G.R. No. 125865 - Liang v. People

3/28/2019 G.R. No. 125865 | Liang v.
People
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
For allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow Asian

Development Bank (ADB) worker, petitioner, an economist at ADB, was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two counts of grave
oral defamation. The MeTC judge received an "office protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
in the country. Based on the said communication, the MeTC judge, without
notice to the prosecution, dismissed the two criminal cases. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent was denied by the MeTC, hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC
set aside the MeTC ruling and ordered the enforcement of the warrant of
arrest earlier issued. Thus, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court
after his motion for reconsideration was denied. He argued that he is covered
by immunity and that no preliminary investigation was held.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Supreme
Court, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation; the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges; and that preliminary investigation is not
a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS;

MOTU PROPRIO DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES, WHEN DEEMED
VIOLATION OF PROSECUTION'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; CASE AT
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/5634/print 1/5
3/28/2019 G.R. No. 125865 | Liang v. People
BAR. — Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication
from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's
determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary
which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex parte the DFA's advice
and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of
the charges. The immunity mentioned under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters
of the ADB is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case
falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have
been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
2. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; NOT APPLICABLE
WHEN DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL FOR HIS ACT
DONE WITH MALICE OR IN BAD FAITH OR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS
AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. — Slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the
Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of
the DFA. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty. TaCDcE
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank

(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested
by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner
is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters
of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case
to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal cases were filed in court. cda
The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The
DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the
DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It
should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of
the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at
the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis
that has yet to be presented at the proper time. 1 At any rate, it has been ruled
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in
the dropping of the charges. 2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this
Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore
necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section
45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut
the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It
appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General,
does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. 6 Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. 7 The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 8
Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render
it defective. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990].

2. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991].
3. M .H . Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357, 368 [1992].
4. Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 [1990]; Animos v. Phil. Veterans Affairs
Office, 174 SCRA 214 [1989]; Dumlao v. CA, 114 SCRA 247 [1982].
5. Section 31, 1 (c); See also Minucher v. CA, 214 SCRA 242 [1992].
6. See Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645 [1997].
7. People v. Abejuela, 38 SCRA 324 [1971].

8. Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9. People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72 [1982]; People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478
[1961].

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3/28/2019 G.R. No. 125865 | Liang v.

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.

For allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow Asian

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS;

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank

The petition is not impressed with merit.

1. See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990].

7. People v. Abejuela, 38 SCRA 324 [1971].

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