[No. L-4254.

September 26, 1951]

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

PRISONS, respondent.

ALIENS; DEPORTATION; HABEAS CORPUS.—A foreign

national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have
been formally made or judicial order issued, may not
indefinitely be kept in detention. He also has the right to life
and liberty and

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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 71

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

all other fundamental rights as applied to human beings, as

proclaimed in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of
which the Philippines is a member. The theory on which the court
is given power to act is that the warrant for his deportation,
which was not executed, is functus officio and the alien is being
held without any authority of law (U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Sup.,
201). The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if
turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the
remedy in that case being to impose conditions in the order of
release and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas

Corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ambrosio T. Dollete for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
Solicitor Florencio Villamor for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff,

the first having been denied in a decision of this Court of
July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was
thus briefly set forth in that decision, written by Mr.
Justice Bengzon:

"The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who

was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative
by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands.
Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he -was handed to the
Commonwealth Government for disposition in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter the People's Court
ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up,
found that having 110 travel documents Mejoff was illegally in
this country, and consequently referred the matter to the
immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation,
the Board of Commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948,
declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944,
without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a
designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be
deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The
petitioner was then under custody, he

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72 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons
having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In May 1948 he was
transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other
Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and
August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the
Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his
companions alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948
after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the
authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where
he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the
Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests
of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements
for his departure are being made."

The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and

said that "temporary detention is a necessary step in the
process of exclusion or expulsion of undersirable aliens and
that pending arrangements for his deportation, the
Government has the right to hold the undersirable alien
under confinement for a reasonable length of time." It took
note of the fact, manifested by the Solicitor General's
representative in the course of the oral argument, that
"this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not
relish keeping him at the people's expense * * * making
efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest
officer of the land." No period was fixed within which the
immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated
deportation beyond the statement that "The meaning of
'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the
availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements
with the governments concerned and- the efforts displayed
to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned that
"under established precedents, too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Mr. Justice Parás, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria,
Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this decision
dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted
for outright discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr.
Justice Parás qualified his dissent by stating that
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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 73

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

he might agree "to a further detention of the herein

petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months,
the Government is still unable to deport him." This writer
joined in the latter dissent but thought that two months
constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found
ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the
country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said
in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no
fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the
petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right
of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 18, 1946,
157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the
petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, as
impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign
nationals, not enemy, against whom no charge has been
made other than that their permission to stay has expired,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of law
and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of
its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not
decide. The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not
unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent
forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law
during the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a
resolution entitled "Universal Declaration Of Human
Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
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74 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its

plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and
liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that
"All human beings are born free and equal in degree and
rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "Every
one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9) ; etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that
the court "has the power to release from custody an alien
who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time
by the Department of Justice after it has become apparent
that although a warrant for his deportation has been
issued, the warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the
theory on which the court is given the power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be
executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held
without any authority of law." The decision cited several
cases which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that
jurisdiction, adding that the same result had been reached
in innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases referred to were
United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404;
Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs.
Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last paragraph; Ex parte
Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs.
Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to
find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948),
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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 75

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

80 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the

case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a
Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911
and many times serving as a seaman on American vessels
both in peace and in war, was ordered excluded from the
United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense
of the steamship company, when he returned from a voyage
on which he had shipped from New York for one or more
European ports and return to the United States. The
grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or
immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of
perjury because in certain documents he represented
himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for
release on habeas corpus, the Court released him upon his
own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, said
in part:

"When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this
court, I suggested that all interested parties * * * make an effort
to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some country that
would receive him as a resident. He is a native-born Pole but the
Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a
Polish subject. This Government does not claim that he is a Polish
citizen. His attorney says he is stateless. The Government is
willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back
aboard ship and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from
which he last sailed to the United States, he would probably be
denied permission to land. There is no other country that would
take him, without proper documents.
"It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that
the petitioner should be released from custody on proper terms * *
*.
"What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has
had him in custody almost seven months and practically admits it
has no place to send him out of this country. The steamship
company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship
by the Union, with proper seaman's papers issued by the United
States Coast Guard, is paying $3 a day for petitioner's board at
Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that
petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials
describe him * * *.

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Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

"I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the
release of the petitioner on his own recognizance. He will be
required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by
mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and
where he can be reached by mail. If the government does succeed
in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country that will be
ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the
manner provided by law."

Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the

case aforecited affords a happy solution to the quandary in
which the parties here find themselves, solution which we
think is sensible, sound and compatible with law and the
Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law
on immigration was patterned after or copied from the
American law and practice, we choose to follow and adopt
the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision
with some modifications which, it is believed, are in
consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing of the petition
at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the petitioner
was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was
expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if
allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's
allegation in its answer that "the herein petitioner was
brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the
fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States
or the Philippines nor identified with the countries allied
against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's
entertaining or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the
interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a
possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly prolonged
detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to
eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or
uncon-
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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 77

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons
trolable. After all, the Government is not impotent to deal
with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just
outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice
Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in connection
with the application for bail of ten Communists convicted
by a lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow of the
United States Government is, in principle, pertinent and
may be availed of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:

"The Government's alternative contention. is that defendants, by

misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail.
Grave public .danger is .said to result from what they may be
expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are' disposed to commit
every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is
still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing
of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet
uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from
predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in
this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice
that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of
which defendants stand convicted.

*      *      *      *      *      *      *

"But the right of every American to equal treatment before the

law is wrapped up in the same constitutional bundle with those of
these Communists. If in anger or disgust with these defendants
we throw out the bundle, we also cast aside protection for the
liberties of more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the
government of some future day.

*      *      *      *      *      *      *

"If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or

theoretical matters of principle, there is a very practical aspect of
this application which. must not be overlooked or underestimated
—that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American
justice if I should now send these men to jail and the full Court
later decide that their conviction is invalid. All experience with
litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a
conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed
this experience lies back of our rule permitting and practice of
allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the hazard ,of
unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to
our

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78 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the

ordinary case, how much more important to avoid every chance of
handing to the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it
would have if this country should imprison this handful of
Communist leaders on a conviction that our own highest Court
'would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either
granting or refusing bail. I am not naive enough to underestimate
the troublemaking propensities of the defendants. But, with the
Department of Justice alert to the dangers, the worst they can
accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is
preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a
celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist
leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their
symbolization of an evil force in the world to be hallowed and
glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that
risk is not to jail these men until it is finally decided that they
should stay jailed."

If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues

presented, its underlying principle is of universal
application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater
force to the present petition, since the right of accused to
bail pending appeal of his case, as in the case of the ten
Communists, depends upon the discretion of the court,
whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges are
instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there
no charges pending against the petitioner, but the
prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the
surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents
in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to
insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall
be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be
submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of
Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a
bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with
sufficient surety or sureties, which
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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 79

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to

exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
No costs will be charged.

Parás, C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, and Jugo,

JJ., concur.

PABLO, M., disidente:

Disiento.
En decision distada por este Tribunal en la primera
causa de habeas corpus incoada por el solicitante Boris *
Mejoff (G. R. No. L-2855, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons) , se
declaró que él había venido a Filipinas procedente de
Shanghai como espía del ejército japonés; en la liberación,
el ejército americano le arrestó por ser espía, habiendo sido
más tarde entregado al Gobierno del Commonwealth para
ser tratado de acuerdo con la ley No. 682; pero como bajo el
Código Penal Revisado, antes de su enmienda por la Orden
Ejecutiva No. 44, (mayo 31, 1945) no se castiga al
extranjero que comete traición, Mejoff fué puesto en
libertad. Después de una debida investigación, la Junta de
Deportación encontró que el solicitante no tenía permiso
para entrar en Filipinas: fué entregado a la Junta de
Inmigración, la cual ordenó su deportación a Rusia por el
primer transporte disponible por haber venido aquí
ilegalmente; fué enviado a Cebú para que allí se
embarcase, pero los dos barcos de nacionalidad rusa que
llegaron a dicho puerto en julio y agosto de 1948 rehusaron
admitirle. Por no encontrar transportación para su
deportación, Mejoff fué enviado a la Prisión de
Muntinglupa, donde está actualmente detenido mientras el
Gobierno no encuentra medio de transportarle a Rusia.
La mayoría contiende que "The Petitioner's entry into
the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the
armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government
whose decrees were law during the occupation." Es tan
ilegal la entrada del solicitante como la del ejército al

________________

* 84 Phil., 218.

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80 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

que sirvió como espía. Ninguno tiene derecho a permanecer

aquí. Puesto que fué vencido el ejército invasor que le trajo,
el solicitante no tiene derecho a permanecer aquí ni un
minuto más. Si desea protección, debe acudir al Gobierno
Japonés a cuyo ejército él sirvió; el hecho de que ya está
aquí no le da título para permanecer libre aquí. El que ha
venido como espía del enemigo del Pueblo de Filipinas no
tiene derecho a pedir igual trato que aquél que ha entrado
de buena fe. ¿ Es que Filipinas tiene la obligación de acoger
a un ciudadano indeseable de Rusia? ¿Desde cuándo tiene
que allanarse una nación a ser residencia de un extranjero
que entró como enemigo o, peor aún, como espía? Un
Estado tiene indiscutible derecho a deportar y expulsar de
su territorio a todo extranjero indeseable.
El solicitante sostiene que no tiene estado. Eso no es
razón para que tenga derecho a permanecer aquí. Puede
ser deportado a Rusia o a Shanghai de donde vino. Si todos
los rusos que, por alguno que otro motivo, o por odio al
comunismo, dejasen su país y emigrasen aquí reclamando
igual derecho, no habría territorio suficiente para ellos. Se
puede decir otro tanto de los chinos que, so pretexto de no
querer someterse al régimen comunista, optasen por residir
para siempre aquí. Y si los mismos comunistas chinos
viniesen clandestinamente y después reclamasen igual
protección como la concedida a Mejoff, ¿ tendremos que
darles por el gusto?
Se invoca la resolución aprobada por la Asamblea
General de las Naciones Unidas, titulada "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights", en la que se establece, entre
otras cosas, que "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile." Yo soy de los que creen
firmemente en lo sagrado de esta resolución; no puedo
permitir que se detenga y se arreste a alguien sin motivo
justificado, de una manera arbitraria; pero el solicitante no
está detenido de esta manera, lo está de una manera
provisional. Tan pronto como haya barco disponible para su
depor-
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VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 81

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

tación o tan pronto como pueda embarcarse en algún barco

para el extranjero o para cualquier otro punto a donde
quiera ir, dejará de ser detenido. Conste que no está preso
como un criminal condenado por un delito; está tratado
como cualquier otro extranjero sujetó a deportación. Si el
solicitante no hubiera sido espía, si no hubiera venido aquí
para ayudar a las hordas japonesas en la subyugación del
pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido como visitante, por
ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo salir, yo sería
el primero en abogar por su liberación inmediata.
Se cita el caso de Staniszewski vs. Watkins, (1948
A.M.C. 931, 42 American Journal of International Law,
732) en el cual el recurrente estuvo detenido ya casi siete
meses cuando se decretó su libertad en un recurso de
habeas corpus. En nuestra opinion, dicho caso no tiene
similitud con la causa presente.. Staniszewski era residente
de los Estados Unidos desde 1911; estuvo sirviendo como
marino en barcos mercantes americanos en tiempo de paz y
en tiempo de guerra y se ordenó su detención en Ellis
Island cuando volvió a America procedente de un viaje a
Europa por no tener papeles de inmigración. Staniszewski
no había entrado en los Estados Unidos como espía, estuvo
residiendo en dicho país por varios años, era ya habitante
de los Estados Unidos. La ocupación de marino es honrosa,
la del espía mercenario, detestable. El espía es peor que el
enemigo. Este lucha cara a cara, y el espía, con disímulo y
arte engañosa, escucha lo que le interesa a su amo para
comunicárselo. Es justo que a Staniszewski se le haya
puesto en libertad. Poner en libertad a un espía es poner en
peligro la seguridad del Estado.
En cuanto a la duración de la detención provisional del
recurrente, no hay regla fija; depende de la circunstancia
de cada caso particular. Es evidente que los medios de
comunicación entre Filipinas y Rusia o Shanghai, debido a
falta de relaciones diplomáticas, son completamente
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82 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

anormales. No es culpa del gobierno el que no encuentre

medios de transportación para él.
La Comisión de Inmigración ha dado pasos para que la
International Refugee Organization of the United Nations
(IRO) se hiciera cargo del recurrente para que pueda ser
repatriado o enviado a otro país extranjero, pero el Jefe de
dicha organización contestó que no estaba en condiciones
para aceptar dicha recomendación.
William Martin Jurgans fué arrestado en 9 de enero de
1920, en 20 de mayo se decretó su deportación por el Sub
Secretario del Trabajo por violación de la Ley de
Inmigración; solicitó su libertad bajo el recurso de Habeas
Corpus, y en 16 de febrero de 1927 se denegó su petición; no
se le pudo deportar porque "the necessary arrangements for
his deportation could obviously not be made." (District
Court of Minnesota, 17 F. 2nd series, 507). Como se verá, la
detención provisional de William Martin Jurgans duró más
de seis años; la de Mejoff no ha sido más que de 31 meses, y
no porque el gobierno no quiere deportarle, sino porque no
hay medio disponible para realizarlo.
En Moraitis vs. Delany, 46 F. Supp., 425, se dijo:

"What constitutes a reasonable time for the detention of the

petitioner in custody for deportation depends' upon the facts and
circumstances of particular cases. This court cannot shut its eyes
to the vitally important interests of this country at this time with
respect to the bottleneck of shipping, when every available ship,
domestic and foreign, must be utilized to the utmost without
delay consequent upon the lack of available seamen. Under these
present conditions the court should be liberal indeed in aiding the
executive branch of the government in the strict enforcement of
laws so vitally necessary in the common defense. There is sound
authority for this view in United States ex. rel. Schlimm vs. Howe,
D. C. N. Y. 222 F. 96, 97, where Circuit Judge Lacombe refused to
release an alien who had come here from Germany and was
ordered deported in 1915 when, by reason of the then existing war
between Germany and England, his deportation to Germany was
not possible. It was said:
" 'At the present time there is no regular passenger ocean
service to German ports, so the authorities are unable to forward

83

VOL. 90, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951 83

Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, et al.

him, and are holding him until some opportunity of returning him
to Germany may present itself. His continual detention is
unfortunate, but certainly is not illegal. His present condition can
be alleviated only by the action of the executive branch of the
government. A federal court would not be justified in discharging
him.' * * *
"If he is not really fit for sea service, it is not probable that he
would be forced into it, although he may be able to serve his
government in some other capacity. But however that may be,
while this country has no power under existing legislation to
impress him into sea service against his will; he has no just cause
to be relieved from the strict enforcement of our deportation laws,
and to remain at liberty in this country as a sanctuary contrary to
our laws."

No es arbitraria la detención de Mejoff. Está justificada por

las circunstancias anormales.
La proposición de vigilar al recurrente hasta que el
gobierno encuentre transporte para su deportación, supone
un gasto innecesario.
 Petition granted.

___________

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