Georgism: Georgism, Also Called Geoism
Georgism: Georgism, Also Called Geoism
Georgism, also called geoism[2] and single tax (archaic), is an economic philosophy
holding that, while people should own the value they produce themselves, economic
value derived from land (often including natural resources and natural opportunities)
.[3][4][5] Developed from the writings
should belong equally to all members of society
of the economist and social reformer Henry George, the Georgist paradigm seeks
solutions to social and ecological problems, based on principles of land rights and
public finance which attempt to integrate economic efficiency with social
justice.[6][7]
Economists since Adam Smith and David Ricardo have observed that, unlike
other taxes, a public levy on land value does not cause economic
inefficiency.[8][9] A land value tax also has progressive tax effects, in that it is
paid primarily by the wealthy (the landowners), and it cannot be passed on to
tenants, workers, or users of land.[10][11] Advocates of land value taxes argue
that they would reduce economic inequality, increase economic efficiency,
remove incentives to under-utilize urban land, and reduce property
speculation.[12] The philosophical basis of Georgism dates back to several
early thinkers such as John Locke,[13] Baruch Spinoza,[14] and Thomas
Paine,[15] but the concept of gaining public revenues mainly from land and
Georgist campaign button from the 1890s.
natural resource privileges was widely popularized by Henry George and his The cat on the badge refers to a slogan
first book, Progress and Poverty (1879). "Do you see the cat?" to draw analogy to
the land question.[1]
Georgist ideas were popular and influential during the late 19th and early 20th
century.[16] Political parties, institutions and communities were founded based
on Georgist principles during that time. Early devotees of Henry George's economic philosophy were often termed Single Taxers for
their political goal of raising public revenue mainly from a land value tax, although Georgists endorsed multiple forms of rent capture
(e.g., seigniorage) as legitimate.[17] The term Georgism was invented later, and some prefer the term geoism to distinguish their
beliefs from those of Henry George.[18][19]
Contents
Main tenets
Economic properties
Sources of economic rent and related policy interventions
Georgism and environmental economics
Revenue uses
Synonyms and variants
Influence
Communities
Institutes and organizations
Reception
Notable Georgists
Economists
Heads of government
Other political figures
Activists
Authors
Journalists
Artists
Philosophers
Other
See also
References
Main tenets
Henry George is best known for popularizing the argument that government
should be funded by a tax on land rent rather than taxes on labor. George
believed that although scientific experiments could not be performed in
political economy, theories could be tested by comparing different societies
with different conditions and by thought experiments about the effects of
various factors.[20] Applying this method, he concluded that many of the
problems that beset society, such as poverty, inequality, and economic booms
and busts, could be attributed to the private ownership of the necessary
resource, land. In his most celebrated book, Progress and Poverty, George
argues that the appropriation of land for private use contributes to persistent
poverty in spite of technological progress, and causes economies to exhibit a
tendency toward boom and bust cycles. According to George, people justly
own what they create, but that natural opportunities and land belong equally
to all.[4] A supply and demand diagram showing the
effects of land value taxation. Note that the
The tax upon land values is, therefore, the most just and burden of the tax is entirely on the land
owner, the rental price of land does not
equal of all taxes. It falls only upon those who receive from
change, and there is nodeadweight loss.
society a peculiar and valuable benefit, and upon them in
proportion to the benefit they receive. It is the taking by the
community, for the use of the community, of that value
which is the creation of the community. It is the application
of the common property to common uses. When all rent is
taken by taxation for the needs of the community, then will
the equality ordained by Nature be attained. No citizen will
have an advantage over any other citizen save as is given by
his industry, skill, and intelligence; and each will obtain what
he fairly earns. Then, but not till then, will labor get its full
reward, and capital its natural return.
George believed there was an important distinction between common and collective property.[21] Although equal rights to land might
be achieved by nationalizing land and then leasing it to private users, George preferred taxing unimproved land value and leaving the
control of land mostly in private hands. George's reasoning for leaving land in private control and slowly shifting to land value tax
was that it would not penalize existing owners who had improved land and would also be less disruptive and controversial in a
country where land titles have already been granted.
Georgists have observed that privately created wealth is socialized via the tax system (e.g., through income and sales tax), while
socially created wealth in land values are privatized in the price of land titles and bank mortgages. The opposite would be the case if
land rents replaced taxes on labor as the main source of public revenue; socially created wealth would become available for use by
the community, while the fruits of labor would remain private.[22] According to Georgists, a land value tax can be considered a user
fee instead of a tax, since it is related to the market value of socially created locational advantage, the privilege to exclude others from
locations. Assets consisting of commodified privilege can be considered as wealth since they have exchange value, similar to taxi
medallions.[23] A land value tax, charging fees for exclusive use of land, as a means of raising public revenue is also a progressive
tax tending to reduce economic inequality,[10][11] since it applies entirely to ownership of valuable land, which is correlated with
income,[24] and there is generally no means by which landlords can shift thetax burden onto tenants or laborers.
Economic properties
Standard economic theory suggests that a land value tax would be extremely efficient – unlike other taxes, it does not reduce
economic productivity.[12] Milton Friedman described Henry George's tax on unimproved value of land as the "least bad tax", since
unlike other taxes, it would not impose an excess burden on economic activity (leading to zero or even negative "deadweight loss");
hence, a replacement of other more distortionary taxes with a land value tax would improve economic welfare.[25] As land value tax
can improve the use of land and redirect investment toward productive, non-rentseeking activities, it could even have a negative
deadweight loss that boosts productivity.[26] Because land value tax would apply to foreign land speculators, the Australian Treasury
estimated that land value tax was unique in having a negative marginal excess burden, meaning that it would increase long-run living
standards.[27]
It was Adam Smith who first noted the efficiency and distributional properties of a land value tax in his book, The Wealth of
Nations:[8]
Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not
raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist,
and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground. More or less can be got for it according as the
competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular spot of ground at a
greater or smaller expense. In every country the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there
accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those competitors would in no
respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the
ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant, or by the owner of the ground, would be of little
importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would incline to pay for the ground; so
that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent.
Both ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are a species of revenue which the owner, in many cases, enjoys
without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should be taken from him in order to defray
the expenses of the state, no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual produce of the
land and labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the people, might be the same after
such a tax as before. Ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are, therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which
can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon them. ... Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund which
owes its existence to the good government of the state should be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something
more than the greater part of other funds, towards the support of that government.
Benjamin Franklin and Winston Churchill made similar distributional and efficient arguments for taxing land rents. They noted that
the costs of taxes and the benefits of public spending always eventually apply to and enrich, respectively, the owners of land.
Therefore, they believed it would be best to defray public costs and recapture value of public spending by applying public charges
directly to owners of land titles, rather than harming public welfare with taxes assessed against beneficial activities such as trade and
labor.[28][29]
Henry George wrote that his plan for a high land value tax would cause people "to contribute to the public, not in proportion to what
they produce ... but in proportion to the value of natural [common] opportunities that they hold [monopolize]". He went on to explain
that "by taking for public use that value which attaches to land by reason of the growth and improvement of the community", it
would, "make the holding of land unprofitable to the mere owner
, and profitable only to the user".
A high land value tax would discourage speculators from holding valuable natural opportunities (like urban real estate) unused or
only partially used. Henry George claimed this would have many benefits, including the reduction or elimination of tax burdens from
poorer neighborhoods and agricultural districts; the elimination of a multiplicity of taxes and expensive obsolete government
institutions; the elimination of corruption, fraud, and evasion with respect to the collection of taxes; the enablement of true free trade;
the destruction of monopolies; the elevation of wages to the full value of labor; the transformation of labor saving inventions into
blessings for all; and the equitable distribution of comfort, leisure, and other advantages that are made possible by an advancing
civilization.[30] In this way, the vulnerability that market economies have to credit bubbles and property manias would be
reduced.[12]
Henry George shared the goal of modern Georgists to socialize or dismantle rent from all forms ofland monopoly and legal privilege.
However, George emphasized mainly his preferred policy known as land value tax, which targeted a particular form of unearned
income known as ground rent. George emphasized ground-rent because basic locations were more valuable than other monopolies
and everybody needed locations to survive, which he contrasted with the less significant streetcar and telegraph monopolies, which
George also criticized. George likened the problem to a laborer traveling home who is waylaid by a series of highway robbers along
the way, each who demand a small portion of the traveler's wages, and finally at the very end of the road waits a robber who demands
all that the traveler has left. George reasoned that it made little difference to challenge the series of small robbers when the final
robber remained to demand all that the common laborer had left.[34] George predicted that over time technological advancements
would increase the frequency and importance of lesser monopolies, yet he expected that ground rent would remain dominant.[35]
George even predicted that ground-rents would rise faster than wages and income to capital, a prediction that modern analysis has
[36]
shown to be plausible, since the supply of land is fixed.
Common ground rent is still the primary emphasis of Georgists because of its large value and the known diseconomies of misused
land. However, there are other sources of rent that are theoretically analogous to ground-rent and are debated topics of Georgists. The
following are some sources of economic rent.[37][38][39]
[40][41]
Extractable resources (minerals and hydrocarbons)
Severables (forests and stocks of fish)[33][42][43]
Extraterrestrial domains (geosynchronous orbits and airway corridor use) [38][39]
Legal privileges that apply to specific location (taxi medallions, billboard and development permits, or the monopoly
of electromagnetic frequencies)[38][39]
Restrictions/taxes of pollution orseverance (tradable emission permitsand fishing quotas)[32][38][39]
[44][45][46]
Right-of-way (transportation)used by railroads, utilities, and internet service providers
Issuance of legal tender (see seigniorage)[32][47]
Privileges that are less location dependent but that still exclude others from natural opportunitiespatents)
( [48][49]
Where free competition is impossible, such as telegraphs, water, gas, and transportation, George wrote, "[S]uch business becomes a
proper social function, which should be controlled and managed by and for the whole people concerned." Georgists were divided by
this question of natural monopolies and often favored public ownership only of the rents from common rights-of-way, rather than
public ownership of utility companies themselves.[30]
Pollution degrades the value of what Georgists consider to be commons. Because pollution is a negative contribution, a taking from
the commons or a cost imposed on others, its value is economic rent, even when the polluter is not receiving an explicit income.
Therefore, to the extent that society determines pollution to be harmful, most Georgists propose to limit pollution with taxation or
quotas that capture the resulting rents for public use, restoration, or acitizen's dividend.[32][54][55]
Georgism is related to the school of ecological economics, since both propose market based restrictions for pollution.[51][56] The
schools are compatible in that they advocate using similar tools as part of a conservation strategy, but they emphasize different
aspects. Conservation is the central issue of ecology, whereas economic rent is the central issue of geoism. Ecological economists
might price pollution fines more conservatively to prevent inherently unquantifiable damage to the environment, whereas Georgists
might emphasize mediation between conflicting interests and human rights.[33][57] Geolibertarianism, a market oriented branch of
geoism, tends to take a direct stance against what it perceives as burdensome regulation and would like to see auctioned pollution
quotas or taxes replace mostcommand and control regulation.[58]
Since ecologists are primarily concerned with conservation, they tend to emphasize less the issue of equitably distributing
scarcity/pollution rents, whereas Georgists insist that unearned income not accrue to those who hold title to natural assets and
pollution privilege. To the extent that geoists recognize the effect of pollution or share conservationist values, they will agree with
ecological economists about the need to limit pollution, but geoists will also insist that pollution rents generated from those
conservation efforts do not accrue to polluters and are instead used for public purposes or to compensate those who suffer the
negative effects of pollution. Ecological economists advocate similar pollution restrictions but, emphasizing conservation first, might
be willing to grant private polluters the privilege to capture pollution rents. To the extent that ecological economists share the geoist
view of social justice, they would advocate auctioning pollution quotas instead of giving them away for free.[51] This distinction can
be seen in the difference between basic cap and trade and the geoist variation, cap and share, a proposal to auction temporary
pollution permits, with rents going to the public, instead of giving pollution privilege away for free to existing polluters or selling
perpetual permits.[59][60]
Revenue uses
The revenue can allow the reduction or elimination of taxes, greater public investment/spending, or the direct distribution of funds to
citizens as a pension orbasic income/citizen's dividend.[33][61][62]
In practice, the elimination of all other taxes implies a very great land value tax, greater than any currently existing land tax.
Introducing a land value tax greater than the value of existing taxes would, at an uncertain point, inevitably cause the price of all land
titles to decrease. George did not believe landowners should be compensated, and described the issue as being analogous to
compensation for former slave owners. Other geoists disagree on the question of compensation; some advocate complete
compensation while others endorse only enough compensation required to achieve Georgist reforms. Geoists have also long differed
from George as to the degree of rent capture needed. Historically, those who advocated for public rent tax only great enough to
replace other taxes were known as endorsers ofsingle tax limited.
Some modern proponents are dissatisfied with the name Georgist. While Henry George was well known throughout his life, he has
been largely forgotten by the public and the idea of a single tax of land predates him. Some now prefer the term geoism,[19][63] with
the meaning of geo (from Greek γῆ gē "earth, land", as incidentally is in Greek the first compound of the name George (whence
Georgism) < (Gr.) Geōrgios < geōrgos "farmer" or geōrgia "agriculture, farming" < gē + ergon "work")[64][65] deliberately
ambiguous. The terms Earth Sharing,[66] geonomics,[67] and geolibertarianism[68] (see Libertarianism) are also used by some
Georgists. These terms represent a difference of emphasis, and sometimes real differences about how land rent should be spent
(citizen's dividend or just replacing other taxes); but all agree that land rent should be recovered from its private recipients.
Compulsory fines and fees related to land rents are the most common Georgist policies, but some geoists prefer voluntary value
capture systems that rely on methods such as non-compulsory or self-assessed location value fees, community land trusts,[69] and
purchasing land value covenants.[70][71][72][73][74]
Some geoists believe that partially compensating landowners is a politically expedient compromise necessary for achieving
reform.[75][76] For similar reasons, others propose capturing only future land value increases, instead of all land rent.
[77]
Though Georgism has historically been considered as a radically progressive or socialist ideology, some libertarians and minarchists
take the position that limited social spending should be financed using Georgist concepts of rent value capture, but that not all land
rent should be captured. Today, this relatively conservative adaptation is usually considered incompatible with true geolibertarianism,
which requires that excess rents be gathered and then distributed back to residents. During Henry George's time, this restrained
Georgist philosophy was known as "single tax limited", as opposed to "single tax unlimited". Henry George disagreed with the
limited interpretation but accepted its adherents (e.g., Thomas Shearman) as legitimate "single-taxers" [Georgists].[78] (See Milton
Friedman in "Critical reception")
Influence
Georgist ideas heavily influenced the politics of the early 20th century. Political parties that were formed based on Georgist ideas
include the United States Commonwealth Land Party, the Henry George Justice Party, the Single Tax League, and Denmark's Justice
Party.
In the UK during 1909, the Liberal Government included a land tax as part of several taxes in the People's Budget intended to
redistribute wealth (including a progressively graded income tax and an increase of inheritance tax). This caused a crisis which
resulted indirectly in reform of the House of Lords. The budget was passed eventually—but without the land tax. In 1931, the
minority Labour Government passed a land value tax as part III of the 1931 Finance act. However, this was repealed in 1934 by the
National Government before it could be implemented.
In Denmark, the Georgist Justice Party has previously been represented in Folketinget. It
formed part of a centre-left government 1957–60 and was also represented in the European
Parliament 1978–79. The influence of Henry George has waned over time, but Georgist ideas
still occasionally emerge in politics. In the United States 2004 Presidential campaign, Ralph
Nader mentioned Henry George in his policy statements.[79]
Economists still generally favor a land value tax.[80] Milton Friedman publicly endorsed the
Georgist land value tax as the "least bad tax".[9] Joseph Stiglitz stated that: "Not only was
Henry George correct that a tax on land is non-distortionary, but in an equilibrium society …
tax on land raises just enough revenue to finance the (optimally chosen) level of government
expenditure."[81] He dubbed this proposition theHenry George theorem.[82]
The German protectorate of theKiautschou Bay concessionin Jiaozhou Bay, China fully implemented Georgist policy. Its sole source
of government revenue was the land value tax of six percent which it levied in its territory. The German government had previously
had economic problems with its African colonies caused by land speculation. One of the main reasons for using the land value tax in
Jiaozhou Bay was to eliminate such speculation, which the policy achieved.[85] The colony existed as a German protectorate from
1898 until 1914, when seized by Japanese and British troops. In 1922 the territory was returned to China.
Georgist ideas were also adopted to some degree in Australia, Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan. In these countries, governments
still levy some type of land value tax, albeit with exemptions.[86] Many municipal
governments of the US depend on real property tax as their main source of revenue,
although such taxes are not Georgist as they generally include the value of buildings
and other improvements. One exception is the town ofAltoona, Pennsylvania, which
for a time in the 21st century only taxed land value, phasing in the tax in 2002,
relying on it entirely for tax revenue from 2011, and ending it 2017; the Financial
Times noted that "Altoona is using LVT in a city where neither land nor buildings
Henry George School of Social
have much value".[87][88]
Science in New York
Reception
The economist Alfred Marshall believed that George's views in Progress and Poverty were dangerous, even predicting wars, terror,
and economic destruction. Specifically, Marshall was upset about the idea of rapid change and the unfairness of not compensating
existing landowners. In his lectures on Progress and Poverty, Marshall opposed George's position on compensation while fully
endorsing his ultimate remedy. So far as land value tax moderately replaced other taxes and did not cause the price of land to fall,
Marshall supported land value taxation on economic and moral grounds, suggesting that a three or four percent tax on land values
would fit this condition. After implementing land taxes, governments would purchase future land values at discounted prices and take
ownership after 100 years. Marshall asserted that this plan, which he strongly supported, would end the need for a tax collection
department of government. For newly formed countries where land was not already private, Marshall advocated implementing
George's economic proposal immediately.[94][95]
Karl Marx considered the Single Tax platform as a regression from the transition to communism and referred to Georgism as
"Capitalism’s last ditch".[96] Marx argued that, "The whole thing is ... simply an attempt, decked out with socialism, to save capitalist
domination and indeed to establish it afresh on an even wider basis than its present one."[97] Marx also criticized the way land value
tax theory emphasizes the value of land, arguing that, "His fundamental dogma is that everything would be all right if ground rent
were paid to the state."[97] Georgists such as Fred Harrison (2003) replied to these Marxist objections.[98]
Richard T. Ely, known as the "Father of Land Economics", agreed with the economic arguments for Georgism but believed that
correcting the problem the way Henry George wanted (without compensation) was unjust to existing landowners. In explaining his
position, Ely wrote that "If we have all made a mistake, should one party to the transaction alone bear the cost of the common
blunder?"[99]
John R. Commons supported Georgist economics, but opposed what he perceived as an environmentally and politically reckless
tendency for advocates to rely on a one-size-fits-all approach to tax reform, specifically, the "single tax" framing. Commons
concluded The Distribution of Wealth, with an estimate that "perhaps 95% of the total values represented by these millionnaire [sic]
fortunes is due to those investments classed as land values and natural monopolies and to competitive industries aided by such
monopolies", and that "tax reform should seek to remove all burdens from capital and labour and impose them on monopolies".
However, he criticized Georgists for failing to see that Henry George's anti-monopoly ideas must be implemented with a variety of
policy tools. He wrote, "Trees do not grow into the sky—they would perish in a high wind; and a single truth, like a single tax, ends
in its own destruction." Commons uses the natural soil fertility and value of forests as an example of this destruction, arguing that a
tax on the in situ value of those depletable natural resources can result in overuse or over-extraction. Instead, Commons recommends
gist severance tax.[100][101]
an income tax based approach to forests similar to a modern Geor
Other contemporaries such as Austrian economist Frank Fetter and neoclassical economist John Bates Clark argued that it was
impractical to maintain the traditional distinction between land and capital, and used this as a basis to attack Geor
gism. Mark Blaug, a
specialist in the history of economic thought, credits Fetter and Clark with influencing mainstream economists to abandon the idea
"that land is a unique factor of production and hence that there is any special need for a special theory of ground rent" claiming that
"this is in fact the basis of all the attacks on Henry George by contemporary economists and certainly the fundamental reason why
[102]
professional economists increasingly ignored him".
Robert Solow endorsed the theory of Georgism, but is wary of the perceived injustice of expropriation. Solow stated that taxing away
expected land rents "would have no semblance of fairness"; however, Georgism would be good to introduce where location values
.[103]
were not already privatized or if the transition could be phased in slowly
Milton Friedman agreed that "the Henry George argument" is "the least bad" means of raising needed public revenue.[104] However,
Friedman viewed Georgism as partially immoral, due to a difference of opinion about the validity of vested property rights in land.
Georgists agree with Friedman that land titles should remain private, however they believe that the private capture of unimproved
.[105]
land-rents is inherently unjust, drawing comparisons to slavery
George has also been accused of exaggerating the importance of his "all-devouring rent thesis" in claiming that it is the primary cause
of poverty and injustice in society.[106] George argued that the rent of land increased faster than wages for labor because the supply
of land is fixed. Modern economists, including Ottmar Edenhofer have demonstrated that George's assertion is plausible but was
more likely to be true during George's time than now.[36]
An early criticism of Georgism was that it would generate too much public revenue and result in unwanted growth of government,
but later critics argued that it would not generate enough income to cover government spending. Joseph Schumpeter concluded his
analysis of Georgism by stating that, "It is not economically unsound, except that it involves an unwarranted optimism concerning the
yield of such a tax." Economists who study land conclude that Schumpeter's criticism is unwarranted because the rental yield from
land is likely much greater than what modern critics such as Paul Krugman suppose.[107] Krugman agrees that land value taxation is
the best means of raising public revenue but asserts that increased spending has rendered land rent insufficient to fully fund
government.[108] Georgists have responded by citing studies and analyses implying that land values of nations like the US, UK, and
Australia are more than sufficient to fund all levels of government.[109][110][111][112][113][114][115]
Anarcho-capitalist political philosopher and economist Murray Rothbard criticized Georgism in Man, Economy, and State as being
philosophically incongruent withsubjective value theory, and further stating that land is irrelevant in the factors of production, trade,
and price systems,[116] but this critique is seen by some, including other opponents of Georgism, as relying on false assumptions and
flawed reasoning.[117]
Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek credited early enthusiasm for Henry George with developing his interest in economics. Later,
Hayek said that the theory of Georgism would be very strong if assessment challenges did not result in unfair outcomes, but he
believed that they would.[118]
After studying Progress and Poverty, Tyler Cowen concluded, "George had some good economic arguments, but [. . .] was politically
naive. At the margin we should move in George’s direction, but ultimately landowners have to be part of the building coalitions
rather than pure victims."[119]
Notable Georgists
Helen Taylor[216]
William Simon U'Ren[217]
Ida B. Wells[218]
Frances Willard[219]
See also
Agrarian Justice Land law
Arden, Delaware Land monopoly
Cap and Share Land tenure and registration
Causes of poverty Land value tax
Citizen's dividend Law of rent
Classical economics Lockean proviso
Classical liberalism Manorialism
Community land trust Natural and legal rights
Deadweight loss Optimal tax
Diggers movement Physiocracy
Economic rent Pigovian tax
Enclosure Poverty reduction
Excess burden of taxation Progress and Poverty
Externality Progressive Era
Free-market environmentalism Prosper Australia (formerly "Henry George League")
Freiwirtschaft Radical centrism
Geolibertarianism Tax reform / shift
Green economy Tragedy of the anticommons
Labor economics Universal basic income
Laissez-faire Value capture
Land (economics) Wealth concentration
Landed property YIMBY
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stated in 1978: "Assuming that a tax increase is necessary , it is clearly preferable to impose the additional cost on
land by increasing the land tax, rather than to increase the wage tax – the two alternatives open to the City (of
Pittsburgh). It is the use and occupancy of property that creates the need for the municipal services that appear as
the largest item in the budget – fire and police protection, waste removal, and public works. The average increase in
tax bills of city residents will be about twice as great with wage tax increase than with a land tax increase. "
145. Stiglitz, Joseph (2 December 2010)."Working Paper No. 6: Principles and Guidelines for Deficit Reduction"(https://w
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