WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?

Author(s): MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY and John F. Bannan

Source: CrossCurrents, Vol. 6, No. 1 (WINTER 1956), pp. 59-70
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24456652
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 WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
at last, a philosophical status. It is a
Whatseem
is phenomenology? It may
strange that this question
philosophy intent upon being an "exact
need still be posed a half century afterscience," but it is also an account of
the first works of Husserl. Yet it is far
space, time, and the world "as lived."
from being settled. Phenomenology is It is an attempt to describe our experi
the study of essences and accordingly its ence as it is and to describe it directly,
treatment of every problem is an at without considering its psychological
tempt to define an essence, the essence genesis or the causal explanations which
of perception, or the essence of con the scientist, historian or sociologist may
sciousness, for example. But phenomen give. Yet Husserl in his final works men
ology is also a philosophy which replaces tions a "genetic phenomenology"1 and
essences in existence, and does not be even a "constructive phenomenology."2
lieve that man and the world can be These contradictions cannot be relieved
understood save on the basis of their by distinguishing the phenomenology of
Husserl from that of Heidegger, for all
state of fact. It is a transcendental phil
osophy which suspends our spontaneous of Sein und Zeit follows a direction indi
natural affirmations in order to under
cated by Husserl, and is only a render
ing explicit of the "natiirlichen Welt
stand them, but it is also a philosophy
for which the world is always "alreadybegriff" or the "Lebenswelt" which the
there" as an inalienable presence which
latter, near the end of his life, gave as
precedes reflection. The whole effort the
of primary theme of phenomenology.
phenomenology is to recover this naiveThe contradiction, then, appears in the
contact with the world and to give work
it, of Husserl himself.
The hurried reader will give up all
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is professorexpectation
of of finding here a completely
Psychology at the Sorbonne and one ofdeveloped doctrine. Indeed, he may
the more prominent figures in French wonder if a philosophy which has not
Phenomenological Existentialism. The managed to define itself is worth all the
frequent association of his name withcommotion generated around it, and if
we are not in fact dealing with a myth
that of Sartre is justified both on ideo
or a fad.
logical grounds and by the fact that he
has collaborated with the latter in the Even if this were the case, the pres
editorship of the periodical Les Tempstige of this myth and the origin of the
Modernes. His best known works to date fad would still pose a problem. The one
are La Structure du Comportement who takes philosophy seriously will trans
and Phénoménologie de la Perception. late this situation by saying that phen
What follows is the Avant-Propos of omenology was practiced and recognized
as a manner or a style, that it existed
this second work, and in it he reviews
from his own point of view the now as a movement before arriving at a com
traditional phenomenological themes. plete philosophical consciousness. It has
His treatment of these marks his work
1 Méditations Cartésiennes, pp. 120, ff.
as a prolongation of the "Lebenswelt"
2 Cf., the Vie Méditation Cartésienne, edited by
motif which became so important for
Eugen Fink and unpublished. G. Berger has been
Husserl near the end of his career. kind enough to make known its contents.

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 *0 CROSS CURRENTS

been on the way

its disciples find
and Kierkegaard
Marx, Nietzsche
ical commentary
nothing of impo
only find in the
there, and the h
more than any o
our own interpr
selves that we w
true meaning of
not so much a q
citations as of fi
that Phenomeno
given several of
when they read
much less the fe
a new philosophy
thing which they
ogy is accessible
logical method.
deliberately to d
known phenomen
are spontaneously
Perhaps then we
phenomenology h
a state of beginn
accomplished. that tradition which I chose to adopt
or that horizon whose distance from me
PHENOMENOLOGICAL tends to disappear, since it would have
DESCRIPTION no such property as distance were I not
there to view it. Scientific views accord
r is a question of description, and not ing to which I am an event in the world
I of explanation or analysis. That first are always naive and hypocritical be
command which Husserl gave to the new cause, without mentioning the fact, they
phenomenology, that it be a "descrip- sustain themselves on that other view,
tive psychology" or that it return "to that consciousness by which, initially, a
the things themselves" is above all a world is disposed around me and begins
disavowal of science. I am not the re- to exist for me. To turn back to the
suit of the intersection of a multiplicity things themselves is to return to that
of causal influences which determine world prior to knowledge of which
my body and my "psychism." I cannot knowledge speaks, and with regard to
think of myself as a part of the world, which every scientific determination is
the simple object of biology, psychology abstractive, dependent and a sign; it is
and sociology, nor can I shut myself like the relationship of geography to
out of the universe of science. Every- the countryside where we first learned
thing that I know of the world, even what a forest, a prairie or a river was.

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MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY 41

This movement is absolutely distinct and oppose this noetic analysis which
from the idealist turning upon consciousmakes the world depend on the synthe
ness, and the demands of pure descriptic activity of the subject with his "noe
tion exclude both the procedure of rematic reflection" which remains with
flective analysis and that of scientificthe object, rendering it explicit rather
explanation. Descartes, and especially than engendering its primordial unity.
Kant, freed the subject or consciousness
The world is there before any anal
by making clear the fact that I would
ysis which I can make of it, and it would
be unable to seize anything as existentbe artificial to derive it from a series
if I did not, first of all, experience my
of syntheses which combine the sensa
self as existent in the very act of seizing
tions and then the perspectives of the
the object. They made consciousness, my
object. In fact both of these are products
absolute certitude of myself, appear as
the condition without which there wouldof analysis and have no reality prior to
it. Reflective analysis imagines itself
be nothing at all, and they established
following in reverse the path of a pre
the act of relating as the foundation of
vious constitution and rejoining what
what was related. Undoubtedly the act
St. Augustine called an "interior man,"
of relating is nothing without the spec
tacle of the world which it relates. The a constituting power which he has al
ways been. And so reflection runs away
unity of consciousness according to Kant
with itself and takes up a position in an
is exactly contemporaneous with the
invulnerable subjectivity, beyond time
unity of the world, and we lose noth
and being. But that is a naïveté, an in
ing by Descartes' methodic doubt be
cause the whole world, at least in terms
complete reflection which loses consci
ousness of its own beginning. I began to
of our experience, is reintegrated with
reflect. My reflection is a reflection on
the Cogito, which itself is certain and
the non-reflective. It cannot ignore it
affected only with the index "thought
of..." self as an event, and hence it appears
as a genuine creation, a change in struc
But the relations of subject and world
ture of consciousness, and it is proper
are not rigorously bilateral. If they were,
to it to recognize, as prior to its own
the certitude of the world in Descartes'
operations, the world which is given to
work would be given at the beginning
the subject because the subject is given
with that of the Cogito, and Kant would
to himself.
not speak of "Copernican revolution."
Reflective analysis moves from ourThe real
ex must be described and not
constructed or constituted. That means
perience of the world to the subject as
a condition of the possibility that I cannot assimilate perception into
of that
experience as distinct from it,syntheses
and re which are of the order of judg
ment,
veals the universal synthesis as thatof acts or of predication. At each
without which there would be nomoment
world.my perceptive field is filled with
reflected
To this extent, such an analysis ceases light, tiny noises and fleeting
tactile
to adhere to our experience, and subimpressions which I cannot pre
cisely connect with the context per
stitutes a reconstruction for an account
of it. It is understandable, then, that
ceived but which I unhesitatingly recog
nize
Husserl could reproach Kant for his as belonging to the world without
"psychologism of faculties of theever confusing them with my dreams.
soul"3
At each instant I do surround things
3 Logische Untersucbungen, Prolegomena zur rri
tun Logik, p. 93. with an aura of fancy. I imagine objects

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62 CROSS CURRENTS

or persons whose presence is not in question which Husserl pondered for a

compatible with the context but which longer time, nor is there a question to
are not in fact part of it. They stand which he returned more often, for the
forth from it in the theatre of the imag "reduction problematic" occupies an im
inary. If the reality of my perception portant place in his unpublished works.
were founded only on the intrinsic co For a long time, and even in recent
herence of "representations," it would texts, the reduction is presented as the
always be hesitant, and given over to return to a transcendental conscious
my probable conjectures. I would have ness before which the world is deployed
to undo at each moment illusory syn in an absolute transparence, animated
theses and reintegrate with the real the through and through by a series of ap
aberrant phenomena which I would have perceptions which the philosopher is
at first excluded from it. Such is defin charged to reconstitute on the basis of
itely not the case. Reality is a solid tis
their result. Thus my sensation of red
sue. It does not await our judgmentsis apperceived as the manifestation of
to annex to itself the most surprising a certain red experienced, the latter as
phenomena, nor to reject our most likethe manifestation of a red surface, which
is itself the manifestation of red card
ly fancies. Perception is not a science
of the world, nor even an act, a delib board and this, finally, is the manifesta
erate taking up of a position. It is the tion or profile of a red thing, of this
basis from which every act issues and book. This then would be the appre
it is presupposed by them. The world hension of a certain hylè which signi
is not an object the law of whose con fies a phenomenon of a superior degree,
stitution I possess. It is the natural the Sinn-gebung, or active operation of
milieu and the field of all my thoughts giving meaning which would define
consciousness. The world would simply
and of all my explicit perceptions. Truth
does not "dwell" only in the "interior be the "world of signification."
man"4 for there is no interior man. Man
is before himself in the world5 and it is
Such a reduction could properly be
in the world that he knows himself. long only to a transcendental idealism,
a doctrine which treats the world as a
When I turn upon myself from the dog
unity of value undivided by Peter and
matism of common sense or the dog
Paul.
matism of science, I find, not the dwell
Their perspectives overlap in this
unity which makes for the communica
ing place of intrinsic truth, but a tion
sub of "Peter's consciousness" with
ject committed to the world.
"Paul's consciousness." The problem of
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL communication which might arise be
REDUCTION cause the perception of the world "by
Peter" is not the fact of Peter and the
Now the phenomenological
brated real meaning of the celeof the world "by Paul" is
perception
reduction
not the no
can be seen. There is undoubtedy fact of Paul is dissipated by the
existence in each of a pre-personal con
4 In te redi: in interiore homine habitat Veritas.
sciousness demanded by the very defini
—St.Augustine.
5 *... Vhomme est au monde..." What is in tion of consciousness, meaning or truth.
tended here is that man's relation to the world For this consciousness, communication
should not be taken as extrinsic or accident al, but
is no problem. Insofar as I am conscious
as essential to his being. For Merleau-Ponty man is
defined as a presence to the world—"être-au-monde."
ness, that is, insofar as something has
Cf. this text p. 9. Trans. meaning for me, I am neither here nor

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MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY 63

there nor Peter nor Paul. I am indis it would not be me that he sees nor he
tinguishable from an "other" consciousthat I see. I must be my exterior and
hetohis body. This paradox and the dia
ness for we are all immediate presences
lectic of the Ego and the Alter-Ego are
the world and the world is by definition
only possible if each is defined by his
unique, since it is the system of truths.
situation and not freed of all inherence.
Such a transcendental idealism despoils
the world of its opacity and its trans
They are only possible if philosophy
cendence. The world is that which we does not attain its completion in the
represent to ourselves, not as men or as return to the self, and if I discover by
empirical subjects, but insofar as we reflection not only my presence to my
are all one single light, and we partici self but also the possibility of a "foreign
pate in the One without dividing it. observer." The paradox and dialectic
Reflective analysis ignores the problem are possible only if at that very moment
of the other person as well as the prob when I experience my existence, and
lem of the world because it makes ap until that extreme point of reflection, I
pear in men, with the first spark of con still lack that absolute density which
sciousness, the power to go to a truth would permit me to step out of time,
which is universal by right, and because and I discover in myself an internal
the other person is also without loca weakness which prevents me from be
tion and without body. Alter and Ego ing absolutely individual, exposing me
are one in the true world, the bond of to the regard of others as a man among
spirits. There is no difficulty in under men or at least a consciousness among
standing how I can think the other per consciousnesses.
son because the I and consequently the
Up to the present the Cogito deval
other person are not caught up in the
uated the perception of the other person.
web of phenomena. We have value ra
It taught me that the I is only acces
ther than exist. There is nothing hidden
sible to itself because it defined me by
from me behind these faces and gestures.
the thought that I have of myself and
No countryside is inaccessible to me.
which, obviously, I am alone in having,
There is only a bit of shadow, and that at least in this ultimate sense. If "other"
only because of the light.
is not to be a vain word, my existence
For Husserl, however, there is a prob must never be reduced to the conscious
lem of the other person, and the alter
ness that I have of existing. It must also
ego is a paradox. If the other person is embrace the consciousness that can be
in his own right, and not merely for
had of it and hence my incarnation in
me,® and if we are for each other, and
a nature and the possibility at least of a
are not merely one and another for God,
historic situation. The Cogito must dis
we must appear to one another. He must
cover me in situation, and it is on that
have an exterior and so must I. Beyond condition alone that the transcendental
the Pour Soi perspective—my view of
subjectivity could, according to Husserl,
myself and his view of himself—there
be an intersubjectivity. As meditating
must be a Pour Autrui perspective—my
view of him and his view of me. Natu ego I can very well distinguish the
world and things from myself, since I
rally these two perspectives in each of
us cannot be simply juxtaposed, for then certainly do not exist in the same fa
shion as things. I may even divest my
6 That is, if the other person does not exist merely
insofar as and to the extent that I am conscious of
self of my extended body as a thing
him. among things, a sum of physico-chemical

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 64 CROSS CURRENTS

processes. But the thinking that I dis intentional ties which bind us to the
cover in this way, if it is unlocated in world in order to make them appear. It
objective time and space, is not with alone is consciousness of the world be
out a place in the phenomenological cause it reveals it as strange and para
world. The world that I distinguished doxical.

from myself as a sum of things or of Husserl's transcendental is not that

causally connected processes is re-dis of Kant, and Husserl reproaches Kan
covered "in me" as the permanent hori tian philosophy for being mundane be
zon of all my thinking and as a dimen cause it utilizes our relation to the world
sion in relation to which I never cease
which is the driving force of the trans
to situate myself. The genuine Cogito
cendental deduction, and makes the
does not define the existence of the sub
world immanent to the subject rather
ject by the thought that it has of exist than standing in awe before this rela
ing. It does not convert the certitudetion, and conceiving the subject as trans
of the world into certitude of the world
cendence toward the world. All the mis
as thought, nor does it replace the world understandings which have arisen be
by the signification world. On the contween Husserl and his interpreters, with
trary it recognizes my thought as an in his existential "dissidents," and finally
alienable fact and it eliminates every with himself, spring from the fact that
type of idealism in discovering me as precisely in order to see the world and
presence to a world.7 to seize it as a paradox, it is necessary
Our relation to the world is so pro to disrupt our familiarity with it, and
found and so intimate that the only way that disruption can teach us nothing
for us to notice it is to suspend its move save the unmotivated surging forth of
ment, to refuse it our complicity (to re the world. The greatest lesson of the
gard it ohne mitzumachen as Husserl reduction is the impossibility of a com
often said) or to render it inoperative. plete reduction. That is why Husserl
It is not that the certitudes of common
questioned himself again and again on
sense should be renounced. On the con
the possibility of the reduction. If we
trary, they are the constant themewereof absolute spirits it would be no
philosophy. But precisely because problem.
they But since we are engaged in
are the presuppositions of all thought,
a world, and since even our reflections
they "go without saying," and remain
take place in the temporal flux which
unnoticed. In order to reawaken them
they attempt to arrest (since they sich
and make them appear, we musteinstromen,
ab as Husserl said) there is no
stain from them for a moment. Un
thought which embraces all our thought.
doubtedly the best formula for the re
duction is given by Eugen Fink, The Husphilosopher, say the unpublished
serl's assistant, when he speaks of an is in a state of perpetual begin
works,
"astonishment" before the world.8 Here, ning. This means that he holds noth
reflection does not retreat from the world ing for definitively acquired which the
toward the unity of a consciousness popular majority or the scientists be
upon which the world is founded. It lieve they know. It also means that phil
withdraws in order to see the transcend osophy cannot consider itself as defini
ences stand forth clearly. It distends the tively established in any of the truths
which it can utter, that it is a renewed
1 "... être au monde." Cf., note S.
8 Die phânomenologische Philosophie Edmund
experience of its own beginning, and
that
Husserls in der gegenwârtigen Kritik, pp. 331 £f. it consists entirely of a description

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MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY 65

only with circumspection and after hav

of this beginning. It means, finally, that
this radical reflection is consciousness
ing explained the numerous significa
tions which have contributed to deter
of its own dependence upon a non-re
flective life which is its initial, constant mine it during the course of the seman
and final situation. Far from being, as tic evolution of the word. This logical
one might think, the formula for an positivism is at the opposite extreme
idealist philosophy, the phenomenologi from Husserl's thought. Whatever may
cal reduction is that of an existentialist have been the shifts in meaning which
philosophy: the "In-cLer-Welt-Sein" offinally gave us the word and concept of
Heidegger only appears on the basis consciousness
of as an acquisition of the
the phenomenological reduction. language, we have a direct way of ap
proaching what it designates: we have
ESSENCE the experience of ourselves. It is against
this experience that language means
something to us. "The experience which
A misunderstanding
sets up a good deal of of
the same
is type
confusion still mute must be led to the pure
around Husserl's notion of "essences." expression of its own meaning."9 The
While every reduction is transcenden Husserlian essences draw back with them
tal, says Husserl, it is also necessarily all their living relations with experience,
eidetic. This means that we cannot sub as the net raised from the ocean floor
mit our perception of the world to phil pulls up living algae as well as fish. Jean
osophical scrutiny without ceasing to be Wahl is incorrect in saying that "Hus
identified with that interest in the world serl separates essences from existence."10
which defines us. We must withdraw The separated essences are those of lan
from our engagement to make it appear guage. It is the function of language to
as a spectacle, and pass from the fact make essences exist in a separation, which
of our existence to the nature of our
is actually only apparent since they still
existence, from Dasein to Wesen. But repose on the antepredicative life of con
it is clear that the essence here is not sciousness. In the silence of the original
the end but the means. It is our effec
consciousness there appear not only the
tive engagement in the world which meanings of words but also the mean
must be understood and conceptualized, ings of things, that primary core of sig
and which polarizes all our conceptual nification around which acts of denom
fixations. The fact that essences are in
ination and expression are organized.
strumental in reflection does not mean
Seeking the essence of consciousness
that philosophy takes them as its object,
but rather that our existence is too strict then, will not mean developing the
Wortbedeutung consciousness, and flee
ly caught up in the world to know it
self as such at the moment when it is ing existence in a universe of things said.
It means recovering my effective pres
thrown forth upon the world, and that
ence to myself, the fact of my conscious
it needs the idea in order to recognize ness which is what the word and con
and conquer its state of fact.
cept of consciousness ultimately mean.
The Viennese school, as is known,
Seeking the essence of the world does
maintains that we can have relations
not mean seeking what it is in idea once
only with meanings. For example, "con
sciousness," for the Viennese school, is
9 Méditations Cartésiennes, p. 33.
not our selves. It is a late and compli 10 "Réalisme dialectique et ^Arbalète,
cated signification which we may use Automne 1942, pages not numb

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46 CROSS CURRENTS

we have reduced it to a word scheme. regard to some sort of truth as such. If

we speak of illusion, it is because we
It means seeking what it is in fact for
us prior to all formulation. Sensualism
have recognized illusions. We could only
"reduces" the world by remarking thathave done that in the course of some
after all we never have anything other
perception which, at that very moment
than states of ourselves. Transcendental attested to its own truth. Hence doubt,
Idealism also "reduces" the world be or the fear of being deceived, is also an
cause, though it renders it certain, it
affirmation of our power to uncover error
does so only insofar as the worldand becould not uproot us from the truth.
comes the thought or consciousness Weof are steeped in truth, and evidence
world, the simple correlative of is our"the experience of truth."11 To look
consciousness. It becomes immanent to for the essence of perception is to de
clare, not that perception is presumed
consciousness, and the aseity of things
is consequently suppressed. to be truth, but that it is defined for us
The eidetic reduction, on the con as access to truth.

trary, is the resolution to make the If I were to wish, with idealism, to

base this evidence of fact, this irresisti
world appear as it is prior to all turn
ing upon ourselves. It is the ambitionble belief, upon an absolute evidence,
to make reflection equal to the non that is upon the absolute clarity of my
reflective life of consciousness. I envision
thoughts for me, and if I wished to find
and I perceive a world. If I were to say,in myself a nature-generating thought
as sensualism does, that there is nothing which creates the framework of the
there but "states of consciousness," and world or reveals it through and through
then attempt to distinguish my percep I would be unfaithful to my experience
tions from my "dreams" by "criteria," of the world and I would be seeking
I would miss the phenomenon of thewhat makes it possible rather than wha
world. For if I can speak of "dreams"it is. The evidence of perception is no
and of "reality," and pose for myself thean adequate thought12 nor apodictic ev
question of the imaginary and the real, dence.13 The world is not what I think,
and if I can doubt the real, it is because but that which I live. I open out upo
that distinction is already made for me the world. Unquestionably I commun
prior to the analysis, and because I havecate with it, but I do not take possession
an experience of the real as well as ofof it. It is inexhaustible. "There is a
the imaginary. Then the problem is notworld," or rather, "there is the world":
to find how critical thought can arrive this is a constant theme of my life whic
at secondary equivalents of that distinc I can never completely think through
tion, but to render explicit our primor The world's state of fact is what makes
dial knowledge of the "real," to describefor the Weltlichkeit der Welt. It is what
the perception of the world as that uponmakes the world the world, just as the
which our idea of truth is permanentlystate of fact of the Cogito is not an im
founded. perfection in it, but rather what makes
We must not wonder, then, if wre real me certain of my existence. The eidetic
ly perceive a world. Rather, we must
say that the world is that which we per 11 "Das Erlebnis der Wahrheit" (Logische Unter
ceive. More generally, we must not ask suchuttgen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, p. 190).
12 "An adequate thought would be one which ex
if our evidences are really truths, or if,
hausted its object."
by some vice of the spirit, what is evi 13 Formale und transzendentale Logik says in sub
dent for us would not be illusory with stance that there is no apodictic evidence. Cf., p. 142.

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 MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY 67

method is that of a phenomenol

positivism which bases the possi
the real. Husserl takes up the Critique of Judg
ment when he speaks of a teleology o
INTENTIONALITY consciousness. It is not a case of making
, , . , human consciousness the duplicate of
,.rr , . an absolute thought which would assign
We can now approach
intentionality—too theasnotion
often cited . . , . . . .of
. , , . to it its ends from without. It is a matter
_ ·, . , · u υ ·
the principal discovery of phenomenol- P . . . . . ,
r, , . . , , of recognizing consciousness as projected
ogy though it is only comprehensible . , ,, , , . , * ,,
V ° .... , into the world and destined to a world
when the reduction is understood. , . , . .
... P which it never envelops nor possesses,
Every consciousness is consciousness of . , ...... ...
; . „ , , . but toward which it is always directed,
something. That is not new. In his ref- . , . . , . . . .,
° ., ,. , , And it is a case of recognizing the world
utation of idealism, Kant demonstrated , , . . . ,. .? , ,
. . .,, as the pre-objective individual whose
that interior perception is impossible . . . .. , , ,
. 1 , imperious unity prescribes to knowledge
without exterior perception, that the . . : , TT . ,. .
,, , r . r , , its goal. That is why Husserl distin
world as the connection of phenomena ., , . . .. Γ ,
, . . . guishes the intentionality of the act,
is anticipated in the consciousness of my . . , , .
, . , ,. ' which is that of our judgments and of
unity and is the way for me to realize , , . , . . .,
.. . ,. . our voluntary adoption of positions (the
myself as consciousness. What distm- , . , r,
... . .. r , „ only one of which the Critique of Pure
guishes intentionality from the Kantian _ ; . .
. . .. , , . . , , Reason spoke) and the operating mten
relation to a possible object is that the . ,. ,, , r A .
, tionahty (fungierende Intentional
unity of the world, before being posed , .
, . . , . The latter establishes the natural and
by knowledge in an act of express iden- ... . , , ,, ,
4 . . ,. , . , . antepredicative unity of the world and
tincation, is lived as already made or , . , · ,
. . . T, . . . r . . of our life, a unity which appears more
already there. Kant himself shows in the , , . rr , .
„ , τ j , . , . clearly in our desires, our evaluations
Critique of Judgment that there is a , ; , , . . .
. , . . . , , ,. and the general demeanor, than in ob
unity of imagination and understanding . . , , , , . , r . ,
, .... . , jective knowledge, and which furnishes
and a unity of subjects prior to the ob- \ , . , , , ,
, ' . r . . , the text of which our knowledge seeks
ject, and that in the experience of the , , . ° .
: τ , r ix · to be the exact translation. The rela
beautiful, for example, I experience an . ... ,, . , r
, Γ , .. . , , tion with the world as it utters itself
accord of the sensible and the concept, . , · , · ,
, 1f , , , , ... indefatigably in us is nothing which can
of myself and the other, an accord which , , ' , , . °. _. ..
...... . . be rendered clearer by analysis. Philoso
is itself without concept. Here the sub- . . . . . . „
... . . . , , . . r phy can only place it in view and offer
ject is no longer the universal thinker of Γ ; . .
, , . . . . ,*, j it for our recognition,
a system of objects rigorously linked, °
that power of conferring reality which. Thanks to this enlarged n
in forming a world, subjects the mul- tentionality, phenomenologic
tiple to the law of understanding. It dis- hension" is distinguished f
covers itself and savors itself as a nature "intellection" which is limited to "true
in spontaneous conformity to the law and unchanging natures," and phenom
of understanding. But if the subject has enology can become a phenomenology
a nature, then the hidden art of the of genesis. Whether it is a case of some
imagination must condition the categor- thing perceived, or a historical event or
izing activity. It is no longer simply the doctrine, "to understand" means to seize
esthetic judgment but also knowledge again the total intention. To under
which rests on it. It is this art of the stand, one must grasp not only what
imagination which is the basis of the these are when represented: the "proper

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«8 CROSS CURRENTS

ties" of the thing perceived, the dust of We must understand in all of these ways
"historical facts," the "ideas" introduced at once. Everything has a meaning, and
by the doctrine. Seizing the total inten we find beneath all the relations the
tion means grasping the unique manner same structure of being. All of these
of existing which is expressed in the views are true as long as they are not
properties of the pebble, the glass or isolated, as long as one goes to the foun
the piece of wax, in all the facts of a dations of history and encounters the
revolution, in all the thoughts of a phil unique core of existential meaning
osopher. In each civilization the Idea
which is explicit in each perspective.
must be found. We mean Idea in the It is true, as Marx said, that history
does not march on its head. But it is
Hegelian sense: not a law of the physico
also true that it does not think with its
mathematic type accessible to objective
feet. Better still, we need not concern
thought, but the formula of a unique
ourselves with either its "head" or its
behavior with regard to others, nature,
time and death. What must be found is "feet" but rather with its body. All the
that certain manner of formularizing economic and psychological explanations
the world which the historian must be of a doctrine are true, since the thinker
thinks only on the basis of what is. Re
capable of adopting and assuming. These
are the dimensions of history. flection upon a doctrine will only be
total if it succeeds in relating itself to
In relation to them, no single word
the history of the doctrine and with the
nor human gesture, however habitual or
external explanations, and in replacing
distracted, is without meaning. I thought
the causes and the meaning of the doc
myself exhausted. A minister thought
trine in an existential structure. There
that he had only made a standard re
is, as Husserl says, a "genesis of mean
mark. But then my silence or his word
ing" (Sinngenesis)14 which alone teach
takes on a meaning because my fatigue
es us, in the final analysis, what the
or the recourse to a ready-made formula
doctrine "means." Like understanding,
expresses a certain disinterest, and
criticism must be pursued on all levels.
hence is still the adoption of a position
Certainly a doctrine cannot be refuted
as regards the situation. In an event con
simply by connecting it to this or that
sidered in close-up and at the moment
accident in the life of its author—its
when it is lived, everything seems to be
meaning extends beyond that. And there
fortuitous: that favorable meeting, the
is no pure accident in existence nor in
ambition of this or that person, or an
coexistence, since one and the other as
other local circumstance seems to have
similate the fortuitous and rationalize it.
been decisive. But the chance happen
Finally, just as history is indivisible in
ings compensate each other, and that
the present, so it is in its succession.
dust of facts forms an agglomeration. In relation to its fundamental dimen
There appears the outline of a way of
sions, all historical periods appear as
facing the human situation, an event
whose contours are defined and of which
manifestations of a single existence or
episodes of a single drama of whose de
one can speak. Should we understand
nouement, if it has one, we are ignorant.
history on the basis of ideology, or pol
Because we are present to a world, we
itics, or religion or economics? Should
we understand a doctrine by its mani
The term is common in the unpublished works.
fest content, or by the psychology of
The idea is already present in the Formate and
the author and by the events of his life? transzendentale Logik, pp. 184 S.

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MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY 69

are condemned to mean

do or say nothing which
a place in history. being. Philosophy is not the reflection
of a more original truth but the art of
RATIONALITY, THE WORLD, making a truth real.
PHILOSOPHY It will be asked how that making real
is possible, and if it is not in fa
HE MOST important acquisition of attaining of a Reason
τ phenomenology is undoubtedly to in things. But the onl
have joined extreme subjectivism and exists is the world i
extreme objectivism in its notion of sophy which makes fo
world or of rationality. Rationality is ence does not begin
exactly measured out in the experiences It is actual or rea
in which it reveals itself. There is ra- which it is part,
tionality, that is, perspectives overlap, hypothesis is cleare
perceptions confirm one another, and a by which we assu
meaning appears. But it cannot be set world in our atte
apart and transformed into either ab- to think it. Ration
solute Spirit or world in the realist sense. Behind it lies no
The phenomenological world is not pure we need determine
being, but the meaning which appears inductively. We are
at the intersection of my experiences stant to this miracl
and at the intersection of my experi- of experiences, and n
ences with those of others by the en- than we how it is d
meshing of one with the other. Thus it this very core of r
is inseparable from the subjectivity and and reason are no
from the intersubjectivity which form mysterious, but my
their unity by taking up my past experi- There is no questi
ences in my present experiences and the mystery by some solu
experience of others in my own. For the prior to solutions.
first time the meditation of the philoso- is re-learning to s
pher is sufficiently conscious not to en- this sense a story r
dow its own results with reality in the the world with as
world or prior to it. The philosopher treatise in philoso
attempts to think the world, the other our own hands. We
and himself and to conceive their rela- for our history by ref
tions. But the meditating Ego, the "im- a decision in which
partial spectator" (uninteressierter Zu- In each case the
schauer)15 never joins forces with verified only in act
a rationality already given. It establishes Phenomenology
itself16 and its rationality by an initia- world rests on its
tive which has no guarantee in being basis.17 All know
and whose right rests entirely on the ef- ground of postulates
fective power which it gives us to as- communication wit
sume our history. The phenomenologi- communication is

17 "Ruckbeziehung der Phànomenologie auf sich

15 Vie Méditation Cartesienne. (Unpublished).
1β Ibid. selbst," say the unpublished works.

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70 CROSS CURRENTS

of rationality. Philosophy as a radical revelation of the mystery of the worl

reflection is in principle deprived of that and the mystery of reason.18
resource. Since it too is in history it It is not accidental that phenomeno
also makes use of the world and reasons ogy was a movement before being a do
already formulated. It must then inter trine or a system. It is as laborious
rogate itself as it does every type ofthe work of Balzac, or of Proust or of
knowledge. It will double back upon itValéry or of Cézanne, because of the
self indefinitely, then, and will be, assame type of attention and wonder, the
Husserl said, an infinite dialogue or medsame demands of consciousness, the same
itation. To the extent that it remains will to seize the meaning of the world
faithful to its own intention, it will or of history in its state of genesis. In
never know where it is going. The in this regard it fuses with modern
completion of phenomenology and the thought.
allure of its inchoative state are not the translated by John F. Bannan
signs of failure. They are inevitable be 18 We owe this expression to G. Gusdorf who,
cause phenomenology has for its task thehowever, uses it in another sense.

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