Petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the

absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such
license being issued only on January 9, 1950. Accordingly, since he is the surviving
brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue, he is entitled to one-half of the
real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real
party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the the Civil Code.

This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void
ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time
(action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must
be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to
the marriage. xxxx

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file
the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was
not even impleaded as a party to said case.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old
Civil Code

HELD: YES

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule,
the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of
the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March
15, 2003.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC; and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties
to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of
their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack
of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral.” xxx

It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
“proper interest” can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving
heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as
follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry
thereon involves questions of fact.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We
take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano
Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and
Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners
of the property involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is
reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila,
were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was
another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will
definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as
parties-defendants.