G.R. No.

L-4254             September 26, 1951

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner, 
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

5 Ambrosio T. Dollete for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianson and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for
respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a
10 decision of this Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus
briefly set forth in that decision, written by Mr. Justice Bengzon:

The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the
latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy,
15 by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth
Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682.
Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the deportation Board taking
his case up, found that having no travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this
country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the
20 corresponding investigation, the Board of commissioners of Immigration on April 5,
1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port of entry
and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to
Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March
25 18, 1948. In May 1948 he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with
three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and August
of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their
masters refused to take petitioner and his companions alleging lack of authority to do
so. In October 1948 after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the
30 authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined
up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is
for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements
for his departure are being made.

The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a
35 necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that
pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the
undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took note of the fact,
manifested by the Solicitor General's representative in the course of the of the oral
argumment, that "this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping
40 him at the people's expense . . . making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the
highest officer of the land." No period was fixed within which the immigration authorities
 should carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the statement that "The meaning of
'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a
passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments
concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned that
5 "under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus."

Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of
this decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright
discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that
10 he might agree "to further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if
after six months, the Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter
dissent but thought that two months constituted reasonable time.

Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the
Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and
15 none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was
through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein

(Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless,"
which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's
20 decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy against whom no charge has been made
other than that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the
25 country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is
unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry into the
Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
30 principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10,
1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and
35 equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law"
40 (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.

In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release
from custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the
 Department of Justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his
deportation has been issued, the warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which
the court is given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to
be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law." The
5 decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that jurisdiction,
adding that the same result had reached in innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases
referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404;
Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last
paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md.
10 Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.

The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of
Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the
case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the
United States since 1911 and many times serving as a seaman on American vessels both in
15 peace and in war, was ordered excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island
at the expense of the steamship company, when he returned from a voyage on which he had
shipped from New York for one or more European ports and return to the United States. The
grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937
had been convicted of perjury because in certain documents he presented himself to be an
20 American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the Court released him
upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, said in part:

When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that
all interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of
25 some country that he would receive him as a resident. He is, a native-born Pole but
the Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject.
This Government does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a
stateless. The Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent
back aboard a ship and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last
30 sailed to the United States, he would probably be denied permission to land. There is
no other country that would take him, without proper documents.

It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be
released from custody on proper terms. . . .

What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody
35 almost seven months and practically admits it has no place to send him out of this
country. The steamship company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the
ship by the Union, with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast
Guard, is paying $3 a day for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the
steamship company that petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the immigration
40 officials describe him. . . .

I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on
his own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis
 Island by mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where
he can be reached by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for
petitioner's deportation to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it
may then advise the petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the
5 manner provided by law.

Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy
solution to the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is
sensible, sound and compatible with law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the
Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and
10 practice, we choose to follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski
decision with some modifications which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the Philippines.

It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that
the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might
15 join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's
allegation in its answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the
Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the
Philippines nor identified with the countries allied against these nations, the possibility of the
petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and security of
20 this country seems remote.

If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of
the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable.
After all, the Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure
25 as that just outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United
States Supreme Court in connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists
convicted by a lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow of the United States Government
is, in principle, pertinent and may be availed of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:

The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after

30 conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from
what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune
disloyal to act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with
traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated
35 but as yet uncommitted crimes. lmprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with
danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary
judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which
defendants stand convicted.

40 But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in
the same constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If an anger or
disgust with these defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast aside protection
 for the liberties of more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of
some future day.

xxx     xxx     xxx 1âwphïl.nêt

If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of

5 principle, there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be
overlooked or underestimated — that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of
American justice if I should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide
that their conviction is invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a
substantial question about a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal.
10 Indeed this experience lies back of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail
where such questions exist, to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons
with consequent reproach to our system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice
in the ordinary case, how much more important to avoid every chance of handing to
the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it would have if this country
15 should imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a conviction that our highest
Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either granting or
refusing bail. I am naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities of
the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the the dangers, the
worst they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is
20 preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated case of
unjustified imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we
permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world to be hallowed and glorified by
any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these men until
it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.

25 If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present
petition, since the right of accused to bail pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the
ten Communists, depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged
before formal charges are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no
30 charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are
slim and remote.

Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the
petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the
surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may
35 be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is
ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of
reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount
of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is
40 authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

No costs will be charged.

 Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PABLO, M., disidente:

5 Disiento

En decision disada por este Tribunal en la primera causa de habeas corpus incoada por el
solicitante Boris Mejoff (G.R. No. L-2855, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons)*, se declaro que el
habia venido a Filipinas procedente de Shanghai como espia japones; en la liberacion, el
ejercito americano le arresto por se espia, habiendo sido mas tarde entregado al Gobierno
10 del Commonwealth para ser tratado de acuerdo con la ley No.682; pero como bajo el Codgo
Penal Revisado, antes de su enmienda por la Orden Ejecutiva No. 44, (mayo 31, 1945) no
se castiga al extranjero que comete traicion, Mejoff fue puesto en libertad. Despues de una
debida investigacion, la Junta de Departacion encontra que el solicitante no tenia permiso
para entrar en Filipinas; fue entregado a la Junta de Inmigacion, la cual ordeno su
15 deportacion a Rusia por el primer transporte disponible por haber vendo aqui ilegalmente;
fue enviado a Cebu para que alli se embarcase, pero los dos barcos de nacionalidad rusa
que llegaron a dicho puerto en julio y agosto de 1948 rehusaron admitirle. Por no encontrar
transportacion para su departacion, Mejoff fue enviado a la Prison de Muntinglupa, donde
esta actualmente de tenido mientras el Gobierno no encuenra medio de transportarle a
20 Rusia.

La mayoria contiende que "The Petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he
was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees
were law during the occupation." Es tan ilegal la entrada del solicitante como la del ejercito
al que sirvio como espia. Ninguno tiene derecho a permanecer aqui. Puesto que fue vencido
25 el ejercito invasor que le trajo, el solicitante no tiene derecho a pemanecer aqui ni un minuto
mas. Si desea proteccion, debe acudir al Gobierno Japones a cuyo ejercito el sirvio; el
hecho de que ya esta aqui no le da titulo para permanecer libre aqui. El que ha venido como
espia de enemigo del Pueblo de Filipinas no tiene derecho a pedir igual trato que aquel ha
entrado de buena fe. ¿Es que Filipinos tiene la obligacion de acoger a un ciudadano
30 indeseable de Rusia? ¿Desde cuando tiene que allanarse una nacion a ser residencia de
una extranjero que entro como enemigo o, peor aun, como espia? Un Estado tiene
indiscutible derecho a deportar y expulsar de su territorio a todo extranjero indeseable.

El solicitante sostiene que no tiene estado. Eso no es razon para que tenga derecho a
permanecer aqui. Puede ser departado a Rusio o a Shanghai de donde vino. Si todos los
35 rusos que, por alguno que otro motivo, o por odio al comunisomo, dejasen su pais y
emigrasen aqui reclamando igual derecho, no habria territorio suficiente para ellos. Se
puede decir otro tanto de los chinos que, so pretexto de no querer someterse al regimen
comunista, optasen por resider para siempre aqui. Y si los mismos communistas chinos
viniesen clandestinamente y despues reclamasen igual proteccion como la concedida a
40 Mejoff, ¿tendreos que darles por el gusto?
 Se invoca la resolucion aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, titulada
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights", en la que se establece, entre otras cosas, que "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Yo soy de los que creen
firmemente en lo sagrado de esta resolucion; no puedo permitir que se detenga y se arreste
5 a alguien sin motivo justificado, de una manera arbitraria; pero el solicitante no esta detenido
de esta manera, lo esta de una manera provisional. Tan pronto como haya barco disponible
para su deportacion o tan pronto como pueda embarcarse en algun barco para el extenjero
o para cualquier otro punto a donde quiera ir, dejara de ser detenido. Conste que no esta
preso como un criminal condenado por un delito; esta tratado como cualquier otro extranjero
10 sujeto a deportacion. Si el solicitante no hubiera sido espia, si no hubiera venido aqui para
ayudar a las hordas japonesas en la subyugacion del pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido como
visitante, por ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo salir, yo seria el primero en
abogar por su liberacion inmediata.

Se cita el caso de Staniszewski vs. Watkins, (1948 A.M.C. 931, 42 American Journal of

15 International Law, 732) en el cual el recurrente estuvo detenido ya casi siete meses cuando
se decreto su libertad en un recurso de habeas corpus. En nuestra opinion, dicho caso no
tiene simulitud con la causa presente. Staniszewski era residente de los Estados desde
1911; estuvo sirviendo como marino en barcos mercantes americanos en tiempo de guerra y
se ordeno su detencion en Ellis Island cuando volvio a America procedente de un viaje a
20 Europa por no tener papeles de inmigracion. Staniszewski no habia entrado en los Estados
Unidos como espia, estuvo residiendo en dicho pais por varios años, era ya habitante de los
Estados unidos. La ocupacion de marino es honrosa, la del espia mercenario, detestable. El
espia es peor que el enemigo. Este lucha cara a cara, y el espia, con disimulo y arte
engañosa, escucha lo que a Staniszewski se le haya puesto en libertad. Poner en libertad a
25 un espia es poner en peligro la seguridad del Estado.

En cuanto a la duracion de la detencion provisional del recurrente, no hay regla fija,

depende de la cincunstancia de cada caso particular. Es evidente que los medios de
comunicacion entre Filipinas y Rusia o Shanghai, debico a fala de relciones diplomaticas,
son completamente anormales. No es culpa del gobierno el que no encuentre medios de
30 transportacion para el.

La Comision de Inmigracion ha dado pasos para que la International Refugee Organziation

of the United Nations (IRO0 se hiciera cargo del recurrente para que pueda ser repartriado o
enviado a otro pais extranjero, pero el Jefe de dicha organizacion contesto que no estaba en
condicines para aceptar dicha recomendacion.

35 William Martin Jurgans fue arrestado en 9 de enero de 1920, en 20 de mayo se decreto su

deportacion por el Sub Secretario del Tarabajo por violacion de la Ley de Inmigracion; solicto
su libertad bajo el recurso de Habeas Corpus, y en 16 de febrero de 1927 se denego su
peticion; no se le pudo deportar porque "the necessary arrangements for his deportation
could obviously not be made." (District Court of Minnesota, 17 F. 2nd series, 507). Como se
40 vera, la detencion provisional de William Martin Jurgans duro mas de seis años; la de Mejoff
no ha sido mas que de 31 meses, y no porque el gobierno no quiere deportarle, sino porque
no hay medio disponible para realizarlo.
 En Moraitis vs. Delany, 46 F. Supp., 425, se dijo:

What constitutes a reasonable time for the detention of the petitioner in custody for
deportation depends upon the facts and circumstances of particular cases. This court
cannot shut its eyes to the vitally important interests of this country at this time with
5 respect to the bottleneck of shipping, when every available ship, domestic and
foreign, must be utilized to the utmost without delay consequent upon the lack of
avilable seamen. Under these present conditions the court should be liberal indeed in
aiding the executive branch of the govenment in the strict enforcement of laws so
vitally necessary in the common defns. There is sound authority for this view in
10 United States ex. rel. Schlimm vs. Howe, D C.N. U Y. 222 F. 96, 97, where Circuit
Judge Lacombe refused to release an alien who had come here from Germany and
was ordered deported in 1915 when, by reason of the then existing war between
Germany and England, his deportation to Germany was not possible. It was said:

At the present time there is no regular passenger ocean service to German ports, so
15 the authorities are unable to forward him, and are holding him until some opportunity
of returning him to Germany may present itself. His continual detention is
unfortunate, but certainly is not illegal. His present condition can be alleviated only by
the action of the executive branch of the government. A federal court would not be
justified in discharging him. . . .

20 If he is not really fit for sea service, it is not probable that he would be forced into it,
although he may be able to serve his government in some other capacity. But
however that may be, while this country has no power under existing legislation to
impress him into sea service against his will, he has no just cause to be relieved from
the strict enforcement of our deportation laws, and to remain at liberty in this country
25 as a sanctuary contrary to our laws.

No es arbitraria la detencion de Mejoff. Esta jutificada por las circunstancias anormales.

La proposicion de vigilar al recurrente hasta que el gobierno encuentre transporte para su

deportacion, supon un gasto innecesario.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
35 Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
 DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and

hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are
5 they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is
No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule
are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

10 Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001[1] and July 3,
2001[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. [3] The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
15 The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a
warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of
the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable

cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the
20 arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same
to be paid in cash.
25 Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court
his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise
directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation
of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
 The Facts

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of

Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the United States
5 Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting
the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon
receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
10 transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant
to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was
granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.
15 [7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a

petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the
SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court
-- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
20 and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued
its October 17, 2000 Resolution.[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
25 held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final
and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001,
30 the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case
No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an
arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
35 defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18
US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section
 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4)
false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5)
illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f
and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
5 Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it
an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10] which prayed that petitioners
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
10 In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez
and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing
the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.
15 After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
20 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at one million pesos in cash.[11] After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
25 Hence, this Petition.[13]

Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

30 grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
 II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional
5 liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any
law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as
10 amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing
bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or
15 proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the
public respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may
20 justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists
that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not
ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
25 Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the
case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public
respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
30 subject bail orders.[14]
 In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether
Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged
5 prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals
(CA), instead of in this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.

The Courts Ruling

10 The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by
15 such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion
would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity
20 to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the
following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and
such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the
parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
25 resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts
ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case [17] ruled on
the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the
decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition
30 courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this
Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the
potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause
 adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under
existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
5 reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though,
has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public
interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.[19] As a fourth exception, the Court
has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of
the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
10 same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence,
a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction
15 to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor.
[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:

[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to
20 be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
25 important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
30 correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of
the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
 That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests
of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said
in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
5 facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
10 forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:

This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,
15 prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain
direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of
bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present
20 case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there
is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
25 interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.
[25] Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition

treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain

postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
30 First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing
crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from
one state to the other.
 With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of
affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing
crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent.Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes
5 that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look
upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular system that has been devised to
return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance
10 with municipal and international law.[31]

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that

criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish
them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
15 punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in
order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
20 extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives
direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and
25 one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties
duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten
30 the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and
 an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be
an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve
our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
5 Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial
process.[34] More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of
the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.
10 [35] That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon

extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have
been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
15 Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36] extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by
itself -- they are not.

An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding

20 which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
25 determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
30 proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
 reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final,
in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
5 extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision
to extradite.
10 Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon
to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
[37] Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in

needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international

judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime
15 is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of
the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the
prerogative of that jurisdiction.[38] The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
20 extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries
the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
25 Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity[40]with
the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
30 Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty.[42] This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as
set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government,
when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the
35 delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
 government is under obligation to make the surrender.[43] Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be
found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
5 Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience[44] of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
10 The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country.[45] Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting
state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2)
15 remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable --
eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well
as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an
ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
20 capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

25 Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the
accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against
him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to
avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a
dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists,
30 mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be
hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due
process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth
the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for
 extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is
within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:

5 SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of

Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
10 any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing
15 thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately
20 setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses
the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would
be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
25 warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,[46] receiving
facts and arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer
be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and
30 swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not
as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
 immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression --
a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
5 Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication
among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26,
1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task
Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to
G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the
10 crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated
exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3)
Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced
in the Affidavit of Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4)
Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary
15 Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty
Steward and enclosed Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression
from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether
20 the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best
serve the ends of justice. He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact,
he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable
25 cause did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:

In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support

of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince
the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing
against the extraditee.[50]
30 We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
35 Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
 answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In
connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
5 emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary[52]in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.

It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something

10 reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized
principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards
third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .[53]
15 Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither
the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very
purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from
20 the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez,
does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It provides:

25 Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
30 the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation --
of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to
 notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All
5 we required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon
which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not
supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:

10 Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely

determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine
the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
15 supported by substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely
further examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the
20 rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate
a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
25 prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action
is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of
30 the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one
-- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure:
35 Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
 judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
5 documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then
the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee,
10 who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In
our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in
15 extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
20 by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
25 Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision
secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules
30 of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of
extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of
 an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
5 the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
10 innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.[60] It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
15 The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does
not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
20 rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.[61] Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be
taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
25 That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in
the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying
the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
30 No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing that,
constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due
process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
35 extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process.
 We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the circumstances -- such as
those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
5 heard is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity
to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the
10 immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court
the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2)
the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
15 best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
20 country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due
processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus
become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.
25 In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the
risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his
personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments interest
30 in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional liberties do not
exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be
carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and
35 weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to
run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating
our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment,
 persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the
treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings,
adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step
5 towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade
their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place
with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
10 short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition
Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

15 The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition

cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and
enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to due
process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
20 extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property
of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling
for its application.[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold
that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of
25 the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71]including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
30 provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is
 basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature
of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power
5 should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral
interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In
short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
10 Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that
are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release
on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss
them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
15 While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a
member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents.We are not
persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:

20 When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,

they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
25 knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing
that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
30 protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
 Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
5 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
10 House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.The
15 importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction.An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
20 call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
25 The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
30 reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
 movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United
5 States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the
case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason
10 to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition
proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of
the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases
15 are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the
extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to
determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues
relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly
20 delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more
reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by
25 considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount
to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to
stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This
we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
30 Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he
stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not
fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of
the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will
not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
35 footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has
 not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is,
upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial
5 court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which
may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

10 The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is

totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular,
Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by
the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners
15 application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the
arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply,
20 the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it
has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed
in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had
been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have
bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both
25 parties and Counter-Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the main
topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in
its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it
noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions,
30 private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that
there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies
not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in
his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of
persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
 In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring,
Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves --
has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon allrelevant questions in
this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further
5 delay these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our Extradition Law
requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and
deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a
firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding
10 basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We believe that this charge is
not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath,
this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and
fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.

Summation

15 As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten

points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether
the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence
that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
20 Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that
the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
25 reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of
its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant
basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal
case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case
30 is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily
available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped
bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable
prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the
 opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
5 and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has
discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled
10 hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of
showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used
15 by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in
the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
20 fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk
involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is
the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.
25 7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of
liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well
aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
30 responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has
broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise
review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not
35 allow contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources
 of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a
treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not
be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can
unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest
5 for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpo
10 se.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated
May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order
dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The
15 Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

20