ICT v.

Sales, September 9, 2015

On February 22, 2006, petitioner hired respondent Mariphil L. Sales as its Customer Service
Representative (CSR) or Telephone Service Representative (TSR), and assigned her to its Capital One
account. On August 21, 2006, respondent became a regular employee, and her monthly base salary was
increased to P16,350.00 and she was given monthly transportation and meal allowances.

On February 21, 2007, respondent was assigned to the Washington Mutual account, where she was
awarded with a certificate for being the "Top Converter/Seller (Second Place)" for the month of April
2007.

On July 3, 2007, respondent wrote to Glen Odom (Odom) - petitioner's Vice President - complaining
about supposed irregularities in the handling of funds entrusted to petitioner by Washington Mutual
which were intended for distribution to outstanding Washington Mutual CSRs and TSRs as prizes and
incentives. However, no action appears to have been taken on her complaint.

Respondent was then transferred to the Bank of America account on July 30, 2007. Without prior notice
to respondent, petitioner scheduled her for training from July 30 to August 6, 2007 on the very same day
of her transfer. On the third day of training (August 1), respondent was unable to attend. When she
reported for training the next day, respondent was informed that she could not be certified to handle
calls for Bank of America due to her failure to complete the training. From then on, respondent was
placed on "floating status" and was not given any work assignment.

In a September 28, 2007 letter9 to petitioner's Human Resource (HR) Manager, respondent tendered her
resignation from work, effective upon receipt of the letter. Reasoning out that she was forced to resign
due to the reason that her employment was made on "floating status" effective August 4, 2007 and up
to the time she wrote the letter (almost two months). Moreover, that her transfer was prompted
because she lodged a complaint against the managers/supervisors assigned in WaMu account.

On October 2, 2007, respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioner and
Odom before the NLRC.

LA- in favor of the respondent; respondent was indeed constructively dismissed; petitioner
discriminated against her and unduly punished her. Although she was not included in the original list of
CSRs/TSRs for program transfer, she was transferred to another account
NLRC – reversed the decision of the LA; find that in the past the complainant had been transferred from
one program to another without any objection on her part and had been absent or usually late in
reporting for work, constraining the respondent ICT to transfer her to another program/account.
CA- in favor of the respondent and reinstated the decision of the LA; While it is true that management
has the prerogative to transfer employees, the exercise of such right should not be motivated by
discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient
cause.

Constructive dismissal exists when the resignation on title part of the employee was involuntary due to
the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test for constructive dismissal is
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up his
employment under the prevailing circumstances. With the decision of the private respondent
corporation to transfer and to thereafter placed [sic] her on floating status, petitioner felt that she was
being discriminated and this perception compelled her to resign. It is clear from her resignation letter
that petitioner felt oppressed by the situation created by the private respondent corporation, and this
forced her to surrender her position.

ISSUE:
1.) WON respondent's transfer was unjustified even if it showed that respondent was not demoted
and was even given the same rank and pay.
2.) WON respondent's placement under floating status was tantamount to constructive dismissal

RULING:

Petitioner's Arguments
- respondent's transfer to another account was done as a valid exercise of management
prerogative
- placing Sales in a floating status was due to her absences and failure to complete the training

Respondent's Arguments
- Her transfer to the Bank of America account was an undue penalty for her complaining about
supposed anomalies in the Washington Mutual account.
- there is no evidence to prove her alleged "attendance and punctuality issues

1.) YES.

Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. The only limitations to
the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity and
substantial justice.

While the law imposes many obligations upon the employer, nonetheless, it also protects the
employer's right to expect from its employees not only good performance, adequate work, and
diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty, hi fact, the Labor Code does not excuse employees from
complying with valid company policies and reasonable regulations for their governance and guidance.

TRANSFER:
Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a transfer
is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in the
service or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or salary; (b) the
employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for legitimate business purposes; (c)
a transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith or is effected as a form
of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause; (d) the employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.

While the prerogative to transfer respondent to another account belonged to petitioner, it wielded the
same unfairly. The evidence suggests that at the time respondent was transferred from the Washington
Mutual account to the Bank of America program, petitioner was hiring additional CSRs/TSRs.43 This
simply means that if it was then hiring new CSRs/TSRs, then there should be no need to transfer
respondent to the Bank of America program; it could simply train new hires for that program.
Transferring respondent - an experienced employee who was already familiar with the Washington
Mutual account, and who even proved to be outstanding in handling the same - to another account
means additional expenses for petitioner: it would have to train respondent for the Bank of America
account, and train a new hire to take her place in the Washington Mutual account. This does not make
sense; quite the contrary, it is impractical and entails more expense on petitioner's part. If respondent
already knew her work at the Washington Mutual account very well, then it is contrary to experience
and logic to transfer her to another account which she is not familiar with, there to start from scratch;
this could have been properly relegated to a new hire.

There can be no truth to petitioner's claim either that respondent's transfer was made upon request of
the client. If she was performing outstanding work and bringing in good business for the client, there is
no reason - indeed it is beyond experience and logic - to conclude that the client would seek her
transfer. Such a claim could only be fabricated.

PUNCTUALITY:
Moreover, as the appellate court correctly observed, even if respondent had attendance and punctuality
issues, her overall performance as a CSR/TSR was certainly far from mediocre; on the contrary, she
proved to be a top performer. And if it were true that respondent suddenly became lax by way of
attendance in July 2007, it is not entirely her fault.
Thus, the only conceivable reason why petitioner transferred respondent to another account is the fact
that she openly and bravely complained about the supposed anomalies in the Washington Mutual
account; it is not her "derogatory record" or her "attendance and punctuality issues", which are
insignificant and thus irrelevant to her overall performance in the Washington Mutual account. And, as
earlier stated, respondent's "attendance and punctuality issues" were attributable to petitioner's
indifference, inaction, and lack of sensitivity in failing to timely address respondent's complaint. It
should share the blame for respondent's resultant delinquencies.

Thus, in causing respondent's transfer, petitioner clearly acted in bad faith and with discrimination,
insensibility and disdain; the transfer was effected as a form of punishment for her raising a valid
grievance related to her work. Furthermore, said transfer was obviously unreasonable, not to mention
contrary to experience, logic, and good business sense. This being the case, the transfer amounted to
constructive dismissal.

The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of
discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by
the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In particular, the employer must be able to
show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should the
employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to
constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in
pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego
with his continued employment.

2. YES.

In placing respondent on "floating status," petitioner further acted arbitrarily and unfairly, making life
unbearable for her. In so doing, it treated respondent as if she were a new hire; it improperly
disregarded her experience, status, performance, and achievements in the company; and most
importantly, respondent was illegally deprived of her salary and other emoluments. For her single
absence during training for the Bank of America account, she was refused certification, and as a result,
she was placed on floating status and her salary was withheld. Clearly, this was an act of discrimination
and unfairness considering that she was not an inexperienced new hire, but a promising and award-
winning employee who was more than eager to succeed within the company. 

In effect, respondent's transfer to the Bank of America account was not only unreasonable, unfair,
inconvenient, and prejudicial to her; it was effectively a demotion in rank and diminution of her salaries,
privileges and other benefits. She was unfairly treated as a new hire, and eventually her salaries,
privileges and other benefits were withheld when petitioner refused to certify her and instead placed
her on floating status. Far from being an "accommodation" as petitioner repeatedly insists, respondent
became the victim of a series of illegal punitive measures inflicted upon her by the former.

Besides, as correctly argued by respondent, there is no basis to place her on "floating status" in the first
place since petitioner continued to hire new CSRs/TSRs during the period, as shown by its paid
advertisements and placements in leading newspapers seeking to hire new CSRs/TSRs and employees.

While this Court agrees with the appellate court's observation that respondent's resignation was
involuntary as it became unbearable for her to continue with her employment, expounding on the issue
at length is unnecessary. Because she is deemed constructively dismissed from the time of her illegal
transfer, her subsequent resignation became unnecessary and irrelevant. There was no longer any
position to relinquish at the time of her

In case of constructive dismissal, the employee is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent, as well as separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.