VOID MARRIAGES

Case Doctrines
1. Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998
A void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.—The fundamental distinction
between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place
at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided
for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in
good faith or in bad faith.
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects.—A voidable marriage,
is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the
special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to
prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in
voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89. x x x Stated otherwise, the
annulment of “the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the
putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance.”
The terms “annul” and “null and void” have different legal connotations and implications.—
Indeed, the terms “annul” and “null and void” have different legal connotations and implications.
Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify;
to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the
beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal
effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
2. Ninal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58.—
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic “autonomous social institution.”
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an “inviolable social institution,” and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as “a special contract of permanent union” and case law considers it “not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment.”
The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage.—Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly
fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid
3. Enrico v. Medinacelli G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
Rule of Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages; Scope; The categorical language of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt—the coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988; The
marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within
the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As
has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
4. Ty vs. CA
Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,
143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77
SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033
(1957), there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and
consent, before such person may contract a second marriage.—A recent case applied the old rule
because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife
charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife
whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder
were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there
was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In
this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation—there are other remedies.—Like the lower courts, we are also of
the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner
wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her
status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her
prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common
sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are
other remedies.
5. Terre vs. Terre, A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
A marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a
subsequent marriage with another woman would be bigamous.—Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will
follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

6. Iwasawa v. Custodio, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines.—This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of
the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the
OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994
in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with
petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3)
that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still
valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
7. Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.—Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution
and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband
or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.—The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
8. Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.—Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, 700
SCRA 69 (2013), that: To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite
of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.