Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil.

115 among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities
and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial of liquidation.
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the police power. It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope,
constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
liberty and property without due process of law; it violates international expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
Constitution. boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so
Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by
and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public
are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or
or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process
are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are clause and the equal protection clause.
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
1
class and those who do not. prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from
use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
applied. entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal subsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police the police power of the State.
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]
basis for said distinction.
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control;
Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures
Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as
its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act,
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
2
collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program.
industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
before the Supreme Court. farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on
August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by
Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to
( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional. provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land
Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131,
sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229,
protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the
welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the
within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to
raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive
with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by
rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order
from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
be constitutional. agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian  Reform The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to
6 11 2010 be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not
solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of
their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
“Equal Protection”
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong
Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also

3
suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share
the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the
burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals
on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular 22 11 2010
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the
Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar Police Power
to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
requirements:
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their
individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
 
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
4
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,  particularly, its check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department
Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a measure which would only against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous
individuals and agencies. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang  Pilipino
23 11 2010
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of Quezon City enacted an ordinance  entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to The law basically provides that  at least six (6) percent of the total area of
elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
police power of the State.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is
no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
debt.
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking

5
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
burden to private cemeteries.
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio
22 11 2010 (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

Police Power (6) must not be unreasonable.

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was Gudani vs. Senga
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it Political Law, E.O. 464
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering FACTS:
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers
Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking
that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the
Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. several senior officers of the military to appear at
a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an
audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate and then Commission on Elections
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of th e 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the had been designated as commander, and Col.
following substantive requirements: Balutan a member, of ³Joint Task Force Ranao´ by the AFP Southern

6
Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.)
Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers als o 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. ³enjoined
received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to officials of the executive department including the military establishment
attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
invitation from Sen. Biazon.
Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President
Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a enjoining them and other military officers from
Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. testifying before Congress without the President¶s consent. Petitioners
Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. also pray for injunctive relief against a pending
Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court
the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers -martial proceedings, initiated within the military
to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gud ani justice system in connection with petitioners¶ violation of the
and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority aforementioned directive.
addressed to the PMA Superintendent.
The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military
However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per discipline on account of their defiance of a direct
instruction from the President that NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. ` order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the ISSUE:
office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee ³in spite of the fact t hat a Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP
guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought
prior to such an appearance;´ that such directive was ³in keeping with the PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY
time[ - ]honored principle of the Chain of Command;´ and that the two
officers ³disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65
(Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is
General Court Martial proceedings x x x´ Both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. unconstitutional?

HELD:

7
 judicial order to compel the attendance of the milita ry officer. Final judicial
The Petition is dismissed. orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of
Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent
the armed forces from testifying before a military officers from testifying before Congress do es
not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive¶s power as
legislative inquiry? commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President¶s prerogatives as
Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
presidential approval before appearing before same limitations as in e xecutive privilege. The commander-in-chief
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section
The impression is wrong. The ability of the 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that ³[t]he
President to require a military official to secure prior consent before President shall be the Commander -in-Chief of all armed
appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations,
independent specie of presidential authority²the commander-in-chief such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
powers of the President. By tradition and commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief,
jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not absolute authority over the persons and
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as actions of the members of the armed forces. Suc h authority includes the
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue
be sanctioned under civilian law.
of her power as commander -in-chief, and that as

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col.

a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
Kapunan was ordered confined under ³house arrest´
military justice. At the same time, we also hold
by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also
that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military
ordered, as a condition for his house arrest,
officer against the consent of the President has
that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military
during his p eriod of detention. The Court
official whom Congress summons to testify before it
unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by

8
³« to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the Again, the ex igencies of military discipline and the chain of command
effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its dutie s under the law depends to mandate that the President¶s ability to control the individual members of
a large extent on the maint enance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer
lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be is torn between obeying the President and obeying t he Senate, the Court
faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on p After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
etitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.´ Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier¶s Judicial relief as re medy:
speech be with the consent and approval of the
military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to rest rain The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress
desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional to interfere with the President¶s power as commander-in-chief, it is
provision or military indoctrination will elimin ate similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress¶s
a soldier¶s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vit al that right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.
military torn by political strife is incapable of
fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the
State. For another, it is ruinous to military constitutional scope and limitations on the
discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry,
dissent against the President, the commander -in- ³with process to enforce it,´ is grounded on the
chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information
President they may dislike or distrust. Even possessed by executive officials on the operation of
petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
permission from their superiors before they could travel reasoning, Congress has the right to that
to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing. information and the power to compel th e disclosure thereof.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court¶s
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander -in- Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to
chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. the public officials concerned, or to any person
9
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the
the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise jurisdiction of the court -martial, considering his
retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth
establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with military law as, among others, ³al l officers and soldiers in the active service
the Senate or House¶s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily of the [AFP],´ and points out that he is no
implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an be outside the jurisdiction of military aut horities when military justice
imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill proceedings were initiated against him before the
of Rights. termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated.
In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket
prohibition barring executive officials from Gudani vs. Senga
testifying before Congress without the President¶s consent G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006
notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify
such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch¶s
assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts,
 The ability of the President to prevent military officers from
as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege,
conclusiveness, attendance or non -attendance but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to
in legislative inquiries. control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial
review, to arbitrate disputes betwe en the legislative
and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional
FACTS:
parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule,
the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP,
authorize the appearance of the milita ry officers including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of
notion of officers appearing before the legislature to the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the “Hello
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final Garci” tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
orders of the courts. Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from
10
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds.
officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from
subsequently declared unconstitutional. testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
ISSUE: speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in
 Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from executive privilege.
testifying at a legislative inquiry
RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
RULING: Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-
of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Remedy is judicial relief

Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the
Congress is based on Commander-in-chief powers military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The
Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for

11
Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on
to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution
consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.
actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality
which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander- Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160),
in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of
eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance,
government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The
case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local
persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is
Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails
considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as
a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - City of Manila v. Chinese Community
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919]
executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to
its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October
1919]
by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel
obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
First Division, Johnson (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in

the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION [292 SCRA (extension of Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be
676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998] expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The

12
Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] alleged in Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may
its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by be expropriated for the construction of a public improvement.
virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the
benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides
Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described that the city (Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The
in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary Charter of the city of Manila, however, contains no procedure by which the
or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190 provides for how right of
existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides that
public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or
other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the City’s purposes, private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property
at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by Section
dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
question had been used by the Chinese Community for cemetery municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine
that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for
places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the
the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing cemetery in question is public (a cemetery used by the general community,
monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would or neighborhood, or church) and seems to have been established under
create irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese Community and to all governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an order
those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public
would have to be destroyed; that the City was without right or authority to use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street general authority. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in
purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of
improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last
and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative
was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. While cemeteries and
husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the
answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still
presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even
Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places,
necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and under such circumstances, should be violated.
all of the defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado,
et. al.) from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]
costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

13
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law be heard.

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others
that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-
shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the 20620, 15 August 1974]
owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with
the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974]
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public
En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 7 concur, 4 took no part
plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others
that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public
plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda.
the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de
with the construction of the building without a permit, because they Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year).
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP
ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the
contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956,
informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to
subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the
property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive occupancy. The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would
comfort and happiness of residents. be recommended to the President. Castellvi then brought suit in the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the Philippine
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against
in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the
their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the
best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the

14
Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property must
market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property
lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property
take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues beneficial enjoyment of the property. The “taking” of Castellvi’s property
thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place
possession of the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the thereof. Two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the
parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation
on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2)
recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. The “taking’
and/or reconsideration, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when
filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied on 12 the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and
July 1961. The Republic’s record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not
December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation”
court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court
On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a “motion to strike out the order of has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
27 December 1961 and for reconsideration”, and subsequently an coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or
amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo- takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
order, stating that “in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court,” and at the possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10
same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal August 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be
dated 19 November 1962, the trial court approved the Republic’s record reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was
on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun filed.
did not appeal.
Phil. Press Institute, Inc. v. Comelec
Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 244 SCRA 272
1959.

Held: A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must
15
a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Commission on Elections is valid.
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-
without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and
1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of
camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally,
PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print
expression. media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such,
Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the
behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an
does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print actual, justiciable case or controversy.
space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution.
According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement
of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such
space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's
utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however,
the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
Comelec over the communication and information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a
fair, impartial and credible election.

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