated and verified.
However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the authenticity or existence of such decisions as he was not the one
who personally called to verify and authenticate them from the court where the listed Decisions/Orders originate."5

The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by Judge Indar, in forty three (43)
cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases from RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions
were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan, affirming each of the decisions as true and authentic based on
the records, while thirty six (36) of such decisions are accompanied by Atty. Silongan’s certification affirming the genuineness of
Judge Indar’s signature affixed on the Decisions.6

On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions issued by
RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrar’s office for annotation and recording. All the Decisions were
signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of Judge Indar’s signature appearing
above the name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The Certificates of Finality were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one case, by Abie Amilil,
the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.7

Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of 8 November 2010 that
she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1 October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the
hearing was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear.

Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the whereabouts of Judge Indar, as
well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22 March 2011, provided the
residence addresses of both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.

Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, was directed to
verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the hearing on 29 March 2011. The hearing was
canceled due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of Appeals.

This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since Justice Gacutan was reassigned to
Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar
and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided by the NBI and at their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed
to Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) "addressee out of town, move to another place" and (2) addressee
"unknown." The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown
address.

Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that:

In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions,
judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to
produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents related therein. He personally checked the records of the RTC.
The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no
showing that a docket fee has been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were notified of a
scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual
proceedings were also made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not
calendared for that purpose.8

Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:

The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as enumerated in the list. The
undersigned even issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk and other responsible officers of the Court to
produce and secure copies of any pleading/documents related to these cases enumerated in the list but his efforts proved futile,
hence:

a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list.

b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a hearing in these cases.

xxxx
There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the manner upon which the questioned
annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the attached list, allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were
commenced are clearly doubtful.

Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed.

xxxx

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an opportunity for the Respondents to be
heard by himself or by counsel. x x x9

To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the report; (2) the
Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3)
the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of January to December 2009 in RTC-
Cotabato, Branch 15.

Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes (Special Case No. 1049),
Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil Case No. 519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr.
(Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-1871) and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc.
07-2262) to determine whether they filed the petitions for annulment of marriage and whether proceedings were actually had before
Judge Indar’s sala in relation to their cases. All the subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals.

In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of due process had been
complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the
course of the investigation.

Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that "while a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles."

Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him were resorted
to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar’s known addresses, namely, his sala in RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-
Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the notices appeared to have been personally received
by Judge Indar.

Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with. Justice Borreta stated
that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The notice of this Court’s Resolution of 4 May 2010,
preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.

Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious misconduct and
dishonesty.

According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indar’s act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the
stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings
occurred.

Moreover, Judge Indar’s act of "affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he allegedly rendered,"
when in fact that case does not appear in the court’s records, constitutes dishonesty.

Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not
included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions.

The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary
proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to
administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states:

Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. –Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily
adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

In Cornejo v. Gabriel,10 the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative investigations, thus:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As
Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right
in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain
proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a
notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x11 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense." 12 It is enough that the party is given
the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.13 Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.14

The Court emphasized in Cornejo15 the Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust,16 which is the underlying principle
for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative proceedings, thus:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as "property." It
is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. 17 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge
Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received
by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who
were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact that the
Court’s Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national
newspapers.18 Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice
on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled
hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte  in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.19

Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of
his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity.21 As the visible representation
of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and
confidence of the people.22

Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,23 the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct and grave
misconduct, thus:

The Court defines misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-
Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled
hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit
Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed,
pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned
annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indar’s reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without conducting any
judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise
grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct greatly
undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indar’s utter lack of moral
fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.

The Court defines dishonesty as:

x x x a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."24

In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial
proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the
annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential
conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
that a judge "perform official duties honestly."

As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in
the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge Indar presided. The cases do
not likewise exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case
numbers in the list are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-
Cotabato.

Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the trial court and found
nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned annulment cases. There was nothing in the records to show that (1)
petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually
held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) the cases were submitted for decision.

Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled
"Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling." Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar
declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that
petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting
Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty.

The Court notes that this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,25 the Court imposed on him a fine of ₱10,000
for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice
to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,26 the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him ₱25,000.

Since this is Judge Indar’s third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating 27 the serious offenses of gross
misconduct and dishonesty,28 the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, with its
accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.29

This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the
Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.30 This Resolution entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned
as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, Judge Indar’s gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial and
complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyer’s oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court." Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Samson v. Caballero,31 where the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to the provisions of AM. No. 02-
9-02-SC, the Court held:
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory,
before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he
should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held
administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the
bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication
or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the
bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and
Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.

It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in
serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canons
1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment.

In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borreta’s recommendation to conduct an investigation on her alleged
participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City
and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for
which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.1âwphi1

Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indar’s record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions on the annulment of
marriage cases issued by Judge Indar.

Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the same to form part
of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with their offices.

This Decision is immediately executory.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216               June 26, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2788-RTJ)

STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUÑEGA-LAGMAN, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by State Prosecutors Josef Albert T. Comilang (State Prosecutor Comilang)
and Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman (State Prosecutor Lagman) against respondent Judge Arnaldo Medel B. Belen (Judge Belen) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36, for manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of
authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Facts

State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) Order No. 05-07 dated February 7, 2005,
was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. On February 16, 2005, he
appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of
his inquest duties in the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Laguna. Thus, on February 21, 2005, he moved that all cases scheduled
for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office on the same day.

Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal Case No. 12654-2003-C
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio ("Estacio Case") requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of
his previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of ₱500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled hearings.

In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early Resolution. On May 30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt for the unsubstantiated, callous and reckless charges extant in his Reiterative Supplemental
Motion, and to pay the postponement fee in the amount of ₱1,200.00 for the 12 postponed cases during the February 17, 2005
hearing.

In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were
based on "his personal belief made in good faith and with grain of truth." Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision dated
December 12, 2005 finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court and for payment of ₱20,000.00 as penalty. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a motion to post a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen granted and fixed in the amount of ₱20,000.00.

On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge
Belen’s May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in the Estacio Case. On April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO)1 enjoining Judge Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and Decision for a period of 60
days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.2

Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order 3 on September 6, 2007 requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his
refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear on September 26, 2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt
of court. In his Compliance,4 State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CA’s injunctive writ putting on hold all actions of the RTC relative
to its May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also
manifested5 that he was waiving his appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him.

Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order6 dated September 26, 2007 directing State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his
defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of
Court to issue a subpoena for him to appear in the October 1, 2007 hearing regarding his failure to comply with previously-
issued subpoenas on September 18, 2007, and on October 8, 2007 for the hearing on the non-filing of his supersedeas bond. State
Prosecutor Comilang moved7 to quash the subpoenas for having been issued without jurisdiction and in defiance to the lawful order
of the CA, and for the inhibition of Judge Belen.

In an Order8 dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to quash subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of
indirect contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 and to
suffer two days' imprisonment. He was also required to post a supersedeas bond amounting to ₱30,000.00 to stay the execution of
the December 12, 2005 Decision.9

Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit10 on October 18, 2007 before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ
issued by the CA. State Prosecutor Comilang alleged that Judge Belen's acts were intended to harass, oppress, persecute,
intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him, and to place him in a disadvantageous and compromising position, as he was prosecuting
the libel case instituted by herein complainant State Prosecutor Lagman against Judge Belen when he was still a practicing lawyer,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 15332-SP and pending before Branch 32 of the RTC of San Pablo City. This libel case eventually
became the basis for Administrative Case No. 6687 for disbarment against Judge Belen.

To further show Judge Belen’s flagrant violation of his oath of office, State Prosecutors Comilang and Lagman jointly filed a letter-
complaint11 dated September 28, 2007 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, which the OCA treated as a supplemental
complaint. They averred that State Prosecutor Jorge Baculi, who found probable cause to indict Judge Belen with libel in Criminal
Case No. 15332-SP, was also harassed and oppressed by Judge Belen with his baseless and malicious citation for contempt and
with the use of foul, unethical and insulting statements.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA directed Judge Belen to comment on State Prosecutors Comilang and Lagman's charges against him.

In his Joint Comment12 dated March 7, 2008, Judge Belen claimed that the allegations against him are factually misplaced and
jurisprudentially unmeritorious, as his assailed orders were issued in accordance with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence.
He explained that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA only enjoined him from enforcing, executing and implementing
the May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision, but it never prohibited him from asking State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain his failure to comply with the order requiring the posting of supersedeas bond to defer the implementation of the mentioned
judgment, in accordance with Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint, claiming to have discharged his judicial functions not in a gross, deliberate and malicious manner.

In its Report13 dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by
failing to separately docket or consolidate with the principal case (the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt charge against State
Prosecutor Comilang. It also found Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA when he issued the orders
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he failed to post a supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of his
administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to bad faith and grave abuse of authority.

Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

Canon 2 – A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Canon 3 – A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Thus, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality and bias, evident bad
faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36,
Calamba City.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA,
but only in part.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court through an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified
petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. 14 In the second instance, the verified petition for
contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which
arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the
issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such,
the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with
the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State
Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action, i.e., the Estacio Case.

However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005
Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the court hears fully the merits of the case. Its primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already
consummated, or to redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve and protect
the rights of the litigants during the pendency of the case.15 The status quo should be that existing ante litem motam or at the time
of the filing of the case.16

The CA's Resolution17 dated July 12, 2006 states in part:

In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our Resolution of April 24, 2006 granted a Temporary
Restraining Order for 60 days from notice directing the respondent Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30, 2005 and
decision of December 12, 2005 declaring petitioner in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a postponement fee of P1,200 and
penalty of P20,000. Considering that the TRO is about to expire, for the same reasons provided under Section 3(b) and (c) Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue, to be effective during the pendency of this case, ordering the
respondent Judge to refrain from enforcing his disputed issuances of May 30, 2005 and December 12, 2005. The petitioner is
exempted from posting the bond, since no private interests are affected in this case.

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete disobedience to the said Resolution,
however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the September 6, 2007 Order 18 requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his
refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order19 seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's explanation for
his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the
next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1,
2007 Order20 finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 and to
suffer two days' imprisonment.

Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his
attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his
non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction
aimed to preserve.

In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,21 the Court succinctly explained:

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional
competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as
with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the
competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and
the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of
procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware
of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.22

This is because judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws.1âwphi1 They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.23 Moreover,
refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt, 24 as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously
defying the injunctive order issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069, was found guilty of indirect contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
101081.25

Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate
disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of
injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held accountable and
subjected to disciplinary action.

Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the Court takes note of Judge Belen’s previous administrative cases where he was
penalized in the following manner:

Docket No. Case Title Charge Penalty

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 Mane v. Judge Belen26 Conduct Unbecoming of a Reprimand, with warning that
Judge a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall merit a more
serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176 Baculi v. Judge Belen27 Gross Ignorance of the Law Suspended for 6 months
without salary and other
benefits, with stern warning
that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall merit a more
serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242 Correa v. Judge Belen28 Conduct Unbecoming of a Fined for PhP10,000.00 with
Judge stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts
shall merit a more serious
penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139 Belen v. Judge Belen29 Violation of Section 4 of Fined for PhP11,000 with
Canon 1 and Section 1 of stern warning that a repetition
Canon 4 of the New Code of of the same or similar acts
Judicial Conduct shall merit a more serious
penalty

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law.30 Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belen’s previous infractions, which are all of serious
nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the
ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no
longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated
in the judiciary.31

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
and controlled corporations and government financial institutions. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any
official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with the Court.1âwphi1
G.R. No. 190171               March 14, 2011

ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI, Petitioners,

vs.
The Hon. BIENVENIDO BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen Ross
Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside the October 13, 2009 Decision1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise
seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing the said decision.

In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered
them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of
law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF
PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation
of their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them to suffer the penalty of
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00.

Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above grave offenses and should they fail to do so
after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the
order of this Court.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.2

The Facts

Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines
v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.

During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy
Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one
Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said
manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez,
before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.

On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.

Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several
witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear
before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-
parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others.

On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor’s continued inquiries
considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.

In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct
contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation.

As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13,
2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine
of ₱100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the assailed November 6, 2009 Order.3

Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on the following

GROUNDS

(A)

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE
DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

(B)

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED
THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.

(C)

SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MUST BE ISSUED AGAINST
RESPONDENT.4

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim
that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses
and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of
discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt
proceedings against them.

Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt" proceeding is clearly oppressive and without
basis.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was
not based on law and evidence.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold
the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the
preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. 6 Such power, being drastic
and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.7
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-
Parte Manifestation.

Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.8

Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within
the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson
case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision
in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held
accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice.

Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of
the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The
attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.

Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to
discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge
of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.

Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not
exceeding ₱2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both.

The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00 each with the additional order to
issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law.

Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be
emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence,
hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.

In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At
most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however,
the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel,
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

x x x.

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against
which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified
true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing.
There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only
learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order
to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was
ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.

The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the proceedings ex-
parte to hear the witnesses’ testimonies had already been completed.

In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate. He
had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions propounded in his July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
 a. Your [petitioner Rodriguez’s] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together
with the attachment of your letter to Gov. Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court,
Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan;

b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you know, and if so what was the official
action thereon;

c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer the charges against him, i.e., calling
him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez, calling him "extortionist."

Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an
extortionist and that Awayan was a bag man and facilitator;

What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the City Jail without permission from the Court on
June 29, 2009 at 2:00 0’clock in the afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o
Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?

d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to sign affidavits in the absence of his
lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why?

e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate of yours, and directly went to the
Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and ring), why?

What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July
1 to 10, 2009. Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics
and your oath of office as a lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and obligation?
9

Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has
given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.10

Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different objects and purposes for
which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the
case of People v. Godoy,11 thus:

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a
disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and
the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the
power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not,
on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect
for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be
considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct
objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.

Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice
required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law.1avvphi1

Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted, the suspension of petitioners must
still fail.

This Court is not unmindful of a judge’s power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be
complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz:

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. – No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the
court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts
done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.12

In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct
and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the
practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and
to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having
violated their right to due process.

Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant
disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show
that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.

In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides:

SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself
of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform
the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a
reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails
of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition
provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and
perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order are hereby annulled and
set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. This
injunctive order is immediately executory.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC               December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito
S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the
Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open
for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172, 5 issued on October 16,
1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a
Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands
declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s
district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his personal interest over the
subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father,
Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant
also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the
latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of
the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s
brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance
of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is
not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by
the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the
complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly
recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent
emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of
Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.

(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that he
(the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The
respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter asserted
his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land
for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted
that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the
payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what his
father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the
said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the
farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng
Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.

(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land
was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had
no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third
term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their
respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the
conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision
applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though
prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he
did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the
applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Court’s Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. 9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second,
when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected
with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the
administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for
government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than
the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms
of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the
public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in
the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all
government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests.12

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we
recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law
to benefit relatives.15

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money
from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence
showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office.18

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant
who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his
position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By
the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By
1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the
conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2,
2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective
public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note
in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how the
orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo,
dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting
party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent
exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-
NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the
respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that
may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel
Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note
that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent
against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the
transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits
dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he
extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to
being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo
agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would
be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were
extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to
the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel
Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his
continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government service, the
complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance"
where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of
evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.  — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. 29 By
way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from
the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is
imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government
service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to
include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by
virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering
Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently
establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private practice of law
as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended
to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard
against the respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck
down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for
Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) 33 of
Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his
nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over
lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April
3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this
finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals35 and,
finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests
on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The
respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the
complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

A.C. No. 8620               January 12, 2011

JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns respondent attorney’s alleged dishonesty
and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened.

Antecedents

On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two
parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their
encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of
45 square meters and of about 600 square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional
Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and
the Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No. 4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in
Malabon City.1

De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the
respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of
dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondent’s sin was allegedly committed
by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-
claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said
spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.2

De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows:

xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the making
and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were
already dead as of that time, which is punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.
Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial
proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN;

Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he falsely made
to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the adverse parties.

12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts, complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise violated:

(a) His Lawyer’s Oath:

xxx

(b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:3

xxx

On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to comment on De Leon’s administrative complaint.4

In due course, or on August 2, 2010,5 the respondent rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit:

1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and
Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;

2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material allegations of the Government’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family, informed him:

a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from Georgina Flores;

b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively managing the family business, and now co-owned the
properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their parents, Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, had executed
in their favor; and

c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly
assumed that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names.

3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were the ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty.
Castelo) consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3,
2006 the fact that it was "the family of the defendants" that had engaged him, and that he had then advised "the children
of the defendants" to seek the assistance as well of a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer;

4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were
then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and would
have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason;

5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death
certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial court of that fact; and

6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification brought against him
(Atty. Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The same office denied the complainant’s motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply, 6 whereby he asserted that the respondent’s claim in his comment that
he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of
the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The
complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal
complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of
the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we
decide the complaint on its merits.

Ruling

We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN.
Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.
I

Attorney’s Obligation to tell the truth

All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyer’s Oath,7 viz:

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, providing:8

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in
or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are expected to
observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others. 9 The least they can do in
that regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or omission
contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to include such element).10

To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:11

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct
must never be at the expense of truth.

Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also
the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their
character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their clients that
are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such
cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their clients’ causes and in protecting the clients’
confidences. With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course
of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages.12

Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the
administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
tribunals or offices only during good behavior.13

II

Respondent did not violate the Lawyer’s Oath

and the Code of Professional Responsibility

On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.14 He alleged therein that:

2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2) parcels of land, together with the building and
improvements thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of
 Rizal, to Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, of Rms. 501 – 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila.
Hence, Leonardo Lim and William Lim are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful owners thereof.

In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby
represent the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as substitute/representative parties in this action. In this
manner, a complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this case can be reached without undue delay. A
photo copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as Annex "1" hereof.

xxx

21. There is improper joinder of parties in the complaint. Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly compelled
to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which they have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation
in.

22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one who, by its governmental authority,
issued the titles to the subject property.

This action is barred by the principles of prescription and laches for plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly
against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering defendants acquired the subject property in good faith and for value. If truly
plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on the subject property, it should not have waited thirty (30) years to bring suit.

Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN. 15 He expressly named
therein as defendants vis-à-vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also
their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the respondent
had already alleged in the answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.16

The following portions of De Leon’s complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz:

2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and
at 46 C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be served with summons and other court processes;

3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age
and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the
property in question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;

4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office in Malabon City, where he may be served with summons
and other court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of registering decrees of Land Registration in
Malabon City under the Land Registration Act;

xxx

7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183
of the Register of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is attached to this Complaint as Annex "G", and copy of the
location plan of the aforementioned property is attached to this complaint as Annex "H" and is made an integral part
hereof;

8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on intervenor’s property, most of them employees of defendant
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William
Lim and Sally Lee who had gained access to intervenor’s property and built their houses without benefit of any building
permits from the government who had made their access to intervenor’s property thru a two panel metal gate more or less
10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate and with permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee
illegally entered intervenor’s property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now separating intervenor’s property
from the former esquinita which is now part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu’s and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo’s and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee’s property and this illegally allowed his
employees as well as their relatives and friends thereof to illegally enter intervenor’s property through the ladders
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said employees and relatives as well
as friends to build houses and shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as permit to occupy said illegal
buildings;

9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no.
3 as described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at
its opening on C. Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance to intervenor’s property as could be seen
from Annex "H" hereof and thus preventing intervenor from entering into his property resulted in preventing intervenor
from fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from his property;

10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter
 intervenor’s property and their control over intervenor’s property is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising
illegal beneficial rights over intervenor’s property at intervenor’s loss and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate
income from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenor’s property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from
enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon
Navotas River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public property exclusively to enrich their pockets;

xxx

13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working and helping one another in their actions to
inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his property;

On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the defendants named in De Leon’s complaint in intervention, responded in an
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, 17 stating that "spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are
now both deceased," to wit:

xxx

2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses Leonardo
Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago acquired the same
from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is attached
hereto as Annexes "1" and "1-A". The same title has already been previously submitted to this Honorable Court on December 13,
2006.

xxx

The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called clarification and submission,18 in which he again adverted to the
deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR;

2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon,
which are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been sold and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to said Motion as Annex "1" thereof.

3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject
property, have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the property. It is on this factual ground that this Motion for
Substitution is based and certainly not on the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon that the same is based on the death of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.

4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the demise of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has any
significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death
certificates are attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "2" hereof.

5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is
the clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu in the said principal complaint.

6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff
DENR, being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject property and the real parties-in-interest in this case.
Without them, no final determination can be had in the Principal complaint.

7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is
identically, if not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as well be a proper
subject of the Principal Complaint of plaintiff DENR.

8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein movants-defendants Lim should be substituted as
defendants in the principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed in this
case.

WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most respectfully submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal
Complaint and pray that the same be granted.

xxx
Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the
averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?

A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the
contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and
in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondent’s pleadings might have created any impression that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For
one, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim
and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an
attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of
the affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e.,
Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were
still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim
knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor
charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons,
as his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their
respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him
or to any other party.

III

Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a Member of the Bar

According to Justice Cardozo,19 "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of
ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."

A lawyer’s reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from
mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous
complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A
Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.1avvphil

The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels
for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of
the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation – apparent from the beginning
– has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later.

WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit.
A.C. No. 5834               February 22, 2011
(formerly CBD-01-861)

TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The case originated from an administrative complaint1 filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for
mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages,
which complainant had filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In an En Banc Decision2 dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others,
abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any
explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed
to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of ₱3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed.

Respondent moved to reconsider3 the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution4 dated February 24, 2004.

Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar,
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report 5 dated November 12, 2007 to then Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases
wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court
a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she
was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that
respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent
orders from her court confirming the report.

Acting on Judge Amog-Bocar’s letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution 6 dated April 9, 2008, required respondent to comment within
ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the
directive to comment; otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with the
Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution 7 on September 29, 2009 finding
respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (₱30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.8

A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondent’s address of record at "26-B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights
Subd., Nangka, Marikina City" by registered mail. The same was delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by
one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per certification 9 dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina
Central Post Office.

Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution based on a
certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal
Management and Budget Office. The said certification reads:

This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE
in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009
Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.10

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial
authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.11

Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a
habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year
suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter,
when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite
receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the ₱30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.

We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a
lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment.12 Sebastian v. Bajar13 teaches

Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the
Court’s orders not "only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof."141avvphi1

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney
for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)

In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she
remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves
the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of
lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent’s personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.
A.C. No. 6689               August 24, 2011

RIZALINA L. GEMINA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO S. MADAMBA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), dismissing the complaint filed by Rizalina L. Gemina (complainant). The complaint charged Atty. Isidro S. Madamba
(respondent) with deceit, malpractice and gross negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment.1

The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of land located in Laoag City.2 These parcels
of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in connivance with the respondent. The documents pertaining to the transactions
over these lands were notarized by the respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with their forged signatures. The
documents the complainant referred to were:

1. Waiver of Rights & Interest

2. Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee

3. Deed of Adjudication3 & Sale

4. Affidavit of Non-Tenancy

5. Deed of Absolute Sale

The complainant alleged that the Waiver of Rights and Interests was submitted by Eugenio to the Department of Agrarian Reform.
This document shows that it was entered in the respondent’s Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII,
Series of 2003. However, when she went to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court, Isabela, to request for a
copy, she found out that Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was an Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee allegedly
executed by the Spouses Efren Alonzo and Imelda Alonzo on September 29, 2003. In the column "REMARKS" of Document No.
2283, the word cancelled was written, but no reason was given for the cancellation, nor was a copy of the alleged cancelled
document in the records. The same Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee was also entered in the respondent’s Notarial Register as Doc.
No. 2285, Page No. 253, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. The complainant submitted a Certification dated May 3, 2004 issued by
Clerk of Court Artemio H. Quidilla, Jr., that a certified true copy of Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003
cannot be issued because the respondent did not submit notarial reports for the years 2003 and 2004, although he was
commissioned as a Notary Public for these years.4

The complainant also asked for a certified true copy of a Deed of Adjudication and Sale allegedly executed by Eugenio and the
other heirs, and notarized by the respondent on July 22, 2003. The instrument shows that this document was entered in the
respondent’s Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2263, Page No. 248, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003, but no copy was submitted to the
OCC. In the column "REMARKS," the words "without copy" appeared, without stating the reason for the absence of a copy. Clerk of
Court Quidilla issued a Certification dated June 21, 2004 that indeed, no copy was submitted.5

In another unlawful sale of a parcel of land, an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy was notarized by the respondent. It was entered in his
Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2448, Page No. 276, Book No. VIII, Series of 2004. The affidavit referred to a Deed of Sale involving
a 2,500-square meter property. The Deed of Sale was notarized by the respondent on November 14, 2002 and entered in his
Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. To verify the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, the
complainant tried to secure a copy but she discovered that no such Deed of Sale existed. In fact, a different document corresponds
to Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. It refers to an Affidavit of Discrepancy, instead of a Deed of Sale.
On the column "REMARKS," the word "cancelled" appeared without indicating the reason for the cancellation. This was confirmed
by Clerk of Court Quidilla in his 1st Indorsement dated July 16, 2004, stating that "Doc. No. 2212, Series of 2002 pertains to an
Affidavit of Discrepancy executed by Joseph Lim Clemente on November 15, 2002."6

In his Comments and Compliance dated August 29, 2006,7 the respondent admitted the complainant’s allegations on the
notarization of the subject documents, but denied any participation in the sale and transfer of the lands covered by the documents.
He claimed that it was his secretary who prepared and drafted the documents. He claimed that his only participation was to affix his
signature on the documents; he was already 82 years old and insulin dependent, so he had no more time to prepare documents
and enter documents in his notarial register. He begged for leniency and consideration from the Court, and asked for forgiveness
for his inadvertent acts. He apologized and committed himself not to repeat these misdeeds.

In a resolution dated November 29, 2006, we referred the complaint to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.8

In the position paper she submitted to the IBP, the complainant reiterated her charges against the respondent, further stating that
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the respondent allowed himself to be used as a Notary Public to illegally enable third parties to
claim rights over properties to which the complainant has hereditary rights. By notarizing documents through false representations,
without the signatories personally present before him as required under the Notarial Law, the respondent should be held guilty of
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.9

The respondent likewise reiterated in his position paper10 his explanations contained in his comment submitted to this Court -

Respondent does not deny having affix[ed] his signatures in the subject documents but he was never a participant in the alleged
unlawful sale. His participation is limited to the affixing [of] his signature in the subject documents. The alleged manipulation was
committed by her [sic] clerk[-]secretary who enjoyed his trust and confidence having been in said position for almost two decades.
Said clerk-secretary is responsible for the preparation and entry of the documents in the Notarial Book. As such, he has all the
chance to do [the] things he wanted to do, which of course respondent has no least suspicion to suspect him to do illegal and
unlawful acts to his Notarial Register.

When respondent was still strong, he personally prepare [sic] document and personally do [sic] the entry of his Notarial Documents
in his Notarial Book, but in the early [year] of 1999, his sickness was aggravated and he became insulin dependent. This
necessarily weakens his body and eyesight. And so he has no choice except to trust said secretary-clerk for the preparation and
entry of notarial documents in his notarial register.

On February 12, 2008, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report and
Recommendation,11 recommending the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, finding that:

In her Complaint, complainant alleged that she is an heir of a registered owner of some parcels of land in Laoag City. However, no
documentary evidence was presented to support the same. She insisted that respondent notarized documents without the
appearance before him of the persons who executed the same, but no clear and sufficient evidence was also presented.

Rule 130, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that "Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated." In the herein case, although complainant made it appear that she has evidence to prove that there was
anomaly in the notarization of the subject documents, she failed to present the same.

An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved and
that as an officer of the court he has performed his duties in accordance with his oath (Acosta v. Serrano, 75 SCRA 254; Atienza v.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338). The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his
charges by a clear preponderance of evidence (Baldoman v. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 139).

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 adopted and approved Commissioner
Maala’s Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the respondent for lack of merit.12
We totally disagree with the findings of Commissioner Maala for the following reasons: First, the IBP cannot inquire into whether
the complainant is an heir of the registered owner of the land. It is not within its authority to determine whether the complainant has
a legal right to the properties involved in the transactions and to require her to submit proof to that effect. Its function is limited to
disciplining lawyers, and it cannot determine issues of law and facts regarding the parties’ legal rights to a dispute. Second, from
the respondent’s own admissions, it cannot be doubted that he is guilty of the charges against him. His admissions show that he
had notarized documents without reading them and without ascertaining what the documents purported to be. He had completely
entrusted to his secretary the keeping and the maintenance of his Notarial Register. This eventually resulted in inaccuracies in the
entry of the notarial acts in his Notarial Register.

The excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing held on November 12, 2007, presided by IBP
Commissioner Oliver L. Pantaleon,13 show:

MR. GEMINA:

Your Honor, itong Affidavit of Discrepancy is not an Affidavit of Discrepancy. Minamanipulate niya yong ano… This is a Deed of
Sale. Pinalitan niya yong ano, eh, document number. This is a Deed of Sale pertaining to the property… Noong sinita na namin
siya pinalitan naniya, the same number pero iba na ang pangalan. Affidavit of Discrepancy na ang pinalabas. The same document
number, page 3, number 8. And we were able to get a copy of these documents.

COMM. PANTALEON:

You can submit that also.

ATTY. MADAMBA:

That is really true, Your Honor, because I have said I am not the one anymore preparing my reports on notarial. I relied on my
secretary. So everything there will present to me and I sign it believing that all are clear.

COMM. PANTALEON:

So you admit that particular allegation.

ATTY. MADAMBA:

Yes, that I have notarized that two documents.

MR. GEMINA:

Not only that, Your Honor, there are several documents we can prove.

ATTY. MADAMBA:

Well, I have already submitted.

The Court is likewise convinced that the respondent notarized the Waiver of Rights and Interests executed by one Juanito Peniera
without asking for proof of identity, relying merely on assurances and his belief that the person before him was a "wise man." 14 It
was shown during the hearing on November 12, 2007 that the document was a forgery. The transcript of stenographic notes of
what transpired during the hearing on November 12, 200715 shows:

COMM. PANTALEON:

Right now, what is your evidence to show that this person did not personally appear before the respondent?

MR. GEMINA:

Can I talk, your Honor?

COMM. PANTALEON:

What is your name?

MR. GEMINA:

I am Candido Gemina, Jr., husband of the complainant. The signature of Juanito Peniera was a forgery. In fact, we also filed a case
against Francisco Eugenio and he was sentenced to jail on that matter.
COMM. PANTALEON:

On this document?

MR. GEMINA:

Yes, on that document.

COMM. PANTALEON:

Why do you say that the signature of Juanito Peniera in this case was forged?

MR. GEMINA:

He testified in court in Laoag City that he did not sign.

COMM. PANTALEON:

Juanito Peniera testified in court?

MR. GEMINA:

Yes, sir.

The IBP resolution, based wholly on Commissioner Maala’s Report and Recommendation, totally missed and disregarded the
submitted evidence and the respondent’s testimony during the hearing of the complaint. The IBP apparently had treated the
respondent with exceptional leniency. In our view, the respondent’s age and sickness cannot be cited as reasons to disregard the
serious lapses he committed in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public. The inaccuracies in his Notarial
Register entries and his failure to enter the documents that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public.
He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held
accountable for these misdeeds.16

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument,
after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should
not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness.
Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be
part of illegal transactions.17

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a
duly commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction
or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.18

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent’s failure to make the proper entry or entries in his Notarial Register of
his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal
on the basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer’s commission as a notary
public.19

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and hereby orders the REVOCATION of his notarial commission, if
still existing. He is further SUSPENDED indefinitely from reappointment as a Notary Public. Considering the seriousness of his
violations, he deserves disbarment from the practice of law but taking into account his old age and sickness, the Court, for
humanitarian reasons, hereby orders his SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.1avvphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended to Atty. Isidro S. Madamba’s personal record as a member of the Bar.
A.C. No. 6655              

PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint1 of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of
falsified documents.

Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed2 was for a consideration of ₱250,000 and appears to have been
executed and signed by Lope’s surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and
Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed 3was for a consideration of ₱1,000,000 and
appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds have identical
registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion.

Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs’ signatures were falsified. She contends that her sister
Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the
time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification4from said hospital. The certification, dated February 6,
2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance Induced Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia,
Undifferentiated Type."

Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of their existence only
recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates5 (CTCs) in her name and in the names of her mother and her
sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them. Complainant submits the affidavit 6 executed by Edwin
Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the
instance of Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that
the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes
that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously simulated deed of
sale7 dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was
likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single.

In his comment,8 respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution. He claims that the preparation and notarization of
the subject deeds were made under the following circumstances:

In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his house and requested him to
prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the parties that the agreed purchase
price is ₱1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the registered owner is "Lope
Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given,
the names and personal circumstances of Lope’s surviving children. He asked where Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that
Marivinia remained home as she was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of
conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they
have not secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.

An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After he finished
typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to sign.
He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed before him as
notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that
same day.

Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita and
Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon
being informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined the document then inquired from the
heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the property for ₱1,000,000. The heirs answered
in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed.
Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.

Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the deed and transfer of the
title in her and her husband’s name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid including the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary clearance for
registration. When asked how much taxes are payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which
will be based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due, with interests and
surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is ₱1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous.
Shirley asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is the
obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an
agreement on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.

Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her co-vendors, however, refused and
said that a big portion of the ₱1,000,000 paid to them was already used by them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley
then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another document be prepared
stating a reduced selling price of only ₱250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway
already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion
between the parties, which was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an
additional deed, however, irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home.

Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with the reduced selling price.
Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the parties’ plea.

In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and notarized the second deed
providing for the lower consideration of only ₱250,000. He used the same document number, page number and book number in the
notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.

Respondent denies complainant’s assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as stated above, all the
parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the
subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan.

As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under confinement at the Cagayan Valley
Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical certificate9stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital
from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending
before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states
that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the appointment of a guardian for
her.

By Resolution10 dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation11 dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found respondent
administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his notarial commission, if still
existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.

According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his actions. As a notary, it was his
responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon
him that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled
that respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce
unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into
a public document.

On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernando’s report and recommendation but
imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s
violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G.
Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for two (2)
years with Warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with severely.12

The above resolution is well taken.

By respondent’s own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the subject deeds of sale, there is
a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public.

Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true consideration for the transaction is
₱1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as
well as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate disposition" when he
acceded to the parties’ plea that he prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of ₱250,000 in order to
reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by respondent and
his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and
hence contrary to respondent’s contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede the first
deed.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint are insufficient for us to
conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that
allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their successors in
interest.13 Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of the
subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the complainant in this proceeding apparently are
still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No.
2836-S).

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to
reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful
statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price
paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act
clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Xxxx

Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of
respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent
document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose.

In Gonzales v. Ramos,14 we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is:

By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a
public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public
and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with
public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.15

Moreover, while respondent’s duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the
declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being
a party to its consummation.16Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from
performing any notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting
such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;

xxxx

In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal purpose. His purported desire to
accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a member of the legal profession, should have stood his
ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and remained steadfast in
his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent to the doing of any. 17 As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.18

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he gavethe second document
the same document number, page number and book number as the first:

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. – x x x

xxxx

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

Xxxx

Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and book number as in the first
deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the
above rule, in furtherance of his client’s intention of concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due
to the Government.

Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the parties and hence superseding the
first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument or
document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a number corresponding to the one in his
register. Said rule is not concerned with the validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the
accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.19 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Xxxx

In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories was meted the
penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales
was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga, 20Serzo v.
Flores,21Zaballero v. Montalvan22 and Tabas v. Mangibin.23 The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent
in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.24

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial
commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two
years is in order.

With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year suspension imposed in Gonzales and
the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice,
he also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for the purpose of avoiding the payment of correct
amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year
suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment
as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

A.C. No. 8920               September 28, 2011

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung
liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded.
The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The
respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City.

Background

Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment 2 with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that
the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent
shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite
me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!"6 Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him
for direct contempt of court for the second time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The
respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on
shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.7

Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of
the Clerk of Court.8

Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.

Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the
modified decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion
to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First
Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected him.10 We quote from his Answer:

23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside the court room when he
was lambasting me[.]

24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration
without oral argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public
that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making
it an impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and
IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.

25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]

xxxx

28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order
that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue so that he
will have the room to humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner’s
Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely
reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the
incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioner’s review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of
stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:12

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his case
but the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed,
the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an argument, the
complainant stated the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to appear before
my court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24,
2008, page 3)

(NOTE: The underlined words – "we are very sorry" [– were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the
quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung
shouted at the presiding judge.

Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?

Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if
should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)

It was observed that the judge uttered the following:

Court: Do not shout.

Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.

(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)

Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.

Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the
undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.

Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to be called. They must have observed the
incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung
who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him "not to shout."

The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:

Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of ₱100.00.

Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance of the law.

Court: Yes, proceed.

(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)

Court: Next case.

Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.

(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)

Atty. Battung: But what we do not like … (not finished)

Court: The next time…

Atty. Battung: We would like to clear …

Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.

Next case.

Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.

(nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of
Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
The respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent
should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be
tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed
that Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct.

With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found
that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the
ends of justice.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants
and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly
showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the
respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the
position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and
brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly
ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. 13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution
would be resting on very shaky foundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system.
When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the
law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s
competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the
manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad
light and bring the justice system into disrepute.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner
recommended a penalty of six (6) months suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for
violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating the
Lawyer’s Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battung’s violations
are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was acting
as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to
the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondent’s personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information and
guidance.
A.C. No. 9081               October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty.
Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in
office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice
on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a
document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila
ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga
sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t
bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at
Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza
Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa
ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa
kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar
kung saan siya ay naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga
pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo)
ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-
sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started
implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most
of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract
executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She
admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña
alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a
letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaña’s knowledge,
consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later
recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was
notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end to
the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña had
failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the
law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized
the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her
propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and
Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaña
did in this case.1avvphi1

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar
documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take
a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled "Legal
Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and
obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other; 6 preparing a
document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which
each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD
that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only
showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries
in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any member
of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Omaña knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore,
Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial
commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this
Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.