MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINESRELATIONS

The Issue ofSabah

ParidahAbd.Samad and
DarusalamAbu Bakar

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The levelof irritation in therelationshipbetweenMa-
laysia and the Philippinesis consideredunnaturalfor two immediate
neighborswho belongto a commonregionalgrouping.In normalcircum-
stances,theirregionalcommonality wouldhave servedas a catalystto ce-
mentand widen mutuallybeneficialties of friendship and cooperation.
Unfortunately, therelationship has been allowedto floatand continuesto
be markedbymutualsuspicionand distrust.The maincontributing factor
to thisdisturbing situationis thePhilippines'sclaimon Sabah, one ofMa-
laysia's 13 states. It is an issuethathas remainedunresolvedfornearly30
years.
On historicaland legal grounds,the administration of PresidentDios-
dado Macapagal officially initiatedthe Philippineclaim to Sabah (North
Borneoas theislandwas knownundercolonialrule)as it was aboutto be
incorporatedinto the proposedFederationof Malaysia. The claim was
relegatedto thesidelineswhenit becameentangledwithinthewidercon-
textoftheRepublicof Indonesia's"confrontation" withMalaysiaand the
Sukarnoregime'sthreatsto resortto militarymeansto crushthefledgling
nation. Upon termination of the confrontation,the disputeover Sabah
was carriedto Bangkok,wherebilateralnegotiations aimed at its resolu-
tionwereabruptlyaborted.In theUnitedNation'sGeneralAssembly,the
disputantsexchangedcontentiouschargesand countercharges.
Ironically,PresidentFerdinandMarcos recognizedthe formationof
Malaysia in 1966, soon afterhe took over politicalpowerin the Philip-
pines. With the inceptionof the five-member Associationof Southeast
Asian Nations(ASEAN), therewas a tacitagreementbetweenMalaysia

ParidahAbd. Samad is SeniorLecturer,School of Mass Communi-

cation,Mara InstituteofTechnology,Shah Alam, Selangor,Malaysia,and ResearchAssoci-
ate, Instituteof Strategicand International
Studies,Kuala Lumpur. Darusalam Abu Bakar
is Lecturer,School of Mass Communication, Mara Instituteof Technology.
? 1992 by The Regentsof the University
of California

554
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 555
and the Philippinesthat the issue be shelvedin the interestof regional
solidarity,and they agreed that it should be finallyresolvedthrough
ASEAN. However,in themorethan25 yearssinceASEAN's formation,
the Sabah dispute has never been an importantagenda item at any
ASEAN conference or meeting.Whileitsleadershavedepictedtheorgan-
izationas a panacea forexistingintraregional tensionsand disputes,they
have been disinclinedto considerthe Sabah matteras a potentialcatalyst
forASEAN disintegration.As a resultof otherdimensionsof regional

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cooperationthroughthis organization,which the two countriescannot
simplyignore,ASEAN has been able to contribute to softeningthepolit-
1
ical tension.
Whiletheimportanceof Sabah to the government in Manila lies in the
perceptionof Philippinehistoricaland legal interests,
internalpoliticalde-
velopments are amongtheimportant determining factorsin patterning the
crisis. The Muslimresistancein thesouthernPhilippines,thepoliticalin-
terestsof presentand formerleaders,deterioration of the country'spolit-
ical and economicperformance all contributed significantly
to hindering
the Philippinegovernment fromdroppingits claim to Sabah. This article
attemptsto describeand explainthepatternof relationsbetweenMalaysia
and thePhilippinesin thecontextoftheSabah dispute.The significance of
variousinternalpoliticaldevelopmentswill be relatedto the disputein
orderto understand how crisesdeveloped.We also examinetheprospects
forbilateralrelationsbetweenthe two countries,consideringthe options
and interestsof bothparties.

The Territorial
Dispute
While territorial jurisdictionover Sabah is foremostamonga numberof
disquietingissues in the relationshipbetweenMalaysia and the Philip-
pines,othersincludethe presenceof Filipinorefugeesand illegal immi-
grantsin Sabah, allegedSabah supportto the Moro National Liberation
Front(MNLF), piracyalongPhilippine-Malaysian borderwaters,overlap-
pingterritorial boundaries,territorial
intrusions,and theCorregidorissue.
The genesisof the main impediment to the normaland steadygrowthof
constructive relationsstartedin June1962 whenthe Philippinesofficially
filedits claim to Sabah.2

1. Paridah Abd. Samad, "InternalVariablesof RegionalConflictsin ASEAN's Interna-

tionalRelations,"IndonesianQuaarterly, Jakarta,April 1990,p. 171.
2. Discussionon genesisoftheSabah claimis in Malaya - Philippine
Relations,31stAugust
1957 to 15thSeptember1963 (Kuala Lumpur:Government of Malaysia, 1964); also in Lela
GarnerNoble,PhilippinePolicyTowardSabah: A Claim to Independence(Tucson: Univer-
sityof Arizona Press,Assn. forAsian Studies,1977).
 556 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO. 6, JUNE1992
Once a partof the Sultanateof Sulu, Sabah's land area exceeds29,000
square miles,smallerthanneighboring Mindanao by about 8,000 square
miles. Its centuries-old
tieswiththe Philippinesare indicatedby the fact
thatinhabitants ofbothcame fromthesame racialstockand have similar
customsand traditions.The Sultanof Bruneioriginallyruledthispartof
Borneo,but in 1704 the Sultanof Sulu helpedsuppressan uprisingthere
and,as a reward,NorthBorneowas cededto Sulu. Subsequently, Europe-
ans came to SoutheastAsia forthe valuable minerals,spices,and other

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richsourcesof revenue,and in 1878,two of theseenterprising merchants
leased NorthBorneofromthe sultanfor5,000 Malaysiandollars. Soon
theBritishNorthBorneoCompanywas formedand awardeda royalchar-
ter.3 In thecourseoflayingthegroundwork forPhilippineindependence,
the treatysignedin 1930 by the U.S. government and the BritishCrown
circumscribed theterritorial
jurisdictionof thePhilippineRepublic. This
treatydid notincludeSabah withintheboundariesof Spanish,American,
or Philippinejurisdiction.Then,a meresix daysafterthePhilippineswas
grantedits independence(July10, 1946),theBritishNorthBorneoCom-
panyturnedoverall its rightsand obligationsto the Britishgovernment,
whichin turnassertedfullsovereignrightsoverSabah throughtheNorth
BorneoCessionOrder.4
Therewas no advancementof Philippineclaimsto Sabah from1946 to
1962. Withinthatperiod,successiveadministrations conductedlow-keyed
investigationson themeritsofsucha claim,and a studyoftheseand other
documentsconvincedDiosdado Macapagal, thenchiefof the Legal Divi-
sionofthePhilippines'ForeignAffairs Department, thata claimon North
Borneo could be filed. The firstofficialPhilippineact on the matter-
House ResolutionNo. 42 adoptedon April28, 1950-stated explicitly that
NorthBorneobelongedto the heirsof the Sultanof Sulu and authorized
thepresident to conductnegotiations fortherestoration ofsovereignjuris-
diction.5But it was June1962 beforethe Philippinegovernment notified
the UnitedKingdomof its claim on Sabah, and the followingDecember
the two agreedto hold talkson theissue. The promulgation of theclaim
broughtthe Philippinesintodiplomaticconflictwiththe British,who re-
gardedit as a nuisancein relationto theirown plan to changethestatusof
North Borneo froma colonyinto a state of an expandedfederationof

3. Ting Ting Conjuangco,"Sabah: A Footnoteof History,"Manila Standard,3 August,

1990.
4. SantaninaT. Rasul, "The Resolutionof thePhilippineClaim to Sabah," ForeignRela-
tionsJournal(Manila), December 1988,p. 90.
5. Ibid., p. 89.
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 557
Malaysia.6 The Britishgovernment rejectedthe Philippinepositionin
view of the overridingneed to formthe Federal Republic of Malaysia,
ostensiblyto containcommunismin SoutheastAsia.7
At thefirstministerialconference on theclaim,heldin Londonin 1963,
a jointcommuniquewas issuedby theforeignministers ofMalaysia,Indo-
nesia,and thePhilippinesstatingthattheinclusionofNorthBorneoin the
FederationofMalaysia"wouldnotprejudiceeitherthePhilippineclaimor
any rightthereunder."Thisjoint statement was ratifiedby thepresidents

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of the threecountrieswhentheymetlaterthatyearin Manila, and Ma-
capagal's participationin itjeopardizedthePhilippineclaimto Sabah. In
any case, the Federationof Malaysia came intobeingon September16,
1963,and due to thephysicalpossessionof Sabah by Malaysia,thePhilip-
pine government refusedto accord diplomaticrecognition, contraryto its
solemncommitment in the Manila Agreement.When Soekarnostarted
his "confrontation" againstMalaysia,Manila reduceditsrepresentation in
Kuala Lumpurto consularlevel.8
Variousunsuccessful effortsweremade to reconcilethePhilippinesand
Malaysiauntilthetwofinallyagreedto restorefulldiplomaticrelationsin
June 1966. Both countrieshave since tried to keep theirrelationship
friendly,usingASEAN as a cornerstone of theirforeignpolicies. They
have agreedto cooperatein theeradicationofsmuggling, subsequentlyen-
teringintoan Anti-Smuggling Pact and a Protocolon BorderCrossing.In
March 1967,the Philippinegovernment was invitedto send observersto
witnessthe firstdirectelectionsin Sabah, but Manila refusedon the
groundsthatthismightprejudiceitspositionon theclaim. The refusaldid
not,however,impedetheparticipation of thePhilippinesand Malaysiain
theformation ofASEAN in August1967,and thefollowing JanuaryPres-
identMarcosand hiswifepaid a statevisitto Kuala Lumpur. But deterio-
rationin bilateralties,again involvingSabah, led to a rupturein relations
in 1969. The Philippines'sinstitutionalization of theclaimthroughenact-
mentof RepublicAct 5546 incorporating Sabah as partof theterritoryof
the Philippinestriggered Malaysiansuspensionof diplomaticties.9 How-
ever,in the spiritof regionalcooperation,relationswererestoredon De-
cember16, 1969,duringASEAN's thirdministerial conference.
PresidentMarcos made a dramaticmovetowardnormalization ofbilat-
eral relationsin 1976,just priorto an ASEAN summitmeeting,whenhe

6. MichaelLeifer,TheForeignRelationsoftheNewStates(Camberwell:LongmanAustra-
lia, Pty.,Ltd., 1974),p. 62.
7. SantaninaT. Rasul, "Resolutionof the Claim," p. 91.
8. Afalaya-PhilippineRelations,op. cit.
9. Malaysia's Ambassadorto thePhilippinesEman Datuk Mohd. Hanif,Malaysia-Philip-
September1989.
pine Relations,paperdeliveredat Ateneode Manila University,
 558 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO. 6, JUNE1992
statedthatthe Philippinesno longerintendedto pressits claim to sover-
eigntyover Sabah, thoughhe did not officially drop it. The pronounce-
ment, however, was never followed by any concrete action. The
heighteningMuslimrebellionin thesouthernPhilippinesappearedto hin-
derthegovernment fromformally implementing thepolicy.10 The dispute
draggedon into the Aquino administration, which triedto resolvethe
problemthroughrevisinglegal and constitutional provisionsin orderto
drop theclaim.11The PhilippineConstitution of 1987 no longerincludes

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the phrase"by historicaland legal rights"as partof the definition
of the
nationalterritory.Also, Senate Bill No. 206, redefiningthe archipelagic
boundariesof the Philippines,called foramendmentsto Republic Acts
5546 and 3046, and it particularlyexcludedSabah fromPhilippineterri-
tory. However,Sultan JamalulKiram III's denouncement of Aquino's
government forendorsingthebill withoutconsultinghim12and bungling
by the newlyinstalledadministration keptthe bill fromgettingthrough
theSenate,denyingMrs. Aquino a diplomaticvictoryat theASEAN sum-
mitin December1987.

The Moro Connection

The Philippinescannotjust drop its claim to Sabah in orderto patchup
differences with Malaysia, as it mustfirstconsiderthe repercussions of
such a decisionon the politicallyunstableSulu Archipelago.Sabah and
Moro are interrelated in prolonging settlementof thedisputeand in deep-
eningthesecurityconcernsofthePhilippinegovernment. SinceSabah has
a total land area of 74,398 square kilometresand is only 10 milesfrom
Sulu, it is a Philippinesecurityconcern. Controlof the northerntip of
Borneo by an unfriendly powerwould constitutea seriousthreatto the
country.Such concernsmay have movedPresidentMacapagal on April
20, 1963,to writeto PresidentJohnF. Kennedystressingthe importance
of NorthBorneo(Sabah) as vitalto the securityof the Philippines.
Malaysia has been implicatedin theMuslimconflicts in thePhilippines
fromthe beginning.Sabah's ruler,Tun Mustapha,who was himselfa
Taudug-the ethnicgroup domiciledprimarilyin the Sulu Archipelago
and fromwhichMNLF leaderNur Misuaricame-was suspectedby the
Philippinesof tolerating, even assistingthe provisionof militarysupplies

10. Philippine/Malaysia:The Sabah Dispute,Asia ResearchBulletin,Singapore,August,

1977,p. 359.
11. New StraitsTimes,Kuala Lumpur,6 June1986.
12. ImpactInternational(Muslim news magazine),London,December 1987; Star, 9, 12
July1986; and BangkokPost,21 November,1987.
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 559
to the Muslim rebelsand providingsanctuaryfor Moro fighters.13As
chiefminister ofSabah,Tun Datu MustaphaallegedlyallowedSabah to be
used, during1972-76,as a trainingcamp, supplydepot,communication
center,and sanctuary.He also allegedlyallowed the Moro rebelsto ac-
quiremotorboats in Sabah to be used to smugglearmsand ammunition to
the rebelsin Mindanao and to bringrebel casualtiesback to Sabah for
treatment.Sabah was allegedto have becomea refugefordisplayedMo-
ros,and in 1983it was estimatedthatbetween160,000and 200,000evacu-

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ees werelivingthere.14
However,Tun Datu Mustapha's United Sabah National Organisation
(USNO) was defeatedin theApril 1976election,partlybecausenon-Mus-
lim SabahansfeltthatthepresenceoflargenumbersofMoros in Sabah as
a resultof the policyof accommodationhad adversepoliticaland social
implications.The predominantly non-MuslimKadazans fearedthat the
influxof Moros wouldjeopardizetheirpoliticaland culturalstatus,and
theyperceivedthetoleranceshownto theMoros as partofa policyaimed
at restructuringthe communalbalance in Malaysia. Tun Mustaphawas
replacedby Datuk HarrisSalleh in 1976,duringwhoseperiodMalaysian-
Philippinerelationsremainedmoreor less stable. The presentchiefminis-
terofSabah, Datuk PairinKitingan,has notrevivedTun Mustapha'spol-
icy of accommodation.In October 1980, PhilippineAdmiral Romulo
Espaldo claimedthattheMalaysiangovernment was tolerating
secession-
ist Moro trainingcamps in Sabah. In November1981,formerPhilippine
DefenseMinisterJuanPonce Enrilereferred to "anti-governmentactivi-
ties" in Sabah, primarilyof the PhilippineDemocraticSocialistParty,
whichwas usingthe stateas a "southernbackdoor: commuting between
Sulu and Sabah." Sometimein 1969,cadresoftheMNLF werediscovered
to be undergoing trainingin Lahad Datu and Bangueyislandsin Sabah,as
wellas in Pulau Pangkorin Malaysia. Malaysianofficials wereaccusedof
havingknowledgeoftheiractivities.In April 1982,a televisiondocumen-
tarywas airedin AustraliawhichclaimedthatBritishand Australianmer-
cenaries were trainingFilipino Muslim guerrillasin Malaysian jungle
camps underthe financing of LibyanstrongmanMuammarGhaddafi.15
The Malaysiangovernment has neverpubliclyadmitteditsinvolvement
in theMoro struggle.But one thingis certain:Malaysianassistancegave
the essentialincentiveto theMoro separatists.The supportof Sabah and

13. David Wurfel,FilipinoPolitics:Development

and Decay (Quezon City: 1988),p. 183;
New StraitsTimes,11 March 1974.
14. Author'sdiscussionwithpersonnelfromthePhilippineAuthority in September1990,
Manila.
15. Hans H. Indorf,Impedimentto Regionalismin SoutheastAsia: BilateralConstraints
AmongASEAN MemberStates,(Singapore:ISEAS, 1984), p. 26.
 560 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO. 6, JUNE1992
otherMalaysianMuslimsectorsenabledtheMoros to elevatethelevelof
conflictfroma fightforequalityandjusticeto a warofliberation, demand-
ing self-determination. AlthoughSabah's supportunderPairinKitingan
has diminished,an importantrole played by Tunku Abdul Rahman in
1970 in promoting international supportfortheMoro cause stillhas con-
temporary significance.As secretary-general of theOIC (Organizationof
Islamic Countries),he endorsedthe Moro case submittedto him in 1972
and asked King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and PresidentGhaddafito help in

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persuadingotherOIC memberstatesto supportit. For thefirsttime,the
case of theMuslimsin thePhilippineswas takenup by theOIC. Malay-
sian involvement in supporting theMoros was notso muchbased on their
commitment to religiousdutyas to pressurethePhilippinegovernment to
drop its claim on Sabah.
Geographicalproximity as well as ethnicand religioustiesbetweenthe
Muslim people of Sabah and the Philippinesallow easy transmigration.
These factorshave givenpiratesvirtuallyfreereinin borderwaters,and
the problemhas becomeserious,especiallyin the coastal areas of Lahad
Datu. It was officially reportedthatsince 1979 therehave been at least
eightmajorpirate raids at sea, thebloodiestof whichoccurredin August
1984 in which33 peoplewerekilledand Filipinopirateslandedon Lahad
Datu and robbedtheStandardCharteredBank and theMalaysianAirline
Systemoffice, leaving10 dead and 11 wounded. In an ensuingaction,the
PhilippinesclaimedMalaysianforcesattackedFilipinoson Maldanas Is-
land in theTawi-Tawigroup,duringwhich53 residentswereeitherkilled,
injured,or takenas hostages.The possibility ofMalaysianintrusions was
brieflyraisedin Manila butquicklydeniedin Kuala Lumpur.16 Such inci-
dentshave continuedtimeand again,each one loweringthe levelof har-
monybetweenthe two countries.

Overlapping Territorial
Boundaries
of
The problem overlapping maritime boundariesis not confinedto the
easternwatersbut extendsto the Spratlys,an archipelagothatoccupiesa
strategiccrossroadbetweentheIndian Ocean and thewesternPacificand
commandsthe southernentranceto the SouthChina Sea. The phenome-
non can be explainedbypoorknowledgeofthemaritime boundariesofthe
Sabah-Sulumaritimeregion,relatedto an unusualset of theoriesdelimit-
ingthePhilippinesthatare ratheruniquebut confusing at thesame time.
This confusionis further compoundedby the presenceof a myriadof is-
lands, islets,and reefsin the Sabah-Sulumaritimezone wheremaritime

in September1990,
16. Author'sdiscussionwithpersonnelfromthePhilippineAuthority
Manila.
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 561
boundarieshave not been strictlyadministered in the past. The colonial
treatiesalso clash withtheprovisionsof themostrecent1982 Convention
of the Law of the Sea.17
The disputeoverthe Spratlyswill be even moredifficult to resolvebe-
cause it involvesnot only Malaysia and the Philippinesbut also China,
Taiwan,and Vietnam,who have made similarclaims. Althoughmaritime
boundarieshave been drawnby some partiesin the Spratlys,it is not so
mucha matterof delimiting boundariesas it is claimsby the contending

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parties.18 As of May 1988,Vietnameseforceswereoccupying21 islands
in theSpratlygroup,thePhilippines8, China 7, Malaysia 3 and Taiwan 1
(claimsexceedactual physicaloccupation). Vietnamand China insiston
theirrightto theentirearchipelago,whiletheotherthreeclaimantshave
morelimiteddemands.Publicly,all fivecountrieshaveexpresseda prefer-
ence fora negotiatedsolutionwhilecontinuing to emphasizetheirinviola-
ble rightto theircurrentpossessionsand to strengthen theirmilitary
patrols.The situationis, therefore, anomalousand adherenceto thestatus
quo can onlybe a temporary accommodation. 19
Thus,it is not an easy taskforMalaysiaand thePhilippinesto sortout
the Spratlysproblem.In 1979,whenMalaysia publishedthemostrecent
map of its nationalterritory, seven cays and reefsof the Spratlygroup
were includeddespitethe protestsof its neighbors.Four yearslater,in
September1983,20 commandosfromMalaysialandedon Layang-Layang
atollto establisha permanent Malaysianpresencethere.The reefis 198.4
milesoffSabah and thusfallswithinMalaysia'sExclusiveEconomicZone
(EEZ), whichmayexplaintheactionbutnotnecessarily justifytheterrito-
rial acquisition.Stillat issue is AmboynaCay, 40 milesfromthe Malay-
sian-heldatoll and currently underVietnamesecontrol.20
Meanwhile,the interestsof the Philippinesin the Spratlysmay have
originatedbecause of a privateinitiative.ShortlyafterWorld War Two,
Tomas Cloma,a Manila-basedbusinessman, organizedseveralexpeditions
to theSpratlys.The Philippinegovernment failedto supporthis claimsof
discoverybut in 1955 announcedits own formalrightswithoutestablish-
inga presenceon theislands. By 1968,thePhilippineshad troopson five
islands and todaycontroleight,whichhave been renamedthe Kalayan
(freedom)islandsand incorporated intoPalawan Provinceas a municipal-

17. Lee Yong Leng, TheMalaysian-PhilippineMaritimeDispute(Singapore:ISEAS, June

1989), p. 61.
18. B. A. Hamzah, "Jurisdictional Claimsin theSpratlys,"Foreign
Issues and Conflicting
RelationsJournal,Manila, March 1990,p. 1.
(Manila:
19. Hans H. Indorf,TheSpratlys:A TestCaseforthe US'Bases in thePhilippines
IISS/CRC, 1989), p. 2.
20. Ibid., p. 3.
 562 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO.6, JUNE1992
ity. Subsequently, oil explorationby the Reed Bank consolidatedPhilip-
pineeconomicinterests.Meanwhile,theapplicationoftheLaw oftheSea
archipelagicconceptextendedPhilippineterritorial watersand solidified
its claimof legitimacy.21 In response,Malaysiasenta strongprotestnote
to the Philippinesstressingnon-recognition of the Philippineclaim and
reaffirmingMalaysiansovereignty over the southernportionof Kalayan.
While Malaysia declaredthe disputedarea as partof its EEZ, thePhilip-
pinesclaimedthatthesaid area is withinPhilippineterritory based on the

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200-mileextensionruleas providedforin theUN Conventionon theLaw
of theSea to whichbothcountriesare signatories.The seriousnessof the
problemofoverlapping territories
was demonstrated by theMalaysianau-
thoritieswhen49 Filipinocrewmemberswereapprehendedin April 1988,
allegedlyforillegalfishingnear Rizal Reef.22
While the two countrieshave initiatedtalkson resolutionof theirdis-
putedterritorial boundaries,the effortshave provedunsuccessful.Three
roundsof talkson maritimeclaimsheld in 1989 failedto reachany con-
creteagreement.

AccusationofMalaysianIntrusions
The relationship betweenthe two countriesis further exacerbatedby the
Philippineaccusationof severalintrusions by Malaysiannaval vesselsand
aircraftintoPhilippineairspaceand territory, particularlyin the vicinity
of Langaan,Taganak,Turtle,Balabac islandsPalawan, and adjoiningar-
eas. In 1980, 18 instrusions
wereallegedto have been committed by Ma-
laysiannaval vesselsin themonthofAprilwhena MalaysianAir Force C-
130 violatedPhilippineairspaceand twicebuzzed a PhilippineNavy ship.
In September1988,some membersof thePhilippineNavy and theSenate
nearlyprovokeda seriousdiplomaticrowwithMalaysiawhen,misreading
a Malaysianmap, theyerroneouslyassumedthatthe Malaysiangovern-
mentwas poised to annex some of the islandsof the Tawi-Tawigroup.
The erroneousreportof Malaysian instrusions into Philippinewatersin
theSulu islandsled to an anti-Malaysiatiradein theFilipinopress. Mala-
canangPalace keptitscomposurethroughout theepisode,butnotwithout
losingfaceovertheunjustaccusation. The publicapologyissuedthereaf-
terby the erringpartydid littleto compensateforthe bad publicitythat
was created. Notwithstanding the factthat both statesare membersof
ASEAN, such blames of instrusionshave furtherstrainedrelationsbe-
tweenthem.

21. Ibid.
22. Lee Yong Leng, op. cit.,p. 61-73.
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 563
FilipinoRefugeesand Illegal Immigrants in Sabah
The presenceof Filipinorefugeesand illegalimmigrants in Sabah is per-
ceivedas insignificant in thecontextof sensitiverelationsbetweenMalay-
sia and the Philippines.The transmigration of mostlyFilipino Muslim
refugeesto Sabah has put the Philippinesin a favorablepositionbecause
thishas significantlycontributed to reducingtheMuslimpopulationratio
and its resistancestrength.
The movement ofFilipinorefugees to Sabah beganjust afterthedeclara-

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tionof martiallaw in thePhilippinesand theoutbreakof the secessionist
movementspearheadedby the Moro NationalLiberationFront. The mi-
grationreachedits peak at theheightof thesecessionistproblemin 1974-
75. Immediatelyfollowingthe signingof the TripoliAgreementbetween
thePhilippinegovernment and theMNLF in 1976,Muslimentryto Sabah
decreasedrelatively.However,anotherwave of Filipinoimmigrants ar-
rivedin Sabah in 1980,largelyin searchoftradingandjob opportunities as
a resultof the decliningeconomicperformance in the Philippines.
Initially,theMalaysianfederalgovernment appearedto freelyallow Fil-
ipino migrationto Sabah, grantingrefugeestatus on humanitarian
grounds.In 1976,however,theSabah stategovernment undertheruling
Berjaya Party formallyadopted a policy designedto help the Filipino
Muslimrefugees alreadyin thestateto settle,butit ruledout all thosewho
arrivedafter1976who wereconsideredillegalimmigrants.Then,in April
1985,undertheleadershipofChiefMinisterPairinKitingan,Sabah tooka
toughstancetowardstherefugees.Kitingan,a strongChristian, expressed
hisbeliefthattheinfluxofrefugees shouldbe controlledregardlessoftheir
race,religionor countryoforiginin theinterests of nationalsecurity,and
that Filipinorefugeesmustbe eventuallyrepatriatedsince theynot only
deprivesomeSabahansofjob opportunities butalso pose a serioussecurity
problemto the state,apparentlyreferring to the alleged involvement of
Filipinosin the seriesof demonstrations, fireand bombingincidentspro-
testinghis new stategovernment in Sabah in March 1986. Consequently,
in July1988thestategovernment startedto implement a newimmigration
policyunderwhichall foreignnationalswho enterSabah withoutproper
traveldocumentsfacedeportation.The stategovernment stressedthatall
Filipino entrantsmust securethe necessarytraveldocumentsand work
cards,and thosewithno regularemployment and who cannotsecurework
permitswouldbe arrestedand subsequently repatriated to thePhilippines.
Illegal entrantsweregivenup to December31, 1988,to legalizetheirsta-
tus. Sabah's Immigration Officedisclosedthatabout4,281 Filipinoswere
 564 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO. 6, JUNE1992
deportedfromthe East Malaysian state duringthe firstfivemonthsof
1989,amongthe 11,912detainedduringthe same period.23

Resolvingthe Disputes
The Sabah issue appears to be the main irritantto Malaysia-Philippine
relationsand it has functioned as an important sourceof deteriorationon
othereven minorissues of dispute. As a result,politicalrelationshave
been stunted,markedby sensitivity, mutualsuspicionand distrust.For

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Malaysia,theserelationsare in deep contrastto thosewithotherneigh-
bors,whereperiodicconsultations betweentheheads of government, min-
isters and senior officialshave been an institutionalized practice and
exchangedvisitsencouragegreaterunderstanding and friendship.Equally
absentare any kindsof formaland informalarrangements in almostall
areas of cooperation.
It is vital in generatinga nationalconsensuson the issue thatit lead
towardsthe formulations of an effective strategyforresolvingthe Philip-
pine claim to Sabah. Resolutionof thisdisputeis expectedto providean
impetusto theprocessof settlingothersensitiveissues. The adventofthe
Aquino administration in 1986and itsresolutionto droptheclaimoffered
a freshimpetusfortheenhancement ofrelations.This positivegesturewas
well-received by the government in Malaysia,and it reciprocatedby ac-
commodating Philippineinterests withseveralagreements thatwould ex-
pand thescope of cooperationbetweenthesetwo countriesonce theclaim
is satisfactorilyresolved.But Malaysia'soptimismand hope fora newand
brighterchapter in Malaysia-Philippinerelations remain unfulfilled.
WhiletheAquino administration made theeffort and tooktheinitiativeto
drop the sovereignty claim on Sabah, it was unable to push throughits
initiativebecause of stumblingblocks. Senate Bill 206, which excludes
Sabah fromPhilippineterritory, remainsunenacted.
At thisstage,the achievements in resolvingthe Sabah issuesare mini-
mal and theopportunities lost,considerable.Politicalcooperationand in-
teractionon mattersofmutualinterests havebeenalmostnon-existent and
overallrelationssadly devoid of substance. These two governments sel-
domconsulteach otheron bilateralmattersthatwouldnormallyhaveben-
efitedboth, and thirtyyears of the unsettledSabah disputereflectthe
absenceof any specificformulaforresolutionthatwould not jeopardize
thenationalintegrity of bothparties.The Philippines'snationalinterests,
the rightsand the requirement of its claim,its dilemmaover Sabah, the
possibilitiesof stepstowardsresolutionof the disputeall should be well

in December1990,
23. Author'sdiscussionwithpersonnelfromtheMalaysianAuthority
Kuala Lumpur.
 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 565
understood.Understanding is the onlysound basis fora consensuseven
thoughthiscould put Malaysia in bothan advantageousand disadvanta-
geous position.
Otherrestraints thatcontribute to thedifficultyto theSabah claimreso-
lutionshouldbe relatedto thenatureofFilipinoperceptionofitsnational
pride. The claim was demonstration of the Philippineabilityto act inde-
pendentlyto protectwhat is definedas Philippineinterests,rightsand
honor,henceto improvethenationalimage. The politicalfactorsaffecting

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the Philippinepolicyare complex. Besidesexaminingthe connectionbe-
tween Filipino perceptionsof the relationshipbetweentheirpursuitof
claim and theirnationalimage,one of the mostsignificant aspectsof the
Philippinesystemof pluralismshouldbe consideredin understanding the
processof solvingthedispute.The systembased itslegitimacy
difficult on
democraticprinciples.Roles and responsibilities wereconstitutionally al-
locatedand checked,electionsprovidedregularopportunities forselection
and replacement of majordecisionmakers, guaranteeof freespeech,press
and assemblyallowed constantreviewand commentary.As a conse-
quence,an extraordinary largenumberof people,groupsand institutions
wereinvolvedat everystageof policymaking,whichmade it difficult for
theauthority to resolvetheproblem.Indeed,whateverefforts mighthave
been exertedto pursuethe Philippineclaims to sovereignty over Sabah
may have been practicallyimpairedby the country'smilitaryand eco-
nomicdebility.It cannotaffordto go to battlein circumstances whereit
does not have the necessarylogisticand finances,and the government is
besetby pocketsof rebellionand secession.
In the situationfacingboth parties,Malaysia must state its position
clearlythat the sovereignty claim to the state of Sabah mustbe finally
resolved.The prolongation of the Sabah claim would be self-serving and
in no way contributes to the long-term interestsof eithercountry.The
prospectsforthe 1990's,therefore, dependverymuchon how the Philip-
pinescontinuesto approachand perceivethisproblem.Malaysia,mean-
while,will continueto facean uncertainprospectin its relationswiththe
Philippinesshould the administration be unable to resolvethe claim by
May 1992 since it is difficult to speculatehow the next administration
wouldchooseto handlethisthornyproblemin theconductofitsrelations
withMalaysia.

The PresentPredicament
The positionofthePhilippinesin notactivelypursuingtheclaimis a con-
cretestepforits government to maintainits nationalimage. It has lefta
mutualsuspicionand distrustthateitherstagnatesor exaggerates thepres-
entpatternofbilateralties. This optionhas seemedto ignoretherepercus-
 566 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXII,NO. 6, JUNE1992
sion of a protractedand possiblydeeperPhilippine-Malaysia rift.Though
it has beensaid thatthePhilippinesdoes notstandto gainor lose anything
fromthepreservation ofthestatusquo in Sabah,thekindofinactionbeing
adoptedby the Philippinegovernment over the issue may,in fact,entail
the loss of a numberof opportunities.In the meantime,whilethe status
quo remains,Malaysia will continueto benefitexclusivelyfromtheboun-
tiesof Sabah and thesurrounding waters. More significant though,while
thecostofthemaintenance ofthestatusquo is minimal,non-resolution of

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theclaimwouldcontinueto be a hindranceto widerintra-ASEANcooper-
ation.
Sinceno law has yetbeenpassedon thedroppingoftheSabah claim,the
Philippinegovernment still has the optionto activelypursuethe claim
throughinternationally acceptednormsthatincludeadjudicationby the
International Courtof Justiceand bilateralnegotiations.By pursuingthe
claim,thePhilippinegovernment could promotethePhilippines'shistoric
rightsand legal titleover Sabah as well as the proprietary rightsof the
heirsoftheSultanofSulu. However,the 1930treatybetweentheU.S. and
GreatBritaindrewa preciseboundaryto separatetheirislandpossessions
offthenortheastcoast ofSabah. The allocationofislandsdefinedin these
treatieswas enshrinedin ArticleI of thePhilippineConstitution of 1935.
Philippinediplomaticblundersover the Sabah issue have not made its
claimany easierto pursue. Duringpast negotiations forthesettlement of
the dispute,the Philippinepanel usuallyfacedits Malaysiancounterpart
withoutadequate preparation, resultingin a publicdisplayof diplomatic
inefficiency. The Philippinenegotiators' embarrassing unpreparedness did
not stem fromtheirlack of comprehensive knowledgeof the issue in-
volved,butrather,thedearthofconsensusbetweenitsexecutiveand legis-
lativebranchesthatkeptthemfrompresenting a cohesivestand.24More
seriouslystill,by continuallyhesitating on whatit shoulddo to settlethe
dispute,thePhilippinegovernment has let Malaysiascorevaluablepropa-
ganda pointsin the eyesof international observers.The Philippineclaim
has no knowninternational supportwhileMalaysia is morallysupported
by GreatBritainand theCommonwealth ofNationsin rejecting theclaim.
Even the UnitedStateshas assumeda positionof neutrality.The other
ASEAN countries,thoughdiscreetly distancingthemselves fromtheissue
since it involvestwo of theirfellowmembers,also seem to silentlyac-
knowledgeMalaysia'srightto thedisputedterritory. For the Philippines
to dropitsclaimto Sabah withoutconcessionswouldmeanoutright recog-
nitionof Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah. Taking this positionmight

24. WilfredoG. Reyes,and Abel. Icatlo, op. cit.

 PARIDAH ABD. SAMAD AND DARUSALAM ABU BAKAR 567
also jeopardize the proprietary rightsof the Sultan of Sulu. In general,
choosingthisoptionappearsto be damagingto nationalintegrity.
The Malaysiangovernment considerstheSabah disputeas a creationof
the Philippineside and henceany effort towardsits resolutionobviously
wouldhaveto be initiatedbythePhilippines.For itspart,Malaysiaagrees
to negotiateto findwaysand meansto resolvethedisputeonce and forall,
and it has monitoredcloselyeveryeffort by thePhilippineadministration
on thisissue and welcomedany definitive step takenby the Philippines.

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At besttheMalaysianadministration is at themomentindulgingin a wait
and see attitude,and will respondaccordinglywhen the Philippinesis
morereadyeitherto pursuetheclaimmoreseriouslyor abandonit. How-
ever,in Malaysianwillingnessto assistthe Philippinesovercomewhat is
essentiallythePhilippines'own problem,theMalaysiangovernment is go-
ing beyondits formerly held positionand, to an extent,evenagainstcur-
rentpublicopinion.
As regardsthetensionson theoverlapping EEZ, Malaysiahas indicated
its readinessto negotiatean interimmeasurewiththe Philippines.This
mayneeddiscussionsat thehighestpoliticallevel,buton thisissueMalay-
sia has clearlystatedthattheyshouldbe conductedwithoutanyprecondi-
tion or linkage to the Sabah dispute. Malaysia has also indicatedits
readinessto extendthe 1987treatyoffriendship and cooperationwiththe
Philippines,especiallyon the agreementon bordercrossingand border
patrol. It furthergave a solemncommitment to satisfactorily
resolvethe
proprietary claim with the recognizedSulu heirs once the sovereignty
claim is legallyand finallydropped. It sees no linkagewhateverbetween
the two claims. In its initiativeto solve the problemof Sabah, Malaysia
has alwaysinsistedthatsovereignty and proprietary rightsoverSabah are
twoseparatequestions.Malaysiaaversthatit has consistently honoredits
financialobligationsto theSulu heirsforthelease ofSabah and is prepared
to negotiatewiththemdirectly, withoutPhilippinegovernment interven-
tion,emphasizingthatthemattersolelyconcernsitselfand theheirsofthe
Sultan of Sulu. The currentdescendantof the Sultan still receives
M$5,000 (US$2,008) a yearas partofthecessionof71,110squarekilome-
ters leased in perpetuityto the Britishcompanyin the nineteenth cen-
tury.25

25. Far EasternEconomicReview,3 December1987,p. 24.