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Building Social Business Models: Lessons from

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 Long Range Planning 43 (2010) 308e325 http://www.elsevier.com/locate/lrp

Building Social Business

Models: Lessons from the
Grameen Experience
Muhammad Yunus, Bertrand Moingeon and
Laurence Lehmann-Ortega

Grameen bank, founded in 1976, has both pioneered the development of micro-finance,
and created nearly 30 businesses designed to alleviate poverty. The article traces the
gradual development of Grameen’s expertise in formulating social business models, which
require new value propositions, value constellations and profit equations, and as such,
resembles business model innovation. The article presents five lessons learned from this
experience: three are similar to those of conventional business model innovation e
challenging conventional thinking, finding complementary partners and undertaking
continuous experimentation; two are specific to social business models: recruiting
social-profit-oriented shareholders, and specifying social profit objectives clearly and early.
We suggest these new business models e where stakeholders replace shareholders
as the focus of value maximization e could empower capitalism to address overwhelming
global concerns.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
The Grameen Group is a network of nearly 30 sister organizations linked to the Bangladeshi
Grameen Bank, the microcredit pioneer and (together with its founder, Muhammad Yunus, one
of this article’s co-authors) 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner. This group was established in 1983
with the creation of the Grameen Bank (‘Grameen’ means village), within the framework of
a new law drafted specifically for the purpose. Yunus, then a professor in economics, had already
started to lend money to people trapped into poverty by greedy moneylenders. He had discovered
that entrepreneurship was by no means a rare quality among poor people e but that traditional
banks refused to grant loans without collateral. Grameen Bank now gives loans to over 7.5 million
poor people-97 percent of whom are women e which help the poor lift themselves out of poverty:

0024-6301/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2009.12.005
68 percent of the families of Grameen Bank borrowers have crossed the poverty line. Motivation
towards repayment is high, with rates currently running at 98.4 percent, and the bank has been
profitable in every year of its existence except 1983, 1991 and 1992. The socially-oriented organi-
zations in the Grameen Group now range from the country’s largest phone company to one sup-
plying affordable healthcare. The Group’s on-going experience (over almost 30 years) of building
firms whose purpose is to alleviate poverty has led to the emergence of the concept of ‘social busi-
ness’, which can be viewed as still being under construction.
Established multinational companies (MNC) have recently shown some interest in the Grameen
experience and in its fight against poverty as part of a more general emphasis on corporate social
responsibility (CSR). However shareholder value maximization remains the rule in the capitalist
system, and e clearly e the reconciliation of this with social objectives is often problematic.
Thus, although advocates of CSR like to propose that companies should be measured by a ‘triple
bottom line’ of financial, social and environmental benefits, ultimately only one bottom line usually
matters: financial profit.

reconciling shareholder value maximization with social objectives is

clearly problematic . despite CSR advocates proposing a ‘triple
bottom line’, only one ultimately matters in the capitalist system

However, research has shown that, if managed strategically, CSR projects can indeed pay off,
both socially and financially.1 In the midst of the current financial and economic crisis, some com-
panies have begun to question their role more fundamentally and seem to be awakening to social
change issues. Some pioneering established companies have sought to implement more pro-active
CSR policies that anticipate social trends and go beyond the minimum required,2 and this impetus
has led to the rise of the number of ‘social businesses’. Many of these have turned to Grameen to
benefit from its experience to help them achieve these goals, and partnered with it in a range of
social business ventures. We report on three of these as our case studies:
 Grameen Phone, a partnership with Telenor (the Norwegian telecommunications company),
has become one of the largest tax payers in Bangladesh. The success is based on the Grameen
‘telephone ladies’, who provide a phone service in their villages by lending users a phone for
just a couple of minutes e avoiding them having to make costly handset purchases;
 Grameen Veolia is a co-creation with Veolia Water (one of the world’s leading water service pro-
viders) designed to use simplified surface-water treatment systems to provide rural populations
with affordable access to drinking water, distributed at village drinking fountains or via cans, us-
ing prepaid card systems;
 Grameen Danone is a collaboration with Danone (one of the world’s leading healthy food
companies) that offers an affordable and easily available dairy product developed to fulfill the
nutritional needs of Bangladeshi children. The yoghurt is produced locally and distributed
door-to-door by Grameen ladies.

The story behind each of these ventures is of the gradual emergence of the social business con-
cept: a self-sustaining company that sells goods or services and repays its owners’ investments, but
whose primary purpose is to serve society and improve the lot of the poor. Building on these recent
Grameen experiments, our goal in this article is to delineate the lessons learned so as to provide
detailed guidance for companies wishing to create social businesses. We analyze these cases (which
are described in more detail in the Appendix) not in chronological order, but in the sequence that

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 309

fits our main purpose e of studying the building of social business models. As the social business
idea borrows some concepts from the capitalist economy, social business implementation can like-
wise borrow conventional business literature concepts. Our idea is to investigate whether the busi-
ness model concept e and in particular the business model innovation literature e can help us
propose a framework for setting up social businesses. The research into business model innovation,
which considers business models as the locus of innovation (rather than products, processes or
technologies), while it doesn’t always use the same terminology, has led to a growing body of
academic literature over recent years.3 This literature suggests that business model innovation is
facilitated by three major strategic moves: challenging conventional wisdom; setting up appropriate
partnerships; and undertaking experimentation. We reviewed these recommendations with the
Grameen experience (see Appendix 2 for the research method), and found that they were also rel-
evant for creating social business models. However, the case studies show that building social busi-
nesses also involves two additional requirements: the needs to involve socially-oriented
shareholders and to state the intended social profit explicitly. Hence, overall, five lessons can be
learned from the Grameen experience.
The structure of this article follows our research path. First, we present the social business model
concept, and highlight how building social businesses resembles business model innovation. We
then describe the five lessons learned through the Grameen experience noted above. This leads
us to develop a specific social business model framework conceived to help managers seeking to
set up businesses conceived to fulfill a social goal.

What is a social business?

In the capitalist system, two extreme types of corporate bodies can be distinguished. On the one
hand, companies can be seen as profit-maximizing businesses, whose purpose is to create share-
holder value. On the other, non-profit organizations exist to fulfill social objectives. Figure 1 shows
how a social business borrows from both these entities: it has to cover its full costs from its
operations, and its owners are entitled to recover their invested money, but it is more cause-
than profit-driven. Its position in the lower right quadrant shows that it has both the potential
to act as a change agent for the world, and sufficient business-like characteristics to ensure it
survives to do so.
In organizational structure, this new form of business is basically the same as profit-maximizing
businesses: it is not a charity, but a business in every sense. The managerial mindset must be the
same as in a business: when you are running a social business, you think and work differently
than if you were running a charity, even though your objective is different from a profit-maximiz-
ing company. At the same time as trying to achieve their social objective, social businesses need to
recover their full costs so they can be self-sustainable. Their owners never intend to make profits for
themselves (there are no dividends), but they are entitled to get their money back if they wish.
Rather than being passed on to investors, surpluses generated by the social business are reinvested

Financial profit maximization

Profit-
N/A maximizing
businesses
No recovery of Repayment of
invested capital invested capital
(self sustainability)
Not-for-profit SOCIAL
organizations BUSINESSES

Social profit maximization

Figure 1. Social business vs. Profit maximizing business and not-for-profit organisations

310 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

in the business, and thus, ultimately, passed on to the target group of beneficiaries in such forms as
lower prices, better service or greater accessibility. Thus, a social business is designed and operated
just like a ‘regular’ business enterprise, with products, services, customers, markets, expenses and
revenues. It is a no-loss, no-dividend, self-sustaining company that sells goods or services and
repays investments to its owners, but whose primary purpose is to serve society and improve the
lot of the poor. Here it differs from NGOs, most of which are not designed to recover their total
costs from their operations, and are therefore obliged to devote part of their time and energy to
raising money. As it seeks self-sustainability, a social business only relies on its investors at the
beginning of a development project.

[While] its primary purpose is to serve society, a social business has

products, services, customers, markets, expenses and revenues like
a ‘regular’ enterprise .It is a no-loss, no-dividend, self-sustaining
company that repays its owners’ investments

This is close to the concept of ‘social entrepreneurship’, defined by Mair and Marti as ‘a process
involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social
change and/or address social needs’. Social businesses can be seen as a subset of social entrepreneur-
ship, which includes both profit and not-for-profit initiatives, and which can be distinguished from
conventional entrepreneurship through the ‘relative priority given to social wealth creation vs. eco-
nomic wealth creation. In business entrepreneurship, social wealth is a by-product of the economic value
created’.4 All those who design and run social businesses are social entrepreneurs - but not all social
entrepreneurs are engaged in social businesses (some models, for instance, still include conventional
dividend payments to profit oriented shareholders).5
Hence, a social business is a new form of business that can be located somewhere between
a profit-maximizing and a non-profit organization. But why might investors put money into
such a business? The many billions of dollars that people around the world donated to charitable
causes every year demonstrate that people want to give money in a way that benefits other human
beings. However, as noted above, investing in a social business is different from philanthropy in
several ways e the social business is self-sustaining and investors get their money back: people
who donate to charity do not. The investor also remains the owner of the company and can
thus decide its future course of action, so that e as well as a chance to provide money e the social
business offers businesspeople an exciting opportunity to leverage their own business skills and
creativity to solve social problems.

Social business as business model innovation

The business model concept is currently attracting much attention from researchers, and seems use-
ful in offering guidance as how to create social businesses. However, despite ever-growing literature
on the business model concept, there is no consensus as to its definition. An in-depth analysis of
business model components in academic literature shows that, among the plethora of definitions,
three elements are usually distinguished: the product/service proposed to customers, the way the
company is organized so as to deliver this product and service to its customers, and the revenue
model. Some authors, however, focus on just some of these components: Chesbrough and
Rosembloom, for example, focus on the revenue model, whereas Zott and Amit focus on transac-
tions between the firm and its external constituents.6 We suggest that a business model has three
components, as shown in Figure 2.

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 311

 Value Proposition Value Constellation
• Customers • Internal value chain
• Product/service • External value chain

Profit Equation
• Sales revenues
• Cost structure
• Capital employed

Figure 2. The three components of a conventional business model

 a value proposition, that is, the answer to the question: ‘Who are our customers and what do we
offer to them that they value?’;
 a value constellation,7 that is, the answer to the question: ‘How do we deliver this offer to our
customers?’ This involves not only the company’s own value chain but also its value network
with its suppliers and partners.
These two components need to fit together like pieces of a puzzle in order to generate:
 a positive profit equation, which is the financial translation of the other two, and includes how
value is captured from the revenues generated through the value proposition, and how costs are
structured and capital employed in the value constellation.

The business model concept offers a consistent and integrated picture of a company and the way it
generates revenues and profit. But, as noted in our cases, Grameen’s creation of social businesses in
Bangladesh could not be based on simply replicating conventional for-profit business models. New
value propositions and new value constellations had to be created so as to match into a positive profit
equation, as illustrated in Table 1: in effect, building social businesses requires building new business
models.

How to build social business models

Business model innovation is about generating new sources of profit by finding novel value prop-
osition/value constellation combinations. Hence, we wondered what the literature on this phenom-
enon offers to our understanding of building social businesses. As mentioned before, five lessons
can be learned about the Grameen experiences: three are similar to those involved in conventional
business model innovation; two are more specific, as highlighted by Table 2.

Similarities between social and conventional business model innovation

Lesson 1: Challenging conventional wisdom
Most research on business model innovation underlines the radicalism of this type of innovation,
which is defined as the capacity to create new strategies which modify the rules of the competitive
game in an industry. This represents a major challenge for companies, as it entails questioning the
models that have previously led them to success. This in turn requires revisiting a number of basic
assumptions, and resembles what Argyris and Schön have described as ‘double loop’ learning.8 In
contrast to ‘single loop’ learning e which confines itself to changing strategies within an existing
framework e double-loop learning forces the organization to transform its fundamental references
and adopt new ones. The creation of Grameen Bank offers an insightful illustration as to how con-
ventional wisdom can be challenged: indeed, the questioning of the current rules of the game was at
the very heart of the bank’s foundation.

. questioning the current rules of the game was at the very heart of
Grameen Bank’s foundation.

312 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

Long Range Planning, vol 43

Table 1. Conventional social business model vs. social business model for Telenor, Veolia and Danone

Grameen Partner Conventional business model (predominantly in developed countries) Social business model
& sector
Value proposition Value constellation Value proposition Value constellation
2010

Telenor, telecom  Sale of a monthly package  Construction of a wireless  Caller borrows a phone when  Construction of a wireless
(phone + air time) to individual network needed and pays per minute network
consumers  Sale of package through retail  Grameen ladies own the phones,
buy discounted air time in bulk
and sell minutes to users as
needed
Veolia, water services  Maximum water quality  Water treatment factories with  Water quality that meets World  Construction of a simplified water
 Distributing water through taps a high level of technology, Health Organization standards plant to recycle surface water
located inside people’s homes recycling and purifying water (rather than US or European  Construction of the water supply
standards) network towards the fountains
 Village water fountains  New distribution channel for
 Prepaid card payment system isolated locations: rickshaws
driven by ‘Grameen Boys’
Danone, dairy products  High-end products  Centralized purchasing and  Low price  Local supply of raw products
 Emphasis on lifestyle production (economies of scale)  Fulfillment of basic nutritional  Local production
 Strong brand name through  Logistics towards distribution needs  Direct door-to-door sales by
advertisement platforms  Grameen brand image ‘Grameen ladies’
 Sales through food retailers  Limited storage by
 Storage by end consumers end-consumers
313
Table 2. Five lessons in building social businesses

Similarities with conventional business model innovation

1. Challenging conventional wisdom and basic assumptions
2. Finding complementary partners
3. Undertaking a continuous experimentation process
Specificities of social business models
4. Favoring social profit-oriented shareholders
5. Clearly specifying the social profit objective

It was Sufiya Begum, a woman from a village called Jobra, who taught Yunus (then an economics
professor) about the problem she encountered. Like many others in her village, she relied on the
local moneylender for the cash she needed to buy the bamboo for the stools she crafted. But he
would only give her the money if she agreed to sell him all she produced, and at a price he would
decide e which was ridiculously low. Thus, though hardworking, she was trapped in poverty e
altogether forty-two people in the village, who had borrowed a total amount of less than $27
from the moneylender, faced the same desperate situation. They could not borrow money from
conventional bankers since they had no credit histories and no collateral to offer, and could not
even fill out the necessary paperwork because they were illiterate. In the event Yunus lent them
the $27 from his own pocket: he recovered it e within a week. But despite evidence provided by
several other similar experiences, conventional bankers continued to be reluctant to consider
poor people as potential customers. They found it impossible to challenge their conventional wis-
dom e that loans could not be granted without collateral: so a dedicated bank had to be set up.
Grameen Bank’s business model reinvented the rules of the game. First, the value proposition of
the bank aims at lifting the poor out of poverty by making small loans sufficient to finance income-
generating businesses e rice-husking, machine repairing, purchasing rickshaws, buying milk cows,
goats, cloth, pottery and so on. Except in very extreme circumstances, interest is charged on all
loans. Second, the value constellation breaks away from bureaucratic control. Local Grameen
branch managers (a branch, typically, covers 15 to 22 villages) first visit the villages and identify
the prospective clientele, who are dealt with in groups of five. Only if the first two borrowers in
a group begin to repay the principal plus interest within six weeks do the other group members
become eligible for loans. Group support, peer pressure, self-interest and the motivation of bor-
rowers ensure that repayment rates on Grameen Bank loans remain high.
Grameen Bank’s business model therefore challenges several standard banking assumptions,
including the beliefs that loans cannot be granted without collateral and that ‘entrepreneurship’
is a rare quality among the poor. Conventional banks were unable to enter the double loop learning
process involved in adopting new frames of reference e but it is challenge that awaits all MNC’s
wanting to set up social businesses.

Lessons 2: Finding complementary partners

The second step in building social business models is to leverage expertise and resources by setting up
partnerships. Again, the need to be open to other players in the industry, and to players in other
industries, is covered in the business model innovation literature. The ideas developed by
Chesbrough e who called for businesses in technological environments to open up their own busi-
ness models to partner companies so as to benefit from new resources e can be applied to the context
of poverty.9 On a theoretical level, in contrast to the competitive paradigm, the cooperative paradigm
places most of its emphasis on collaboration,10 which allows organizations to gain access to new
resources they would otherwise have needed to either develop alone or purchase. The main advantage
of collaborative agreements lies in the pooling of resources and knowledge leveraged by the part-
ners,11 which may in turn lead to the development of a broader portfolio of resources for firms in
the network. Cooperation is considered as a major factor of success for pro-active CSR strategies,12
and research stresses the importance of long-term relationships among such actors.

314 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

 As the specific literature on business model innovation which aims at social benefits has already
shown,13 the Telenor example illustrates how setting up a collaborative partnership is a major step
in building social business models. The advantages are clear: Grameen had no experience in build-
ing a wireless phone network, while, for its part, Telenor had no experience of developing world
markets. Telenor benefited from Grameen’s knowledge of the country and the network of people
the bank had already built. This created a strong barrier against new entrants. The combination
of the two partners’ resources and skills led this successful venture, which offered a useful value
proposition to customers while also helping poor people become entrepreneurs and lift themselves
out of poverty.
Such partnerships between businesses and not-for-profit organizations can be highly productive
and low in risk, as they take place between actors who are not in direct competition with each
other.14 Having learned from past failures, the Grameen Group encourages partnerships with estab-
lished and skilled companies whenever possible. For example, several years ago the Group had
undertaken an experimental project to develop locally-produced weaning food to compete with
imported baby food. The product e Cerevit e was trial-marketed at a much lower price than
that of imported products, but did not succeed. One reason was that the project lacked the right
kind of partners to make it happen, a type of problem that was overcome in the Grameen Danone
case by partnering with an organization that could offer such knowledge.

Lesson 3: Undertaking continuous experimentation

Strategic experimentation is another recommendation from the business model innovation litera-
ture, where it is viewed as a specific type of knowledge acquisition.15 In effect, an existing firm im-
plementing this type of innovation is forced to imagine and learn new ways of doing business e the
changes need to be radical, and will question the firm’s conventional way of doing business. In the
‘classical’ strategic approach, most learning occurs in the preliminary phase of diagnosis through
analyses and studies. However, the fundamental nature of business model innovation means that
simple market studies or client surveys are inefficient and not very useful: the people surveyed
are unable to project themselves into this ‘radical newness’.16 Strategic experimentation offers
another route towards the required learning, and can be fundamental to solving problems where
solutions are uncertain, or when critical information sources are non-existent or unavailable.
Launching a series of small experiments helps minimize risk and maximize the firm’s rate of learn-
ing, making it possible to identify a strategy’s potential for success most efficiently.17

a series of small experiments minimizes risk and maximizes learning,

[this is] not intuition, but involves the ability (and intention) to make
changes if the first chosen path turns out unsuccessful
Thus, as for conventional business model innovation, social business models can start small, be
refined and then rolled out. Corporate world experts can provide the relevant tools for analyzing
the market and finding new outcomes, but analysis alone is not sufficient: only experimentation
can determine whether new business model will work out. Experimentation does not mean
intuition, but involves the ability (and intention) to make changes if the path first chosen turns
out unsuccessful. (This resembles the concept of ‘redirection’ noted in Thompson and MacMillan’s
article in this issue on building business models for generating societal wealth.18) The development
of the Veolia Grameen business model provides an interesting illustration. During the first stage of
operation, the factory will supply water to approximately 25,000 people, and its facilities will be
extended during a second stage, raising this figure to around 100,000, after which other factories
will be built throughout Bangladesh. This social business model is still under construction,
and e as with earlier Grameen trials e will need to be fine-tuned as it is implemented.

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 315

 Table 3 provides a summary analysis of our three cases which emphasizes the first three lessons
from business model innovation: how conventional wisdom needs to be challenged, how partner-
ships pay off, and how experimentation helps create a good road map for rolling out the concept.
The story behind each of our cases is of the gradual emergence of the social business concept: a self-
sustaining company that sells goods or services and repays its owners for their investments, but
whose primary purpose is to serve society and improve the lot of the poor. Such lessons lead to
the identification of the specificities of social business models.

Specific lessons for building social business models

Grameen Danone is considered to be the world’s first consciously-designed multinational social
business e an international business with a social mission but run as a for-profit organization e
so special lessons can be learned from this case. As noted earlier, building social business models
relies on some of the same strategic moves as conventional business model innovation. However,
the Grameen Danone example also illustrates the specificities of this type of business model: the
need to take all stakeholders (not just shareholders) into account and the need to define the social
profit expected from the social business.

Lesson 4: Favoring social profit-oriented shareholders

As noted above, more and more corporate managers are keen to launch CSR projects that seek to
help developing countries. But they face the problem that, even if such projects are small in terms of
the overall scale of the company, they still require resources. In the Danone case these resources
included both asset expenditure (for the factory) and valuable top management time. Since business
managers report to owners or shareholders, they must give profit the highest priority e reducing
profits to promote social welfare might leave owners and/or shareholders feeling cheated. Corporate
social responsibility could be viewed as corporate financial irresponsibility unless financial profit-
oriented shareholders can be shown that the incurred costs will turn into a positive cash flow in
the medium or long term.

Table 3. Building Social Business Models: Lessons 1 to 3

Lesson 1: Challenging conventional wisdom Lesson 2: Finding Lesson 3: Undertaking

partners experimentation
Basic assumption New recipe

Grameen Phone Buying power in The handset can be Telenor, the Norwe Grameen Phone
developing countries rented rather than gian incumbent extended the network
is too low to build owned step by step
a profitable wireless
network
Grameen Veolia In developed Water has to reach Veolia (French Fine-tuning of the
countries, water is minimal World company), one of the model in Goalmari
treated in high tech health organization’s global leaders in water
factories so as to be standards. It can be services
safe and is distributed distributed at public
inside’ people’s homes fountains
Grameen Danone A yogurt can only be Local production and Danone, one of the First plant in Bogra
affordable if produced door to door distribu- world’s leading healthy serving families
in large quantity and tion can lead to an food companies within a 30 km radius
distributed through easily available and
retail affordable dairy
product

316 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

 Despite the ever growing number of studies trying to measure the impact of CSR on financial
performance over the past thirty years (some list 52 such studies, others 127), researchers still argue
about the existence of a positive, negative or neutral link.19 These unclear outcomes stem from dif-
ferent shortcomings, including inappropriate constructs, methodological flaws or problems in the
definition of ‘performance’. More recent studies have taken these shortcomings into account and
attempted to correct them e but, as Barnett observes, ‘the link between CSR and financial perfor-
mance has become only murkier’.20
Even if we claim a positive link between CSR initiatives and corporate financial performance,
another debate remains, as Friedman’s advocates would argue that such a positive financial contri-
bution is not necessarily consistent with maximizing shareholders’ wealth. As the CEO of a pub-
licly-held company, Riboud is answerable to his Danone’s shareholders, but he risked being
unable to provide clear evidence of how the resources used in the Grameen Danone experiment
maximize value for them. So, in order to avoid alienating skeptical shareholders, Danone developed
another innovation by disconnecting the funding of Grameen Danone from the stock market. The
company created a publicly-trade mutual fund with a special mission e to give investors social ben-
efits rather than financial benefits e and gave Danone’s shareholders the option of joining if they
wished. V765 M has been raised so far, of which 20 has came from Danone. Over 25 percent of
Danone’s 8,000 employees in France have opted to invest part of their profit-share income into
the fund. 90 percent of the mutual fund’s assets will be invested in money-market instruments
yielding a predictable market rate of return; the remaining 10 percent will be invested in social busi-
nesses, which will pay no return. Taken together, these two pools of money will provide investors
with a near-market yield on their money, while at the same time supporting businesses that are
bringing specific social benefits to people in need. Although theoretically, a social business should
provide no annual return, this mutual fund is an acceptable and innovative way of financing social
businesses through the existing stock market.

the value proposition and value constellation of the social business

model must link all stakeholders, including shareholders who
understand and accept its social mission

This leads us to refine the social business model framework so it includes not only customers, sup-
pliers and other partners, but also shareholders who understand and accept the social mission of the
experiment. In building social business models, the value proposition and the value constellation
must be constructed through innovative links between all stakeholders, including shareholders.

Lesson 5: Specifying social profit objectives clearly

As is often the case in partnerships, cooperation can uncover conflicts between partners over time.
For example, the Grameen Group’s idea was to convert Grameen Phone into a complete social busi-
ness by giving the poor the majority of shares in the company so as to let them benefit from its
soaring profits e but Telenor refused to sell its shares. To avoid such problems, the mission of
Grameen Danone was established in detail at the beginning of the project.
When the objective is to build a social business, its business model must be shifted from tradi-
tional financial profit generation towards social profit generation. This is possible where only social
profit-oriented shareholders are involved in the project, but it makes the design of the business
model more difficult, since it must focus not only on financial profit, but on profit for all stake-
holders. Hence, while financial profit is implicit in conventional business model innovation, social
business models need to define their objectives clearly.
So Grameen Danone’s mission statement is very explicit: ‘to bring daily healthy nutrition to low
income, nutritionally deprived populations in Bangladesh and alleviate poverty through the

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 317

implementation of a unique proximity business model’. Several sources of social profit were targeted,
with two constraints: the need to limit the environmental impact of the operation, and the need
for it to become economically viable (full cost recovery constraint). Nutritional profit was the first
source. Shoktidoi yoghourt naturally contains calcium and proteins, and is expected to have
a strong nutritional impact on children aged 3 to 15 who eat it on a regular basis. There is
also an employment profit: jobs were created locally on the (one-person) micro-farms, at the fac-
tory, and in the distribution channels. Grameen Danone plans to create 3,000 micro-farms, while
the Bogra factory was conceived with the aim of creating local employment rather than using so-
phisticated machinery, so also avoiding recurrent equipment maintenance problems. The
Grameen ladies e local entrepreneurs already involved in collecting loan interest payments for
local Grameen Bank branches and selling Grameen Phone calls e have increased their income
by distributing the product. By developing local employment without competing with existing
networks, Grameen Danone is also helping fight against rural exodus, which is at the root of
many problems in developing countries. It is also important to add that these ‘profits’ have not
been achieved at the cost of compromising on the third ‘bottom line’ e environmental
issues e in fact, quite the opposite. Grameen Danone is particularly vigilant in implementing
its environmental policy, which focuses on ecological packaging and reduced energy use. Although
the cup in which the yogurt is contained is not (yet) edible, it is made out of PLA (Poly Lactic
Acid) which is elaborated from corn starch, and is designed to be completely biodegradable in
local climate conditions. Furthermore, the rickshaw vans used to distribute the product use no
natural gas or oil.

inherent and ongoing conflicts between the demands of economic and

social profit objectives are ‘facts of life’ for social businesses

The example of Grameen Danone shows that social and environmental goals do not necessarily
conflict with long-term economic goals. However, conflicts can appear at any point. As just one
example: in 2008 the rise in milk prices made it difficult for Grameen Danone to break-even, posing
the problem of which objective e the economic or the social profit e should be favored in such
a situation. Such questions highlight ‘facts of life’ for those designing or managing social business
models e conflicts of this type are inherent and ongoing, and represent yet another specificity of
social as compared to conventional business models.

The social business model framework

Drawing from these Grameen Group experiences, we can highlight the adjustments needed in
switching from a traditional to a social business model framework. The first change is the spec-
ification of targeted stakeholders, and the provision that the value proposition and constellation
are not focused solely on the customer, but are expanded to encompass all stakeholders. The sec-
ond is the definition of desired social profits through a comprehensive eco-system view, resulting
in a social profit equation. The third is that the economic profit equation targets only full recovery
of cost and of capital, and not financial profit maximization. These changes are illustrated by
Figure 3.
Our topic here has been limited to the social impact of social businesses; however it is important
to stress that the social business model can also be applied to environmental issues. Problems rang-
ing from climate change and water shortages to industrial pollution and high-priced energy, which
are mere nuisances to people in the North, pose life-and-death difficulties for those in the South.
These problems could also be addressed by social businesses using specific new social business
models.

318 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

 Social Profit Equation
• Social profit
• Environmental profit
• ...

Value Proposition Value Constellation

• Stakeholders • Internal value chain
• Product / service • External value chain

Economic Profit Equation

• Sales revenues
• Cost structure
• Capital employed
=> No economic loss (full
recovery of capital)

Figure 3. The four components of a social business model

Conclusion
By comparing the business model innovation literature and the Grameen experience, we have
shown five lessons that can be learned about building social business models. We have also designed
a social business model framework and demonstrated its value to our understanding of social busi-
nesses. We believe these findings not only concern MNC’s wishing to engage in pro-active CSR pol-
icies, but can also be generalized to all entrepreneurs seeking to create social businesses.
We consider this article as a first step in shaping the concept of the social business model, and
further field experiment and research are needed for researchers and practitioners to study and de-
velop this self-sustaining type of business. Indeed, many questions remain unsolved. For instance,
how should the performance of social businesses be assessed? While return on capital employed is
an accepted measure for conventional business models, social profit is difficult to measure with
such standard ratios. Relevant indicators will probably suffer from greater time lags than those
used in financial performance management: the impact of Shoktidoi yoghurt on children’s health,
for instance, will not become measurable for a couple of years. Certification procedures, such as the
one developed by the Global Reporting Initiative, might be helpful, but are still under construction.
However, we believe strongly there will be a growing interest in building social business models
for three main reasons. First, humans have an instinctive, natural desire to make life better for their
fellows if they can. Given the chance, people would rather live in a world without poverty, disease,
ignorance and needless suffering. These are the causes that lead people to donate billions of dollars
to charity every year, to launch NGOs and non-profit organizations, to volunteer countless hours to
community service, and (in some cases) to devote their careers to relatively low-paid work in the
social sector. The same drivers will lead many to create social businesses, once this new path is
widely recognized and understood.
Second, unlike conventional businesses, social businesses are not engaged in a contest. Their ob-
jectives are social, so they can learn from one another and best practices should spread rapidly. The
effort involved in creating and refining social business models is, in a sense, a ‘donation’: they are
unlikely to be seen as intellectual property in any sense, and so can be easily copied and rolled out
by other global partners e and may even merge to become a stronger social force in the world.
Last but not least, there is another set of reasons why these cases studies should encourage busi-
nesses to engage in this type of initiative. We believe, although small, these new ventures can play
prominent roles within MNCs. While disagreement remains as to their effects on firm performance,
several studies have found a positive relationship between CSR and firm reputation,21 while re-
search has also consistently demonstrated the advantageous effect of CSR initiatives on current
and prospective employees.22 Building social businesses could be seen as a ‘learning lab’, offering
an arena where managers can challenge their conventional wisdom and develop dynamic capabil-
ities that could in turn be helpful to an MNC’s main business.

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 319

 All these arguments speak in favor of the development of social business initiatives within estab-
lished companies, and suggest there should be a proliferation of social businesses through new or
duplicated business models. Research on this topic needs to go on e not only does it enhance our
understanding of pro-active CSR policies, but it also challenges our conventional approach to busi-
ness thinking. Indeed, introducing it into the capitalist system may save the system altogether, by
empowering it to address the overwhelming global concerns that currently remain outside main-
stream business thinking. In addition, as we highlight in this article, building social businesses
requires taking all stakeholders into account, a lesson that might also be usefully transferred to
MNCs’ conventional businesses, so as to contribute to a ‘post-crisis system’ where stakeholder value
maximization replaces shareholder value maximization. Taken altogether, research on social busi-
ness could be a factor in changing the capitalist system, by helping both academics and practitioners
to challenge the current dominant shareholder paradigm.
The findings in this article have emerged from the field, and in the specific context of shaping
current experiments at Grameen. So far, our findings cannot be generalized to theory: further em-
pirical inquiries need to be made into more social businesses, within and beyond the Grameen
Group. However, we hope our lessons and framework will become a vehicle for examining new
cases, so as to ultimately become a definite contribution to theory.

people would rather live in a world without poverty, disease and

needless suffering. Social businesses do not engage in contest . [and]
could be a learning lab where managers challenge conventional
wisdom and develop dynamic capabilities. [They] may become
a stronger social force in the world . [leading] to a ‘post-crisis system’
where stakeholder value replaces the shareholder paradigm.

Acknowledgements
We thank the Special Issue editors, Benoit Demil and Xavier Lecocq; the journal’s Editor-in-Chief,
Charles Baden-Fuller, and its anonymous reviewers for their guidance and encouragement. We
acknowledge the support of the Danone Chair in Social Business at HEC Paris. This article has also
benefitted from the encouragement and thoughtful comments of Amy Edmondson, Novartis
Professor of leadership and management at Harvard Business School.

Appendix 1. Case studies

Case study 1: Grameen phone
In 1996, in partnership with three foreign companies,23 the Grameen Bank created a mobile phone
company, Grameen Phone, to extend telephone services across Bangladesh, where it was one of four
companies licensed by the government to provide mobile phone services. With no land-line service
in most of the 80,000 villages in Bangladesh, mobile phone technology was essential to bring the
country into the age of electronic communication. A UK-based consultant estimated the market
in 2005 would be 250,000 mobile phones e in fact, it turned out to be about 8 million, and
grew to 40 million subscribers by 2008: by challenging conventional wisdom and rules of the
game, Grameen Phone had created a new market.

320 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

 In developed countries, individuals contract for a monthly package including the handset and air
time: this engagement ensures the profitability of the operator which, in turn, enables it to build the
telecoms infrastructure required. But poor people simply can’t afford this type of commitment. So,
relying on the shared know-how of its two partner companies, Grameen Phone developed another
business model, based on both a non-conventional value proposition and value constellation, which
turned out to be profitable even in rural areas, after having being tested in denser urban settings.
People who need to make connections with a friend, family member or business associate can bor-
row a phone and buy just a couple of minutes from the ‘Grameen Telephone ladies’ who provide
the phone service to their villages they, in turn use Grameen bank loans to buy the mobile phones
and bulk air time.
By mid-2007, Grameen Phone e now owned by Telenor (62%), the Norwegian telecoms incum-
bent, which had a total 2008 turnover of $4.8 billion, and Grameen Telecom (38%), a non-profit
company created specifically for this purpose, and run by experienced Telenor managers e had
become the largest tax-generating company in Bangladesh, with over twenty million subscribers.

Case study 2: Grameen Veolia

Veolia Water (a subsidiary of Veolia Environnement), is the world’s leading provider of water ser-
vices with a 2008 turnover of V12.6 billion. In March 2008, Veolia Water created a joint venture
with the Grameen Bank e Grameen Veolia e with the aim of providing affordable access to drink-
ing water for rural populations in Bangladesh, many of whom had previously been obliged either to
buy bottled water, or to drink polluted surface water or even water tainted with arsenic. For several
years previously, Veolia Water had been developing solutions to allow access to drinking water for
vulnerable people in urban areas, but had not yet tackled the problems of isolated rural areas. As
with other developed country water service operators, Veolia Water’s conventional business model
consisted of recycling and purifying unclean water and billing consumers for their water
consumption.
But the rural people of Bangladesh cannot afford water points in their own homes, so Veolia and
Grameen shared their knowledge and resources to experiment with a new business model. By the
end of 2008 they had built a factory and a whole water supply network in Goalmari, a fairly densely
populated rural area. The value proposition was to provide safe drinking water at an affordable
price to the inhabitants. The value constellation challenged Veolia’s conventional business model
in several ways. First, the cost of water treatment was to be reduced as much as possible in order
to offer the cheapest price, so the factory was kept simple, and it was decided to recycle surface wa-
ter as a less costly option. While the drinking water it produced would not meet current US or Eu-
ropean norms, it did nonetheless meet World Health Organization standards. Second, three
different water access modes needed to be implemented: inside people’s homes, at the village’s pub-
lic drinking fountain, or by distributing water cans, which were dispatched to the most isolated vil-
lages by rickshaws driven by Grameen-financed entrepreneurs (a distribution mode that was a first
for Veolia). Finally, new payment facilities needed to be implemented and a system of prepaid cards
is being established. Grameen Veolia is currently fine-tuning this business model, and expects to roll
it out over Bangladesh and other countries in the coming years.

Case study 3: Grameen Danone

Created in 2006, Grameen Danone is a 50-50 joint venture between the Grameen Group and the
French Groupe Danone, one of the world’s leading healthy food companies. (Number one in the
worldwide market for fresh dairy products and number two in bottled water, Danone had 2008 rev-
enue results of V15.2 billion.) Danone has been involved in a dual commitment to business success
and social responsibility for the past 30 years, over which its mission has evolved from: ‘bringing
health through food’ in early 2000 to ‘bringing health through food to a maximum number of people’
currently.
Echoing its two partners’ mission statements, Grameen Danone’s goal is to ‘help the children of Bangla-
desh to be healthy’ by offering them ‘a nutritious and healthy product which they may consume on a daily

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 321

basis’. The value proposition meant that, to be effective, its product had to be affordable e on a daily basis -
for poor families who represented a radically different target market from Danone’s conventional high-end
consumers. ‘Shoktidoi’ (literally, ‘yoghourt which makes one strong’) was created to achieve this goal. Made
from cow’s milk and date molasses enriched with micronutrients, Shoktidoi contains calcium and proteins
essential for children’s growth and bone strength. Thanks to its price e 6 BDT (approximately V6 cents)
per container e even the poorest Bangladeshi families could purchase it regularly.
The business model is still being fine-tuned. In terms of the value constellation, the whole value
chain again had to be questioned. The three main processes of the value constellation e supply,
production and distribution e needed to be radically revisited. Grameen Danone favored using lo-
cally available ingredients for several reasons: to reduce raw materials costs (no import fees, simpli-
fied logistics, etc.), to minimize fossil energy consumption (reduced transportation), and to
promote local community development and counter rural exodus. To avoid competing with other
milk purchasers, and so as to limit any increases in already high milk prices, Grameen Danone had
to structure the upstream market, and chose to develop micro-farms to form part of its own supply
network. Micro-credits were offered by the Grameen Bank to potential owners of dairy cattle, who
received a guaranteed annual fixed price and veterinary advice to help improve quality and output.
As far as production is concerned, the Grameen Danone factory at Bogra in northern Bangladesh is
small (500 square meters in surface area) and has a capacity which is approximately one thirtieth of
Danone’s typical European factory, so the production process has been simplified to the extreme
and slightly automated. Door-to-door distribution and sales are handled by the ‘Grameen ladies’,
who can reach 200 households per day and, although illiterate, have been trained to deliver a nutri-
tional message. Again, they act as small-scale entrepreneurs: they are not employees of Grameen
Danone but use credit from Grameen Bank to buy in their product stock and receive a commission
for each yoghourt they sell e unsold items are not taken back. As well as this door-to-door distri-
bution system, Grameen Danone sells Shoktidoi via existing (mostly food) stores.
The standard advertising model (press and television-based ad campaigns) was not deployable,
due to the lack of conventional media penetration in rural Bangladesh. But Grameen Danone
was fortunate to get the support of Zinedine Zidane, the internationally famous French soccer
player, who visited the factory and contributed to a spectacular launch for the brand.24 Grameen
Danone is still fine tuning its business model in Bogra; there is no doubt that through experimen-
tation, changes will occur to improve the current model.

Appendix 2. Research method

This research relies on a close collaboration between two academic researchers and a reflective prac-
titioner (the first author). The other two authors’ original research focus was on business model
innovation, particularly in established firms and low-tech industries, which led to an in-depth study
of about 30 cases. Their interviews with leaders involved in the process highlighted three main steps
of business model innovation from the literature: challenging conventional wisdom, finding
complementary partners and undertaking a continuous experimentation process.
They encountered the Grameen examples while looking for new case study possibilities. The idea
of the research was to confront conventional literature on business model innovation with the social
business experiences implemented by the Grameen Group, to test whether the Grameen experimen-
tations were actually business model innovation, and to find out if building social businesses resem-
bled conventional business model innovation. The most appropriate method seemed to be the case
study, since the objective was to highlight the process of building social businesses.25 As the liter-
atures on both business models and social businesses were nascent, a qualitative approach provided
the best methodological ‘fit’: thus, research relied on data collected through interviews, and its de-
sign implied an iterative, exploratory, back and forth process between the literature and the field.26
The three case studies were written based on narratives by the first author, the founder of the
Grameen Bank concept. These identified the three main steps in building social business models
as similar to those in business model innovation. However, this dialogue also showed that these

322 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

three steps did not completely explain success or failure in designing and building a social business
model e more data collection was needed. Contrasting the Telenor and Danone cases has been
particularly revealing. Although Grameen Phone has been a significant success as far as profit is
concerned, Grameen Phone has not been transformed into a ‘real’ social business, as much of its
profit continues to flow to for-profit shareholders rather than to mission-oriented stakeholders.
Grameen has learned from this failure to meet this element of its social objectives, and taken it
into account in building its venture with Danone. Thus, new data has emerged through extensive
interviews with managers involved in this venture (at Danone as well as those in the field in
Bangladesh). Less data is available about the Veolia case, which builds on Grameen’s experience
of the Danone venture, but is more recent and as yet less well advanced.
Analyzing this new primary source material has provided grounds for the two lessons more that
are specific to building social businesses: the need to actively try to source and recruit social profit-
oriented shareholders and to specify the social profit objective(s) clearly. These two additional steps
could not be found in the literature, since the phenomenon is only emerging, but allowed us to go
back to the theory and propose our social business model framework.

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Biographies
Muhammad Yunus, the founder and managing director of Grameen Bank, was born in Bangladesh and educated at
Dhaka University, and subsequently awarded a Fulbright scholarship to study economics at Vanderbilt University.
He served as a Chairman of the Economics Department at Chittagong University before devoting his life to
providing financial and social services to the poor. Yunus and Grameen Bank were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2006, and his book Banker to the Poor and Creating a World without Poverty has become a best-seller.
Mirpur Two, DHAKA 1216, Bangladesh. E-mail: [email protected]
Bertrand Moingeon is Professor of Strategic Management and Deputy Dean of HEC Paris. He is also a member of
the CNRS unit Greghec. He has written more than 60 refereed articles and book chapters on organizational
learning, change management, organizational identity and strategic innovation, and published several books in-
cluding Organizational Learning and Competitive Advantage (with Amy Edmondson, Sage, 1996) and Corporate and
Organizational Identities (with Guillaume Soenen, Routledge, 2002). He serves as expert adviser on governing

324 Building Social Business Models: the Grameen Experience

authorities (e.g. company administrations, government committees and editorial boards). HEC School of Man-
agement, 1, rue de la Libération 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, Paris, France Tel: +33139 677002 Fax: +33139 677430
E-mail: [email protected]
Laurence Lehmann-Ortega is an Affiliate Professor of Strategic Management at the HEC School of Management in
Paris specializing in Executive Education. After graduating from HEC, she worked as a consultant in strategy and
earned her Ph.D. in Management from the University of Aix en Provence in 2006. Her research focuses on strategic
innovation, especially in incumbent firms in mature and low-tech industries. In this context, she deals with
business model innovation as a response to sustainable development constraints and with its consequences in
multinational firms, in particular the learning process and the questioning of mental schemes. HEC School of
Management, 1, rue de la Libération 783510 Jouy-en-Josas, Paris, France. Tel: +33139 677002
E-mail: [email protected]

Long Range Planning, vol 43 2010 325

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