Center for Security Studies

The Relevance of the Cold War Today

Before we fret too much about the possibility of a new Cold War, argues Barbara Zanchetta,
we better remember the residual effects of the old one on 1) existing nuclear arsenals and
their related treaties; 2) today’s unresolved conflicts; and 3) long-standing institutions such
as NATO and the EU.
This article was originally published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
in May 2016.
Is there, or not, a legacy of the Cold War that continues to define the international system?
The Cold War divided Europe and the world in two opposing spheres of influence for four
and a half decades. The emergence of the United States as a dominant international
actor following the Second World War was shaped by the rivalry with the Soviet Union,
which, in turn, defined its new global posture on the basis of the competition with America.
Cold War necessities came to dictate both superpowers’ foreign and defence policies for
decades. While historians agree on assessing the Cold War as an important chapter in the
turbulent history of the twentieth century, far less consensus exists among analysts on the
contemporary relevance of the bipolar conflict. In other words, is the Cold War still relevant
today, or was it just a passing – albeit important – historical phase? Is there, or not, a legacy
of the Cold War that continues to define the international system?
This paper argues that the bipolar conflict shaped the international system in ways that
are still very much relevant today. The easiness with which Western commentators talk
about a ‘new Cold War’ with Russia – whether in the context of the crisis in the Ukraine or
of the conflict in Syria – testifies to the enduring notion of an inherent and deeply rooted
rivalry between Washington and Moscow. A Cold War mentality of distrust seems to
define the language used in describing Russia, still seen as an international actor whose
ambitions and objectives are not shared by the United States and the rest of the – however
ambiguously defined – Western world.
In addition to an enduring Cold War mentality and easily resurfacing rhetoric, the legacy
of the Cold War and its relevance for contemporary politics rotates around at least three
more tangible elements: (i) the former superpowers’ nuclear arsenals and the related
arms control and non-proliferation treaties, negotiated during the Cold War; (ii) local
conflicts or interventions that originated during the Cold War, but whose consequences
and ramifications endure today; (iii) the continued presence and relevance of international
institutions – such as the European Union and NATO – whose origins lie in the Cold War
division of Europe.
Key Points
Beyond the easily re-surfacing rhetoric on a ‘new Cold War’ when referring to the Western
world’s relationship with Russia, the bipolar conflict (1945-1989) shaped the international
system in tangible ways that remain highly relevant today. The concrete legacy of the Cold
War rotates around three elements: nuclear weapons and the related arms control and
non-proliferation treaties; local conflicts with long-lasting consequences; and international
institutions that continue to play a key role today. Current instability in the world’s hotspots
– from the Korean peninsula to Afghanistan – cannot be understood, nor future courses
charted, without turning to the Cold War in search for the roots and causes of today’s
dilemmas. The major institutions that govern the ‘West’ – NATO and the EU – are both
rooted in the bipolar era, and the sense of community, belonging and shared values that
characterise them was forged throughout the decades.
1. Nuclear weapons and arms control treaties
At the dawn of the nuclear era, the United States had hoped to maintain the monopoly over
nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. However, four years after the explosion of the
nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device,
unleashing the nuclear arms race. During the 1950s, the United States expanded its nuclear
weapons programs, seeking to compensate its alleged conventional weapons inferiority in
Europe by relying on the doctrine of massiveretaliation. Nuclear deterrence therefore came
to shape the defence posture of the superpowers and MAD (mutual assured destruction)
became a defining feature of the Cold War.
The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union induced other major
powers to seek their own independent nuclear deterrent, thus leading to an initial, limited
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and the
People’s Republic of China (1964) in fact tested their own nuclear devises, and nuclear
weapons became a seemingly permanent element of the international system.
However, following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 – when the superpowers had come
dangerously close to a nuclear exchange – Washington and Moscow started to engage in
the first arms control negotiations in order to reduce the future possibility of nuclear war.
This gradual reduction of tension between the superpowers led to the successful conclusion
of the multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the beginning of strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union.
At the time of the negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear
proliferation threatened to further destabilize the international system, as analysts predicted
that 20-25 states would acquire nuclear weapons within 20 years. The impetus behind the
NPT was, in fact, the need to prevent a world with many nuclear weapon states. The Cold
War nuclear deterrent between the US and USSR was dangerous, but stable. Having more
nuclear weapon states would multiply the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorised
use of weapons and increase chances of escalation from conventional to nuclear war in
case of conflict.

Freezing the situation as it was in the late 1960s, the negotiations were in essence based
on a bargain between the non-nuclear weapons states – that agreed never to acquire
nuclear weapons – and the five nuclear weapons states – that agreed in exchange to share
the technology for the peaceful use of nuclear weapons and to pursue nuclear disarmament
in order to, ultimately, eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The NPT was signed in July 1968,
and entered into force in March 1970. From the initial 40 signatory states, required for the
treaty to become effective, 190 states are now party to the treaty. While it was initially meant
for a limited duration of 25 years, the parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely at the
review conference of 1995.
Today, the vast majority of states are members of the NPT. However, four UN member
states never joined the treaty – India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan (that separated
from Sudan only in 2011). North Korea acceded to the treaty in the 1980s, but announced
its withdrawal in 2003. Of the non-party to the NPT states, three have tested nuclear
weapons – India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). Israel, instead, has
maintained a policy of so-called nuclear ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying the
possession of nuclear weapons (but is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons).
In parallel with the multilateral negotiations that led to the signing of the NPT, the United
States and the Soviet Union started bilateral talks to limit the size of their nuclear arsenals.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) started in the late 1960s and led to the signing
of two landmark treaties in 1972 and 1979. Although the SALT I and SALT II treaties
codified a persistently high level of nuclear weapons, they initiated an arms control process
that was, despite setbacks, never interrupted. The SALT treaties in essence set the basis
for the nuclear arms reduction talks (START), the agreements reached between the US and
Russia in the post-Cold War era.
Both the NPT and the US-Soviet/Russian agreements had and continue to have many
problematic features. Critics of the NPT underline the importence of the international
community in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the states not party to
the treaty, as well as the difficulty in monitoring the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear
programs, with the Iranian case, in this context, being exemplary. Furthermore, the non-
nuclear weapons states have charged that while their side of the “bargain” has been
respected, in essence condoning a world with the “haves and the haves not”, the nuclear
weapons states have not maintained their treaty commitments in all aspects related to
nuclear disarmament. Almost fifty years from the signing of the treaty, in fact, it is still
difficult to imagine a world without nuclear weapons. The national security strategies of the
nuclear weapon states still openly rely on nuclear weapons as a crucial element of their
defence.
The US-Russian agreements are instead criticised for allowing the former superpowers to
maintain an excessive number of nuclear weapons. Despite the drastic reduction in the size
of their nuclear arsenals – now at less than one-fifth compared to the height of the arms
race in the 1960s – the United States and Russia still possess more than enough strategic
warheads to deter a nuclear attack, and they are both still updating and modernizing their
delivery systems. Should these weapons be used, even in a “limited” way, the result would
be catastrophic.
Notwithstanding the many problematic aspects of the NPT, and the thousands of nuclear
weapons still present in the stockpiles of the United States and Russia, these agreements
continue to define the international system today. The NPT remains the only treaty that
regulates nuclear proliferation, while the bilateral US-Russian treaties provide for verification
mechanisms that maintain the level of weapons under control and prevent both sides from
developing more weapons in the future.
2. Local conflicts and superpower interventions
From the early 1950s onwards, the Cold War ‘order’ stabilised the division of Europe and
the bipolar competition moved outside the old continent to become increasingly more
global. This process was aided by the nuclear balance of terror between the superpowers,
which led Washington and Moscow to avoid direct confrontation. Local conflicts therefore
assumed a greater significance in the worldwide struggle to gain influence and supremacy.
The first signal that the Cold War had moved outside of Europe came with the escalation of
tension in the Korean peninsula. During the Second World War, Korea was liberated from
Japanese forces by both the US forces – that entered to country from the south – and the
Soviet forces – that invaded from the north. The line of separation between the two was
marked by the 38th parallel. As the Cold War came to dominate the relationship between
the two former allies, Korea – like Germany – remained divided.
In 1947, the issue of Korea was deferred to the newly created United Nations. Elections
were held and two states were created, each under the sphere of influence of the US (South
Korea) and the Soviet Union (North Korea). However, in an attempt to reunite the country, in
June 1950 the Soviet-backed North attacked the South, thus initiating the Korean War.
In the United States, the North Korean move was interpreted as a confirmation of Soviet
expansionist ambitions. This perception triggered an escalation and further militarization
of the Cold War. In fact, only months before the Korean War, the newly created People’s
Republic of China and the Soviet Union had stipulated an alliance, seen by the United
States and the Western world as the coalescing of two Communist “giants” into a strong and
menacing bloc. The need to stop the advance of North Korea and the unification of Korea
under a communist government therefore came to symbolize the global fight between East
and West, of capitalism versus communism.
Following months of fighting, the UN-sponsored (but mainly American) forces pushed
the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, re-establishing the status quo ante. The
armistice line of July 1953 again separated the two Koreas and their opposing political
systems. This is the same armistice line that continues to divide the Korean peninsula
today.
While the Korean situation escalated into open war, in a number of other countries the
United States and the Soviet Union fought for influence in more subtle – though no less
destabilizing – ways. An example of American involvement with long-lasting consequences
was the decision to back the 1953 coup d’état in Iran that ousted the democratically
elected government led by Mohammed Mosaddegh and strengthened the rule of Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Mosaddegh had challenged the British and American influence
by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in order to allow Iran to have a more
equitable share of its profits. Assessed in Washington as too left leaning and as not
sufficiently aligned with Western interests, Mosaddegh was removed from power in a CIA-
orchestrated coup.

Although in the case of Iran the advancement of Soviet or Soviet-inspired influence was
only supposed (and proved to be misguided), Moscow’s interventions in other so-called
Third World countries were actual, and prompted American reactions of different kinds.
Countries considered to be in the periphery compared to the focal areas of the Cold War –
such as Angola – became important for Washington because of the advancement of Marxist
influence, sponsored either directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union. As US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger put it, “it was not the intrinsic importance of Angola,” that mattered,
but “the implications for Soviet foreign policy and long-term East-West relations.”[1]
Accordingly, the US aided the anti-communist factions and tried to match the Soviet influx
of weapons into the Angolan conflict until a negative vote of the US Congress which, in the
immediate aftermath of the fall of Saigon, wanted to avoid foreign interventions that evoked
Vietnam-like situations (even if the interventions were of covert nature, such as in Angola).
The Angolan Civil War triggered alarm bells in Washington on Soviet expansionist ambitions
in the Third World, confirmed (from the US viewpoint) a few years later in the context of the
Ethiopia-Somalia Ogaden War (1977-1978). The Soviet Union in fact openly intervened
in favour of the newly established Marxist regime in Ethiopia, betraying its former ally,
Somalia. In response, the United States started to provide aid to Somali dictator Said
Barre, in essence implementing a reversal of alliances in order to counter perceived Soviet
expansionism in a strategically important area – the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the
Red Sea and, ultimately, the entire Middle Eastern region.
The notion – circulating in Washington in the later part of the 1970s – of a Soviet master
plan to conquer warm water ports in the Persian Gulf seemed to be confirmed by the
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Following the Iranian revolution and the
departure of the Shah earlier that year, the United States had lost its major ally in the region
and the main bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Persian Gulf. For this reason, the
Carter administration was determined to block the advancement of the Soviet Union in
the area. In an effort to make the Soviets pay a heavy price for their intervention, the US
initiated a covert program of aid to the anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan, the mujahidin (the
“soldiers of God”). The program was continued and expanded during the Reagan years and
became the greatest covert operation in the history of the CIA.
In all of these cases, the superpower rivalry played out in the so-called periphery had long
lasting regional consequences, most of which still resonate today. The US complicity in
the overthrow of Mosaddegh and the subsequent support for the Shah of Iran marred US-
Iranian relations for years and played a part in building up the stanch anti-Americanism of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Angolan Civil War endured for decades until well after the
end of the Cold War, devastating the country’s infrastructure and economic enterprises.
While Ethiopia successfully managed a constitutional transition after the end of Mengistu’s
regime in the early 1990s, Somalia’s fate was far more tumultuous. The ousting of Said
Barre was followed by civil war, with various factions controlling parts of the country but
never establishing a central government. In the early 1990s, Somalia was classified as a
“failed state” and instability, factionalism, poverty and weak government institutions continue
to characterize the country today. In Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal left a country
devastated and divided, which would first descend into civil war and then witness the rise
and consolidation of Islamic extremism, with the emergence of the Taliban in the early
1990s. Moreover, US support for the Islamic mujahidin fighters indirectly aided the rise of
transnational Islamic terrorism, which would later dramatically target America itself on 11
September 2001.
These countries and regions remain hotspots today, due to the fragility of state structures,
extremism and overall instability, which has proved to be fertile ground for the growth
and expansion of terrorist networks. Not only is the Cold War to blame for this, as the
superpowers, blinded by their great power rivalry, overlooked and sometimes exploited
problematic local realities. But present dynamics cannot be understood, nor can future
courses be charted, without turning to the Cold War in search for the roots and causes of
today’s dilemmas.
3. Institutions – NATO and the EU
Although the Cold War came to touch the entire world, its origins were in the post-World
War II division of Europe. The liberation from Nazi occupation left the continent divided. The
presence of Western and Soviet forces gradually translated into spheres of influence, as
the Cold War came to define the relationship between the West – led by the United States
– and the Soviet Union. While US President Franklin Roosevelt had hoped to cooperate
with Stalin in the post-War settlement and reconstruction of Europe, following his death the
relationship with Moscow rapidly deteriorated. The West interpreted various signals – from
Stalin’s 1946 “inevitability of conflict” speech, to the difficulty in cooperating on Germany
and the occupation of Eastern Europe – as demonstration of Soviet intransigence and
aggressiveness. In March 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously
captured the sense of a looming Cold War by stating:
“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has descended across
the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and
Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and
Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the
Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to
a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.”[2]
In order to counter the perception of an impending Soviet threat in Europe, the Western
camp merged to form various institutions that would ensure its cohesion from both an
economic and military point of view. The first coordination of European economic policies
was introduced to manage the European Recovery Program (that came to be known as
the Marshall Plan, taking the name from US Secretary of State George Marshall). Then,
in order to overcome the fears of German resurgence, while at the same time charting
a path for German recovery (vital for the revival of the entire continent), French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman proposed the creation of a supranational authority to control
the production of steel and coal in France and Germany, open for membership to other
countries. The European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, with six
member states (France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg).
This set the basis for the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, as the
principle of supra-nationalism was expanded to include other sectors of the European
economies. The EEC established a common market and customs union; closer union
among the peoples of Europe; and, in general, the pooling of resources to strengthen
peace.
While the United States oversaw and encouraged the economic integration of Europe,
it was to remain the senior partner in all aspects related to military defence. Marking a
significant turning point in the history of American foreign policy – which had until then, in
the words of George Washington, avoided “entangling alliances” – in 1948 the US Senate
passed a resolution (named after Senator Arthur Vanderburg) that allowed the United
States to take part in permanent regional accords, if and when these directly related to
the defence of American national security. This paved the way for the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty a year later. Then, as the Cold War escalated (following, most notably, the
explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb and the beginning of the Korean War), the member
countries of the treaty agreed to create a permanent organization, NATO – initially based in
Paris – and to strengthen its military integrated structure.
Although both NATO and the European Union (established by the Maastricht Treaty of
1992, which significantly expanded the competences of the EEC, including the creation
of a single European currency) have obviously evolved into organizations with different
mandates compared to their origins, it is important to recall that both institutions were
inherently linked to the Cold War. It was at a time when the European countries and the
US shared the perception of a common threat that the transatlantic ties were created,
strengthened and expanded. While analysts had predicted the dismantlement of NATO
following the end of the Cold War (as its core mission seemed to have evaporated), the
alliance not only remained in place, but also welcomed new member states, therefore
expanding to include many former “enemies” of the dissolved Warsaw Pact.

A renewed NATO and a much larger EU remain key players in the international system
today, testifying to the enduring legacy of links and institutions created during the Cold War.
4. Conclusions
The last Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev had envisioned a reformed and more open Soviet
Union that could have become part of a new pan-European structure, which he called
the “common European home.” This inherently conveyed the idea of building close links
between the Soviet Union and the then European Community in the transition to a post-
Cold War era. Events proved Gorbachev wrong. The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not
lead to a new European structure that included Russia (and the former Soviet republics).
On the contrary, NATO expanded into the former Soviet space at a pace unforeseen and
unexpected even in the West. Therefore, it can be argued that not only the Cold War
but also the way in which the Cold War ended had a long-lasting negative impact on the
Western world’s relationship with Russia.
The excessive facility with which contemporary observers revert to notions of a “new Cold
War” not only reveals the continuation of an inherent Cold War mentality, but also the
absence of a new structure to define the international system. However, the relevance of
the Cold War today does not lie in simple, and often misguided, analogies. The international
system today is radically different from the bipolar one, and the challenges to state security,
increasingly rooted in non-state actors and transnational forces, are of drastically different
nature compared to the – in many ways more simply defined – challenges of the Cold War
era.
The relevance of the Cold War, instead, rests in concrete issues that continue to define
the international system, such as nuclear weapons, problematic regional conflicts and the
continued presence of transatlantic institutions, such as NATO and the European Union.
These institutions have – over the decades – created a sense of common values and
shared ideals. Even when interests have diverged, both within members of the European
Union and between some European states and the United States, these transatlantic links
have endured, testifying to a continued sense of belonging to a loosely defined “West” as
different and distinct from the “the rest.” This, in itself, is another long-lasting legacy of the
Cold War.
This paper is part of the History and Policy-Making Initiative, a joint research project led by
the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the International History Department of
the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva.
Notes
[1] Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, London: Phoenix Press, 2000, p. 810.
[2] Excerpt from Winston Churchill’s so-called Iron Curtain speech, delivered on 5 March
1946 in Fulton, Missouri.
About the Author
Dr. Barbara Zanchetta is currently a Senior Researcher at the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies in Geneva working in a research project called
Reassessing the End of the Cold War funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
She is specifically working on American foreign policy towards the Middle East during the
last decade of the Cold War, and on a monograph provisionally titled The United States
and the ‘Arc of Crisis’: American foreign policy, radical Islam and the end of the Cold War,
1979-1989.
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