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2. Domain impacts
The included case studies’ initiatives facilitate their active engagement with and
development of AI-related technologies whose emergence impacts the economic,
sociopolitical, and military-security domains. AI’s application within these domains
can be associated with a ream of ‘generic’ impacts which are shortly outlined in the
sections below, which include both threats and opportunities. Within the context of
this study, ‘generic’ impacts are derived from a ‘horizon scan’-style literature review of
±50 documents published by research institutes, think tanks, NGOs & consultancies,
and academia, while more concrete (domain-specific) implications are derived from
observations made from the case studies themselves. More specifically, we identify
concrete negative externalities which are associated with initiatives undertaken
by actors within the study. This approach is underpinned by several overarching
assumptions; namely:
This means that – in general – the concrete negative externalities outlined in the
sections below constitute extrapolations based on past and present initiatives.
2.1 Economic
The economic impacts of AI-related technologies are acutely evident in society as
a result of the private sector role in the development and use of AI for commercial
applications. Prospect of gains have prompted companies to seek applications of AI to
outperform competitors, both nationally and internationally.112 While the processing
of Big Data has provided ample opportunities - namely: supply-side efficiencies,
personalization of goods and services and stimulation of the economy - the benefits
112 Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, “2018 Industrial R&D Scoreboard: EU Companies Increase
Research Investment amidst a Global Technological Race” (European Commission, December 17, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/2018-industrial-rd-scoreboard-eu-companies-increase-research-investment-
amidst-global-technological-race-2018-dec-17_en.
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of these are being distributed unevenly. AI’s effectiveness depends heavily on the
quantity and quality of data, elements often reserved to the leading corporations
in the digital sector.113 Data generation and its use is creating path dependencies,
as companies with the greatest data accumulation continuously reinforce their
leadership position and stifle market competition.114 The adverse effects of these
trends are evident in modern markets’ tendency towards developing oligopolistic
markets with winner-takes-all-dynamics, the rise in inequality, economic insecurity
and a protectionist response with the creation of rival regulatory frameworks.
Moreover, these threats are becoming evident at the individual, market and state
levels. A high-level overview of the threats and opportunities associated with AI’s
application within the economic domain is provided in Figure 7 below.
Threats Opportunities
Winner-takes-all dynamics
Emergence of oligopolistic market structures Improves supply-side efficiency
Manifests AI ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ Allows for personalization of goods and services
Leads to protectionist regulatory frameworks Facilitates market and trade expansion
Impacts economic security
Economic
2.1.1 Threats
113 Willem Sundblad, “Data Is The Foundation For Artificial Intelligence And Machine Learning,” Forbes, October
18, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/willemsundbladeurope/2018/10/18/data-is-the-foundation-for-artificial-
intelligence-and-machine-learning/.
114 Daniel Faggella, “The AI Advantage of the Tech Giants: Amazon, Facebook, and Google,” Emerj, February 26,
2019, https://emerj.com/ai-executive-guides/ai-advantage-tech-giants-amazon-facebook-google/.
115 Faggella.
116 “AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives”
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018), 38, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
AI-China-Russia-Global-WP_FINAL.pdf.
117 Jacques Bughin et al., “Notes from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Global Economic Impact of AI” (McKinsey),
accessed April 13, 2019, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Artificial%20
Intelligence/Notes%20from%20the%20frontier%20Modeling%20the%20impact%20of%20AI%20on%20the%20
world%20economy/MGI-Notes-from-the-AI-frontier-Modeling-the-impact-of-AI-on-the-world-economy-
September-2018.ashx.
118 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “PwC’s Global Artificial Intelligence Study: Sizing the Prize,” PwC, accessed June 28,
2019, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/data-and-analytics/publications/artificial-intelligence-study.html.
119 Arif Khan, “Disrupt the Disruption: The Tech Oligopoly Part 2,” SingularityNET, October 7, 2018, https://blog.
singularitynet.io/disrupt-the-disruption-the-tech-oligopoly-part-2-bb8747b7e16d.
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tech clusters and the accompanying high-paying salaries are concentrated in a
number of developed countries, indicating a tech talent flow to these clusters and
resulting in a harder hit on developing nations’ economies.120 Within nation states,
the rural-urban divide has been highlighted in recent years by the rise in populism,
where the disenfranchised rural areas continue to stagnate while the largest cities
flourish.121 While AI is not responsible for this trend, it is acting as a stress factor on
the current socio-economic trends. Within industries, AI is acutely impacting low-
skilled professions, where increases in automation are resulting in human tasks being
replaced or even becoming obsolete. Within the technology sector, technical jobs
are male-dominated, particularly in countries leading the AI development race. This
sectoral gender-divide highlights the risks that gender inequality will be ingrained in
AI due to bias in the development process.122 This is further leading to the unequal
distribution of benefits, with few policy suggestions currently in place to offset this.
AI is perceived to further establish ‘AI haves and have-nots’ among nation states. It
threatens to eliminate comparative advantages of developing economies that rely
heavily on cheap, labor-intensive manufacturing, such as textile production.123 While
countries such as China and the US are predicted to be the top beneficiaries by taking
70% of AI’s economic benefits, developing countries across Asia, Africa and Latin
America are expected to gain less than 6% of the prospected global GDP increase.124
The overall result is anticipated wider income, gender, geographic, and international
inequalities.125 It is notable, that the extent of these technologies’ overall impact on
the labor market is currently inconclusive, with evidence of both positive and negative
trends, whereby while some jobs are displaced, new opportunities are created. Past
waves of technological progress have often resulted in worker displacement, while at
the same time generated net positive gains in employment. However, estimates for
the current technological revolution estimate the impact to take effect at ten times
the pace of the previous ones.126 As a result, it is evident that to harness the benefit
of AI, policies have to be adopted to accommodate transition of displaced workers to
other professions.
120 “AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives.”
121 Gideon Rachman, “Urban-Rural Splits Have Become the Great Global Divider,” Financial Times, July 30, 2018,
https://www.ft.com/content/e05cde76-93d6-11e8-b747-fb1e803ee64e.
122 Hannah Devlin and Alex Hern, “Why Are There so Few Women in Tech? The Truth behind the Google
Memo,” The Guardian, August 8, 2017, sec. Life and style, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/
aug/08/why-are-there-so-few-women-in-tech-the-truth-behind-the-google-memo; John Villasenor, “Artificial
Intelligence and Bias: Four Key Challenges,” Brookings (blog), January 3, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2019/01/03/artificial-intelligence-and-bias-four-key-challenges/.
123 “AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives.”
124 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “PwC’s Global Artificial Intelligence Study.”
125 Though AI is likely to result in job loss in the short term, the technology’s implementation will also create jobs
and/or greatly increase demand for several existing professions. See McKinsey & Company, Inc., “Smartening up
with Artificial Intelligence (AI) - What’s in It for Germany and Its Industrial Sector?,” April 2017, https://www.
mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Semiconductors/Our%20Insights/Smartening%20up%20with%20
artificial%20intelligence/Smartening-up-with-artificial-intelligence.ashx.
126 Klaus Schwab, “Globalization 4.0,” January 22, 2019, 0, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
world/2019-01-16/globalization-40.
127 Christopher Foster and Shamel Azmeh, “Trade Wars Are Growing over the Digital Economy – and Developing
Countries Are Shaping the Agenda,” The Conversation, 2019, http://theconversation.com/trade-wars-are-
growing-over-the-digital-economy-and-developing-countries-are-shaping-the-agenda-113000.
128 This view is further exacerbated by the fact that many developing countries preside over neither the technical
know-how nor the foreknowledge to predict how their domestic industries will develop and are therefore unable
to comprehensively evaluate these rules’ likely impact.
129 “U.S. Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment as Dispute Settlement Crisis Looms,” Reuters, August 27, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-idUSKCN1LC19O.
130 Jacob Kastrenakes, “Trump Issues Order Blocking Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, Citing National Security,”
The Verge, March 12, 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/12/17111766/broadcom-qualcomm-acquisition-
blocked-trump-national-security.
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international potential of companies. A further issue is corporate espionage, which
has become more prolific in the age of digitization. Leading Western technology
companies are consistently under attack from groups seeking to acquire commercial
technology.131 Reinforced by predatory business practices, market players are
challenged further through unfair intellectual property (IP) transfers, whether legal
or illegal. In the case of China, most companies simply handed over their IP as a
prerequisite to gain access to the Chinese market.132 The impact is significant, as in
numerous instances, technology produced by Western companies is being used to
reinforce digital totalitarianism in authoritarian states.133 Due to the aforementioned
dependence on the private sector in digitization, corporate espionage threatens to
undermine not only economic, but also national security.
Overall, the economic threats arising from AI are ample and will have wide-reaching
implications. Within markets, introduction of AI risks to reinforce the position of
the leading firms in a winner-takes-all-dynamic, stifle competition and thus limit
innovation. The uneven distribution of AI and automation within the economy will
likely result in increases in inequality across numerous boundaries, between, among
others, the digitally literate vs illiterate, blue-collar vs white-collar workers and
rural vs urban residents. The resulting adverse effects are prompting governments
to establish protectionist measures to safeguard domestic industries and limit the
negative externalities of the exponentially growing impact of AI technologies. Finally,
the economic risks involving the companies behind AI development have implications
on national security by limiting the strategic position of states, as well as exposing
critical industries to foreign predatory practices and corporate espionage.
2.1.2 Opportunities
131 “China Broke Hacking Pact before New Tariff Fight,” Axios, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.axios.com/
china-broke-hacking-pact-before-new-tariff-tiff-d19f5604-f9ce-458a-a50a-2f906c8f12ab.html.
132 United States International Trade Commission, “China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and
Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy” (US Government, 2011), https://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4226.pdf.
133 Sui-Lee Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise,” The New York Times,
February 21, 2019, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-
thermo-fisher.html.
134 Bughin et al., “Notes from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Global Economic Impact of AI.”
135 Andrew Scott et al., “Modeling Artificial Intelligence and Exploring Its Impact” (Frederick S. Pardee Center for
International Futures Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver, May 2017),
https://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/files/ArtificialIntelligenceIntegratedPaper_V6_clean.pdf.
136 James Vincent, “Welcome to the Automated Warehouse of the Future,” The Verge, May 8, 2018,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/8/17331250/automated-warehouses-jobs-ocado-andover-amazon.
137 April Glaser, “Why Amazon Is Testing Drone Delivery in the U.K. — and Not in the U.S.,” Vox, December 14,
2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/12/14/13955818/amazon-drone-delivery-uk-us-faa-testing.
138 E. Geist and A. J. Lohn, How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? (rand.org, 2018),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html.
139 Bernard Marr, “27 Incredible Examples Of AI And Machine Learning In Practice,” Forbes, accessed July 15, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/04/30/27-incredible-examples-of-ai-and-machine-learning-in-
practice/.
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As a result of the improvements in supply chains and better market understanding,
AI has the potential to be a crucial economic stimulant. The overall impact of
automation and AI-related activities is not evident, but the benefits of AI are already
visible in the energy, transport, finance, manufacturing and retail sectors. On the
supply side, implementation of AI is leading to the automation of processes and
augmentation of worker experience, in turn generating efficiency gains in production.
On the consumer side, targeted advertising is processing mass amounts of customer
data and applying algorithms to improve the classification of its audience for targeted
advertising campaigns. Resulting gains stimulate innovation and drive international
trade due to increased competition both in hardware, software, services and consumer
goods. AI technologies should further accelerate the transition to services economies
and boost output of products such as robots, microchips, sensors and other machine
equipment.140 Furthermore, economic growth will result from required upgrades in
current (telecommunications) infrastructure, as well as the addition of internet fiber-
optic cables and the roll out of 5G network equipment around the world.141
2.2 Sociopolitical
As AI technology reaches into every aspect of daily routines, it is set to augment
the basic principles of societal functions. Commercial interests have generated
a path dependence in technological progress, as companies seek to understand
the most intricate details about their customers. As a result of their dominance
in the development of AI, intricate algorithms and data generating tools are now
being applied en-masse, in use cases which span far beyond targeted advertising.
AI is enabling governments to understand their citizens better, in some cases for
the improvement of the quality of life, while in others, for stemming individual
140 Joshua P. Meltzer, “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Trade,” Brookings (blog), December 13,
2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-international-trade/.
141 “Do We Understand the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Employment? | Bruegel,” accessed July 15, 2019,
https://bruegel.org/2017/04/do-we-understand-the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-employment/.
142 Steve Lohr, “A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?,” The New York Times, November
30, 2017, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/technology/ai-will-transform-the-economy-
but-how-much-and-how-soon.html.
Threats Opportunities
Centralization of data
AI-enforced governance models Improvements in the quality of life
Export of digital totalitarianism Enhancements to the online experience
Reinforcement of societal polarization Augments social interactions
Diversification of foreign influence campaigns
Sociopolitical
2.2.1 Threats
143 Jathan Sadowski, “Companies Are Making Money from Our Personal Data – but at What Cost? | Technology
| The Guardian,” The Guardian, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/31/personal-data-
corporate-use-google-amazon.
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social credit systems.144 Meanwhile, in Western democracies, the dependence of
large swathes of the population on services provided by the FAANG corporations has
stalled anti-competition legislation against these countries both in North America and
Europe.145 In both liberal and illiberal states, the growing dependence on platforms
that centralize data collection increases the risk of infringement of human rights, by
means depicted in the following paragraphs.
The rise of AI-enforced governance models and the export of digital totalitarianism
are intimately linked, largely because the implementation of AI-enforced governance
models requires the development of easily transferable technologies.146 Within the
context of this study, these phenomena have been predominantly observed in the
Russian and Chinese case studies. In the Chinese case, the combination of AI-driven
facial recognition, centralization of communication platforms (WeChat, etc.) and
state utilization of ‘ground level’ (healthcare, etc.) data has allowed for the inception of
an early social credit system in which citizens are awarded credit for ‘good behavior’,
and penalized for ‘bad behavior’, including, among others, jaywalking and walking
a dog without a leash.147 Penalties reportedly range from citizens being precluded
from using certain forms of public transport, denying their children enrollment into
the best schools, and in the worst cases, to imprisonment.148 Russia utilizes a similar,
though far less-developed system to optimize its domestic information campaigns,
and to identify and repress dissent domestically.149 The technologies underlying these
control systems are easily exportable, and – in serving to consolidate the regimes
which implement them – have the potential of ‘normalizing’ illiberal governance
internationally.150 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Pakistan,
Singapore, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela and Zimbabwe have all sought to implement
Chinese surveillance technologies in bids to emulate Beijing’s model of AI-led
repressive governance.151
144 Jack Karsen and Darrel M. West, “China’s Social Credit System Spreads to More Daily Transactions,” Brookings
(blog), June 18, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/06/18/chinas-social-credit-system-
spreads-to-more-daily-transactions/.
145 John Naughton, “Tech Giants Face No Contest When It Comes to Competition Law,” Then Guardian, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/25/tech-giants-no-contest-on-competition-law-
amazon-whole-foods.
146 Amy Hawkins, “Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed June 28, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-brother-tech-needs-african-faces/.
147 Alexandra Ma, “China has started ranking citizens with a creepy ‘social credit’ system — here’s what you can do
wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish you,” Business Insider Nederland, October 30,
2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4.
148 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu and Bang Xiao, “‘Punishing the Disobedient’: China’s Social Credit System Could Engineer
Social Behaviour by 2020,” Text, ABC News, March 31, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-31/chinas-
social-credit-system-punishes-untrustworthy-citizens/9596204.
149 Soldatov and Borogan, “Russia’s Surveillance State.”
150 Wu’er Kaixi, “China’s New World Media Order | by Wu’er Kaixi & Christophe Deloire,” Project Syndicate, June 3,
2019, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-press-freedom-attack-democracy-by-wu-er-kaixi-
and-christophe-deloire-2019-06.
151 For the full list of countries, see Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism”
(Freedom House, October 31, 2018), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2018_Final%20
Booklet_11_1_2018.pdf.
152 Matt Kapko, “How Social Networks Are Changing Mobile Advertising,” CIO, August 20, 2014, https://www.cio.
com/article/2475406/how-social-networks-are-changing-mobile-advertising.html; Mostafa M. El-Bermawy,
“Your Filter Bubble Is Destroying Democracy,” Wired, November 18, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-
bubble-destroying-democracy/.
153 Kapko, “How Social Networks Are Changing Mobile Advertising.”
154 “AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives.”
155 Jeff Stibel, “Fake News and Social Media: Confirmation Bias Puts Us in Echo Chambers,” UsaToday, May 15, 2018,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2018/05/15/fake-news-social-media-confirmation-bias-echo-
chambers/533857002/.
156 Villasenor, “Artificial Intelligence and Bias.”
157 Karen Hao, “Inside the World of AI That Forges Beautiful Art and Terrifying Deepfakes,” MIT Technology
Review, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612501/inside-the-world-of-ai-that-forges-
beautiful-art-and-terrifying-deepfakes/.
158 Stanford University, “Edit Video by Editing Text,” Stanford News, June 5, 2019, https://news.stanford.
edu/2019/06/05/edit-video-editing-text/; Emerging Technology from the arXiv, “Facebook’s AI System Can
Speak with Bill Gates’s Voice,” MIT Technology Review, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/613647/facebooks-ai-system-can-speak-with-bill-gatess-voice/.
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recent years been used in political contexts, in one instance by the Flemish Socialist
Party’s video campaign of a faked Donald Trump speech on climate change.159 Deep
fakes are therefore yet another tool to reinforce societal polarization and enable
disinformation campaigns to be more impactful, as visual content has a higher
tendency to go ‘viral’ on social media platforms and as a result, capable of reaching
wider audiences. Moreover, the ease of access of deepfakes on the internet and the
offerings of deepfakes-as-a-service presents them as a powerful tool for non-state
actors that are seeking to generate the greatest impact at the lowest possible cost.
As such, deepfakes are an example of AI shifting the balance of power, particularly
between state and non-state actors.
2.2.2 Opportunities
159 Hans von der Burchard, “Belgian Socialist Party Circulates ‘Deep Fake’ Donald Trump Video,” POLITICO, May
21, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/spa-donald-trump-belgium-paris-climate-agreement-belgian-socialist-
party-circulates-deep-fake-trump-video/.
160 Charlotte Jee, “Russia Wants to Cut Itself off from the Global Internet. Here’s What That Really Means.,” MIT
Technology Review, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613138/russia-wants-to-cut-
itself-off-from-the-global-internet-heres-what-that-really-means/.
161 Dan Sabbagh, “Mark Zuckerberg Has ‘No Plans’ to Go to UK to Give Evidence to MPs,” The Guardian, May 15,
2018, sec. Technology, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/15/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-
plans-uk-evidence-mps-parliament.
Beyond nursing and medicine, applications have been identified in legal processes,
law enforcement and education. Automation of legal tasks, such as the use of NLP to
process legal evidence, has been estimated to reduce the number of working hours
for lawyers by 2.5% annually over the next 5 years and as a result, expedite legal
proceedings.164 In law enforcement, adoption of computer vision has enabled the use
of facial recognition for the identification of suspects or wanted criminals, as well as
for improving border security.165 Meanwhile in education, NLP and machine learning
algorithms are being developed to personalize teaching in schools and expand class
sizes in higher education institutions.166 With the help of AI, schools have the ability to
introduce concepts such as ‘adaptive learning’ that help stimulate students and boost
their academic performance, producing, as a result, more agile future generations.
These technological advancements are enabling efficiency gains in delivery, expanding
provision and improving the quality of social services.
162 Mizuho Aoki, “Nursing Care Workers Hard to Find but in Demand in Aging Japan,” The Japan Times Online, June
27, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/27/reference/nursing-care-workers-hard-to-find-but-in-
demand-in-aging-japan/.
163 Yoav Shoham et al., “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2018 Annual Report” (Stanford, CA: AI Index Steering
Committee, Human-Centred AI Initiative, Stanford University, December 2018).
164 Jason Tashea, “Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now,” Wired, April 17, 2017,
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/; Steve Lohr, “A.I. Is Doing
Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet.,” The New York Times, March 19, 2017, sec. Technology,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence.html.
165 Standing Committee on the One Hundred Year Study of Artificial Intelligence, “Artificial Intelligence and
Life in 2030” (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861/f/
ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf.
166 Standing Committee on the One Hundred Year Study of Artificial Intelligence.
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is that it enables users to connect with various other individuals that share the
same ideals, interests or lifestyles, and access topics relevant to their interests. The
ability to discover like-minded individuals and organize into groups using social
media platforms fosters more collective action that can appear in the form of social
movements based on certain beliefs or issues, as illustrated in movements such as
Fridays For Future. As in other contexts, however, AI is a dual-use technology, meaning
that while some algorithms drive collective action on pressing challenges such as
climate change, others are fortifying digital echo-chambers of extreme political groups
by directing individuals to more extreme content.
AI technologies are poised to transform the most basic social processes, from legal
proceedings and law enforcement to medical care and education. While most are
currently undergoing testing, the demonstrated potential is extensive. Machines are
increasingly outperforming human counterparts in linear, but complex tasks, allowing
the outsourcing of highly-specialized activities to AI and resulting in the improvement
of service delivery. Meanwhile, internet users are set to experience enhanced digital
environments, as collected user information is fueling classification algorithms
to provide content they are likely more interested in. In turn, this opens wider
opportunities for association and supports social movements.
2.3 Military-security
The military domain is often the early-adopter of nascent technologies, fueled by
extensive funding and the pursuit to outperform adversaries. As such, the use-cases
of AI technologies in the military are clearly identified, as the deployment of such
technology possesses the ability to reduce military as well as civilian casualties
and alter warfare as a whole. Moreover, AI presents an opportunity in reduction of
operational costs and operational efficiency gains. On the other hand, the risks it
presents are reflected in both combat settings and at the geopolitical level, where an
arms race between leading AI-developing countries is gaining steam. The increasing
permeation of AI in the military domain is leading to fewer constraints on going
to war, with friction breeding escalation. The asymmetric nature of AI application
is leading to upsets in the military balance of power, resulting in the possibility of
hyper war with the ‘human-out-of-the-loop’. A high-level overview of the threats
and opportunities associated with AI’s application within the military-security domain
is provided in Figure 9 below.
Military-security
2.3.1 Threats
There are a number of threats associated with the inclusion of AI in existing military
capability portfolios. The first is that new AI powered systems can upset the existing
military balance of power by making traditional systems and doctrines obsolete.
Development of AI has presented an alternative stream of competition, providing
militarily stagnant countries with a new opportunity to re-enter the race. This has
been the case with Russia and China, which, despite spending on military a fraction
of what the US’ does, have concentrated large proportions of the spending in AI
research.167 China’s accelerated rate of AI development has positioned it to outpace
the US, and considering the close proximity of Chinese enterprises with the Chinese
state, the technological gains are highly likely to be transferred to the military.
Moreover, there is a diffusion of power to non-state actors, that are able to utilize
low-cost, widely available tools to sow discord. This can be carried out, among other
167 Christina LarsonFeb. 8, 2018, and 9:00 Am, “China’s Massive Investment in Artificial Intelligence Has an
Insidious Downside,” Science | AAAS, February 7, 2018, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/china-s-
massive-investment-artificial-intelligence-has-insidious-downside; Gregory Allen Kania Elsa B., “China Is Using
America’s Own Plan to Dominate the Future of Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed June 28,
2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/08/china-is-using-americas-own-plan-to-dominate-the-future-of-
artificial-intelligence/; Debby Wu, Henry Hoenig, and Hannah Dormido, “Who’s Winning the Tech Cold War?
A China vs. U.S. Scoreboard,” accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-us-china-who-
is-winning-the-tech-war/.
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ways, through the use of deepfakes in disinformation campaigns or the use of cheap
unmanned drones to provoke or battle more sophisticated adversaries.168
Among the major contestants for AI-driven systems, friction breeds escalation. The
US, Chinese and Russian governments’ focus on exploiting AI-related technologies
within the military highlights the security dilemma associated with not exploring
these weapons.169 The US and Chinese approaches differ markedly, with the Chinese
military focusing more heavily on empowering algorithms to partake in strategic
decision making, and the US military being geared almost solely to developing
‘human-in-the-loop’ systems. The asymmetry between these approaches incentivizes
continued investment, as both strive to overcompensate for the activities of the other.170
The upsetting of the military balance of power is associated with increased friction
and escalation potential within the military-security domain, as countries like Russia
and China attempt to challenge the status quo, while the US retrenches to maintain
its military superiority.171
The large-scale advent of an AI arms race significantly increases the risk of a hyperwar
with the ‘human-out-of-the-loop’, as the pressures associated with ‘winning’ such
an arms race may incentivize states to cut corners in pre-deployment testing and
potentially declaring the technologies ‘operational’ prematurely. AI technology will
expedite decision-making processes and make split decisions, resulting in narrower
time frames for non-military crisis management in times of conflict escalation.
Because autonomous (‘human-out-of-the-loop’) weaponry can operate independent
of human oversight,172 these systems can also escalate the pace of conflict operations
to such a degree that human intelligence can no longer keep up, resulting in the
advent of so-called ‘hyperwars’.173
The role of AI in combat is profound, as the political costs of going to war decrease
with the prospect of reduced human costs. Deployment of unmanned equipment
reduces the loss of soldiers in combat, hence resulting in fewer constraints on going
to war. The 2015 shootdown of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force near the
Turkey-Syria border resulted in a major diplomatic fall out between the two nations,
including responses at the head-of-state level. Meanwhile, multiple takedowns of
2.3.2 Opportunities
Enhancing the safety of troops and the reduction of casualties in combat, both
military and civilian, is considered to be one of the primary objectives for the adoption
of AI in the military.177 In fulfilling operational tasks, AI-related technologies also
have the potential of directly contributing to reduced combatant attrition rates. This
is presented by these technologies’ ability to operate autonomously in hazardous
and inaccessible areas, as well as carry out terrain analysis and automated target
acquisition.178 In high-risk environments, autonomous weapons systems can be
deployed instead of soldiers, to reduce the risk of loss of life within own forces.
174 Michael R. Gordon, “American Warplane Shoots Down Iranian-Made Drone Over Syria,” The New York Times,
June 20, 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/middleeast/american-warplane-shoots-
down-iranian-made-drone-over-syria.html.
175 “Human-Machine Teaming.”
176 “Human-Machine Teaming.”
177 For an overview of many non-kinetic applications of AI, see De Spiegeleire, Maas, and Sweijs, “Artificial
Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications for Small and Medium-Sized Force Providers.”
178 Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas
National Security Review 1, no. 3 (May 15, 2018), https://doi.org/10.15781/T2639KP49; “Daksh Remotely Operated
Vehicle (ROV),” Army Technology (blog), accessed July 15, 2019, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/
remotely-operated-vehicle-rov-daksh/; U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Capabilities
Integration Center, The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, n.d.
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The introduction of AI technologies, such as satellite image analysis, can be used to
identify civilians and diminish accidental killing of non-combatants, particularly in
air campaigns. Similarly, computer vision allows for the extraction and identification
of ‘objects of interest’ from moving or still imagery. This is illustrated in the US
Department of Defense’s Project Maven, which has the ability to improve targeting of
drone strikes, identify civilians and diminish accidental killing of innocent people.179
179 Cheryl Pellerin, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s End,” U.S. Department
of Defense, July 21, 2017, sec. DoD News, Defense Media Activity, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/.
180 Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power.”CEOs, and academics
have suggested that a revolution in artificial intelligence is upon us. Are they right, and what will advances in
artificial intelligence mean for international competition and the balance of power? This article evaluates how
developments in artificial intelligence (AI
181 Such as a swarm attack of unmanned devices or an inbound hypersonic weapon. See Andrew Feickert et al.,
“U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations
for Congress,” Informative report (Congressional Research Service, November 20, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
weapons/R45392.pdf.
182 Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power.”CEOs, and academics
have suggested that a revolution in artificial intelligence is upon us. Are they right, and what will advances in
artificial intelligence mean for international competition and the balance of power? This article evaluates how
developments in artificial intelligence (AI
183 Feickert et al., “U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI):
Considerations for Congress.”
184 Elsa B. Kania, “数字化 – 网络化 – 智能化: China’s Quest for an AI Revolution in Warfare,” The Strategy Bridge,
accessed June 28, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/6/8/-chinas-quest-for-an-ai-revolution-in-
warfare.
185 Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” National Security, 2017, 132.
186 “Dilbert at War,” The Economist, June 23, 2014, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2014/06/23/dilbert-at-
war.
187 Wayne McLean, “Drones Are Cheap, Soldiers Are Not: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of War,” The Conversation,
accessed June 28, 2019, http://theconversation.com/drones-are-cheap-soldiers-are-not-a-cost-benefit-analysis-
of-war-27924; War Is Boring, “How Much Does an F-35 Actually Cost?,” War Is Boring (blog), July 27, 2014,
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/how-much-does-an-f-35-actually-cost-21f95d239398.
188 “Dilbert at War.”
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