EN BANC

[G.R. No. 176707. February 17, 2010.]

ARLIN B. OBIASCA, 1 petitioner, vs. JEANE O. BASALLOTE,

respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J : p

When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it

regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law
should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor
another. As a court of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to
adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of the law
but also according to the higher principles of right and justice.
The facts of this case are undisputed.
On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso
appointed respondent Jeane O. Basallote to the position of Administrative
Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay. 2
Subsequently, in a letter dated June 4, 2003, 3 the new City Schools
Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo, advised School Principal Dr.
Leticia B. Gonzales that the papers of the applicants for the position of
Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of respondent, were
being returned and that a school ranking should be accomplished and
submitted to her office for review. In addition, Gonzales was advised that
only qualified applicants should be endorsed. CaESTA

Respondent assumed the office of Administrative Officer II on June 19,

2003. Thereafter, however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz,
Human Resource Management Officer I of the City Schools Division of
Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be
forwarded to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because of her failure to
submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales.
Respondent tried to obtain Gonzales' signature but the latter refused
despite repeated requests. When respondent informed Oyardo of the
situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position
of Teacher I. Respondent followed the advice.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B.
Obiasca to the same position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment
was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. 4 Upon learning this,
respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.
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 In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales
administratively liable for withholding information from respondent on the
status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three
months. Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. 5 ADaSET

Respondent also filed a protest with CSC Regional Office V. But the
protest was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the
Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action. 6
On motion for reconsideration, the protest was reinstated but was
eventually dismissed for lack of merit. 7 Respondent appealed the dismissal
of her protest to the CSC Regional Office which, however, dismissed the
appeal for failure to show that her appointment had been received and
attested by the CSC. 8
Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC. In its November 29, 2005
resolution, the CSC granted the appeal, approved respondent's appointment
and recalled the approval of petitioner's appointment. 9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals (CA) claiming that the CSC acted without factual and legal bases in
recalling his appointment. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
In its September 26, 2006 decision, 10 the CA denied the petition and
upheld respondent's appointment which was deemed effective immediately
upon its issuance by the appointing authority on May 26, 2003. This was
because respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of
the duties and responsibilities of the position.
aESHDA

The CA found that respondent possessed all the qualifications and

none of the disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II; that
due to the respondent's valid appointment, no other appointment to the
same position could be made without the position being first vacated; that
the petitioner's appointment to the position was thus void; and that, contrary
to the argument of petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due
process when he was not allowed to participate in the proceedings in the
CSC, it was petitioner who failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a
single pleading despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the
proceedings in the CSC.
The CA opined that Diaz unreasonably refused to affix her signature on
respondent's PDF and to submit respondent's appointment to the CSC on the
ground of non-submission of respondent's PDF. The CA ruled that the PDF
was not even required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied
on February 8, 2007. 11
Hence, this petition. 12
Petitioner maintains that respondent was not validly appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer II because her appointment was never
attested by the CSC. According to petitioner, without the CSC attestation,
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 respondent's appointment as Administrative Officer II was never completed
and never vested her a permanent title. As such, respondent's appointment
could still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Petitioner
further argues that, under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292, 13 every appointment is required to be
submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise,
the appointment becomes ineffective. 14 Thus, respondent's appointment
issued on May 23, 2003 should have been transmitted to the CSC not later
than June 22, 2003 for proper attestation. However, because respondent's
appointment was not sent to the CSC within the proper period, her
appointment ceased to be effective and the position of Administrative Officer
II was already vacant when petitioner was appointed to it. IEDHAT

In her comment, 15 respondent points out that her appointment was

wrongfully not submitted by the proper persons to the CSC for attestation.
The reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of respondent's
appointment papers to the CSC — the alleged failure of respondent to have
her PDF duly signed by Gonzales — was not a valid reason because the PDF
was not even required for the attestation of respondent's appointment by
the CSC.
After due consideration of the respective arguments of the parties, we
deny the petition.
The law on the matter is clear. The problem is petitioner's insistence
that the law be applied in a manner that is unjust and unreasonable.
Petitioner relies on an overly restrictive reading of Section 9 (h) of PD
807 which states, in part, that an appointment must be submitted by the
16
appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the
appointment becomes ineffective:
Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The [CSC]
shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or

promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, police forces, firemen and jailguards, and disapprove those
where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately
upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his
duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by
the [CSC], if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of
the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing
laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the [CSC] shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All
appointments requiring the approval of the [CSC] as herein
provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority
within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment
becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
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 STIHaE

This provision is implemented in Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 (Omnibus Rules):
Section 11. An appointment not submitted to the [CSC] within
thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date
appearing on the fact of the appointment, shall be ineffective. . . .

Based on the foregoing provisions, petitioner argues that respondent's

appointment became effective on the day of her appointment but it
subsequently ceased to be so when the appointing authority did not submit
her appointment to the CSC for attestation within 30 days.
Petitioner is wrong.
The real issue in this case is whether the deliberate failure of the
appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submit respondent's
appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her
appointment ineffective and incomplete. Substantial reasons dictate that it
did not.
Before discussing this issue, however, it must be brought to mind that
CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 recalling petitioner's appointment
and approving that of respondent has long become final and executory.
REMEDY TO ASSAIL CSC DECISION
OR RESOLUTION
Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules provide the proper
remedy to assail a CSC decision or resolution: EcTDCI

Section 16. An employee who is still not satisfied with the

decision of the [Merit System Protection Board] may appeal to the
[CSC] within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no
petition for reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from
receipt thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 18. Failure to file a protest, appeal, petition for
reconsideration or petition for review within the prescribed
period shall be deemed a waiver of such right and shall render
the subject action/decision final and executory. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the
CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in
the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioner's part allowed the CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory. 17
Hence, for all intents and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29,
2005 has become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. 18
A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised,
amended or reversed. 19 Thus, in praying for the reversal of the assailed
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 Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the final and executory CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the Court to
reverse a final and executory judgment and disregard the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments.
True, a dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from
availing of remedies other than those provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus
Rules. This is precisely the purpose of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
provides for the filing of a petition for review as a remedy to challenge the
decisions of the CSC.
While Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of
appeal under Rule 43, we cannot disregard Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules,
which requires that a petition for reconsideration should be filed, otherwise,
the CSC decision will become final and executory, viz.:
The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no
petition for reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from
receipt thereof.

Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC

decisions involving its administrative function, that is, on matters involving
"appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service," 20 as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it adjudicates the
rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law. 21 AcTHCE

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for

reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct
the errors committed in the administrative forum. 22 In Orosa v. Roa, 23 the
Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to the courts. 24 While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to certain exceptions, 25 these are not present in this
case.
Thus, absent any definitive ruling that the second paragraph of Section
16 is not mandatory and the filing of a petition for reconsideration may be
dispensed with, then the Court must adhere to the dictates of Section 16 of
the Omnibus Rules.
Moreover, even in its substantive aspect, the petition is bereft of merit.
SECTION 9 (H) OF PD 807 ALREADY
AMENDED BY SECTION 12 BOOK V OF
EO 292
It is incorrect to interpret Section 9 (h) of Presidential Decree (PD) 807
as requiring that an appointment must be submitted by the appointing
authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the
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 appointment would become ineffective. Such interpretation fails to
appreciate the relevant part of Section 9 (h) which states that "an
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the
appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties
immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the
[CSC]." This provision is reinforced by Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, which reads:
ECaTDc

Section 1. An appointment issued in accordance with

pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has
assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his
salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until
disapproved by the Commission. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

More importantly, Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9 (h)

of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that all appointments subject to CSC
approval be submitted to it within 30 days. Section 12 of EO 292 provides:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension of Service
beyond retirement age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of
the departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units
and other instrumentalities of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations; conduct periodic review of the
decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been
delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and
the employees in these offices and apply appropriate sanctions
whenever necessary.

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases

indicates an intention to change its meaning. 26 It is presumed that the
deletion would not have been made had there been no intention to effect a
change in the meaning of the law or rule. 27 The word, phrase or sentence
excised should accordingly be considered inoperative. 28
The dissent refuses to recognize the amendment of Section 9 (h) of PD
807 by EO 292 but rather finds the requirement of submission of
appointments within 30 days not inconsistent with the authority of the CSC
to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters.
However, the intention to amend by deletion is unmistakable not only in
the operational meaning of EO 292 but in its legislative history as well. caITAC

PD 807 and EO 292 are not inconsistent insofar as they require CSC
action on appointments to the civil service. This is evident from the
recognition accorded by EO 292, specifically under Section 12 (14) and (15)
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 thereof, to the involvement of the CSC in all personnel actions and programs
of the government. However, while a restrictive period of 30 days within
which appointments must be submitted to the CSC is imposed under the last
sentence of Section 9 (h) of PD 807, none was adopted by Section 12 (14)
and (15) of EO 292. Rather, provisions subsequent to Section 12 merely
state that the CSC (and its liaison staff in various departments and agencies)
s h a l l periodically monitor, inspect and audit personnel actions. 29
Moreover, under Section 9 (h) of PD 807, appointments not submitted within
30 days to the CSC become ineffective, no such specific adverse effect is
contemplated under Section 12 (14) and (15) of EO 292. Certainly, the two
provisions are materially inconsistent with each other. And to insist on
reconciling them by restoring the restrictive period and punitive effect of
Section 9 (h) of PD 807, which EO 292 deliberately discarded, would be to
rewrite the law by mere judicial interpretation. 30
Not even the historical development of civil service laws can justify the
retention of such restrictive provisions. Public Law No. 5, 31 the law formally
establishing a civil service system, merely directed that all heads of offices
notify the Philippine Civil Service Board "in writing without delay of all
appointments . . . made in the classified service." 32 The Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 was even less stringent as approval by the
Director of the Civil Service of appointments of temporary and emergency
employees was required only when practicable. Finally, Republic Act (RA)
2260 33 imposed no period within which appointments were attested to by
local government treasurers to whom the CSC delegated its authority to act
on personnel actions but provided that if within 180 days after receipt of
said appointments, the CSC shall not have made any correction or revision,
then such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made.
Consequently, it was only under PD 807 that submission of appointments for
approval by the CSC was subjected to a 30-day period. That, however, has
been lifted and abandoned by EO 292.
There being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be
submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from issuance, it is
doubtful by what authority the CSC imposed such condition under Section
11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules. It certainly cannot restore what EO 292
itself already and deliberately removed. At the very least, that requirement
cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent. ADaECI

Under the facts obtaining in this case, respondent promptly assumed

her duties as Administrative Officer II when her appointment was issued by
the appointing authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and
remained effective until disapproved by the CSC. 34 Respondent's
appointment was never disapproved by the CSC. In fact, the CSC was
deprived of the opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented
from doing so. More importantly, the CSC subsequently approved
respondent's appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall
has already become final and immutable.
Second, it is undisputed that respondent's appointment was not
submitted to the CSC, not through her own fault but because of Human
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 Resource Management Officer I Ma. Teresa U. Diaz's unjustified refusal to
sign it on the feigned and fallacious ground that respondent's position
description form had not been duly signed by School Principal Dr. Leticia B.
Gonzales. 35 Indeed, the CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her failure to act in
the required manner. 36 Similarly, the Ombudsman found both City Schools
Division Superintendent Ma. Amy O. Oyardo and Gonzales administratively
liable and suspended them for three months for willfully withholding
information from respondent on the status of her appointment.
xxx xxx xxx
All along, [respondent] was made to believe that her
appointment was in order. During the same period, respondent
Gonzales, with respondent Oyardo's knowledge, indifferently allowed
[respondent] to plea for the signing of her [position description form],
when they could have easily apprised [respondent] about the
revocation/withdrawal of her appointment. Worse, when [respondent]
informed Oyardo on 25 June 2003 about her assumption of office as
[Administrative Officer II], the latter directed [respondent] to go back
to her post as Teacher I on the ground that [respondent] had not been
issued an attested appointment as [Administrative Officer II], even
when [Oyardo] knew very well that [respondent's] appointment could
not be processed with the CSC because of her order to re-evaluate the
applicants. This act by [Oyardo] is a mockery of the trust reposed upon
her by [respondent], who, then in the state of quandary, specifically
sought [Oyardo's] advice on what to do with her appointment, in the
belief that her superior could enlighten her on the matter.
HaEcAC

It was only on 02 July 2003 when [Gonzales], in her letter, first

made reference to a re-ranking of the applicants when [respondent]
learned about the recall by [Oyardo] of her appointment. At that time,
the thirty-day period within which to submit her appointment to the
CSC has lapsed. [Oyardo's] and Gonzales' act of withholding
information about the real status of [respondent's] appointment
unjustly deprived her of pursuing whatever legal remedies available to
her at that time to protect her interest. 37

Considering these willful and deliberate acts of the co-conspirators

Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales that caused undue prejudice to respondent, the
Court cannot look the other way and make respondent suffer the malicious
consequences of Gonzales's and Oyardo's malfeasance. Otherwise, the Court
would be recognizing a result that is unconscionable and unjust by
effectively validating the following inequities: respondent, who was vigilantly
following up her appointment paper, was left to hang and dry; to add insult
to injury, not long after Oyardo advised her to return to her teaching
position, she (Oyardo) appointed petitioner in respondent's stead.
The obvious misgiving that comes to mind is why Gonzales and Oyardo
were able to promptly process petitioner's appointment and transmit the
same to the CSC for attestation when they could not do so for respondent.
There is no doubt that office polities was moving behind the scenes.
In effect, Gonzales' and Oyardo's scheming and plotting unduly
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 deprived respondent of the professional advancement she deserved. While
public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is
nevertheless a protected right. 38
It cannot be overemphasized that respondent's appointment became
effective upon its issuance by the appointing authority and it remained
effective until disapproved by the CSC (if at all it ever was). Disregarding this
rule and putting undue importance on the provision requiring the submission
of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days will reward wrongdoing in the
appointment process of public officials and employees. It will open the door
for scheming officials to block the completion and implementation of an
appointment and render it ineffective by the simple expedient of not
submitting the appointment paper to the CSC. As indubitably shown in this
case, even respondent's vigilance could not guard against the malice and
grave abuse of discretion of her superiors. DCTSEA

There is no dispute that the approval of the CSC is a legal requirement

to complete the appointment. Under settled jurisprudence, the appointee
acquires a vested legal right to the position or office pursuant to this
completed appointment. 39 Respondent's appointment was in fact already
approved by the CSC with finality.
The purpose of the requirement to submit the appointment to the CSC
is for the latter to approve or disapprove such appointment depending on
whether the appointee possesses the appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications and whether the laws and rules pertinent to the process of
appointment have been followed. 40 With this in mind, respondent's
appointment should all the more be deemed valid.
Respondent's papers were in order. What was sought from her (the
position description form duly signed by Gonzales) was not even a
prerequisite before her appointment papers could be forwarded to the CSC.
More significantly, respondent was qualified for the position. Thus, as stated
by the CA:
The evidence also reveals compliance with the procedures that
should be observed in the selection process for the vacant position of
Administrative Officer II and the issuance of the appointment to the
respondent: the vacancy for the said position was published on
February 28, 2003; the Personnel Selection Board of Dep-Ed Division of
Tabaco City conducted a screening of the applicants, which included
the respondent and the petitioner; the respondent's qualifications met
the minimum qualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II
provided by the CSC. She therefore qualified for permanent
appointment. 41 TCHcAE

There is no doubt that, had the appointing authority only submitted

respondent's appointment to the CSC within the said 30 days from its
issuance, the CSC would (and could) have approved it. In fact, when the CSC
was later apprised of respondent's prior appointment when she protested
petitioner's subsequent appointment, it was respondent's appointment
which the CSC approved. Petitioner's appointment was recalled. These points
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 were never rebutted as petitioner gave undue emphasis to the non-
attestation by the CSC of respondent's appointment, without any regard for
the fact that the CSC actually approved respondent's appointment.
Third, the Court is urged to overlook the injustice done to respondent
by citing Favis v. Rupisan 42 and Tomali v. Civil Service Commission. 43
However, reliance on Favis is misplaced. In Favis, the issue pertains to
the necessity of the CSC approval, not the submission of the appointment to
the CSC within 30 days from issuance. Moreover, unlike Favis where there
was an apparent lack of effort to procure the approval of the CSC,
respondent in this case was resolute in following up her appointment papers.
Thus, despite Favis' having assumed the responsibilities of PVTA Assistant
General Manager for almost two years, the Court affirmed her removal,
ruling that:
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials,
resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter
does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval
by the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments,
ineffective and unenforceable. 44 (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in its entirety, this case shows that the lack of CSC
approval was not due to any negligence on respondent's part.
Neither was it due to the "tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the
proper officials." Rather, the underhanded machinations of
Gonzales and Oyardo, as well as the gullibility of Diaz, were the
major reasons why respondent's appointment was not even
forwarded to the CSC.
Tomali, likewise, is not applicable. The facts are completely different.
In Tomali, petitioner Tomali's appointment was not approved by the CSC due
to the belated transmittal thereof to the latter. The Court, citing Favis, ruled
that the appointee's failure to secure the CSC's approval within the 30-day
period rendered her appointment ineffective. It quoted the Merit Systems
Protection Board's finding that "there is no showing that the non-submission
was motivated by bad faith, spite, malice or at least attributed to the fault of
the newly installed [Office of Muslim Affairs] Executive Director." The Court
observed: aCcSDT

Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She

assumed the position four months after her appointment was issued or
months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become
ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on
01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to
the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should have at
least verified considering the relatively long interval of time between
the date of her appointment and the date of her assumption to office.
45

The Court also found that "[t]here (was) nothing on record to convince
us that the new OMA Director (had) unjustly favored private respondent nor
(had) exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or
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 despotic manner." 46

The peculiar circumstances in Tomali are definitely not present here.

As a matter of fact, the situation was exactly the opposite. As we have
repeatedly stressed, respondent was not remiss in zealously following up the
status of her appointment. It cannot be reasonably claimed that the failure
to submit respondent's appointment to the CSC was due to her own fault.
The culpability lay in the manner the appointing officials exercised their
power with arbitrariness, whim and despotism. The whole scheme was
intended to favor another applicant.
Therefore, the lack of CSC approval in Favis a n d Tomali should be
taken only in that light and not overly stretched to cover any and all similar
cases involving the 30-day rule. Certainly, the CSC approval cannot be done
away with. However, an innocent appointee like the respondent should not
be penalized if her papers (which were in the custody and control of others
who, it turned out, were all scheming against her) did not reach the CSC on
time. After all, her appointment was subsequently approved by the CSC
anyway.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, "[t]he condition shall be deemed
fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." Applying this to
the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is
negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for
approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by
the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment
to the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of respondent's
appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the conditions for the
approval of respondent's appointment, however, deliberately and with bad
faith, the officials responsible for the submission of respondent's
appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus,
the said condition should be deemed fulfilled. CDTSEI

The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment
remains valid in certain instances despite non-compliance of the proper
officials with the pertinent CSC rules. In Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,
47 the CSC challenged the validity of the appointment of Ong on the ground

that, among others, it was not reported in the July 1995 Report of Personnel
Action (ROPA), thus making such appointment ineffective. The subject rule
provided that an "appointment issued within the month but not listed in the
ROPA for the said month shall become ineffective thirty days from issuance."
Rejecting the CSC's contention, the Court held that there was a legitimate
justification for such delayed observance of the rule:
We find the respondent's justification for the failure of the POEA
to include Ong's appointment in its ROPA for July 1995 as required by
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994 to be in order. The
records show that the [Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)] did not include the contractual appointment of Ong in its July
ROPA because its request for exemption from the educational requisite
for confidential staff members provided in [Memorandum Circular] No.
38 had yet been resolved by the CSC. The resolution of the petitioner
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 granting such request was received only in November, 1995. The
POEA, thereafter, reported the appointment in its November, 1995
ROPA. 48

The Court reached the same conclusion in the recent case of Chavez v.
Ronidel 49 where there was a similar inaction from the responsible officials
which resulted in non-compliance with the requirement:
Lastly, we agree with the appellate court that respondent's
appointment could not be invalidated solely because of [Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor's (PCUP's)] failure to submit two copies
of the ROPA as required by CSC Resolution No. 97368. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

We quote with approval the appellate court's ratiocination in this

wise:
To our minds, however, the invalidation of the
[respondent's] appointment based on this sole technical
ground is unwarranted, if not harsh and arbitrary, considering
the factual milieu of this case. For one, it is not the
[respondent's] duty to comply with the requirement of the
submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies of her
appointment to [the Civil Service Commission Field Office or] CSCFO
within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution. The said
resolution categorically provides that it is the PCUP, and not the
appointee as in the case of the [respondent] here, which is required to
comply with the said reportorial requirements. caCTHI

Moreover, it bears pointing out that only a few days after the
[petitioner] assumed his new post as PCUP Chairman, he directed the
PCUP to hold the processing of [respondent's] appointment papers in
abeyance, until such time that an assessment thereto is officially
released from his office. Unfortunately, up to this very day, the
[respondent] is still defending her right to enjoy her promotional
appointment as DMO V. Naturally, her appointment failed to
comply with the PCUP's reportorial requirements under CSC
Resolution No. 97-3685 precisely because of the [petitioner's]
inaction to the same.

We believe that the factual circumstances of this case calls for

the application of equity. To our minds, the invalidation of the
[respondent's] appointment due to a procedural lapse which is
undoubtedly beyond her control, and certainly not of her own
making but that of the [petitioner], justifies the relaxation of
the provisions of CSC Board Resolution No. 97-3685, pars. 6, 7 and 8.
Hence, her appointment must be upheld based on equitable
considerations, and that the non-submission of the ROPA and the
certified true copies of her appointment to the CSCFO within the period
stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution should not work to her
damage and prejudice. Besides, the [respondent] could not at all
be faulted for negligence as she exerted all the necessary
vigilance and efforts to reap the blessings of a work promotion. Thus,
We cannot simply ignore her plight . She has fought hard enough to
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 claim what is rightfully hers and, as a matter of simple justice, good
conscience, and equity, We should not allow Ourselves to prolong her
agony.

All told, We hold that the [respondent's] appointment is valid,

notwithstanding the aforecited procedural lapse on the part of PCUP
which obviously was the own making of herein [petitioner]. (Emphasis
supplied) EIAaDC

Respondent deserves the same sympathy from the Court because

there was also a telling reason behind the non-submission of her
appointment paper within the 30-day period.
The relevance of Joson a n d Chavez to this case cannot be simply
glossed over. While the agencies concerned in those cases were accredited
agencies of the CSC which could take final action on the appointments, that
is not the case here. Thus, any such differentiation is unnecessary. It did not
even factor in the Court's disposition of the issue in Joson and Chavez. What
is crucial is that, in those cases, the Court upheld the appointment despite
the non-compliance with a CSC rule because (1) there were valid
justifications for the lapse; (2) the non-compliance was beyond the control of
the appointee and (3) the appointee was not negligent. All these reasons are
present in this case, thus, there is no basis in saying that the afore-cited
cases are not applicable here. Similar things merit similar treatment.
Fourth, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively
revoked the previous appointment of respondent and usurped the power of
the CSC to withdraw or revoke an appointment that had already been
accepted by the appointee. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which
has this power. 50 This is clearly provided in Section 9, Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules:
Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee
cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority
and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the
[CSC]. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court ruled in De Rama v. Court of Appeals 51 that it is the

CSC which is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved when
such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations.
Petitioner seeks to inflexibly impose the condition of submission of the
appointment to the CSC by the appointing authority within 30 days from
issuance, that is, regardless of the negligence/diligence of the appointee and
the bad faith/good faith of the appointing authority to ensure compliance
with the condition. However, such stance would place the appointee at
the mercy and whim of the appointing authority even after a valid
appointment has been made. For although the appointing authority may
not recall an appointment accepted by the appointee, he or she can still
achieve the same result through underhanded machinations that impedes or
prevents the transmittal of the appointment to the CSC. In other words, the
insistence on a strict application of the condition regarding the submission of
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 the appointment to the CSC within 30 days, would give the appointing
authority the power to do indirectly what he or she cannot do directly. An
administrative rule that is of doubtful basis will not only produce unjust
consequences but also corrupt the appointment process. Obviously, such
undesirable end result could not have been the intention of the law. ACTISD

The power to revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment

of another may not be conceded to the appointing authority. Such position is
not only contrary to Section 9, Rule V and Section 1, Rule IV of the Omnibus
Rules. It is also a dangerous reading of the law because it unduly expands
the discretion given to the appointing authority and removes the checks and
balances that will rein in any abuse that may take place. The Court cannot
countenance such erroneous and perilous interpretation of the law.
Accordingly, petitioner's subsequent appointment was void. There can
be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be
legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can
be appointed to succeed her. 52
In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and
well-established jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow
portion of the provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision
and other related rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of context.
Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., join the dissent of J. Bersamin.
Bersamin, J., please see dissent.
Del Castillo, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
BERSAMIN, J., dissent:

I respectfully register my dissent to the learned and comprehensive

majority opinion ably written by an esteemed colleague, Justice Renato C.
Corona, dismissing the petition that would treat the appointment of the
respondent as ineffective on the ground that the appointment did not carry
the attestation by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
As I write, I find myself in the same situation of Justice Joseph Story of
the United States Supreme Court nearly 200 years ago, when dissenting
from his colleagues on an important case became unavoidable for him. He
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