EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152574. November 17, 2004]

FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real parties in
interest, and both have legal standing, in a suit assailing a Civil Service
Commission (CSC) order disapproving an appointment. Despite having legal
interest and standing, herein petitioner unsuccessfully challenges the
constitutionality of the CSC circular that classifies certain positions in the
career service of the government. In sum, petitioner was appointed to a
Career Executive Service (CES) position, but did not have the corresponding
eligibility for it; hence, the CSC correctly disapproved his appointment.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

[1]

challenging the November 16, 2001 Decision  and the March 8, 2002
[2]

Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58987. The
[3]

Assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. [4]

The challenged Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

 

The Facts

The CA narrates the factual antecedents in this wise:

Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export

Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal
Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of
Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive
Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy,
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then
the required eligibility for said position.

It appears, however, that on May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission
issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994, the pertinent
provisions of which read:

1. Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service

xxxxxxxxx

(b) In addition to the above identified positions and other

positions of the same category which had been previously
classified and included in the CES, all other third level positions of
equivalent category in all branches and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are embraced within the Career Executive Service
provided that they meet the following criteria:

1. the position is a career position;

2. the position is above division chief level

3. the duties and responsibilities of the position require the

performance of executive or managerial functions.

4. Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included

Under the Coverage of the CES. Incumbents of positions which
are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first
time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent
appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in
their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer
to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these
incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES
positions until they qualify.

Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999,
petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said
appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioners
eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the
disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a
temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment
Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.
Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent appointment by
respondent to the Civil Service Commission, which issued Resolution No.
000059, dated January 10, 2000, affirming the action taken by respondent.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC in
Resolution No. 001143 dated May 11, 2000.

xxxxxxxxx

Undaunted, petitioner filed with [the CA] a petition for review seeking the
reversal of the CSC Resolutions dated January 10, 2000 and May 11, 2000
on the ground that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994 is
unconstitutional as it rendered his earned civil service eligibility ineffective
or inappropriate for the position of Department Manager [III] [5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA shunned the issue of constitutionality, arguing that a constitutional

question should not be passed upon if there are other grounds upon which the
case may be decided.  Citing CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998
[6]

and Mathay v. Civil Service Commission,  the appellate court ruled that only
[7]

the appointing officer may request reconsideration of the action taken by the
CSC on appointments. Thus, it held that petitioner did not have legal standing
to question the disapproval of his appointment. [8]

On reconsideration, the CA added that petitioner was not the real party in
interest, as his appointment was dependent on the CSCs approval.
Accordingly, he had no vested right in the office, since his appointment was
disapproved. [9]

Unsatisfied, petitioner brought this recourse to this Court. [10]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

A. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner
lacks the personality to question the disapproval by respondent
office of petitioners appointment as Department Manager III, Labor
and Employment Center, SBMA.

B. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner
is not the real party in interest to question the disapproval by
 respondent office of petitioners appointment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA.

C. Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing
petitioners appeal on a mere technicality considering that petitioner
is questioning the constitutionality of respondent office issuance of
Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which
deprived petitioner his property right without due process of law. [11]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Who May File Reconsideration or Appeal

Preliminary Observation

Petitioner imputes to the CA grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

of jurisdiction for ruling that he had no legal standing to contest the
disapproval of his appointment.  Grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a
[12]

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, this
Court resolved to grant due course to the Petition and to treat it appropriately
as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
grounds shall be deemed reversible errors, not grave abuse of discretion.

Approval Required for

Permanent Appointment

A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who

has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in
accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the standards
promulgated pursuant thereto.  It implies the civil service eligibility of the
[13]

appointee.  Thus, while the appointing authority has the discretion to choose
[14]

whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. [15]

To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must

comply with all legal requirements.  Thus, the law requires the appointment to
[16]

be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the
proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules
pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.  The applicable
[17]

provision of the Civil Service Law reads:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission

shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxxxxxxxx

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions

in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect
immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes
his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by
the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability
of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing
laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All
appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided,
shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from
issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days
thereafter.
[18]

The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not
concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.  In acting on
[19]

the appointment, the CSC determines whether the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the
appointee does, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be
disapproved.  According to the appellate court, only the appointing authority
[20]

had the right to challenge the CSCs disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule
VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 (Omnibus Rules on Appointment
and Other Personal Actions), which provides:

Section 2. Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval

of an appointment may be made by the appointing authority and submitted
to the Commission within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the
disapproved appointment.

Appointing Authoritys Right to

Challenge CSC Disapproval
 While petitioner does not challenge the legality of this provision, he now
claims that it is merely a technicality, which does not prevent him from
requesting reconsideration.
We clarify. The power of appointment necessarily entails the exercise of
judgment and discretion.  Luego v. Civil Service Commission  declared:
[21] [22]

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. [23]

Significantly, the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the

totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing authority.  No tribunal, not
[24]

even this Court,  may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored
[25]

person.[26]

The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of

the appointing authoritys discretion. The appointing authority must have the
right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the
appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
In Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,  this Court has affirmed that
[27]

the appointing authority stands to be adversely affected when the CSC

disapproves an appointment. Thus, the said authority can defend its
appointment since it knows the reasons for the same.  It is also the act of the
[28]

appointing authority that is being questioned when an appointment is

disapproved. [29]

Appointees Legal Standing to

Challenge the CSC Disapproval

While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge

the CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the
same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service
Commission, should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to
appeal.  On this point, the concepts of legal standing and real party in
[30]

interest become relevant.

Although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, legal standing and real party in interest are different
concepts. Kilosbayan v. Morato explained:
[31]
The difference between the rule on standing and real party-in-interest has
been noted by authorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party-in-interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas. (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328
[1985])

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases

suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1962))

xxxxxxxxx

On the other hand, the question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is

the party who would be [benefited] or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88
Phil. 125, 131 [1951]) [32]

If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a

law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the challengers
part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order
disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced by the disapproval,
since he could not continue his office.
Although petitioner had no vested right to the position,  it was his
[33]

eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be

granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the
outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied
his permanent appointment.

The Appointee a Real

Party in Interest

A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the

judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit.  Interest within the meaning
[34]

of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by

the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a
mere incidental interest.  Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a real or present
[35]

substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future,

contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.  As a general rule, one
[36]

who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
[37]

Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority

is adversely affected by the CSCs Order and is a real party in interest, the
appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC
disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a
permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable
judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all
the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

Appointee Allowed
Procedural Relief

Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 should not

be interpreted to restrict solely to the appointing authority the right to move for
a reconsideration of, or to appeal, the disapproval of an appointment. PD 807
and EO 292, from which the CSC derives the authority to promulgate its rules
and regulations, are silent on whether appointees have a similar right to file
motions for reconsideration of, or appeals from, unfavorable decisions
involving appointments. Indeed, there is no legislative intent to bar appointees
from challenging the CSCs disapproval.
The view that only the appointing authority may request reconsideration or
appeal is too narrow. The appointee should have the same right.
Parenthetically, CSC Resolution 99-1936 recognizes the right of the
[38]

adversely affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional Offices prior to

elevating a matter to the CSC Central Office.  The adversely affected party
[39]

necessarily includes the appointee.

This judicial pronouncement does not override Mathay v. Civil Service
Commission,  which the CA relied on. The Court merely noted in passing --
[40]

by way of obiter -- that based on a similar provision,  only the appointing

[41]

officer could request reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on

appointments.
In that case, Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay Jr. sought the
nullification of CSC Resolutions that recalled his appointment of a city
government officer. He filed a Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had
previously denied his Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and
for being filed out of time. We observed then that the CSC Resolutions were
already final and could no longer be elevated to the CA.  Furthermore, [42]

Mathays Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA was improper, because there
was an available remedy of appeal. And the CSC could not have acted
without jurisdiction, considering that it was empowered to recall an
appointment initially approved. [43]
 The right of the appointee to seek reconsideration or appeal was not the
main issue in Mathay. At any rate, the present case is being decided en banc,
and the ruling may reverse previous doctrines laid down by this Court. [44]

Second Issue:
Constitutionality of
Section 4, CSC Memorandum
Circular 21, Series of 1994

Alleging that his civil service eligibility was rendered ineffective and that
he was consequently deprived of a property right without due process,
 petitioner challenges the constitutionality of CSC Memorandum Circular 21,
[45]

s. 1994.  The pertinent part of this Circular reads:

[46]

1. Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service.

(a) The Career Executive Service includes the positions of

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director
(department-wide and bureau-wide), Assistant Regional
Director (department-wide and bureau-wide) and Chief of
Department Service[.]

(b) In addition to the above identified positions and other

positions of the same category which had been previously
classified and included in the CES, all other third level
positions in all branches and instrumentalities of the
national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters are
embraced within the Career Executive Service provided
that they meet the following criteria:

1. the position is a career position;

2. the position is above division chief level;

3. the duties and responsibilities of the position require the

performance of executive or managerial functions.

xxxxxxxxx

4. Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Under the Coverage of

the CES. Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive
Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold
permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their
respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other Career
Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under
temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.

Petitioner argues that his eligibility, through the Executive Leadership and
Management (ELM) training program, could no longer be affected by a new
eligibility requirement. He claims that he was eligible for his previous position
as department manager of the Legal Services Department, PEZA; hence, he
should retain his eligibility for the position of department manager III, Labor
and Employment Center, SBMA, notwithstanding the classification of the latter
as a CES position.

CSC Authorized to Issue

Rules and Regulations

The Constitution mandates that, as the central personnel agency of the

government,  the CSC should establish a career service and adopt measures
[47]

to promote the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,

and courtesy in the Civil Service.  It further requires that appointments in the
[48]

civil service be made only through merit and fitness to be determined by

competitive examination.  Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the
[49]

CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to carry out its mandate.
In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly
define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service.
 Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective,
[50]

specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.

Career Service
Classified by Levels

Positions in the career service, for which appointments require

examinations, are grouped into three major levels:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service
positions which involve non-professional or sub[-]professional work in a
non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of
collegiate studies;

(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific
positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief level; and

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. [51]
 Entrance to the different levels requires the corresponding civil service
eligibility. Those in the third level (CES positions) require Career Service
Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. [52]

The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioners ELM eligibility. He was
appointed to a CES position; however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility
must necessarily conform to the requirements of the position, which in
petitioners case was a CSEE.

Rights Protected

The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they

remain in the positions to which they were previously appointed. They are
allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the
lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of prospectivity of
regulations;  hence, there is no basis to argue that it is an ex post facto
[53]

law  or a bill of attainder.  These terms, which have settled meanings in
[54] [55]

criminal jurisprudence, are clearly inapplicable here.

The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus,
his right to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also
ceased. Upon his reemployment  years later as department manager III at
[56]

SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility
prescribed at the time for that position.

Security of Tenure
Not Impaired

The argument of petitioner that his security of tenure is impaired is

unconvincing. First, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service --
except in the case of first and second level employees in the civil service --
pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the employee may be
appointed.  Second, petitioner had neither rank nor position prior to his
[57]

reemployment. One cannot claim security of tenure if one held no tenure prior
to appointment.

Due Process
Not Violated

Petitioner contends that his due process rights, as enunciated in Ang

Tibay v. Court of Appeals,  were violated.  We are not convinced. He points
[58] [59]

in particular to the CSCs alleged failure to notify him of a hearing relating to

the issuance of the challenged Circular.
The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative,
not a quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice
and hearing are necessary.
 In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates
the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law.  The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for
[60]

official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the
performance of this function.  On these considerations, it is elementary that
[61]

due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed.

These requirements include prior notice and hearing. [62]

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative

agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government.  Prior
[63]

notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are
not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have
to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct.[64]

Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to

heads of departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication,
since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative bodys power to
issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties. [65]

Final Issue:
Disapproval of Appointment

Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his
permanent appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard,
because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an
administrative disciplinary measure.  The CSC, in approving or disapproving
[66]

an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the

law and the appointees possession of all the minimum qualifications and none
of the disqualification.
[67]

In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal

the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the
position he was appointed to.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal
standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it prays for the reversal of the
CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as department manager III of
the Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 18-39.
[2]
 Id., pp. 7-13. Third Division. Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with the concurrence of
Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (Division chair) and Alicia L. Santos (member).
[3]
 Id., pp. 14-15.
[4]
 Assailed Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 12.
[5]
 Id., pp. 1-5 & 7-11.
[6]
 Id., pp. 5-6 & 11-12 (citing People v. Pinca, 376 Phil. 377, November 17, 1999).
[7]
 371 Phil. 17, August 9, 1999.
[8]
 Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 11.
[9]
 Assailed Resolution, p. 2; rollo, p. 15.
[10]
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on July 23, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of
the Office of the Solicitor Generals Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor
General Renan E. Ramos and Associate Solicitor Tomas D. Tagra Jr. Respondent
CSCs Memorandum, signed by Director Engelbert Anthony D. Unite and Atty.
Bonifacio O. Tarenio Jr., was filed on June 30, 2003. Petitioners Memorandum,
signed by Attys. A.B.F. Gaviola Jr. and Marie Josephine C. Suarez, was filed on July
3, 2003.
[11]
 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 185-186. Original in upper case.
[12]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 186.
[13]
 27, Title I, Book V, EO 292, The Administrative Code of 1987; Chua v. Civil Service
Commission, February 7, 1992, 206 SCRA 65; Achacoso v. Macaraig  , 195 SCRA
235, 239, March 31, 1991. In contrast, a temporary appointment is one made to fill a
vacancy in the absence of appropriate eligibles (ibid.).
[14]
 Ferrer v. Hechanova, 125 Phil. 524, 528, January 25, 1967.
[15]
 Umoso v. Civil Service Commission, 234 SCRA 617, 623, July 29, 1994; Espaol v. Civil
Service Commission, 206 SCRA 715, 721, March 3, 1992.
[16]
 Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, 238 SCRA 572, 576, December 1, 1994.
[17]
 Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, Id., p. 575; Mitra v. Subido, 128 Phil. 128, 143,
September 15, 1967. See also Cortez v. Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA 216;
222, March 13, 1991.
[18]
 PD 807, The Civil Service Law, promulgated October 6, 1975. Title I, Book V, EO 292, also
provides:
Section 12 Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions
of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws
[19]
 Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240, 247, April 22, 1992; Mitra v. Subido,
supra.
[20]
 Guieb v. Civil Service Commission, 229 SCRA 779, February 9, 1994; Lapinid v. Civil
Service Commission, supra, p. 388; Central Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744, 752, April 10, 1989;Luego v. Civil Service Commission,
supra, p. 333.
[21]
 Sevilla v. Parina, 128 Phil. 639, 643, October 30, 1967; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil.
903, 911, April 30, 1954.
[22]
 227 Phil. 303, August 5, 1986.
[23]
 Id., p. 307. See also Rimonte v. Civil Service Commission, 314 Phil. 421, 430, May 29,
1995.
[24]
 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 274 Phil. 381, 387, May 14, 1991, per Cruz J.  See
also Jimenez v. Francisco, 100 Phil. 1025, 1032, February 28, 1957; Branganza v.
Commission on Elections, 127 Phil. 442, 447, August 15, 1967.
[25]
 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission,  supra; Amponin v. Commission on Elections, 128
Phil. 412, 415, September 29, 1967.
[26]
 Sevilla v.  Parina, supra; Manalang  v. Quitoriano, supra. See also Torio v. Civil Service
Commission, 209 SCRA 677, 691, June 9, 1992; Medalla v. Sto. Tomas, 208 SCRA
351, 357, May 5, 1992.
[27]
 171 SCRA 744, 756, April 10, 1989.
[28]
 Id., p. 757, per Gancayco, J.
[29]
 Ibid.
[30]
 See Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86, 104, April 29, 1999.
[31]
 316 Phil. 652, July 17, 1995
[32]
 Id., pp. 695-696, per Mendoza, J. See also Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc., GR No. 155001, January 21, 2004.
[33]
 This Court has recognized that while public office is not property to which one may acquire
a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right. Bince Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 218 SCRA 782, 792, February 9, 1993 (citing Cruz, I.A., Constitutional
Law [1991], 101; and Bernas, J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines [1987], Vol. 1, 40).
According to existing jurisprudence, protection begins upon the favorable action of
the CSC. Thus, no title to the office may be permanently vested in favor of the
appointee without the favorable approval of the CSC. Until it has become a
completed act through the CSCs approval, an appointment can still be recalled or
withdrawn by the appointing authority (Grospe v. Secretary of Public Works &
Communications, 105 Phil. 129, 133, January 31, 1959). It would likewise be
precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure or to claim a vested right over the
position (Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, supra, p. 576. See also Corpuz v. Court
of Appeals, 348 Phil. 801, 812, January 26, 1998).
[34]
 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,  GR No.
155001, January 21, 2004; Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 697, July 17,
1995; Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd.,  88 Phil. 125, 131, January 31, 1951.
[35]
 Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482, December 15, 1999; Ralla v. Ralla, 199
SCRA 495, 499, July 23, 1991; Guinobatan Historical and Cultural Association v.
CFI,  182 SCRA 256, 262, February 15, 1990.
[36]
 De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 254, 265, August 15, 1997 (citing Manuel V. Moran,
1 Commentaries on the Rules of Court 154 [1979]).
[37]
 Mathay v. Court of  Appeals, supra; Ralla v. Ralla, supra.
[38]
 Issued August 31, 1999. This Resolution governs disciplinary and non-disciplinary
proceedings in administrative cases.
[39]
 Pertinent portions of the Resolution reads:
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. -The Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
 xxx
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;
xxx
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. -The Civil Service
Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;
xxx
Section 71. Complaint or Appeal to the Commission. -Other personnel actions, such
as, but not limited to, x x x action on appointments (disapproval, invalidation, recall,
and revocation) x x x, may be brought to the Commission, by way of an appeal.
Section 72. When and Where to File. -A decision or ruling of a department or agency
may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely
affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper
within the same period. x x x
[40]
 Supra.
[41]
 Then Item I (3) of Memorandum Circular 38, s. 1993. Id., pp. 26-27.
[42]
 Id., pp. 26-28.
[43]
 Ibid. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, states that a petition for certiorari may be availed of
when a tribunal, a board or an officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[44]
 4, paragraph (3), Article VIII of the Constitution, states: No doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc  or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
[45]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 191.
[46]
 The Memorandum Circular, addressed to All Heads of Departments, Bureaus and
Agencies of the National and Local Government including Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations and State Colleges and Universities, was issued pursuant to
CSC Resolution 94-2925, dated May 31, 1994.
[47]
 3, Article IX-B.
[48]
 Ibid.
[49]
 2, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. Recognized in 5, PD 807 and 7, Title I, Book V, EO 292.
[50]
 Whereas Clause, CSC Resolution 94-2925, dated May 31, 1994.
[51]
 8, Title I, Book V, EO 292; 7, PD 807. See also CSC Resolution 94-2925.
[52]
 Memorandum Circular 37, s. 1998, dated October 20, 1998; Memorandum Circular 1, s.
1997, dated January 24, 1997.
[53]
 Article 4 of the Civil Code states: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided.
[54]
 An ex post facto law is one (1) which criminalizes an action that was done before the
passing of the law and that was innocent when done, and punishes such action; (2)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; (3) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than that imposed by the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (4) which alters the legal rules of
 evidence and receives less or different testimony than that which the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.  Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, 447-448, January 30, 1982. See also People v.
Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, 249, July 3, 1992.
[55]
 A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment on individuals without judicial
trial. Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659, January 30, 1990.
[56]
 Reemployment is defined as the reappointment of a person who has been previously
appointed to a position in the career or non-career service and was separated
therefrom as a result of reduction in force, reorganization, retirement, voluntary
resignation, non-disciplinary actions such as dropping from the rolls and other modes
of separation. Reemployment presupposes a gap in the service. Memorandum
Circular 15, s. 1999, dated August 27, 1999, amending Memorandum Circular 40, s.
1998.
[57]
 General v. Roco, 350 SCRA 528, 533, January 29, 2001; Cuevas v. Bacal, 347 SCRA 338,
351, December 6, 2000.
[58]
 69 Phil. 635, 624-644, February 27, 1940. The cardinal primary requirements that must be
respected in administrative proceedings are as follows: (1) there must be a right to a
hearing, including the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal must act
on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and (7) the tribunal should
render its decision in such a manner that one can know the various issues involved
and the reasons for the decision rendered.
[59]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 192.
[60]
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1018, August 29,
1996.
[61]
 Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 497, 506, November 29, 1999.
[62]
 See Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 119 Phil. 304, 313,
January 30, 1964.
[63]
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals; supra, p. 1019.
[64]
 Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines,  347 Phil. 333, 342,
December 12, 1997; Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622, 628, August 31, 1987. Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of Transportation, 202 Phil. 925, 934,
September 30, 1982; Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel, 150-A Phil. 86, 101,
April 11, 1972.
[65]
 Taada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535, December 29, 1986. See also Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 1018. At any rate, Memorandum
Circular 21, s. 1994, was allegedly published in the Manila Standard on June 14,
1994. CSCs Memorandum, p. 21; rollo, p. 165.
[66]
 Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184, 199, September 26, 1994.
[67]
 Ibid.