No. L-31934. July 29, 1977.* FERNANDEZ, J.

:
RAMON LANZAR, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO,
respondents. This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. No. 34333-R entitled “Ramon Lanzar Applicant-Appellee, versus The Director
Property; Accretion; Lands formed by action of the sea as accretion form part of of Landed The City of Iloilo, Oppositors-Appellants”, declaring the
the public domain.—Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits
caused by action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no ________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
property sought to be registered as the property of the public domain devoted to
service, the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the
public use not susceptible of private appropriation.
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

In May 1960, the petitioner, Ramon Lanzar, filed an application for registration of
Same; Same; Lands formed by action of the sea as accretion may not be
title to a parcel of land located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City in the Court of
registered in the name of the applicant an the basis of adverse possesion for over
First Instance of Iloilo alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in
30 years.—The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue
question and asking that the title thereto be registered in his name.
to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any
portion of them to private persons, remain part of the public domain and are for
In August 1961, the Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed an opposition to
public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State,
the application on the ground that the land in Question is a foreshore land which
such lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto,
forms part of the public domain and is needed by the City of Iloilo as a road right
are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public
of way of the Molo-Arevalo Boulevard, and that the applicant had not possessed
uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the
the property in such a manner as to warrant an implied grant entitled him to
provision of article 1936 of the Civil Code.
confirmation of his title thereto.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of appeals

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision in March 1963
holding that the property in question, having been possessed by the applicant and
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
his predecessors-in-interest, publicly, continuously and adversely for more than
30 years, the same was adjudicated to the petitioner, it appearing that no proof
     Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
had been adduced that the said land is necessary for public utility or
establishment of special industries (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-37).
     Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo
and Solicitor Jose A. Janolo for respondents.

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The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo appealed to the Court of Appeals IV
which on March 24, 1970 reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo and held that the land in question, being an accretion formed by the action THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
of the sea, is property of the public domain and not susceptible of private ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY THRU ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.”
appropriation.
(Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 1-2)
Hence, the applicant-appellee, Ramon Lanzar, filed this petition for certiorari to
review the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts are not disputed.

The petitioner assigns the following errors: The petitioner has applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land which
is admittedly an accretion of Lot No. 1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, it
“I having been formed by the gradual action of the sea before 1922. Ignacio Arroyo,
the registered owner of Lot 1899, leased in 1922 the property to Maximo
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LANDS FORMED BY ACTION OF Tonogbanua who possessed the whole of Lot 1899 and its accretion. In 1927,
THE SEA AS ACCRETION TO THE SHORES ARE PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION, Ignacio Arroyo donated Lot 1899 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, together with
ON THE AUTHORITY OF ART. 4, LAW OF WATERS, KER & CO. VS. GAUDEN AND its accretion, to Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo, which in turn leased the
GOVERNMENT VS. ALDECOA. property to the applicant, Ramon Lanzar. The lessee planted coconuts and
bananas on the land and a portion thereof was devoted to palay. A verification of
II Lot 1899 by the Bureau of Lands disclosed that the portion of land applied for and
described in the plan, Exhibit A, and in its technical description, is outside of Lot
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING ON MONTEVERDE VS. DIRECTOR OF 1899, the same being an accretion thereto formed by the action of the sea.
LANDS, 93 PHIL 134 HOLDING THAT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE CAN Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo and the applicant entered into an
DECLARE THE LAND AS NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE AND SO SHALL agreement, Exhibit 1, on August 13, 1959, under which Beaterio de Santissimo
BELONG TO THE ADJACENT OWNER. Rosario de Molo assigned all its rights to the accretion, the title to which is sought
to be registered by the applicant. Beaterio de Santissimo Rosario de Molo had
III possessed Lot 1899 and its accretion through its lessee, openly, publicly,
uninterruptedly and adversely to all claimants and under claim of ownership. The
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE ART. 422 OF THE NEW Beaterio had declared Lot 1899 for taxation and when it assigned the rights to the
CIVIL CODE PROVIDES THAT PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN WHEN NO LONGER applicant, he caused the tax declaration to be transferred to his name in May
INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE, SUCH INTENTION CAN ONLY BE SPELLED OUT BY THE 1960, Exhibit J.
EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE, NOT BY THE COURTS.

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During the Cadastral Survey of 1911-1912, the lot in question was non-existent to prove any such grant or concession in this case and, in fact, it is apparent from
(Exhibit 2, Director of Lands). Hence, said land as an accretion to Lot 1899 must the evidence that the conditions upon which the adjoining owners would be
have gradually developed from 1912 to 1922 and thereafter. It is now separated entitled to such a grant have never existed because for a long time the property
by the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard from the sea. was used by the Spanish navy and it is now occupied by the present government
as a naval station, and works costing more than $500,000, money of the United
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the title to the land in question States, have been erected thereon.” (Idem. p. 736)
which was formed by action of the sea as an accretion to Lot 1899 may be
registered in the name of the applicant on the basis of adverse possession for It is contended by the petitioner that:
over 30 years.
“As found by the Court of Appeals, the accretion began before 1922, but after
Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides: 1912, as shown by the undisputed evidence, hence, during the regime of the
Spanish Civil Code, which became effective on December 8, 1889, and
“ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by consequently, its nature shall be determined by the said code. Now, the said code
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer provides:
washed by the waters of the sea, and are not necessary for the purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, ‘ARTICLE 399. The following are property of public domain:
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.” ‘1.Those things intended for public use, as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads and others
In Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil. 732, this Court said: of a like nature.’ ” (Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 10-11)
However, in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa and Company, 19 Phil. 505, this
“This case is directly covered by the first part of said article 4. There is therein an Court held:
express declaration that land formed in the way this land was formed is public
property. Nothing could be more explicit and the effect of this declaration is not ‘The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, the
in any way limited by the subsequent provisions of the same article. The claim of twentieth day of its publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th of November
the appellants that these subsequent provisions indicate that the ownership of of the same year, confirms the provisions of the said Law of Waters, since, in its
such land is in the private persons who own the adjoining property, and that the article 339, it prescribes that:
declaration which is spoken of is simply proof of that ownership, can not be
sustained. It is in direct conflict with the statement made in the first part of the ‘Property of public ownership is—
article. The true construction of the article is that when these lands which belong
to the State are not needed for the purposes mentioned therein, then the State
shall grant them to the adjoining owners. No attempt was made by the appellants
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‘1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, The contention of the petitioner-appellant that by “thus expanding the meaning
and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a of shores to include inland property formed by the action of the sea, Government
similar character.’ vs. Aldecoa is guilty of judicial legislation x x x” (Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, p.
15) has no merit.
Article 341 of the same code provides:
Articles 339 and 340 of the Spanish Civil Code are not repugnant to Article 4 of
‘Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The said provisions of the said Spanish Code
requirements of the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State did not provide that lands added to the shores by action of the sea form part of
property’. the patrimonial property of the State.

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to he As stated by this Court in Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, supra, p. 541, the Civil
devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of Code of Spain confirms the provisions of Article 4 of the Law of Waters, citing
them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for public Article 339 of said code.
uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such
lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are This Court has been consistent in ruling that lands formed by the action of the sea
not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, belong to the public domain. Thus in Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil.
they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the provision 134, it was held:
of article 1936 of the Civil Code.
“Lots Nos. 1 and 2 were admittedly formed and added to the shores by the
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by natural action of the sea, and the petitioners herein have claimed title thereto as
accretions and alluvium deposits occasioned by the sea, where the occupant or accretion to their adjoining lots, in accordance with article 4 of the Law of Waters
possessor is a private person and holds without previous permission or of August 3, 1966, which provides as follows:
authorization from the Government, granted in due form, although he may have
had the intention to hold it for the purpose of making it his own, is illegal ‘Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by action of
possession on his part and amounts to nothing more than a mere detainer of the the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
land, which is out of the sphere of the commerce of men, as belonging to the water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
public domain and being alloted to public uses and for the use of all persons who establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the Government
live at the place where it is situated.” (Idem, pp. 514-515) shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.’“
It is thus seen that the petitioner could not acquire the land in question by
prescription. (Idem. pp. 135-136)

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In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the property
sought to be registered as part of the public domain devoted to public use not ——o0o——
susceptible of private appropriation. The land in question is needed by the City of
Iloilo for the expansion of the Arevalo-Molo Boulevard. © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Lanzar vs. Director
of Lands, 78 SCRA 130, No. L-31934 July 29, 1977
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

     Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz-Palma, Martin and Guerrero, JJ.,

concur.

Petition for review dismissed and decision affirmed.

Notes.—The ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by

prescription. (Lovina vs. Moreno, 9 SCRA 557). R.A. 2056 merely empowers the
Secretary of Public Works to remove unauthorized obstruction or encroachments
upon public streams, constructions that no private person may anyway be
entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquired by adverse possession. (Ibid., citing Palanca vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).

Since neither the Church nor the municipality could present positive proof of
ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of time and the only
indubitable fact is the free and continuous use of Lot 2 by residents of Catarman,
coupled with the fact that the town has no public plaza to speak of other than this
disputed parcel of land, there is a strong presumption that the same was
segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the municipality of Catarman. It
should therefore be excluded from the application for registration filed by the
Church. (Bishop of Calbayog vs. Director of Lands 45 SCRA 418).
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