Asia Pacific Viewpoint Vol. 59, No.

2, 2018
ISSN 1360-7456, pp173–185

The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

Emma Mawdsley
Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3EN, UK.
Email: [email protected]

Abstract: A more polycentric global development landscape has emerged over the past decade or so, ruptur-
ing the formerly dominant North–South axis of power and knowledge. This can be traced through more diversi-
fied development norms, institutions, imaginaries and actors. This paper looks at one trend within this turbulent
field: namely, the ways in which ‘Northern’ donors appear to be increasingly adopting some of the narratives
and practices associated with ‘Southern’ development partners. This direction of travel stands in sharp contrast
to expectations in the early new millennium that the (so-called) ‘traditional’ donors would ‘socialise’ the ‘rising
powers’ to become ‘responsible donors’. After outlining important caveats about using such cardinal terms, the
paper explores three aspects of this ‘North’ to ‘South’ movement. These are (i) the stronger and more explicit
claim to ‘win-win’ development ethics and outcomes; (ii) the (re)turn from ‘poverty reduction’ to ‘economic
growth’ as the central analytic of development; and (iii) related to both, the explicit and deepening blurring and
blending of development finances and agendas with trade and investment.

Keywords: development studies, North–South development, polycentric development, Southerni-

sation, South–South development cooperation

Introduction But even as the geographies of poverty, wealth

and inequality became more variegated over
From its inception, the global development the decades (e.g. Harris, 1986), producing new
regime has been dominated by the ideologies, and often more complex development chal-
norms and practices of northern actors.1 These lenges (Rigg this volume), the North–South
actors include civil society organisations, think development binary remained tenacious
tanks and philanthropic organisations and (Weiss, 2009).
states, the latter being the focus of this paper. For the most part, development studies teach-
The corollary of this northern dominance is the ing, the subject of this special issue, reflected
conventional framing and positioning of the these uneven power geometries, sometimes
South as passive, needy, unruly and/or deviant endorsing and reproducing them, but increas-
(Donald Trump’s ‘shithole countries’). ‘North– ingly critiquing and contesting them. Orthodox
South’ axes in the institutions, structures and endorsement can be traced in many develop-
imaginaries of global development have per- ment historiographies and their omissions (exam-
sisted through otherwise profound paradigmatic ined by Prashad, 2007); the frequent under-
shifts. Ideologies have changed from state-led representation of Southern agency in interna-
modernisation to the neoliberalisms of the tional relations, including global development
Washington, post-Washington and California governance (examined by Alden et al., 2010);
Consensus (Gore, 2000; Desai and Kharas, and over-emphasis on modalities like foreign aid,
2008; Hart, 2010); as have contexts, from the projects and programmes (examined by Glennie,
Cold War to the ‘war on terror’, for example, 2008); as well as in bibliographic and citational
(Duffield, 2007). Progressive and even radical practices. But development studies as a discipline
ideas have been absorbed and co-opted into (and critical development studies taught in
the mainstream – basic needs, women (later anthropology, geography and elsewhere) has also
gender), participation and sustainability and so been a champion of more critical perspectives.
on (Chambers, 1983; Adams, 2009; Chant and These include dependency and world systems
Beetham, 2014; Cornwall and Edwards, 2014). theories, Marxism, post-structuralism, post-

© 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd doi:10.1111/apv.12192
 E. Mawdsley

colonialism, Indigenous theory, post-develop- Vicente, 2012; Tang et al., 2015; Constantine
ment, feminist theories, critical race theory and et al., 2016; Scoones et al., 2016; Shankland
queer theory (Wallerstein, 1979; Escobar, 1995; and Gonçalves, 2016; Xu et al., 2016; Amanor
Kapoor, 2008; McEwan, 2009; Six, 2009; Amar, and Chichava, 2016; Taela, 2016). Novel col-
2012; Gudynas, 2016). In different ways, critical laborations are growing, and there are signs of
theorists have powerfully decentred and ‘paro- convergence around particular agendas and
chialised’ the West (Chakrabarty, 1992) in the modalities between some actors, in certain sites,
context of development. However, while founda- and around particular interests (e.g. Curtis,
tional within scholarly circles, and to greater and 2013; Kragelund, 2015; Mawdsley, 2017a). Crit-
lesser extents engaged with and supporting activ- ically, however, as ‘non-traditional’ partners
ism and social movements, these different critical have grown in visibility and stature, they have
perspectives have mostly had rather limited managed to retain their ideational autonomy.
impacts on institutional North–South structures Notwithstanding elements of convergence, and
and levers of developmental power. the variety of relationships that have been culti-
Over the last decade, however, the circum- vated with the (so-called) ‘traditional donors’
stances for the (re)production of the North– who are members of the Development Assis-
South development axis and its contestation tance Committee of the Organisation for Eco-
and critique have changed very substantially. nomic Cooperation and Development (the
Horner and Hulme (2017) suggest that ‘the con- OECD-DAC, or just DAC),2 and multilateral
temporary global map of development appears organisations, Southern partners have resisted
increasingly incommensurable with any notion wholesale co-option into the structures and
of a clear spatial demarcation between First and norms of the ‘traditional’ development regime.
Third Worlds, “developed” and “developing”, or This is despite the early expectations of the DAC
rich and poor, countries’ (see also Kanbur and and its members that their role would be to
Sumner, 2012; Sidaway, 2012; Roy and Crane, ‘socialise’ the rising powers into becoming
2015). The changing global geographies of ‘responsible’ and ‘proper’ donors in the early/
wealth, poverty, inequality and precarity are so mid-2000s, of which more below.
profound that mainstream actors, including Much of the ‘convergence’ analysis in the
those that have been active boundary makers, field of development co-operation takes as its
have had to respond. In 2016, for example, the starting point the changes taking place – or not
World Bank declared that it would no longer taking place – within and amongst various
use the term ‘developing countries’ for low Southern development actors (e.g. Kragelund,
and middle income states given the enormous 2015 for a nuanced discussion of China and the
dissimilarities within these categories (Sandhu, development finance regime). This paper
2016). While there remain significant average focuses on the ways in which Northern donors
per capita income gaps between high- and have moved further ‘South’ than Southern part-
middle/low-income countries (Milanovic, 2016), ners have moved ‘North’.3 This argument
as well as enduring power differentials requires some serious caveats, and the question
(Vestergaard and Wade, 2014), many commen- mark in the title points to caution in at least two
tators now point to a more polycentric develop- registers. The first concerns the dangers of
ment landscape (Kragelund, 2015; Fejerskov essentialism and gross simplification in using
et al., 2016; Lewis, 2017). ‘North’ and ‘South’. The diversity and dyna-
A key set of actors and processes upsetting this mism of both of these categories render them
long-standing binary are a variety of Southern, hugely problematic as empirical or analytical
Gulf and Eurasian countries. Collectively, they constructs (Lancaster, 2007; Mawdsley, 2012).
are providers of a growing share of development To offer a few obvious examples, Mexico and
finance and resources, of distinctive ideas and the Turkey are currently more influential part-
approaches, and their presence is increasingly ners in global development forums than Chile
necessary to the credibility and legitimacy of or Thailand; China prioritises infrastructure
older and newer donor forums and development within its development portfolio more than
organisations (Carmody, 2011; Cheru and Obi, Cuba; and the USA is more strongly shaped by
2010; Chaturvedi et al., 2012; Gonzalez- competing domestic interests than Norway.

174 © 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
 The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

China, Korea and Japan all have attributes of some ways, ‘Southernisation’ is in part a return
‘Asian donors’, but each one is very differently to the status quo ante.
historically positioned in relation to the DAC With these very important caveats in mind,
and other development actors. The term ‘South- the paper hopes to avoid essentialist and ahis-
ernisation’ therefore begs the question of torical constructions of ‘North/northern’ and
‘which’ South – Brazil, China or Cuba, or for ‘South/southern’, even as it proposes a broad
that matter, Indonesia or Senegal? Should ideas resolution argument. Specifically, I will examine
of ‘Southernisation’ take the state as the unit of three areas where there appears to have been a
analysis? The variations within and across the ‘Southernisation’ of global development over
‘North’ and the ‘South’ are profound, in other the last decade. These are in: (i) discursive fram-
words, and multiple points of difference and ings of a ‘win-win’ ethics of development, insist-
similarity can be found intersecting across this ing that (supposedly) ‘national’ interests are
complex field. compatible with partner benefits and develop-
The second caveat is that the arguments pre- ment effectiveness more broadly; (ii) the (re)turn
sented here are thrown into particularly stark from ‘poverty reduction’ to ‘economic growth’
relief given the recent context of the Millennium as the ‘central analytic’ of development; and
Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–2015), and (iii) related to both, the explicit and deepening
the associated reforms of the ‘aid effectiveness’ blurring and blending of development finances
and poverty reduction agendas. Notwithstand- and agendas with trade and investment. The
ing important continuities, this period was paper concludes with a brief discussion of the
something of an outlier in global development rationales and drivers of the ‘Southernisation’ of
history. From the 1950s to the mid/late-1990s, development. Before doing so, the next
Northern aid and development policy was typi- section outlines the early expectations that the
cally more openly oriented to economic and DAC donors would and should help ‘socialise’
geopolitical agendas; tied to donor goods and the emerging Southern partners.
services; and in earlier decades, lax in its atten-
tion to environmental standards, democracy
Early expectations
and human rights. These attributes are (rightly
or wrongly) now more strongly associated with As has been well-documented, Southern devel-
the South. Hulme and Fukuda-Parr (2009) ana- opment partnership dates back decades. A high
lyse the late 1990s as a moment of convergence point of activity and analysis came in the 1970s,
between political agendas, opportunities and as demonstrated in the launch of the Buenos
agents, which together provided a window Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Imple-
through which the MDGs and the poverty menting Technical Cooperation among Devel-
reduction agenda emerged. In the following oping Countries in 1978, in support of calls for a
years, politicians, policy advocates and celebri- New International Economic Order (Prashad,
ties championed a powerful narrative of 2007). Over the 1980s and 1990s, however,
(Northern) morality as the ethical impetus for South–South was increasingly neglected in
aid and development (Sachs, 2005; Gallagher, scholarly and policy circles. This started to
2009; Richey, 2016). Also relevant is the fact change in the early/mid-2000s, as the ‘tradi-
that since the 1980s, Northern donors have tional’ centres of the global development regime
tended to place growing emphasis on institu- started to become more aware of the growing
tions, governance and social programmes and activities and impacts of Southern development
technologies. This has been contrasted both partners (Manning, 2006). Above all, this
with Southern insistence on non-interference/ applied to China, and specifically, to an often
refusal to impose policy conditionalities; and reductionist construct of ‘China-Africa’. China
their stronger emphasis on the importance of was and still is the biggest ‘emerging’ Southern
material infrastructures underpinning economic partner, but even so, the disproportionate early
growth. One could argue, therefore, that the share of ‘China-Africa’ analysis and much of its
Northern donors have been at their most dis- tone appeared to indicate that these partnerships
tinctive vis-à-vis Southern partners over the were particularly transgressive of dominant
MDG period compared to earlier decades: in norms and imaginaries (see Hitchens, 2008).

© 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 175
 E. Mawdsley

Northern media and policy commentary was economically, the key driver of Northern desires
sometimes shaped by uninformed and hostile to ‘socialise’ the Southern development partners
perspectives on China; proprietorial and neo- lay in the increasing concerns about their use of
colonial views of Africa; and uncritical claims to state-backed development finance to consider-
Northern goodwill and expertise (Mawdsley, able competitive effect.
2008). A feature of some of this more hostile There were, of course, more expert voices,
debate was the weak differentiation between notably Bräutigam (2009), and more informed
sectors (e.g. agriculture, minerals, manufactur- and aware research-based work began emerg-
ing), countries (e.g. South Africa, Ethiopia, the ing across ‘North’, ‘South’ and their many inter-
Democratic Republic of Congo) and types of sections. But over these early years, while
partnership (e.g. investment, trade, technical recognising that any emerging field tends to
assistance). The ‘China-Africa’ focus also proceed unevenly and iteratively, some aca-
resulted in a distorted analysis of the broader demic, media and policy debate around the ‘ris-
South–South phenomenon, neglecting (early on) ing powers’ and South–South cooperation
other ‘BRICS’ [Brazil, Russia, India, China and struggled to find accurate terms, to understand
South Africa] partners, working within and alternative principles of ‘development’, and to
across Africa, not to mention the dozens of smal- de-centre the historical assumptions that shaped
ler Southern partners. It also often obscured simi- North–South development geographies. To be
lar involvement and practices by Northern clear, this is not an argument for an uncritical
powers in some cases, such as the use of celebration of Southern development partner-
resource-backed loans (Bräutigam, 2009). This ship, but an observation of the importance of
focus ignored other geographies too – many reflexive and informed analysis based in rigor-
Southern partners had older and now (re-)emerg- ous research and evidence: not something
ing development histories in South America, the always strongly present in the first decade of the
Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific. new millennium. This then was the context in
Scholars and analysts working beyond China- the early 2000s for the widespread assumption
Africa were initially in a distinct minority, which that the role of the OECD-DAC and its member
limited awareness of the ways in which ‘China- states would to attempt to ‘socialise’ the rising
Africa’ was representative or not of South-South non-DAC partners into the proper conduct and
Cooperation (SSC). Overall, Southern develop- principles of donorship. Global development
ment partnerships were often poorly understood was one target for Robert Zoellick’s memorable
– many Northern commentators referred to the insistence that, ‘China needs to become a
various flows and activities that comprise the responsible world power’.4 For Abdenur and Da
loose, blurred and blended category of ‘devel- Fonseca (2013) this was a project of co-option.
opment cooperation’ as ‘foreign aid’, and in This assumption of tutelage was in keeping
doing so, fell into an erroneous comparison. with the long history of North–South develop-
Heightening the sense of difference, as noted ment. Critical scholars point to post-colonial
above, was the cultural script of Northern for- continuities of personnel, imaginaries and insti-
eign aid in the heady years of the Millennium tutions in newly established development indus-
Development Goals and the unfolding Paris tries (Kothari, 2007). In the following decades,
agenda on ‘aid effectiveness’. Together they this was expressed through the persistent tropes
assembled a particularly strong framing of of Third World lack, deficiencies, perversity and
(Northern) aid as a disinterested and fundamen- backwardness, which could and should be over-
tally virtuous transfer of funds and expertise to come by emulating (idealised and partial projec-
solve poverty. This obfuscation of the long- tions of ) ‘northern’ economies, polities and
standing (and still extant) geopolitical and geo- subjectivities. The role of the benign donor
economic agendas of foreign aid encouraged community was to help provide the material
attitudes of moral disdain for China’s develop- resources, science and knowledge, and the
ment principles and approaches (Chan, 2013), modern for development, as well as the neces-
as well as technical and policy views that the sary disciplining tools and presence to overcome
‘new donors’ would need to be taught how to recalcitrance and ensure compliance. Yet,
‘do development properly’. Politically and despite the ‘graduation’ of a number of South-

176 © 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
 The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

East Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s benefit, enabling both partners to retain their
(to use the official terminology, which none too dignity through exchange (whether of resources,
subtly exemplifies the trope of children ‘growing expertise, or votes at the UN). In the language of
up’), in the early 2000s the global development much South–South cooperation, this was ‘win-
community initially seemed rather unprepared win’ development, explicit in its claims to be of
to deal with the ‘rise of the South’ (UNDP, mutual benefit. The table was intended to be a
2013). China and others were becoming power- heuristic device, and not a hard and fast binary;
ful economic and political powers, and (poten- nor an explanation of actual motivations and
tial) challengers of global norms and structures, principles, but of important founding and fram-
while often still having very substantial shares of ing ‘myths’.5 Interestingly, and importantly for
the world’s poor. This has raised a host of tricky this paper, while both sets of discursive claims
issues for national development agencies and and their component tropes and vocabularies
multilateral institutions, which were designed to have persisted and remain important, it is possi-
operate around the earlier binaries of ble to trace some revealing shifts. A number of
developed-developing (Kanbur and Sum- Southern partners appear to be projecting an
ner, 2012). increasingly pragmatic set of underlying princi-
Although there is still evidence of poorly ples, with less reference to the lofty ideals of
informed and/or Eurocentric media and policy Southern solidarity. For example, Marcondes
discussion, knowledge and understanding of and Mawdsley (2017b: 689) note that:
SSC has clearly evolved and improved in the
last decade. There is evidence of some ‘South-
After a few months in office, [President] Rous-
to-North’ convergence over this time – amongst seff told [Foreign Minister] Patriota that she
some Southern partners, around some issues, at was interested in a results-orientated diplo-
some moments and in some places (Kragelund, macy, with more concrete achievements and
2015; Mawdsley, 2017a). But in contrast to less ‘symbolism’. This emphasis continued dur-
early expectations of socialising the Southern ing her second term. Foreign Minister Mauro
partners and assuming the tutelary mantle, there Vieira (2015–2016) stated that the ‘valuable
has also been more of what looks very like a symbolism of [diplomatic] presence could not
‘North-to-South’ direction of travel in several replace a diplomacy of results – results mea-
registers. These are discussed below. sured with numbers’.

The focus of this section, however, is shifts in

Discursive framing. In Mawdsley (2012), I for- Northern donor narratives. As noted above, the
mulated a table which set out a simplified – MDG era was characterised by a particularly
almost caricatured – comparison of the strong projection of the moral imperative of
dominant narrative differences between North- poverty reduction and associated improvements
ern foreign aid and Southern development assis- in hunger, health, mortality, empowerment and
tance. The former, I suggested, was discursively so on. Notwithstanding the realpolitik of aid,
constructed as a sympathetically-motivated the official discourse and dominant public
transfer from richer to poorer countries, based understanding of aid in Northern countries were
on the superior model, knowledge and expertise strongly articulated by politicians, policy-
of the West. Virtue was derived from the (appar- makers, celebrities and advocates as that of
ent) charity of the donation, or in the language ‘doing good’ to the ‘less fortunate’ (Gallagher,
gift theory, by (apparently) suspending the obli- 2009; Brockington, 2014; Richey, 2016). These
gation to reciprocate. I suggested that SSC, on discourses were supported and strategically
the other hand, was discursively constructed as advanced by many NGO campaigns which
an empathetically motivated act of solidarity have sought to cajole Northern publics and pol-
with other formerly colonised and still subordi- iticians into funding and action based on
nated countries, based on shared identities and images of desperate need, despair, hunger and
experience-based knowledge. Gift theory hopelessness; more recently, images of decent,
reveals the virtue of this model, which is derived aspirational individuals who just need a hand-
precisely from the insistence on reciprocal up have been used. Dogra (2012) argues that

© 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 177
 E. Mawdsley

whether NGOs deploy images of despair or dig- – appear to have embraced a more assertive,
nity, most have done little to educate their giv- explicit and openly articulated set of claims
ing publics of the structural causes of global about how foreign aid works in ‘the national
inequality.6 Aid can act to conceal and obscure interest’ (Breman, 2011; Mawdsley, 2017b).
exploitation past and present, while conferring This is invariably finessed as nonetheless being
upon donor countries and publics a sense of of ‘mutual benefit’ to partner countries (Keijzer
their generosity, decency and national virility and Lundsgaarde, 2017). The 2015 UK aid strat-
(Kapoor, 2008). However, notwithstanding this egy paper, for example, published by George
very strong ‘charity’ discourse, different North- Osborne and the Treasury in partnership with
ern donors have always variously acknowl- Department for International Development, is
edged and sometimes actively (although called ‘UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in
selectively) publicised the ways in which their the National Interest’.7 Northern donors are
foreign aid contributions serve ‘national self- increasingly adopting a language of develop-
interests’. Any one donor has multiple voices – ment partnership that invokes Southern claims
Prime Ministers and Presidents, Ministers and to ‘win-win’ development, including the
other politicians, diplomats, civil servants, unapologetic, explicit claim that aid is and
development agencies and so on. They speak to should be ‘mutually beneficial’.
different audiences – a Minister at a policy A number of factors explain the stronger
launch at Chatham House or the United emphasis on the pragmatic benefits of aid to the
Nations is likely to adjust some tone and rea- donor. These include the election of conserva-
soning when it comes to a breakfast television tive governments in many countries during this
show. Justifying foreign aid budgets in part by period (including the Australia, Canada,
articulating national self-interest is the case for New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the UK);
some DAC donors more than others – Australia and the global financial and Eurozone crises,
and the USA, for example, have traditionally which have to different extents and in different
been more emphatic in justifying their Official ways put aid budgets under stronger public
Development Assistance (ODA) budgets in scrutiny and pressure. From the (supposed) uni-
terms of national interest, compared to, say, versality of the Sustainable Development Goals
Sweden. But even in the heyday of the UK’s to the growing levels of poverty and precarity in
insistence on ethical foreign policy under New high income countries, the changing geogra-
Labour (1997–2010), for example, politicians phies of wealth, poverty and inequality are also
included aspects of national self-interest as part contexts for the stronger desire to justify aid in
of their justification for the ODA budget terms of domestic benefits. Such justifications
(Gallagher, 2009). Complementary, competing include arguments about soft power, the
and contradictory rationales for aid budgets and ‘enlightened self-interest’ behind supporting
development interventions are a reality global pubic goods, supposed links with
(Lancaster 2007). Although the ‘charity’ framing national security, and the role of aid in fostering
was very strong in most DAC members over the economic opportunity (Mawdsley, 2017b).
MDG era, it would be a mistake to see the Importantly, another reason behind the shift in
growing insistence on aid acting in the national ‘traditional’ donor narratives lies in the growing
interest – to which we now turn – as sense of competition with Southern develop-
entirely new. ment partners, especially the larger ones. North-
Bearing in mind, therefore, that this is not a ern donors are keenly aware of the (tempered)
stark transition but more a change in the bal- welcome extended to Southern partners by
ance of narrative threads, I suggest that over the recipient governments, and the successful pro-
last decade or so there has been a discernible jection (if more complicated reality) of the lan-
shift in the discursive framing of aid rationalities guage of ‘win-win’. Southern partners are
amongst most if not all DAC donors. Individual actively and openly subsidising commercial
Northern donors still differ in their particular ref- trade and investment through technical assis-
erences and ‘myths’, and in how they balance tance, diplomacy and various forms of blended
different rationalities to different domestic and finance (explored in more detail below). The
international audiences. But most – perhaps all paternalism of Northern aid narratives and as

178 © 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
 The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

well as its practices are being challenged by They differed on the dominant mechanisms –
increasingly empowered partner countries, very broadly, growth and redistribution versus
enabled in part by the growing presence of growth and trickle down. State-led modernisa-
alternative Southern resources, approaches and tion aimed to transform economies, societies
partnerships. and subjectivities primarily by mobilising invest-
To conclude, the discernible shift to a stron- ment in ‘modern’ sectors and major infrastruc-
ger assertion of national self-interest (claimed to tures; while neoliberal development has aimed
be mutually beneficial) by Northern donors is to stimulate growth primarily through deregula-
the result of a whole series of specific articula- tion, marketization, trade and the fostering of
tions of domestic and international factors. individualised entrepreneurial subjectivities and
Whatever the particular confluence of drivers opportunities. Needless to say, the actual out-
for individual donors, Northern donors overall comes of these approaches have been highly
geographically and socially variable. But for all
currently sound more like Southern develop-
of their differences, what these changing
ment partners in some of their discursive posi-
approaches shared was economic growth as the
tioning around aid and global development
‘central analytic’ of development, to use Hulme
than the other way around. Whether this strat-
and Fukuda-Parr’s (2009) term. Thus, the con-
egy will be convincing to domestic audiences
sensus that emerged in the late 1990s/early
or partner countries is another question. In the 2000s around the idea that aid and develop-
case of international partners though, it is ment policy should first and foremost be
important to note that while Northern donors directly aimed at poverty reduction, was quite
appear to be increasingly mimicking the ‘win- distinctive. Economic growth was viewed as
win’ language of Southern partners, they cannot essential to this agenda, but in a novel depar-
appropriate the Third World-ist history of these ture, poverty reduction moved to become the
claims to solidarity and mutual experience of ‘central analytic’. Emblematic of this was the
colonial and post-colonial subordination. very first Millennium Development Goal, which
was to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Economic growth strategies. Economic growth by 2015.
appears to be an almost unassailable synonym In the early 2000s, Southern states – and
and metric for mainstream global development. famously, the BRICs (later the BRICS) – started
GDP remains sovereign as the ever expanding to become more visible and influential drivers
and elusive horizon and vehicle of ‘develop- of the global economy. Their surging domestic
ment’, notwithstanding the fact that the growth production and demand, trade and outward
fetish has been tempered within mainstream investment, all became the subjects of intense
development in a variety of ways (the human scrutiny and discussion. This ‘rise of the South’
development index, human security and so on) (UNDP, 2013) underpinned a significant
and profoundly critiqued from ‘without’ (indige- expansion of development cooperation, often
nous and peasant activists, post-development blurred and blended with diplomacy, trade and
theorists, ecofeminists and now also through investment. All Southern partners include tech-
ideas around de-growth). Ideological prefer- nical assistance, humanitarian intervention,
ences for the respective role of states, markets social programmes and so on in their develop-
and institutions have changed over the decades, ment partnerships. But many are now also
but the foundational pillar of economic growth placing a higher and/or expanding emphasis
has not in itself been shaken. That said, as men- on fostering (supposedly) mutually beneficial
tioned above, the late 1990s and early 2000s economic growth as the primary engine of
saw the emergence of a distinctive agenda ‘development’ (for a critical assessment, see
within the (northern-dominated) international González-Vincente, 2013). This has tended to
community, elevating poverty reduction to the take the form of very substantial investments in
primary goal of development (Hulme and roads, ports, information and communications
Fukuda-Parr, 2009). In previous eras, the eco- technologies and energy production and trans-
nomic benefits of state-led modernisation or mission; as well as minerals/oil, agricultural
market-led neoliberalisation were expected to and manufacturing investment; and stimulating
eventually benefit the wider population, includ- trade and market-building. As we have seen
ing through a secular decline in poverty rates. above, this is couched within ethical claims to

© 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 179
 E. Mawdsley

‘win-win’ development between formerly colo- to physical infrastructure by Northern donors.

nised and subordinated states. While most donors cannot compete with, say,
In this section, I suggest that once again, the Chinese road contractors for construction ten-
‘North’ has ‘Southernised’ over the last decade. ders, they can provide engineering and mana-
A trend that has been widely recognised by gerial expertise and collaborate in infrastructure
global development commentators and scholars financing packages. The well-known Chinese
is the (re)turn to economic growth as the domi- saying ‘If you want to get rich, first build a road’
nant development agenda within the ‘tradi- appears to have permeated DAC consciousness,
tional’ development community (shared, it and there is evidence that donors are re-
should be said, with security – although here balancing their development portfolios (in terms
too, economic growth, jobs and opportunities of personnel, funding, projects and pro-
are widely seen as part of the answer). It should grammes) back towards supporting infrastruc-
be clear from the discussion above that this was tural development. Northern and multilateral
not an abrupt transition, but a shift in balance – donors are talking more about the necessity of
of policy language, in the allocation of funding, financing infrastructure for development, build-
and in the buzz around particular approaches ing up their business consultancy funding and
and initiatives. Again too, the causes are com- roles and (as we will see below), allocating a
plex rather than singular, and each DAC donor growing share of traditional ODA towards
economic growth strategies (e.g. Gutman
is subject to a specific set of contexts and
et al. 2015).
drivers. While competition and collaboration
Without over-simplifying too much, it would
with Southern partners is one such driver (the
be reasonable to say that in the formation and
focus of this section), others include the domes-
early years of the MDG period, much of the
tic impacts of the Eurozone (for some) and
emphasis and energy of DAC donors lay in the
global financial crises. The threats and chal-
‘software’ of development – capacity-building,
lenges of automation and profound alterations
governance and institutions; and in social and
in the world of work, allied to a ‘youth bulge’ in economic programmes that focused on individ-
many countries, has pushed and incentivised an uals and families – health, education, microcre-
emphasis on ‘growth and jobs’. Poverty reduc- dit. But the world around was changing, with
tion is certainly still high on the agenda, but the Southern powers especially driving rising com-
‘buzz’ is around finding ways to stimulate modity prices, emerging markets, and new fron-
growth. Although there is much discussion, tiers of profit-making. At the same time,
from the UN down about ‘private sector-led building roads, ports and other major infrastruc-
growth’, the development industry appears to tural investments became emblematic of Chi-
be willingly embracing the idea that it should nese development cooperation in particular, but
use official finances and state activity to subsi- Brazil, India and others were doing this too.
dise the private sector, as discussed in more Whatever the respective successes and failures
detail in the next section. Astonishingly, and of these different interventions and emphases, if
highly regressively, the discussion of whether one had to point to a dominant direction of
and how growth may translate into sustainable travel, it would be clear that it is the Northern
and inclusive ‘development’ appears once donors who have moved more strongly to
again to be reliant on neoliberal assumptions of embrace Southern approaches and agendas
trickle down. than vice versa.
This renewed emphasis on the centrality of
economic growth promotion as a development Explicit blurring and blending of development
strategy for poorer countries is taking several finances and agendas with trade and
forms. What is particularly interesting for investment. The argument of this section inter-
the argument being developed here around the sects with the two above. That is, the amplifying
‘Southernisation’ of development, are the notion that foreign aid should openly support
changing economic prescriptions and tools that national interest on the one hand (albeit in ways
are being mobilised in support of this growth. assumed to align with recipient benefits), and
We will come to ‘development finance’ in the the growing emphasis on private sector and
next section, but here note the growing (re)turn infrastructure-led economic growth strategies on

180 © 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
 The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

the other, are discursively and materially the 2011 Busan High-Level meeting. Amongst
threaded through an increasingly explicit blur- other things, ‘traditional donors’ were evidently
ring and blending of development finances and failing to meet requirements to harmonise and
with trade and investment goals (Janus et al., align, and the unfolding Eurozone and global
2015). As in previous sections, it would be financial crises were creating a chillier eco-
wrong to see this as a sudden or new phase. For- nomic and geopolitical context than that of the
eign aid has always openly and covertly been confidently expansionary era of the early new
used to support trade and investment in various millennium. At the same time, Busan was a
ways – from the illegal deals associated with the clear marker of Southern empowerment –
UK’s Pergau Dam scandal in Malaysia China most notably, but other Southern part-
(Lankester, 2013), to the role of official bilateral ners too, made it obvious that they would not
Development Finance Institutions in stimulating be swayed by the blandishments of the tradi-
investment in poorer countries, for example. tional powers (Eyben and Savage, 2013;
Over the last two decades, there has been a wel- Mawdsley et al., 2014). But if the future of
come debate, although only very partial moves older and newer development cooperation
towards, ‘policy coherence for development’ in forums (such as the DAC, Development Coop-
many ‘traditional’ donor states and forums. Here eration Forum, Global Partnership for Effective
the intention is that the (supposedly) beneficial Development Cooperation) looked a little
impacts of aid should not be undone by other shaky, there was more convergence around the
policies in other sectors. Rather, foreign aid and idea of ‘development effectiveness’. As
development policies should – in theory – be described in the section above, this can be
positively supported by other national policies loosely defined as the (re)turn to economic
(e.g. procurement, transparency, agricultural growth as the central analytic in development.
protectionism, global supply chains and so on). This agenda is being built around deepening
So, once again, in suggesting that blurring and state-capital formations like Public Private Part-
blending of sectors, agendas or policies repre- nerships, in which ODA is re-purposed to
sents a ‘Southernisation’ of development, the directly serve trade and investment.
issue is one of emphasis and balance, rather A founding rationale for the creation of the
than a swerve in policy or complete novelty. OECD-DAC in 1960 was to prevent or limit
As noted earlier, the OECD DAC-led aid effec- member states from using ‘aid’ as an export
tiveness agenda, and UN-led poverty reduction credit, and thus ‘distort’ competition with other
agenda, both sought in some ways to ‘purify’ for- members. The USA was particularly concerned
eign aid and development. The aid effectiveness about former colonial powers using foreign aid
agenda relied on a depoliticised vision of to secure ongoing economic preferences in ex-
reformed donor-donor-recipient relations, colonies. The OECD-DAC thus sought to pro-
through a dominantly technocratic and rational- mote the voluntary regulation of foreign aid, or
ist vision of donors harmonising between them- Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), as it
selves, aligning with the systems and agendas of is more formally known. Over the years, the
recipients and acting in transparent and DAC has attempted to build a distinction and
accountable ways.8 The aid effectiveness regulate a divide between ODA and other forms
agenda attempted to respond to critiques of pre- of official (commercial/sovereign) financing.
vious decades of aid and development interven- The aid effectiveness agenda, codified in the
tions, including the distortion of aid by donors to 2005 Paris Declaration, was the latest iteration
serve national geostrategic (economic and politi- of this boundary-making, trying to ensure that
cal) interests. The poverty reduction agenda also aid ‘truly’ served developmental purposes. The
sought to reform aid and development regimes, premise was that one reason for the failure of
in this case by promoting norms and targets that aid to significantly impact on poverty reduction
directly centred on the most needy and vulnera- was that all too often it was distorted by donor
ble (Craig and Porter, 2003; Maxwell, 2003). economic and geopolitical interests.
While neither of these agendas has entirely Over the last 5–10 years, the World Bank,
disappeared, both have been superseded. The the OECD-DAC, and ‘traditional’ donors have,
aid effectiveness agenda ran into the ground at however, increasingly turned to the concept

© 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 181
 E. Mawdsley

and instruments of ‘development finance’,9 with Conclusions

profound implications for the governmentality of
aid and development. The move to the idea of In an increasingly polycentric development
‘development finance’ centres on the attempt to landscape, complex trends, patterns and direc-
broaden the definition and legitimate use of ODA tions of movement are evident across actors,
to enable it to leverage private sector investment sectors, places and modalities. In this paper I
(Kharas et al., 2011; Carroll and Jarvis, 2014), have picked out a roughly framed ‘North to
with ‘blended finance’ the emerging orthodoxy South’ direction in a number of important regis-
(Kenny, 2015). My argument is that this direction ters. This stands at odds with complacent
of travel could be said to be inspired by, or even expectations about the tutelary role of the North
mimic, the characteristic approaches of many that initially characterised the early new millen-
Southern states to development finance. Classi- nium, when the (re)emerging Southern develop-
cally, they have made much use of various forms ment partners were starting to expand
of state-subsidised funding and/or risk reduction significantly their global development partner-
instruments to promote trade and investment ships. In all three examples (changing moral
abroad. This is enrolled within their definition of narratives, the shift from poverty to growth and
‘development cooperation’, and defended as a from aid to development finance), there is a
mutually beneficial set of flows and outcomes. shift in balance rather than a completely novel
departure. But these trends are certainly taking
An example can be found in India’s Lines of
place, constituting just some of the elements of
Credit (LOC), which is managed by India’s EXIM
a post-north/south development geography.
Bank and Ministry of External Affairs and which is
Below this very broad resolution, of course, are
framed as a key part of India’s development assis-
much more specific interplays which both
tance to poorer countries in the region, Africa
endorse and complicate this argument. The
and beyond (Sinha, 2011). In theory, partner
implications for development studies pedagogy
countries (and sub- and non-state actors therein) are exciting and challenging. Today’s increas-
propose specific projects (e.g. port rehabilitation). ingly polycentric landscape is being shaped in
India provides cheap funding through an LOC, in multiple ways, including the ‘North’ moving
return for which, 70% must be spent on Indian ‘Southwards’.
goods and services. Proponents argue that this
exemplifies Southern development principles – it
is (supposedly) partner-led, mutually beneficial
Acknowledgements
and does not come with heavy-handed donor
conditionalities interfering with sovereign matters.
I would like to express my sincere thanks to
The benefits and problems associated with LOCs
Kearrin Sims, Lisa Law and all of the organisers
can be explored (Saxena, 2016), but the point and participants at the Rethinking Development
here is that Northern donors have moved from Pedagogies conference in 2017. Thanks to both
(mostly) criticism to (considerable) emulation of anonymous reviewers who provided very help-
these Southern practices. ful advice on improvements. I am immensely
For many, these are very positive trends – the grateful to The Leverhulme Trust for their gener-
Sustainable Development Goals, for example, ous support through a Leverhulme Research
are predicated on moving beyond aid (the Fellowship.
MDG model) to unlocking all sorts of blurred
and blended finances. ‘From billions to trillions’
is the call to arms. For others, the danger is that
Notes
this will simply deepen and accelerate capitalist
accumulation, unevenly and unjustly, creatively 1 The constructs of ‘little d’ and ‘big D’ development, and
but destructively: while the development indus- the relationships between them (Hart, 2010), are more
try does what it has always done, which is to complex than is sometimes suggested. Their shorthand
use for immanent/intentional ‘development’ can be use-
normalise, contain and validate these ideas, ful, but also problematic in suggesting too strong a
instruments and outcomes in the name of boundary. Much ‘South–South’ development partnership
‘progress’. quite deliberately transcends this distinction – a subject

182 © 2018 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
 The ‘Southernisation’ of development?

for another paper. This paper is broadly concerned with Amar, P. (ed.) (2012) Global south to the rescue emerging
what is usually defined as ‘big D’ development, but I do humanitarian superpowers and globalizing rescue
not adhere conceptually or empirically to the industries. London, UK: Routledge.
distinction. Bräutigam, D. (2009) The Dragon’s gift: The real story of
2 The OECD-DAC (initially known as the Development China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Assistance Group) was founded in 1960. Membership Breman, J. (2011) A change for the better? Dutch
was initially limited to only the richest countries, and development aid in the good times and bad times.
until 2010, Japan was the only non-Northern member. It Review essay, Development and Change 42(3):
now has 30 members (including the European Union in 833–848.
its own right). In 2010, South Korea joined Japan as only Brockington, D. (2014) Celebrity advocacy and international
the second Asian member state. development (rethinking development). London, UK:
3 At this point I am going to leave out the Gulf and Eur- Routledge.
asian states, as very particular development actors. Some Carmody, P. (2011) The new scramble for Africa.
of the analysis that follows could be adapted and Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
debated in the context of these states, but I believe they Carroll, T. and D.S.L. Jarvis (2014) Financialisation and
would need more specific analysis than space provides development in Asia. London, UK: Routledge.
in this paper. Chakrabarty, D. (1992) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial-
4 Memorable for its breathtaking hypocrisy. Zoellick was ity and the critique of history, Cultural Studies 6(3):
one of the supporters of the neoconservative ‘Project for 337–357.
a New American Century’ that, amongst other things, Chambers, R. (1983) Rural development: Putting the last
advocated the invasion of Iraq at the first possible oppor- first. Essex, UK: Longmans Scientific and Technical
tunity. This culpably irresponsible decision has had dev- Publishers New York: John Wiley.
astating and ongoing consequences. Chan, S. (ed.) (2013) The morality of China in Africa: The
5 To my chagrin, I have sometimes seen this reproduced middle kingdom and the dark continent. London: Zed
as ‘actual’ differences between Southern and Northern Books.
actors, despite explanations in the text that it referred to Chant, S. and G. Beetham (eds.) (2014) Gender, poverty,
discourses. The table has stalked me ever since. and development. Critical concepts in development
6 Exceptions include Oxfam’s campaign on inequality, studies. London, UK: Routledge.
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