Abbasid Revolution

The Abbasid Revolution, also called the Movement of the

Men of the Black Raiment,[2] was the overthrow of the
Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE), the second of the four
major Caliphates in early Islamic history, by the third, the
Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE). Coming to power three
decades after the death of the Muslim prophet Muhammad
and immediately after the Rashidun Caliphate, the
Umayyads were a feudal Arab empire ruling over a popula‐
tion which was overwhelmingly non-Arab as well as primar‐
ily non-Muslim. Non-Arabs were treated as second-class
citizens regardless of whether or not they converted to
Islam, and this discontent cutting across faiths and ethnici‐
ties ultimately led to the Umayyads' overthrow.[3] The
Abbasid family claimed to have descended from al-Abbas,
an uncle of the Prophet.
 Abbasid Revolution

Date June 9, 747 – July, 750

Location Greater Khorasan and present day Iran and Iraq

Result Abbasid victory

Abbasid appropriation of most former Umayyad

territory
Eventual establishment of the Emirate of Córdoba
End of privileged status for Arabs
End of official discrimination against non-Arabs

Belligerents

Abbasids Umayyad Caliphate

Support Support
Shia Muslims[1] Tribal Arabs
Non-Arab Sunni Muslims
Kharijites
Middle Eastern Christians
Mizrahi Jews
Zoroastrian Iranians
Indian and Afghan
Buddhists

Commanders and leaders

Abu Muslim Khorasani Marwan II
Qahtaba ibn Shabib al-Ta'i † Nasr ibn Sayyar †
Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba Yazid ibn Umar
Abdallah ibn Ali Ma'n ibn Za'ida al-Shaybani
The revolution essentially marked the end of the Arab em‐
pire and the beginning of a more inclusive, multiethnic state
in the Middle East.[4] Remembered as one of the most well-
organized revolutions during its period in history, it reori‐
ented the focus of the Muslim world to the east.[5]

Background
By the 740s, the Umayyad Empire found itself in critical con‐
dition. A dispute over succession in 744 led to the Third
Muslim Civil War, which raged across the Middle East for
two years. The very next year, al-Dahhak ibn Qays al-
Shaybani initiated a Kharijite rebellion that would continue
until 746. Concurrent with this, a rebellion broke out in reac‐
tion to Marwan II's decision to move the capital from
Damascus to Harran, resulting in the destruction of Homs –
also in 746. It was not until 747 that Marwan II was able to
pacify the provinces; the Abbasid Revolution began within
months.[6]

Nasr ibn Sayyar was appointed governor of Khurusan by

Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik in 738. He held on to his post
throughout the civil war, being confirmed as governor by
Marwan II in the aftermath.[6]

Khurusan's expansive size and low population density

meant that the Arab denizens – both military and civilian –
lived largely outside of the garrisons built during the spread
of Islam. This was in contrast to the rest of the Umayyad
provinces, where Arabs tended to seclude themselves in
fortresses and avoided interaction with the locals.[7] Arab
settlers in Khorasan left their traditional lifestyle and settled
among the native Iranian peoples.[6] While intermarriage
with Arabs elsewhere in the Empire was discouraged or
even banned,[8][9] it slowly became a habit within eastern
Khorasan; as the Arabs began adopting Persian dress and
the two languages influenced one another, the ethnic barri‐
ers came down.[10]

Causes
Support for the Abbasid Revolution came from people of di‐
verse backgrounds, with almost all levels of society sup‐
porting armed opposition to Umayyad rule.[11] This was es‐
pecially pronounced among Muslims of non-Arab descent,
[12][13][14] though even Arab Muslims resented Umayyad rule
and centralized authority over their nomadic lifestyles.[13][15]
Both Sunnis and Shias supported efforts to overthrow the
Umayyads,[11][12][14][16][17] as did non-Muslim subjects of the
empire who resented religious discrimination.[18]

Discontent among Shia Muslims Edit

Remn
rious
Following the Battle of Karbala which led to the massacre of
Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad, and his kin and
companions by the Umayyad army in 680 CE, the Shias
used this event as a rallying cry of opposition against the
Umayyads. The Abbasids also used the memory of Karbala
extensively to gain popular support against the
Umayyads.[20]

The Hashimiyya movement (a sub-sect of the Kaysanites

Shia) were largely responsible for starting the final efforts
against the Umayyad dynasty,[6] initially with the goal of re‐
placing the Umayyads with an Alid ruling family.[21][22] To an
extent, rebellion against the Umayyads bore an early associ‐
ation with Shi'ite ideas.[15][23] A number of Shi'ite revolts
against Umayyad rule had already taken place, though they
were open about their desire for an Alid ruler. Zayd ibn Ali
fought the Umayyads in Iraq, while Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya
even established temporary rule over Persia. Their murder
not only increased anti-Umayyad sentiment among the Shia,
but also gave both Shias and Sunnis in Iraq and Persia a
common rallying cry.[17] At the same time, the capture and
murder of the primary Shi'ite opposition figures rendered
the Abbasids as the only realistic contenders for the void
that would be left by the Umayyads.[24]

The Abbasids kept quiet about their identity, simply stating

that they wanted a ruler from the descendant of
Muhammad upon whose choice as caliph the Muslim com‐
munity would agree.[25][26] Many Shi'ites naturally assumed
that this meant an Alid ruler, a belief which the Abbasids
tacitly encouraged to gain Shi'ite support.[27] Though the
Abbasids were members of the Banu Hashim clan, rivals of
the Umayyads, the word "Hashimiyya" seems to refer specif‐
ically to Abd-Allah ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, a
grandson of Ali and son of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah.

According to certain traditions, Abd-Allah died in 717 in

Humeima in the house of Mohammad ibn Ali Abbasi, the
head of the Abbasid family, and before dying named
Muhammad ibn Ali as his successor.[28] Although the anec‐
dote is considered a fabrication,[24] at the time it allowed the
Abbasids to rally the supporters of the failed revolt of
Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, who had represented themselves as the
supporters of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. By the time the
revolution was in full swing, most Kaysanite Shia had either
transferred their allegiance to the Abbasid dynasty (in the
case of the Hashimiyya),[29][30] or had converted to other
branches of Shi'ism and the Kaysanites ceased to exist.[31]

Discontent among Sunni Muslims who were non-

Arab
Edit

The Umayyad state is remembered as an Arab-centric state,

being run by and for the benefit of those who were ethni‐
cally Arab though Muslim in creed.[13][32] The non-Arab
Muslims resented their marginal social position and were
easily drawn into Abbasid opposition to Umayyad rule.[15]
[16][28] Arabs dominated the bureaucracy and military, and
were housed in fortresses separate from the local popula‐
tion outside of Arabia.[7] Even after converting to Islam, non-
Arabs or Mawali could not live in these garrison cities. The
non-Arabs were not allowed to work for the government nor
could they hold officer positions in the Umayyad military
and they still had to pay the jizya tax for non-Muslims.[32][33]
[34][35] Non-Muslims under Umayyad rule were subject to
these same injunctions.[36] Racial intermarriage between
Arabs and non Arabs was rare.[8] When it did occur, it was
only allowed between an Arab man and a non-Arab woman
while non-Arab men were generally not free to marry Arab
women.[9]

Conversion to Islam occurred gradually. If a non-Arab

wished to convert to Islam, they not only had to give up their
own names but also had to remain a second-class citizen.
[14][34] The non-Arab would be "adopted" by an Arab tribe,[35]
though they would not actually adopt the tribe's name as
that would risk pollution of perceived Arab racial purity.
Rather, the non-Arab would take the last name of "freedman
of al-(tribe's name)", even if they were not a slave prior to
conversion. This essentially meant they were subservient to
the tribe who sponsored their conversion.[14][37]

Although converts to Islam made up roughly 10% of the na‐

tive population – most of the people living under Umayyad
rule were not Muslim – this percent was significant due to
the very small number of Arabs.[13] Gradually, the non-Arab
Muslims outnumbered the Arab Muslims, causing alarm
among the Arab nobility.[32] Socially, this posed a problem
as the Umayyads viewed Islam as the property of the aristo‐
cratic Arab families.[38][39] There was a rather large financial
problem posed to the Umayyad system as well. If the new
converts to Islam from non-Arab peoples stopped paying
the jizya tax stipulated by the Qur'an for non-Muslims, the
empire would go bankrupt. This lack of civil and political
rights eventually led the non-Arab Muslims to support the
Abbasids, despite the latter also being Arab.[40]

Even as the Arab governors adopted the more sophisticated

Iranian methods of governmental administration, non-Arabs
were still prevented from holding such positions.[8] Non-
Arabs were not even allowed to wear Arabian style
clothing,[41] so strong were the feelings of Arab racial supe‐
riority cultivated by the Umayyads. Much of the discontent
this caused led to the Shu'ubiyya movement, an assertion of
non-Arab racial and cultural equality with Arabs. The move‐
ment gained support among Egyptians, Arameans and
Berber people,[42] though this movement was most pro‐
nounced among Iranian people.

Repression of Iranian culture Edit

Coinage depicting Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan

The early Muslim conquest of Persia was coupled with an

anti-Iranian Arabization policy which led to much
discontent.[43] The controversial Umayyad governor Al-Hajjaj
ibn Yusuf was upset at the usage of Persian as the court
language in the eastern Islamic empire, and ordered all writ‐
ten and spoken Persian to be suppressed in both govern‐
ment and even among the general public, by force if
necessary.[44][45] Contemporary historians record that al-
Hajjaj contributed to the death of the Khwarezmian
language, closely related to Persian. Once the Umayyads ex‐
panded into Khwarezm, a stronghold of east Iranian civiliza‐
tion, al-Hajjaj ordered the execution of anyone who could
read or write the language, to the point that only the illiterate
remained.[46]

Discontent among non-Muslims Edit

Support for the Abbasid Revolution was an early example of

people of different faiths aligning with a common cause.
This was due in large part to policies of the Umayyads
which were regarded as particularly oppressive to anyone
following a faith other than Islam. In 741, the Umayyads de‐
creed that non-Muslims could not serve in government
posts.[47] The Abbasids were aware of this discontent, and
made efforts to balance both its Muslim character as well
as its partially non-Muslim constituency.[48]

Persecution of Zoroastrians was part of state policy during

the Umayyad era. Al-Hajjaj allegedly killed all Zoroastrian
clergy upon the conquest of east Iranian lands, burning all
Zoroastrian literature and destroying most religious
buildings.[46] The non-Muslim aristocracy around Merv sup‐
ported the Abbasids, and thus retained their status as a
privileged governing class regardless of religious belief.[15]

Events

Buildup Edit

Beginning around 719, Hashimiyya missions began to seek

adherents in Khurasan. Their campaign was framed as one
of proselytism. They sought support for "a member of the
House of the Prophet who shall be pleasing to everyone",[49]
without making explicit mention of the Abbasids.[27][50]
These missions met with success both among Arabs and
non-Arabs, although the latter may have played a particu‐
larly important role in the growth of the movement. A num‐
ber of Shi'ite rebellions – by Kaysanites, Hashimiyya and
mainstream Shi'ites – took place in the final years of
Umayyad rule, just around the same time that tempers were
flaring among the Syrian contingents of the Umayyad army
regarding alliances and wrongdoings during the
Second[34][51] and Third Fitna.[52]

At this time Kufa was the center for the opposition to

Umayyad rule, particularly Ali's supporters and Shias. In
741–42 Abu Muslim made his first contact with Abbasid
agents there, and eventually he was introduced to the head
of Abbasids, Imam Ibrahim, in Mecca. Around 746, Abu
Muslim assumed leadership of the Hashimiyya in
Khurasan.[53] Unlike the Alid revolts which were open and
straightforward about their demands, the Abbasids along
with the Hashimite allies slowly built up an underground re‐
sistance movement to Umayyad rule. Secret networks were
used to build a power base of support in the eastern Muslim
lands to ensure the revolution's success.[23][51] This buildup
not only took place right on the heels of the Zaydi Revolt in
Iraq, but also concurrently with the Berber Revolt in Iberia
and Maghreb, the Ibadi rebellion in Yemen and Hijaz,[54] and
the Third Fitna in the Levant, with the revolt of al-Harith ibn
Surayj in Khurasan and Central Asia occurring concurrently
with the revolution itself.[13][14] The Abbasids spent their
preparation time watching as the Umayyad Empire was be‐
sieged from within itself in all four cardinal directions,[55]
and School of Oriental and African Studies Professor
Emeritus G. R. Hawting has asserted that even if the
Umayyad rulers had been aware of the Abbasids' prepara‐
tions, it would not have been possible to mobilize against
them.[6]

Revolt of Ibn Surayj Edit

In 746, Ibn Surayj began his revolt at Merv without success

at first, even losing his secretary Jahm bin Safwan.[56] After
joining forces with other rebel factions, Ibn Surayj drove
Umayyad governor Nasr ibn Sayyar and his forces to
Nishapur; the two factions double-crossed each other
shortly thereafter, with Ibn Surayj's faction being crushed.
Western Khorasan was controlled by Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya
at the time, cutting Ibn Sayyar in the east off from Marwan
II. In the summer of 747, Ibn Sayyar sued for peace, which
was accepted by the remaining rebels. The rebel leader was
assassinated by a son of Ibn Surayj in a revenge attack
while at the same time, another Shi'ite revolt had begun in
the villages. The son of the remaining rebels signed the
peace accord and Ibn Sayyar returned to his post in Merv in
August of 747[56] – just after Abu Muslim initiated a revolt
of his own.

Khorasan phase Edit

On June 9, 747 (Ramadan 25, 129AH), Abu Muslim success‐

fully initiated an open revolt against Umayyad rule,[13][57]
which was carried out under the sign of the Black Standard.
[53][58][59] Close to 10,000 soldiers were under Abu Muslim's
command when the hostilities officially began in Merv.[5] On
February 14, 748 he established control of Merv,[56] ex‐
pelling Nasr ibn Sayyar less than a year after the latter had
put down Ibn Surayj's revolt, and dispatched an army
westwards.[53][58][60]

Newly commissioned Abbasid officer Qahtaba ibn Shabib

al-Ta'i, along with his sons Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba and
Humayd ibn Qahtaba, pursued Ibn Sayyar to Nishapur and
then pushed him further west to Qumis, in western Iran.[61]
That August, al-Ta'i defeated an Umayyad force of 10,000 at
Gorgan. Ibn Sayyar regrouped with reinforcements from the
Caliph at Rey, only for that city to fall as well as the Caliph's
commander; once again, Ibn Sayyar fled west and died on
December 9, 748 while trying to reach Hamedan.[61] Al-Ta'i
rolled west through Khorasan, defeating a 50,000 strong
Umayyad force at Isfahan in March 749.

At Nahavand, the Umayyads attempted to make their last

stand in Khorasan. Umayyad forces fleeing Hamedan and
the remainder of Ibn Sayyar's men joined with those already
garrisoned.[61] Qahtaba defeated an Umayyad relief contin‐
gent from Syria while his son al-Hasan laid siege to
Nahavand for more than two months. The Umayyad military
units from Syria within the garrison cut a deal with the
Abbasids, saving their own lives by selling out the Umayyad
units from Khorasan who were all put to death.[61] After al‐
most ninety years, Umayyad rule in Khorasan had finally
come to an end.

At the same time that al-Ta'i took Nishapur, Abu Muslim was
strengthening the Abbasid grip on the Muslim far east.
Abbasid governors were appointed over Transoxiana and
Bactria, while the rebels who had signed a peace accord
with Nasr ibn Sayyar were also offered a peace deal by Abu
Muslim only to be double crossed and wiped out.[61] With
the pacification of any rebel elements in the east and the
surrender of Nahavand in the west, the Abbasids were the
undisputed rulers of Khorasan.

Mesopotamia phase Edit

Folio from the records of Balami depicting As-Saffah as he receives pledges

of allegiance in Kufa

The Abbasids wasted no time in continuing from Khorosan

into Mesopotamia. In August 749, Umayyad commander
Yazid ibn Umar al-Fazari attempted to meet the forces of al-
Ta'i before they could reach Kufa. Not to be outdone, the
Abbasids launched a nighttime raid on al-Fazari's forces be‐
fore they had a chance to prepare. During the raid, al-Ta'i
himself was finally killed in battle. Despite the loss, al-Fazari
was routed and fled with his forces to Wasit.[62] The Siege
of Wasit took place from that August until July 750.
Although a respected military commander had been lost, a
large portion of the Umayyad forces were essentially
trapped inside Wasit and could be left in their virtual prison
while more offensive military actions were made.[63]

Concurrently with the siege in 749, the Abbasids crossed

the Euphrates and took Kufa.[34][58] The son of Khalid al-
Qasri – a disgraced Umayyad official who had been tortured
to death a few years prior – began a pro-Abbasid riot start‐
ing at the city's citadel. On September 2, 749, al-Hasan bin
Qahtaba essentially just walked right in to the city and set
up shop.[63] Some confusion followed when Abu Salama, an
Abbasid officer, pushed for an Alid leader. Abu Muslim's
confidante Abu Jahm reported what was happening, and
the Abbasids acted preemptively. On Friday, November 28,
749, before the siege of Wasit had even finished, As-Saffah,
the great-grandson of Muhammad's uncle, al-Abbas, was
recognized as the new caliph in the mosque at Kufa.[53][64]
Abu Salama, who witnessed twelve military commanders
from the revolution pledging allegiance, was embarrassed
into following suit.[63]

Just as quickly as Qahtaba's forces marched from

Khorosan to Kufa, so did the forces of Abdallah ibn Ali and
Abu Awn Abd al-Malik ibn Yazid march on Mosul.[63] At this
point Marwan II mobilized his troops from Harran and ad‐
vanced toward Mesopotamia. On January 16, 750 the two
forces met on the left bank of a tributary of the Tigris in the
Battle of the Zab, and nine days later Marwan II was de‐
feated and his army was completely destroyed.[14][34][63][65]
The battle is regarded as what finally sealed the fate of the
Umayyads. All Marwan II could do was flee through Syria
and into Egypt, with each Umayyad town surrendering to the
Abbasids as they swept through in pursuit.[63]

Damascus fell to the Abbasids in April, and in August

Marwan II and his family were tracked down by a small
force led by Abu Awn and Salih ibn Ali (the brother of
Abdallah ibn Ali) and killed in Egypt.[14][34][53][59][65] Al-Fazari,
the Umayyad commander at Wasit, held out even after the
defeat of Marwan II in January. The Abbasids promised him
amnesty in July, but immediately after he exited the fortress
they executed him instead. After almost exactly three years
of rebellion, the Umayyad state came to an end.[13][22]

Tactics

Ethnic equality Edit

Militarily, the unit organization of the Abbasids was de‐

signed with the goal of ethnic and racial equality among
supporters. When Abu Muslim recruited mixed Arab and
Iranian officers along the Silk Road, he registered them
based not on their tribal or ethno-national affiliations but on
their current places of residence.[57] This greatly diminished
tribal and ethnic solidarity and replaced both concepts with
a sense of shared interests among individuals.[57]

Propaganda Edit

The Abbasid Revolution provides an early medieval example

of the effectiveness of propaganda. The Black Standard un‐
furled at the start of the revolution's open phase carried
messianic overtones due to past failed rebellions by mem‐
bers of Muhammad's family, with marked eschatological
and millennial slants.[5] The Abbasids – their leaders de‐
scended from Muhammad's uncle Al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-
Muttalib – held vivid historical reenactments of the murder
of Muhammad's grandson Husayn ibn Ali by the army of the
second Umayyad ruler Yazid I, followed by promises of
retribution.[5] Focus was carefully placed on the legacy of
Muhammad's family while details of how the Abbasids actu‐
ally intended to rule were not mentioned.[66] While the
Umayyads had primarily spent their energy on wiping out
the Alid line of the prophetic family, the Abbasids carefully
revised Muslim chronicles to put a heavier emphasis on the
relationship between Muhammad and his uncle.[66]

The Abbasids spent more than a year preparing their propa‐

ganda drive against the Umayyads. There were a total of
seventy propagandists throughout the province of
Khorasan, operating under twelve central officials.[67]

Secrecy Edit

The Abbasid Revolution was distinguished by a number of

tactics which were absent in the other, unsuccessful anti-
Umayyad rebellions at the time. Chief among them was se‐
crecy. While the Shi'ite and other rebellions at the time were
all led by publicly known leaders making clear and well-
defined demands, the Abbasids hid not only their identities
but also their preparation and mere existence.[51][68] As-
Saffah would go on to become the first Abbasid caliph, but
he did not come forward to receive the pledge of allegiance
from the people until after the Umayyad caliph and a large
number of his princes were already killed.[11]

Abu Muslim al-Khorasani, who was the primary Abbasid mil‐

itary commander, was especially mysterious; even his name,
which literally means "father of a Muslim from the large, flat
area of the eastern Muslim empire" gave no meaningful in‐
formation about him personally.[67] Even today, although
scholars are sure he was one real, consistent individual,
there is broad agreement that all concrete suggestions of
his actual identity are doubtful.[53] Abu Muslim himself dis‐
couraged inquiries about his origins, emphasizing that his
religion and place of residence were all that mattered.[67]

Whoever he was, Abu Muslim built a secret network of pro-

Abbasid sentiment based among the mixed Arab and
Iranian military officers along the Silk Road garrison cities.
Through this networking, Abu Muslim ensured armed sup‐
port for the Abbasids from a multi-ethnic force years before
the revolution even came out in the open.[23] These net‐
works proved essential, as the officers garrisoned along the
Silk Road had spent years fighting the ferocious Turkic
tribes of Central Asia and were experienced and respected
tacticians and warriors.[60]

Aftermath

National borders in the region by 800AD

The victors desecrated the tombs of the Umayyads in Syria,

sparing only that of Umar II, and most of the remaining
members of the Umayyad family were tracked down and
killed.[11][34] When Abbasids declared amnesty for members
of the Umayyad family, eighty gathered in Jaffa to receive
pardons and all were massacred.[69]

In the immediate aftermath, the Abbasids moved to consoli‐

date their power against former allies now seen as rivals.[11]
Five years after the revolution succeeded, Abu Muslim was
accused of heresy and treason by the second Abbasid
caliph al-Mansur. Abu Muslim was executed at the palace in
755 despite his reminding al-Mansur that it was he (Abu
Muslim) who got the Abbasids into power,[18][22][60] and his
travel companions were bribed into silence. Displeasure
over the caliph's brutality as well as admiration for Abu
Muslim led to rebellions against the Abbasid Dynasty itself
throughout Khorasan and Kurdistan.[22][70]

Although Shi'ites were key to the revolution's success,

Abbasid attempts to claim orthodoxy in light of Umayyad
material excess led to continued persecution of Shi'ites.
[12][15] On the other hand, non-Muslims regained the govern‐
ment posts they had lost under the Umayyads.[12] Jews,
Nestorian Christians, Zoroastrians and even Buddhists were
re-integrated into a more cosmopolitan empire centered
around the new, ethnically and religiously diverse city of
Baghdad.[5][35][48]

The Abbasids were essentially puppets of secular rulers

starting from 950,[11][16] though their lineage as nominal
caliphs continued until 1258 when the Mongol hordes killed
the last Abbasid caliph in Baghdad.[13][16] The period of ac‐
tual, direct rule by the Abbasids lasted almost exactly two-
hundred years.[71]

One grandson of Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, Abd ar-Rahman I,

survived and established a kingdom in Al-Andalus (Moorish
Iberia) after five years of travel westward.[13][14][34] Over the
course of thirty years, he ousted the ruling Fihrids and re‐
sisted Abbasid incursions to establish the Emirate of
Córdoba.[72][73] This is considered an extension of the
Umayyad Dynasty, and ruled from Cordoba from 756 until
1031.[12][32]

Legacy
The Abbasid Revolution has been of great interest to both
Western and Muslim historians.[58] According to State
University of New York professor of sociology Saïd Amir
Arjomand, analytical interpretations of the revolution are
rare, with most discussions simply lining up behind either
the Iranic or Arabic interpretation of events.[4] Frequently,
early European historians viewed the conflict solely as a
non-Arab uprising against Arabs. Bernard Lewis, professor
emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University,
points out that while the revolution has often been charac‐
terized as a Persian victory and Arab defeat, the caliph was
still Arab, the language of administration was still Arabic
and Arab nobility was not forced to give up its land holdings;
rather, the Arabs were merely forced to share the fruits of
the empire equally with other races.[58]
Al-Ukhaidir Fortress, an early example of Abbasid architecture

C.W. Previté-Orton argues that the reasons for the decline of

the Umayyads was the rapid expansion of Islam. During the
Umayyad period, mass conversions brought Iranians,
Berbers, Copts, and Assyrians to Islam. These "clients," as
the Arabs referred to them, were often better educated and
more civilised than their Arab masters. The new converts,
on the basis of equality of all Muslims, transformed the po‐
litical landscape. Previté-Orton also argues that the feud be‐
tween the Arabs in Syria and the Arabs in Mesopotamia fur‐
ther weakened the empire.[74]

The revolution led to the enfranchisement of non-Arab peo‐

ple who had converted to Islam, granting them social and
spiritual equality with Arabs.[75] With social restrictions re‐
moved, Islam changed from an Arab ethnic empire to a uni‐
versal world religion.[35] This led to a great cultural and sci‐
entific exchange known as the Islamic Golden Age, with
most achievements taking place under the Abbasids. What
was later known as Islamic civilization and culture was de‐
fined by the Abbasids, rather than the earlier Rashidun and
Umayyad caliphates.[16][35][48] New ideas in all areas of soci‐
ety were accepted regardless of their geographic origin, and
the emergence of societal institutions that were Islamic
rather than Arab began. Though a class of Muslim clergy
was absent for the first century of Islam, it was with the
Abbasid Revolution and after that the Ulama appeared as a
force in society, positioning themselves as the arbiters of
justice and orthodoxy.[75]

With the eastward movement of the capital from Damascus

to Baghdad, the Abbasid Empire eventually took on a dis‐
tinctly Persian character, as opposed to the Arab character
of the Umayyads.[15] Rulers became increasingly autocratic,
at times claiming divine right in defense of their actions.[15]

Historiography
An accurate and comprehensive history of the revolution
has proven difficult to compile for a number of reasons.
There are no contemporary accounts, and most sources
were written more than a century after the revolution.[76][77]
Because most historical sources were written under
Abbasid rule, the description of the Umayyads must be
taken with a grain of salt;[76][78] such sources describe the
Umayyads, at best, as merely placeholders between the
Rashidun and Abbasid Caliphates.[79]

The historiography of the revolution is especially significant

due to Abbasid dominance of most early Muslim historical
narratives;[77][80] it was during their rule that history was es‐
tablished in the Muslim world as an independent field sepa‐
rate from writing in general.[81] The initial two-hundred year
period when the Abbasids actually held de facto power over
the Muslim world coincided with the first composition of
Muslim history.[71] Another point of note is that while the
Abbasid Revolution carried religious undertones against the
irreligious and almost secular Umayyads, a separation of
mosque and state occurred under the Abbasids as well.
Historiographical surveys often focus on the solidifying of
Muslim thought and rites under the Abbasids, with the con‐
flicts between separated classes of rulers and clerics giving
rise to the empire's eventual separation of religion and
politics.[82]

See also
Arab–Byzantine wars
Muslim conquest of the Maghreb

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Further reading
Blankinship, Khalid Yahya (1994). The End of the Jihâd
State: The Reign of Hishām ibn ʻAbd al-Malik and the
Collapse of the Umayyads . Albany, New York: State
University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-1827-7.
 Daniel, Elton L. (1979). The Political and Social History of
Khurasan under Abbasid Rule, 747–820. Minneapolis and
Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, Inc. ISBN 0-88297-025-9.
Hourani, Albert, History of the Arab Peoples
Kennedy, Hugh N. (2004). The Prophet and the Age of the
Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the 6th to the 11th
Century (Second ed.). Harlow, UK: Pearson Education
Ltd. ISBN 0-582-40525-4.
Shaban, M. A. (1979). The ʿAbbāsid Revolution .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ISBN 0-521-29534-3.
Sharon, Moshe (1990). Revolt: the social and military
aspects of the ʿAbbāsid revolution . Jerusalem: Graph
Press Ltd. ISBN 965-223-388-9.

External links
Abbasid Calipahte Bibliography at Oxford Bibliographies
The Rise and Spread of Islam

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