American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

Economic Development and the Distribution of Land Rents in Singapore: A Georgist

Implementation
Author(s): Sock-Yong Phang
Source: The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 489-
501
Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
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 Economic Development and the Distribution
of Land Rents in Singapore:
A Georgist Implementation

By SOCK-YONG
PHANG*

ABSTRACT. Independent Singapore, which has a tradition of free trade, has

implemented large doses of Henry George's prescriptions. It has successfully
captured land rents for redistribution through its land acquisition, public hous-
ing and other programs.These policies have been instrumentalin the successful
economic development of the island city state. Industrialestates on state-owned
land were leased to foreign multinationals for export-oriented manufacturing
which created the bulk of jobs in the sector. Commercial developments are
built by the private sector on land leased through the government sale of sites
program.Affordable99-yearleasehold housing, built by the state, provided added
economic incentives for employment, and helped keep inflation and wages
down. Privatemotor vehicle ownership and usage are heavily taxed. While land-
related policies have improved international competitiveness and wealth dis-
tribution generally, particular aspects have generated wipeouts and windfalls
in an almost lottery-like manner. George would have approved of the former
but not the latter. Apart from the horizontal equity issues of selective taxes,
selective subsidies and partial takings, successful land value capture has con-
tributed to large and persistent budget surpluses with implications for inter
generational equity. The progress which Singapore has made from the poverty
of the 1960s represents an excellent case for the ideas of Henry George.

The Ideas of Henry George and the Policies of Singapore

HENRYGEORGEis not a name which is generally known to policy makers in

Singapore. However, a comparison of his ideas and Singapore's economic pol-
icies reveals fundamental similarities, as well as some areas of differences.
Henry George made a strong case for the taxation of rents from land, claiming
that this would abolish poverty and economic crises, the latterbeing simply the

* [Sock-YongPhang, PhD., is senior lecturerat the NationalUniversityof Singapore,Kent

Ridge,Singapore,119260,Republicof Singapore,E-mail([email protected]).]She wishes to thank
two anonymousreferees for useful commentson an earlierdraft.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 4 (October, 1996).
? 1996 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

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490 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

result of speculation in land values. While the targetof land taxation-the present
landowner-may have paid a market price reflective of the capitalized value,
George was of the view that it was not unfairfor the state to take these capitalized
values from the landowner.1He was an ardent advocate of free trade and a critic
of too centralized government management of the means of production-so-
cialism-as it would destroy spontaneous coordination. He did not believe in
government handouts as a solution to poverty but in incentives and rewards.
Singapore's success formula has included large doses of the above Georgist
elements.
Singapore is a small island city state with a total land area of 640 square
kilometers and a population of three million. It was founded as a Britishtrading
post in 1819 and remained a British colony until 1959 when it achieved internal
self-government. The People's Action Partywhich was elected in 1959 has been
returned at every election since. Singapore joined the then newly formed Fed-
eration of Malaysiain 1963 but withdrew in 1965 when it became an independent
republic. At the time of its independence, the Singapore government was con-
fronted with a host of political and economic problems soon compounded by
the closure of British military bases in Singapore. Rapid population growth, a
severe housing shortage evidenced by chronic overcrowding in dilapidated
buildings and squatter slums, and the need for employment creation topped
the list of problems.
Three decades later, Singapore has become a model for economic develop-
ment. It has enjoyed growth rates in GNP per capita which averaged 7 percent
annually and per capita income is presently in excess of US$20,000 (The World
Bank, 1995). There is virtually no unemployment and approximately one fifth
of the labor force is comprised of foreigners. The national savings rate is 51
percent while the home ownership rate is 92 percent. Many authors have at-
tempted analysis of the factors behind rapid growth in Singapore and in the
other EastAsian countries. In a recently published book, TheEastAsian Miracle,
the World Bank concludes that there is no single East Asian model and that
"...high performing Asian economies have used different and changing sets
of policies to achieve rapid growth with equity" (1993, 347). This paper rep-
resents an attempt to demonstratethat the Singaporemodel of economic growth
encompasses key policy prescriptions of Henry George.
Section 2 of this paper describes the process by which land rents in an ex-
tremely land scarce country were captured. Section 3 highlights the importance
of this exercise for international competitiveness and hence for the export-led
growth which Singapore has enjoyed. In Section 4, the massive public housing
program, through which the benefits of land value capture were redistributed,

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 Singapore and Georgist Policies 491

is described. Section 5 looks at the effects of land rent captureon the government
budget. The philosophy of the Singapore government with regard to incentives
and rewards,as reflected in its fiscal and social security policies, is also described.
Section 6, entitled "Wipeoutsand Windfalls,"examines the distributionalimpact
of certain land related policies. Section 7 concludes by highlighting areas of
policy concern.

II

Land Value Capture

THEREIS NO HINTof George's policies if one is to examine the property tax

system in Singapore.This is especially true in that no attempt is made to separate
site value from the improvements on land. A flat rate of 12 percent on the
estimated annual rental value of property applies. There is a concessionary tax
rate of 4 percent for owner-occupied residential properties. Unlike other East
Asian countries such as South Korea,Taiwan, andJapan, there is no capital gains
tax on private sector real estate transactions.2The Singapore government has,
instead, relied on the process of nationalization of land on a selective basis to
effect the process of land value capture.
This section describes the process through which land value capture has been
effected in Singapore. The general planning powers which have enabled the
government to capture land rents and to implement urban development in Sin-
gapore are contained principally in three pieces of legislation.3 These are: (1)
the Planning Act, (2) the LandAcquisition Act and (3) the Control of LandRent
Act. Another land-related class of policies involved those pertaining to the tax-
ation of motor vehicle ownership and usage. To the extent that road usage rights
represent rights to the use of a land related resource, the taxation of that right
is completely in line with George's prescription for land related taxation.
Planning is an important element of government policy. The Master Plan
which delineates land use in Singapore is derived from the Planning Act. The
nature and intensity of land use at a particular site is delineated by its zone
designation, density ratio, and plot ratio prescriptions. Landsare classified into
various predominant use zones, and buildings and uses are permitted, not per-
mitted or permitted subject to special consideration. The Plan is the statutory
basis for controlling private sector development. Public sector projects are ex-
empted from the limiting constraints of the plan. In the case of private devel-
opment, a development charge is levied upon the grant of permission for de-
velopment at densities in excess of the maximum densities prescribed in the
Master Plan, or for developments which require an alteration to the zoning

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492 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

prescribed by the Master Plan. The development charge is thus a form of a

betterment or windfall tax.
Shortly after independence in 1965, the Singapore government with the aid
of the United Nations, prepared a Concept Plan for purposes of long range land
use planning. The result was the 1971 Concept Plan which served as a physical
development policy and advisory plan for public sector led urban development
until the late 1980s. In 1987, with the mass transit system by then in place,
planners began a review of the concept plan which was completed in 1992.
During the period of review, the expected 1990 update of the Master Plan did
not materialize. Instead, bold changes were and are being made for land use
zoning and density prescriptions contained in 55 Development Guide Plans
(DGPs), 32 of which had been released by May 1996. These DGPs, which are
statutory in nature, are in accordance with the broad prescriptions of the New
Concept Plan.
The central piece of legislation for land nationalization and rent capture is
contained in Singapore's LandAcquisition Act of 1966. Between 1963 and 1965,
when Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia,Article 13 of the Con-
stitution of Malaysiaprovided that no person should be deprived of property
except as specified by the law, and that no law shall provide for compulsory
acquisition without adequate compensation. The new independent government
of Singapore was, however, strongly committed to the idea that urban land
should, with few exceptions, be owned by the state; this was due in no small
part to the extreme scarcity of land in the island republic. The LandAcquisition
Act of 1966, which became operative from 17 June 1967, conferred powers on
the state and its agencies to acquire land for any public purpose, or for any work
or undertaking which is of public benefit, public utility or public interest, or
for any residential, commercial or industrial purpose. An amendment in 1973
set compensation for acquired land at the marketvalue as at Nov. 30, 1973 (the
statutorydate) or at the date of gazette notification, whichever was lower. The
rate of compensation was thus independent of marketconditions as well as the
landowner's purchase price. Subsequent amendments fixed the statutorydates
as at Jan. 1, 1986, for property acquired on or after Nov. 30, 1987 but before
Jan. 18, 1993; as at Jan. 1, 1992, for property acquired on or afterJan. 18, 1993
but before Sep. 27, 1995; and Jan. 1, 1995, for property acquired on or after
Sep. 27, 1995.
A related piece of legislation which furtherdepressed land prices for acquired
land was the Control of Rent Act. Rent control was introduced in Singapore in
1947 by the British colonial government in the aftermath of World War II to
protect tenants at a time when there was a severe housing shortage. The statutory

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 Singapore and Georgist Policies 493

rent was set at the rateswhich existed on Aug. 1, 1939 and affected privateowned
premises built on or before Sep. 7, 1947. It remained generally in effect for the
next 40 years. Block decontrol for 32 hectares of prime land located in the central
business districtwas introduced in 1969. Vacantdecontrol was introduced in 1980
and rent control is being phased out in stages beginning in 1988. The government
was able to acquire controlled premises (under the LandAcquisition Act which
overrides the Control of Rent Act) for public sector projects at 1973 prices (prior
to 1987)-set prices which had been depressed by rent control.
In 1960, the state already owned 44 percent of the land in Singapore. By 1985,
the proportion of land under state ownership had increased to 76 percent. Some
18,000 hectares of land were acquired by various government agencies between
1959 (internal self-government) and 1984. This exercise wiped out land rent
increases for affected landowners, some of whom suffered actual losses, having
purchased their land at prices above the 1973 price. Some such landowners
even had to carry on with loan repayments for land which had already been
acquired by the government.
This apparent disregard for losses incurred by unfortunate landowners is
completely in line with George's uncompromising stand that rents paid to in-
dividual landowners were unfair even if capitalized in the purchase price. How-
ever, the Singapore means of land value capture differed in three fundamental
respects from George's prescriptions. First, George did not advocate nation-
alization of land, simply the taxation of the site or location value of land. The
developmental objectives of the state in Singapore however, necessitated the
nationalization of large parcels of land for industrial and housing estates-land
which was previously often under fragmented ownership. Secondly, national-
ization was enforced on a selective basis, thus violating the principle of horizontal
equity. Thirdly, the process involved a one-time capture of land rents on a
selective basis. A system for the perpetual capture of all land rents was not
instituted. However despite what (to George and many others) would have
been considered shortcomings of this partial land value capture process, the
Singapore government managed to capture a significant amount of land rents
via its imperfect system, relative to the situations of governments elsewhere.
Motor vehicle taxation in Singapore represents a form of regulatory capture
which is related to land use. Road space is a valuable resource in this land scarce
city-state and is priced accordingly for private motor vehicle owners and users.
As a result, congestion is not an occurrence which motorists generally expect.
Road usage pricing has been implemented since 1975. There are other onerous
charges relating to vehicles which may or may not be consistent with George's
ideas.4

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494 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

III

Effects on Production Costs and International Competitiveness

WITH INTERNAL
SELF-GOVERNMENTin 1959, the Singapore government realized
that the country could no longer rely almost exclusively on entrepot trade for
its survival.It subsequently embarked on an industrialpolicy which emphasized
the wooing of foreign multinational corporations to operate in Singapore. Sin-
gapore's manufacturingsector is thus dominated by foreign multinational cor-
porations (Lim et.al., 1988, Chapter9). Tax incentives were introduced in 1959
and liberally extended to promote industrialinvestments. Pioneer tax incentives
as well as expansion incentives provide for tax holidays of varying duration.
Selective tax incentives have also been liberally used to encourage the devel-
opment of various activities or sub-sectors of the economy. Industries which
qualify under these schemes enjoy zero or concessionary income tax rates.
To facilitate foreign direct investment in the manufacturingsector, the Eco-
nomic Development Board,which was established in 1961, developed industrial
sites on state-owned land at various locations throughout Singapore. In 1968,
the Jurong Town Corporation(JTC)was established as a separatestatutoryboard
to manage and develop industrial estates. The JTC leases land or facilities to
individual industrial tenants. JTC land leases are normally for either 30 or 60
year terms. Largetractsof land for industrialpurposes were thus made available
at low cost through the LandAcquisition Act.
Despite its small domestic market, Singapore has developed into a major
international financial center. Offshore financial activities relating to foreign
exchange, futures, loans and deposits are handled by both domestic and a host
of multinational financial institutions. Asian CurrencyUnits handle designated
internationalassets and liabilities and enjoy preferential regulatoryand tax con-
ditions. Futures tradersand fund managers in Singapore also enjoy preferential
tax rates. The government's efforts to develop Singapore as an international
financial center dates back to 1968 when tax incentives were introduced for the
establishment of an Asian CurrencyMarketin Singapore.
The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) was given the task of planning
and redeveloping the city in a comprehensive manner.To facilitateprivatesector
redevelopment, legislation for block decontrol of 770 privatelyowned properties
on thirty-two hectares of commercial land in the heart of the Central Business
District was introduced in 1969. The tractof land subsequently became known
as the Golden Shoe due to its high value and shape. Land acquired by the
government in and around the central area was leased to private developers
(usually for 99 years) through a public tender process. The URAspecifies the

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 Singapore and Georgist Policies 495

desired type of development as well as the design guidelines. Through the URA
sale of sites programmes, offices, hotels, shopping centers, warehouses, recre-
ational facilities as well as residential projectswere built by the privatedevelopers
who were successful in the tender process. The differences between the prices
paid by private developers for state land leases and the compensation (at 1973
prices until 1987) given to dispossessed landowners represented the land value
captured by the government in a rough sense because improvements and dif-
ferences in annual rents are involved.
While land use decisions have been made largely by the public sector, the
inefficiencies that could have resulted from such a process have been minimized.
Unlike the socialist city where the absence of land markets had very negative
impacts on efficiency, productivity and environmental quality (Bertaud and Re-
naud, 1995), the markets for land and property leases (as well as for freehold
land and properties) are active in Singapore and transmitimportantinformation
to urban planners. Since speculators were active, operating where there was no
capital gains tax on private real estate transactions, importantrecent changes in
law have occurred (see Note 2).

IV

Effects on Cost of Living

THEPUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM in Singapore is well known and is a source of

great pride for the government. Public housing in the Singapore context refers
to housing built by the state which is either rented at will or leased for an annual
rentalcost on a 99-yearbasis to eligible households. In 1990, the home ownership
ratewas 88 percent. Eighty-sixpercent of households resided in public housing,
of which 77 percent were owner-occupiers and 9 percent were tenants. By 1994,
the home ownership rate had increased to 92 percent. Additionally, this real
estate has appreciated in value significantly over the years.
Households finance their housing purchase through a compulsory savings
scheme known as the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The CPF is a fully-funded
social security scheme which requires all employees to contribute 20 percent
of their monthly contractual wage as compulsory savings. The employer con-
tributes a further 20 percent. The savings may be withdrawn at age 55 or may
be withdrawn for the financing of housing, education, medical expenses, or for
investment in approved financial instruments. Home ownership is thus made
attractivefor the majorityof the population in Singapore.
A resale market for public housing has existed since 1979, the size of which
has grown as households upgrade to largerunits or privatehousing. A household

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496 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

which has enjoyed a direct subsidy (either by purchasing their housing directly
from the HDB at subsidized price or has received a housing grantfor the purchase
of a resale flat) needs to fulfil a minimum occupancy period of five years before
the flat can be sold. Since 1989, HDB regulations have been relaxed to allow
owner occupiers of Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats to invest in
private residential property as well as for permanent residents and owners of
privateresidential property to purchase resale flatsfor owner occupancy. Resale
prices are marketdetermined and much higher than prices for new units which
are subsidized. In 1994, a housing grant for the purchase of resale housing was
introduced for eligible households. Instead of being on the waiting list for
subsidized new flats, a household could choose to purchase a resale unit and
enjoy a grant of S$40,000. If the location of the unit is close to that of their
parents/married children, the grant is S$50,000.
If one is to focus on private housing and motoring costs in Singapore, it must
surely be one of the most expensive cities in the world to reside in. However,
cost of living figures change dramaticallywhen one considers a typical non-car
owning Singaporean household which is eligible for public housing subsidies.
The inflation rate averaged 2.5 percent between 1980 and 1993 (The World
Bank, 1995). Despite the doubling of private housing prices between 1991 and
1994, the average increase for the CPI for those years was below 4 percent.
Public policy, in particularthe large public housing sector, has served to cushion
the impact of inevitably rising prices of land and housing on the cost of living
in a rapidly growing economy where land is a very scarce commodity.

Incentives and Rewards: The Fiscal System

THE SINGAPOREGOVERNMENThas had a surplus in its budget since 1968. As a

result of successful land rent capture, revenue from land sales (leases) and
motor vehicle related charges are important sources of revenue. Singapore has
a high ratio of non-tax revenue to GDP. The ratio is partly dependent on the
volume of government land sales for the year.
The tax rates on income and profits have been steadily reduced over time.
The corporate income tax rate was 40 percent between 1966 and 1986. It has
since been reduced to 26 percent, with 25 percent as the eventual target set by
the Ministry of Finance. However, there exist numerous schemes for tax ex-
emption, tax deduction, and tax concessions which have been introduced as
part of Singapore's industrial policy to attractselected types of direct foreign
investment (Lim et.al., 1988:258). More recently, fiscal incentives were intro-

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 Singapore and GeorgistPolicies 497

duced to encourage firms to invest outside of Singapore (Ministryof Trade and

Industry, Singapore, 1993 and 1994).
In 1966, the marginal personal income tax rate varied from 6 to 55 percent,
with the highest marginalrate being applied to chargeable income of S$750,000
and above. In contrast, at present, the marginal tax rate varies from 2 to 28
percent; and the highest marginalrate is applicable to chargeable incomes above
S$400,000. Generous tax reliefs and rebates provide incentives for higher income
women to have more children.
Unlike many of the OECD countries which rely heavily on social security and
payroll taxes, there is no social security and payroll tax in the usual sense in
Singapore since its social security policy is based on individual or family re-
sponsibility, with the state's financing role being largely limited to deductions
and exemptions from the income tax for the retirement provision. Singapore
relies on its mandatory Central Provident Fund mechanism to finance social
security, i.e. alleviaiton of absolute poverty, old age income maintenanace and
provision of health care. While there is no payroll tax, government expenditure
on social services and welfare is also negligible which reflects not only the
government's ideological aversion to the welfare state, but also the tight labor
market as well as the demographic structure (Asher, p. 165).
In recent years, the government has introduced a number of novel means for
transfer payments to Singaporeans in its efforts to reduce the budget surplus
and accumulated reserves. Since 1993, grantsof $200 to $300 have been credited
into the accounts of each Singaporean CPF member each year. These could
either remain in the account or be used to purchase property or shares (known
as the CPF Share Ownership Top Up Scheme). However, the benefit required
a corresponding deposit from the CPF account holder. Education grants have
also been deposited in Edusave accounts of Singaporean students which can be
used to pay for various "enrichment" programs outside of the classroom. The
large public housing sector has also become a means of facilitating transfer
payments. From 1993, various waivers on rents and service and conservancy
charges for households residing in public housing have become a part of the
government budget.

VI

Wipeouts and Windfalls

RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH and a tight labor market have virtually eliminated the

incidence of absolute poverty in Singapore. Income distribution, as measured

by the Gini coefficient, however, has shown little improvement over the last

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498 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

two decades. Income distribution in the labor force had mostly a Gini of 0.46
to 0.47 for the 1973-1993 period (Rao, 1996). Mandatoryunemployment benefits
do not exist in Singapore and public assistance is offered only to those in social
distress. Only about 2,000 persons received direct public assistance from the
government in 1994.
The majorityof households in Singapore have benefited from access to own-
ership of affordablepublic housing. An active resale marketfor public housing,
which developed in the 1980s, allows households mobility within the public
housing sector or to upgrade to private housing more easily. The public housing
supply also benefited those who were not eligible for public housing indirectly
as prices of comparable housing in the private sector would otherwise have
been higher. Housing price appreciation is thus less of a problem (politically
and economically) in a city state where 92 percent of households own at least
one piece of residential property.
With the aging of the public housing stock, the government has since 1989
begun the retrofittingof some older public housing estates at considerable public
expense. This multi-billion dollar exercise may be considered another round
of subsidies for households which have benefitted from the substantialimprove-
ments made to their homes and housing estates.
While some landowners suffered wipeouts of large values, a select group of
owners of property spared from state acquisition were able to enjoy the benefits
of continued ownership and land price appreciation made more pronounced
by the increasing scarcity of private freehold land in Singapore. Between 1975
and 1994, the price index for private housing increased at an average annual
rate of 14 percent. From 1994, changes in zoning and plot ratios as contained
in the Development Guide Plans have also resulted in tremendous windfalls
(some in the region of millions of dollars) for certain fortunatepropertyowners.
For example, an increase in residential plot ratio from 1.036 to 1.6 at a certain
location allowed the eight affected owners to collect between S$5 million to
S$19 million each when the site was sold for redevelopment (The Straits Times,
April 8, 95).
From 1992, the Housing and Development Board began a program for the
sale of its shops to tenants at discounted prices. Prior to this, a speculative
market for tenancy rights to HDB shops had already developed. Some shop-
keepers who had purchased leases to their shops were able to sell these im-
mediately for overnight profits of up to half a million dollars.5The large profits
were a result of discounted prices being based on conservative valuations as
well as a real estate boom during the period in question. In the words of the
Prime Minister himself (National Day Rally speech, 1994)-"it was as if they

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 Singapore and GeorgistPolicies 499

had struck a lottery"-indeed a curiously arbitraryand very selective way of

redistributing land rents!
From 1995, middle income housing estates built by the public sector are
being privatized. Middle income estates were built by the Housing and Urban
Development Corporation (HUDC) to cater to young professionals whose in-
comes were too high for HDB housing, but too low for them to afford housing
built by private developers. Between 1976 and 1989, some ten thousand units
of such middle income housing have been built at 18 localities. In May 1995,
the government began a program for the privatization of HUDC estates. Upon
conversion, HUDC flat owners will own and manage their respective strataor
individual units, as well as common propertylike car parksand open landscaped
areasas tenants in common. They will also be freed from the regulationsaffecting
HDB flat owners and enjoy the status and privileges of private property owners.
The most significant changes are the eligibility of foreigners to purchase HUDC
flatsand the lifting of the owner-occupancy criteria. Owners will pay conversion
costs estimated at S$25,000 per flat which is expected to be lower than the
appreciation in price resulting from the conversion.

VII

Conclusion

THESINGAPORE had,in effect,implementedlandreformin anurban

GOVERNMENT
setting in the initial two decades of nation building. However, the manner in
which land rents were acquired and then redistributed through leases (mostly
99 year ones) was effective in only changing the wealth distribution during the
initial period. What is lacking is both a George-prescribed mechanism as well
as the political will for the continuous capture of land rents. Singapore has not
considered site value taxation and is not in favor of a capital gains tax on real
estate in view of its perceived effects on the real estate market as well as on its
financial sector development.
A related issue is that of the country's high savings rate which was 51 percent
of GNP in 1995. Mandatorysavings, government budget surpluses as well as the
surpluses of government statutoryboards and companies contribute significantly
to gross national savings. In view of the heavy reliance on non-tax revenue, a
good Georgist would argue for the further decrease in tax rates on incomes.
However, tax rates have been reduced graduallyduring the past decade and are
by no means onerous. The constraint perhaps, is not so much domestic, but
international in that the government does not desire the country to be labeled
a tax haven with its related adverse connotations. Many forms of tax relief,

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500 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

concessions and rebates exist for both corporationsand individualsalike. Recent

tax rebates and policies for the redistribution of the reserves reflect the philos-
ophy of the government to do so in a manner which will minimize any possible
effects on incentives to work or invest. This refunding of government revenues
as grants to households is in keeping with George's view that land rents belong
to the entire community.
While there are clear similarities to Georgist policies, the extensive govern-
ment involvement in the economy-industrial policy, zoning, compulsory sav-
ings, housing subsidies, etc.-is not very George-like. Moreover, policies of
selective subsidies and taxes as well as selective rezonings and nationalization
of land have little regard for horizontal equity. While the equity and efficiency
effects of rapid asset price inflation may be less severe in Singapore because of
its large public housing program, they nevertheless exist and will continue to
be important issues in the nation's agenda.
Finally,to what extent are the land rent capturepolicies in Singaporeapplicable
elsewhere? One may argue that such draconian policies were able to be imple-
mented because of circumstances peculiar to Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s:
there were few large landowners; there was a sense of urgency resulting from
the crises of separation from Malaysia and the withdrawal of British troops;
Singapore has a one party government which is also virtually corruption free.
But not all these factors are unique to Singapore. Since its partial modified
application of a key idea of George has had promising results, they may find
wider application in other countries, especially developing ones.

Notes
1. In Progressand Poverty,he raisedan analogybetween land and slaves,and askedwhether
the returnfrom slaves was legitimatemerelybecause a slaveownerhad purchaseda slave for a
value reflectingthe expected returnsto the slave. See Harriss(1985).
2. There is a capitalgains levy for transactionsinvolvingthe sale of subsidizedhousing built
by the public sector. FromMay15, 1996 capitalgainsfrompropertiessold within threeyearsof
their purchaseare subjectto income tax as well as additionalstampduties.
3. Historicaldetailsof these Actsas well as the ConceptPlanmaybe found in Phang(1992):
19 to 40.
4. Taxes and chargesassociatedwith car ownershipinclude an importtax, registrationfees,
annualroadtaxes, and a certificateof entitlement (COE) which is requiredfor the registration
of any new vehicle. A COEmaybe obtainedin a public tenderfor a predeterminedquotawhich
is held each month.The COEis valid for a period of ten years.
5. Some cases which were featuredin the local newspaper(The StraitsTimes,June 3, 1995)
include the following: (a) a shoe shop owner purchasedhis shop for S$700,000in 1992 and
sold it in early 1995 for S$1.2 million; (b) a doctorpaid S$1.7 million for a shophouse in 1995.
The originalowner had purchasedit from the HDB at S$900,000;(c) a tyre shop owner hopes
to sell his shophouse purchasedat S$1.25million fromthe HDB for S$1.95million.

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 Singapore and Georgist Policies 501

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Singapore,1989.
Bertaud,Alainand BertrandRenaud."CitiesWithoutLandMarkets:Locationand LandUse in
the SocialistCity,"WorldBankPolicy ResearchWorkingPaper1477, 1995.
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Harriss,Lowell."Lessonsof EnduringValue:HenryGeorgea CenturyLater,"AmericanJournal
of Economicsand Sociology,Vol. 44, No.4, Oct. 1985.
Lim,ChongYah,et.al. PolicyOptionsforthe SingaporeEconomy,Singapore:McGrawHill, 1988.
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UP, 1995.

9tb International Symposium on Victimology

August 25-29, 1997, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Caring for Victims

From 25 to 29 August 1997, an International Symposium on Victimology will

be held in Amsterdam,the Netherlands. It is being organized under the auspices
of the WorldSociety of Victimology by the Ministryof Justice of The Netherlands,
in co-operation with several other European Institutions. The theme of the sym-
posium is "Caringfor Victims: roles of the community and the professions."
This symposium is the firstto be organized in Amsterdamand is the ninth in
a series of tri-annualsymposia organized under the auspices of the World Society
of Victimology (WSV). For more than two decades, the WSV-symposiahave
been on the cutting edge of both practicaland theoretical research and analysis
of criminological and victimological topics. The 1997 symposium will bring
together government, academical, civil and private sector practitioners, and re-
searchers from around the world. The WSV-symposiawill explore the devel-
opments taking place in research of and practice on victimology and victim
support.
In spite of efforts in the field of crime prevention, we have seen an increase
of crime all over the world over the past few years. Sadly to say, but the same
goes for the number of victims, not only because of (petty) every-day crime,
but also because of crime committed in (civil) wars. In the light of these de-
velopments, the principal theme of the Symposium is "Caringfor Victims: roles

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions